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Abstract

The study focuses on the understanding and influence of power in the context of the Brazilian campaign for a permanent seat in the UNSC. The study contains different related objectives. The main focus is an analysis of the recent phase of the Brazilian campaign which is framed as 2014, and to provide qualitative depth the Argentinean opposition towards Brazil in 2014 will also be included. It is also an objective of the study to conceptualize power into applicable analytical tools, and thus the analysis revolves around these concepts, as means of interpreting the two states' understanding and construction of power.

The study is a discourse analysis and the conceptualizations of power are based on Foucauldian notions of governmentalities. The aim of this approach is to provide the field of IR with answers, based on unconventional methods, and thus promote the use of discourse analyses as ways of looking at power in international relations.

The study should be of interest to the researcher/student that seeks information about how the understanding of power functions and influences agency within the United Nations, and more specifically the United Nations Security Council. The theoretical and methodological framework also provides interesting and new approaches to how analyses of power can be conducted, mainly because the analytical tools are created uniquely for this study, with the expectation that they can be applied in other studies as well.

The structure of the analysis is based on the discourse analytical methods of Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, with Political Discourse Analysis tool and a focus on Discourse and Ideology added to further test and validate the results.

The data corpus consist of nine documents taken mainly from the official United Nations electronic database, and these have been selected with the context of the Brazilian and Argentinean positions regarding a United Nations Security Council reform in mind. This means that also the agency of BRICS, G4 and UfC are represented in the data corpus.

Brazil and Argentina independently and as parts of the groupings BRICS and G4 (Brazil) and UfC (Argentina) promotes the need for a more efficient Security Council, and this occurs both via constructions of the two actors being economical and democratic role models, and via juxtaposing of different international conflicts and connecting these to the lack of Security Council reform. Both Argentina and Brazil constructs the need for a reform in their discursive actions, and it seems as if Argentina opposes Brazil by trying to influence the general reform debate, whereas Brazil react towards opposition by labeling the Argentinean agency as ineffective and anti-United Nations.

The study shows that both Brazil and Argentina apply the same western democratic and liberal discourse to promote their opposing agenda's. Other results of the analysis have led to the challenging of IR hypotheses, and thus fulfill the projections of adding knowledge to the field of IR.

The theoretical dimension of the study is proven worthy of further application in study's of power and agency in the international arena, and we encourage the further refinement of the applied Foucault inspired approach, perhaps as a way to study meta-discursive transformations in the UN.

Introduction

Brazil's campaign for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was officially launched in 2004 at the United Nations' (UN) 59th General Assembly (GA)¹ via a draft resolution² proposed to the GA by 'The Group of Four' (G4) (Brazil, Japan, Germany and India). The resolution included the call for the addition of six permanent seats (including 1 for each G4 member) to the current five (out of 15 seats total) in the UNSC. The resolution also called for the addition of four non permanent seats.

This study seeks to analyze a recent phase, 2014, of Brazil's official³ campaign within the UN for a permanent seat in the UNSC. To widen the empirical scope and to add further contextual depth, the study will include the agency of Argentina within the UN, in relation to Brazil's campaign for a UNSC seat. Argentina's position on this matter can be documented both in Argentina's Latin American concerns⁴ and in Argentina's membership of the 'Uniting for Consensus group' (UfC).⁵ An analysis of Argentina's agency regarding its opposition towards Brazil's claim for a permanent UNSC seat will make the study relevant for the regional and global context of Brazilian claims.

Brazilian claims as well as Argentinean opposition revolve within the framework of power.⁶ Conceptualizations and analyses of power are complex tasks already involving a wide array of theoretical and methodological approaches. We seek to create contributions to the understanding of power by treating the subject within the above mentioned contexts. When dealing with the UNSC and having labeled Brazil's campaign for a seat within the UNSC as an issue of power, we believe the analysis is very relevant to the field of 'International Relations' (IR). To assume an interesting premise, to promote the use of discourse studies, and to relate to the concept of governmentality as ways of dealing analytically with the international arena and IR, we aim to analyze the concept of power inspired by Foucault's and Foucauldian theoritician's approaches.⁷ This strategy allows us to look at specific promotions, constructions and applications of actions and agency, and analytically conceptualize them as power.

Overall the study targets the following general contributions.

1. Governmentality inspired conceptualizations of power as theoretical tools for analysis.
2. Uncovering how Brazil understands and thus constructs its power discursively in relation to its campaign for a permanent seat in the UNSC, and how Argentina analogously opposes this claim.

¹ Center for UN reform education, *Governing and managing change at the United Nations – Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013*, Ed. Lydia Swart and Estelle Perry, NY, USA: 2013, 7

² UN A/59/L.64

³ 'Official' meaning that we will analyze documents that are officially part of the UN archive or that are records of speeches given at the UN.

⁴ Leslie E. Wehner, "Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers' Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power". *Foreign Policy Analysis*, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (2014) 0, p. 1-21

⁵ Center for UN reform education, 6

⁶ This statement is based on a *realist/neo-realist* epistemology. For further explanation see Theory section page*.

⁷ 'Power' as a concept applied by Foucault and Foucauldian scholars demands thorough explanation, limitation and debate/discussion. Furthermore, such theoretical approaches needs undertaking in this present study, as we aim to (re)define the concept of power for the aforementioned empirical contexts and for possible further implications.

3. Acquiring knowledge about how notions of governmentality are relevant for the power in international relations.⁸

The general campaigning for international power and influence in the UNSC surely goes on in many arenas. We have chosen to focus only on the UN intrinsically, due to the qualitative potential in this a more narrow focus.⁹ Unofficial campaigning and undocumented meetings most likely influences the Brazilian campaign. Such data seems too difficult to find, and even if we discovered any of such, we would most likely not be able to collect the sufficient amounts, for a valid analysis. Thus the focus on official UN documents both serve as a practical and methodological measure. When focusing on official documents the emphasis on discursive action is validated, as our data showcases statements which represent the official positions of Brazil and Argentina. We believe that official statements about a specific agenda, or issues related to a specific agenda, will include discursive action, whenever the agenda is being presented or referred to (explicitly or not), because official documents of the kind we are analyzing, have been created to (re)present an agenda. To secure the fulfillment of portraying the recent phase of the Brazilian campaign the data corpus will consist of UN documents from 2014. All empirical materials are official statements and documents presented to the UN by the following actors: The Brazilian mission to the UN, the Argentinean mission to the UN, the G4, The BRICS¹⁰, the President of the UNSC, and the GA.

⁸ International Governmentality has to be understood as an application of governmentality theory on an international level. In the selected international context, one ought to understand governmentality as the manoeuvres made by the governance upon the body of state representatives (i.e. the governed actors), as seen in the actions of the body of state representatives. In this particular study we are going to focus on the manoeuvres made via discursive operations by Brazil and Argentina (i.e. body of state representatives in the UN) and their discursive actions as sometimes governance and sometimes the governed. For further discussions on theoretical aspects and application see the chapters on Theory and Methodology.

⁹ Also the many organizations [ALBA, CELAC, MERCOSUR, Pacific Alliance, UNASUR] relevant to and inclusive of Latin America could have been included in an analysis of Brazilian ascension to more regional/global influence.

¹⁰ Center for UN reform education, 14-15

Problem Formulation and Research Questions

We seek to analyze power in the international arena of the UN. We believe that this field of study will benefit from our approach of discourse analysis applied to conventional IR foci. When analyzing power within IR, many will assume a positivist approach by looking for and at military, economic, and alliance systemic variables. Such approaches are all necessary, but as we will come back to in the chapters about 'Answers in IR' and 'methodology' they are not necessarily sufficient. We aim to expand the understanding of power in the international arena by combining the fields of IR, discourse analysis and also by including a governmentality perspective. As a way of achieving this we will in our theory section create concepts of power that revolves around Foucault's¹¹ and Foucauldian scholars' notions of governmentality and power. In a general sense we will label governmentality according to the following of Foucault's many descriptions of this concept: "I have proposed to call governmentality [...] the way in which one conducts the conduct of men [...] a proposed analytical grid for [...] relations of power."¹² But through our conceptualizations of power, we will explain more specific approaches of analyzing power and governmentality. These conceptualizations of power we will then use to analyze Brazil's and Argentina's agency in relation to Brazil's campaign for a permanent UNSC seat. As a result of the theoretical conceptualization we will have a set of tools applicable for doing discourse analysis of governmentality related power in the international arena of the UN.

We believe that the area focus described above will contribute knowledge and understanding of Brazil's position within the UN. A better understanding of this should inspire further studies of the future statuses of rising powers such as the G4 members, and how power is being understood on the international scene and mainly within the UN. The analysis conducted via concepts of power will be structured to answer the following research questions:

1. How does Brazil discursively construct its campaign within the UN arena for achieving a permanent seat in the UNSC? And how does the Brazilian understanding and construction of power [as conceptualized by us] influence the Brazilian agency?
2. How does Argentina discursively oppose the aforementioned Brazilian campaign within the UN arena? And how does the Argentinean understanding and construction of power [as conceptualized by us] influence the Argentinean agency?

In answering the research questions, the validity and applicability of the created concepts of power will be tested. As will be explained in the methodology chapter, we target a hermeneutic approach. This means that we wish to strengthen our creations of conceptualized power via the results from the analysis. We will touch upon the refining of the concepts of power during the analysis, and in the discussion following the analysis, we will conclude on the analytical strength of these concepts of power, and on how well they can be used as means of analyzing power in international relations from a discourse analytical standpoint. We will also discuss if and how the concepts of our creation can be applied to other contexts.

¹¹ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at Collège de France, 1978-79*, Ed. by Michel Sennelart, (Houndsmills UK: Palgrave Mcmillan 2008)

¹² Foucault, *The Birth*, 186

Theory

This chapter includes the overall framework of the study's theoretical scope. First will be a part where we present how the field of conventional IR studies "answers" our research questions/views our area focus. Talking about IR and coining "conventionalism" might not be the most correct approach, but we will present our view of 'conventional IR' in this sense. The point of this part is to clarify how a discourse analytical approach can contribute to or challenge notions subtracted from non discursive studies of international relations. In order to do this, we must first present the approaches and conclusions of (some) IR studies and schools. Having presented [what we deem] important points of IR foci and hypotheses, allows for the comparison between these and the results of our analysis, this will be done mainly as part of our discussion (See pages 100-102).

The second part of this chapter will be a brief presentation and discussion of our foundational premises for the ensuing conceptualized theoretical tools. Here we will try to qualify and validate our approach to the creation of contextual theory.

The third and final part will be the presentation and conceptualization of the theoretical tools, for the analysis and based on Foucault's¹³ and Foucauldian scholars' notions of power and governmentality. In this part the process of conceptualization will be presented along with the framing of the concepts. Also the general approaches of application will be touched upon regarding each of the concepts.

Answers in IR

This part will present examples and a discussion of what can be labeled conventional answers [in this case conventional means examples of on non-discursive analytical approaches] about and explanations of power regarding Brazil, Argentina and UNSC reform. This will allow us to compare the results and approaches of non-discursive IR studies to this study's discursive analytical approach.

The purpose of this section is to present the field which we aim to have an impact upon via this study's discourse analytical approach. This section will result in a partial conclusion in which the major relevant concepts and theoretical lines will be reiterated.

A main premise for this study is that the IR field of study can benefit from focusing more on discursive approaches. In order to qualify such an approach we will first present a short discussion of how discourse analysis has been included in IR, and how we see room for improvement.

Jennifer Milliken stated in her widely used and discussed¹⁴ article "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods"¹⁵ that: "The problem is *not*, as some critics would have it, that there is little or no research [...]. Rather, it is that no common understanding has emerged in

¹³ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹⁴ A search on google scholar shows that the article is referred to in 671 other works.

<https://scholar.google.dk/scholar?hl=da&q=The+Study+of+Discourse+in+International+Relations%3A+A+Critique+of+Research+and+Methods&btnG=> accessed Apr. 16. 2015

¹⁵ Jennifer Milliken. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5. No.2. (1999), 225-254

International Relations about the best ways to study discourse.”¹⁶ The chapter about discourse analysis in IR, in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash’s book about Qualitative IR methods,¹⁷ suggests that social constructivist ontology is the dominating notion in the conjunction of IR and discourse analysis. The combination of these two viewpoints suggests that epistemological notions are needed for the application of discourse analysis in IR. We will try to answer such a need in the discussion, based on how our theoretical concepts can be applied via our methodological framework.

The influence of human agency seems to have become manifest as recognized important influence in IR, since the uprisings in Eastern Europe in the late 80’s and the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989.¹⁸ The overall constructivist notion of “how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents”¹⁹ also bodes well with how we see the field where discourse analysis and conventional IR meets. Working with Foucault²⁰ and Fairclough (see methodology page 28)²¹, also entails a poststructuralist approach as the focus will be on the power and identities in texts/language.²² Approaching the combination of IR and discourse analysis can be done by assuming a constructivist/poststructuralist standpoint.

We will now in a sense be portraying how our discourse-centered research questions would be answered, as if they were not discourse-centered.²³

Reforming the UNSC

The issue of a UNSC reform is foundational to our study, although we do not analyze the reform processes as an object. We start from the point of Brazil’s campaign for permanency, by looking at how Brazil is constructing the need for a reform, and then constructing itself as vital part of that reform, and as mentioned the Argentinean opposition towards this.

In IR literature regarding a reform of the UNSC many aspects have been, and are continuously being analyzed. In general we see two main interests. One is to answer ‘why the reform’ and the other is ‘how the reform’. ‘The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations’²⁴, edited by Thomas G. Weiss (Weiss) and Sam Daws (together with other 39 contributors – renowned IR scholars²⁵) provides a number of answers to the aforementioned questions. Edward C. Luck (Luck), one of the contributors in relation to UN reform

¹⁶ Milliken, 226

¹⁷ Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, *Qualitative Methods in IR – A pluralist guide* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan dirt. Ltd., 2008)

¹⁸ John Baylis and Steve Smith. *The Globalization of World Politics An introduction to International Relations* (Oxford University press, Oxford: UK. 2014) 4-5

¹⁹ Michael Barnett in Baylis and Smith, *Globalization*, 162

²⁰ Foucault, *The Birth*

²¹ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, (London: Longman 1989)

²² Lene Hansen in Baylis and Smith, *Globalization*, 169

²³ Our research questions are specifically discursive, and furthermore the non-discursive approaches would not be having the same questions. So when we state that we will look for IR answers, we mean how IR studies has dealt with Brazil’s quest for UNSC permanency and Argentina’s opposition.

²⁴ Thomas G Weiss and Sam Daws, *The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007). Daws and Weiss are associated with Grand theories within the fields of IR and studies of the UN. Both are renowned authors of a number of books.

²⁵ e.g. Edward C. Luck, Martha Finnemore, Christer Jönsson, Michael Pugh and others.

processes, sees the two-tiered structure of the UNSC (the voting for majority of the 15 members together with the veto power of the P5) and the effect it has on the functionality of the council, as the main and increasing reason that calls for a reform.²⁶ We might call this a functionalist/structural view, as Luck is not pointing towards reform calls being based on foundational disagreement with the UNSC, but the UNSC's (un)ability to function due to its structure.

H.M. Jaeger labels Luck as a realist scholar in his article 'UN, Biopolitics and governmentality',²⁷ and such a label seems valid considering how Luck explains the unsuccessful outcome of the UNSC reform processes in 1996-97 and 2003-06. Luck explains that in the debate about a UNSC reform in 1996-97 and between 2003 and 2006, GA president Razali Ismail and Secretary General Kofi Annan respectively, suggested reform proposals, which did not tamper with the veto rights of the P5. All of the suggested reforms targeted a more democratic representation in the UNSC, but they initially failed from progressing due to the lack of support from States described as middle powers.²⁸ A main notion of realist explanations of International relational issues is that power is perceived as a zero sum game. According to Luck potential supporters thought they might lose more power than they would gain (via the reform) as other states might gain more power than themselves. When considering realism as an implemented theoretical approach for this study, we also have to consider the intrinsic differentiations inside of realism theories.

We might for example talk about neo-realism (this aspect will be discussed in relation to the following section on 'Brazil's quest for permanency' see page10). Tim Dunne and Brian Schmidt discuss the notions of defensive and offensive realism in their contribution to 'The Globalization of World politics an introduction to International Relations'. In these notions states should be viewed as security maximizers and power maximizers respectively.²⁹ Such aspects of realism could be interesting to define based on discursive approaches and in relation to governmentality related power.

Thomas G. Weiss presents a more liberalist explanation for why calls for UNSC reforms are growing and how the different UN member states propose the reforms. Weiss states that international paradigm changes occurred after the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001, and that such change has influenced the calls for reforms in a substantive manner. He lists the following as being newer dominant foci areas in the International arena, and thus as fields of importance regarding the UNSC reform "climate": Disarmament, non-proliferation and intellectual framework linking security and poverty.³⁰ He makes a personal statement which seemingly points towards a liberalist mindset: "[E]veryone can agree that the council's decisions would have greater political clout if they had broader support".³¹ A realist might argue that it was more important that the council's decisions reflected the power relations of the world, or that they were based on their implantation-probability.

In the discussion we will try to relate our results to such general IR notions and concepts. (see page 100-102)

²⁶ Edward C. Luck in Weiss and Daws, *Oxford Handbook*, 660

²⁷ Martin H. Jaeger, "UN reform, biopolitics, and global governmentality". *International Theory*. Vol.2. No.1. 2010, 51

²⁸ Weiss and Daws, *Oxford Handbook*, 662-663

²⁹ Baylis and Smith, *Globalization*, 106

³⁰ Thomas G. Weiss, *Thinking About Global Governance: Why People and Ideas Matter*, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011) 121

³¹ Weiss, *Thinking*, 122

Brazil's quest for permanency

Steen Fryba Christensen³² (Fryba) describes the Brazilian quest for a permanent UNSC seat, as being the zenith (from a Brazilian standpoint) of Brazil's agenda's of becoming included in the global political and economic governance.³³ He also juxtaposes the Brazilian campaign with the quest for more multilateralism regarding global security issues,³⁴ and underlines the regional perspectives of Brazil's quest as being; Brazil's wish to be the leader of South America and certain regional opposition (mainly Argentinean) towards Brazilian ascension.³⁵ It seems that Fryba views Brazil's chances for a permanent seat in the UNSC as not being good. He concludes that Brazilian geopolitical agency has been successful regarding its establishment as a regional power, and Brazil can focus more on its corporation with other BRICS countries. The problem for Brazil in this regards, as this author sees it, is that China and Russia (Brazil's geopolitical "allies" in the BRICS) apparently does not support Brazil's quest for UNSC permanency.³⁶ Part of this study's dataset is a BRICS statement to the UNSC, and it will be interesting to relate the search for Brazilian discursive influence in this in relation to these aforementioned conclusions. Fryba's explanation for why Brazil has not succeeded in acquiring permanent UNSC representation can be labeled as a neo-realist explanation.³⁷ His conclusion points towards Russia and China as valuing their UNSC positions as being more powerful than their BRICS membership, and therefore they do not support Brazil for moving into the UNSC, regardless of Brazil's important role as part of BRICS. Another neo-realist explanation is referred to by Peter Dauvergne and Deborah Fairias³⁸ as they conclude Brazil's international agency as being 'soft power' (as the co-creator of neo-realism Joseph Nye Jr. applied this term³⁹). Dauvergne and Farias point to Brazil as being powerful through it's "focusing on forming and leading coalitions of developing states to strengthen shared values and normative commitments".⁴⁰

Dr. Leslie E. Wehner⁴¹ proposes that explanations for Brazil's UNSC agency should be sought for within more constructivist realms. He argues, that Brazil's approaches towards its international goals are and has

³² Steen Fryba Christensen is an author and a Lecturer at Aalborg University with a particular interest and expertise in Brazil's contemporary role in global politics. His article referred to in this section has been referred to in a number of international journals and publications.

³³ Steen Fryba Christensen. "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities". *Third world quarterly*. Vol 34. No.2. 2013, 273

³⁴ Christensen, 276

³⁵ Christensen, 278

³⁶ Christensen, 283-84

³⁷ Neo-realism: The idea that the international arena is dominated by anarchy, and that states will always do what is most profitable for them, which includes seeing international power as a zero sum game – Robert O Keohane, *Neorealism and its critics* (New York, USA: Columbia University Press 1986) 7-8

³⁸ Peter Dauvergne is an awarded author in the field of IR and a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. Deborah Fairias is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of British Columbia with a prior career in the Brazilian state administration.

³⁹ Peter Dauvergne and Deborah Fairias. "The rise of Brazil as a global development power". *Third world quarterly*. Vol. 33. No.5. 2012, 903. This article refers to Joseph Nye Jr. and "soft power". Joseph Nye Jr. created the IR theory of neo-realism in Joseph Nye Jr. and Robert Keohane. *Interdependence and power* (Boston, Ms.: Longman, 2012) (first published in 1977). Joseph Nye Jr. created the term soft power in Joseph Nye Jr. *Soft power – The means to success in world politics* (New York, N.Y.: Public Affairs, 2004). Joseph Nye Jr. categorizes soft power as: Attraction, Agenda seeking Values, Culture, Policies, Institutions, Public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

⁴⁰ Dauvergne and Fairias, 903

⁴¹ Leslie E. Wehner is a Doctor and author on International relations with his expertise being IR, Latin America and role theory. For more info about Dr. Wehner see <http://www.bath.ac.uk/polis/staff/leslie-wehner/> - accessed March 19. 2015

to be constructed based on a combination of Brazil's perception of its status and Brazil's assessment of other states' perceptions of Brazil's status.⁴² Wehner also hypothesizes about Brazil as being somehow caught within its constructed role as a consensus seeker/promoter state, a construction Brazil has promoted via the re-building of Haiti, and through the interest and external involvement in the nuclear/non-proliferation talks between the P5 and Iran.⁴³

Amado Luiz Cervo⁴⁴ connects the Haiti and Iran issues to a liberalist explanation for Brazil's call for permanent UNSC representation. He states that Brazil's liberal policies (in the sense of both more free market and democratization) were thwarted by USA and EU neo-liberal economic hegemony during the 2000's.⁴⁵ Cervo also claims that since 2003: "Brazil has maintained continuity of ideas and conduct, as it has advocated the peaceful, negotiated solution of disputes and the promotion of the interests of the rich and the poor through the international trade system. However, multilateralism has not been guided by these principles over time. In the 21st century, the Security Council still lacks representativeness, impartiality, and efficacy for maintaining peace, [...]"⁴⁶ We label such a statement as a liberal explanation due to its focus in ideas and lack of focus on power relations.

Wehner's observation of his earlier mentioned "consensus-predicament" of Brazil's, can be clearly seen when considering that the opposition against Brazil (and others) getting permanent UNSC representation, has been highly advocated by the international group calling themselves 'Uniting for Consensus' (the UfC). In this study's analysis, it will be interesting to see how this discourse of consensus are being managed by Brazil and opposed by e.g. Argentina, in relation to understanding of power and governmentality.

We have shown examples of how neo-realist, constructivist and a liberalist IR theory can view the area focus of this study. The aforementioned examples each portray power as being understood and carried out as a battle for it, a construction of it or a creation of it respectively. Monica Hirst's⁴⁷ recent is an example of a try to combine IR theory to explain the Brazilian campaign and its status. She suggests that Brazil's international policies has been promoting multipolarity and multilateralism, and that emerging powers (states) such as Brazil represent a vital constructive criticism to the international political scene.⁴⁸ Hirst then eventually addresses the fact that Brazil, out of fear or the protection of alliances, abstained from voting in the UN GA, when resolutions regarding Syria and Ukraine were voted on.⁴⁹ Although Hirst is not explicit about this, such actions indicate notions of realism over liberalism/idealism. This leads one's thinking in the direction that Brazil's promotion of liberal values, are prioritized below specific relations when it comes to allies in relation to the UNSC. A hypothesis based on these (explanations of) actions could be that, Brazil is not being more aggressive in its claims for permanency, and that this is due to its realist perception of

⁴² Wehner, 3-4

⁴³ Amado Luiz Cervo. "Brazil's Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World" *Rev. Bras. Polít. Int.* Vol.53 (special edition) 2010, 17-18

⁴⁴ Amado Luiz Cervo is Tenured Emeritus Professor of History of International Relations of University of Brasilia – UnB and senior researcher of National Council for Scientific and Technological Development.

⁴⁵ Cervo, 8

⁴⁶ Cervo, 11

⁴⁷ Monica Hirst is Professor, Brazil-USA relations expert and advisor for UNDP and the Ford Foundation. The article referred to is: Monica Hirst. "Emerging Brazil: The Challenges of Liberal Peace and Global Governance." *Global Society*. 2015.

⁴⁸ Hirst, 1-2

⁴⁹ Hirst, 13

power, as it respects the power of China and Russia more than it believes in the power of promoting multipolarity. In this study's analysis the quest for unveiling Brazilian understanding of power, will ideally lead to conclusions regarding liberalist vs. realist influence on Brazilian conduct in the international arena.

Argentina's role and motivation

Argentina's opposition is often explained via liberalist, realist/neorealist or constructivist hypotheses. As we have touched upon such explanations in regards to Brazil, we will only briefly explain such conceptual approaches to the Argentinean opposition, and focus on other theoretical approaches.

Leslie Wehner promotes an interesting aspect of Argentinean opposition. He explains how it is a major focus of Argentina's to direct the discussion of (Brazil as a) regional representation in the direction of Latin America instead of South America, to make regional power for Brazil more difficult to obtain. According to Wehner, Argentina believes that Latin America is too big a region to have one major representation i.e. Brazil, and does not want to be represented by Brazil regarding geopolitics.⁵⁰ This social constructivist explanation is close to being discursive, but it is not. Wehner states that his article has "demonstrated how the role-based interactions between regional power and secondary power are also bound to their respective conceptual understandings of their region. In fact, it shows that actors used their regional identities strategically—via roles—to contest the rise of the regional power".⁵¹ This indicates the focus upon the political usage of identity, and not on an analysis of the discourses behind or within the construction of identity.

This leads us to briefly touching upon the aspect of regionalism. Regionalism is in this case understood as the foreign political focus on regional corporation and competition. Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini⁵² analyze how the foreign policy's of Latin American countries has been strongly influencing their regional policies since the 1960's. They state that: "Ultimately, regional positioning pertains to the domain of foreign policy and as such is highly dependent on national calculations."⁵³ This means that however Argentina (or Brazil) act in relation to the Latin American or South American region is based on their own foreign political agenda and not on the promotion of the aforementioned regions as units on the geopolitical scene. This notion of regionalism as being shaped by national calculations is compatible with a neo-realist notion of anarchical ontology. In the case of Latin/South America we believe that analyzing the understanding of regional power from a discourse analytical standpoint can reveal "how - what is going on" instead of the more conventional "what is going on - and why" which we believe is what Malamud and Gardini is doing. Conclusions such as Malamud and Gardini's about Latin American States' ambiguous agenda's towards certain regional fractions (in this case Mercosur and UNSAUR), we believe, calls for further analysis. They state: "To Brazil, Mercosur is essentially, a tool to manage its relation with the neighbors but has limited economic impact. For the other three associates, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, Mercosur has economic relevance – it provides access to the Brazilian market – and somehow ideological appeal. UNASUR is a Brazilian creation to realize its vision of South – as opposed to Latin –

⁵⁰ Wehner, 7, 18

⁵¹ Wehner, 16

⁵² Malamud and Gardini are not major scholars, but researchers at Lisbon University and Professor at Bath University. The article was chosen as it very recent and also because it builds upon a large amount of data regarding the large amount of Latin and South American regional organizations.

⁵³ Andrés Malamud and Gian Luca Gardini. "Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and its Lessons", *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 47, No.1. 2012, 124

America as a region in its own right, coinciding with what Brasilia has defined as its sphere of interest”⁵⁴. We believe that a discourse analytical approach that focuses on the understanding of power and governmentality can relate some of the varied strategies to unmentioned issues such as the UNSC.

Part conclusion

This section has presented some non-discursive approaches to explaining the UNSC reform agenda, the Brazilian quest for permanency and Argentina’s opposition. Many more could have been presented, but we have chosen the ones presented above, to showcase explanations that are building upon major concepts of IR theory. The theoretical IR concepts of realism(s), liberalism(s) and constructivism(s) will be included in our discussion, as means of comparing our results with more “conventional” IR theory.

Premises for construction of theory

The construction of our theoretical framework has been inspired by William Walters’⁵⁵ (Walters) elaborations about Foucault and governmentality from his book from 2012 titled “Governmentality Critical encounters”. Walters have been highly dedicated to the integration of discourse studies into the study of politics (in a wide sense). In the chapter ‘Foucault, power and governmentality’ of the aforementioned book, Walters proclaims that it is the researcher of powers’ responsibility/function to map and distinguish ‘power’ in order to promote the understanding of it.⁵⁶

As we embarked on the mission on applying Foucault’s⁵⁷ (and Foucauldian) theory, we saw that Foucault⁵⁸ does not present any one theory of explaining *power*, but rather *power* analytical techniques, via examples of analyses. Walters agrees with this application, and how this should influence the studies of governmentality. Walters presents how he thinks we should view Foucault⁵⁹ and proposes that he has presented us “[...] a set of methodological and conceptual guidelines, as a provocation towards doing a different kind of analysis of political government”⁶⁰. The manner, in which we have chosen to construct the theoretical framework for the study, is rather close to Walters’ suggestions.

The actual theory which will be presented in the ensuing part of this chapter has been made into concepts, which will guide the analysis. At the same time these concepts contains methodological implications as they encourage the search for discursive action found in texts. We will get back to the framing of these implications in the methodology chapter (see pages 43-46).

An important epistemological premise is our interpretative approach. We recognize that a more positivist study could also be conducted based on Foucault.⁶¹ This would seemingly demand viewing him as the

⁵⁴ Malamud and Gardini, 124-125

⁵⁵ <http://carleton.ca/polisci/people/walters-william/> accessed March 13 2015.

⁵⁶ William Walters, *Governmentality: Critical encounters* (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2012) 14

⁵⁷ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁵⁸ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁵⁹ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁶⁰ Walters, 40

⁶¹ Foucault, *The Birth*

creator of a theory telling us what to look for and then find “it”. Our interpretative approach is rooted in seeing Foucault⁶² as having taught us “how” to look for power, not what power is. This approach calls for interpretativism as the theory then must be a guide for understanding both itself and the results it produces. That is why we have also constructed our theory as concepts, with accurate framework but still as concepts, which could be further refined through the analysis. Walters encourages the application of Foucault’s concepts and guidelines as tools, and paraphrases him as referring to his own techniques as being tools to pick and choose from, according to the object of study.⁶³ Walters⁶⁴ encourages also the sharpening of Foucault’s tools, end even the crafting of new tools.

We believe we have achieved what Walters suggests, by constructing a “toolbox” based on Foucault⁶⁵, and we also believe that we have allowed for further potential refinement through our process of analysis. One might label such framework as either hermeneutic-interpretivism or as interpretative-idealism. The former is pointing towards the continual refinement of theory as a practical consequence and the latter to refinement of theory as a goal in itself. We believe such approaches to have been favored by Foucault⁶⁶ as he throughout his lectures discerns/describes subjects of interests, and at the same time continually evaluates and refines his own applied methodologies.

Theoretical concepts

As the study’s aim is to analyze power, based on Foucault’s⁶⁷ and Foucauldian theories of governmentality, discourse and power we need to conceptualize the term power in relation to these notions.

As the aforementioned theoretical premises are complex and contain many aspects, we need to construct specific concepts of power to fathom the benefits of the great width of the theoretical inspiration. At the same time the ensuing process of conceptualizations of power as theoretical tools, will ensure the practical application for this study. Therefore we will construct six overall concepts of governmental and governmentality related power, which will be the theoretical tools for the discourse analytical approach. The vast variety of Foucauldian theories has put us in the impossibility to apply all these power-related theories; therefore we chose some of them, while other Foucauldian power-related theories we left aside (such as Royal Power⁶⁸).

In each of the ensuing conceptualizations of power we are firstly going to subtract applicable definitions of governmentality-related power from Foucault⁶⁹ and Foucauldian scholars. These definitions we are going to either apply as they are presented to us in the literature, or we are going make restructurings and/or combinations within the concept. Either way it will be made clear how the conceptualization process is conducted, or how the potential joint concepts are conceptualized together.

⁶² Foucault, *The Birth*

⁶³ Walters, 103

⁶⁴ Walters, 103

⁶⁵ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁶⁶ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁶⁷ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁶⁸ Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended*, Trans. by David Macey, London, UK: Penguin (First published in 1997) 2003, 25-27

⁶⁹ Foucault, *The Birth and Society*

We will now present the conceptualizations of power through six individual parts. Each part contains the conceptualization of a governmentality related power, and within the conceptualization will be brief references to the concepts' analytical application. Each section will start by our chosen label for the concept, followed by how we are going to refer to it, in a parenthesis.

Rational operation of Power (*Rational Power*)

Foucault⁷⁰ embarks on the explanation of the notion 'what can be done' / 'what cannot be done' when describing a governmental transfer occurring in the middle of the eighteenth century. The transfer constructed by him was from *raison d'état* to *critical governmental reason*⁷¹. He describes *raison d'état* as basically the Western governmentality which replaced the Middle Ages' governing system of sovereign rulers instituted by God, with an "extrinsic self limitation"⁷² as its most distinctive feature. *Raison d'état* was about governing the state according to relations to other states, and keeping ones states' force strong enough to not be the inferior.⁷³ The governmentality that here is labeled as *critical governmental reason*, is described as containing the actions between the ones governing and the governed. These actions are described as being: "[...] conflicts, agreements, discussions, and reciprocal concessions: all episodes whose effect is finally to establish a de facto, general, rational division between what is to be done and what is not to be done in the practice of governing."⁷⁴

What it has been propagated here could be viewed as a method for discerning governmental agency. One should consider the governing agent as being aware of this need for *self limitation*⁷⁵, but also as being without the ability to master "this maximum/minimum"⁷⁶ principle of governance. This means that we cannot presume that the governing agent has the power to govern in a manner, which will secure the governing position, i.e. the governing agents has no stationary/essential power. Therefore it is useful to analyze how governing is conducted, in order for us to define active power. We should look for how the governing agent limits the degree of governance, in relation to the knowledge of the need for doing what has to be done/what can be done and in relation to avoid doing what must not be done/what cannot be done.

Therefore we will label this notion of as the concept of rational operation of power (*rational power*). This label is in itself somewhat general, but as mentioned the analysis will demonstrate its applicability and also potentially refine the conceptualization. In the analysis the initial application of *rational power* will be: The definition of how actors' strategic discursive actions in accordance with their understanding of the limitations/framework of what to do/what can be done and what not to do/what cannot be done.

This first concept of power will help us reveal and understand how Brazil and Argentina perceive limitations of their power, as seen in for their discursive agency in relation to the context. This concept of

⁷⁰ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁷¹ Foucault, *The Birth*, 12-13

⁷² Foucault, *The Birth*, 6

⁷³ Foucault, *The Birth*, 5-7

⁷⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*, 12

⁷⁵ Foucault, *The Birth*, 19

⁷⁶ Foucault, *The Birth*, 17

governmental related power will reveal both agencies as a governing actor and as a governed actor. In both situations the actor conducts its discursive agency according to its understanding of the aforementioned limitations.

The representation of neo-liberalism (*neo-liberal power*)

Foucault presents economy and politics as things which do not exist, but things that are “being inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false”⁷⁷. Many concepts concerning, explaining or describing politics and economy can be labeled as ideological. Our data however indicates politics and economy occur within it, where it makes sense to label them as related to neo-liberalism. The analysis will show in what manner, how this is being done and what the implications are. In constructing such an analytical concept, we thus need a concept which promotes the understanding of neo-liberalism as governmentality within the UN arena. According to Foucault⁷⁸, any government whether old or new needs to defend or explain its actions in relation to their usefulness and their potential harmfulness. This principle will be included in the conceptualization, as the understanding of *neo-liberal power*, will revolve around discursive agency to present and/or construct useful/harmful framework, which can be related to neo-liberal discourse. As Foucault⁷⁹ elaborates over neo-liberalism he presents two types of governmental actions, which both defines neo-liberal governmentality and are characteristic to this type of governmentality specifically. The two types are *regulatory actions* and *organizing actions*. These are presented as economical focused interventions, and they will provide economic aspects to this study’s analysis, if necessary. *Regulatory actions* are market interventions in a wide sense (prize and cost) with a focus on prize control before everything else. *Organizing actions* is market framework intervention e.g. legislation and education.⁸⁰ If such actions, which Foucault labels as “the original armature of neo-liberalism”⁸¹, are constructed or promoted as part of a UNSC discourse, it will be interesting for our analysis of power in the UN arena, as it points towards *neo-liberal power* as a power within this arena. This economic aspect of the construct *neo-liberal power* goes well with the aforementioned and broader governmentality aspect of explaining actions in relation to their usefulness and harmfulness as it will be sought to show how *neo-liberal power* is being used discursively to promote or deconstruct agendas.

When addressing liberalism, Foucault⁸² points out the intrinsic paradox or maybe even antagonism of this governmentality. He emphasizes that liberalism is about the production of freedom, but that this can only occur via the implementation of coercion, limitation and control.⁸³ This means that in prolongation of this paradoxical feature of liberalism “there is no liberalism without a culture of danger.”⁸⁴ This freedom orientated discursive aspect of this governmentality, will help us relate this construction to if and when a freedom/democracy discourse is visible in our data.

⁷⁷ Foucault, *The Birth*, 20

⁷⁸ Foucault, *The Birth*, 40

⁷⁹ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁸⁰ Foucault, *The Birth*, 138-141

⁸¹ Foucault, *The Birth*, 145

⁸² Foucault, *The Birth* and Foucault, *Society*

⁸³ Foucault, *The Birth*, 64

⁸⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*, 67

Foucault⁸⁵ presents the essential characters [the idealism of liberalism] of liberalism as based on the behavior of *homo æconomicus*⁸⁶. Both regarding economic and political liberalism, he states that: “The game of liberalism – not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their course [...] basically and fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course according to the laws, principles, and mechanism of reality itself.”⁸⁷ This ultra liberal presentation of liberalism only increases the interesting aspect of the aforementioned paradox between liberalism and the control its implementation requires. If liberalism really is a governmentality meant to promote freedom, then why is it in practicality constrained or framed by measures of control. In this game of liberalism that reflects reality, with its self-curbing and self-regulating benefits in favor of the governance, there is a need for a form of governance (reflected in governmentality) – this need reflects the perpetuation of the aforementioned paradox: freedom under limitation and control.

This paradox can also be subtracted from one of Foucault’s earlier works in which he identifies the intertwined Juridical and Economic power⁸⁸. He identifies the juridical conception of power relations as something that is given (therefore it can be possessed), can be exchanged (can be transferred or alienated) or taken back. Exchanging power for something else through a juridical act (a contract) is at the basis of “juridical conception and [...] liberal conception of political power”⁸⁹; it has some common features with a contemporary conception of Marxism – understood as the perpetuation and renewal of economic relations at the basis of this power. “Their common feature is what I will call «economism» in the theory of power.”⁹⁰ This particular paradox is being explained as a system or schema of analyzing power. He defines this power as “a primal right that is surrendered, and which constitutes sovereignty, with the contract as the matrix of political power. And when the power that has been so constituted oversteps the limit, or oversteps the limits of the contract, there is a danger that it will become oppression. Power-contract, with oppression as the limit, or rather the transgression of the limit.”⁹¹ He calls this the Contract-Oppression schema, which can be identified as one basic form of (liberal) governmentality.

The aforementioned paradox is also being highlighted and explained by Barry Hindess⁹² when comparing Foucault with Max Weber. Hindess argues that power relations in Foucault’s perception (these “strategic games between liberties”⁹³) seem to be inherited to human interaction in which one side manifests power on the other, but both sides are free between certain boundaries. Furthermore, Hindess argues that “There is no suggestion here that power should be seen as a quantitative phenomenon, such that those with more power could normally be expected to prevail over those with less, as there would be, for example, in the case of Weber’s conception of power as ‘the chance of a man or a group of men to impose their own

⁸⁵ Foucault, *The Birth and Society*

⁸⁶ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, Ed. Michel Sennelart (Houndsmills UK: Palgrave Mcmillan 2007) 41

⁸⁷ Foucault, *Security*, 48

⁸⁸ Paul Patton, *From Resistance to Government: Foucault’s Lectures 1976-1979*, in *A Companion to Foucault*, Ed. Christopher Falzon et al. (Chichester UK: Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 179-180.

⁸⁹ Foucault, *Society*, 13

⁹⁰ Foucault, *Society*, 13

⁹¹ Foucault, *Society*, 16-17

⁹² Barry Hindess, *Knowledge and Political Reason*, in *Foucault*, ed. Robert Nola (London-Portland UK: Frank Cass Publishers 1998), 63-81

⁹³ Hindess in Nola, 65

will’.”⁹⁴ In the UN, this paradoxical idea has been materialized into the principle of equality between sovereign states seen in Chapter 1 of the UN Charter⁹⁵, followed in Chapter 5 by the non-explicit (yet, deductive) veto power of the five permanent members⁹⁶.

The reform processes and discussion within the UN have by others been linked to the concept of neo-liberalism, by placing the ideological development in the UN as moving from [Westphalian] state based sovereignty to a more conditional sovereignty.⁹⁷ These conditions which states have to live up to are mainly conditions that promote human security, as can be seen in the context of the UN ‘R2P’ doctrine of obligatory human protection. This aspect of the reform of the UNSC discussions relate to both our power concept of *securitization* (see pages 20-21) and to the present *neo-liberal power*. The latter can be relevant with the promotion of security in relations to democracy and human rights, whereas the former is more with Jaeger who’s article on the UN and biopolitics has proved useful for the connection between Foucault⁹⁸ and more contemporary treatments of neo-liberalism states that: “Neoliberal governmentality deploys a variety of legal and technical means, as well as forms of expertise, to promote freedom (in the sense of exercising choice) and to elicit competitive and responsible conduct.”⁹⁹ This statement bodes well with our exemplification of the issues mentioned earlier in the conceptualization of *neo-liberal power* about ‘legal’ and ‘technical’ means and ‘expertise’ to promote ‘freedom’. Such phrases initially allows for control and framing, just as much as for freedom.

Jaeger quite accurately points to the apparent problem of the paradoxical relation between security and freedom, regarding the interventionist prerogative of the UNSC (as the aforementioned emphasis by Foucault in general). Seemingly the reform processes in the UN showcases neo-liberal governmentality where this paradox is not present/being presented, but where freedom and security are constructed as promoting each other.¹⁰⁰

When Foucault¹⁰¹ talks about neo-liberalism he makes sure to emphasize that it is not a new governmentality, it is build upon already applied types of governing. But at the same time he proclaims neo-liberalism as being a modified liberalism which should not “...be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention.”¹⁰² Regardless of whether this is contradicting the aforementioned juxtaposing of liberalism and neo-liberalism, it shows that he presented quite clearly that neo-liberal governmentality includes measures of intervention and control. As we seek to reveal the agency related to our construct of *neo-liberal power*, the focus will be on discursive promotions of usefulness/harmfulness, regulatory and organizing economic agency, contract-repression schema and the governmentality discourse of a UNSC which promotes security via freedom and vice-versa.

The concept of *neo-liberal power* will make sure the analysis includes economic discursive focus and that it includes the promotion of economical and democratic freedom, as a power.

⁹⁴ Hindess in Nola, 65

⁹⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> accessed March 9 2015

⁹⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml> accessed March 9 2015

⁹⁷ Jaeger, 51 (H.M. Jaeger presents a number of well known IR scholars as having this position)

⁹⁸ Foucault, *The Birth*

⁹⁹ Jaeger, 58

¹⁰⁰ Jaeger, 68, 72-73

¹⁰¹ Foucault, *The Birth*, 130-131

¹⁰² Foucault, *The Birth*, 132

The power of the Panopticism of War (*War-panopticism*)

The notions of *war as power* and *panopticism* are in this case taken directly from Foucault¹⁰³, albeit Foucault applies the notion of the *panopticism* as this notions' originator, Jeremy Bentham¹⁰⁴, explained its implications. The governmentality related power concepts *war-panopticism* will be based on these notions of Foucault's and will target the revelation of how the Brazilian and Argentinean discursive agency is being constructed, according to the states' understanding of the UNSC's power, as a power based on its prerogative for conducting war [military intervention]. Also the fact that the P5 are seen as "the winners" of WWII,¹⁰⁵ and that the "threat" of intervention from the P5, in theory, never can be regarded as not present, just like the prison guard in the panoptic prison tower, never can be thought of as not present by the prisoners.¹⁰⁶

Foucault presents the potential approach of analyzing power as war, by pointing to the propositions by 18th and 19th century Prussian General and war theoretician Carl Von Clausewitz that 'War is the continuation of politics'¹⁰⁷. Foucault¹⁰⁸ suggests the inversion of this proposition so politics becomes the continuation of war. As he explains the theoretical implications of this inversion and suggests the following analytical approach, it becomes clear that such an approach is compatible with a power oriented analysis of the UNSC. This study targets the Brazilian campaign for a permanent seat in the UNSC, which only the P5 has at the moment and the P5 states are commonly known as the victors of WWII. Foucault claims that the power relations to be analyzed, should be seen as having been established "[...] in and through war at a given historical moment, that can be historically specified."¹⁰⁹ This can be transferred to explain that certain power relations are in place between the UNSC/the P5 and the rest of the world/The UN. Foucault elaborates further over this possible analytical view of power, by stating that politics represent the continuation of the power statuses caused by war, and does not operate to nullify the power relations caused by war.¹¹⁰

The application of this concept of *war-panopticism* must lead us to revealing and understanding the impact of UNSC's (especially P5's) *power of war/power of repression* on the discursive agency of Brazil and Argentina. This will help us define a power within the UN arena and the Brazilian and Argentinean understanding of such power.

From his lectures in 1976¹¹¹, when Foucault initially lectured about 'war as power' based on the aforementioned applications, he continuously talks about the notion of domination in relation to the same conceptualized *war as power* and *power as oppression*. This elaboration leads once more to Clausewitz' proposition and the subsequent inversion. Interestingly Foucault states that he himself was a bit wrong

¹⁰³ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹⁰⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*, 67

¹⁰⁵ See the chapter 'Answer in IR' (page 19). Here is resented the contemporary and loud voices of criticism, resting on this connection between WWII and the P5.

¹⁰⁶ According to Bentham the idea is that the prison inmates can never be sure if they are being watched or not.

¹⁰⁷ Foucault, *Society*, 15

¹⁰⁸ Foucault, *Society*, 15

¹⁰⁹ Foucault, *Society*, 15

¹¹⁰ Foucault, *Society*, 16

¹¹¹ Foucault, *Society*, 1-165

earlier, when talking about *war as power*.¹¹² In somewhat of an opposition to the aforementioned statements of politics being the manifestations of power relations caused by war, upon which the application for this study's context rested, Foucault also claims: "We do not try to trace their [relations of domination] origins back to that which gives them their basic legitimacy. We have to try, on the contrary, to identify the technical instruments that guarantee that they function".¹¹³ He also paraphrases Bentham to say that "[...] for Bentham, panopticism really is a general political formula that characterizes a type of government".¹¹⁴

Foucault¹¹⁵ presents Bentham's notion as a (liberal) governmentality of prioritizing supervision. This notion also bodes well with the aim of our construct of *war-panopticism* as we target the discursive agency of Brazil and Argentina in relation to their understanding of how the UNSC and P5 power is present (supervising them), and how the power of UNSC as 'war-repression' is being understood and reacted towards from Brazil and Argentina.

Bentham's introduction of his *panopticism* is here brought to verify its applicability:

"Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should actually be in that predicament [constant and total supervision], during every instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be so."¹¹⁶

We have articulated the concept of *war-panopticism* as a way of ensuring that the analysis contains the perspective of how governance is being perceived by and reflected in the actions of Brazil and Argentina, with the specific emphasis on *war as power*.

The power of securitization (*securitization*)

In the conceptualization of *neo-liberal power*, the discursive utilization of security was included. In order to grasp and reveal the impact and understanding of security, also outside of neo-liberal contextualization; we will construct a concept with another perspective on the power of security. Security and securitization are popular areas of foci within the field of discourse studies,¹¹⁷ this and the fact that our study revolves around the issue of UNSC, calls for a concept which main focus is a discourse of security.

The conceptualization of the power of *securitization* should be a theoretical tool which reveals an important discursive and governmentality related *power of security* within the UN arena and in relation to the UNSC especially. It should also be based on our theoretical premise of doing discourse analysis via Foucault¹¹⁸ and Foucauldians. Our concept of *securitization* is when security is being constructed or even

¹¹² Foucault, *Society*, 45-49

¹¹³ Foucault, *Society*, 46

¹¹⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*, 67

¹¹⁵ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹¹⁶ Jeremy Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, Ed. Miran Bozovic (London: Verso, 1995) 4

¹¹⁷ Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond", *European Journal of International Relations*, Sept. 2007, Vol. 13. No.3. 358-60

¹¹⁸ Foucault, *The Birth*

de-constructed as a way of promoting an agenda discursively. In this case it could very well be when Brazil constructs scenario A as being more secure if Brazil is in the UNSC, or that scenario B will become more insecure, if Brazil is not in the UNSC. Sometimes such constructions might seem to be overlapping, but when one is conducting an interpretative discourse analysis, the emphasis on one aspect over the other, could reveal interesting results. It seems fair to propose that security is a strong discourse within the UN, and that it therefore can be applied as power in a governmentality related sense. Chapter one article one of the UN's founding charter, states as the very first thing that "The purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international security and peace [...]"¹¹⁹. In his renowned work from 1996 Michael Dillon claims it to be an easy task to "establish that security is the first and foundational requirement of the State, of modern understandings of politics, and of International Relations, [...]"¹²⁰. In the case of the UN and the UNSC, the security of the state and the security of international relations are being combined. The UN charter makes the sovereignty of every member state and its domestic jurisdiction very clear in article 2.¹²¹

The UN framework clearly presents security as a priority, and as Sven Opitz states: "[T]he notion of security allows for the problematizing of various political and social questions in quite specific ways."¹²² Our construct of the power of *securitization* subscribes to Opitz' description. This means that we will look for how agenda's are being constructed and promoted, and going from general to specific, via the discourse of security. To Foucault¹²³ the notion of security was also an important part of governmentality analyses. It was in fact such an integrated aspect of governmentality to him, that in the first three lectures of the series *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault uses the term 'sécurité' in place of governmentality.¹²⁴

Securitization as an analytical tool will be used, to reveal how discursive utilization of (constructed) security issues are being used as a means of promoting or opposing agency relevant to the Brazilian campaign for a permanent UNSC seat. Analyzing when and how such actions are occurring, we will be able to see how power and governmentality is being understood, in relation to the discourse of securitization.

The power of pastoral representation (*pastoral power eder and polis*)

In the context of rationalities of government, Barry Hindess briefly defines the aims of the government within the framework of Pastoral power. He points out that "The aim of government, in this view, is to promote the well-being of its subjects [...] by means of a detailed and comprehensive regulation which attends both to the flock as a whole and to the behavior of each of its members. The shepherd-flock metaphor presents the former as a superior kind of being, and there is no suggestion that shepherds should

¹¹⁹ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> accessed March 12, 2015

¹²⁰ Michael Dillon, *The politics of Security*, (N.Y. USA: Routledge, 1996) 12

¹²¹ UN charter article 2:1,7

¹²² Sven Opitz, "Government Unlimited the Security Dispositif of Illiberal Governmentality", in Bröckling et. al. *Governmentality*, (N.Y.: Routledge 2011) 94

¹²³ Foucault, *Security*

¹²⁴ Mariana Valverde. "Genealogies of European states: Foucauldian reflection", *Economy and Society*, Vol.36 No.1 2007, 172

be accountable to, or appointed by, the flock which they control. The shepherd is responsible for the welfare of a flock, not for promoting either the liberty or the wishes of its members.”¹²⁵ We observed the two different dimensions of the Pastoral power: the first one is the promotion of the well-being of the subjects (the governed population), and the second one is the undisputable authority of the one in charge, disregarding the wishes of singular members.

The aforementioned aims and characteristics of the pastoral power in use by the government/governance are going to be connected with Hindess’ next approach on apparatuses. Hindess previously noted and defined (in his work) in the context of Power, Domination and Government, two apparatuses: apparatus of government and apparatus of power. Hindess argues that the state seen as an apparatus of government “albeit one that in certain respects is both centralized and unusually powerful, suggests a different and more practical focus on the art of government, that is, on questions of what must be done in order to manage the affairs of a large and diverse population in the interests of the whole.”¹²⁶ The state as an apparatus of power – what Foucault¹²⁷ understands as ‘domination’ – seems to have different aims and characteristics: “[O]nce the state is securely in place, the ability of the ruler to impose his will can hardly be in doubt. In this view of the state’s capacities, the practical issues involved in the pursuit of governmental objectives [...] are of less significance than the question of right, of legitimacy and the normative basis of sovereignty, which define the conventional focus of political theory.”¹²⁸ As seen, the apparatus of government seem to be the backbone of the governance that focuses more on concentrating power in actions that would bring the wealth of the governed, while the apparatus of power seem to be the foundation of the dominating governance that focuses more on the right to act and to control, not having a major focus on the members’ wishes and liberties.

After looking at the outlines of the pastoral power and at the two apparatuses, we observe that the former has the duties of the apparatus of government, yet the claims of the apparatus of power.

After looking at the characteristics of pastoral power according to Hindess, let us look at what Foucault actually says about it in major lines, in order to further conceive graspable tools from this theoretical concept. He starts the concept of pastoral power from the idea of governing men in the Greek cities on one hand, and in the East-Mediterranean on the other¹²⁹. He immediately compares the characteristics of the Gods of the two geographical regions, and subsequently the requirements of the leaders (resembling the Gods) for governing the regions and the people – these two dimensions are soon going to be differentiated.

When talking about the characteristics of the God(s) in the Greek cities, Foucault says: “The Greek God is a territorial god, a god *intra muros*, with his privileged place, his town or temple. [...] The Greek God, rather, appears on the walls to defend his town.”¹³⁰ He points out that in the Greek cities the king (as a reflection of or the chosen of the God of the city) was the direct governor of the city and indirectly of the people. Foucault, by mentioning King Oedipus, compared the city with a ship, and the ruler as the helmsman (or the pilot) that avoids the ship from getting into riffs or storms, or being attacked by pirates, and that ultimately

¹²⁵ Hindess in Nola, 72

¹²⁶ Hindess in Nola, 69

¹²⁷ Foucault, *Society*

¹²⁸ Hindess in Nola, 68

¹²⁹ Foucault, *Security*, 122-125

¹³⁰ Foucault, *Security*, 125

brings it into safe ports for its wealth¹³¹. As we could see, the ruler is not in charge of the lives of those inside the city, but of the safety and wealth of the city itself. In this context, Foucault actually defines the characteristics and prerogatives of power: “[I]n Greek thought anyway, and I think also in Roman thought, the duty to do good was ultimately only the one of the many components characterizing power. Power is characterized as much by its omnipotence, and by the wealth and splendor of the symbols with which it clothes itself, as by its beneficence. Power is defined by its ability to triumph over enemies, defeat them, and reduce them to slavery. Power is also defined by the possibility of conquest and by the territories, wealth, and so on it has accumulated. Beneficence is only one of a whole bundle of features by which power is defined.”¹³² It seems that the other characteristics of power are not ultimately good, despite being in the benefit of both the ruler and the city, and subsequently of the inhabitants of the city.

When Foucault talks about the Gods of the Assyrians, Egyptians or Jews, he comprises them under the Hebrew God; he refers to God as the shepherd, and the population under his rule as the flock, using this metaphor constantly: “The shepherd’s power is not exercised over a territory but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one place to another. The shepherd’s power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement. [...] The Hebrew God [...] is the God moving from place to place, the God who waders. The presence of the Hebrew God is never more intense and visible than when his people are on the move, and when, in his people’s wanderings, in the movement that takes them from the town, the prairies, and pastures, he goes ahead and shows his people the direction they must follow. [...] The Hebrew God appears precisely when one is leaving the town, when one is leaving the city walls behind and taking the path across the prairies.”¹³³ This is the actual place where Foucault refers to pastoral power. He continues by saying that the shepherd does everything not in his own benefit, but for the sake of the flock, and therefore the shepherd “serves the flock and must be intermediary between the flock and pasture, food and salvation, which implies that pastoral power is always a good in itself.”¹³⁴

Now that we have defined briefly Foucault’s approach on pastoral power and on the Greek thought, both in the context of governing men, we are going to further define their uses, but not before specifying a connection between these thoughts. Given the fact that both views are considered in the context of governing men, we see the Greek thought as part of the pastorate, not specifically in the sense of shepherd-flock metaphor, but in the sense of bringing the city to wealth and goodness together with the inhabitants by the ruler which can play the role of the shepherd. In support of this claim, we want to point out that Foucault himself argued that “All of these reflections on governmentality, this very vague sketch of the pastorate, should not be taken as gospel truth.”¹³⁵ He also argued that these two views on the government of men are not necessarily opposed, and nor is either-one-or-the-other choice, but they intertwine in a grey area¹³⁶, and in support of this assertion, he talks about Plato’s works in which the idea of the ruler as a shepherd is constantly supported¹³⁷.

¹³¹ Foucault, *Security*, 122-123

¹³² Foucault, *Security*, 126

¹³³ Foucault, *Security*, 125

¹³⁴ Foucault, *Security*, 128

¹³⁵ Foucault, *Security*, 135

¹³⁶ Foucault, *Security*, 136

¹³⁷ Foucault, *Security*, 138-146

In the international context, we are going to use these two dimensions of the concept as the dynamic power of representation by a leader – the shepherd.

The first type of representation is related to the Greek thought on the ruler of the city. We see the city as a concept because it comprises a multitude of things (e.g. a territory, walls, buildings, institutions, the population etc.) into a singularity. Therefore, we are going to treat the city as an idea/concept, and the shepherd of the city as the leader that represents a particular idea. In this study, this dimension of the concept is going to be used whenever the power of representation of an idea is in use in international arena by an actor or group of actors. For the sake of convenience, this dimension of the concept is going to be called 'pastoral power *polis*' (*polis* means *city* in Greek).

The second type of representation is related to the Eastern-Mediterranean thought on the governing of men. This is more closely related to the Foucauldian metaphor of shepherd-flock, meaning that in this study we are going to use this concept whenever the power of representation of a framed group of people is in use in international arena by an actor or group of actors. For the sake of convenience, this dimension of the concept is going to be called *pastoral power eder* (*eder* means *flock* in Hebrew¹³⁸).

These two pastorates are not opposed, and therefore they can be both seen in use by the same actor or group of actors, but as it will be seen in the analysis, one might be a better description than the other.

Understanding Knowledge and Power in relation to Action and agency

This last conceptualization of power is the most comprehensive of our theoretical constructs. For practical reasons we have not provided this concept with a label. As it will be seen in the ensuing conceptualization, this concept will be applied as a tool through many sub-concepts.

Barry Hindess points out that "Michel Foucault insisted first, that there is no knowledge without the exercise of power and, second, that there is no power without knowledge."¹³⁹ Hindess makes the connection between this correlation of knowledge and power, on one hand, and on the other, the pretentious analysis of modern western government – all these while indicating the idea of knowledge of *society* (as a Foucauldian construct) intensely connected to liberalism.

When presenting the connection between power and knowledge, Robert Nola points out the different forms of power and knowledge connections and causality from the perspectives of various philosophers. First, Nola points towards a Baconian aphorism that can be understood in two ways: "[1] we only have the power (or ability) to bring about certain effects in nature if we *know that* particular causes bring about particular effects, or [2] if we *know how* to manipulate causes to bring about desired effects."¹⁴⁰ The bracketed numbers have been added. Afterwards, he mentions the "Aristotelian distinction between two sorts of knowledge: *knowing how to*, which denotes a human skill, ability, capacity, and sometimes power to do certain things [...]; and *knowing that* in which our knowledge in science and elsewhere has

¹³⁸ Search "flock": <http://biblehub.com/hebrew/5739.htm> accessed March 19, 2015

¹³⁹ Hindess in Nola, 63

¹⁴⁰ Nola, 110

propositional content”¹⁴¹. Nola eventually gets to the first result that power (P) is causally dependent on knowledge (K), therefore he uses $K \rightarrow P$ Thesis¹⁴² – in which the arrow shows the dependent causality relations. After briefly stating a Platonian thought, he gets to the reverse form of the previous thesis, therefore: $P \rightarrow K$ Thesis – in which the arrow shows the causal dependence between power and knowledge. “If the two theses of dependence are conjoined, then there is alleged to be a spiral-like interdependent link between sorts of power and particular bits of knowledge.”¹⁴³ In this study, whenever talking about knowledge and power relations, we are going to use this concept according to the spiral-conjoined understanding of these theses. Nevertheless, we are going to use knowledge with both the additional understandings of *how to* and *that* – differentiating them when applied in the analysis.

Let us briefly explain how knowledge has to be conceptually understood in this study – the explanation on how knowledge is going to be applied in the study will be revealed later in this subchapter. As stated above, knowledge is understood in a Baconian¹⁴⁴ manner (explained via the Foucauldian scholar Robert Nola¹⁴⁵) as *know how to* and *know that*, but the focus here is not on knowledge itself; the focus is on the understanding of knowledge by the actors, because the actors act according to their understandings of knowledge, more than on their knowledge alone. We needed to explain this, because we do not claim to be able to grasp knowledge in its most genuine form from actors – it would be both ill-advised and negligent to do so. This is the reason why we are looking for the actors’ agencies (within the empirical data) in order to uncover their understandings of knowledge (be it *how to* or *that*). Focusing on understanding of knowledge that is related to power, and can be seen in agency, also strengthens the study’s aim at answering the research questions which revolve around Brazil and Argentina’s understandings of power.

Now, in the same manner as knowledge had been explained, we are going to explain how power relations have to be conceptually understood in this study – how this concept is going to be applied in the study will be revealed later in this subchapter. As seen above, the applied relation between knowledge and power is almost inseparable, although the two are definitely distinct. We understand power as something dynamic and uncovered mainly in actions and agency, that is why we are conducting our analysis according to the actions and agency revealed in the empirical data, and that is also why power has to be understood as power relations (understood as power in action between international actors). Just as in the previous paragraph, we need to follow how the actors (Brazil and Argentina) understand power (based on their campaign) and thus we will be able to uncover their understandings of power. We do not claim to be able to grasp power in its genuine form, because we do not claim the universality of power – as neither Foucault does¹⁴⁶. We have already argued that in the international arena, actors act according to their understandings of power; and just as in the case of knowledge, power has two dimensions: power of the actor (PA), and power of other actors (PO). PA is how one actor understands its power to act, and respectively PO is how one actor understands the other actor’s power to act and react according to the actor’s agencies. Again, the focus stands on the understanding of power (relations/in action), and not on the power itself (which we find ungraspable).

¹⁴¹ Nola, 110

¹⁴² Nola, 111-115

¹⁴³ Nola, 111

¹⁴⁴ Nola, 110

¹⁴⁵ Nola, 110-111

¹⁴⁶ Foucault, *The Birth*, 3

As seen, most of the focus lays upon the understanding of knowledge and power relations, more than on knowledge and power alone. We are going to manage the analysis of the empirical data in a chronological manner, in order to see the actions and consequent reactions of Brazil and Argentina according to the construction of their campaigns in various international arenas (within the UN). It is essential to understand the cause-effect process of actions throughout the analysis because this process may uncover the understanding of knowledge and power relations of actors (i.e. mainly Brazil and Argentina) in the international arena. This understanding of knowledge and power relations might be unique to each actor, but nonetheless it is present in every actor before their actions – therefore actions depend on the understandings. Actions themselves generate new understandings of knowledge and power relations specific to each actor's previous action, or observation of other actions – understandings that they will use in their benefit and prudence; in short, they will further act according to their understanding, but we are not going to look in this study at this latter particular aspect.

The focus lay upon the action and agency (seen in the empirical data) and understanding of K/P (uncovered by analyzing the empirical data), and the fact that K/P are spirally-conjoined is a great shorthand that is going to be used in this study in the sense of a singularity. Just as in the causal dependence between K and P shown above by Nola, we are going to bring in the study the U and A dependence causality relations – in which U stands for Understanding (of both concepts), and A stands for Action (of the actor). Therefore, as briefly mentioned above, we see the U/A relation as causally dependent, therefore we argue the $U \rightarrow A$ Thesis – which shows the A's causal dependence on U. In other words, in the first thesis the actors' understanding of knowledge and power causes the actor to act in a particular manner. In a larger study that stresses over a longer period of time in which we could oversee the development of an actor, we could argue for the $A \rightarrow U$ relation, meaning that the understanding is based upon the experience of past actions; this relation is not relevant for this study, and therefore we are going to disregard it.

Now, we need to understand the different causations of K/P relations. We need to remember that K and P are both understandings of knowledge and power. For the sake of simplifying the relation, let us call the *know how to*, KH, and *know that*, KT. In this particular causality relation, K has to be understood as *knowledge*, *know(s)* and *knowing* at once. Seeing KH and KT, together with PA (power of the actor, explained above) and PO (power of the other actors, also explained above), we see the need to combine these dimensions of K/P in order to result into U (understanding).

We have presented and explained the conceptualization of knowledge and power, how they intertwine and how understanding and actions are interconnected. The method in which we are going to combine the dimensions of K and P, resulting into different U's, is going to be presented and explained in the Methodology chapter (page 20-21). These multiple dimensions might be better understood in a schema; therefore we will create one just for the sake of a better understanding.

Methodology

In this chapter we will present our approaches and strategies of answering the study's research questions. As demonstrated in the theory chapter (see pages 45-46) we have created a set of theoretical concepts, based mainly on Michel Foucault's¹⁴⁷ governmentality notions. The aim of the methodology is to frame the application of these to the answering of the study's research questions.

First we will outline the overall methodological framework. In the second part we will present the data corpus, the process of collecting it, and how we are going to handle the data in the analysis. In parts three and four will be presentations of the methodological tools and how these are going to be applied. First (in part three) we will present the overall approaches and how these relate to our theory. In part four we will present the structure of analysis.

The overall framework

The main methodological framework is discourse analysis focused on how power and governmentality are understood and utilized within the UN arena. The present study is built upon Foucault's¹⁴⁸ and what we have labeled Foucauldian scholars' treatments and analyses of discourse, power and governmentality. The resulting theoretical concepts materialized as hybrids/conjunctions between power and governmentality.

Having briefly introduced the chosen application of discourse, Foucault¹⁴⁹ and Foucauldians, we now need to define these labels, as well as our approach to the notions of power and governmentality. We also need to clarify what is meant by 'The UN arena' and 'The UN framework', as the UN will be treated as an important frame for discursive agency in the analysis. We have called the components of the framework 'pillars'.

Pillar 1: Discourse analysis

As the study's main influent is Michel Foucault¹⁵⁰, we will present a statement of his that deals with both a definition of discourse, and a description of the task of the discourse analyst:

"A task that consists of not - of no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe"¹⁵¹

In the study discourses will be viewed as texts and as representation and/or results of actions. We believe that context is a very important aspect of our chosen approach to discourse analysis, and therefore we want to relate discursive agency to the surrounding contexts of the discourses, e.g. the UN as whole, the UNSC or the Brazil/Argentina relationship regarding Brazil's campaign. The argumentation will be more

¹⁴⁷ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹⁴⁸ Michel Foucault, *Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on language*, Trans. from French by A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York, USA: Pantheon Books 1972)

¹⁴⁹ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹⁵⁰ Foucault, *Archeology*

¹⁵¹ Foucault, *Archeology*, 49

transparent and understandable when knowing that we look for how the discourse are seen as related to [and thus constructing] the context.

When talking about discourse in relation to action(s), we should briefly mention some epistemological aspects of this. Rodney H. Jones and Sigrid Norris, introduces Mediated Discourse Analysis (MDA) as an approach to understanding discourses as/in actions. They aim to analyze social situations rather than merely texts. "The reason is that 'meaning' does not so much reside in the discourse itself, but rather reside in the actions people take with it".¹⁵² This view of discourses we will not apply, as we would have to go far outside of our data to learn about the actions the data produced. As mentioned in the introduction (see page 4-5) we seek to interpret how Brazil and Argentina understands power, and we aim to do it by analyzing how they act discursively within the UN regarding Brazil's campaign for UNSC permanency. Thus we will not be analyzing the social actions, that Jones and Norris targets in the MDA. This is a point of epistemological difference from MDA. Norris and Jones want to keep a distance to the concepts of 'context'. They believe this notion is not good enough for analyzing discourse as a social action, whereas we view context as a way of securing, that we do not analyze the actions caused by discourses instead of the discourses themselves. Norris and Jones point to e.g. Fairclough as one looking for discourse and action, but ending up "caught" inside discourse as text.¹⁵³ Based on the present study, Norris and Jones would most likely place us under the same criticism.

As the study is constructed on notions from Foucault,¹⁵⁴ we wish to bring two quotes from him, which we believe qualify our position of seeing discourse as representing action, in relation to power and governmentality.

1: Governmentality: "[...] it [governmentality] is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved."¹⁵⁵

2: Power: "The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, [...] does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, [...]"¹⁵⁶.

The best coining of our approach towards discourses as actions via contexts is to label it interpretivism. As we analyze the contexts, as parts of the discursive agency, the results will be based on our subjective interpretations. A key word is: understanding. Alan Bryman talks about Max Weber's *verstehen* when describing the focus on the analyzed actors' view of his actions.¹⁵⁷ So we are also taking about a hermeneutic approach, to target this type of understanding, as we will be going back and forth between

¹⁵² Sigrid Norris and Rodney H. Jones, *Discourse in Action: Introducing Mediated Discourse Analysis*, (Abingdon UK: Routledge 2005) 4

¹⁵³ Norris and Jones, 107

¹⁵⁴ Foucault, *Archeology*

¹⁵⁵ Michel Foucault in Burchell et al., *The Foucault effect studies in governmentality*, (Chicago USA: The university of Chicago Press 1991), 95

¹⁵⁶ Michel Foucault. "The subject and power", *Critical inquiry*. Vol. 8. No.4. 1982, 788

¹⁵⁷ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 4th ed. (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press 2012) 18

context and discourse. The context we generally will view the discourses in relation to, is the contexts of the Brazilian campaign for UNSC permanency and/or the Argentinean opposition to it.

Going back to Foucault's descriptions of discourses, let's briefly touch upon his notions about what discourses are not: "I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language."¹⁵⁸ We subscribe to the notion of not simplifying the concept of discourse to a conjunction of language and reality, with both phenomena impacting each other. This is another reason why we have chosen to be interpretative, and a reason for treating discourse as action. Action is more "alive" than the aforementioned conjunction of language and reality. Action is also more agenda prone, and this is where we again adhere to Fairclough's CDA, which seeks to reveal agenda's as well as understanding.¹⁵⁹

The choice of conducting the research as an analysis of discursive action, with focus on interpretation of understanding, was made, as we believe that the academic understanding of power should be based on the analyzed actors' understanding of power. In prolongation of this point we also believe that statements – which are what the majority of our selected data consists of – do not mainly project intentional messages but more so reveals perceptions [of the powers of self and others].

Pillar 2: Power and governmentality

Power and governmentality are concepts which contain high degrees of complexity and potential applicability. One might argue that they should be separated to enhance the understanding, but in this study's theoretical framework, they are so strongly connected that they best be dealt with together. In the introduction (see page 4-5) governmentality is presented, by reference to Foucault¹⁶⁰, as the conduct of men and an analytical grid for relations of power. It is thus somehow a means to the understanding of applied power.

The theoretical concepts we created mainly focuses on how to understand governmentality through the means of (understanding of) power, which makes power a means of understanding governmentality. The two concepts have been intertwined in this manner, as we believe this reinforces our idea of a hermeneutic or holistic study. We wish to have our discoveries of understood governmentality and the (re)actions based on this, to be influencing our discoveries of understood power and the (re)actions based this – and vice versa. This notion, we believe, is in accordance with a strong elaboration about power from Foucault¹⁶¹ in 1982. Here power is described as non-static and as an action towards other(s) action(s).

This description of power relates to our aim of revealing when Brazil and Argentina act according to their understanding of their own power, and when they act according to their understanding of the powers of other actors.

"The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not

¹⁵⁸ Foucault, *Archeology*, 48

¹⁵⁹ Fairclough, 40-41

¹⁶⁰ Foucault, *The Birth*

¹⁶¹ Foucault, *The subject*

exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, [...]. In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.”¹⁶²

When Foucault mentions “a way in which certain actions modify others”¹⁶³, we believe that this can be seen as analogous to governmentality i.e. “the conduct of men and an analytical grid for the relations of power.”¹⁶⁴ Via the processes described in the ensuing parts of this methodology chapter, we will further show how power and governmentality correlates in our selected data.

Power and governmentality in IR

We need to talk about the methodological conjunction of conventional IR and a Foucauldian discourse study of power and governmentality. We have chosen to look for power at the collective level (as opposed to the individual level). According to Lene Hansen, this is an important methodological choice, when conducting a poststructuralist analysis of power in IR, influenced by Foucault.¹⁶⁵

As a conventional IR theorist Audie Klotz introduces her co-authored book ‘Qualitative Methods in International Relations – A pluralist guide’, as a way of promoting a less narrow minded methodological approach. She wants to bridge the gap between different methodologies within IR.¹⁶⁶ Klotz goes on to state that: “We may still disagree on procedures and standards, but dialogue over methodology forces us to state the goals of our research, clearly define our core concepts, and set out our theoretical assumptions.”¹⁶⁷ This is a good example of the recognition that possible conjunctions of different methodologies can be beneficial to the field of IR, if the methodological constructions are transparent. Klotz focuses intensely on constructivism as the approach which deconstructs essentialism.¹⁶⁸ We are in agreement with this, and that is a main reason for our subscription to constructivist ontology. As the Foucault¹⁶⁹ quote brought in the former section about power being a non-universal phenomenon (see page 30), essentialism should in the case of power and governmentality be avoided. In IR constructivism power can be seen as “[N]ot only the ability of one actor to get another actor to do, what they would not do otherwise, but also the production of identities, interests, and meanings that limit the ability of actors to control their fate.”¹⁷⁰

The poststructuralist definition of collective power in IR, as a means of government¹⁷¹, and the just mentioned constructivist description of power in IR, as a source of identity construction and limitation of actors’ conduct, provides us with possible influence of IR in the analysis. We wish to show how active construction of group identities are taking place, and how conduct (governmentality) influences the agency and represented ideology of international actors.

¹⁶² Foucault, *The subject*, 788-789

¹⁶³ Foucault, *The subject*, 788

¹⁶⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*, 186

¹⁶⁵ Baylis and Smith, 174

¹⁶⁶ Klotz and Prakash, introduction

¹⁶⁷ Klotz and Prakash, 2

¹⁶⁸ Klotz and Prakash, 57

¹⁶⁹ Foucault, *The subject*

¹⁷⁰ Baylis and Smith, 162

¹⁷¹ Baylis and Smith, 172

We will demonstrate the specificities of how we aim to solve this task in the coming sections, but will here present a methodological hypothesis. The aforementioned approach was transparently constructed based on methodological notions of IR constructivism and poststructuralism. The fulfillment of the task seems to also call for the implementation of realist, liberalist and regionalist methodological considerations. This postulate we believe is warranted by the study's area foci (UNSC reform, Brazil and Argentina). The focus on the UNSC should include a realist methodological approach of focusing on states as the most important actors, as the UNSC is a body consisting of represented states. At the same time it cannot be ruled out that ideational aspirations influences the UNSC (e.g. human rights, democracy), and therefore a liberalist approach of defining ideas and their influence on discourses, should also be included in the analysis. Brazil and Argentina is part of the same geographical region. As we have discussed they do not always agree on the framing of this region (see answers in IR page 7-8), but it seems that their agency also should be analyzed via an inclusion of how regional factors, has been constructed and have been of influence. We believe that our focus on the understanding of the analyzed actors' (via texts) understandings of power, as opposed to searching for how the aforementioned –isms are being manifested, ensures the general inclusion of the aforementioned perspectives.

The main notion of this section has been to validate power and governmentality as concepts which promote methodological inclusion of multiple approaches, and at the same time as concepts that call for transparent methodological planning of analysis. Now the fourth and last of pillars of the overall framework will be described.

Pillar 3: The UN

We have referred to and will be referring to the UN framework or the UN arena on many occasions. This framing of the UN means that we are analyzing the understanding and agency of Brazil and Argentina in relation to Brazil's campaign for a UNSC seat, and that we are doing it by looking at official UN documents. This means that all our analyzed material has been created with the awareness, that it would be publicized. The implications of this are that we will not be allowed to analyze what is going on behind closed doors. Although we call the UN transcripts diplomacy, they actually consist of public diplomacy.

The UN as selected arena of analysis helps with the framing of power and governmentality. We have constructed the theoretical concepts, in such manners that they will promote the understanding of discursive action, both when it is directed towards the UN as an organization and when it is directed to other actors. As is the case with every other pillar, we will have to be precise and transparent, when constructing and treating hypotheses about how discursive construction of and towards the UN can be seen in the data corpus.

Having now described the overall framework of the analysis, we will move on to a presentation of the data and the process of its collection, and a discussion of why we have chosen this body of data, and how we plan to treat it in the analysis.

Data – The actors/agents

In this section we will first present and discuss the data collection process. After this will be a presentation and discussion of the handling of the data.

The study aims at interpreting power and governmentality in the Brazilian campaign for UNSC permanency and in the Argentinean opposition against this. We want to analyze the two states' actions within the UN arena, and therefore the selected data is mainly made up by official UN documents.¹⁷² In the official document system (the ODS) of the United Nations (ods.un.org) we have sought for documents from 2014.¹⁷³

We have chosen to include the GA speeches of the two states' presidents at the 69th GA. President of Brazil Mrs. Dilma Rousseff (Dilma) spoke on the 24th of September 2014, as the first speaker of the general debate and the president of Argentina Mrs. Christina Kirchner also spoke in the general debate on the same day. These two speeches are parts of our data corpus.¹⁷⁴

We wished to expand the data corpus, but it is too big of a task to seek out every document that mentions Brazil and/or Argentina and the UNSC. Therefore we have chosen to include the names of specific alliance groupings, relevant to the question of UNSC reforms, in our search for data. The search for documents that includes the mentioning of these groups, assumes the function of guiding our search for documents in the direction of; debates that includes Brazilian and/or Argentinean discursive agency regarding reform of the UNSC.

The debate in the UN about a reform of the UNSC, and about which states should potentially be included in an expansion, includes agendas and actions from a number of international alliances.¹⁷⁵ The most influential alliances in which Brazil and Argentina are members are: Brazil: 'the group of four' (G4), 'BRICS' and L69, and Argentina: 'Uniting for Consensus' (UfC). Before explaining the how we applied those names in our search for data, we will very briefly explain the agenda of these groups.

As mentioned in the study's introduction (see page4-5) Brazil's campaign for a permanent UNSC seat officially began as part of a resolution draft by a group of states calling themselves 'the group of four' (commonly known as G4). The G4 (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan) promotes the idea of six added permanent seats to the UNSC, of which the four members of G4 should all receive one.¹⁷⁶ In 2011 the G4 made a specific reform proposal and claimed to have back up from a majority of the GA. The proposal did not have the promoted backup and it received sharp criticism from a number of UfC member states.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Documents available for the public via the online UN document database and categorized in the UN system official UN documents.

¹⁷³ All searches were carried out as described in the text and the footnotes. When describing the actual process the search only for documents from 2014 is implied and therefore not specified. To search for documents from 2014 in the ODS system, one has to carry out a search e.g. as described in our footnotes, and then click '2014' in the right hand side of the screen.

¹⁷⁴ The speech of Cristina Kirchner was not in the UN database, so we found it on her official homepage: <http://www.cfkargentina.com/address-by-cristina-kirchner-at-un-general-assembly-2014/> accessed Apr. 11 2014

¹⁷⁵ Center for UN reform education, *Governing*, 23-60

¹⁷⁶ Also more claims were made in the resolution, see introduction page 4

¹⁷⁷ Richard Gowan and Nora Gordon, *Pathways to Security Council Reform*, (New York University, NY: 2014) 29

The BRICS' (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) agenda towards reforming the UNSC is not clear regarding how it should be reformed. The group has however stated that the UN needs reform, including the UNSC, and the UN is the organization most often mentioned in official BRICS statements.¹⁷⁸

The L69 is a group of 42 states from Latin America, The Pacific, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This group advocates expansion to the UNSC, both in case of permanent seats, non permanent seat and in the case of veto power. Brazil is also a part of this group.¹⁷⁹

'Uniting for Consensus' is a group of which Argentina is a member. UfC opposes any addition of permanent members to the UNSC¹⁸⁰, it is the only group that officially opposes this as a part of a reform.¹⁸¹ UfC does not have an official listing of members but 12 states is commonly seen as the agenda setters, these 12 include Argentina, Mexico, Columbia and Costa Rica from Latin America.¹⁸²

We searched the ODS for documents from 2014 containing the at least one of the phrases: 'Uniting for Consensus', "the group of four", "L 69", and "BRICS"¹⁸³. It could have been interesting to include the analysis of all statements from all member states of these alliances, but the time and space does not suffice. Therefore we will select documents containing statements from representatives of Brazil and/or Argentina, or official statements from the groups where it can be documented that Brazil or Argentina is represented.¹⁸⁴ We will now present an overview of the documents our search produced and how we chose to include or exclude the texts that were found.

"Uniting for consensus" in 2014.

This search provided five documents. One document contains only one mentioning of 'Uniting for Consensus' which is the Italian representative stating Italy's membership of the group.¹⁸⁵ Neither Brazil, Argentina nor any representative speaking on behalf of any of the aforementioned alliances makes statements in this document, and therefore it will not be included in the data corpus.

Another document that was excluded was the second part (the afternoon meeting) of a GA meeting discussing 'equitable representation in the UNSC'. In this part 2 of the meeting¹⁸⁶, no statements are made by Argentina, Brazil or by any of the alliances we have chosen to focus on.

Exclusion was made of a document that presented an overview over starting times, venues and agenda's of GA meetings.¹⁸⁷ The meetings mentioned here, are the other meetings recorded in the other four documents, which we describe in this part.

¹⁷⁸ Leslie Elliot Armijo and Cynthia Robert. "The Emerging Powers and Global Governance and why the BRICS matters", in Robert E. Looney, *Handbook of Emerging Economies*, (Abingdon UK: Routledge 2014) 511-513

¹⁷⁹ Center for UN reform education, *Governing*, 22-24

¹⁸⁰ Center for UN reform education, *Governing*, 3

¹⁸¹ Gowan and Gordon, *Pathways*, 29

¹⁸² Gowan and Gordon, *Pathways*, 29

¹⁸³ ods.un.org; 'access ODS without logging in'; 'basic search'; "Uniting for Consensus", "the group of four", "L 69" and "BRICS" accessed March 02. 2015

¹⁸⁴ If the UfC makes a statement, we assume that Argentina is represented as Argentina officially is a member of the groups. The same assumptions are made regarding Brazil and the groups: L 69, BRICS and G4.

¹⁸⁵ UN 69th GA, 25th Sept. 2014. UN document: A/69/PV.9 p 37.

¹⁸⁶ UN 69th GA, 12th Nov. 2014. UN document: A/69/PV.50

The two documents included in the data corpus out of the five found based on the search for ‘uniting for consensus’ are:

1. GA meeting on reform of the UNSC, held Sept. 8 2014. Document title: UN A/68/PV./106
 - The representative from Brazil made a statement.

2. GA Meeting held Nov. 12. 2014. Document title: A/69/PV.49
 - The representative from Brazil made a statement, on behalf of the G4
 - The representative from Argentina made a statement

“The Group of Four” in 2014

This search also produced five documents. Four out of the five documents which also includes the phrase ‘Uniting for Consensus’ were produced by this search. One of these is the document containing a schedule of meetings,¹⁸⁸ and again we excluded this document. Another document found in this search and the search for ‘Uniting for Consensus’ was the aforementioned part II of a meeting, without any statements from the actors of our focus. This document was again excluded.¹⁸⁹ Out of the now three remaining documents we also chose to exclude a transcript from a GA meeting, where the only mentioning of ‘The Group of Four’ is by the representative of India, listing a number of groups within the UN arena.¹⁹⁰ The agenda or the statements at this meeting do not concern the UNSC, and neither Argentina nor Brazil is speaking, nor is anybody representing any of the group in focus.

The result of this search is the inclusion of the same two documents as the search for ‘Uniting for Consensus’.

“L 69” in 2014

Seven documents are produced by this search. One document is the aforementioned part II of a GA meeting,¹⁹¹ this is again excluded. Part I of the meeting is also a product of this search, as the two earlier searches, and is again included. Two of the documents are schedules as was the one excluded from the two earlier searches. These two new schedules are both excluded.¹⁹²

Two other of the seven documents are records from part I and II of a UNSC meeting. The meeting is led by the, at that time, Argentinean president for the UNSC, Mrs. Perceval. No statements other than opening and closure of the meeting are made by Mrs. Perceval, and no statements are made on behalf of any of the groups we have been focusing on in the searches. In part II of the meeting, the Brazilian representative makes a statement. Thus we have excluded part I, and included part II of this meeting. Many times in the meeting a reference is made to a letter from the Argentinean representation. This letter¹⁹³ is also included.

¹⁸⁷ Journal of the United Nations. Programme of meetings and agenda, UN document: No. 2014/218

¹⁸⁸ Journal of the United Nations Programme of meetings and agenda, UN document: No. 2014/218

¹⁸⁹ UN 69th GA, 12th Nov. 2014. UN document: A/69/PV.50

¹⁹⁰ UN 69th GA, 25th Sept. 2014 UN document: A/69/PV15, 17.

¹⁹¹ UN 69th GA, 12th Nov. 2014. UN document: A/69/PV.50

¹⁹² UN 69th GA, 24th Oct. 2014. UN document: JOURNAL NO.2014/204 and UN 69th GA, 2nd Jul.2014. UN document: A/AC.172/2014/L.2

¹⁹³ UN Document: S/2014/725

Searching for L 69 also resulted in a GA meeting discussing the report from the UNSC.¹⁹⁴ At this meeting a statement from Brazil was made, but no statements from Argentina or by any state as a representative of any of our groups in focus, were given. We have included this document in the data corpus.

The result of this search is the inclusion of one of the two documents already included and the addition of the following documents:

1. UNSC meeting part II on the UNSC working methods, held Oct. 23 2014. Document title: S/PV/7285 (resumption 1)
 - The representative from Brazil made a statement
2. GA Meeting held Nov. 21. 2014. Document title: A/69/PV.58
 - The representative from Brazil made a statement
3. Letter calling a UNSC meeting dated Oct. 8. 2014. Document title: S/2014/725
 - The Argentinean UNSC presidency called the meeting

“BRICS” in 2014

The search for documents from 2014 containing the word “BRICS” produced 97 results. Here we made a choice of simply including a declaration statement from a BRICS meeting on UNSC reform. This declaration was delivered in the UN by Brazil on behalf of the BRICS. The 96 other documents we have chosen to exclude. Some might have been better, but we chose one were we feel secure that the linkage between Brazil, BRICS and the UNSC agenda is present.

The result of this search is the inclusion of the following document:

1. Declaration from BRICS to the GA and the UNSC on reform of the UNSC etc.

As mentioned we have chosen to include the speeches from the presidents of Argentina and Brazil. The searches in the UN database resulted in the choice of six documents. We have also chosen to include a press release from the G4 states about UNSC reform. This is not an official UN document.

The study targets mainly the Brazilian agency, and places the Argentinean role in the secondary position. This position is reflected in the collection of data, wherein the number of documents containing statements from Brazilian representatives or from groups representing Brazil (7) outnumbers documents containing statements from Argentina or from groups representing Argentina (2)¹⁹⁵. We think it is possible to still point to interesting discursive agency from Argentina, in the two cases were representatives from Argentina speaks. The documents that will make the data corpus for the study are the following:

1. BRICS statement to the GA and the UNSC from Aug. 21. 2014
2. Record of GA meeting held Sept. 8. 2014

¹⁹⁴ UN 69th GA, 21st Nov. 2014. UN document: A/69/PV.58.

¹⁹⁵ We place the letter from the Argentinean presidency of the UNSC as not representing Argentina.

3. *Record of GA speech from Brazil president Ms. Dilma Rousseff held Sept. 24. 2014*
4. *Record of GA speech from Argentina president Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner held Sept. 24. 2014*
5. *Joint G4 press statement presented Sept. 25. 2014*
6. *Letter from Argentina as UNSC president calling a meeting, dated Oct. 8. 2014*
7. *Record of UNSC meeting held Oct. 23. 2014 part two*
8. *Record of GA meeting held Nov. 12. 2014*
9. *Record of GA meeting held Nov. 21. 2014*

The choice of focusing on the most recent phase of Brazil's campaign,[which we have framed as being 2014] is based on the epistemological presumption that the most recent phase is the most relevant, for conceptualizing contextual power and make valid claims about the campaign, in a way that is as relevant and up to date.

We wish to conceptualize power to apply it analytically within the chosen UN/UNSC/2014 context. A study of the history or the evolvement of the Brazilian campaign would be more of a genealogical study¹⁹⁶. Such a study would no doubt be of interest and relevance, but revealing and analyzing discursive genealogy, history and evolvement would not contribute the same knowledge as a study of the most recent phase. A study of a more genealogical character, focusing on the history and evolvement of the campaign, could provide knowledge about discursive strategic choices having been made by the Brazilian government. A study, as the present study, focusing on the most recent phase is more prone to revealing a "snapshot" of the actual, more contemporary and in many senses more relevant contextual (understandings of) power. If the aim is to reveal how Brazil and Argentina understands power and how this understanding can be related to the agency of these two states, in relation to the Brazilian campaign and within the UN arena, then we believe that a genealogical, historical and evolutionary overview and timeline approach, is not as beneficiary as a study that tries to reveal more up to date statuses and perceptions of power.

Also the amount of space and time available does not seem to allow for a study which seeks to include fully both Argentina and Brazil and the understandings of power, and the two states' agency in relation to this understanding of power over a longer period. As stated in the introduction, Brazil's call for a permanent seat was launched in 2004, but only in recent years has the UN made serious structural and organized attempts at speeding up the process of reforming the UNSC. As recently as 2010, the first negotiation text was framed, a text which is still not universally accepted as valid.¹⁹⁷ One could argue that any (discursive) agency prior to 2010, should be looked at differently than after 2010, because of the existence of a negotiation text. The mentioned text is not very concrete; it mainly concludes that the need for a reform of the UNSC is growing, and that both structure and working methods of should be considered as being ripe for change.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ E.g. the focus on how different terms and/or concepts has been used or conceptualized by Brazil over a period of time: see Dianna Taylor, *Michel Foucault: Key Concepts*, (Durham UK: Acumen 2011) 112

¹⁹⁷ Center for UN reform education, *Governing*, 23

¹⁹⁸ Gowan and Gordon, *Pathways*, 22

2015 is by many member states seen as the year where reforms have to be achieved. It is the UN's 70th anniversary, it will be 50 years since any reforms of the UNSC has occurred and it will be the 10 year anniversary of the world summit, where the official UN efforts for creating serious discussions about a reform of the UNSC was initiated.¹⁹⁹ Not only are these emblematic motivations in place for 2015, but critical voices of the UNSC seems to be (at an all time) high, and member states are more than ever criticizing the UNSC, and officially calling for a reform, not least because of what has been labeled as the paralysis of the UNSC on the Syrian question. Based on our wish for up to date focus and the transparent choice of somewhat disregarding discursive genealogy, we have chosen a recent phase focus which we believe can be defended via the aforementioned intrinsic UN trending towards reform discussions.

The data corpus presented will be the basis for a qualitative approach as the documents are records of speeches and statements that has been presented physically, and open letters and statements that has only been presented as text. We believe that interpreting the discursive action of these varying text types, can best be achieved via a qualitative approach. Therefore we will analyze examples from the texts, to show the presence of discursive actions as opposed to a more corpus based analysis²⁰⁰, which could document tendencies, but might lack in documenting emphasis from agent producing the texts. The data do present a somewhat quantitative value. When considering that we are looking only at 2014, the data selected covers the majority of mentioning of G4, UfC and L69 within official UN documents from that year [but of course not close to all of the mentioning of Brazil and Argentina from 2014]. A more quantitative approach could have afforded findings overlooked by the qualitative approach chosen.

Although aiming for in depth analysis, the data corpus is large. This presents us with the problem that we cannot go into deep analyses of every interesting discursive action. We will try to be selective in a transparent manner, as to focusing on the discursive activity which mostly relates to the study's focus.

The process of collecting data and creating theoretical concepts (see pages 14-27) is related to the Grounded Theory methodology. This refers to a process of influence from data to theory and vice versa, and the groupings of data and coding of concepts being carried out in a circular process. According to Alan Bryman grounded Theory is about the interdependency and influence between data and theory²⁰¹, and although we have prioritized the Foucauldian inspiration before the data collection, the theory has been constructed with the UNSC, Brazil, Argentina (the international groupings) and the UN framework in mind, which we have shown as being the core concepts of our selected data. Therefore the theory has been influenced by the data, and remains flexible in the sense that it can be refined by our results. This is an aspect we will consider in the analysis, and include mainly in the discussion (see page 100-102).

Handling the data

The data will be analyzed either in chapters of the analysis, either containing one document or a grouping of two documents. In the final chapter of the analysis (see page 95-99) we will emphasize the influence of the results from different parts on each other.

¹⁹⁹ Gowan and Gordon, *Pathways*, 4-5

²⁰⁰ For a presentation of the possible benefits of applying corpus based analysis see: Lynn Flowerdew in James Paul Gee and Michael Handford, *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, (Abingdon, Oxon UK: Routledge 2012) 174-189

²⁰¹ Bryman, 541

When a piece of data is referred to in the analysis, it will be labeled as: example no.1, 2, 3 etc. (ex 1), appendix (app.) number 1, 2, 3 etc. and page number. The directions for reference will be showcased in a parenthesis following the part of the text which requires a reference. This will be the procedure for all references and quotations. When examples from the data are included for analysis, we will write line numbers at the left hand side, to make reference back to the examples more clear. This we will do if the examples are 4 lines or longer, as exemplified below:

(1)“The first, clearest and most basic is the absolute necessity of reforming the Security Council and
(2)ending the status quo. An unreformed Council is obsolete. Its loss of legitimacy, effectiveness and
(3)relevance affects the entire Organization. [...] the Council’s working methods being a clear example
(4)that we must work to improve and make more transparent.”

At the beginning of each part of the analysis, it will be specified which pieces of data are the main objects of analysis. If pieces of data from other sections of the analysis are included in the section, these will be referred to, when applied

Example of introductory specification of data objects:

6. Addressing the UNSC reform

Data:

- Sept. 25th 2014, public/press statement from a ministerial G4 meeting to the 69th UN GA assembly (app.7.)
- Oct. 23rd 2014, UNSC meeting about UNSC working methods and treatment of a letter from the Argentinean representation to the UN secretary General from Oct. 8th 2014 (app.8.)

Examples of reference to and quoting from main object(s) in analysis:

- The statement by the Argentinean representative points to the intended deconstruction of the democratic validity of an expansion of permanent UNSC seats (app.8.p.15)
- The Nigerian representative’s states: “We are therefore pleased to see that that the Council’s working methods have evolved over the years to accommodate the concerns of the broader membership for greater transparency and closer engagement with non-members” (ex. 23 app.8.p.13.l.26-30)

As we embark on the interpretative analysis of the above mentioned documents, we will be referring to a number of actors. On some occasions we will refer to statements and present the specific origin of the statement (i.e. a person), but on most occasions we will refer to Brazil and Argentina as entities of agency. This means that we attribute the results of the present analysis to the entity in question. On most occasions there will be no cause of confusion as the description will be e.g. “the Italian representative speaking on behalf of the UFC”. Or “Based on the aforementioned statement, we see Brazil as promoting neo-

liberalism". The main point is that we will refer to both individual and collective origins of the statements, but it will always be as a means of understanding (the understanding of) power and governmentality in relation to or within the overall Brazilian or agendas, and therefore we will mainly refer to either Brazil or Argentina.

Moving on from the presentation of our data and the selection process, we will now present the analytical strategies of the study.

Overall approaches

This study is about interpreting and explaining the understanding of power and governmentality through discourse analysis. It is also about hermeneutically refining the Foucauldian concepts we have constructed, by testing them in the data. We believe such aims are best achieved by applying a varied and at the same time coherent analytical methodology. Variety should be applied to ensure a higher degree of validation for our results [as they will be tested via more than one methodological approach]. Coherence is achieved via the application of methodologies which aims at analyzing discourse and can be labeled as Foucauldian in their approaches.

The data corpus consists of speeches, statements and declarations. Parts of the data were delivered in speaking and some in writing. We will analyze them all as written documents. This means that certain speech acts²⁰² such as pausing and volume cannot be analyzed.

The main methodological approach for conducting a Foucault-oriented²⁰³ discourse analysis will be critical discourse analysis (CDA). This will be carried out mainly via Norman Fairclough's CDA methods.²⁰⁴

Teun Van Dijk presents methodological approaches in his chapter "Discourse and Ideology"²⁰⁵. One of Van Dijk's main emphases is the construction of 'group identity' / 'us' and 'them' groupings.²⁰⁶ As this analysis deals with the Brazilian construction of a campaign and the Argentinean opposition to this campaign, we want to find out how both sides portray/construct themselves and the other. The application of Van Dijk's tools will be explained in the part about 'Structure of Analysis' (see page 43).

The methodology of the analysis also includes the more specific political approach. Paul Chilton and Christina Schäffner present an approach to political discourse analysis (PDA).²⁰⁷ We will use this PDA approach to structure our analysis of the strategic functions of linguistics choices, which is what Chilton and Schäffner labels as the main overall objective of their PDA approach.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Paul Drew and Marja-Leena Sorjonen. "Dialogue in institutional Interactions", in Van Dijk, 190-92

²⁰³ Foucault, *The Birth*

²⁰⁴ Fairclough, 110ff

²⁰⁵ Van Dijk, 380

²⁰⁶ Van Dijk, 380-82

²⁰⁷ Paul Chilton and Christina Schäffner. "Discourse and Politics", in Van Dijk, 303

²⁰⁸ Chilton and Schäffner in Van Dijk, 312

As it will be explained in 'Structure of analysis'(see pages 43) the CDA approach will be the dominating one, as we believe that PDA and ideological discourse focus can be implemented in a structure based on a specific CDA approach suggested by Fairclough.²⁰⁹ Applying CDA as the main structural frame promotes the necessity of briefly discussing a certain epistemological issue. What is 'critical' about CDA? And why should we assume such a critical approach for this study?

Teun Van Dijk states that other approaches within the field of discourse studies might also assume critical perspectives, but that CDA analysts explicitly promote the notion that no science can be value-free.²¹⁰ This means that in all discourses are found agency related to power/social relations. He goes on to state what the requirements of CDA are, and concludes these by saying: "More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society."²¹¹ James Paul Gee targets the question of the criticalness of CDA, and proposes that non-critical discourse analysis target the construction of social relationships in texts, but mainly to the point of documenting its occurrences. The critical discourse analysis, according to Gee, points also to the occurrence of constructed social relationships, but goes further and analyzes the implications of such constructions e.g. status, wealth, and the distribution of social goods.²¹²

We subscribe to these explanations of what is critical about CDA, i.e. the focus on how power is constructed and upheld in discourse, in comparison with other discourse analyses. The data corpus, selected for this study, is taken from an arena (the UN) where the member states constantly are engaged in debates about and formulations of policies, goals and resolutions. Analyzing discourses in texts taken from and related to this arena will most likely reveal constructions of social relationships / positions of power, as most of the time such activity promotes the construction of donors, receivers of donations, victims, missions of experts etc. But as we target to interpret how power is understood by Brazil and Argentina, in a specific context, we should target the uncovering of representations and constructions of power in the texts we analyze, and the implications of these regarding the Brazilian campaign.

The aspect that makes a critical approach imperative is that fact that we aim to connect the discursive agency we see in the analyzed texts, to the theoretical concepts of our own making. (see pages 14-27). This means that we have to pinpoint the construction of social/power relationships in the texts, and also describe the implications of these, in relation to the overall context [the Brazilian campaign and the Argentinean opposition]. This will be done via the aforementioned concepts, which revolve around understandings of power. For us to interpret the understandings of power, we need to do more than point to the presence of constructed positions of power.

Fairclough's states in 'Language and power': "[I]n analyzing texts, one's focus is constantly alternating between what is 'there' in the text, and the discourse type(s) which the text is drawing upon."²¹³ In the

²⁰⁹ Fairclough, 110ff

²¹⁰ Teun Van Dijk. "Critical Discourse Analysis" in Deborah Schiffrin et al., *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, (Malden MA USA: Blackwell Publisher 2001) 352-53

²¹¹ Van Dijk, Teun in Schiffrin et al., 353

²¹² James Paul Gee. "Discourse analysis: what makes it critical?" in Rebecca Rogers, *An introduction to critical discourse analysis in education* (Mahwah, N.J. USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2004), 23

²¹³ Fairclough, 110

present study, we see the discourses the text is drawing upon as the ones related to the understanding of power and governmentality.

Now that the methodological approach to the study's analysis have been presented as being CDA, PDA and a focus on ideologies and discourse, we wish to talk about these approaches in relation to methodological notions from Foucault²¹⁴, as he and his notions about power and governmentality makes up the theoretical framework of the study.

Foucault's methodological precautions

In the book 'Society must be defended'²¹⁵, is presented methodological precautions for analyzing power. Foucault²¹⁶ points to power as being analyzable, only if the analyst seeks to define its [powers'] transgressions and extremities. It seems clear that he is encouraging the search for expansive power (expanding across existing discursive limitations). Foucault also believes it is necessary to define peripheral bodies (peripheral to influence on the action of power)²¹⁷; when doing this, one will discover how subjects are being constructed as either central to power or peripheral to power. It seems that he wants to ensure that his precautions do not lead to essentialism or universalism regarding the understanding of power. This is also something we wish to avoid. After his mentioning of the center/periphery dichotomy, he explains that one should not distinguish between those who have power, and those who have not.²¹⁸ This fits well with the study's analysis of two main actors Brazil and Argentina, as we believe that both actors are constantly involved (with)in the construction of what power is, in relation to Brazil's campaign. It also fits with the notion that their understandings and actions of power vary according to the contexts, e.g. the UN as a whole, the UNSC or in an economic sense. In the concept of *war-panopticism* (see page 19) this means finding out, who is being constructed or perceived as "the prison guard" and who as the "prisoner" – and of course: how, in both cases.

As we have mentioned, we include a political focus in our overall discourse analytical approach. To once again relate our methodological choices to Foucault, we will talk briefly about his notion of "politics of truth". The main points of "The politics of Truth",²¹⁹ regarding analysis of governmentality, is summed up by Bröckling et al. as "[A]n epistemological-political field [...] that investigate the discursive operations, speakers' positions, and institutional mechanisms through which truth claims are produced."²²⁰ And also that "Studies of governmentality trace the contours of this productive power, which produces a specific (and always selective) knowledge [...]"²²¹. A main part of our analysis will be to seek for the how claims of truth a presented and constructed. This epistemological approach corresponds to our overall constructivist ontology, which reflects the position from Bröckling et al. that governmentality studies differ from political science and sociology as its main focus is the how the political realm is constructed/produced.²²²

²¹⁴ Foucault, *The Birth*

²¹⁵ Foucault, *Society*, 25-27

²¹⁶ Foucault, *Society*, 28

²¹⁷ Foucault, *Society*, 29

²¹⁸ Foucault, *Society*, 29

²¹⁹ Michel Foucault, *The politics of Truth*. Ed. by Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hoch Roth, (New York USA: Semiotext(e) 1997)

²²⁰ Bröckling et al., 12

²²¹ Bröckling et al.,

²²² Bröckling et al., 13

A way of securing an accurate Foucaultian and Foucauldian discourse analysis is to emphasize how the discursive construction of subjects, subjectivities, objects and objectivities are carried out.²²³ In this study we have framed the focus as being how this is done in relation to an overall object; the UNSC, and an overall agency; the Brazilian campaign / and the Argentinean opposition. We have presented the general discourse analytical implications of the theoretical framework and the study's area focus. We will now present the analysis' structural methodology. We have earlier stated that we target a hermeneutic circular method of understanding the implications of our theory (see page 14). This is to be achieved by going back and forth between theory and data via the methodology. This means that the methodology has to be flexible as well. This is one of the main reasons why CDA has been included, as it is "problem oriented" and "starts with a research topic" before it frames the entire methodology,²²⁴ and also because it's specific methodological suggestions are fit for interdisciplinary studies.²²⁵

We will now present an overview of how the presented methodological strategy will be structured

Structure of analysis

This part contains first a description of the methodical structure of chapters 1-7 of the analysis, followed by the description of a different structure to be applied in chapter 8.

Chapters 1-7

As mentioned Fairclough's CDA approach is the overall methodology for the analysis. This means that Chilton & Schäfer's PDA and the focus on ideological discourses taken from Van Dijk will be applied in a critical way, in the meaning of 'critical' which we have already referred to and explained. In this part we aim at explaining how we are going to combine the aforementioned discourse analytical approaches, as means of showing and interpreting the presence of the governmentality related understandings of power i.e. our own conceptualizations (see pages 14).

Fairclough suggests a method for CDA consisting of 10 questions to "ask" the texts. These are split into three main categories of focus:

1. Vocabulary features
2. Grammatical features
3. Textual structures²²⁶

When focusing on these features, Fairclough suggests that the analysts look for how experiential, relational, and expressive values are constructed in the texts. This search for values consists of a great number of discursive actions. We will explain the relevant aspects of the tools from Fairclough's CDA, as we apply them throughout the analysis. The general analytical process advocated in Fairclough's CDA is to look at the three main categories, and when looking at each of them, to look for the three aforementioned values. The three values are meant to promote the understanding of the following discursive action:

²²³ Van Dijk, 23, 380; Bröckling et al. 305-7; Ruth Wodak, *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics As Usual*, (Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 67, 78, 111

²²⁴ Van Dijk, 358-59

²²⁵ Wodak, *Discourse*, 33

²²⁶ Fairclough, 112

Experiential values = construction of knowledge and beliefs e.g. ideologies

Relational values = construction of social relations e.g. group relations

Expressive values = construction of social identities e.g. subjects and object roles²²⁷

The three areas combined with the three values will guide the structure of the analysis. The 10 questions bring different elements to the analysis²²⁸, and these will be applied in a manner which we believe best suits the overall focus of answering the research questions.

We will support the CDA analysis with features from Chilton & Schäfner's PDA approach. This will be done by looking also for three main features, what the authors refer to as 'strategic functions':

1. The search for discursive coercion and resistance
2. Legitimization and de-legitimization
3. Representation and misrepresentation²²⁹

The PDA focus will be applied mainly as a way of supporting the CDA by seeking for the mentioned 'strategic functions' in support of or combined with the findings from the CDA approach. As a general rule for the analysis, we seek to combine the two to subtract the most possible meaning from our selected data. The choice of assuming the overall critical approach will ensure an overall focus on the constructions of power relations, and thus the understanding of power and governmentality.

We include also specific tools from Teun Van Dijk's 'Discourse and Ideology'²³⁰ to support the CDA and PDA tools in the analysis. Van Dijk's approach will, in a simple manner, guide us to further analyzing discursive constructions of group relations in our selected data corpus, as Van Dijk emphasize how groupings of 'us' and 'them' are constructed.²³¹ Both CDA and PDA includes the search for construction of group identities, but we see the application of Van Dijk as a way of securing analytical focus on constructions of identities. This will help us analyze how Brazil and Argentina present and construct themselves regarding the agenda of UNSC reform.

The methods presented above have been chosen; as we believe the inherent combination of analytical tools make possible the search for our theoretical conceptualizations of power (see page 14). We will emphasize a holistic method of validation. This means that we will try to locate discursive agency, [related to our theoretical concepts of power] via a combination of tools from PDA, CDA and the 'ideological square'.

As it will be seen in the analysis, the texts that are analyzed are different in structure and substance. Therefore they will be analyzed via focus on how they relate to the Brazilian and Argentina agency, rather than through a pre-fixed sequence.

²²⁷ Fairclough, 112

²²⁸ Fairclough, 112

²²⁹ Chilton and Schäfner in Van Dijk, 312

²³⁰ Van Dijk, 379-404

²³¹ Van Dijk, 396

Chapter 8

The structure for the analysis of chapter 8 is different, but it is still related to the overall CDA approach applied in chapters 1-7. We will in chapter 8 not be analyzing text in the same manner as when applying the tools from Fairclough's CDA²³², but we will be analyzing the results of the already conducted CDA and PDA including the focus on ideology (see page 40). The terminology of the method is not Foucauldian, but rather rests on a historical tradition conceptualizing knowledge and power, which are areas that interested Foucault as well.²³³ Chapter 8 is theoretically and methodologically connected to chapters 1-7 as it, as mentioned, deals with results brought about through the analytical processes of chapters 1-7, and as mainly emphasizes the analyzed actors' [Brazil and Argentina] understandings of power as conceptualized by us. (see pages 14)

Having seen the method for the seven chapters of analysis, in this section we are going to show the method of analysis that we are going to use in the last chapter of analysis. As we discussed in the Theory section (see page 14), this theoretical concept contain different dimensions and different relations of knowledge and power that consequently provide different understandings. We are going to make use of the results of the previous seven chapters as a form of data that we are going to analyze in accordance to the following method. The positions of both Brazil and Argentina, seen in the results of the analyzed empirical data, will reflect their knowledge in relation to the intertwined international issues and own agendas, and will also reflect their use of discursive power to find solutions to the constructed international issues and strategies to achieve their agendas.

Our first relation is: KT (Knowing That) and PA (Power of Actor), which shows the actor's knowledge that it has power. In this relation we are looking for how Brazil and Argentina's actions showcase their knowledge of the presence of own power.

The second relation is: KH (Knowing How to) and PA (Power of Actor), which uncovers the actor's knowledge of how to make use of its own power. In this dimension we are looking for the agency of Brazil and Argentina when they act by their own (and not part of associations).

The third relation is: KT (Knowing That) and PO (Power of Others), which uncovers the actor's knowledge that other actors have power. In this relation we are looking for the agendas of the groupings and for opposing agendas of groupings, as reflected in our whole analysis – the focus is still going to lie upon the two countries' groupings.

The forth relation is: KH (Knowing How to) and PO (Power of Others), which uncovers the actor's knowledge of how to use the power of others. In this relation we are looking for the agency of the two countries when they act from within different groupings (BRICS, G4 and UfC).

The resulting understandings are going to be further tackled in the Discussion section (see page 100-102).

²³² Fairclough, 112

²³³ Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1991) 328

Chapter 1

The document to be analyzed is the Fortaleza Declaration given at the 69th General Assembly Security Council on the 21st of August 2014, by the Permanent Mission of Brazil on behalf of BRICS countries. The theme of this document is “Inclusive growth: sustainable solutions”.

Given the fact that this declaration contains 72 points which have multiple foci accordingly to the agenda items, we are going to arbitrarily select the points that we find relevant for answering the study’s RQ.

Brazil’s discursive agency from within the BRICS reveals certain aspects of power as they have been conceptualized in the theory section (pages 14) towards achieving a permanent seat in the UNSC (‘Answers in IR’ page 7). Further supporting this assertion, the agenda items of this document are mentioned on the first page, of which the item 123 represents “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”²³⁴. Therefore, we will be mostly looking at this aspect as it is of immediate and explicit relevance for answering the study’s RQ in relation to Brazil.

At the outset of the document, point no. 1, is presented the unity of the co authors of the document (BRICS):

“We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014 at the sixth BRICS summit.”(ex 1, app.1. p. 109)

Here is seen the manifestation of the BRICS, i.e. who this unit is, and this presentation is further strengthened as the recipients are told that “we” refers to the leaders of these countries. In Fairclough’s CDA is included the search for how grammar constructs social relations (*relational values of grammatical features*).²³⁵ Here we see the construction of an *exclusive we*, which Fairclough relates to a relationship of solidarity.²³⁶ It seems that Brazil and the rest of the BRICS appreciate the construction of ‘a relationship of solidarity’ regarding the issue of UNSC reform, and by looking at “we” + verb, we can see the unity of will and agency.

(1)“25. We reiterate our strong commitment to the United Nations as the fundamental multilateral
(2)organization entrusted with helping the international community maintain international peace and
(3)security, protect and foster human rights and promote sustainable development. The United Nations
(4)enjoys universal membership and is at the very centre of global governance and multilateralism. We
(5)recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1). We reaffirm the need

(6)for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council, with a view to
(7)making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can adequately respond to global
(8)challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to Brazil, India and South Africa’s
(9)status and role in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the United
(10)Nations.”(ex 2, app.1, p. 110)

²³⁴ Appendix 2, p. 1

²³⁵ Fairclough, 111, 125-28

²³⁶ Fairclough, 128

In ex 2 the verbs following the personal pronoun we are: “reiterate [our strong commitments]”(line 1), “we [recall] (lines 4-5), “we [reaffirm]”(line 5).

The aforementioned verbs are formed by the morphological element prefix “re-“(synonymous with the semantic element adverb “again”) plus the roots of the verbs. These verbs are associated with the pronoun “we”, defined previously as referring to BRICS, and with “China and Russia”(line 8). The discursive meaning of representing BRICS agency as again supporting the UN agency, is done in order to show that BRICS have for a long time been advocating UN values, and thus the UN can trust a “greater role”(line 9) to BRICS countries.

In this example we see the separation of “we”(BRICS) into “China and Russia” – also defined by the 3rd person plural personal pronoun “they”(line 8) – and “Brazil, India and South Africa”(line 8) – further separated by the 3rd person plural possessive adjective “their”(line 9). This separation seems to have been required by the status of China and Russia as permanent members in the UNSC, in comparison with the other three that do not have this status. Nonetheless, China and Russia show attachment (“attach” – line 8) and “support” to the “aspiration”(line 9) of the other three members. It is interesting that the constructed unity of “we” is here being somewhat deconstructed, but from a Brazilian stand point it does not necessarily mean a weaker support from the unity. The China/Russia unity represents P5 members, whereas the BRICS unity represent unity of both P5 members and non permanent members, and the latter might then by some be perceived as a weaker support for UNSC permanency. But we still see Brazilian agency in the document as one conducting itself via the understanding of *rational power* (see page*), because Brazil can get support from Russia and China for a greater role in the UN. But it seems that Brazil cannot get explicit support, from these two countries, for UNSC permanency.

This *rational power* can also be seen in the usage of the noun “commitment” together with the adjective “strong”(line 1), when referring to the UN. By this commitment, BRICS show discursively their allegiance to the fundamental principles of UN, such as “helping [...] maintain international peace and security”(lines 2-3) etc. Only after making sure discursively that their allegiance to the UN principles is trustworthy, they brought into discussion the “2005 World Summit Outcome”(line 5), followed by a statement. This statement was discursively constructed as an utter requirement – through the noun “need”, reinforced by the definite article “the”(line 5) – for a “reform of the United Nations [and] Security Council”(line 6). The reform agenda is strengthened by the adjective “comprehensive”(line 6), meaning that this reform ought to be broad, extensive in scope. The discursive argumentation for this assertion comes in the same sentence by emphasizing the improvement of the UN, by the adverb “more” followed by three adjectives “representative, effective and efficient”(line 7); through this adverb, BRICS do not argue that UN is not representative, effective or efficient, but that it can be improved by BRICS’ proposed reform. Saying that UN is not all of that would have contradicted BRICS’ allegiance to the UN and the principles themselves. The *rational power* uncovers the need to first: show the approval and support of the governmental system in order to second: propose changes for the sake of improvement. These two steps seem to be essential for actors in the international arena in order not to step out of what is acceptable to be said and/or done, i.e. what can be done / what cannot be done (see page 14)

As defined in the theory section, the *neo-liberal power* (see page 16) seems to be formed by the paradox of limited freedom through contract, and once the limit of the contract is overstepped or transgressed by the

one(s) in charge with power “there is a danger that it will become oppression.”²³⁷ In this example we can find two dimensions of this power. The first one is related to the economic dimension. By looking at how Foucault’s approach of contract-oppression schema has been discussed in the theory section (see page 16), we assume that development is part of the economic dimension; this is reflected again into the “strong commitment”(line 1) of BRICS to the UN capacities to help “the international community [...] promote sustainable development”(lines 2-3). The discursive promotion of development – emphasized by the adjective “sustainable” – within the international community not only shows the economical duty that UN has, but also a specific niche where the proposed reform of the UN could bring more effectiveness and efficiency (“more [...] effective and efficient” – line 7) from the BRICS members. The second dimension of the *neo-liberal power* is the contract-oppression dimension. The commitment or allegiance to UN reflects the contractual dimension of this power. The two sides of this contract (from this example) is constructed as BRICS being committed to the UN on one side, and on the other the UN having the duty to be a “multilateral organization entrusted with helping the international community”(lines 1-2) in many regards. UN is defined by the adjective “multilateral”(line 1) and also by its features of “universal membership”(line 4), “very centre of global governance and multilateralism”(line 4). The prerogatives that UN “enjoys”(line 4) – from this discursively implied contract – also implies the duty of multilateralism – indicated both by the adjective “multilateral”(line 1) and by the noun “multilateralism”(line 4). In this context, BRICS’ statement for reforming the UN and the UNSC as a response to the “global challenges”(lines 7-8) seems to point towards the construction of Brazil, India and South Africa as relevant members in the potentially reformed UN, alongside the already permanent members in the UNSC, China and Russia. This is done via the usage of the definite article and noun “the importance”(line 8) when revealing the relations between BRICS members regarding the “status and role in international affairs”(line 9) of the three members, and their further promotion towards a “greater role in the”(line 9) UN. The use of the comparative form of the adjective *great* constructs the three members as already playing great roles in international affairs and UN, but ready “to play greater role[s]”(line 9).

We have identified the discourse of securitization in this example; consequently the understanding of the Power of *securitization* (see page 21) is relevant here. This is seen in the maintenance of “international peace and security”(lines 2-3) that had been mentioned in ex. 2 as part of the UN duties, also stipulated in the 1st article of the 1st chapter of the UN Charter²³⁸. We argue that the discourse of securitization in this example was invoked in order to support the commitment of BRICS members to the UN principles, and also to further construct the ability of the three members to occupy a “greater role”(line 9) in the UN, and therefore to improve in a “more representative, effective and efficient”(line 7) manner also the international maintenance of “peace and security”(lines 2-3).

A feature of the *pastoral power* (see page 22) seems to be present in this example, as the use of the verbs “protect” and “foster [of] human rights”(line 3) is mentioned. The discourse of human rights is constructed and personified as something that ought to be protected and fostered (or nurtured), while the relation of the shepherd (i.e. UN or UN principles) to the city and/or flock (i.e. international community) is implied; this particular example does not reveal too many elements to support the pastorate, other than the implied

²³⁷ Foucault, *Society*, 17

²³⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> accessed April 20, 2015.

ones. This is an example of *pastoral power* being utilized as a coherent understanding of power, and not as either *eder* or *polis*.

Later in the declaration we see a statement which has implications for the UNSC agenda.

(1)“49. We believe that information and communications technologies should provide instruments to (2)foster sustainable economic progress and social inclusion [...] We agree that particular attention (3)should be given to young people and to small and medium-sized enterprises, with a view to (4)promoting international exchange and cooperation [...] We agree that the use and development of (5)information and communications technologies through international cooperation and universally (6)accepted norms and principles of international law is of paramount importance in order to ensure a (7)peaceful, secure and open digital and Internet space. We strongly condemn acts of mass electronic (8)surveillance and data collection of individuals all over the world, as well as violation of the (9)sovereignty of States and of human rights, in particular the right to privacy. We take note of the (10)Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, held in São Paulo, on 23 (11)and 24 April 2014. We thank Brazil for having organized it.”(ex. 3, app. 1, p. 111)

The example’s subject revolves around BRICS’ position regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the internet, cyberspace, and their relation to human rights and development. In this example we are going to focus upon the grammatical and vocabulary features indicated by Fairclough²³⁹, starting with pronouns.

As we already mentioned in ex. 1, the personal pronoun first person plural “we” represents the BRICS countries. An interesting feature of this pronoun and its value is related to the fact that in this example, each sentence starts with this pronoun (lines 1-2-4-7-9-11). This multiple use at the beginning of each sentence reveals the unity in will and agenda of BRICS members. Another interesting element is the lack of any other pronoun; this might indicate the disregard for other international members and potential opposing positions besides BRICS, and thus further highlighting an exclusive approach.

This discursive agency fits into Van Dijk’s *ideological square* approach.²⁴⁰ This especially comes to mind as Brazil is mentioned and thanked towards the end of the speech, and thus is somehow more connected to all the positive aspects mentioned, than any other country, as none other are mentioned. The *ideological square* is about focus on one owns positive aspects and the others’ negative aspects.²⁴¹ The aforementioned emphasis on “we” [the BRICS] and thereby exclusion of others, can be seen as constructing such an ideological measure. Focusing on Brazil, we can talk about how the *resources* being mentioned in ex 2 e.g. “technologies”(line 1), “social inclusion”(line 2), and “international cooperation”(line 5) all help Brazil “exercise their power”²⁴² as Van Dijk puts it when describing *resources*. This seems to be part of an agenda of Brazil becoming the BRICS’ leader in the areas mentioned in ex 2. This mainly point towards *pastoral power polis* (see page 22) as the substance in ex 3 are more ideological than anthropocentric.

Next we are going to look at the grammar and vocabulary features of verbs and adverbs, nouns and adjectives. By looking at the verbs, we see a positive approach in the first half of the example within the

²³⁹ Fairclough, 110ff

²⁴⁰ Van Dijk, 395

²⁴¹ Van Dijk, 395-97

²⁴² Van Dijk, 396

verbs “believe”, “provide”(line 1), “foster”, “agree”(line 2), “be given”(line 3), “promoting”, “agree”(line 4), “ensure”(line 6), together with the two uses of the modal verb “should”(lines 1-3) which indicates an ‘expressive value of grammatical features’, i.e. “[A] categorical commitment of the producer to the truth of the proposition”,²⁴³ the “truth” being in ex 3 not regarding constructions of objectivity, but rather the “truth” of a discourse of positivity, which as will be shown, will be connected to Brazil. This positive approach towards the benefits of the internet (in all its complexity) is seen in the first part through adjectives and nouns: “information and communications technologies”(lines 1-5), “sustainable economic progress”, “social inclusion”(line 2), “young people”, “small and medium-sized enterprises”(line 3), “international exchange and cooperation”, “development”(line 4), “international cooperation”(line 5), “peaceful, secure and open digital and Internet space”(line 7). The second part of the example focuses more on the negative sides, seen in the use of the adverb and verb “strongly condemn”(line 7); the use of the following adjectives and nouns support the same position: “acts of mass electronic surveillance and data collection of individuals”(lines 7-8), “violation of the sovereignty of States and of human rights, [...] the right to privacy”(lines 8-9). The ending of this point seems to be revolved around the agency of BRICS as a reaction to these issues, by organizing the “Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance”(line 10). Here we can see the Brazilian agency, as the BRICS countries “thank Brazil for having organized”(line 11) the meeting. Brazil thus becomes the country standing out from the rest, and thus it is presented as the country most condemning of the bad things such as “mass electronic surveillance”(lines 7-8) and “the violation of the states sovereign rights and human rights”(lines 8-9). Brazil also becomes the country mostly representing the aforementioned positive aspects. In the search for *experiential values of grammatical features*²⁴⁴ Fairclough indicates that ideological measures can be inherent when agency is unclear.²⁴⁵ In ex 3 the general and somewhat omnipresent agent is the BRICS as a unity constructed by the excessive use of the pronoun “we”. The verb following these “we”s indicates active involvement. But at the end of ex 3 Brazil becomes the agent, although without removing the agency of BRICS as seen in line 11: “We [agent: BRICS] thank Brazil [agent/object: Brazil] for having organized it”.

Looking at the connections that Fairclough²⁴⁶ makes in his schema, we have identified based upon the excessive use of the pronoun “we” along the verbs, that there is an *expressive value* of features that has the structural effect of social identity, and therefore the focus lies upon the subjects that express these values – identified previously in the use of modal verbs.

We have seen Brazil being represented through the BRICS’ Fortaleza Declaration, and thus assuming the group/unity features²⁴⁷ of the BRICS in support of Brazil’s UNSC agenda of reform. We see Brazil as understanding the need for *rational-power*, as Brazil through this declaration assumes both the support of BRICS as a group, and of China/Russia as P5 members. Brazil cannot get the explicit support for permanency of the latter, but nevertheless it seems like a strong authority, given China/Russia’s P5 status. The statements agenda also showcases *rational power* as the UN is criticized regarding efficiency and supported as an institution. In the construction of BRICS – UN relations we also see *neo-liberal power* as *securitization* as these are both in place as support of the UN as an institution, and as discursive measures to point of areas which need improvement, of which the BRICS can be of help/inspiration. This inspiration is

²⁴³ Fairclough, 128-29

²⁴⁴ Fairclough, 120-25

²⁴⁵ Fairclough, 124-25

²⁴⁶ Fairclough, 112

promoted via *pastoral power* as the BRICS are constructed as potential leaders for the UN regarding the area of human rights.

Chapter 2

The data is the record of a 68th GA plenary meeting from Sept. 8th 2014. The official agenda is ‘The question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters’. No groups representing Brazil or Argentina speaks, neither does Argentina. Brazil speaks, and we will analyze the Brazilian statement.

After a formal introduction the Brazilian representative (Brazil) addresses the issue of the UNSC reform, exemplified below:

(1)“As highlighted in the group of four letter addressed to you, Mr. President, [...] decision 68/557, which
(2)was just adopted and is a mere repetition of last year’s language, does not recognize your significant
(3)legacy [...] Your presidency will be remembered as a moment in which the membership advanced
(4)towards the goal of reforming the Security Council”(Ex. 4. App.2. p. 113)

Brazil first mentions the G4, most likely to emphasize that Brazil is part of the G4 and thereby a part of an international important group, and to construct a perception of unity between G4 and Brazil (line 1). This is followed by a critique of the status quo of the reform progress, by using the adverb “mere” to indicate that this “repetition” is something not positive/not adequate (line 2). After this an antagonism is constructed between the aforementioned status quo and the GA president’s legacy (lines 3 and 4). This is achieved by the semantic opposition between “mere repetition”(line 2) and “advanced towards the goal”(lines 3 and 4)

What also seems to be constructed is a unity of opinion/agenda between Brazil, G4 and the GA presidency regarding the UNSC reform [that a reform should occur]. The entire UN membership is attached to this unity via a statement about the future: “your presidency will be remembered as [...] in which the membership advanced [...]”(line 3). This construction of unity is strengthened by the fact that the only actors being identified are those being presented as supportive of a UNSC reform: Brazil, G4, the president and the membership. The opposition is constructed as being “mere repetition of last year’s language”(line 2) and therefore also in an antagonist relation to the GA president’s legacy, which it “does not recognize”(line 2).

The non-identification of any opposition agency to the constructed unity, can be seen in the statement about the “decision 68/557, which was just adopted”(lines 1 and 2). This decision has involved the membership, but here it is constructed as a somewhat independent phenomenon, by the lack of presented agency e.g. it could have said “which was just adopted by the membership”. This appears to be a strategic choice, as it could have been problematic for Brazil to present the aforementioned unity, if there was also some sort of unity or even agent representing the opposing cause.

Fairclough advises that as part of the search for *experiential value* of grammatical features “[O]ne should be sensitive to possible ideologically motivated obfuscation of agency, causality and responsibility.”²⁴⁷ This is what we see occurring in example 1; the agency and responsibility of an opposition are unclear, which makes it seem as if the majority is for a reform, and reinforces the construction of unity.

Having presented this view, we will now look at another example before we connect the discursive agency to the theoretical power concepts (see pages 14).

²⁴⁷ Fairclough, 124

(1)There seems to be a prevailing view among Member States that the Security Council is not responding
(2)satisfactorily to specific crises around the world, and a growing sense of frustration arises from a widely
(3)perceived dysfunctionality of the body. If we leave things as they are, we run the risk of bringing
(4)discredit and erosion of authority to the United Nations in a core area of its mandate.”

(Ex.5 App.2. p. 113)

Here, the criticism of status quo as seen in example 1 is upheld, and reinforced via the use of negatively charged phrases built around nouns like “crises [around the world]”(line2), “sense of frustration”(line 2), “dysfunctionality”(line 3), “discredit”(line 4) and “erosion of authority”(line 4). It is worth noting the emphasis of the words with morphological element prefix “dis-”, and how these point towards the qualities of a UNSC in status quo as the opposite of what the UNSC should be: “dysfunctionality”(line 3) and “discredit”(line 4) as opposed to functionality and credit.

The use of *expressive modality* can also be seen. This by Fairclough is labeled as “The speaker/writer’s evaluation of truth.”²⁴⁸ It can be seen in the use of action verbs: “prevailing”, “[not]responding”(line 1) and “growing [sense]”, “arises”(line 2). Fairclough agrees that modality is not exclusively about modal auxiliaries.²⁴⁹ The claims incorporated in these modalities find their warrants, in the construction of them as already being in action, as seen in the form of the aforementioned examples.

We also see *expressive modality* in lines 3 and 4, as a means of constructing causality. This is seen in the verb “are”(line 3), because the presented consequence of “bringing discredit[.]”(line 3), rests on the constructed status of how things are (lines 1,2, and 3). This is specified by the statement “If we leave things as they are”(line 3).

A strategic function of *coercion*²⁵⁰ is visible in the examples presented here. According to Chilton and Schäfner this type of *coercion* occurs when “[H]earers are obliged to at least temporarily accept [assumptions about realities] in order to process the text or talk.”²⁵¹ In ex. 4 the hearers are being presented with the truth claims that “decision 68/557 [...] is a mere repetition”, “does not recognize”(line 2) and “your presidency will be remembered”(line 3). In ex. 2 the *coercion* can be seen in the plot that is constructed via the aforementioned *expressive modality*.

The intensity seems to be rising in ex. 5, thus leading the hearer from the first notion of a seemingly “prevailing view”(line 1) to UNSC non-responsiveness towards “specific crises” and the growing “frustration”(line 2). Even more seriousness is present as “widely perceived dysfunctionality”(line 2-3) is added, before the “erosion of authority to the United Nations”(line 4) is presented as the consequence of not changing the status quo.

Only in this presentation of the risk (line 3) is the pronoun “we” applied. “if we” then “we run the risk”(line 3). The pronoun “we” functions here as a placement of emphasis on cohesion. The “we” that has to act (to avoid leaving things as they are), are the same “we” that “run the risk”(lines 3 and 4). “We” in this case “cues a connection between one sentence and another.”²⁵² It seems that emphasis is placed on the unity of “we”, as it connects the sentences instead of a *logical connector*,²⁵³ e.g. the adverb “then”. (“if we [...] then we run the risk of”). This unity between the group that has the problem (the UN/UNSC), sees the problem (the ones wanting to change it), and that will suffer the consequences (the ones not wanting “discredit and

²⁴⁸ Fairclough, 124

²⁴⁹ Fairclough, 129

²⁵⁰ Chilton & Schäfner, in Van Dijk, 311

²⁵¹ Chilton & Schäfner, in Van Dijk, 311

²⁵² Fairclough, 130

²⁵³ Fairclough, 131

erosion of authority”(lines 4)), appears similar to the unity constructed in ex. 4 (the [entire] membership, Brazil, G4, and the GA president).

The two examples indicates that Brazil acts from an understanding of *pastoral power*; both *eder* and *polis*. The construction of unity of the UN, as mainly seen in ex. 4, and the strong promotion of the necessity of reform (the idea of reform), is both *eder* and *polis pastoral power* respectively. The ideational (*polis*) part of this construction is backed up by a securitization discourse (and thus *securitization* understanding of power) as seen clearly in line 2, where “specific crises around the world” is mentioned. It can also be seen in the presented risk of the UN losing its authority. (ex. 5 line 4).

Brazil constructs itself as being the leader of a unity of member states (*pastoral power eder*), when promoting the necessary idea, which is the reform/improvement of the UNSC (*pastoral power polis*). And the necessity of following/supporting Brazil is supported by utilizing securitization discursive aspects pointing towards crisis and the risk of losing UN authority (power of *securitization*).

Chapter 2 has shown us that Brazil emphasizes the construction of unity among Brazil, G4, the GA presidency, and the UN membership. This unity Brazil wants to lead both as the leader of a group and as a leader/promoter of an idea. This is *pastoral power* both *eder* and *polis* (see page 22). To support the construction of unity and Brazil as being a leader, it is supported by *securitization*, which is warranted by the mentioning of international conflicts/crises and of risks that the UN might run if not being led by Brazil in the aforementioned manners.

Chapter 3

This chapter will provide first an analysis of the speech from the Brazilian President followed by an analysis of the speech from the Argentinean president. After having analyzed both speeches we will make a brief summarization and comparison of the results.

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff opening the 69th GA on Sept. 24th 2014

The document is a record of Dilma Rousseff's (Rousseff) speech. Due to the length, and the fact that we wish to include a wider group of documents in the analysis, we have to choose certain parts of the speech for in depth analysis, and thus exclude others. The speech in itself seems qualified for an entire study in its own, regarding the many aspects of ideology, politics and IR being addressed in it. This study's focus on power in relation to Brazil's campaign for UNSC permanency, allows for the exclusion of interesting aspects. We will try to include some of these interesting aspects, if they have relations to the aforementioned focus of the study.

Issues regarding the UNSC are addressed halfway through the speech. Prior to this Rousseff embarks on the construction of Brazil as a role model for social, political and economical development. As it will be demonstrated, these discursive constructions reflect an understanding and utilization of *pastoral power* (see page 22), which can be seen throughout the speech. At the beginning of the speech, Rousseff connects the aspects, which we will show points to *pastoral power*, to the aspect of Brazilian international engagement. These can be seen as foundational for the following discursive actions regarding the UNSC.

(1) "The Great Transformation to which we are committed has resulted in a modern economy and a more
(2)egalitarian society. At the same time it has required strong civic participation, respect for human rights
(3)and a sustainable vision of development.
(4)It has also required an engagement on the world stage characterized by multilateralism, respect for
(5)international law, the quest for peace and a culture of solidarity." (ex.6.app.3.p.115)

The use of the term "The Great Transformation" (line 1) can be indicative of different agendas. It is the title of a classic economic-historic book from 1944 by Karl Polanyi²⁵⁴. Polanyi's main argument is that economic liberalism [free market principles] is good but not without the state as its overseer, and thus policies of social focus over economic foci are necessary.²⁵⁵ But it also bears similarity to the label that has been used to describe the Chinese rise on the world economic stage, which is also characterized by being state-controlled market economy.²⁵⁶ Rousseff is most likely referring to the name of a campaign promoting social policy focus, launched by former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio da Silva, as a support/guideline for the Brazilian workers party's (PT) nomination of Dilma Rousseff for the presidential candidate in 2010.²⁵⁷ The reason why we have mentioned other potential meanings of the term is that Rousseff cannot expect all

²⁵⁴ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, (Boston MA: Beacon Press 2001, orig. 1944)

²⁵⁵ J.H. Hexter and Karl Polanyi "The Great Transformation by Karl Polanyi", *The American Historical review*. Vol.50, no.3. (apr. 1945)

²⁵⁶ See e.g. Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, *China's Great Economic Transformation*, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press 2008)

²⁵⁷ <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/02/19/lula-da-silva-s-bets-all-his-prestige-on-rousseff-rousseff-as-presidential-candidate> - accessed May 20. 2015

hearers to know Brazilian political slogans. Instead the term might make the hearer think about e.g. Polanyi's economic hypotheses, and thus show that a social democratic / Keynesian discourse is being presented.

Rousseff only uses the word "transformation" on one more occasion during the speech, which is two short paragraphs following the first mentioning. Here she connects the transformation specifically to "economic policies". We will now present a couple of statements from Rousseff's speech, which do not bear explicit mentioning of the UNSC. This is done as we see these as part of Rousseff's discursive agency towards the general UNSC agenda.

"This transformation was the result of economic policies which generated 21 million jobs and appreciated the minimum wage, increasing its purchasing power by 71% With these policies inequality was reduced [...]"(ex.7.app.3.p.115)

The *members resources* (MR) of the hearers i.e. the background knowledge they use to interpret the cues in a text²⁵⁸, will most likely interpret "policies" that can be labeled as active agency. Such agency through policies can be seen as the presentation, from Rousseff, of how Brazil politically achieved the progresses described in ex.6.

In ex.6 adjectives are used to construct the notion of progress: "modern [economy]"(line 1), "more [egalitarian society]", "strong [vision]"(line 2), and "sustainable [vision]"(line 3). These features are attributed to 'The Great Transformation'. Fairclough suggests, that when looking for *grammatical features*, one should look for how adjectives point towards either a subject or an event, to locate the ideological focus in a text.²⁵⁹ In ex.6 'The Great Transformation' and the mentioned progresses are the events that the adjectives point to.

In ex.7 there are no adjectives pointing towards an event or a subject. This could be because it is no longer the focus of Rousseff to present 'The Great Transformation', but now she wants to explain it; "This transformation was the result of [...]"(line 1). In ex.7 is then presented the "facts"("economic policies", "21 million jobs", "minimum wage", and "purchasing power") which caused the progresses the adjectives in ex.6 describe.

The discursive actions by Rousseff in ex.6 and ex.7 seem to be a presentation of first the positive achievements in ex.6, followed by the explanation of why these achievements occurred (ex.7). The explanation is backed up by "facts". Such agency is what Van Dijk targets in his *ideological square* and calls it the emphasis on good things and the de-emphasis of bad things.²⁶⁰

This is relevant to the issue of Brazil's UNSC campaign for two reasons. One reason is the immediate construction of Brazil as a role model and thus one of having *pastoral power* (see page 22) for both the Brazilian people (*eder*) and for the idea of development (*polis*), which will be utilized throughout the text. The second, and somewhat more interesting reason of relevance is, that Rousseff mentions in ex.6. line 4 that "It ['The Great Transformation'] has also required an engagement on the world stage", but Rousseff does not in either of the places where 'The great Transformation'/'transformation' is mentioned, talk about what Brazil specifically has done internationally, as is the case with the national policies in ex.7 This indicates an understanding of *rational power* (see page 22). The argument for this is that Rousseff knows what she can do: promote Brazilian achievement/results and policies, but also what she cannot do: connect the results of national policies to international achievements. She does mention specific international

²⁵⁸ Fairclough, 141

²⁵⁹ Fairclough, 122

²⁶⁰ Van Dijk, 396

agendas “Multilateralism” and “respect of international law” (ex.6 line 4-5), but she cannot present results. (i.e. what she cannot do)

The *pastoral power* points to Brazil as a governing actor, while the *rational power* points to Brazil as also perceiving to be governed.

To show the aforementioned promotion of Brazil as a role model via the presentation of national development results, as seen in ex.7 and that this points to both types of *pastoral power*, we will here bring a couple of examples of this discursive promotion:

“Thirty six million Brazilians have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 2003; 22 million during my Administration alone.”(ex.8 app.3 p.115)

“There has been an unprecedented expansion of higher education with the establishment of new publicly funded universities and the granting of scholarships and financial aid that have enabled 3 million students to have access to private universities.”(ex.9.app.3.p.116)

“Brazil jumped from being the 13th to being the 7th largest economy in the world. Per capita income increased by more than threefold and inequality rates fell sharply.”(ex.10 app.3 p.116)

“While in 2002, more than half of the Brazilian population was poor or below the poverty line, today 3 out of every 4 Brazilians are a part of the middle class and upper income ranges.”(ex 11 app.3 p.116)

“Between 2010 and 2013, we avoided launching into the atmosphere an average of 650 million tons of carbon dioxide per year.”(ex.12 app.3 p.119)

“We have created on the internet the Government Transparency Portal, which provides citizens near immediate access to information on Government spending.”(ex.13 app.3 p.119)

As demonstrated Rousseff is here massively constructing a positive side of Brazil, and somewhat connecting Brazilian successes to global problems, i.e. what Brazil has done, is what the world needs generally. This is exemplified in ex. no. 9:

“During the crisis, while the world economy left hundreds of millions of workers unemployed, Brazil created 12 million formal jobs.”(ex.14.app.3 p.116)

The focus on poverty (ex.8 and ex.11), education (ex.9), pollution (ex.12) and jobs (ex.14), can be seen as the connections between Brazilian results and international / UN foci, as these are all focus areas of the UN millennium development goals.²⁶¹ These were decided by the UN at the Millennium Summit in 2005, which was also the scene for Brazil’s initiation of the campaign for UNSC permanency.

We mentioned earlier that Rousseff could not present international results, but throughout the speech she constructs a connection between the Brazilian achievement and the official UN agenda (the MDG’s). This points towards an understanding of *rational power* as Brazil must be constructed as an international influencer, but Brazil must not be constructed as such in any kind of opposition towards the UN. The safest/most rational path towards this goal seems to be the aforementioned focus on core UN values as portrayed in e.g. the UN MDG’s.

In the speech is constructed also a representation of *neo-liberal power* (see pages*). It is being presented right before the topic of UNSC is being presented. First the Brazilian economy is presented as strong and then Rousseff states:

²⁶¹ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> - accessed May 5 2015

(1)“In addition, we became one of the main destinations of foreign investment.[...] All of these gains have
(2)materialized within the context of a sound fiscal environment. We have reduced the net public debt to
(3)GDP ratio from approximately 60% to 35%. The gross external debt in relation to GDP fell from 42% to
(4)14%. Our international reserves increased tenfold, turning Brazil into an international creditor”(ex.15.app.3.p.116)

The use of personal pronouns in the paragraph: “we [became]”(line 1), “We [have]”(line 2), and “Our” [international] (line 4), displays the construction of a unit which is Brazil. Van Dijk talks about ideological schemas in discourse. One of those displayed here is *resources*, which is what is needed for the group [we Brazil] to exercise power.²⁶² We point this out, as we see Rousseff constructing Brazil as having *neo-liberal power*, and according to Foucault,²⁶³ we need to target what is constructed as being useful for economic development (see page*). Here it is the strength of Brazilian economy, which is useful to have a say internationally: “Turning Brazil into an international creditor” (line 4).

Van Dijk emphasizes the manifestation of group relations in ideological discourses, and he suggests the search for how ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, are constructed and used in texts.²⁶⁴ Although there is no constructed presence of ‘them’ in ex. 15, we can look for the next specified actors in the speech, and these are found only half a page later.

(1)“It is also imperative, Mr. President, to eliminate the disparity between the growing importance of
(2)developing countries in the global economy and their insufficient representation and participation in the
(3)decision-making processes of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank.
(4)delay in the expansion of voting rights of developing countries in these institutions is unacceptable.
(5)these institutions are in danger of losing legitimacy and efficiency.”(ex.16 app.3 p117)

The discourse of Brazil as a strong economic state, as seen in ex. 14 and 15 included the construction of a united Brazil via the use of personal pronouns. In ex. 16 we can see the possessive adjective “their”(line 2) which shows that developing countries is not a category Brazil wants to be placed in. The *pastoral power* constructed here is thus *polis*, as Brazil represents an idea of sufficient representation and participation of developing countries (the opposite of the critique proposed in line 2 via “insufficient representation”), instead of representing the Brazilian people, which would have been *eder*.

One might argue that a neo-liberal discourse (which is related to *neo-liberal power*) is hardly in play, when criticism of IMF and the World Bank is presented, but ex. 16 shows that Rousseff is not criticizing the institutions, she is more so protecting them from “losing legitimacy and efficiency”(line 5), thus implying that at the present state these institutions have those features. Presenting / implying that IMF and the World Bank posses such features (legitimacy and effeciency) is what Fairclough labels *expressive values* of words.²⁶⁵ In this particular case, due to legitimacy and efficiency of multinational economic organs can be differentiated according to perceptions, are therefore ideologically contested. Fairclough talks about ideologically contested words also due to the words’ potential different semantic presuppositions,²⁶⁶ as could be argued being a characteristic of the word “efficiency”.

²⁶² Van Dijk, 396

²⁶³ Foucault, *The birth*

²⁶⁴ Van Dijk, 396

²⁶⁵ Fairclough, 118

²⁶⁶ Fairclough, 114-15

Rousseff is constructing the developing countries as an *out-group* [as “them”]²⁶⁷ and placing the IMF and the World Bank as subjects in need of Brazilian council to avoid the dire consequences such as loss of legitimacy (ex.16). Thus the *in-group*²⁶⁸ “We”, is placed on neutral ground, but as a valid counselor based on the economic responsibility and progresses presented in examples: 8,9,10,11,14 and 15. This is *neo-liberal power*, as Brazil is presented as a state from which IMF and World Bank should seek inspiration. In e.g. ex. 11 Rousseff talks about the rise of the “middle class” and in ex. 15 about “foreign investment”, and Brazil as an “international creditor”. These are promotions of economic usefulness, which is part of *neo-liberal power* (see page*). In ex 16 Rousseff makes a suggestion, from a constructed discursive neutral standpoint, to prevent economic harmfulness (see page 16).

In the application of a neo-liberal discourse, Rousseff seems to act according to an understanding of *rational power*. Rousseff “can” present problems and solutions regarding IMF/the World Bank, and by doing this Brazil is constructed as having *pastoral power* [mainly *polis*] in relation to developing countries. She cannot criticize the ideas of the aforementioned institutions, because that would diminish the construction of Brazil having *neo-liberal power*, as these are neo-liberal institutions.

Our constructs of power (see page*) are triangulating, and seems to be generally interfering. We might here consider if there is or should be made a connection between *neo-liberal power* and *rational power*. The intrinsic antagonism of the former [the promotion of freedom via restrictions see page*], might often be handled via an understanding and application of the latter. We will get back top this in the discussion (see pages*).

We have deemed it relevant to analyze how Rousseff has constructed Brazil prior to the mentioning of the UNSC, because as we have shown, the concepts of power can be seen in the discourses present in the text. At this point, we have knowledge of how Rousseff constructs the power of Brazil outside of explicit UNSC statements. We will now turn to the part of the speech, where the UNSC is being talked about.

The UNSC

Before talking about the UNSC, Rousseff mentions the conflicts in Palestine, Libya, Iraq, Sahel, and Ukraine. (app.3.p.4). Then Rousseff states:

(1)“The Security Council has been having difficulties in promoting peaceful solutions to those conflicts.[see (2)above] A genuine reform of the Security Council is necessary to overcome the current paralysis. This (3)process has been dragging on for too long. The 70th anniversary of the United Nations, in 2015, must be (4)an auspicious occasion for achieving the progress required. I am certain we all understand the serious (5)risks of paralysis and inaction at the Security Council. A more representative and more legitimate (6)Security Council would also be a more effective Council.”(ex.17 app.3 p.118)

Looking first at the vocabulary of ex.17, we will search for *experiential*, *relational* and *expressive* values²⁶⁹ (see methodology pages*).

In ex.17 are presented problems and solutions specifically regarding the UNSC. The problems can also be viewed as warrants and the solutions as claims. The problems/warrant are: “Difficulties in promoting peaceful solutions”(line 1), “Paralysis”(line 2 and 5), and “Inaction”(line 5). The solutions/claims presented are: “A genuine reform”(line 2), “70th anniversary as auspicious occasion”(lines 3 and 4), “More legitimacy”(lines 5 and 6), and “More efficiency”(line 6)

²⁶⁷ Van Dijk, 397

²⁶⁸ Van Dijk, 397-98

²⁶⁹ Fairclough, 112

Part of locating the *experiential values* in a text is to look for hyponyms,²⁷⁰ i.e. how a meaning of one word is included in another. According to Fairclough hyponymy shows preoccupations with an aspect, and in ex 17 the problems/warrants can be included in the meaning of 'paralysis' [paralysis → difficulty and inaction]. Paralysis is the only problem/warrant repeated in ex 17, and we can assume a discursive emphasis on this word.

Here we might again be seeing the interconnectedness of two understandings of power: *securitization* and *war-panopticism*. A paralyzed UNSC, i.e. a UNSC that cannot secure peace and security in the world, makes the world less secure. This is a "serious risk"(line 5). This is *securitization*, because then the solution to a problem of less security would mean more security.

We see *war-panopticism* utilized when we consider, that only a powerful / and "effective"(line 6) UNSC can prevent the presented insecurity. The power of the UNSC lies in its mandate to wage legal war (see page*), and if the UNSC is paralyzed, no one will respect the UNSC and its power. Rouseff is on this occasion governing via *war-panopticism* through *securitization*.

The solutions/claims being presented can be split into three foci; 1, the quality of a reform ("genuine"(line 2)) 2, The timing of a reform (2015 / "70th anniversary"(lines 2 and 4)) and 3, the substance of a reform ("legitimacy"(lines 5 and 6), "efficiency"(line 6)). As we have shown the problems/warrants were hyponyms of paralysis. But the solutions/claims are more diverse. The *relational values* in text "depend on and help create social relationships".²⁷¹ The social relationship in the present context is Rouseff as the monologue speaker, and the hearers as the audience. In ex.17 no different relationship is created.

The aforementioned relationship between Rouseff and the hearers is however depended upon that Rouseff constructs both what is wrong and how it can be made right via her monologue prerogative of being the speaker. In constructing what is wrong she presents the aforementioned problems/warrants, but the *relational value* is more visible in other places. In line 1 Rouseff refers to the Palestinian, Syrian, Ukrainian, Iraqi and Sahel situations as "[T]hose conflicts" thus constructing the agreement between her and the hearers, that these situations can be juxtaposed. She seems here to be constructing a relationship of unity between her and the hearers, by presenting a universal perspective on conflicts, instead of a complicated one, to which there might exist a larger number of different presuppositions. The solution she presents is "a genuine reform"(line 2). Here we can add to the argument by drawing from the PDA's search for *coercion* as Rouseff is "[...] giving answers to questions, responding to requests, etc."²⁷² and "[...] positioning the self and others in specific relationships,[...]"²⁷³.

Moving on to the *expressive values* which includes the search for construction of subjects and social identities.²⁷⁴ The PDA approach includes also the focus on social identities. This focus should emphasize the positioning of the speaker, audience and others²⁷⁵ by looking at pronouns and their functions regarding this. In ex. 17 we see the construction of unity between Rouseff and the hearers as she states: "I am certain we can all understand the serious risks"(line 4). The "we" constructs an *in-group*²⁷⁶ of those who can understand. This points to *pastoral power polis* (see page*) as the group is based on understanding (an idea) and not so much on being a UN member state (*eder*/"people").

²⁷⁰ Fairclough, 116

²⁷¹ Fairclough, 116

²⁷² Chilton and Schäfner in Van Dijk, 311

²⁷³ Chilton and Schäfner in Vand Dijk 311

²⁷⁴ Fairclough, 112, 118-19

²⁷⁵ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 316

²⁷⁶ Van Dijk, 395

In Fairclough's CDA the focus on pronouns is also part of looking for *relational* and *expressive values* of grammatical features, which is about the discursive positioning of subjects which can be both the speaker, audience and others.²⁷⁷ We see here an identical focus of CDA and PDA, and therefore we will go a bit deeper into the analysis of how pronouns influence the discursive aspects of Rouseff mentioning of the UNSC.

Prior to the statements showed in ex. 17 Rouseff had presented the situations of conflict, which she referred to as "those conflicts"(line 1). She is thus connecting these situations of conflict to the issue of the UNSC. The aforementioned "we" from ex. 17 (line 4). When talking about the situations which she refers to in ex.17 Rouseff said:

"We witness a tragic proliferation in the numbers of civilian victims and humanitarian catastrophes. We cannot allow these barbaric acts to increase, harming our ethical, moral and civilizational values."(ex.18 app.3 p.118)

This example we have brought, as the "we" i.e. the 'in-group'²⁷⁸ that is constructed here, also points towards *pastoral-power polis* (see page*). Rouseff is part of the 'we' and speaking to the group based on "[E]thical, moral and civilizational values". At the same time we can see the political discursive aspect of *representatives* from PDA, as Rouseff is making a truth claim about proliferation of catastrophes without any evidence.²⁷⁹ This claim is the basis for the proposed consequence/action of not allowing these to "increase, harming our ethical [...]". Rouseff does not propose concrete measures for not allowing the barbaric acts to increase etc, but we should note the *expressive modality*²⁸⁰, in stating that "we cannot", as this entails that the group of "we" has to take action.

We believe that the "we" which Rouseff mentions in ex.17 "I am certain we can all understand"(line 4), draws from the discursive construction of the *in-group*²⁸¹ and the *expressive modality*²⁸², which was established, without presenting a solution, prior to when Rouseff suggested "a genuine reform"(ex.17.line 2) and a more legitimate and effective UNSC (ex.17 lines 4 and 5)

Having now analyzed the Dilma Rouseff's speech we turn our attention to the speech from the Argentinean President. After this we will summarize and compare the result from the analyses of both speeches.

Argentinean President Christina Fernández de Kirchner at the 69th GA on Sept. 24th 2014

The document to be analyzed is a record of the speech of Christina Fernández de Kirchner's (Kirchner). As with the analysis of Rouseff's speech, this analysis will include examples of relevance via context, and of explicit statements about the UNSC. We are looking for how any relevance or explicit statements relate to an Argentinean opposition towards Brazil campaign for UNSC permanency.

²⁷⁷ Fairclough, 125-28

²⁷⁸ Van Dijk, 395

²⁷⁹ Chilton & Scäfner in Van Dijk, 318

²⁸⁰ Fairclough, 128-29

²⁸¹ Van Dijk, 315

²⁸² Fairclough, 128-29

Kirchner opens the speech by addressing UN general secretary Ban Ki-Moon and presenting him as an advocate of multilateralism (app.4 p.120). Hereafter she constructs what multilateralism is by a discursive action of constructing what the opposite of multilateralism is, as will be shown:

"I sincerely believe that most of the problems that the planet has today economically and financially, with respect to terrorism and security, in terms of force and territorial integrity, of war and peace, are the result of the exact opposite: the absence of an effective, practical and democratic multilateralism." (ex.18 p.120)

The *experiential values* of the vocabulary, which indicate the speaker's presentation of knowledge and beliefs²⁸³, can be found when looking at the adjectives describing the ideal multilateralism being constructed: "effective", "practical" and "democratic". These adjectives are all what Fairclough calls *ideologically contested*²⁸⁴ i.e. they can be applied to portray different and opposing beliefs. The only information the hearers are given about what these adjectives actually mean, is that they promote the opposite of "most of the problems that the planet has today". The warrant given for this claim is Kirchner's sincere beliefs (line 1). What ex.18 shows us in relation to the rest of the speech which includes specific references to the UNSC is that Kirchner wants to present Argentina as a promoter of multilateralism that opposes the worlds' problems. It seems that even more than power of *securitization* and *neo-liberal power* ex.18 shows a construction of *pastoral power polis* (see page 22) as the epicenter of the example is the framed multilateralism.

Only a couple of sentences after ex.18 Kirchner says:

(1)"We always came calling for reform of the Security Council and of the International Monetary Fund.
(2)Our point of departure was the experience we had in my country, the Argentine Republic. Today,
(3)I would go so far as to say in this international context that my country, the Argentine Republic, is a
(4)triple leading case in terms of economics and finance, terrorism and security, and force and territorial
(5)integrity." (ex. 18 P.120)

At the beginning of this example, President Kirchner starts with the appeal for reform of both the UNSC and IMF. This can be seen in line 1 through the use of the noun "reform", through the adverb "always", and through the gerund verb "calling"; these word choices, such as the undefined temporal dimension indicated by the adverb "always", and the continuous form of the verb *call* shown by the gerund, suggest the continuity and consistency of the agenda (i.e. reform of UNSC and IMF) throughout time. Fairclough defines these as *vocabulary features*.²⁸⁵

In this example we are also going to focus on pronouns and verbs, indicating *grammatical features*. The two uses of first person pronoun plural "we" (lines 1-2) and the possessive adjective first person plural "our [point of departure]" (line 2) seem to be the agents in the first part of the example. The actions of the agents are materialized within the verbs "came" (line 1), "was" and "had" (line 2), all being on the past tense simple. The second part of the example (coinciding with line 3) shows the first person singular "I" and the possessive adjective first person singular "my [country]", and the verbs "would go" and "is" – both verbs at present tenses (conditional present with the function of auxiliary modal verb and indicative

²⁸³ Fairclough, 112

²⁸⁴ Fairclough, 114

²⁸⁵ Fairclough, 116

present respectively). This switch from plural and past towards singular and present seems to gather the attention of the international leaders from the Argentine agenda throughout the years, towards the president herself and towards the present time. Once this attention has been caught, President Kirchner starts defining Argentina as a “leading case” (line 4) in three fields. This particular vocabulary feature (see page*) indicates a choice for juridical terminology, and thus Kirchner seems to invest Argentine’s experience with more authority that can serve as a guide for future decisions in struggles that relate to “economics and finance, terrorism and security, and force and territorial integrity”(lines 4-5), these roughly comprising UNSC’s and IMF’s purposes.

At the end of ex 18, Kirchner talks about “triple leading case”, indicating a numerical reference to ‘three’. Then she mentions six terms, which she pairs in two’s thus making them into three constructed concepts. The six terms are 5 nouns: “economics”, “finance”, “terrorism”, “security” and “force”(line 4), and an adjective: “territorial”(line 5). The pairings makes sense as the terms combined often are related, and as we [the analysts] see this, we can assume, in this case, that the hearer of Kirchner’s speech does so as well. This is utilization of the *MR* of the hearers i.e. cues that activate the hearers interpretation.²⁸⁶ In this sense we can talk about cues of lexical fields. Kirchner’s discursive action of making six concepts into three pairings is *coercion*²⁸⁷ as the hearers are not asked about the pairings and the pairings are not presented as plausible, but rather as facts. When such discursive action is conducted, and presented as a leading case, it seems to relate to governmentality because as we have mentioned in the part about ‘The Pillars’ (see page 28) we subscribe to Foucault’s²⁸⁸ notion of governmentality being about arranging things in ways to achieve ends, even via the use of laws. The question we need to answer is what is Kirchner trying to achieve?

The first pairing of “economics and finance” (line 4) is relevant to *neo-liberal power* as Argentina is constructed as a state leading the way in these fields. *Neo-liberal power* can both be *organizing* and *regulatory* actions (see page 16) which both relate more to the concepts of economics than finance, but as Kirchner mentions both finance and economics, it seems that she is seeking a representation of Argentina as encompassing leadership in both of these aspects. Constructing Argentina as having *neo-liberal power* is interesting because Argentina seems to be struggling on the global economic and financial stage,²⁸⁹ which Brazil is not.²⁹⁰ Kirchner’s construction of *neo-liberal power* can thus be seen as a way of refusing Brazil to claim that leadership role in Latin America / South America, by opposing it discursively. Kirchner seems to present an alternative answer to any hearers thinking that Brazil is the *neo-liberal power* of Latin America/South America. We might also have talked about *pastoral power*, but we do not see the construction of neither an idea (*pastoral power polis*), nor a people (*pastoral power eder*). It is more a construction of what Argentina “is” as seen in line 4 of ex. 18: “a triple leading case”.

The second pairing seems to be a construction of what we have labeled *securitization*. It is interesting that the second pairing which is of “terrorism and security” (line 4) contains antagonistic concepts. Security is

²⁸⁶ Fairclough, 141

²⁸⁷ Chilton & Schäfner, in Van Dijk, 310

²⁸⁸ Michel Foucault, “Governmentality”, in Burchell et. al. *The Foucault effect studies in governmentality*, (Chicago USA: The university of Chicago Press 1991) 95

²⁸⁹ Francisco Panizza, *Contemporary Latin America Development and democracy beyond the Washington Consensus*, (New York: Zed Books 2009) 245-47

²⁹⁰ Panizza, 232-41

often the means to fighting terrorism and terrorism usually target peoples' views on security. Security and terrorism can be seen as antonyms. When Fairclough suggests the search for *experiential values* of vocabulary²⁹¹, he states that ideologies can be creatively created in a text via e.g. antonyms.²⁹² The "ideology" we see created here, is that Argentina masters both the fight against or limitation of terrorism, and the creation or conducting of security. Naming the two concepts together strengthens the power of *securitization* discourse, because security in general is considered a positive and so is security against terrorism. Using the two aforementioned terms in a combination points to Argentina subscribing to a discourse of what we have just explained, that the two are in opposition to one another. This means that whoever subscribes to this ideological view should look to Argentina as an example for precedence. Argentina is thus being constructed as a state that buys into the notions of the connection of security and terrorism which initially points to Argentina constructing itself as an ally in the discussion about what is terror and security.

The third pairing of "force and territorial integrity" (lines 4-5) can be seen as relevant to the understanding of *war-panopticism* (see page 19). *War-panopticism* relates to *war as power* and Kirchner's verbalization of "force" can indicate that Argentina is able to be a state that should rely on the power of *war-panopticism*. The prerogative of the P5 to wage war (see page 20) can be seen as the "force" to violate "territorial integrity", so if Argentina is a leader of "force and territorial integrity" then Argentina knows about how this prerogative should be handled. Since Argentina is not campaigning for a permanent seat in the UNSC, then this knowledge of Argentina's can be seen as revolving around how a reform should be conducted. This is what Kirchner is also talking about (line 1). If *war-panopticism* is being utilized it might bring to the attention of the hearers what type power a permanent seat in the UNSC actually entails, and the hearers might ask themselves if they really want any more states possessing the prerogatives of the P5. This is in line with the UfC and Argentina agenda (in opposition to Brazil and the G4's) that no more permanent members should be added to the UNSC.

Cristina Kirchner also states:

(1)"That is why, a few minutes from now in the Security Council, of which Argentina is a non-permanent
(2)member, we wish to raise some of those issues. We have no certainties, no absolute truths, but we
(3)have many questions. We want to put them to those who possess a lot more information than we do,
(4)far more data and far more extensive networks of information than my country has."(ex.19 p.125)

In this example we are going to focus once again on the functions of pronouns. The first person plural pronoun "we"(lines 2-3) is used multiple times in combination with the verbs "wish", "have", "want", "do"(lines 2-3) – as we can see, all these verbs are used at present tense. The use of this pronoun is not specific, therefore leaving space for possible personifications: it can be "Argentina"(line 1), but given the plural pronoun, it could rather be a metaphor for the people of Argentina; this pronoun represent President Kirchner herself, together with her crew. One more possibility is the representation of all non-permanent members of the UNSC; in support of this assertion, we ought to look upon the emphasis that the Argentine president puts on the fact that "Argentina is a non-permanent member"(lines 1-2); this use of the non-restrictive relative pronoun "[of] which" has the role of adding more information regarding the

²⁹¹ Fairclough, 112-16

²⁹² Fairclough, 115-16

status and position of Argentina in relation to the UNSC, and therefore constructing itself as part of the larger group of non-permanent members. According to Fairclough the use of pronouns can reveal how “[R]elationships of power and solidarity are formed”²⁹³, and the different possible personifications mentioned, makes possible a wide range of identification from the hearers with the Argentinean statement. The verbs following the pronoun indicate *pastoral power polis* (see page 22) because the emphasis is on framing the action and not on framing those who promote/desire the action. A social relation is thus made possible between everybody who “wish to raise some of those issues” (line 2), “have no certainties”(line 2), “have many questions”(line 3), and “want to put them [the questions] to those who possess a lot more information”(line 3).

Moving onwards, we are looking at other pronouns, such as “those”(line 2), “them” and “those”(line 3). All three are demonstrative pronouns that reveal distance. The use of these pronouns in opposition to the pronoun “we” reveals separation and consequent grouping. The grouping fits with what van Dijk calls Group Identity and Identification²⁹⁴. Another element of identity is revealed by the final use of the possessive adjective first person singular “my” in relation to the noun “country” (line 4).

The aforementioned separation in example 3, asks us to look at the particularities of the groups and how they are defined by President Kirchner. First, Argentina is defined as a “non-permanent member” (line 1-2) in the UNSC, and by extent of the use of the first person plural “we”, we argued that there might be a reference to all non-permanent members in the UNSC. This group is defined according to what they are having (or not having): “no certainties, no absolute truths” (line 2) and “questions”(line 3). On the other side there are implicitly “those” (line 3) who are the permanent members of the UNSC, also defined by what they have: “possess a lot more information” (line 3) “far more data and far more extensive networks of information”(line 4). In the lines 3 and 4 of example 3, these elements of definition of those in the other group are flanked by the comparative adjective “more” and “than”, followed by elements of the first group: “we” and “my country”. This approach fits with what van Dijk calls *group relations*,²⁹⁵ and strengthens the aforementioned Fairclough focus of social relations. Van Dijk points to the construction of the groups resources as a way of sometimes locating “explicit resistance ideologies”.²⁹⁶ In this case we might see construction of a non-permanent member being able to make claims towards the UNSC. Since the aforementioned constructions of social relations seemingly mainly targeted states outside of UNSC permanency, it can be seen as a construction of Argentina being a strong representative of those, as one critical towards the UNSC. This is then *pastoral power polis* yet again, which is mainly interesting in relation to how Brazil constructs its criticism of the UNSC. This will be covered in chapter 8 as well.

Part conclusion

Both Rouseff and Kirchner construct their respective states as role models within economical issues, thus showcasing understandings of *neo-liberal power* (see page16). Kirchner is more explicit about criticizing the IMF and pointing towards the lack of multilateralism in the international economic arena, whereas Rouseff more so presents Brazil as being an example that the IMF and the World Bank should look to. Both

²⁹³ Fairclough, 127

²⁹⁴ Van Dijk, 395

²⁹⁵ Van Dijk, 395

²⁹⁶ Van Dijk, 396

Presidents use *securitization* as a way of promoting agenda's and both combine *securitization* with the utilization of other understandings of power e.g. *pastoral power*.

Rational-power is only seen in Rousseff's speech, in the way she balances criticism of UNSC, IMF and the World Bank and the agenda of wanting more international influence. Rousseff constructs Brazil as having *neo-liberal power* to promote Brazil's international authority and thus helping the agenda of becoming a permanent UNSC member. Kirchner apparently does not see the need for this type of conduct, which could indicate that criticizing international institutions such as the UNSC and the IMF, is easier to do if the state an actor represents does not seek inclusion in the leadership of such institutions and that it still is possible to seek influence even while criticizing.

The understanding of *war-panopticism* is seen in both speeches as being the power of the UNSC / the P5. Rousseff connects *war-panopticism* with securitization as a way of criticizing the lack of efficiency of the UNSC, and Kirchner utilizes this understanding of power to create fear of these powers of the UNSC / P5 among the hearers, in order to promote opposition against more states obtaining such powers.

Chapter 4

This press statement of the G4 countries was released on the 25th of September 2014, and it is related to the UNSC reform. As mentioned in the methodology (see page 35) the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) support the reform of UNSC including an expansion of the number of permanent seats in the SC.

After a formal introduction of the representative members and of the topic (i.e. UNSC reform) in the first point, the Brazilian representative stated in the second point:

(1)“2 – The G4 Ministers underscored their continuous commitment to a Security Council reform (2)reflective of the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. They agreed that the difficulties of the (3)Security Council to effectively address current international challenges are a compelling reminder of (4)the urgent need for a Security Council reform which makes it more broadly representative, efficient (5)and transparent and thereby further enhances its effectiveness and the legitimacy and (6)implementation of its decisions.”(ex.20 app.5 p.126)

Given the RQ and our focus, we are going to look in this example at specific techniques used via verbs and nouns, together with adjacent adverbs and adjectives. This is part of or related to what Fairclough calls *grammatical features*.²⁹⁷ In line 1, the use of the noun “commitment” related to their purpose indicated by the multiple nouns “Security Council reform” being further reinforced by the indication of temporal dimension via the adjective “continuous”; the temporal dimension of the *present* appears throughout the text in reference to the reform via the ordinal numeral and noun “21st century”(line 2) and the adjectives “current”(line 3) and “urgent”(line 4). These uses seem to be escalating, from the most general dimensions (such as the first two terms) to the more defined (third term) culminating with a construction of imminent requirement (the fourth term) highlighted by the noun “need”(line 4). This escalation prompted by vocabulary can be put into Fairclough’s *classification scheme*²⁹⁸ which is concerned with how a text, via vocabulary, connects to a discourse. In this case we can talk about the discourse of UNSC reform. This discourse exists and does not need to be constructed. Therefore G4 can draw from this and make attempts at naturalizing the notion that a reform is becoming more and more urgent. The vocabulary in ex 1 appears “[T]o be a surreptitious piece of ideological struggle under the veil of semantics.”²⁹⁹ Here the struggle is about whether or not a reform is needed.

The constructed pressure for reform ends in example 1 with the results that such a reform would have over the UNSC in addressing “international challenges”(line 3). This assertion is constructed via the adverb and verb “effectively address”(line 3), the comparative adjective “more broadly”(line 4) followed by three adjectives “representative, efficient and transparent”(lines 4-5), concluded with the nouns “effectiveness” and “legitimacy”(line 5). *Effect* as a root word – used in different syntactical forms – seems to be repetitively used when highlighting the benefits of a UNSC reform.

When the G4 is addressing the effects of a reform, and putting pressure on the process, it points towards an understanding of *pastoral power polis* (see page*). We see this as G4 talk more about what should be the results of the reform, than about whom could benefit from a reform, i.e. a focus on the idea over the

²⁹⁷ Fairclough, 120-28

²⁹⁸ Fairclough, 114-15

²⁹⁹ Fairclough, 114

people. Also the G4 is somehow placing itself as a frontrunner for the idea of a reform, and thus assuming both ownership and leadership, which also points towards *pastoral power polis*.

The point following ex.20 is:

(1)“3 – The Ministers voiced their concern that, 70 years after the foundation of the United Nations, 50
(2)years after the first and only time that the Security Council was reformed, nearly 15 years after the
(3)Millennium Summit and 10 years after the 2005 World Summit – when our leaders unanimously
(4)called for an early reform of the Security Council – discussions are still at a stalemate. [...]”(ex.21 app.5 p.
p.126)

The use of numerals in this example is abundant: cardinal numerals followed by the plural noun “years”, such as “70 years”(line 1), “50 years”(lines 1-2), “15 years”(line 2), “10 years”(line 3), and the ordinal numeral “first”(line 2). They are all used in reference to historical events related to UN history, and seem to serve promoting their agenda i.e. reform of Security Council. This construction of the development of UN and its UNSC ends with “discussions are still at a stalemate”(line 4). Through this sequential events and ending in the present – shown by the present tense verb “are” and adverb “still”, together indicating stationary present time – the G4 representatives seem to highlight how UN does not want to accept a reform despite being “unanimously called”(lines 3-4).

This is a reflection of what Foucault³⁰⁰ said when he inverted Clausewitz’s proposition, and promoted that politics during peace reveal “the disequilibrium revealed by the last battle of the war”³⁰¹ – in this case, the G4 are talking about the unchanged political structure since World War Two and the sequential formation of UN with the victors of this war having a permanent seat in the UNSC. We have defined this understanding of power as part of *war-panopticism*, and although no threats or explicit fear of war are being mentioned, we can see that the ministers are concerned (line 1) which indicates fear. We can then make a semantic interpretation that the fear/concern is related to the unchanged status since War Two, which in the UNSC context is the unchanged prerogative to wage war of the P5.

In ex.21 we also see a utilization of a democracy argument in that “our leaders unanimously called for an early reform”(lines 3 and 4). If something is unanimously called for, it is in general the democratic want. The possessive adjective first person plural “our”(line 3) indicates an ‘in-group’³⁰² of everybody who’s “leaders” wanted the reform in 2005. The unanimous call for reform, which G4 refers to, is point 153 in the resolution adapted by the GA on 24th of October 2005.³⁰³ Since the document is GA approved, it represents all member states. So the ‘in-group’ being constructed consists of all member states; but we also know that not all member states agree with how G4 wants a reform to be implemented, and thus the constructed group is not represented by its discursive indication of agenda-unity. That is why the discursive cue to democracy is important. Fairclough talks about *cues* as being how the recipients interpret the message given to them.³⁰⁴ In this case it is interesting that the G4 uses the term “our leaders”(line 3) and not e.g. “we” or “the GA”. The leaders they are referring to are (for a major part somewhat) democratically elected,

³⁰⁰ Foucault, *Society*, 15-16

³⁰¹ Foucault, *Society*, 15

³⁰² Van Dijk, 396

³⁰³ UN Document: A/RES/60/1

³⁰⁴ Fairclough, 141

and therefore it seems the democratic thing to do, to agree with the G4. This utilization of a democracy discourse, reinforced by an *in-group* which (falsely) connects all UN members to its agenda, points towards *neo-liberal power* (see page 16) as we can see a *contract oppression scheme* in ex 21. The recipients are told to give up their freedom to be outside of the constructed 'in-group', in order to support the democratic path which the G4 stands for.

The ensuing point in the statement is:

(1)"4 – The G4 countries reiterated their commitment as aspiring new permanent members of the UN
(2)Security Council, as well as their support for each other's candidatures. They also reaffirmed their
(3)view of the importance of developing countries, including from Africa, to be represented in both the
(4)permanent and non-permanent categories of an enlarged Council."(ex.22 app.5 p.126)

The 4th point of the statement shows the agenda of G4 countries in regards to the adhesion of new members in the UNSC. We will be looking at the grammar and vocabulary features³⁰⁵ in this example.

The use of the verbs "reiterated"(line 1), "reaffirmed"(line 2), and "represented"(line 3) have the common feature of the morphological element prefix "re-"(synonymous with the semantic element adverb "again"). This highlights the continuity and multiple attempts into materializing their agenda. A similar use of these types of verbs had been analyzed and discussed in Chapter 1 (see page 46).

In the first sentence, the focus seems to lie upon the plural nouns "countries", "members"(line 1) and "candidatures"(line 2) which are used to show the agenda of G4 i.e. "support [...] each other"(line 2) to get a permanent seat. In the second sentence, the focus (verbalized in the definite article and noun "the importance") changes towards other members from outside the G4, seen in the use of the adjective and noun "developing countries"(line 3), and in the proper noun "Africa"(line 3). This change of focus, together with the verb "including"(line 3), reveal an inclusive approach of all those who are not part of the UNSC; this inclusive approach is further emphasized by mentioning the area of "both the permanent and non-permanent categories"(lines 3-4) in which these members can be "represented"(line 3). The final indication of inclusion outside the G4 is revealed by the adjective and noun "enlarged Council"; this adjective indicates enough room for all members to be represented, and the use of the noun "Council", despite becoming a proper noun in this context, points towards the consultation of all members from the "developing countries, including from Africa"(line 3).

We should also pay attention here to the explicit verbalization of "new permanent members"(line 1) which is the G4 agenda (and thus Brazil's) but it is not a statement often seen explicated [this will be seen in the ensuing documents to be analyzed and we will come back to this point in the discussion].

The social relation which is constructed via the vocabulary in ex.22 (as pointed out above) is a group or a unity between the G4 and Africa. Since the G4's official claim is for permanent seats for themselves (all four) and two for African countries, this reiteration of agenda and the use of the "enlarged Council"(line 4) might be to reassure the African Countries of their belonging to the agenda group together with the G4. This can be seen as the mentioning of "developing countries, including from Africa"(line 3) only can refer to African countries when it comes to new permanent seat, according to the G4 agenda. This we can figure

³⁰⁵ Fairclough, 112

out by looking at the G4 agenda, which is permanent seats for themselves and two unnamed African countries. Ex.22 seeks the support from African countries by reaffirming the support for them both as African countries and as developing countries, and at the same time includes all developing countries in the agenda, even though no developing countries outside of Africa and G4 (if India in any way can be considered as such) are included in the actual agenda. Such discursive agency points towards a use of *pastoral power eder*, as G4 is constructed as the representative of the people of the developing world and of Africa.

In chapter 4 we see Brazil being part of the G4's representation of its UNSC reform agenda. *Pastoral power polis* is behind the promotion of G4's reform promotion, as the ideational aspects are emphasized over the focus on whom the reform will benefit. But we also see *pastoral-power eder* as the G4 constructs itself as being a leader of the African countries, which then includes a focus on whom will benefit from the G4 reform agenda. The release shows also that the G4 understands the power of the P5 as *war-panopticism* as seen in the references to WWII and the proposed unchanged status since then. Democracy is being discursively applied in the use of *neo-liberal* power, as the hearers are sought convinced to support the G4 as the G4 represent the majority regarding UNSC reform issues.

Chapter 5

The documents to be analyzed are the record of part II of UNSC meeting held on 21st of October 2014, and the letter calling the meeting which was produced by the Argentinean presidency of the UNSC.

At the UNSC meeting Brazil speaks. No group representing Brazil or Argentina speaks, and neither does Argentina.

The letter calling the meeting is a formal letter, and the Argentinean presidency is thus representing the UNSC and not Argentina in this sense.

The emphasis will be on the Brazilian statement as only this can be labeled as representing Brazilian understanding of power. The Argentinean letter is included as we might find Argentinean agency in it. We do recognize that it will be hard to point to Argentinean agency and thus understanding of power in this letter, as it is a letter from the UNSC.

The Argentinean letter

The letter is one of the UNSC and not from Argentina, as we see in ex.23 that it is circulated as a document from the UNSC.

“I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.” (ex.23 app.6 p.128)

It is presented as a document of the UNSC and the provisional rules [rule no.18] of the UNSC also clearly defines the presidency as representing the UNSC and not the representatives’ member state. Also the rules [rule 20] states that a President should not preside over the council on a matter in which the member the President represents are involved [rule 20].³⁰⁶ Argentina is not involved in the discussion, but we assume that since the rules target impartiality, then the Argentinean representative would be careful in displaying interests.

We will however briefly engage in analyzing the document in search for Argentinean agency, related to the Brazilian campaign.

The introductory part of letter, labeled the ‘concept paper’ is ended with an emphasis that the council is not discussing reform but working methods of the UNSC (app.6.p.129). Here we might talk about what is presented in Chilton & Schäfer’s PDA as ‘coercion’ when “selecting topics”.³⁰⁷ Although we cannot attribute this selection to the Argentinean presidency of the UNSC, we can attribute it to the Argentinean representation that produced the letter which did not promote reform – but rather working methods discussion.

The letter proposes two issues as the objects for debate; 1, “*Enhancing due process in sanctions regimes*” (app.6 p.130) and 2, “*Follow-up of Security Council referrals to the International Criminal Court*” (app.6 p.132)

³⁰⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/chapter4.shtml> - accessed May 15. 2015

³⁰⁷ Chilton & Schäfer in Van Dijk, 311

At the end of the letter which is labeled the 'format', the protocol for the debate is framed. Here it is stated that member states should "[S]hare their views on matters pertaining to the agenda item under consideration." (app.6 p.132) We see here again the promotion of a structure which excludes a discussion of reform, as the "agenda item under consideration" is the working methods of the Security Council, and this do not refer to a structural reform.³⁰⁸

Based on the letter from Argentina we can conclude that it does not include any efforts towards discussing a structural reform of the UNSC. The fact that Argentina addresses the UNSC to discuss UNSC working methods and not reform, suggests that reform is not an important priority of Argentina. Considering discourse aspects, it might also suggest that the present discourse of reform in the UN is in favor of the Brazilian approach (the G4, see page 35), and thus Argentina do not wish bring it up. The agency from the Argentinean representative points towards an understanding of the need for *rational power* (see page 15). Argentina knows that it cannot act in a way that will make it seem partial, and thus outside of the mentioned protocol. But it seems that Argentina knows that it can and also must do what can be done to prevent the promotion of reform discussions. A good way to prevent this can be to initiate other discussion regarding the future of the UNSC which can be seen as the agenda of this letter.

The Brazilian Statement

The Brazilian representative (Brazil) talks about the two aforementioned issues for most of the statement, where after the focus is turned to discussing a reform of the UNSC. It is interesting that the participants in the meeting, has been asked specifically to only speak about UNSC working methods (app.6 p.129), and that Brazil still brings up the issue. Brazil finishes the addressing of the two prefixes issued, and then states:

(1)"It is necessary to recognize that there is a limit to what working methods can do for the Council [...]
(2)Some of the shortcomings in the working methods of the Security Council can only be corrected in the
(3)framework of a comprehensive reform of that body. Initiatives aimed at achieving a more accountable
(4)and transparent Council are more likely to prosper in an expanded and more inclusive Council with new
(5)permanent and non-permanent members, a Council reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century
(6)and committed to fresh and more participatory working methods. In concluding, I invite us all to take
(7)the opportunity provided by the seventieth anniversary of the Organization next year to finally achieve a
(8)concrete outcome to the long overdue reform process of the Council. By September next year, let us
(9)fulfill the mandate extended by our heads of State and Government at the 2005 Summit, when they
(10)unanimously called for an early reform of the Security Council." (ex.24 app.7 p.135)

This example presents the overall agenda of first negatively projecting the focus on UNSC working methods (lines 1-3), and then presenting the potential benefits of a structural reform of the UNSC (lines 3-6). These presentations are followed by an invitation to actively engage in the promotion of reform (lines 6-9). Let us first look at the construction of the presentation of and relation between the working methods agenda and the reform agenda, and what this points to regarding the Brazilian understanding of power.

³⁰⁸In the UN the agenda when discussing a reform of the UNSC is "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters" e.g. as seen in the agenda's of app. 1 and 2.

The initial usage of the adverb “necessary” and verb “recognize” (line 1) can be seen as legitimization of why Brazil brings up the reform albeit explicitly asked not to do so. The two words help the construction of Brazil as acting out of necessity to provide the truth to the rest of the hearers [so they can recognize it]. Brazil is here acting against the contextual protocol of not discussing reform, and the “legitimization” seen in line 1, can be targeting the *interpretive strategies of the hearers* when placed within Chilton & Schäfner’s PDA approach,³⁰⁹ or the MR according to Fairclough’s CDA.³¹⁰ From a PDA standpoint we would say that Brazil is targeting acceptance of its political standpoint, based on the *general ideological principle* that if something is necessary it should be sought for,³¹¹ and in CDA the focus would be the cue in the hearers interpretation, to think that the working methods of the UNSC should not be limited (because the hearers are discussing how to improve the working methods). Going on with the *MR* perspective, we can see that hearers might be inclined to accept Brazil being out of protocol, and interpreting Brazil’s actions as positive, because the action of bringing up the reform issue, is linked to the improvement of the original topic of the meeting (the working methods) in line 5-6.

Here we see Brazil acting according to an understanding of *rational power* (see page 15) within the UN framework of UNSC meeting protocols. Brazil can promote the reform issue, but cannot do it without connecting it to the discussion about working methods. Brazil seems also to be conducting *rational power*, as a reform must be included in the discussions of UNSC and that these discussions must not be focused on the working methods (from a Brazilian standpoint). It seems that Brazil understands the need to act according to the can/ cannot and must/must not framework of *rational power* (see page 15).

Part of Chilton & Schäfner’s PDA is also to look for not only legitimization, but also delegitimization.³¹² Although this part of the suggested PDA mainly targets the delegitimization of actors, we can here beneficially consider Brazil’s emphasis on criticizing the limits of the working methods (without reform). The overall ‘textual structure’³¹³ of ex. 24 points to the inclusion of working methods in mainly to legitimize the focus on reform. Consider the following “narrative”:

First the working methods focus are criticized by being connected to the restrictive nouns “limit [to what working methods can do]”(line 1) and “shortcomings [in the working methods]” (line 2). Hereafter the reform focus is introduced and legitimized by its proposed effects on the working methods. This is seen via positive sounding adjectives being connected to the UNSC e.g. “accountable”, “transparent” (line 3), “expanded”, “more inclusive” (line 4) and “reflective [of the realities]” (line 5). At the end of ex. 24 an invitation is given to achieve the aforementioned positives of the reform focus. In this solution is not included mentioning of the working methods. These are then somehow delegitimized by their absence, and “the long overdue reform process” (line 7) is seen as referring to the structural reforms and not working methods, as the only specific suggestions in ex 24 are “new permanent and non-permanent members” (lines 4-5)

PDA, CDA and the discourse and ideology approach, all emphasize the search for construction of social identities. Such constructions are not in place in the first overall part of ex.24, which can be seen as the

³⁰⁹ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 312

³¹⁰ Fairclough, 141

³¹¹ Chilton & Schäfner, 312

³¹² Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 312

³¹³ Fairclough, 137-39

problematization-part (lines 1-6). Here is presented the negatives of the UNSC in general and the limitedness of the working methods focus. Only in the second overall part is introduced the construction of [group] identities. This part can be seen as the invitation-part (lines 6-9).

In this invitation-part pronouns are used in what we view as being the framing of a discourse of democratization, which points to an understanding of *neo-liberal power* (see page 16). For clearer overview we again present this part that we have labeled 'the invitation part':

(1)"In concluding, I invite us all to take the opportunity provided by the seventieth anniversary of the
(2)Organization next year to finally achieve a concrete outcome to the long overdue reform process of the
(3)Council. By September next year, let us fulfil the mandate extended by our heads of State and
(4)Government at the 2005 Summit, when they unanimously called for an early reform of the Security
(5)Council." (ex.25 app.7 p.135)

The object pronoun first person plural "us" (lines 1-3) is used as a group forming democratization via the invitation of Brazil (line 1) to "fulfill the mandate"(line 3) that was called for, by member states' heads and governments; the latter are constructed as another group via the personal pronoun third person plural "they" (line 4). So we see the personal pronoun first person singular "I" (line 1), representing Brazil, that is "inviting" (line 1) the group of "us" (lines 1 and 3). When Brazil constructs itself as being part of the "us" that are invited, it might do so in order to align Brazil with the hearers. This can be seen as a democratic move, because it feeds the notion that the 'us' in the UNSC are somehow equal, but in reality any P5 member can veto any reform proposals. The democracy discourse can thus be seen as one asking/pressuring the P5 to be more democratic, and to signal to other (UNSC member) states, that Brazil promotes democracy. This notion of democratization can be labeled as a discourse of democratic international governance and also a discourse of promoting democratization in international institutions. This fits well with the UN arena, as the UN, with the exception of the veto right of the P5 in the UNSC, functions as a democratic organization.³¹⁴ Such a discourse is further promoted by lines 3 and 4. Here Brazil separates the hearers (the UNSC personnel / "us") from the Heads of State and Governments, which are part of an 'out-group' labeled they" (lines 3-4). This *out-group* represents the people of the states, which the UNSC are supposed to represent. The UNSC representatives are from another grouping than governments of states, but they act according to the will of their government, and thus can be seen as strategic discursive agency, to construct a scene wherein the UNSC is more so independent of heads of States and Governments.

Construction of a democratic discourse point towards *neo-liberal power*, as it seems that Brazil is adding power to its agenda through this specific approach (see page 16). The understanding of *neo-liberal power* can be seen through the construction of a democratization discourse. We might consider, if *neo-liberal power* should include both the promotion of economic aspects and political aspects, when these two are not clearly connected. This is a matter for further we will come back to in the discussion. In the case of ex.24 we see a reference from Brazil to "the realities the twenty-first century" (ex.24 line 5). Here we might consider if this is not referring to the economical rise of other countries, than the ones establishing and dominating the UNSC (the P5). The P5 are still strong military powers, although others have risen since the

³¹⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/> - accessed May 20 2015. : see article 18 about 'voting'

foundation of the UNSC. More important changes in international relations, has been the rise of new economies such as Brazil, and these might be the “realities” Brazil is referring to.

In ex.24 a very specific reference is seen to the discussion of how the UNSC should be reformed. In lines 4 and 5 is mentioned that a reform should include both new permanent and non-permanent members. As showed in the description of the different groups’ agenda’s (see methodology pages 33-36) the addition of permanent members is point of vital difference between the G4 agenda [representing Brazil] and the UfC agenda [representing Argentina]. Interestingly, Brazil chooses not only to talk about reform as a necessity, in a meeting where it is not a topic, but Brazil also chooses to present a contested view on the matter. Let us therefore look also at this statement in isolation:

“Initiatives aimed at achieving a more accountable and transparent Council are more likely to prosper in an expanded and more inclusive Council with new permanent and non-permanent members, a Council reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century and committed to fresh and more participatory working methods.” (ex.26 app.7 p.135)

We have already pointed to the connection between the agenda of working methods and the agenda of reform, so we will not go more into depth here. The main discursive aspect we see here is the usage of positively charged adjectives, and that these adjectives also support the aforementioned democratization discourse, as can be seen in the mentioned “participatory working methods”. The adjectives also describe aspects of the UNSC that one [most] will agree upon as desirable i.e. “accountable and transparent” and “reflective of the twenty-first century”, and then these aspects are connected to the reform of both the permanent and non-permanent membership structure. The adjectives: “accountable [Council]”, “expanded and inclusive [Council]”, “reflective [of the realities]”, “fresh and more participatory [working methods]”. Brazil is thus not explicitly describing the benefits of its perception of how to reform the UNSC, but more so presenting this perception as the way to achieving what these adjectives describe. Chilton and Schäfner’s concept of *representation*³¹⁵ is a good description of what we see going on here as it describes the notion of controlling what information is made available.

The emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the presented solution of both permanent and non-permanent members represents this approach as being clearly the best. Also we see the use of the comparative adjective “more”: “more accountable”, “more likely to prosper”, “more inclusive council”, and “more participatory working methods”. The ‘experiential value’³¹⁶ of this discursive move indicates ‘coercion’³¹⁷, as the recipients have to accept that the lack of the presented achievements will cause or uphold the negatively charged [in this case] comparative adjective “less” as becoming/being the status of the issues described via the adjective “more”. There is also ‘experiential values’ to be found in the *overwording* i.e. excessive use of the comparative adjective “more”. Fairclough relates *overwording* to ideological struggles, and we believe the comparison of the projected futures in ex.26 represent the ideological struggle between the views of whether or not a structural reform of the UNSC will improve important UNSC aspects or not.

It is also interesting, that no strong presence of *expressive modality* is found in the text. Fairclough advices the search for *expressive modality* to define how the speaker constructs authority in relation to what is

³¹⁵ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 312

³¹⁶ Fairclough, 120-21

³¹⁷ Chilton & Scäfner in Van Dijk, 311

true.³¹⁸ Normally this modality can be seen in the usage of auxiliary modal verbs such as *could*, *should*, and *must*, but none of such are present in ex.26. Brazil states that “initiatives aimed at achieving [...] are more likely to [...]” (ex.26), we see expressive modality in this statement in the phrase “are more likely”. The fact that expressive modality is in play in the constructing of the potential benefits for certain initiatives and not in the construction of how to get there i.e. the addition of both permanent and non-permanent members, does not devalue the truth claim attached to this reform approach. It seems as if the avoidance of auxiliary modal verbs makes the claims about the Brazilian reform approach contain a stronger representation of truth. This can be seen mainly via the part of the statement following the mentioning of both permanent and non-permanent members, where the potential UNSC council is presented as: “[A] Council reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century and committed to fresh and more participatory working methods.” Thus a separation of the working method focus and reform focus appears.

In the specific mentioning of a UNSC reform, Brazil both connects the working methods agenda and the reform agenda, and separates them. The connection is made to validate the fact that Brazil brings up the subject of reform, and the separation is made to strengthen the arguments of the structural benefits of a reform, as these are then not dependent on the improvement of working methods.

In the end of this chapter we would like to briefly point that Argentina acts according to the principles of *rational power* when respecting the UN protocol and still seemingly conducting anti-reform agency by promoting other UNSC issues than reform. Brazil also understands the need to act with *rational power* but they break the UN protocol, and seek to legitimize the breach via constructing a connection between the goals of working methods and effects of a reform. Brazil’s agency can also be seen as based on *neo-liberal power* as it utilizes a discursive reference to democracy and international democratic governance to promote the need for a reform of the permanent member structure. Brazil is explicit about the need for new permanent members.

³¹⁸ Fairclough, 126-27

Chapter 6

This chapter presents analyses of the records from a GA meeting held Nov. 12th 2014. On the agenda was the UNSC reform. Both Brazil (on behalf of G4) and Argentina made statements at the meeting.

We will first look at the Brazilian statement, since it was presented before the statement from Argentina at the meeting. The Brazilian statement is interesting as it is being delivered on behalf of the G4. As we have mentioned the G4's main agenda is the reform of the UNSC including permanent seats for all G4 members. The Brazilian representative (Brazil) opens with the following:

"I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Four (G4) countries: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan"(ex.27 app.8 p.137)

The main aspect of ex.27 is the diffusion of agency and at the same time the construction of a strong unit behind the statement. When Brazil represents G4, Brazil is only partly responsible for what is said, which might influence how Brazil acts according to the understanding of *rational power*, e.g. maybe G4 and Brazil differ in what they can and cannot do. (see pages 15-17). The different agents being presented are "I" = representative from Brazil, the "(G4)" = the group and then the four individual members of G4.

Brazil addresses the newly appointed chairman [Mr. Rattray] of the UN working group: 'Intergovernmental Negotiations', which is the forum in which official UNSC reform negotiations are conducted.³¹⁹ Looking for how 'social relations' are constructed both in grammatical and vocabulary features [which Fairclough suggests³²⁰] seem relevant in ex.27 as it is referring to the relationship between G4 and Mr. Rattray.

"Let me assure Ambassador Rattray that the G4 is encouraged by his appointment and is committed to working closely with him with a view to achieving the much-needed and long-awaited reform of the Security Council."(ex.28 app.8 p.137)

Fairclough would characterize this as being a *declarative mode*, as information is given as a declaration from the speaker to the addressee.³²¹[The information does not need to be tested or is not promoted as a question]. And we find this worthy of focus, as the addressee can both be seen as the GA, Mr. Attray and both. But the statement/information is not delivered directly to Mr. Attray, who is the object of the information together with the commitment of the G4.

The vocabulary points to the construction of a partnership just waiting to realize its ultimate goal. The verb "achieving" signals that this is indeed the goal [the reform], and the description of the goal "the much-needed and long awaited reform" signals agreement of the parts who will be working "closely" together. It should be noted that the 'Intergovernmental Negotiations' forum, is targeting the negotiations of a reform³²², and mainly seeking a reform as well, but that it includes representations of different agenda's. Applying the specific article "the [much-needed]" instead of "a [much needed]", signals agreement which in reality is not there. Through this grammatical feature describing the social-relation between G4 and Mr.

³¹⁹ Center for UN reform, 6

³²⁰ Fairclough, 116-17, 125-27

³²¹ Fairclough, 126

³²² Center for UN reform, 5-7

Attray, Brazil constructs a unity of agenda between: Brazil, Mr. Attray, G4 and Intergovernmental Negotiations, i.e. a unity of agenda between all other parties being included in the discourse, than the GA which is the actual hearer of the statement.

Also a relationship of positioning can be seen in the sentence. Although it has already been stated, that Brazil is delivering on behalf of G4, there is still a differentiation of agency in the beginning of ex.28 “[let]me [assure that] the G4”. He could have said just “The G4 assures Mr. Attray that”, but as Brazil includes itself in the sentence, again agency is diffused. Brazil is somehow bringing a message to Mr. Attray, that the mighty G4 will grant him their corporation. This could be an exaggerated interpretation, but note also that Brazil states that it is an “honor” to represent G4 as seen in ex.28 It seems as if Brazil presents first the G4 as an international authority and then backs this up by being honored to present the G4.

The statement shows Brazil as conducting itself according to *pastoral power eder*. It seems that the flock which Brazil is constructed to shepherd, is the ‘Intergovernmental Negotiations’ group more than it is the G4. Brazil is officially representing the G4, but the differentiation in this case between Brazil and G4, points to Brazil as being a mediator, one that “assures” the “working together” and “close commitment” towards the common goals. We see here, how the construction of Brazil as having *pastoral power eder* (over a group) is targeting just as much the leadership of a process or an idea (*polis*). But in this case is mentioned “the reform” instead of “a reform” which is a construction of a specific object. The construction of what subjects are involved, points to a focus on the construction of a group (of whom Brazil can lead/guide towards results). It seems as if Brazil is constructing itself as a leader of a group, and via this construction also signaling the leadership of an idea.

The infusion of the *pastoral-power of eder* and *polis* could be an issue we need to target/discuss further. It seems advantageous to apply them differently, and this can indicate strategic representation of one to construct also the other. But at the same time, it should be considered if the concepts are better applied as a more coherent concept, to avoid that we as analysts create differences that might not be there.

Following the examples analyzed above, Brazil talks about the former Chairman of ‘Intergovernmental Negotiations’³²³ Mr. Zanir Tanin. Here Brazil presents/constructs him, as being in agreement with the G4 that a foundational text is needed in the negotiations about a UNSC reform.³²⁴ This action is explicit in the following example:

“looking ahead, he [Zanir Tahin] pointed out that a text-based discussion remains the logical evolution for this process.”(ex.29 app.8 p.137)

Directly after ex.29 Brazil states:

“That is why the G4 believes it is imperative to start the first meeting of the next round of the intergovernmental negotiations with a text on the table. We cannot allow the next round of the intergovernmental process to be yet another merry-go-round.”(ex.30 app.8 p.137)

³²³ The official group charged with leading the negotiations concerning a UNSC reform.

³²⁴ This is a matter of disagreement between G4 and UfC. Although the majority of member states support so called text-based negotiations, some member states from the UfC and ‘The African Group’, criticizes the current development of the text, and wishes to draw the process back to an earlier stage and start over, see: Center for UN reform, 14

The metaphor of a “merry-go-round” catches the eye in ex.30 and the syntactical strategy of first presenting something as “imperative” and constructing the sentence as the opposite being a “merry-go-round” creates an antagonistic relation the serious/imperative and the ridiculous/merry-go-round. The comparison between negotiations regarding UNSC reform and a “merry-go-round”, serves to deconstruct the validity of UNSC negotiations without the wished for text, via the metaphorical meaning of a merry-go-round i.e. a never ending cycle. The vocabulary in ex.30 indicates the belief that if something happens soon/quickly it is more likely to be successful. The noun and ordinal numeral “start [the] first” point to this, as they both refer to beginnings and swiftness, and this approach is presented as the issue that is “imperative”. This is what Fairclough would call a *classification scheme*.³²⁵ This scheme is likely constructed to put pressure on those opposing the need for a negotiation text.³²⁶ This promotes emphasis both on the substantive aspect of the reform i.e. Brazil and G4’s focus on both permanent and non-permanent expansion, and on the temporality aspect i.e. the “imperative” aspect. When stating that something is “imperative” and then later that the lack of this imperative action will not be allowed, a sense of unavoidability is constructed, which signals that the G4 has unavoidable power as Brazil states that: “We cannot allow the next round”.

That text based negotiations is presented as “imperative” is interesting as this legitimization through necessity was also seen in ex.28 when stating “the much need and long awaited reform”

It seems that Brazil is here conducting itself [on behalf of G4] based on the power of *war-panopticism* (see page 19). The reason we see this, is that the *expressive value* or the “[C]ategorical commitment of the producer to the truth of the proposition” as Fairclough puts it³²⁷ indicates a threat, and what Chilton & Schäfer calls a *commissive*, which they believe only can be performed based upon recognized power.³²⁸ This means that the *commissive* will only be effective if it is considered valid by its recipients. This backs up the notion that Brazil/G4 believes in their own power to present such a *commissive*. The threat is not backed up by a *securitization* discourse through e.g. the potential threat to world peace, nor is it presented through a *neo-liberal discourse* where focus is on the threat to freedom or economy. Neither of such aspects has been mentioned prior to ex.30. *War-panopticism* as a concept is based on the prerogative of the UNSC (the P5) to wage war. The G4 does not have this permanently, as they are not permanent members of the UNSC. Thus we might need to include such aspects in the *war-panopticism* concept (see page 19). But for now we can see, that Brazil and G4 believes themselves in the position of having the power to “not allow” something not to happen.

Moving into the *grammatical features*, we might consider whom the personal pronoun “we” refer to. If it refers to G4 (as presumed above) we are seeing power related to the mechanisms of *war-panopticism*. If the “we” refers to all of the UN members, then we are seeing *pastoral power polis* as the G4 then is constructed as a shepherding promoter of the idea of reform. The textual structure of ex.30 suggests that the “we” is referring back to G4, as it is the G4 who sees the issue of beginning the reform negotiations from a specific standpoint (“a text on the table”) as being “imperative”, and the MR of the hearers will suspect a provided solution from the speaker, to this provided problem. As mentioned not everyone in the UN agrees about the necessity of a negotiation text for ‘Intergovernmental Negotiations’ to continue, and right after ex.30 Brazil addresses this perception.

³²⁵ Fairclough, 115

³²⁶ For an overview of which states support text based and non text based negotiations and why, see Center for UN reform education, *Governing and managing change at the United Nations – Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013*. New York NY, USA: 2013, 34-37

³²⁷ Fairclough, 129

³²⁸ Chilton & Schäfer in Van Dijk, 315

“As for those who state that there must be a prior consensus before presenting the intergovernmental negotiations with a working document, let me point out that such a requirement has no precedent in any other United Nations process. In fact, that line of thought could actually be considered anti-United Nations”(ex.31 app.8 p.137).

Ex.31 seems to be a reference to the Uniting for Consensus group given that this is that groups explicit agenda (see page 34) The opening phrase “as for those” seem to be very explicit construction of this opinion as belonging to what Van Dijk coins as an *out-group* of whom is given “[A] negative representation of Them, at all levels of discourse”.³²⁹ After this initial framing of an *out-group* opinion, Brazil states “let me [point out]” and thus again constructing a focus on Brazil before the G4. This turn of agency constructs Brazil as one having *pastoral-power polis* as juridical discourse is being invoked via the negated noun “no precedent”, and Brazil is the one leading all other against this unprecedented “line of thought”, which is even coined as being “anti-United Nations”.

Using the metaphor “line of thought” seemingly materializes the constructed *out-groups’* agenda as being something they actively and rationally pursue, a line of thought indicates rationality, and this in opposition to the UN being represented via “any other United Nations process”. So the *out-group* is constructed to deliberately be acting in an “anti-United Nations” manner. The two positions are being discursively antagonized via positive/negative emphasis.³³⁰ This happens via the *syntactical structure* of the sentences, which via “[A]ctive sentences emphasizes negative agency vs. passive sentences or nominalizations that de-emphasize agency.”³³¹ The active being “line of thought” and the passive being “United Nations process”. The construction of an *out-groups’* line of thought as being “anti-United Nations”, points towards Brazil on behalf of G4 conducting *neo-liberal power*. Also the morphological application of “anti-[United Nations] is constructed as harmful to liberty (as opposed to useful to liberty). The fact that the *out-groups’* opinion is presented as a “requirement”, also enforces the notion of harmfulness to liberty. Somehow the *neo-liberal power* is also conducted through a *contract oppression scheme* (see page 16-17) which in this case is the social contract between the UN member states and the UN. The UN member states cannot support anything being “anti-United Nations” as they then become an *out-group* themselves in relation/opposition to the UN. We see this construction of “anti-United Nations” being also enforced via the syntactic organization of the sentence “In fact, that line of thought could [...]”. This emphasizes the factuality of the postulate, whereas “this could, in fact be thought of [...], more so emphasizes a possibility/potentiality. Chilton & Schäfner suggests the focus on “communicative functions that are not directly encoded in the content of words [...]”³³² and this is what we see here.

Later in the statement, after having referred to the unity of opinion between the G4 and a former GA president Brazil states:

³²⁹ Van Dijk, 396

³³⁰ Van Dijk, 398

³³¹ Van Dijk, 398

³³² Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 322

“I assure the Assembly that the G4 remains ready to start real negotiations on Security Council reform at any time.”

The use of personal pronoun first person singular “I”, personalizes the promise that is being delivered on behalf of the G4, and thus somehow the credibility is being based on multiple agencies: The state of Brazil, the representative and the G4. Chilton & Schäfner juxtaposes promises and threats as both being *comissives*.³³³ As was showed earlier a threat *comissive* has been delivered when stating the G4 would not allow unproductive negotiations. (app.,p*). Here a promise is being delivered, and if we subscribe to Chilton & Schäfner’s juxtaposing of the two, we can see the current [promise]*comissive* as being a rewording of the former [threat]*comissive*. Rewording is the use of the same words or formulations “for purposes of control,[...], as a way of leading participants into accepting one’s own version [...] and so limiting their options for future contributions.”³³⁴

Another part of this rewording strategy can be seen via the construction of “real negotiations” as being equivalent to the former presented “imperative” of having a “[negotiation] text on the table”. G4 stated that they could not allow the lack of negotiations, and in ex.* G4 is presented as “ready to start real negotiations”. We can assume that “real negotiations” are referring back to text based negotiations, otherwise the G4 would have been represented as having a contradictive position on the matter.

At the end of the statements, reiteration of a number of points and formulations occur which we have seen in the other analyzed texts.

(1)“There is a prevailing view among Member States and among civil society that the Security Council is not (2)capable of responding satisfactorily to specific crises around the world. One can clearly identify a (3)growing sense of frustration arising from the paralysis in the efforts to reform it. During the last general (4)debate, over 100 delegations stressed the need for reform. “(ex.32 app.8 p.137)

In the GA meeting which we analyzed in chapter 2, Brazil stated [presented in italics to differentiate between this and ex.32]

(1)“*There seems to be a prevailing view among Member States that the Security Council is not responding (2) satisfactorily to specific crises around the world, and a growing sense of frustration arises from a widely (3) perceived dysfunctionality of the body. If we leave things as they are, we run the risk of bringing discredit (4) and erosion of authority to the United Nations in a core area of its mandate.*”(ex.5 app.2. p.113)

In the analysis of ex.5, (see page 53) we saw *pastoral power* both *eder* and *polis*, and we saw the power of *securitization*. The claims in ex.32 can be viewed as an escalation of the claims in ex.5. In ex 5 “there seem to be [a prevailing view]”(line 1) and in ex. 32 “there is [a prevailing view]”(line 1). It is now a stronger claim to truth which according to Chilton & Schäfner is possible due the authority of the role of being the speaker.³³⁵

A pattern can also be seen when in ex.32 “one can clearly identify a growing sense of frustration arising from the paralysis in the efforts to reform it [the UNSC]”(lines 2-3), whereas in ex.5 the claim was that “a growing sense of frustration arises from a widely perceived dysfunctionality [of the UNSC]”(lines 2-3). Here we are also witnessing an escalation from “dysfunctionality” to “paralysis”, but these nouns refer to the UNSC in ex.5 and to the reform process in ex.32.

³³³ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 319

³³⁴ Fairclough, 136

³³⁵ Chilton & Scäfner in Van Dijk, 318.

At the end of ex.33 Brazil states:

“If we leave things as they are, we run the risk of bringing discredit and erosion of authority to the United Nations in a core area of its mandate”(ex.33 app.8 p.137)

The exactly same sentence was stated by Brazil in the GA meeting on Sept. 8th 2014 (app.2 p.113). This does not manifest any escalations as the aforementioned comparisons, but it shows interconnectedness and intertextuality between when Brazil represents G4 and when Brazil represents itself.

Based on the repetition of formulations and sentences and the escalations seen from one formulation to a very similar formulation we direct our attention towards *intertextuality*,³³⁶ because this is related to perceived presuppositions i.e. how the producer of a text aims at constructing an ideal reader. Fairclough says that “[H]aving power may mean being able to determine presuppositions.”³³⁷ It seems that G4, and thus Brazil, assumes that they have the power to make the hearers presuppose that the UN as a whole is dissatisfied with the efficiency of the UNSC. This we assume as this (perceived) presupposition is first being constructed as seen in ex.5 and then built upon to demand text based negotiations and structural reforms in ex.31 The proclaimed dissatisfaction is what Chilton & Schäfer calls a *representative* which builds upon mutual knowledge between the presenter and the audience.³³⁸ In this case G4 builds upon a perception of this. We might also talk about a *naturalization*³³⁹ of a discourse, although it is hard to validate with data from only 2014. However the adjective *paralyzed* and noun *paralysis* seem to be reoccurring when the UNSC is being criticized, especially since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.

We will now move on to analyzing the Argentinean statement at the same GA meeting. Following this we will make a combined part conclusion.

The Argentinean statement

At the plenary meeting in November 12 2014, after Brazil’s representative speech, Mister Estreme, Argentina’s representative, gave a speech in regards to the UNSC reform. After showing gratitude to the GA president, he expressed “Argentina’s support for the statement delivered by the representative of Italy on behalf of Uniting for Consensus.”(page *) It seems that from the very beginning of the speech, the Argentinean representative (Argentina) shows the allegiance to the agenda of UfC. The rest of the speech continues by supporting this agenda, by pointing out three major elements of issue: reform of UNSC, relations between GA and Council, and the veto right in regards to the expansion of UNSC. We are going to look in-depth how he does it by taking some examples.

(1)“The first, clearest and most basic is the absolute necessity of reforming the Security Council and (2)ending the status quo. An unreformed Council is obsolete. Its loss of legitimacy, effectiveness and (3)relevance affects the entire Organization. [...] the Council’s working methods being a clear example (4)that we must work to improve and make more transparent.”(ex. 34 app.8 p.138)

³³⁶ Fairclough, 152-53

³³⁷ Fairclough, 152

³³⁸ Chilton & Schäfer in Van Dijk, 318

³³⁹ Fairclough, 90-91

We are going to look in this example at grammatical and vocabulary values³⁴⁰.

The example begins in line 1 with the definite article “The” that gives the next three parts of speech the values of subject: ordinal numeral “first”, superlative adjectives “clearest” and “most basic”. This start strengthens the noun “necessity” that is previously strengthened by the adjective “absolute”(which semantically accomplishes the same superlative degree), all forming an imperative statement for “reforming the Security Council and ending the status quo”(lines 1-2).

Argentina continues the appeal for reform by characterizing negatively the present Council through the adjective “obsolete”(line 2), stating it lost “legitimacy, effectiveness and relevance”(lines 2-3). The use of the noun “loss”(line 2) indicates that the Council once had these elements, but it lost them as they are no longer relevant (“obsolete”) and now this “affects the entire Organization”(line 3). “Organization” is a metonymy as it refers to the UN; this lexical choice seems to emphasize the fact that the UN is a living organism, and not simply an institution. The negative effect on the “Organization”(seen as a living thing), together with the definite article and adjective “the entire”, further strengthens the need for reform.

In line 4, the imperative tone, continues with the modal auxiliary verb “must”, this indicating a *relational value*³⁴¹ as it summons more members, through the personal pronoun plural “we”, to act together; the agency is seen in the verbs “work”, “improve” and “make” – all verbs indicating the development of the Council towards becoming “more transparent”. The comparative degree of the adjective “transparent”(accomplished by the adverb “more”) shows that the Council is already transparent, but that it can be improved by the gathering of the summoned “we”.

(1)“[...] my country believes that the reform should not allow for new permanent members or create (2)exclusive categories. We are of the view that this type of seat, that is to say permanent seats, does (3)not necessarily guarantee greater participation by those who at present are not represented in the (4)Council. [...] we believe that any formula must include the concept of a legitimate democratic and (5)representative process, with elections as a fundamental element.”(ex.35 app.8 page 139)

We are looking in this example at how Argentina constructs the status of permanent seats. This is of utter importance for the study’s answering of the RQ as the analysis can reveal how Argentina opposes Brazil by constructing the prerogatives of permanent seats.

“my country believes”(line 1) is an example of personification³⁴² of the noun “country” – preceded by the possessive adjective first person singular “my” – as it is followed by the verb “believes”, which is a human agency (or characteristic). This personification seems to show the unity of Argentina in its beliefs. The personification is replaced, in this example, by the personal pronoun plural “we”(lines 2) that “are of the view”(line 2) – again showing unity in vision; pronoun “we”(line 4) is used with the same charge, followed by the same verb as in the personification from line 1, “believe”(line 4). This construction of Argentina as united in beliefs and vision, gives a greater strength to the Argentinean agenda.

³⁴⁰ Fairclough, 112-129

³⁴¹ Fairclough, 126-127

³⁴² Related to the effects of metaphors, see Fairclough, 119-120

Having seen the unity in beliefs and vision (both arguably contextual synonyms), we are going to look for *grammatical features*. “reform should not allow”(line 1) contains the modal auxiliary verb “should not”; “any formula must include”(line 4) also contains the auxiliary modal verb “must”. Fairclough³⁴³ states that part of the grammatical features are also the modal verbs which bear relational and expressive values; in these two cases of modal verbs usage, we identified the expressive value, because they show the speaker’s evaluation of truth – specifically related to beliefs, as mentioned previously.

The truth being presented revolves around beliefs (line 1 and 4) and concludes in the promotion of “a legitimate democratic and representative progress” (line 4-5). As Argentina presents its agenda within these frames, we see it as an understanding of *pastoral-power polis* (see page 22).

Further strengthening of this agenda is the uses of modal verbs constructed around the elements defining the permanent seats. The characteristics of permanent seats are constructed with adverbs of negation: “not [allow]”(line 1), “not [necessarily guarantee]” and “not [represented]”(line 3). These adverbs show the opposition of Argentinean representative against “new permanent members”(line 1), “exclusive categories”(line 2), lack of “guarantee [for] greater participation”(line 3), and against the situation of “those [...] not represented in the Council”(lines 3-4). The strategic goal of Argentina seems to be the “guarantee” that other non-permanent members are represented in the UNSC, and therefore Argentina seems to use the discourse of democratization for underlining the current state of affairs that seems to promote “exclusive categories” which are undemocratic. The alternative for all these negated characteristics come in the last sentence through the modal verb “must” which expresses an imperative value; therefore, the new formula (resulting from the reform) must be “a legitimate democratic and representative process, with elections as a fundamental element”(lines 4-5).

“[...] we will achieve a compromise that satisfies all Member States, respecting the principles of transparency, good faith, mutual respect, openness and inclusiveness.”(ex.36 aap.8 page 139)

Argentina in ex.36 presents future achievements, through the auxiliary verb “will” followed by the verb “achieve”. The achievement seems to be “a compromise that satisfies all Member States”. The use of these words points future results: “will” is used for future indefinite events; “compromise” is a word through which “we” can achieve future “satisfaction”. It seems that Argentina supports the idea that through compromise they can all achieve satisfaction, meaning that the stubbornness of certain agendas will not reach satisfactory results. The future achievements are constructed as satisfactory to “all Member States” through a set of principles indicated by the nouns and adjectives “transparency, good faith, mutual respect, openness and inclusiveness”. The mentioning of these principles, to which supposedly all members subscribe, might have the effect of bringing together the recipients. Again we see the underlying power being *pastoral-power polis*, as the emphasis in ex.36 is on the substances which will satisfy all members, and not so much on framing the members besides via “all”. If the power behind this was *pastoral-power eder* then the phrase might have started “to satisfy all the members, we will achieve”, and thus literally put the members before the compromise.

Argentina continues:

³⁴³ Fairclough, 126-127

(1)“[...] since the 1945 negotiations [...] and with greater emphasis [...] in October 1946, and [...] 1947,
(2)Argentina established a very firm position against the veto. There is no doubt as to our position. In
(3)the years that followed, my delegation reiterated that same position repeatedly. But at the same
(4)time, we believe that, given the fact that eliminating the veto is not possible at this point, formulas
(5)that would seek to perpetuate it or extend it to new members should not be accepted.”(ex.37 app.8
p.139)

In this example we identified the temporal dimension seen in the years represented by the cardinal numerals “1945”, “1946” and “1947”(line 1) constructing the continuity and consistency of Argentinean agenda. The focus lies upon the opposition against the veto. The opposition is seen in the adverb “against”(line 2), preceded by the two adjectives and noun “very firm position”(line 2), by the negative element “no” and the noun “doubt”(line 2). The continuity and consistency is shown by alliteration of the verb “reiterated” and adverb “repeatedly”(line 3), which stresses Argentinean commitment. The construction of their agenda is seen in the repetition of the noun “position”(lines 2-3) present in the first three sentences.

The second half of the example starts with the conjunction “But”(line 3), which plays the role of highlighting an exception. What follows is a form of cooperation with the realities of the present that imposes “eliminating the veto is not possible”(line 4). The presence of the modal verb “should not”(line 5), indicates an *expression value*³⁴⁴ addressed in relation to “formulas that [...] perpetuate [the veto]”(lines 4-5). Through this statement, the Argentinean agenda changes by becoming more flexible in relation to the international rules constructed as set-in-stone.

The veto is framed as not changeable, and we see this as a reference to *war-panopticism*, as the ultimate reason is that the veto powers (the P5) can veto a removal of the veto system. This power/prerogative of theirs is related to them being the “winners” of WWII and thus this power is based on war. It is not clear cut *war-panopticism* (see page 19) but it is related to this understanding of power as conceptualized by us.

(1)“We all know that in any negotiating process, intransigent positions do not lead to any result. We
(2)have the opportunity to overcome the impasse and the lack of progress. We call on all delegations to
(3)follow the example of Uniting for Consensus [...] to show flexibility and readiness to work on
(4)innovative and consistent formulas that will ensure a more democratic presence in the Council [...]
(5)and to reformulate the working methods so that the Council can be more democratic, fair and
(6)transparent.”(ex.38 app.8 p.139)

This example comes from the end of the speech; therefore it takes a form of conclusion as it tries to provide a form of solution to all the three issues discussed at the beginning of this report. We are going to start by looking at pronouns. It seems that the personal pronoun first person plural “we” is the only pronoun used in this example, but it is used at the beginning of each sentence: “We all know”(line 1), “We have”(lines 1-2), “We call”(line 2). The first use includes the pronoun “all” which indicates the entirety of the present members or representatives. The second use refers to either the entirety suggested by the previous use, either the people of Argentina. The third use refers to Argentinean people/representatives as it implies the summoning of “all delegations”(line 2).

³⁴⁴ Fairclough, 112

As we have seen, the first use of “we”(line 1) summons all the members present at the plenary meeting; here we identified a form of *coercion*³⁴⁵ as Argentina stated that all know and therefore subscribe to the fact that “intransigent positions do not lead to any result”(line 1). We have also identified a form of *legitimization*³⁴⁶ constructed by an initial opposition to “intransigent positions”(line 1) through the use of negative forms such as “not lead to [...] results”(line 1), nouns “impasse”(line 2) and “lack of progress”(line 3); after this opposition, the Argentinean representative continued by calling all members to “follow the example of”(line 3) UfC. The *vocabulary feature*³⁴⁷ of the verb “follow” shows a solution to the discussed issues by submitting to UfC exemplary (“example of”) agenda; this feature is further strengthened by words that apparently define UfC, such as the nouns “flexibility” and “readiness”(line 3), and adjectives “innovative”, “consistent”, “democratic”(line 4), “more democratic, fair and transparent”(lines 5-6). These nouns and adjectives show elements which all members agree upon, and therefore the focus on the UfC solution is further strengthened. Again as in ex.3 the emphasis is on the ideational aspects and therefore we see it as understood *pastoral-power polis*.

Part conclusion

In chapter 6 we see Brazil acting both as a part of G4 and as an independent actor. Brazil seems to construct its independent representation as having *pastoral-power eder* in relation to the ‘Intergovernmental Negotiation’ group, by moderating on their behalf within the G4. By this construction of leading a group (*eder*) Brazil is also seeking to utilize *pastoral power polis*.

Brazil via the G4 also acts in a manner indicating *war-panopticism* as G4 makes a “threat-like” statement of not being able to allow the lack of reform. We point to *war-panopticism* as it is a panoptical aspect that G4 reminds all that they are watching the process, and will not allow those who have the power to wage war (see ex.31) to not be reformed.

Brazil / G4 assumes a *pastoral-power polis* leadership, as it criticizes those who opposes a negotiation text. This is promoted via the labeling of opposing thoughts regarding reform as being “anti-United Nations” and this construction seems to be more targeted by Brazil by separating itself discursively from G4 in the context of this construction.

The mentioning of anti-UN also shows an understanding of the power of representing *neo-liberalism*, as the agenda of attacking anti-UN lines of thought is seen as being useful to liberty. (see pages 16-17)

Argentina’s agency in chapter 6 points mainly to agency via *pastoral-power polis*, as focus in Argentina’s statements are ideational aspects of how a reform of the UNSC should be, this is characterized especially in ex.35 where the notions of legitimacy and democratic (line 4) are connected to UNSC members being decided via elections, which is in opposition to the Brazillian agenda where new permanent members are decided beforehand. In general a discourse of democracy promotion is used to frame the wished for UNSC reform within ideas instead of around nations/groups. This is also what we have coined an understanding of the power of *pastoral-power polis*.

³⁴⁵ Chilton and Schäfner, in van Dijk, 311

³⁴⁶ Chilton and Schäfner, in van Dijk, 312

³⁴⁷ Fairclough, 112-16

Chapter 7

The document to be analyzed is the record of a GA meeting held on 21st of November 2014. On the agenda is 'Report of the Security Council' which is the annual report from the UNSC to the GA.³⁴⁸ Brazil spoke at the meeting on its own behalf. None of the groups we have targeted as representing Brazil or Argentina spoke at the meeting, and neither did Argentina.

After the initial greeting towards the GA president, the Brazilian representative (Brazil) addresses the UNSC report.

"We therefore believe that the annual report [...] represents an important tool for strengthening the Council's accountability vis-à-vis the 178 Member States that do not regularly take part in its deliberations."(ex.39 app.9 p.141)

Looking at the *relational value*³⁴⁹ in the vocabulary, we see constructed a relationship of common interest, between Brazil and the "178 Member States" – the common interest being the "strengthening" of the UNSC's accountability. This is achieved via the usage of the phrase "strengthening the accountability", because in ex* the only mentioned actors are "we"(personal pronoun first person plural, referring most likely to Brazil³⁵⁰) and "the 178 member states", Brazil being a member of the '178 member states group' on a regular basis, as it is not a permanent member. The UNSC is not presented as an actor but an object which needs strengthening, and is not in its own providing this "tool for strengthening" as the report merely "represents an important tool" and not *is* an important tool.

A very important social-relation or *in-group*³⁵¹ is also constructed grammatically via the definite article "the [178 member states]". This is referring to the constant amount of UN members not being in the UNSC. This group is actually dynamic, as new members are elected every 2 years for the 10 non permanent seats in the UNSC, but the construction in ex 39 hints at a group of 178 member states stuck outside the UNSC permanently.

The noun "accountability" also show us what Fairclough calls *experiential value* of vocabulary features. Fairclough explains that such discursive actions often occur via a classification scheme, and that a "classification scheme constitutes a particular way of dividing up some aspect of reality which is built upon a particular ideological representation of that reality."³⁵² By using this noun, Brazil is constructing a reality in which influence from the non-members of the UNSC strengthens the accountability, and thus also means that the less influence from non-members, the less accountability of the UNSC.

The construction of unity between Brazil and the 178 member states, and that more influence from this group equals a stronger accountability of the UNSC point towards *pastoral power eder* (see page 21). We see this as Brazil wants to represent all states, except permanent members. Also *pastoral power polis* might be relevant here, as the idea of accountability is being led by Brazil.

³⁴⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/reports/> accessed May 13. 2014

³⁴⁹ Fairclough, 116

³⁵⁰ Brazil is being presented as the agent in the formulation (app.8. p*)

³⁵¹ Van Dijk, 395-96

³⁵² Fairclough, 115

Hereafter, Brazil launches criticism of the UNSC which we see founded on a securitization discourse. This will first be documented via a number of examples that show how securitization is being drawn upon, and also how this can be related to Brazil's understanding of power. After the presentation of these, Brazil presents solutions to the presented problems causing the issues being criticized. This we believe clearly documents that Brazil understands that power can be utilized via securitization i.e. the concept we have coined as *securitization*. First some examples of how the UNSC is being criticized via a securitization discourse. As mentioned in the theory chapter (see page 20) we coined the power of securitization as being present when an issue was presented as either less or more secure according to agenda being promoted.

(1)“During the period covered by the report, the situation in the Middle East once again deteriorated amid
(2)increasing tensions and threats to international peace and security in various parts of the region [...]
(3)fighting in Syria has created a perverse combination of death, suffering and destruction and has resulted
(4)in millions of internally displaced persons and refugees. As the situation on the ground further
(5)deteriorates, the Council's chronic inability to act promptly and substantively is seen by many as an
(6)illustration of a worrisome pattern of dysfunctionality.”(ex.40 app.9 p.141)

We can find *experiential value* in the preposition “during” and the adjective “covered”(line 1). These words indicate the UNSC had been aware of what was happening, or should have been since their “report”(line 1) covers the “period” of “deterioration”. This helps the construction of responsibility because the UNSC has to act to preserve international peace and security according to chapter V article 24 of the UN charter.³⁵³ The “threats to international peace and security”(line 2) is mentioned, and thus replicates the aforementioned UN charter wording which also strengthens the construction of responsibility. The construction of UNSC responsibility is also promoted as the aforementioned threats are described as “increasing”(line 2), which points to a process, and therefore not something that could have surprised the UNSC.

At the end of ex. 40 we find once again a reference to deterioration. In line 1 we saw that “the situation in the Middle East [...] deteriorated” and here in line 4-5 “the situation on the ground further deteriorates”. This repetition is made up of a past tense “deteriorated”(line 1) and a present tense “deteriorates”(line 5). Such a construction points to a situation that at some point became worse than it was, and now it is becoming even worse. This might imply the aforementioned reference to UNSC's responsibility, as the situations deteriorated and deteriorates against the UNSC's mandate. In lines 1 and 2 we saw a construction of UNSC not being able to prevent an increasing threat to its core mandate, and in lines 4 and 5 is a construction of a worsening of the same circumstances. Here the UNSC is blamed and labeled as having a “chronic inability to act”(line 5). The use of adjective “chronic”(line 5) indicates that the problem is just as much the UNSC itself as it is the “worrisome pattern of dysfunctionality”(line 6).

The overall agenda in ex. 40 seems to be the construction of a connection between the fact that atrocities are occurring in the Middle East, and the UNSC's “chronic inability to act”. This connection is somehow the claim being made, and the warrant for that claim is that many see a “worrisome pattern of dysfunctionality”(line 6).

Brazil is stating that the UNSC has failed in living up to its mandate, and we can therefore talk about *deligitimization* of the UNSC. According to Chilton & Schäfner' *deligitimization* can be used to promote reasons not to be obeyed.³⁵⁴ This is a serious criticism of the UNSC, and seemingly Brazil operates from an

³⁵³ <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml> accessed 14. accessed May 2015

³⁵⁴ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 312: The authors say that legitimization gives reason to be obeyed, and that delegitimization is the essential counterpart. Therefore we assume that they would say that delegitimization gives reasons not to obey.

understanding of *rational power* (see page 15) when presenting this criticism. Brazil can criticize the UNSC based on its functionality, but cannot criticize the idea or the institution of UNSC. If it did, then it would seem that Brazil should be against joining the UNSC. Also the other component of *rational power*, seems to be relevant regarding ex. 40. Brazil must criticize the performance and/legitimacy of the UNSC, in order to promote a reform, but Brazil must not criticize the institution, for the same reasons that Brazil cannot criticize it.

Ex.40 presents a rather explicit utilization of a securitization discourse as it questions the UNSC's ability to secure international peace and security, and therefore we can assume an understanding of power as *power of securitization* (see page 20). Ex.40 somehow indicates that Brazil understands the UNSC's power as *war-panopticism* or that Brazil wants to promote this understanding. This can be seen as Brazil criticizes the UNSC for not acting "promptly and substantively" (line 5), which means that the world should expect such action from the UNSC. These expected actions rest upon the UNSC's *war-prerogative* (see page 19), which is closely linked to *war-panopticism*. Also the phrase "as the situation on the ground further deteriorates" might contain a reference to the war-prerogative of the P5 (see page 19). "on the ground" (line 4) can be an interpretative 'cue'³⁵⁵ which makes the hearers think of the debate regarding whether the UNSC should/will make provisions for military interventions against ISIS in Syria/Iraq on the ground, as opposed to the current airborne attacks. A known phrase for placing soldiers in a conflict is "putting boots on the ground".³⁵⁶

This shows that Brazil understands the power of the UNSC as including *war-panopticism* and is referring to it, to criticize the UNSC by saying that even though the world knew that the UNSC could have acted, the situations in the Middle east still deteriorated and deteriorates, thus the UNSC power of *war-panopticism* is ineffective when it comes to upholding the UNSC mandate.

After commenting on the lack of efficiency regarding a specific resolution on the Syrian crisis (app.8 p.141) Brazil uses the Syrian example to present another critique of the UNSC.

"In other words, the militarization of the conflict proceeds with the tacit, or not so tacit, approval of Council members. How long will it take for the Security Council to adopt a common position against the continuing militarization of the crisis?" (ex.41 app.9 p.141)

Ex.41 constructs/strengthens the connection between the conflict in Syria and the UNSC. It is strongly indicated via the phrase "tacit, or not so tacit", that the UNSC approves of the "militarization of the conflict". Here it also seems like Brazil is conducting *rational power* (see page 15) as Brazil cannot exclusively claim that all members of the UNSC promotes militarization, but Brazil can indicate this, or present speculations about this. Van Dijk talks about *predication* as a way of attributing negative characteristics to another group, and also about *implications* as a way of achieving this.³⁵⁷ In ex.41 the UNSC are being predicated as having either tacitly or not tacitly approved a militarization of the Syrian conflict. The implication of this predicate is that the UNSC have approved the militarization, because whether it was tacitly or not, does not remove the presented factuality of the preceding agency of approval.

When posing a question as part of a monologue, we might talk about what Foucault calls *interactional conventions* and *turn taking systems*.³⁵⁸ Although these aspects of Fairclough's CDA are targeting dialogue(s), we can use it here, as Brazil is constructing a dialogue. The construction of dialogue occurs in

³⁵⁵ Fairclough, 141

³⁵⁶ <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/boots-on-the-ground> accessed May 20. 2015

³⁵⁷ Van Dijk, 398

³⁵⁸ Fairclough, 133-36

the question “How long will it take for the Security Council to adopt a common position”. This question Brazil leaves unanswered, and thus both by asking the question and by not answering it, Brazil is coercing the hearers to answer the question, according to what they find subjectively acceptable. The discursive action here is, that the attention is placed on when the UNSC will response not if it will. The *if* is excluded as an option, and we see the discursive effect from a dialogue imputed to Brazil’s speech as Brazil is: “in a position (like the teacher) to specify the nature and purposes of an interaction at its beginning, and to disallow contributions which are not (in their view) relevant thereto.”³⁵⁹

After the mentioning of the Syrian crisis Brazil talks about the conflict in Iraq, and Israel/Palestine. We will briefly present examples of this and point to the securitization aspects. After this we show how Brazil connects the examples of Syria, Iraq and Israel/Palestine (and the securitization based critique of the UNSC) to their campaign for UNSC permanency.

“In Iraq we are also witnessing a severe deterioration in the security and humanitarian situations, with the expansion of extremism and the spread of terrorist activities.”(ex.42 app.9 p.141)

In ex.42, the noun “deterioration” is used again, as in ex.40 and ex.41; furthermore, it is preceded by the adjective “severe” which shows aggravation. The “severe deterioration in security” points towards a securitization discourse that creates the “expansion of extremism and the spread of terrorist activities”.

(1)“The brief hope that emerged from the resumption of direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians in (2)July 2013 quickly dispelled, owing to the parties’ failure to deal with the essential elements of the (3)conflict. The conflict not only undermined the prospects for talks, but also fed the cycle of violence and (4)left an intolerable legacy of civilian deaths, destruction and displacement.”(ex.43 app.9 p.141)

After this mentioning of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Brazil connects this conflict to the UNSC:

“The commendable emphasis placed by the Security Council on the protection of civilians when dealing with other items on its agenda cannot be sidestepped when it comes to the responsibility to protect the Palestinian people.”(ex.44 app.9 p.141)

The vocabulary in ex.44 points to a criticism of the lack of coherence between UNSC doctrine and UNSC praxis. “protection of civilians” and “the responsibility to protect” are clear references to the R2P doctrine (responsibility to protect). This doctrine was adapted in 2005 to provide possible legitimization for interventions in states where the government could not or would not guarantee the safety of the states’ population. It was used as validation of the intervention in Lybia in 2011.³⁶⁰ Some IR scholars have seen Brazil’s problematisation of the lack of R2P continuity from the UNSC, as differing from Brazil’s search for a UNSC permanent seat.³⁶¹ But we subscribe to the belief that Brazil is engaging in norm entrepreneurship or norm development,³⁶² as a way of profiling itself for more international influence. Norm development and entrepreneurship can be seen as related to *pastoral power polis*, as power, from a Brazilian standpoint, can be attained or demonstrated via a leader/shepherd role for those subscribing to an idea. Following that line of thought can promote Brazil’s campaign, as a leader for the protection of civilians, would be a good permanent addition to the UNSC.

³⁵⁹ Fairclough, 136

³⁶⁰ <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml> accessed Apr. 22. 2015

³⁶¹ Eduarda Passarelli Hamann and Robert Muggah, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New directions for International Peace and security*, (Brasilia Brazil: Igrapé Institute 2013) 60

³⁶² James Pattison. “The Ethics Of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’: BRAZIL, The Responsibility To Protect, And Guidelines For Humanitarian Intervention”. *Human Rights and welfare working papers*, working paper no. 71. (2013) 2-3

In ex.43 we also see the reference to a “cycle of violence”(line 3). This metaphorical description refers to violence occurring again and again. The metaphor of a “cycle of violence” is reminiscent to the construction in ex. 30 from part 6 where Brazil on behalf of the G4 talked about reform negotiations without a text to guide them, as being another “merry-go-round”(ex.30 app.8 p.137). Putting these together we see the connection between the discussions that does not lead to reform (“merry-go-round”) and the presentation of the dire Palestine/Israel conflict. It might be said that both need a structural reform to be fixed.

The present study targets Brazil’s campaign for UNSC permanency and how this is conducted discursively regarding the understanding of governmentality related power. Examples 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 do not explicitly refer to a reform of the UNSC, nor to Brazil wanting permanent representation. We have tried to show how Brazil operates discursively via relevant to Brazil’s campaign, as indications are that a main aspect of the campaign revolves around a critique of the UNSC’s lack of efficiency, and the connection of this with the need for a reform. It also seems that Brazil acknowledges that mere criticism of UNSC and promotion of reform is not enough. Brazil also promotes itself as a role model of aspects promoted as needed to improve the UNSC. This strategy of self promotion, often constructed via *pastoral power*, can be seen in the following examples.

“We are also pleased to note that Latin America and the Caribbean can increasingly be portrayed as an example of peace, sustainable development and corporation — a region that fully engages with the multilateral system of collective security.”(ex.45 app.9 p.142)

First it might be noted that Brazil here is applying a regionalization discourse that can be labeled Latin American instead of South American. This is seen in the mentioning of “Latin America and the Caribbean can be described as an example”, the indefinite article “an” indicates a coherence between Latin America and the Caribbean, where Latin America is the region being used to represent Brazil. As we have mentioned this is a discursive struggle between Argentina and Brazil, as Brazil wants to be a representative of Latin America, whereas Argentina only recognizes Brazil as a South American power (see page 7). This is relevant to the Brazilian campaign, as regionalization i.e. the idea of more regional representation is present in the discussion about UNSC reform³⁶³, and a state representing Latin America all but seems more valid for a permanent seat, than one representing South America. Utilizing the regionalization focus is *pastoral power* as Brazil constructs itself as the leader of the people from Latin America. And this statement even goes further, by presenting Latin America and the Caribbean as “a region that fully engages” i.e. as one unit/region. We identified in this construction the *experiential value* in the noun “region” because it is used to describe another expression of the region which Brazil wants to represent.

The *relational value* of the grammatical feature of the personal pronoun first person plural “we” in ex.45 constructs Brazil as neutral observer, and therefore increases the example’s objective value. “we” refers to Brazil, and it notes (“we are pleased to note”) what is going on in Latin America and the Caribbean. This constructs Brazil as having observed and as reporting to the UN, what is going on, and through such a construction of the “we” being the observer, decreasing the presented subjectivity.

The interesting claim being made in ex.45 is that Latin America and the Caribbean is “a region that fully engages with the multilateral system of collective security.” The warrant is presented prior to the claim as the same region “can be portrayed as an example of peace, sustainable development and corporation”. This claim-warrant construction indicates that a state has to exercise the content of the warrant to be labeled as a region that lives up to the content of the claim. The final words of the claims “collective security” thereby constructs “sustainable development and corporation” as matters of “collective security”.

³⁶³ Center for UN reform education, *Governing*, 24

Here we again see a connection of *pastoral power eder* [the regionalization] and *pastoral power polis* [peace, sustainable development and corporation].

It could also be a part of the agenda in ex.45 to present the region of Latina America or Latin America/the Caribbean as one that exercises values that the UNSC does not and thereby implicitly be pointing out that this region does not have any permanent representation in the UNSC.

In Van Dijk's *ideological square* as a way of locating "strategies of ideological discourse control"³⁶⁴, we can see that until ex.44 the document brought as app.9 has been about emphasizing the bad things and de-emphasizing the good things about the UNSC, and that ex.45 introduces the emphasis of Brazil's good things and de-emphasis of Brazil's bad things. After this Brazil concludes its statement:

(1)Finally, let me point out that one cannot discuss the work undertaken by the Security Council without
(2)mentioning the growing frustration among Member States and civil society with the absence of a
(3)satisfactory answer from the Council in response to some specific crises around the world, such as the
(4)situations in Syria, Ukraine and Palestine. The task of reforming the structures of the Council remains
(5)urgent. As we approach the watershed year of 2015, Brazil wishes to call once again on Member States
(6)to embrace the opportunity provided by the seventieth anniversary of the Organization to finally adapt
(7)the Security Council to the geopolitical realities of twenty-first century, making it a more legitimate and
(8)representative body that is capable of addressing contemporary challenges. (ex.46 app.9 p.142)

In ex.46 is seen the aforementioned connection between the presented inefficiency of the UNSC and the need for a structural reform of the UNSC. In ex.46 the former is presented as "the absence of a satisfactory answer from the Council in response to some specific crisis around the world, such as the situations in Syria, Ukraine and Palestine"(lines 3-4). Fairclough's search for intertextual cohesion is to look for "how formal features connects parts of a text"³⁶⁵. We believe that we can attribute a logical connection in what Fairclough labels a broad sense,³⁶⁶ between the presentation of the "specific crises"(line 3) and to the ensuing statement "The task of reforming the structures of the Council remains urgent."(lines 4-5). We see this as being constructed via the syntax in ex.46 which Chilton & Schäfner describes as a 'strategic function' of a text's linguistics.³⁶⁷

Brazil states "Finally, let me point out"(line 1), and does not suggest anymore in ex.46 that another point is coming e.g. via the use of "furthermore" or "also". This indicates a constructed cohesion in ex.46 i.e. that the entire phrase refers to the same issue being pointed out. Also we can see the usage of the formulation about "growing frustration among member states and civil society"(line 2) which is similar to formulations being used in examples 26 and 34 when talking about the necessity of a reform. If this is indeed the case, then ex.46 shows that Brazil constructs the campaign for a reform by connecting the Palestinian, Syrian and Ukrainian problem in causal relations with the lack of a reform.

We should note here that the relatively strong criticism of the UNSC's abilities to live up to its core mandate is connected to the need for a reform of the UNSC, but in ex.46 which one might see as being the strongest criticism of the UNSC, we see no mentioning of the substantive elements of a potential reform i.e. the discussion of how many members should be added and whether or not any new permanent members should be added. It seems as if, this matter is mainly presented when Brazil represents the G4 or when the G4 represents Brazil. This is a matter to be further elaborated on in chapter 8 (see page 95). This indicates *rational power* as the one being governed. Brazil seems to understand its own power as being limited to

³⁶⁴ Van Dijk, 396

³⁶⁵ Fairclough, 130

³⁶⁶ Fairclough, 130

³⁶⁷ Chilton & Schäfner in Van Dijk, 313

campaigning for a reform when representing itself (what it can do) and not campaigning for permanency when representing itself (what it cannot do). (see pages 15)

At the end of ex.46 are presented indications towards the aforementioned substantive aspect of a potential reform. The UNSC is asked to “finally adapt the Security Council to the geopolitical realities of twenty-first century, making it a more legitimate and representative body that is capable of addressing contemporary challenges.”(lines 6-8)

The comparative degrees utilized via the adjective “more [legitimate and representative body]” point towards a discursive connection to ex.26 app.7 p.135 from the Brazilian statement at the UNSC meeting, where Brazil also states “[...]Initiatives aimed at achieving a more accountable and transparent Council are more likely to prosper in an expanded and more inclusive Council with new permanent and non-permanent members” (page 75). Also in Rouseff’s speech at the opening of the GA this comparative degree is used to project the need future of the UNSC. Rouseff states that “A more representative and more legitimate Security Council would also be a more effective Council”(ex.17 app.3 p.118). In part 8 of the analysis we will try to look at how these interconnections relate to overall discourses and understandings of power.

We can see this via the adjective and noun “geopolitical realities”, adjectives “legitimate” and “representative”. These are what Fairclough calls *ideologically contested*, which is part of the *experiential values* of vocabulary, signaling the presenters’ knowledge and/or beliefs.³⁶⁸ The vocabulary chosen to warrant the call for a reform, all can all be used to describe a contesting view, as they are not connected to any constructed objective truth measurements. This points again to *rational power* as even when Brazil do hint at the substance of a reform, it is not being constructed as explicit or specific, as the criticism of the UNSC as seen throughout ex.46.

In this chapter, Brazil is seen as constructing itself as having *pastoral power* both *eder* and *polis*. *Eder* is seen when Brazil constructs itself as being the representative of the group of 178 UN member states that are outside of seats in the UNSC. *Polis* is seen as Brazil constructs itself a representative for protecting of civilians and for accountability of the UNSC.

The power of *securitization* is seen in many places in part 7. Brazil connects the lack of security in many crises/conflict areas with the lack of an effective UNSC. Also these examples are connected to a construction of the UNSC’s power being understood as *war-panopticism* but that this power is also ineffective.

Rational power seems to be a foundational understanding of Brazil’s conduct in part 7. This is mainly seen when Brazil criticizes both the legitimacy and the functionality of the current UNSC, but refrains from criticizing or deconstructing the idea of the UNSC. We do not see at any point a criticism of the veto system, which could have been pointed out as undemocratic, and also as an important factor of the inefficiency of the UNSC regarding e.g. the Syrian conflict. This lack of criticism is in line with our hypothesis that that Brazil refrains from essential criticism of the UNSC, as it wants to join the UNSC.

³⁶⁸ Fairclough, 112, 114

Chapter 8

This last chapter will focus upon connecting the results from the previous seven chapters of the analysis. These results are both those related to our theoretical concepts, but also other findings that are relevant for answering our RQs. In order to reveal the understandings of power that are at the basis of Brazil's campaign for a permanent seat in the UNSC, and that are also at the foundation of Argentina's opposition against this campaign, we ought to analyze the selected empirical data. The results showed us the particularities of understandings of power (within the frames of our theoretical concepts) in use – reflected in the contexts of our empirical data (speeches and letter). Yet these could not show the spiral interdependency of knowledge and power, because for this approach we needed to take a step backwards, so to speak, and look at the entire analysis in all its complexity. Through this chapter we want to show the understandings that lay behind Brazil and Argentina's agency in the international arena.

These understandings are based upon different Knowledge-Power relations (K-P), which are going to be differentiated into four subsections, according to their four dimensions (see Methodology page 45). We are going to include the search for how our concepts function as discursive cross-references between the aforementioned K-P relations. In all four subsections we are going to take samples, which support the four dimensions, from all the analyzed seven Chapters.

1. KT→PA

This K-P relation revolves around the knowledge of the actor that it has power. This relation focuses upon the description of the actor's potential agency.

In Chapter 3 example 1, we identified Brazil's usage of the term "The Great Transformation". We saw that this usage is innate to Brazil's characteristics, both revealed in recent history and in political stand-point. In regards to recent history, this was the slogan of the former president Luiz Inácio da Silva in support for Rousseff's candidature by the Brazilian workers party. The political stand-point connects with the worker's party campaign, but also to social democratic theory – seen in the Keynesian discourse (related to Karl Polanyi's economic hypotheses).

In Chapter 3, in the first 9 examples we identified a characterization of Brazil's developments made by Rousseff with emphasis on the achievements and disregard of failures – *ideological square*. We saw these constructions as being intrinsic, constructed with a purpose, but not being used at this point. As we have argued in Chapter 3, these promotions might be at the basis of *pastoral power* via the power of example, *rational power* via the ways that they had been constructed, and *neo-liberal power* via the principles that lay on their foundation; these had comprised the fact that Brazil has succeeded in becoming a emerging national economy. The ways in which these promotions are being used later, are going to be presented in the 2nd subsection of this chapter.

In Chapter 3, example 10, Brazil is presented as being successful in attracting foreign investments. This knowledge that Brazil is a main destination for investors, gives it the power to promote itself from a neo-liberal dimension. This will be especially relevant in the next subsection.

In the case of Argentina, we identified in Chapter 3 example 14, Kirchner's description of Argentina as being a leading case in three (or six, as we have argued) fields. This statement is based upon the past experiences of Argentina. These characterizations are based upon *neo-liberal power* (first), *securitization* (second) and *war-panopticism* (third).

2. KH→PA

This K-P relation revolves around the knowledge of the actor of how to use its own power. This relation focuses upon the actions of an actor.

Chapter 1 shows the agency of BRICS, in which the five countries show a common agenda. This is more relevant when talking about the PO, but at the end of example 3 we identified solely the agency of Brazil, when the other members of BRICS thanked Brazil for organizing a meeting in regards to Internet Governance. Brazil stands out of the group as it promotes maybe more than the rest the need for and providing of security – power of *securitization*. We identified in Chapter 7, example 39, the use of *securitization* in the context of lack of security provided by the SC. Power of *securitization* is also present in Chapter 2, ex. 5, used by Brazil when presenting the risks of UN losing its authority because of the major dissatisfactions of the Member States.

In Chapter 2, ex. 5, Brazil openly criticizes the UNSC, constructing itself as giving voice to the Members States that are also dissatisfied. It seems that Brazil is using *pastoral power eder* and *polis* in order to unite them, to create *coercion* – having the knowledge of how to use their dissatisfaction with Brazil's power. In the same manner, in Chapter 7 example 45, Brazil is seen as also using the two dimensions of *pastoral power*, on one hand by representing the 178 UN member states group, and on the other by representing the protection of civilians and holding accountable the UNSC.

In Chapter 3, after the promotion of Brazil from a neo-liberal perspective in the first nine examples, we identified in tenth example the agency of Brazil by becoming an international creditor. We can see here how Brazil is using its power as part of the campaign for a permanent seat – via *neo-liberal power*.

The use of power, via *rational power*, can be seen in Chapter 3 example 16 when Brazil's agency point towards being able to find problems and solution to the IMF and World Bank issues. *Rational power* is also identifiable in Chapter 5, ex. 24, in which we saw that Brazil is constructing first the defects of the UNSC only to use in ex. 25 the occasion to gather all Member States around a single purpose: reform of SC. Similar uses of *rational power* can be seen in Chapter 7, example 40, by Brazil taking the first step in criticizing the legitimacy and functionality of the SC, but does not deconstruct the elements that stand at the foundation of the SC.

In Chapter 5, ex. 26, we saw Brazil promoting the idea that the UNSC should be expanded with both permanent and non-permanent members. This is one of the examples in which Brazil knows how to use its power to discursively promote the appropriate conditions to achieve a permanent seat in the SC.

Regarding Argentina, in Chapter 3 examples 18 and 20, we identified the use of *pastoral power polis* from the emphasis put on multilateralism, and on framing the action of asking questions in the name of all non-permanent members. Here we saw in both cases how the knowledge of international issues is used to oppose Brazil's campaign through Argentina's power.

3. KT→PO

In this section we are going to show examples that demonstrate Brazil and Argentina's knowledge of the power of others.

We can see that Brazil knows that it has power when being represented through others, in the BRICS statement (app. 1), the G4 statement (app. 2) and when referring to these groupings at different occasions in our data. Argentina's analogous knowledge is mainly seen when representing the UfC. We can also see that Brazil knows about the power of others, as opposition, when referring to this in our data

In the BRICS statement Brazil knows about BRICS's support of UNSC reform, and Russia, China's support for greater UN influence for Brazil (India and South Africa). In chapter 1 (pages 46-51) we labeled this Brazilian understanding as *rational power* displaying Brazil's knowledge of not being able to have explicit support for UNSC permanency, but still having support for greater influence from two of the P5 states. In ex.2 we see the BRICS statement singling out Brazil with thanks for having organized a meeting regarding internet governance (ex.3 chapter 1). This shows Brazil as having *pastoral power polis* (see page 22) as Brazil is representing the ideational aspects of development, anti-surveillance, and human rights. This shows that Brazil knows it has achieved this discursive power through the BRICS' power of being an international authority, especially in this study's context as two out of five BRICS members are P5 members.

The G4 as a group materializes Brazil's Knowledge of power of others, as Brazil knows that the G4 agenda is the UNSC reform that Brazil wants. In the G4 statement (chapter 4) we see also *pastoral-power polis* of Brazil (through G4) as ex.20 chapter 4 shows emphasis on the results of the wished reform, more than on who would benefit from the reform. Brazil also has knowledge of the power of the UNSC, and our analysis of ex.21 chapter 4 shows the perceived power of *war-panopticism*. The G4 statement also show Brazilian knowledge of the G4 having the power to discursively construct representation of all UN members, as seen when referring to UN unity regarding a UN resolution from Oct. 24th 2005³⁶⁹.

Argentina knows the G4 agenda, which Argentina opposes through the UfC. The fact that Argentina explicitly opposes the addition of new permanent members in the UNSC (ex.35 chapter 6), shows the knowledge of the existence of this agenda. The connection between this knowledge and the promotion of opposition throughout chapter 6, juxtaposed with the mentioning of UfC, show Argentina's knowledge of UfC power to be in opposition to the G4. The letter from the Argentinean representative calling the UNSC meeting (app 6) seemingly reveals Argentinean knowledge of a strong discourse of UNSC reform within the UN (see chapter 5 page 71). A main knowledge of Argentina is seen when Kirchner proposes Argentina as a "triple leading case" (ex.18 chapter 3). Here Kirchner constructs Argentina as having *neo-liberal power* and applies *securitization* (ex.19 chapter 3). These actions show that Kirchner knows what power Brazil is using

³⁶⁹ UN Document: A/RES/60/1

to promote its campaign, as she opposes these by applying the same powers (of our concepts), but as opposition. Kirchner also knows about the veto power and war-prerogative of the P5, as seen in Kirchners description of security and terrorism as part of Argentina's triple leading case, which we saw as *war-panopticism* (chapter 3 ex.20).

Brazil knows that the power of the UfC campaign opposing the G4's is centered on consensus, this is seen in chapter 6 ex.31 where Brazil implicitly refers to UfC and explicitly to consensus. Brazil's knowledge of power in the application of a UN-values discourse, is seen as Brazil labels the opposition as anti-United Nations.

4. KH→PO

This section focuses on Brazil and Argentina knowledge on how to use the power of others. We will point to this by looking at discursive actions.

In the G4 statement a democracy related *neo-liberal power* (see page 16) is utilized to promote the construction of an *in-group* of all members of the UN as being supportive towards a UNSC reform. A construction of unity is also being promoted in the statement via the *pastoral-power eder*, as leadership for developing countries and Africa is constructed as a characteristic of G4 as seen in chapter in ex.22 chapter. It seems that Brazil's inclusion in G4 and BRICS promote the power of unities. This can be seen in the aforementioned examples from the G4 statement, and in the BRICS statement ex.2 chapter 1, where a unity between the UN and BRICS is constructed as a premise for UNSC reform oriented criticism via *rational power*. Brazil knows how to use its membership of units (groups) to promote unity for UNSC reform. This unity of pro reform is then connected explicitly to the need for new permanent members, implicitly via the unity of emerging national economies, which is presented as "the realities of the twenty-first century" [e.g.BRICS, and Brazil/India from G4] (ex.46 chapter 7).

The fact that a number of examples show, that groups (that includes Brazil) promote UNSC reform, including addition of permanent members, showcases the presence of growing calls, most likely among a rising number of members, for that type of reform. Argentina opposes this (regardless if it actually is growing or not) via its knowledge of power of the UNSC. This is seen as the Argentinean presidency of the UNSC uses *rational power* to curb it's (presupposed by us) partiality and direct the discussions of reform from structure to working methods (see app. 6 p. 130).

Part of Argentina's knowledge of power of others, can be seen via Kirchners construction of Argentina having *pastoral-power polis* as seen in chapter 3 ex. 19. The fact that Kirchner utilizes *pastoral-power polis* as a way of using the power of others, seems related to understanding of power dominating the Argentinean statement in the GA meeting on Nov. 12th 2014. (app. 8). Here *pastoral-power polis* can be seen in the concluding remark which encourages all delegations to follow UfC's example, which is presented as the way to a more democratic UNSC (ex.38 chapter 6).

In chapter 6 we see quite clear Brazil's knowledge of power of the G4, as Brazil is delivering the statement on behalf of G4. Here again (as in chapter 4) Brazil uses *pastoral-power eder* (ex. 30 chapter 6) but this time to be constructed as the leader of Intergovernmental negotiations, and the mediator of this group to and

from the G4. Brazil knowledge materializes efficiently as both Brazilian and G4 agency can be seen (ex. 31 chapter 6) Brazil rebukes those who wish for consensus instead of text based negotiations, and does so via *pastoral-power polis*. This is a reference to the UfC, and this strongly implicative reference, which is not seen in the data when Brazil acts alone, shows that Brazil is aware of the power of other (the G4).

Discussion

We are now going to discuss the meanings of our study's results, and the contributions in our fields of study.

We started the study with the knowledge that Brazil wanted a permanent seat in the UNSC as part of the G4 agenda of gaining permanent seats for its members. We also knew that Argentina and the UfC (of which Argentina is a member) was in opposition towards Brazil's getting a permanent UNSC seat.

We chose to conduct a discourse analysis targeting the understanding of power in relation to the aforementioned agendas. We gathered knowledge about how conventional IR would answer questions pertaining the present study's area foci. We expected the discourse analytical approach to provide answers regarding which of the IR theories would be the best frame for answering our research question. In a sense we expected our results to supplement conventional IR approaches, to show that discourse analysis can be equally as effective as the more conventional approaches when answering IR related questions.

During the analysis we discovered another component besides the two original of 1, the Brazilian campaign and 2, the Argentinean opposition. The 3rd component was the Brazilian counter-opposition towards the UfC/Argentina. It seems as if a discourse analysis is a very good approach towards subtracting knowledge from this counter opposition, as it is not explicit, but can be seen mainly in discursive actions of Brazil.

Brazil's campaign (both components) and Argentina's opposition both rely on generally the same strategies. They both argue for a reform based on democratic, liberal aspirations such as multilateralism and democracy, which also materializes in presented agreement with UN values such as the goals of the MDG's. The conventional IR theoretical approaches would most likely define the actors' understanding of power based on a liberalist approach. We came to the same conclusion, as we saw a dominance of ideational components in the discursive actions, and to a far less degree we saw realist understandings of power. This means that we cannot view Brazil and Argentina as being in ideological opposition when it comes to application of power, as they both understand power [in the UN] as promotion of an agenda via liberal values. This can be seen in the fact that especially *neo-liberal power*, but also our other concepts, in different manners are aligned with the promotions of liberal values.

The results of the analysis indicates that the discourse analytical approach of ours, based on the creation of theoretical concepts of governmentality related power, provides a wider and more encompassing realm of possible explanations for questions pertaining power in international relations than conventional IR approaches do. This can be seen for example in the case of Dauvergne and Farias' hypothesis about Brazil having power through being the leader of coalitions of developing states (see page 10). This neo-realist approach is not deconstructed by our results, but even just based on the limited amount of empirical material we have analyzed, it seems that Brazil's "power" in the case of coalitions, is more complex. We saw for example that Brazil discursively constructed developing countries as an *out-group* (see page 58) although leading it via *pastoral power*. We also saw that Brazil exercises varied discursive agency, depending on if the context is e.g. G4, or Brazil representing itself. We can also add a question mark to Weiss' statement that a broader support for the UNSC would mean greater political impact. We learned that Argentina and Brazil presented different agendas regarding a UNSC reform via the promotion of a

more representative council. But we know that the two actors do not seek the same kind of added representativeness, i.e. what is multilateral and democratic to one, might not be so to the other.

Opposing Steen Fryba's hypothesis about Brazil not having the support of China and Russia towards UNSC permanency, we saw in BRICS' statement China/Russia's explicit desire for UNSC reform, while in the same paragraph supporting Brazil (India and South Africa) for more influence in the UN, but not mentioning Brazil's campaign purpose. From a power perspective, the realist view would be (as Steen Fryba's): China/Russia do not want to give away their P5 power, and thus do not support Brazil. A liberalist explanation would be: China/Russia do support Brazil, as they can foresee a more powerful BRICS countries if Brazil gains permanency – yet they cannot be explicit due to the BRICS' economic function. The concepts we have created are founded in constructivism and applied interpretatively. This means they promote dynamic and contextual understandings of power (as a dynamic entity), and provide answers focused on the actors' understandings of power in specific situations, actions, and contexts. In the analysis' chapter 1, we coined Brazil's agency in the example as *rational power*. Looking at China/Russia's agency, also as *rational power*, we can depart from the static definitions of power which dominate conventional IR theory, and see power as a dynamic phenomenon analyzed action per action. Therefore in the BRICS statement, we see Russia/China using *rational power* as they can support Brazil (liberalist) and they cannot support Brazil (realist) for a permanent seat in the UNSC, and therefore they choose to do neither, thus showcasing a different understanding of power than the ones applied by realism and liberalism.

Foucault's work has been criticized for not being relevant for 21st century IR studies. Walters acknowledges the criticisms (limitations) of Foucault's work, and gives voice to critics, such as Jan Selby. Selby criticizes Foucault for being too domestic oriented towards the Western states where liberalism prevailed, while the IR is less interested in domestic governance and more towards interactions of large actors³⁷⁰. We agree that applying Foucault's work literally from a methodological standpoint, onto such a study as the present one, would probably produce unsatisfactory results. But by creating the theoretical concepts based upon Foucault's understandings of power, and by successfully proving their capacity to subtract knowledge from empirically-material throughout the analyses chapters, we showed that Foucault's work is still relevant for the post-Cold War IR studies from a theoretical standpoint.

Part of our results is the toolkit of theoretical concepts that had been empirically demonstrated throughout the eight chapters of analysis. We want to discuss briefly the *neo-liberal power* and the *pastoral power* in this section. We had been skeptical about these concepts whether the first one should be separated into democratic and economic, while the two dimensions of the second one (*polis* and *eder*) should be combined. We agree these changes might have been made, but not to the study's benefit. First, we saw in Chapter 1 the *neo-liberal power* being used for promoting democratic values, yet we argue that the economic dimension is at the core of BRICS, as it is an association of five emerging national economies. Therefore we argue, exemplified in this case, that the *neo-liberal power* should not be separated. Second, throughout many chapters of analysis we saw *pastoral power* being used in both dimensions; yet there are many more examples where the need for *polis pastorate* did not imply the *eder pastorate* and vice-versa. We therefore argue that the two theoretical concepts should not be changed as they reach to our requirements.

³⁷⁰ Walters, 93-94

Another interesting result lies on the excessive use of liberal discourse in each chapter of the analysis. We saw a liberal discourse being used not only in *neo-liberal power*, but also in the other concepts that are far from being closely related to this discourse – such as *war-panopticism* which can be argued it is the most realist related concept. This is an interesting result because the context of veto power and permanent seats in the Security Council – context related to our RQ – had been mostly associated with realism throughout the decades – especially during the Cold War, in which the two blocs took part in the notorious Nuclear Arms Race. The results reveal that at the beginning of the 21st century, the campaigns for and against additional permanent seats in the UNSC are constructed on the basis of liberal values, instead of realist values. The study's results, indicate a the occurrence of a switch from realist governmentality – related to the constant fear of a nuclear war and domination – to liberal governmentality – focused on democracy, economic development, human rights, multilateralism etc.

Conclusion

We sat out to interpret the agency of Brazil and Argentina, and also sought to conceptualize power in order to explain its influence on Brazil and Argentina's agency.

Brazil conducts a varied strategic discursive agency to construct the campaign for UNSC permanency. In this the UNSC is criticized for not being efficient in carrying out its mandate, while this mandate, and thus the UNSC, is also constructed as being imperative for the provision of international security. Brazil mainly applies the promotion of liberal values to strengthen both the aforementioned criticism and support. The discursive conduct of Brazil displays an emphasis on construction of unity and groups based on both ideational (*pastoral-power polis*) and people oriented (*pastoral-power eder*) understandings of power.

Brazil's discursive construction differs whether it is a part of or connected to the G4/BRICS or Brazil independently. In the former cases the demand/promotion of added permanent seats are central, and in the latter this aspect is left out, and the non specified reform is the focus. In both cases Brazil is presented as a role model in regards to UN values and national economic achievements.

Interestingly the Argentinean opposition applies the same discursive strategies of discursive construction of unity and groups and also promotes its opposition towards added permanent seats via liberal, democratic and UN values. Argentina do not apply *rational-power* in the same manner as Brazil, and thus seems to be less confined to strategic considerations regarding how it presents its UNSC agenda.

We discovered that Brazil conducts a strategy of counter opposition which was most clearly displayed when referring to the UfC (and Argentinean) agenda as being anti-United Nations.

The discursive construction and agency of the two actors show the prevalence of a liberal discourse in the UN regarding what a UNSC reform should target. We can thus conclude that both actors construct their campaigns based on the same understandings of power, and at the same time maneuver strategically to fit opposing agenda's within this governmental framework.

Further research should look for how this liberal understanding of power in the UN has assumed discursive dominance/has been naturalized, as our concepts of power are limited to the explanations of actors' understandings of power, and to revealing that genealogical development of discourses or governmentalities has occurred, but not so much how.

The study has sought to avoid universalist understandings of power, which has produced many results and hypotheses occurring in the analysis. This shows that power is indeed dynamic and should be analyzed in actions interpreted according to contexts. An advantage of this approach is that we can look into specific actions in the analysis and see how power was understood, and we can look for patterns of understandings among the many results and thus conclude the dominance of the aforementioned liberal discourse.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1 BRICS statement to the GA and the UNSC from Aug. 21. 2014

United Nations

A/68/976-S/2014/534



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
21 August 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 35,
36 and 123

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Culture of peace

**Information and communications technologies
for development**

Macroeconomic policy questions

**Follow-up to and implementation of the outcome of the
2002 International Conference on Financing for
Development and the 2008 Review Conference**

Sustainable development

Groups of countries in special situations

Eradication of poverty and other development issues

Operational activities for development

Towards global partnerships

Social development

Prevention of armed conflict

The situation in the Middle East

Question of Palestine

**Question of equitable representation on and increase
in the membership of the Security Council and
related matters**

Note verbale dated 5 August 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Secretary-General and has the honour, on behalf of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS countries), to transmit the enclosed Declaration and Action Plan of the sixth BRICS summit, held in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014. On that occasion, the leaders of Brazil, the

14-58346 (E) 090914

Please recycle



**Annex to the note verbale dated 5 August 2014 from the
Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General**

Fortaleza Declaration

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014 at the sixth BRICS summit. To inaugurate the second cycle of BRICS summits, the theme chosen for our discussions was "Inclusive growth: sustainable solutions", in keeping with the inclusive macroeconomic and social policies carried out by our Governments and the imperative to address challenges to humankind posed by the need to simultaneously achieve growth, inclusiveness, protection and preservation.

2. In the aftermath of the first cycle of five summits, hosted by every BRICS member, our coordination is well established in various multilateral and plurilateral initiatives and intra-BRICS cooperation is expanding to encompass new areas. Our shared views and commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre and foundation, are widely recognized and constitute a major contribution to global peace, economic stability, social inclusion, equality, sustainable development and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.

3. We renew our openness to increasing engagement with other countries, particularly developing countries and emerging market economies, as well as with international and regional organizations, with a view to fostering cooperation and solidarity in our relations with all nations and peoples. To that effect, we will hold a joint session with the leaders of the South American nations, under the theme of the sixth BRICS summit, with a view to furthering cooperation between BRICS and South America. We reaffirm our support for the South American integration processes, and recognize in particular the importance of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in promoting peace and democracy in the region, and in achieving sustainable development and poverty eradication. We believe that strengthened dialogue among BRICS and South American countries can play an active role in enhancing multilateralism and international cooperation for the promotion of peace, security, economic and social progress and sustainable development in an interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.

4. Since the inception of the group, the BRICS countries have been guided by the overarching objectives of peace, security, development and cooperation. In this new cycle, while remaining committed to those objectives, we pledge to deepen our partnership with a renewed vision, based on openness, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation. In this sense, we are ready to explore new areas towards a comprehensive cooperation and a closer economic partnership to facilitate market interlinkages, financial integration, infrastructure connectivity as well as people-to-people contacts.

5. The sixth summit takes place at a crucial juncture, as the international community assesses how to address the challenges of strong economic recovery from the global financial crises, sustainable development, including climate change, while also formulating the post-2015 development agenda. At the same time, we are confronted with persistent political instability and conflict in various global hotspots

fundamental role played by small and medium-sized enterprises in the economies of our countries as major creators of jobs and wealth. We will enhance cooperation and recognize the need for strengthening intra-BRICS dialogue with a view to promoting international exchange and cooperation and to foster innovation, research and development.

24. We underline that 2015 marks the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the end of the Second World War. In this connection, we support the United Nations in initiating and organizing commemorative events to mark and pay tribute to these two historical moments in human history, and reaffirm our commitment to safeguarding a just and fair international order based on the Charter of the United Nations, maintaining world peace and security, as well as promoting human progress and development.

25. We reiterate our strong commitment to the United Nations as the fundamental multilateral organization entrusted with helping the international community maintain international peace and security, protect and foster human rights and promote sustainable development. The United Nations enjoys universal membership and is at the very centre of global governance and multilateralism. We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1). We reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to Brazil, India and South Africa's status and role in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations.

26. We recall that development and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace. We reiterate our view that the establishment of sustainable peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and cooperation, that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their political, economic and social dimensions. In this context, we also stress the close interrelation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We also highlight the importance of bringing gender perspectives to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

27. We will continue our joint efforts in coordinating positions and acting on shared interests on global peace and security issues for the common well-being of humanity. We stress our commitment to the sustainable and peaceful settlement of disputes, according to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. Bearing this in mind, we emphasize the unique importance of the indivisible nature of security, and that no State should strengthen its security at the expense of the security of others.

28. We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. We will foster dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect in the field of human rights, both within BRICS and in multilateral forums, including the Human Rights Council, where all BRICS countries serve as members in 2014, taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfil

believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism, which must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the Charter, and with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We express our concern at the increasing use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet and other media, and reiterate that such technologies can be powerful tools in countering the spread of terrorism, including by promoting tolerance and dialogue among peoples. We will continue to work together to conclude negotiations as soon as possible and to adopt in the General Assembly a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. We also stress the need to promote cooperation among our countries in preventing terrorism, especially in the context of major events.

49. We believe that information and communications technologies should provide instruments to foster sustainable economic progress and social inclusion, working together with the information and communications technology industry, civil society and academia in order to realize the potential opportunities and benefits of information and communications technologies for all. We agree that particular attention should be given to young people and to small and medium-sized enterprises, with a view to promoting international exchange and cooperation, as well as to fostering innovation, research and development in information and communications technologies. We agree that the use and development of information and communications technologies through international cooperation and universally accepted norms and principles of international law is of paramount importance in order to ensure a peaceful, secure and open digital and Internet space. We strongly condemn acts of mass electronic surveillance and data collection of individuals all over the world, as well as violation of the sovereignty of States and of human rights, in particular the right to privacy. We take note of the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, held in São Paulo, on 23 and 24 April 2014. We thank Brazil for having organized it.

50. We will explore cooperation on combating cybercrimes and we also recommit to the negotiation of a universal legally binding instrument in that field. We consider that the United Nations has a central role in this matter. We agree it is necessary to preserve information and communications technologies, particularly the Internet, as an instrument of peace and development and to prevent its use as a weapon. Moreover, we commit ourselves to working together in order to identify possibilities for developing joint activities to address common security concerns in the use of information and communications technologies. We reiterate the common approach set forth in the eThekweni Declaration about the importance of security in the use of information and communications technologies. We welcome the decision of the national security advisers to establish a group of experts from BRICS member States which will elaborate practical proposals concerning major fields of cooperation and coordinate our positions in international forums. Bearing in mind the significance of these issues, we take note of Russia's proposal of a BRICS agreement on cooperation in this field to be jointly elaborated.

51. We reiterate our commitment to the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols, with special attention to the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. We recognize the challenge posed by the agreed targets on conservation of biodiversity and reaffirm



General Assembly

Sixty-eighth session

Official Records

106th plenary meeting
Monday, 8 September 2014, 3 p.m.
New York

President: Mr. Ashe (Antigua and Barbuda)

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Agenda item 123 (continued)

Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

The President: Members will recall that the Assembly considered this item jointly with agenda item 29, entitled "Report of the Security Council", at its 46th, 47th, 48th and 49th plenary meetings, on 7 and 8 November 2013. Members will also recall that, pursuant to decision 67/561, of 29 August 2013, the Assembly continued intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary meetings during the current session.

In a letter dated 6 August 2014, I circulated for consideration by Member States language for a draft oral decision on this important issue.

May I now therefore take it that the General Assembly decides:

"To reaffirm the central role of the General Assembly on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council;

"To immediately continue intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in an informal plenary of the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, as mandated by General Assembly decisions 62/557 of 15 September

2008, 63/565 B of 14 September 2009, 64/568 of 13 September 2010, 65/554 of 12 September 2011, 66/566 of 13 September 2012 and 67/561 of 29 August 2013, building on the informal meetings held during its sixty-eighth session, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, while welcoming the active engagement, initiatives and intensive efforts of the President of the General Assembly, and taking note of the previous proposals of the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, and noting with appreciation his active role and concrete efforts, including the preparation of the text reflecting the positions of and proposals submitted by Member States, with a view to an early comprehensive reform of the Security Council;

"To convene the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council during the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, if Member States so decide; and, finally,

"To include in the agenda of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly an item entitled 'Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council'?"

The draft oral decision was adopted (decision 68/557).

The President: Before giving the floor to speakers in explanation of position, may I remind delegations

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are surprised and even dismayed that there has been no reference to the non-paper in the rollover decision presented by you. We will of course draw our own conclusions on why that is so, but your words of last July and September resonate in our minds even today.

In conclusion, I would like to say that we are incurable optimists. We believe that just like the turnstiles that have now been removed at the entrance of our main building, the last obstacles to the negotiation text in the intergovernmental negotiations will be removed under the dynamic visionary leadership of our President-elect, His Excellency Mr. Sam Kutesa, former Foreign Minister of Uganda, and we will have a clear road map to Security Council reform in the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Patriota (Brazil): Thank you, Mr. President, for your statement, your leadership and your commitment to move the process forward.

As highlighted in the group of four letter addressed to you, Mr. President, on 15 August, we would like to reaffirm our view that rollover decision 68/557, which was just adopted and is a mere repetition of last year's language, does not recognize your significant legacy nor the efforts of the Chairman Ambassador Zahir Tanin. Your presidency will be remembered as a moment in which the membership advanced towards the goal of reforming the Security Council. The non-paper produced by your team of advisers, in which I had the honour to take part, and endorsed by you, is now a widely recognized tool to frame our discussions. We encourage delegations to use it in the upcoming round of negotiations.

There seems to be a prevailing view among Member States that the Security Council is not responding satisfactorily to specific crises around the world, and a growing sense of frustration arises from a widely perceived dysfunctionality of the body. If we leave things as they are, we run the risk of bringing discredit and erosion of authority to the United Nations in a core area of its mandate. The year 2015 will mark 50 years since the first and only time the Security Council was expanded, and 10 years after the 2005 World Summit, when our leaders unanimously called for an early reform of the Security Council.

As Ambassador Tanin has rightly recognized in his assessment of the current state of play, the seventieth anniversary of the Organization will provide a tremendous opportunity for achieving much-needed

reform. It is therefore imperative that, in order to produce tangible results by next year, we start the first meeting of the next round of negotiations with a text on the table.

Mr. Schieb (Germany): I would like to second the points made earlier by the Permanent Representatives of Japan, India and Brazil.

Let me add to that our gratitude to you, Mr. President, and your team for your leadership and genuine efforts to help us achieve long-overdue progress on Security Council reform. We, the group of four countries, took note in our letter to you of 15 August that the rollover decision 68/557 was a mere verbatim repetition of last year's decision 67/561.

It may only be a sign of your modesty, Mr. President, that you did not want to highlight more prominently your personal role and achievements. In our view, however, that does not adequately reflect your valuable contributions. Other speakers have mentioned the advisory group and the non-paper, as well as the Chairman's assessment.

I wish to add to that the strong sense of urgency felt among the majority of Member States that, with the year 2015 fast approaching, we need to recommit ourselves to finally break the deadlock. Against that background, it is even more important that we commence the new round of intergovernmental negotiations as early as possible and on the basis of a genuine negotiation text. I therefore encourage you, Sir, to ensure that the positive momentum that you have created is carried over into the new intergovernmental round.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Oral decision 68/557, which was just adopted by the General Assembly to smoothly carry over the intergovernmental negotiations to the next session, reflects the common interest and a general consensus of Member States.

During the intergovernmental negotiations at this session, Member States had extensive and in-depth exchanges of views with regard to the reform of the Security Council. It is regrettable that views on reform diverge significantly. Our next step should be to engage in democratic and extensive consultations so as to meet each other halfway, work to build consensus, seek a comprehensive solution and reach the broadest possible agreement, while taking into consideration the concerns and interests of all parties.

We hope to work with other Member States to find a solution to the issue of comprehensive reform that



BRAZIL

**STATEMENT BY H. E. DILMA ROUSSEFF,
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL,
AT THE OPENING OF THE GENERAL DEBATE
OF THE 69TH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

New York, 24 September 2014

(check against delivery)

Ambassador Sam Kutesa, President of the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations,

Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Distinguished Heads of State and Government,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great satisfaction for Brazil - which has the honour and privilege of opening this debate - to have as the President of this Session of the General Assembly a son of Africa. As Brazilians we are united by ties of history, culture and friendship with the African continent. This legacy was and will always be decisive for my country's national identity.

Mr. President,

I open this General Debate on the eve of elections which will determine, in Brazil, the President of the Republic, State governors and a significant portion of Congress. These elections represent the celebration of a democracy we achieved almost thirty years ago after two decades of dictatorial rule. Through democracy we also advanced towards the country's economic stability.

During the last twelve years, in particular, we have consolidated these achievements by building an inclusive society based on equal opportunities.

The Great Transformation to which we are committed has resulted in a modern economy and a more egalitarian society. At the same time it has required strong civic participation, respect for human rights and a sustainable vision of development.

It has also required an engagement on the world stage characterized by multilateralism, respect for international law, the quest for peace and a culture of solidarity.

Mr President,

A few days ago FAO announced that Brazil is no longer in the World Hunger Map.

This transformation was the result of economic policies which generated 21 million jobs and appreciated the minimum wage, increasing its purchasing power by 71%. With these policies inequality was reduced.

Thirty six million Brazilians have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 2003; 22 million during my Administration alone. Social policies and income transfer programs consolidated within the "Brazil Without Extreme Poverty" Plan have also contributed to these results.

In the area of health care, we were able to meet the goal of reducing child mortality before the deadline established by the Millennium Development Goals.

Universal access to primary education has become a reality and we are now pursuing the same goal with regard to secondary education. We are equally committed to enhancing the quality of education, by improving curricula and raising the profile of teachers.

Vocational education has made strides with the creation of hundreds of new schools and the professional technical training of 8 million young people over the last four years.

There has been an unprecedented expansion of higher education with the establishment of new publicly funded universities and the granting of scholarships and financial aid that have enabled 3 million students to have access to private universities.

Affirmative action policies have allowed the mass enrollment of poor, indigenous and afro-descendent students into universities.

Finally, the challenges of building a knowledge-based society led to the creation of the "Science Without Borders" Program which has sent over a hundred thousand undergraduate and graduate students to the world's best universities.

By presidential initiative Congress has passed legislation that allocates 75% of the royalties of pre-salt oil exploration to education and 25% to health care. Furthermore, 50% of the social fund generated by pre-salt oil revenues will also go to education.

We will thus transform finite resources - such as oil and gas - into permanent assets: education, science and technology, and innovation. This will be our passport to the future.

Mr. President,

We have not neglected fiscal discipline and monetary stability, and we have striven to shield Brazil from external volatility.

We were thus able to overcome the challenges arising from the major global economic crisis triggered in 2008 by the collapse of Lehman Brothers that subsequently developed into national sovereign debt crises affecting many countries.

We resisted its worst consequences: unemployment, wage depreciation, erosion of social rights and the freezing of investments.

We followed through with income distribution by stimulating growth and employment and maintaining investments in infrastructure.

Brazil jumped from being the 13th to being the 7th largest economy in the world. Per capita income increased by more than threefold and inequality rates fell sharply.

While in 2002, more than half of the Brazilian population was poor or below the poverty line, today 3 out of every 4 Brazilians are a part of the middle class and upper income ranges.

During the crisis, while the world economy left hundreds of millions of workers unemployed, Brazil created 12 million formal jobs.

In addition, we became one of the main destinations of foreign investment.

We resumed investments in infrastructure through strong partnerships with the private sector.

All of these gains have materialized within the context of a sound fiscal environment. We have reduced the net public debt to GDP ratio from approximately 60% to 35%.

The gross external debt in relation to GDP fell from 42% to 14%.

Our international reserves increased tenfold, turning Brazil into an international creditor.

The annual inflation rate has been kept within the ranges determined by the national inflation targets in place.

Mr. President,

Although we have managed to withstand the most harmful consequences of the global crisis we have also been acutely affected by it in recent years.

This is due to the persistence, in all regions of the world, of substantial economic adversities that hinder our growth.

Allow me to reiterate what I said last year at the opening of the General Debate.

It is vital and urgent to restore the dynamism of the global economy, which should work towards fostering investment, international trade and the reduction of inequalities among countries.

Regarding international trade, there must be a unanimous commitment to a work program that leads to the conclusion of the Doha Round.

It is also imperative, Mr. President, to eliminate the disparity between the growing importance of developing countries in the global economy and their insufficient representation and participation in the decision-making processes of international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The delay in the expansion of voting rights of developing countries in these institutions is unacceptable.

These institutions are in danger of losing legitimacy and efficiency.

Mr. President,

Brazil had the pleasure of hosting the Sixth Summit of the BRICS countries last July. We welcomed the leaders of China, India, Russia and South Africa in a fraternal and fruitful meeting that pointed to important perspectives for the future.

We have signed agreements on the establishment of the New Development Bank and of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. The Bank will help meeting the infrastructure financing needs of the BRICS and those of other developing countries. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement will protect countries from financial volatility. Each instrument will have a capital injection of US\$ 100 billion.

Mr. President,

The current generation of world leaders – our generation – is also being called to face significant challenges concerning peace, collective security and the environment.

We have been unable to solve old disputes and to prevent new threats.

The use of force is incapable of eliminating the underlying causes of conflict. This is made clear by the persistence of the Question of Palestine; the systematic massacre of the Syrian people; the tragic national destructuring of Iraq; the serious insecurity in Libya; the conflicts in the Sahel; and the clashes in Ukraine.

Each military intervention leads not to peace, but to the deterioration of these conflicts.

We witness a tragic proliferation in the numbers of civilian victims and humanitarian catastrophes. We cannot allow these barbaric acts to increase, harming our ethical, moral and civilizational values.

Nor can we remain indifferent to the spread of the Ebola virus in West Africa. In this regard, we support the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response.

Mr. President,

The Security Council has been having difficulties in promoting peaceful solutions to those conflicts. A genuine reform of the Security Council is necessary to overcome the current paralysis. This process has been dragging on for too long.

The 70th anniversary of the United Nations, in 2015, must be an auspicious occasion for achieving the progress required. I am certain we all understand the serious risks of paralysis and inaction at the Security Council.

A more representative and more legitimate Security Council would also be a more effective Council.

Let me reiterate that we cannot remain indifferent to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, particularly after the tragic events in Gaza. We condemn the disproportionate use of force that strongly impacts the civilian population, especially women and children.

This conflict must be resolved, not precariously managed, as has been the case. Effective negotiations between the parties must lead to a two-State solution, with Palestine and Israel living side by side, in security and within internationally recognized borders.

Amid so many situations of conflict, Latin America and the Caribbean seek to tackle the main issue that has affected our region for centuries – social inequality.

We have strengthened the roots of democracy and intensified our quest towards a more just, inclusive and sustainable economic development. Regional integration efforts have advanced, with Mercosur, UNASUR and CELAC.

Mr. President,

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our times. To overcome it, we need a sense of urgency, political courage and the understanding that each of us should contribute according to the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.

Convened at a timely occasion by the Secretary-General, the Climate Summit invigorates the negotiations under the Framework Convention.

The Brazilian Government will strive to ensure that the outcome of negotiations leads to an agreement that is balanced, fair and effective.

Brazil has been doing its part in tackling climate change.

At the Copenhagen Conference, we committed to a voluntary reduction of 36-39% of our projected emissions by 2020.

Between 2010 and 2013, we avoided launching into the atmosphere an average of 650 million tons of carbon dioxide per year.

Throughout those years, we achieved the lowest deforestation rates of our history.

In the last decade, we have reduced deforestation by 79%, without relinquishing economic development and social inclusion.

We have shown that it is possible to grow, to include, to preserve and to protect. Such an achievement stems from the continuous and steadfast efforts of Government, Brazilian civil society, as well as other public and private actors.

We expect that developed countries - who have not only the legal, but also the political obligation to lead by example, will unequivocally and concretely demonstrate their commitment to address this challenge that affects us all.

At Rio+20 we were proud to set the foundations for a new development agenda, based on Sustainable Development Goals applicable to both developing and developed nations.

It will be crucial for us to identify means of implementation that correspond to the magnitude of the challenges we have committed to overcome. We must be ambitious when it comes to financing, cooperation, national capacity building and technology transfer, especially towards least developed countries.

Let me underscore, in this context, the need to establish a mechanism for the development, transfer and dissemination of clean, environmentally sustainable technologies.

Mr. President,

Together with sustainable development and peace, the international order to which we aspire must be founded on fundamental values.

Among those, emphasis should be put on the fight against all kinds of discrimination and exclusion.

We have an unequivocal commitment to the empowerment of women in the labor market, liberal professions, entrepreneurship, political activity, and access to education, among others. My Government tirelessly combats violence against women in all its forms. We consider the 21st century to be the century of women.

By the same token, the promotion of racial equality aims to rescue Brazilians of African descent, who represent more than half of our population, from the consequences of centuries of slavery to which they were subjected.

We owe them our rich and permanent legacy of cultural, religious and human values. To us, racial miscigenation is a matter of pride.

Appendix 4 Record of GA speech from Argentina president Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner held Sept. 24. 2014

Address by Ms. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, President of Argentine Republic 69th session, 6th plenary meeting, General Assembly Wednesday, 24 September 2014, 9 a.m. New York

I address the General Assembly at a very special moment, not only for the world but also for my country. I would like to begin by reflecting on the words with which Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon opened this sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly. He went over many of the problems, tragedies and calamities that are unsettling the world today, and I think, if I remember correctly, that he literally confirmed that the turmoil, as he defined it, that is upsetting the world today is endangering multilateralism.

I sincerely believe that most of the problems that the planet has today economically and financially, with respect to terrorism and security, in terms of force and territorial integrity, of war and peace, are the result of the exact opposite: the absence of an effective, practical and democratic multilateralism. That is why, I would like to begin today in particular by thanking and congratulating the General Assembly for adopting resolution 68/304, on 9 September, by which it finally decided by a wide majority of 124 votes to dedicate itself to drafting a multilateral convention which will be a regulatory legal framework for restructuring the sovereign debts of all countries, a task that we needed to take on.

I have been coming to the General Assembly since 2003, first as a Senator, and then, starting in 2007, as President. We always came calling for reform of the Security Council and of the International Monetary Fund. Our point of departure was the experience we had in my country, the Argentine Republic. Today, I would go so far as to say in this international context that my country, the Argentine Republic, is a triple leading case in terms of economics and finance, terrorism and security, and force and territorial integrity.

The first area is the economic and financial crisis that spread throughout the world starting in 2008, which persists to this day and which is beginning to threaten emerging economies whose greater economic growth we have supported over the past decade. The 2008 crisis was experienced by my country in 2001, when the largest default on sovereign debt in living memory occurred. At the time, the Argentine Republic had accrued debt representing 160 per cent of the gross domestic product, with the consent of multilateral organizations, because when one is speaking about that level of debt, the problem is not just that of the debtor, but also of the creditors.

Starting with the dictatorship on 24 March 1976, and through the neoliberal period, Argentina was a favourite of the International Monetary Fund. In the end, Argentina accumulated an unprecedented debt that caused the country to implode, not just in economic terms but also in political terms. We had five presidents in a single week. At that point, nobody claimed responsibility for what had taken place in Argentina. Argentina had to resolve its problems as best it could, and in 2003, a few months after taking office, a President who had come to head the Government with only 22 per cent of the vote came to speak at the General Assembly (see A/58/PV.11) and maintained that it was necessary to generate a model of development and growth for the country so that the country could shoulder its debt. He maintained, in a rather interesting metaphor, that dead people do not pay their debts and that countries have to live, develop and grow in order to meet their obligations.

But he also said that the level of debt — 160 per cent of the gross domestic product — was not our country's responsibility alone; that we as a country were accepting responsibility for having adopted

policies that had been forced upon us; that while we were shouldering our responsibility, we were also requesting and calling for the multilateral organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the creditors themselves, which had lent money at usurious rates — at that time as high as 14 per cent in United States dollars — which were receiving payments in the Argentine Republic, to also assume part of the responsibility for that indebtedness.

And with that man — who took over with 22 per cent of the vote, with 25 per cent unemployment, a 54 per cent poverty rate and 27 per cent of extreme poverty, without education, without health, without social security, over time, with a model of development and growth — we were able not only to create millions of jobs, millions of people becoming integrated in the social security system, including retirees and pensioners, but also to invest 6 per cent of the gross domestic product in education, and set aside enormous amounts of money for the country's infrastructure, building roads, schools, nuclear plants, hydroelectric plants, water, gas and electricity plants that now cover the entire country, in an unprecedented programme of social inclusion that has allowed to reduce poverty and extreme poverty to single digits.

Today, the International Monetary Fund itself recognizes that Argentina's economic growth between 2004 and 2011 is the third-largest globally in terms of quality of growth. Only Bulgaria and China are ahead of us. In Latin America, we have the greatest quality of growth and the best purchasing power for our workers and salaried employees and the highest social security deposits.

We have been able to achieve all of that while also dealing with debt that others had generated. It is worth repeating that our Governments were not the ones that declared a default, nor were they the ones that had assumed the debt; we were simply the ones who shouldered the debt, as appropriate, and paid, from 2003 to today, more than \$190 billion — I repeat, more than \$190 billion — by restructuring the defaulted debt with 92.4 per cent of creditors through two debt swaps, one carried out by President Kirchner in 2005 and the other carried out by me in 2010.

What is certain is that we were successful. We succeeded because 92.4 per cent of Argentina's creditors regularized their situation. We began to make regular payments, and not only to them. We also fully paid our debt to the International Monetary Fund through so-called stand-by arrangements. We were able to completely cancel our debt with the International Monetary Fund. A few months ago, we also concluded negotiations with the Paris Club on a debt dating back to 1956. It was so long ago that I was three years old when that debt was created and the Minister of the Economy of my country, who discussed the restructuring and renegotiation of the debt with the Paris Club, was not even born. Yet we reached an agreement with 19 European Union finance ministers to finally restructure the debt. We are now paying the first phase of \$642 million.

This does not end there. We also regularized the situation with the rulings of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes at the World Bank, which has begun hearings not for acts or actions committed by our Government, but for the actions of previous Governments that ended up in the World Bank tribunal. We have also resolved that issue, just as we arrived at an arrangement with Repsol when we decided to regain control of our energy resources and expropriated 51 per cent of the oil company's shares. We also restructured that debt and reached an agreement.

We have done all this with our own resources, without access to capital markets because Argentina, due to the default of 2001, was denied access to capital markets. This represents a process of unprecedented social inclusion. Why do I say "unprecedented"? During the 1950s there were similar inclusion processes in my country, but the difference is that we initiated this process of inclusion after complete and utter bankruptcy. At the peak of default, we were able to overcome default, to

include the people of Argentina and to enjoy social growth with inclusion. And today Argentina is extricating itself, and in addition we have one of the lowest debt ratios in the world.

The other leading case to which I referred and now wish to discuss is the emergence of the so-called vulture funds. That is not a term used by any popular South American leader or by any African ruler, although African countries have also been major victims of these vulture funds. One of the first global leaders to mention them was the former English Prime Minister Gordon Brown at the General Assembly in 2002. This expression became the copyrighted shorthand for something unworthy and immoral that kept countries from addressing the genuine problems of education, health and poverty. Today, with the support of the judicial system of this country, Argentina is now being assaulted by these vulture funds.

What are these vulture funds? They represent the 1 per cent of debt-holders that did not take part in the 2005 restructuring. They could not participate because they had purchased bonds in 2008. As everyone knows, these are specialized funds, as indicated by their names, that purchased funds or shares of countries that had defaulted on their debt or were about to do so. Subsequently, they did not revert to the country in question for the payment of that debt, but brought suits in various jurisdictions in order to make exorbitant profits. “Profits” is hardly the right word, because what has been recognized in a judgment passed down here in the jurisdiction of New York is that this 1 per cent grew at a rate of 1,608 per cent in a five-year period. Is there any business, undertaking or investor earning 1,600 per cent in just five years? That is why they are called vulture funds. Today, they are obstructing the recovery of that 92.4 per cent who trusted in Argentina.

I am therefore pleased that the Assembly has taken the bull by the horns, and I hope that between this year and next — before the General Assembly holds its new session in 2015 — we will have arrived at a regulatory framework to restructure sovereign debts. The point is to engage in an exercise in active and constructive multilateralism so that no other country will have to experience what Argentina — a country that has the ability and willingness to pay its debts despite the harassment of these vulture funds — has been through.

These vulture funds also threaten and hold the economy of our country hostage by provoking rumours, slander and libel from the personal to the economic and financial, so that they sometimes act as a destabilizing factor in the economy. Those who set bombs are not the only terrorists; those who destabilize the economy of a country and create poverty, misery and hunger through the sin of speculation are economic terrorists. That is what we want to spell out. That is why we strongly advocate the establishment of a multilateral convention soon and expeditiously, not just for Argentina, but for the rest of the world. We believe that a financial and economic balance that addresses the social and economic disparities among countries and within societies will also be a great antidote to those who recruit young people who have no hope in the future and enrol them in crazy crusades. We must all lament that. We can see only the surface of the phenomenon; we also have to delve deeply into the causes that mobilize people.

We also talked about my country as a triple leading case on terrorism and security. My country is the only country of the Americas other than the United States of America that was the target of terrorist attacks: one in 1992 when the embassy of Israel was blown up, and the second in 1994 when the headquarters of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) was bombed. This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the bombing of AMIA. I dare say before this Assembly — in the presence of some of the family members of the victims who have always been with us — that the Government headed by President Kirchner did the utmost and went the greatest lengths to uncover the real culprits, not only because it opened all my country’s intelligence files and created a special prosecutor investigation unit, but also because, when in 2006 the justice system of my country

accused Iranian citizens of involvement in the bombing of AMIA, I myself was the only President who dared to propose asking the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with and assist in the investigation. That request was made intermittently from 2007 to 2011, until the Islamic Republic of Iran finally agreed to a bilateral meeting, allowing it to be included in the agenda. That meeting led to the signing by both countries of a memorandum of understanding on legal cooperation that allowed for the Iranian citizens who had been accused, and who live in Tehran, to be deposed before the judge.

But what happened when we signed that memorandum? It seemed as if all hell had broken out, both nationally and internationally. The Jewish associations that had sought our support for so many years and that had come here with us to ask for help turned against us, and when an agreement was finally reached on legal cooperation they accused us of complicity with the State of Iran.

The same thing happened here in the United States. When the vulture funds lobbied before the United States Congress, they accused us of collaborating with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which at the time was known as the Terrorist State of Iran. They even lobbied on their websites, posting pictures of me on the Internet with former President Ahmadinejad as if we were business partners. Just this week, we learned that the iconic Waldorf Astoria hotel, in this city, was the setting for a meeting between the Secretary of State of this country and his Iranian counterpart.

We are not criticizing them. Quite the contrary, anything that represents dialogue and understanding seems very good to us. But we wish to ask those who have been accusing Iran of being a terrorist State — and I am not speaking here of the last century, but of last year — what they would say today about the members of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), many of whom not so long ago were called freedom fighters when they were fighting in Syria against the Government of Bashar Al-Assad. And this is where I believe we have another problem with respect to security and terrorism. The major Powers too often and too easily seesaw from the concept of friend to enemy, and terrorist to non-terrorist. We need to agree once and for all not to use international politics or geopolitical positions to determine positions of power. I say that as a militant opponent of international terrorism.

By the way, just to add a touch of color, ISIS has apparently issued a threat against me that is under legal investigation in my country. The threat apparently has two justifications: first, because of my close relationship with His Holiness Pope Francis, and secondly, because I recognize the need for two States, Israel and Palestine. While I am at it, let me reiterate my call on the Assembly to recognize Palestine once and for all as a State with full membership in this body. We have to begin to undo some of the Gordian knots — because there is not just one Gordian knot but several — regarding the situation in the Middle East, which involves recognizing the State of Palestine, Israel's right to live securely within its borders, and Palestine's right not to be subjected to the kind of disproportionate use of force that led to the deaths of hundreds of women and children, which we condemn just as we also condemn those who attack Israel with missiles.

In a time of economic vultures and hawks of war, we need more doves of peace to build a safer world. We need more respect for international law and more equal treatment of those seated in this Hall. Just this morning, I overheard one leader refer to the use of force to attack the territorial integrity of a country.

Here too, the Republic of Argentina is a leading case. For more than 100 years, we have had a claim against the United Kingdom on a matter of sovereignty. We once again ask the Assembly to call on the United Kingdom to sit down with Argentina to discuss the matter of the sovereignty of the Malvinas. No one cares and there is not a single veto from the Security Council, because Argentina

is not a member of the Security Council and is not even among the countries that decide what happens in the world. So long as that continues, and so long as the votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council are worth more than the votes of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Egypt, Uganda, Argentina, Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates, nothing will be resolved. We will just have the same speeches we hear every year without arriving at a resolution.

The Assembly must fight to take back the powers it delegated to the Council, since —almost paradoxically — the Assembly has to ask the Council for permission on its decisions or on whether to admit a member. We need to reassert that the Assembly is a sovereign body of the United Nations, and that each of us is worth one vote in a true global democracy. Not everything will be resolved when that global democracy is respected to the letter, but I do believe it will mark the beginning of a solution. I am neither a pessimist nor an optimist; I consider myself to be a realist. In any event, the child of pessimism and optimism is always optimism, but with realism. Optimism without realism is either ingenuity or cynicism. I do not wish to appear ingenuous or cynical before this audience.

I want to convey what we really think in my country. We have long demanded reform of the Security Council and of the International Monetary Fund. In 2003, reform of the International Monetary Fund seemed almost inevitable; today, hardly anyone remembers the idea of reforming the International Monetary Fund, because it no longer plays a central role in decisions. Even the International Monetary Fund itself and both its current head and former leaders, including Anne Krueger, are also calling for reforms with respect to the restructuring of sovereign debts. So long as there is no international treaty approved by this Assembly, no matter how many clauses are imposed by the restructuring, there will always be a Judge Griesa somewhere in the world who says that they are meaningless, and who will end up applying usurious taxes to bleed some poor country to death. That is what is happening, because it seems to me that they are trying to overturn the restructuring of sovereign debt for which the Argentine people worked so hard.

Before coming here I was in Rome, meeting with a fellow countryman who today occupies a strong, exemplary religious and moral leadership. I would like to offer a message of peace and of peacebuilding. If we truly wish to fight terrorism, then let us work for peace. We cannot fight the terrorists by beating the drums of war. Quite the contrary, that is exactly what they want — a symmetrical reaction so that the wheel again begins to turn and a price is paid in blood.

That is why I think it is important for us to think deeply about those issues. Above all, I want to bring to the table the certainty that if the United Nations recovers its leadership, if the Assembly resumes its mandate, when too many countries fail to comply with international law, even though they require others to do so, then I am certain that we will have made a major contribution to peacebuilding and the fight against terrorism from which no one would have been left out. But we have to leave to our children a much better world than the one we have today.

Finally, I wish to recall that a year ago the problems were different. A year ago, we were discussing other problems, other threats to security. Times have changed. The wrongdoers of yesterday do not seem so bad today. Those who should have been invaded and crushed a year ago, today seem to be cooperating to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). First, it was Al-Qaida, and, I wonder, where did Al-Qaida and the Taliban spring from? Where do they get their weapons and resources? My country does not produce weapons. Who sells arms to those groups? Then there was the Arab Spring, which ended up by being not so much a spring as a fall and even a winter. Those involved went from being freedom-fighters to being persecuted or imprisoned. Now there is ISIS, a new terrorist organization that carries out beheadings on television on a carefully set stage. What is causing all this, I wonder? Where is this coming from? I have become really distrustful of

everything after seeing what is happening in the world today — real-life scenes that make fictional series look trivial.

It is therefore worth asking ourselves why it is that we are facing ever-greater problems — problems that caused the Pope to comment that there is practically a third world war. That is true. It is a world war but not along the lines of the more conventional wars of the twentieth century. There are hotspots where the only victims are civilian populations. That is why, a few minutes from now in the Security Council, of which Argentina is a non-permanent member, we wish to raise some of those issues. We have no certainties, no absolute truths, but we have many questions. We want to put them to those who possess a lot more information than we do, far more data and far more extensive networks of information than my country has. Heaven forbid that, with all those data, they have a wealth of information but can understand little of what is happening. For they have to be able to comprehend what is happening if they are to come up with a definitive solution. I deeply appreciate once again the political will of the 124 countries that supported resolution 68/304. As everyone knows, there was pressure to keep us from getting that number of supporters or having a vote, but I think that the exercise of practical, effective and democratic multilateralism that the adoption of the resolution represents demonstrates that all is not lost. On the contrary, it is in the hands of each and every one of us, each of our countries, to find real and effective solutions to the problems the world has today.

**Ministerial Meeting of the G4 Countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) on
the margins of the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly**

Joint Press Statement

New York, 25 September 2014

1 - The Minister of External Relations of Brazil, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, the Minister of External Affairs of India and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan met in New York on 25 September 2014, on the margins of the opening of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, to exchange views on Security Council reform.

2 - The G4 Ministers underscored their continuous commitment to a Security Council reform reflective of the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. They agreed that the difficulties of the Security Council to effectively address current international challenges are a compelling reminder of the urgent need for a Security Council reform which makes it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thereby further enhances its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.

3 - The Ministers voiced their concern that, 70 years after the foundation of the United Nations, 50 years after the first and only time that the Security Council was reformed, nearly 15 years after the Millennium Summit and 10 years after the 2005 World Summit - when our leaders unanimously called for an early reform of the Security Council - discussions are still at a stalemate. They underscored that the process of bringing about reforms of the Security Council should not be seen as an endless exercise. The G4 Ministers therefore invited all their counterparts to use the 70th anniversary of the UN as an opportunity to finally achieve a concrete outcome on a process that has dragged on for over twenty years and to engage in all possible efforts to fulfill, by September 2015, the mandate given by our Heads of State and Government.

4 - The G4 countries reiterated their commitment as aspiring new permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as their support for each other's candidatures. They also reaffirmed their view of the importance of developing countries, including from Africa, to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of an enlarged Council.

5 - The Ministers emphasized their readiness to further reach out to reform-oriented member states in order to discuss models of an enlarged Security Council in the permanent and non-permanent categories. In this context, they commended Japan's initiative to host an outreach meeting with other UN member states, with attendance from participants with a wide range of views on the reform issue in July 2014. They recognized the need for greater involvement of civil society, the media and academia on the discussions about the reform of the Security Council and recalled the seminars hosted by Brazil, India and Japan to broaden the debate on the urgency of reforming the body.

6 - The Ministers also discussed the outcome of the tenth round of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. They expressed their appreciation for the important role played by the President of the 68th General Assembly, H.E. Mr. John Ashe, in generating positive momentum for the negotiations, notably reflected in the establishment of an Advisory Group, which produced a non-paper providing a clear summary of the main positions of Member States under each of the five key issues contained in decision 62/557. The Ministers also welcomed the assessment, dated 9 July 2014, by the chairman of the IGN, H.E. Ambassador Tanin, and noted with interest his call for a high-level event to be held at the General Debate of the 70th General Assembly and the need to finally start text-based negotiations.

7 - The Ministers expressed their expectations to work closely with the President of the 69th General Assembly, H.E. Mr. Sam Kahamba Kutesa, in order to bring about the urgently needed reform of the Security Council.

Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado
Minister of External Relations of Brazil

Frank-Walter Steinmeier
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany

Sushma Swaraj
Minister of External Affairs of India

Fumio Kishida
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

(7)

United Nations

S/2014/725



Security Council

Distr.: General
8 October 2014
English
Original: English and Spanish

**Letter dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative
of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Argentina, the Security Council will be holding an open debate on the theme "Working methods of the Security Council" on Thursday, 23 October 2014. In order to guide the debate, Argentina has prepared the attached concept paper (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Maria Cristina **Perceval**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

Open debate of the Security Council on the theme “Working methods of the Security Council”, 23 October 2013

Concept paper

The working methods of the Security Council are of interest not only to Council members but also to the broader membership. In addition to being interested in improving the efficiency of the Council’s work, Member States are particularly keen on the development of more democratic practices, transparency and accountability, as evidenced by the fact that these issues are raised repeatedly at the annual open debates on the working methods of the Council, as well as in specific groupings and at other meetings where that question is discussed. In the note by the President of the Security Council of 28 August 2013 (S/2013/515), the members of the Council expressed their commitment to continuing to provide opportunities to hear the views of the broader membership on the working methods of the Council, including in any open debate on the implementation of the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507), and to welcoming the continued participation of the broader membership in such debates.

Argentina, which has chaired the Security Council Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions for two consecutive years (January 2013-December 2014), is pleased to convene this open debate to honour that commitment, as one of the highlights of its presidency of the Council for the month of October 2014.

Security Council reform, which is being debated by the General Assembly, does not constitute the subject of this open debate, which considers instead the procedures of the Council and the way the Council conducts its work.

1. Background

The working methods of the Security Council have developed greatly throughout the years, yet the demands of the international community continue to grow. Some issues are recurrent, both in internal discussions and in the statements of the broader membership, and are considered always in the quest for improvement. Other issues have also emerged, representing new areas of concern.

During the current chairmanship of the Informal Working Group, both recurring and new issues have been addressed.

In 2013, the Informal Working Group drafted two notes by the President: the one dated 28 August 2013 focused on dialogue with non-members of the Security Council and other bodies (S/2013/515) and the one dated 28 October 2013 dealt with consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries (S/2013/630). In 2014, the Informal Working Group drafted two other notes by the President: the one dated 14 April 2014 was on the role of penholders in the drafting of Council products (S/2014/268) and the one dated

4 August 2014 was on intra-Council dialogue (S/2014/565). All four notes build upon prior decisions of the Council. Also in 2014, the Informal Working Group worked on a note by the President dated 4 June 2014 on a new issue: the handover of the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies (S/2014/393).

One of the proposals made by the Argentine chairmanship at the beginning of its term was to discuss extending the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson to cover other sanctions lists, that is to say, not only the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1989 (2011) (the Al-Qaida Sanctions List). That proposal did not enjoy consensus. Furthermore, the Council has to date failed to agree on a mechanism for following up on situations referred by it to the International Criminal Court. Neither issue is new, but the Council has yet to take up either.

2. Objectives and proposed issues for debate

For the upcoming open debate, it is proposed that delegations build on the experience of prior discussions at previous open debates on the working methods of the Security Council, wrap-up sessions and other events by assessing the progress made since the 2013 annual open debate, identifying gaps and making concrete proposals to the Informal Working Group or to the Council to enhance the efficiency, transparency and interactivity of the work of the Council. In assessing progress, it is important to consider the documents concerning the working methods of the Council agreed upon by the Informal Working Group since the 2013 open debate (S/2013/630, S/2014/268, S/2014/393 and S/2014/565) and the implementation — or lack thereof — of previously adopted notes by the President of the Council.

Delegations are invited to consider two issues that the Security Council should address in a more meaningful manner: due process and targeted sanctions, in particular the possibility of extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson to all sanctions committees; and Security Council follow-up of its referrals to the International Criminal Court.

Enhancing due process in sanctions regimes

Targeted sanctions were an important United Nations response to the controversy surrounding the adverse humanitarian impact of the comprehensive economic sanctions that prevailed in the early 1990s. The purpose of targeted sanctions is to apply restrictive measures against individuals, entities or materials that are contributing to the threat to international peace and security during or immediately after a conflict. Throughout the years, in each of the categories subject to targeted sanctions — finance, travel, arms and commodities — the Security Council has adopted a number of policy innovations to improve their design and to overcome problems resulting from inadequate implementation.

As important as the requirements for effectively implementing targeted sanctions was the demand that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions. This concern was reflected in paragraph 109 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, which was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/1.

Although due process has improved with the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson and with each new Security Council resolution, because of both human rights and security concerns, due process issues continue to be raised by Members of the Council and by the broader membership alike. Probably the most significant concern raised by Member States is that the mandate of the Ombudsperson covers only petitioners whose names are inscribed on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

In the seventh and eighth reports of the Office of the Ombudsperson submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 (c) of annex II to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012) (S/2014/73 and S/2014/553), dated 31 January 2014 and 31 July 2014 respectively, a number of considerations and recommendations were made on how to continue to deliver a fair process and contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of the Al-Qaida sanctions regime of the Council. While stressing that the Ombudsperson process continues to operate in compliance with the fundamental principles of fairness, in the reports it is indicated that further advances are needed in terms of due process, in particular with regard to the manner in which reasons for removing and maintaining names on the list are made and provided, including the issue of the absence of public disclosure, and the general lack of transparency in the process. Concerns were also expressed in both reports that, while the Ombudsperson had functioned independently in practice, no separate Office of the Ombudsperson had been established as mandated. Furthermore, the administrative structure relied on to implement the resolution, in terms of budget, staff management and contractual arrangements, lacked the critical features of autonomy and contained insufficient safeguards for independence. In the reports, it was concluded that due process could and must be strengthened and, at the same time, it was shown that there was merit in having an independent and impartial Ombudsperson who, in addition to and bearing in mind her experience in dealing with individual delisting requests, made recommendations to the Council to continue to strengthen due process.

In this context, participants in the open debate are encouraged to address the question of due process in targeted sanctions, in particular the possibility of extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson to all sanctions committees, building on the experience gained by the Office of the Ombudsperson with the Al-Qaida sanctions regime.

Follow-up of Security Council referrals to the International Criminal Court

At the Security Council open debate held on 17 October 2012 on the initiative of Guatemala on the theme "Peace and justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court", a number of Member States called for a more efficient and vigorous follow-up to cases referred by the Council to the International Criminal Court than was contained in the Court's periodic reports, as an essential part of the responsible action taken by the Council to foster justice and accountability for serious crimes of international concern. At other open debates, many Member States have reiterated their concern about a lack of effective and responsible follow-up to cases referred by the Council to the Court.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court gives the Security Council a unique jurisdictional role. By article 13 (b) of the Statute, the Court grants the Council the power, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to refer to the Court situations in which one or more crimes within the

every sixth months on both referrals; but, unlike issues pertaining to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which have been dealt with, since 2000, by the Security Council Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, the Council has to date not conducted an effective follow-up of the referrals nor has it agreed on a follow-up mechanism.

The open debate will provide an opportunity for Member States to continue to discuss the establishment of a mechanism to demonstrate the Security Council commitment to an effective follow-up of its referrals to the Court, including by considering whether the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals should be tasked with dealing with issues pertaining to Court referrals or establishing a specific subsidiary body.

3. Format

The meeting will be held on Thursday, 23 October 2014, at 10 a.m., in an open debate format, in order to allow Member States to share their views on matters pertaining to the agenda item under consideration.

As an innovation compared to the open debates held in previous years, participants in the meeting will be briefed by the Ombudsperson of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, Kimberly Prost, and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda.

The Ombudsperson will be invited to brief the Council on the counter-terrorism regime under her mandate and due process of law and to make recommendations for further enhancing the effectiveness of the regime.

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court will be invited to focus her presentation on the value of strengthened cooperation between the Security Council and the Court, in particular with regard to the follow-up of referrals, in pursuance of the shared aim of combating impunity for heinous crimes.

United Nations

S/PV.7285 (Resumption 1)



Security Council

Sixty-ninth year

Provisional

7285th meeting
 Thursday, 23 October 2014, 3 p.m.
 New York

<i>President:</i>	Mrs. Perceval/Mr. Oyarzábal/Ms. Millicay	(Argentina)
<i>Members:</i>	Australia	Mr. White
	Chad	Mr. Gombo
	Chile	Mr. Llanos
	China	Mr. Xu Zhongsheng
	France	Mrs. Le Fraper du Hellen
	Jordan	Ms. Al-Hadid
	Lithuania	Mr. Špokauskas
	Luxembourg	Ms. Lucas
	Nigeria	Mr. Haidara
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Park Yong Min
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sergeev
	Rwanda	Mr. Nkerabigwi
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . .	Mr. Meek
	United States of America	Mr. Simonoff

Agenda

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2010/507)

Security Council working methods

Letter dated 8 October 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2014/725)

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In that regard, we reiterate our belief that the best way to fill that gap is to have an appropriate forum to discuss all aspects of the relationship between the two bodies. We believe that, first, because of the large number of referrals to the Court in the Council's work, which shows a clear development in its approach towards the Court, The second reason is because the ICC deals with complex situations, in which the Security Council seeks to achieve similar goals. Several arrest warrants have been issued against individuals responsible for atrocities committed during some of the worst conflicts on the Council's agenda. The third reason is because the Council must exercise its powers of referral and postponement in an effective and responsible way.

When the Council refers a situation to the Court, it must therefore be ready for the Court to effectively fulfil its mandate. When the rule of law is not respected and the Council does not prevent such a breach, the rule of law is violated. The reluctance of the Council to take further action or to follow up on matters before the Court, limiting itself to receiving periodic reports from the Prosecutor on specific country situations, shows its indifference not only to upholding the rule of law and to guaranteeing accountability in general, but also, in particular, to ensuring the effective implementation of its own decisions.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

Mr. Patriota (Brazil): Let me thank you, Madam President, for having convened this open debate on the working methods of the Security Council. I wish to congratulate Argentina on its leadership in the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. I also wish to thank Ms. Kimberley Prost for her briefing and Ms. Fatou Bensouda for her briefing and her presence.

The concept paper (S/2014/725, annex) that guides our discussion today highlights some important issues related to the Council's work, in particular due process, targeted sanctions and the referral of cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Brazilian Government is of the view that sanctions regimes must always comply with the highest standards of human rights and international law.

In that sense, we note with appreciation the work carried out by the Ombudsperson of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and

entities, which has proved to be a valuable asset to increase fairness and transparency in the consideration of delisting requests. We encourage the Security Council to continue studying ways to strengthen due process within sanctions regimes, including through the extension of the Ombudsperson mechanism to other sanctions committees.

The appointment of the Ombudsperson is certainly a step in the right direction, but much more remains to be done with regard to the promotion of human rights, due process and international law in the context of the sanctions regimes. In improving the work of those committees, one must, however, bear in mind that sanctions are simply a tool at the disposal of the Security Council to give effect to its decisions.

This month marks the tenth anniversary of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court. The pursuit of international justice and the achievement of lasting peace and security are common objectives that mutually reinforce each other. Both the Court and the Security Council have pivotal, albeit different, roles in pursuing those objectives and striking the right balance between peace and justice, accountability and reconciliation. That is valid both for referrals and non-referrals of situations, where the same rules and principles should apply equally to all, thus avoiding double standards and selectivity.

Another issue of concern relates to the costs involved in referrals. We reiterate our call for the implementation of article 115 (b) of the Rome Statute in relation to the financial burden of referrals. The expenses of the Court relating to referrals by the Security Council must be met by funds of the United Nations, not fall just upon the parties to the Rome Statute. The Court will only be strong based on the support it receives, not only from States parties, but also from the United Nations. We ensure that the cooperation between the Court and the United Nations goes beyond rhetoric and finds its concrete implementation in the funding of referrals.

The Security Council acts on behalf of the 193 States Members of the United Nations, and it is therefore of utmost importance to ensure that that body be more transparent and more accountable to the broader membership. In a sense, Brazil has long advocated that the Council should carry out its work, as often as possible, in an open and public manner. Brazil believes that this organ should also consider new ways to improve the participation of troop-contributing

countries, regional and subregional organizations, countries hosting peacekeeping operations and other relevant actors in its decision-making process.

It is almost imperative to improve communication and dialogue between the Security Council and other United Nations bodies. Closer cooperation is needed, not only with the General Assembly regarding, for instance, the issue of Security Council's encroachment on the General Assembly's prerogatives, but also with the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). We must ensure that the process of reviewing the peacebuilding architecture in 2015 will allow the Council to have a better understanding of the advisory, early warning and preventive roles that the PBC can play, and is playing.

The President returned to the Chair.

We encourage the Council to dedicate more of its time and efforts to preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter. I would like to commend Argentina for its work as Chair of the Informal Working Group on the Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. The adoption over the past 14 months of six notes concerning the Security Council's working methods is evidence of that country's engagement in promoting a more effective, accessible Council. Brazil fully shares that commitment.

It is necessary to recognize that there is a limit to what working methods can do for the Council. Changes in working methods alone will not provide the Security Council with the tools needed to adequately address contemporary challenges. Some of the shortcomings in the working methods of the Security Council can only be corrected in the framework of a comprehensive reform of that body. Initiatives aimed at achieving a more accountable and transparent Council are more likely to prosper in an expanded and more inclusive Council with new permanent and non-permanent members, a Council reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century and committed to fresh and more participatory working methods.

In concluding, I invite us all to take the opportunity provided by the seventieth anniversary of the Organization next year to finally achieve a concrete outcome to the long overdue reform process of the Council. By September next year, let us fulfil the mandate extended by our heads of State and Government

at the 2005 Summit, when they unanimously called for an early reform of the Security Council.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Mr. Thöresson (Sweden): Today I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and my own country, Sweden. Let me first of all thank you, Madam President, for organizing today's debate. As Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, Argentina has made important contributions to improving the working methods of the Security Council. We hope that your successor as Chair will be equally diligent.

Let me also thank the two briefers from this morning, Ombudsperson Kimberly Prost, and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, for their presentations and tireless efforts.

Let me start by addressing the two subject areas that are the focus of the excellent concept paper (S/2014/725, annex) on enhancing due process in sanctions regimes and the follow-up to Security Council referrals to the ICC.

The Nordic countries welcome this opportunity to take stock of the situation concerning listing and de-listing. A gradual approach by the Council has made steady advances possible for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, as most recently witnessed by some further improvements made in resolution 2161 (2014) and usefully discussed in the Ombudsperson's eighth report (S/2014/553). However, we urge the Council to actively consider how similar due process guarantees could be introduced into other sanctions regimes. The informal group of like-minded countries has repeatedly emphasized the importance of taking such a broader perspective. Here as well, a gradual approach would yield the best results.

The Nordic countries commend the important and persistent work of the Office of the ICC Prosecutor aimed at developing the cooperation between the ICC and the Security Council on effective follow-up to referred situations. As has also been noted in the concept paper, the fulfilment of the mandate of the Court is dependent upon full cooperation by States. The ultimate aim of a referral by the Council is in jeopardy if States fail to cooperate without the Council taking



General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

Official Records

49th plenary meeting
Wednesday, 12 November 2014, 10 a.m.
New York

President: Mr. Kutesa (Uganda)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

together we can make progress on this critical undertaking.

Agenda item 119

Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

Since the founding of the Organization nearly 70 years ago, the world has undergone profound change. The challenges we face have become more complex given the wide range of new and emerging threats to international peace and security. We therefore need to reform the Security Council, in particular to make it more representative, effective and efficient. Indeed, our Organization should continue to adapt to the constructs and exigencies of our present-day world in order to be effective and relevant. It is therefore in the best interests of all Member States to take the necessary steps to reform the Security Council so as to preserve its fundamental role in the maintenance of international peace and security for generations to come.

The President: Members will recall that one of the priorities I have set for this session is advancing the revitalization of the General Assembly and the reform of the Security Council. As members well know, the road towards the reform of the Security Council has thus far been a long and winding journey. At the 2005 World Summit, leaders expressed support for reform of the Council

“in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions” (resolution 60/1, para. 153).

As the reform discussions move forward, it is important to ensure that they are not a mere repetition of previously stated positions — a dynamic that has characterized the intergovernmental negotiation process in the past. What is now required is a firm commitment to moving the process to text-based negotiation on all clusters. The mandate for negotiations firmly belongs to all the Member States. It is my hope that today’s debate will serve as a useful foundation for future reform and galvanize productive negotiations over the coming months.

At the start of this year’s session, more than 100 leaders expressed concern at the lack of progress in the negotiations on Security Council reform 10 years since the World Summit. We therefore need to renew the commitment of all Member States to the reform agenda and the next phase of the intergovernmental negotiations. Above all, we must undertake this endeavour in a steadfast state of compromise. I am optimistic that today’s debate will provide a clearer picture of the challenges we have to surmount and the opportunities that we must then harness to advance the reform process. Although the task may seem daunting,

I wish to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan, for spearheading the intergovernmental negotiations for the past years. As representatives

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representative of twenty-first-century realities, more efficient and transparent in its work, and accountable to the general membership of the United Nations.

Mr. Patriota (Brazil): I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Four (G4) countries: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.

I would like to start by thanking you, Sir, for your letter of 10 November, in which you announced the appointment of the Permanent Representative of Jamaica, Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, as the new Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations. Let me assure Ambassador Rattray that the G4 is encouraged by his appointment and is committed to working closely with him with a view to achieving the much-needed and long-awaited reform of the Security Council. Allow me to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Zahir Tanin once more for his invaluable work and tireless efforts during the past five years to move that process forward.

I would also like to commend you, Mr. President, for your strong commitment to the cause of Security Council reform, which is undoubtedly very clear after less than two months in office. In your capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, you have been following this issue very closely for a long time, having personally participated in the adoption of the Ezulwini Consensus. You therefore understand more than anyone else the urgency of the matter.

The sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly brought important developments to the intergovernmental process. Former Assembly President John Ashe endorsed the non-paper produced by his Advisory Group, which represents a neutral and objective summary of the main positions expressed over the past 20 years and is now a widely recognized tool to help frame our discussions. When we went through another series of meetings convened by Ambassador Tanin, based on the five clusters established by decision 62/557, some convergences were clearly identified, especially with respect to the existence of a clear majority in favour of expanding both categories of membership.

In his assessment of the current state of play, circulated to the membership on 9 July, Ambassador Tanin also recognized the proactive tone and momentum achieved at the most recent session and, looking ahead, he pointed out that a text-based discussion remains the logical evolution for this process. That is why the G4

believes it is imperative to start the first meeting of the next round of the intergovernmental negotiations with a text on the table. We cannot allow the next round of the intergovernmental process to be yet another merry-go-round.

As for those who state that there must be a prior consensus before presenting the intergovernmental negotiations with a working document, let me point out that such a requirement has no precedent in any other United Nations process. In fact, that line of thought could actually be considered anti-United Nations. As a matter of fact, in his statement delivered at the meeting on the roll-over decision held on 8 September, former President Ashe stressed that a negotiating text needs sufficiently wide but not necessarily universal agreement. I assure the Assembly that the G4 remains ready to start real negotiations on Security Council reform at any time. Negotiations, however, do not happen in a vacuum. Relying on your authority and mandate as President of this body, Sir, we therefore ask you to empower the new Chair by yourself putting forward a negotiating text that does not prejudice any positions or outcomes.

There is a prevailing view among Member States and among civil society that the Security Council is not capable of responding satisfactorily to specific crises around the world. One can clearly identify a growing sense of frustration arising from the paralysis in the efforts to reform it. During the last general debate, over 100 delegations stressed the need for reform.

Let us recall that 2015 will mark 50 years since the first and only time that the Security Council was reformed, 15 years since the Millennium Summit and 10 years since the 2005 World Summit, when world leaders unanimously called for early reform of the Security Council. If we leave things as they are, we run the risk of bringing discredit and erosion of authority to the United Nations in a core area of its mandate. It is time to fulfil the mandate given to us by our Heads of State and Government — a call that was reiterated by the Foreign Ministers of the G4 at their most recent meeting, held in New York on 26 September. As the former Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations pointed out in his aforementioned assessment, the seventieth anniversary of the Organization in 2015 will provide a “tremendous opportunity” for achieving the much needed reform. The G4, in close cooperation with the rest of the membership, will keep working towards that goal and believes it is achievable.

Mr. González de Linares Palou (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for the interest you have shown in working closely with all the States Members of the United Nations on the issue of Security Council reform.

We congratulate Ambassador Rattray warmly on his appointment and wish him every success in his important task. He can count on Spain's full support. I would also like to express our deep gratitude to his predecessor, Ambassador Tanin, for his work, tireless efforts and patience during his term.

We subscribe fully to the statement delivered on behalf of Uniting for Consensus by the Permanent Representative of Italy and would like to make a few additional remarks.

After working for a long time on the process of reforming the Security Council — in my case, since 1993 — my country has learned that our strength comes from unity, while divisive approaches and actions only cause delays and complicate reform even further. As States Members of the United Nations, we all share the goal of creating a more representative, accountable, effective and democratic Security Council, and to achieve it we must be willing to consider new ideas and build bridges between the various groups and positions. The Security Council reform process resembles the construction of a big building. It needs a good, solid foundation. If it uses only part of that foundation, the building cannot be built, and if it is built, it will collapse.

We are eager to see a modern version of the Security Council that is more representative and influential, and in particular a place where African and small States can make their voices heard. Spain believes that increasing the Council's membership will help it be more representative, but much more than that is needed. It is also essential that we increase every Member State's chances of having a seat on the Council from time to time. And the best way to achieve that goal is by increasing the number of elected seats, which would also make the Security Council more democratic and accountable to all the Member States of this Organization. That does not mean that new permanent seats should be created, since we believe that will not make the Council more representative. On the contrary, we would be creating a more exclusive Council rather than a more inclusive one, turning our backs on the need for greater democracy and accountability in the Council.

We need a more accountable and effective Council. Those features go hand in hand. Spain supports the idea of allowing Member States that wish to make a significant contribution to the Council's work to serve on it more often and for longer periods of time. Spain believes in a Security Council that is based on merit, not privilege. My country supports the Uniting for Consensus proposal to create seats for longer terms with the possibility of immediate re-election. That formula, we believe, would enable States with the desire and ability to contribute more to the Council's work to extend their service on it.

In conclusion, Spain wishes to reiterate its willingness to collaborate with other groups and States Members of the United Nations to reach the best possible solution for achieving a more representative, accountable, effective and democratic Security Council.

Mr. Estreme (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of my delegation, I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting.

I would like to express Argentina's support for the statement delivered by the representative of Italy on behalf of Uniting for Consensus. I would also like to offer our thanks to Ambassador Zahir Tanin of Afghanistan for his work in the past few years leading the intergovernmental negotiations, and to warmly welcome and congratulate Ambassador Courtenay Rattray of Jamaica on his appointment to the position. He can count on the Argentine delegation's full cooperation and constructive efforts in his work as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations.

As others have pointed out, the process of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform has been framed by the content of resolutions 48/26 and 53/30 and decision 62/557. The discussions have enabled us to exhaustively analyse the five main issues: membership categories, the veto question, regional representation, the size and working methods of an expanded Security Council, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. Those issues are interrelated and cannot be tackled separately, since they are all parts of a single package.

The areas of convergence are well known. The first, dearest and most basic is the absolute necessity of reforming the Security Council and ending the status quo. An unreformed Council is obsolete. Its loss of legitimacy, effectiveness and relevance affects the entire Organization. There are other areas of convergence,

of course, with the Council's working methods being a clear example that we must work to improve and make more transparent. Another is the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. And to a lesser extent, there is also convergence on the number of members on an expanded Council. But none of those three areas presents differences that are insoluble or insurmountable. At the same time, the intergovernmental negotiations process has identified other aspects on which we have divergent positions, in particular on the membership categories and the issue of the veto.

With respect to the first issue — the categories of membership — my country believes that the reform should not allow for new permanent members or create exclusive categories. We are of the view that this type of seat, that is to say permanent seats, does not necessarily guarantee greater participation by those who at present are not represented in the Council. At the same time, we believe that any formula must include the concept of a legitimate democratic and representative process, with elections as a fundamental element.

The phase now beginning is positive. It will enable us to pragmatically and rationally explore the possibilities afforded us by the so-called intermediary solution. In so doing, we will achieve a compromise that satisfies all Member States, respecting the principles of transparency, good faith, mutual respect, openness and inclusiveness.

With regard to the issue of the veto, since the 1945 negotiations at the San Francisco Conference and with greater emphasis at the first session of the General Assembly, in October 1946, and the second session, in 1947, Argentina established a very firm position against the veto. There is no doubt as to our position. In the years that followed, my delegation reiterated that same position repeatedly. But at the same time, we believe that, given the fact that eliminating the veto is not possible at this point, formulas that would seek to perpetuate it or extend it to new members should not be accepted.

We must reach a comprehensive solution, not by phases or in an incomplete manner. As I said earlier, all the issues are linked and cannot be dealt with separately. We all know that in any negotiating process, intransigent positions do not lead to any result. We have the opportunity to overcome the impasse and the lack of progress. We call on all delegations to follow

the example of *Uniting for Consensus*, as expressed by the representative of Italy this morning, to show flexibility and readiness to work on innovative and consistent formulas that will ensure a more democratic presence in the Council, based on rotation among the non-permanent members, and to reformulate the working methods so that the Council can be more democratic, fair and transparent.

In closing, my delegation wishes to once again reiterate the Argentine Government's intention to compromise, to remain open to any approach that can bring positions closer together and that can bring about the much-needed reform of the Security Council. My country is confident that under your leadership, Mr. President, and that of Ambassador Rattray, we can take the first steps on the path to agreement.

Mr. Alday González (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this debate on the reform of the Security Council and for your decision to separate this discussion from that on the Council's annual report to the General Assembly. They are issues that deserve their own space and separate discussions.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Italy on behalf of *Uniting for Consensus*.

My delegation welcomes the new facilitator of the intergovernmental negotiations, Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, and extends to him its support and willingness to work towards our common goal — an outcome that is acceptable to all. We also thank Ambassador Tanin for his leadership in this process over the past five years.

Over 20 years of discussions, we have found that the most important quality for a facilitator on this issue is the ability to listen to the positions of Member States with impartiality, transparency and objectivity, and on that basis determine the way that will allow for agreement to be reached on a solution that has the widest possible support. The facilitator also needs flexibility on the part of States to move towards that common goal. Without flexibility or willingness to compromise, the facilitator's room to manoeuvre is reduced to a minimum. In such a scenario, we cannot wait for the person directing the process to interpret the various positions or, worse, discard or minimize proposals submitted by delegations.

Listening to the Member States does not mean seeking to impose summary documents with artificial

United Nations

A/69/PV.58



General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

58th plenary meeting
Friday, 21 November 2014, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

President: Mr. Kutesa (Uganda)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Agenda item 110

Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations

Note by the Secretary-General (A/69/300)

The President: As members are aware, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, and with the consent of the Security Council, the Secretary-General is mandated to notify the General Assembly of matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security that are being dealt with by the Security Council and of matters with which the Council has ceased to deal. In that connection, the General Assembly has before it a note by the Secretary-General issued as document A/69/300.

May I take it that the Assembly takes note of that document?

It was so decided.

The President: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 110?

It was so decided.

Agenda item 28

Report of the Security Council

Report of the Security Council (A/69/2)

The President: I now give the floor to the President of the Security Council, His Excellency Mr. Gary Quinlan, to introduce the report of the Council.

Mr. Quinlan (Australia): Let me begin by congratulating you, Sir, on behalf of all the members of the Security Council, on your election as President of the General Assembly. I thank you for arranging today's meeting.

As the President of the Security Council for the month of November, it is my honour to introduce the annual report of the Council (A/69/2), which covers the period from 1 August 2013 to 31 July 2014.

The Charter of the United Nations entrusts the Security Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Over the past year, with the support of the full membership of the United Nations, the Security Council has discharged its responsibilities by supporting the peaceful resolution of conflicts and undertaking a range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.

During the reporting period, the Security Council held 238 formal meetings, of which 218 were public. The Security Council adopted 55 resolutions and 26 presidential statements, while also issuing 113 statements to the press.

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Mr. Patriota (Brazil): I thank you, Sir, for organizing this debate. I would also like to thank the Permanent Representative of Australia and President of the Security Council for the month of November, Ambassador Gary Quinlan, for presenting the annual report of the Security Council (A/69/2), which covers a period of intense activity in the domain of international peace and security.

The transparency and accountability of the Security Council to the general membership is a matter to which Brazil ascribes great importance. We therefore believe that the annual report, by providing a comprehensive account of the Council's activities to the General Assembly, represents an important tool for strengthening the Council's accountability vis-à-vis the 178 Member States that do not regularly take part in its deliberations.

We have also long been supportive of improvements in the Council's working methods aimed at making it less opaque and more democratic. The report makes it clear that attempts continue to be made to reach out to the wider membership, and we note with satisfaction the number of public meetings, open debates, wrap-up sessions and consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries being held. However, it is essential to deepen and broaden that trend in order for Council decisions to be more effective and legitimate.

During the period covered by the report, the situation in the Middle East once again deteriorated amid increasing tensions and threats to international peace and security in various parts of the region. After almost four years of conflict, fighting in Syria has created a perverse combination of death, suffering and destruction and has resulted in millions of internally displaced persons and refugees. As the situation on the ground further deteriorates, the Council's chronic inability to act promptly and substantively is seen by many as an illustration of a worrisome pattern of dysfunctionality.

It took 15 months for the Council to endorse the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), which had been approved by consensus in June 2012, and has since been considered to be the most rational road map for a political settlement of the crisis in Syria. Similar delays were involved in the adoption of resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014), which allowed for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the civilian population.

Despite their irrefutable importance, those resolutions fell short of dealing with some of the most critical aspects of the Syrian conflict. While the political process remains paralysed and human rights violations are relentlessly being committed, the flow of weapons to all belligerent parties continues, resulting in more violence, instability and suffering. In other words, the militarization of the conflict proceeds with the tacit, or not so tacit, approval of Council members. How long will it take for the Security Council to adopt a common position against the continuing militarization of the crisis?

In Iraq we are also witnessing a severe deterioration in the security and humanitarian situations, with the expansion of extremism and the spread of terrorist activities. The crisis is a stark reminder of the unpredictable consequences of unilateral actions, such as those undertaken in 2003. It is our duty to support Iraq in its efforts to overcome the crisis and combat terrorism in a way that is fully and strictly compatible with the Charter of the United Nations.

The brief hope that emerged from the resumption of direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians in July 2013 quickly dispelled, owing to the parties' failure to deal with the essential elements of the conflict. As a result, the international community witnessed yet another devastating war in Gaza, the third in five years. The conflict not only undermined the prospects for talks, but also fed the cycle of violence and left an intolerable legacy of civilian deaths, destruction and displacement.

Let us not forget that the protection of civilians must be implemented in a universal and non-selective manner. The commendable emphasis placed by the Security Council on the protection of civilians when dealing with other items on its agenda cannot be sidestepped when it comes to the responsibility to protect the Palestinian people.

While the Security Council held a significant number of meetings on the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, its deliberations have had little influence on the ground. Had its past resolutions on the matter been fully implemented, illegal unilateral actions might not have reigned with impunity, the situation might not have become so tragic and the gap between the parties might not have grown so wide. Brazil expects the Council to play a leading role on that issue, actively supporting and steering the peace

process, while positioning itself firmly against the status quo.

As the recent deterioration in Jerusalem and elsewhere shows, the current situation is neither sustainable nor acceptable. Brazil condemns all acts of terrorism, including the attack that took place on 18 November in a synagogue in West Jerusalem, which claimed the lives of five Israelis and left eight people injured. We firmly believe that only through the implementation of the two-State solution will Israel and Palestine be able to achieve durable peace and security and put an end to the suffering of the civilian population on both sides.

I would also like to address the issue of the relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC), especially the referral and deferral mechanisms. The Security Council should strive to preserve a balance between, on the one hand, upholding the instruments of international criminal justice, such as the ICC Statute, while, on the other, responding with wisdom to requests that are legally sound and meet with wide political support.

Brazil is convinced that there is institutional space to defuse polarization, ensure respect for international law and the rule of law and address the legitimate questions being raised by regional groups. In that context, the fact that in November 2013 the Security Council failed to approve the deferrals of the Kenyan cases proved to be an avoidable misstep. That draft resolution, which would not have precluded the proceedings but just postponed them, could have represented a confidence-building manifestation, and in that sense was a missed opportunity (see S/PV.7060).

On a more positive note, let me refer briefly to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where the Security Council, working in partnership with the United Nations team on the ground under the leadership of former Special Representative of the Secretary-General José Ramos-Horta and with the close attention of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), contributed to the restoration of constitutional order. As a close friend of Guinea-Bissau, Brazil is encouraged to witness the full re-engagement of international partners with the country, which became clear at meetings held in New York this week. We would like, once again, to express our support for the efforts that are being undertaken by the new authorities with a view to ensuring the stability, development, institutional progress and prosperity of Bissau-Guineans.

As I have previously mentioned to the Council in my capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, I believe that Guinea-Bissau provides us with a good example of how constructive and complementary the interactions between the Security Council and the PBC can be. That relationship is certainly worth strengthening in order for the Council to better take advantage of the advisory and early-warning roles that the PBC can and does play.

We are also pleased to note that Latin America and the Caribbean can increasingly be portrayed as an example of peace, sustainable development and corporation — a region that fully engages with the multilateral system of collective security. The situation in Haiti — the only item relating to the region that is inscribed on the agenda of the Security Council — continues to evolve positively, as rightly indicated in the Council's annual report and the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2014/617). We hope that, a year from now, when we meet again to discuss the next annual report of the Security Council, we will be able to institute a substantial drawdown in the international military presence in that country within our sights.

Finally, let me point out that one cannot discuss the work undertaken by the Security Council without mentioning the growing frustration among Member States and civil society with the absence of a satisfactory answer from the Council in response to some specific crises around the world, such as the situations in Syria, Ukraine and Palestine. The task of reforming the structures of the Council remains urgent. As we approach the watershed year of 2015, Brazil wishes to call once again on Member States to embrace the opportunity provided by the seventieth anniversary of the Organization to finally adapt the Security Council to the geopolitical realities of twenty-first century, making it a more legitimate and representative body that is capable of addressing contemporary challenges.

Before concluding, let me refer briefly to the statement delivered by the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, and signal our interest in further pursuing some of the suggestions regarding the way the Council's annual report could be drafted, the nature of its content and how to improve its discussion in the General Assembly.

Mr. Aboulatta (Egypt): At the outset, I wish to thank you, Sir, for having convened this important