

Deconstructing Marxism for Theory of International Relations: A Marxist, International Analysis of the Chinese State

Abstract:

The objective of this thesis is to determine the possibility of developing a theory of International Relations based on the Marxist concept of the State. Marxism has long remained on the sidelines of theory of International Relations, with most of the approaches stemming from a proliferation of various interpretations of Marxism. Meanwhile, the most prominent approaches are derived from isolation of products from workers, as illustrated by Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory. By comparison this study attempts to assess the possibility of maintaining the conditions of the class struggle and its relation to the state in understanding the international environment. In order to do so I initially decide that the most effective manner to determine this is through evaluating whether the basic premises of class and state in Marxism are compatible with international analysis. This involves two operations: 1) Deconstructing class and state, as well as their relation, to the simplest Marxist interpretation. 2) Employing the terms in an analysis of an actual state, in order to determine if the resulting Marxist state interpretation can be operationalized as an actor in inter-state relations.

In terms of the former I hinge the basic relationship between state and class on the Marxist thesis stating that the organization of the state is a crystallization of the class rule of the society in which the state is embedded. Conjunctively I attempt to separate normative concepts inscribed in class and state, effectively aligning it with a Marxist model of state-analysis developed by Göran Therborn. I designate the Chinese state as the target of analysis on the basis of its *sui generis* nature. During the course of the analysis I find that the Chinese state harbors many ideals and employs a proliferation of political technology, which is only partially explained through the relationship between class and state. On the basis of these findings, I denounce the possibility of erecting a theory of International Relations on the basis of the Marxist concept of the state. I conclusively attribute this to three features: problems haunting patchwork approaches, theoreticism in Marxism, and cluttering of structures and relations. These findings lend credence to a narrow strand of Marxism which assesses that there can be no Marxist theory of the state in general, since the Marxist definitions of class and state are inherently intertwined with the capitalist mode of production.

Author: Jess Nerth Trolle Schytter

Supervisor: Søren Dosenrode

Number of Characters: 167,356

European Studies/Chinese Area Studies

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	4
1.1 Foreword	4
1.2 Problem of Interest.....	5
1.3 On the Problem Formulation.....	6
Chapter 2: Theory.....	7
2.1 Marxism in International Relations	7
2.2 The Relationship between the State and Class Rule	10
2.3 Historical Materialism.....	11
2.4 Infrastructure and Superstructure	13
2.5 The Resulting Thesis	17
2.6 Problem of Specification.....	17
2.7 Definitions of Key Terms.....	19
2.7.1 Class	19
2.7.2 The State.....	20
Chapter 3: Methodology	22
3.1 The Deviant Case Study	22
3.1.1 The Chinese State as a Case	23
3.2 Therborn’s Analytical Model	24
3.3 Conditions of Therborn’s Analytical Model.....	27
3.4 The European Influence.....	29
3.5 The Method in Summary.....	30
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Chinese State.....	32
4.1 Input Mechanisms	32
4.1.1 Principles Regulating the Type of Task Dealt with by the State	32
4.1.2 Criteria of Personnel Recruitment to the State Apparatuses.....	33
4.1.3 Modes of Securing State Revenue.....	34
4.2 Processes of Transformation.....	35
4.2.1 Modes of Decision-Making and Handling of Tasks.....	35
4.2.2 Patterning of Organizational Positions and of Relations among their Incumbents	36
4.2.3 Modes of Allocation and Utilization of Material Resources.....	36

4.3 Output Mechanisms	37
4.3.1 Patterning of Decisions and Practices of the State towards Other States	37
4.3.2 Patterning of Decisions and Practices of the State towards the Society which it is Part.....	38
4.3.3 Patterning of Relations of the State Personnel with the Personnel of Other States	39
4.3.4 Patterning of Relations of the State Personnel with the Members of the Same Society	40
4.4.5 Modes of Outflow of Material Resources from the State	41
4.4 Principles Determining Responses to the International Environment.....	42
Chapter 5: Discussion of Results.....	45
5.1 The Analysis in Retrospect.....	45
5.1.1 Inputs.....	45
5.1.2 Processes of Transformation	45
5.1.3 Outputs.....	46
5.1.4 The European Variable	46
5.1.5 The Organization of the State and its Technology	47
5.2 Marxist State Analysis in IR Theory	47
5.2.1 Criticisms	47
5.2.2 The Marxist Thesis.....	49
Conclusion	50
Bibliography.....	52
Appendix item A: NPC Composition, 2003	55
Appendix item B: Government Revenue Sources	56
Appendix Item C: Decentralized Policy Process	57
Appendix Item D-1: Type of Government Control	58
Appendix Item D-2: Type of Social Organization.....	61
Appendix Item D-3: Relationship Between Control (C-1) and Organization (C-2)	62
Appendix Item E: Government Expenditure	63

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Foreword

The dissertation at hand spawned from several distinct ideas and ponderings, a few of which have been made pivotal to the entire process, and some which have taken a more passive, secondary role. The very central question, as we shall soon see, is a specification of a broader question which could roughly be formulated as such: “Did Marx achieve any useful insights for the field of International Relations?” To accompany such, one would naturally have to question; ‘Have such insights been satisfactorily utilized in theory of International Relations?’, ‘What does it mean to be a Marxist? – How far can the concept be deconstructed before we ought to scrap it and start over?’, and, of course, ‘Do the basic premises of Marxism still hold any explanatory value in contemporary society?’

Undoubtedly, some of the questions are simple, and rather than list them, I’ve employed them sometimes as a helpful structure, a few times it has caused me to swiftly explicate on a matter tangentially related, and some questions I’ve had to surrender to focus on the matter at hand. Other questions are less simple, namely, what it means to be a Marxist, which is not something currently enjoying intellectual agreement despite Lenin’s blunt claim:

“A Marxist is solely someone who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat [...] This is the touchstone on which the real understanding and recognition of Marxism should be tested!” (Lenin 1964:412)

But the term ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ has been waning since the end of the Cold War and has all but disappeared. Is it time to revive the concept? Probably not; the terms ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletariat’ has vanished from common and political discourse; the Communist parties of EU have either disbanded, reformed into liberal Socialists, or remained as radicalized, unpopular parties. Despite this, I wonder if there may yet remain an essence of Marxism, which contains valuable scientific and political insights even in contemporary society.

The Freudo-Marxists of the Frankfurt school (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, etc.) managed to reinvigorate Marxism, combined with Freud’s meta-psychology, to launch one last critique of Capitalism and its neo-liberal guise. But as the fields of psychology and sociology began to outpace their foundations, the insights of Freud were deemed irrelevant in the face of neuro-psychology, while the Marxist dialectic method was obsoleted in the face of statistical possibilities in social sciences. The revival was a short-lived one, yet a thorn in the side remains, and it sporadically appears – sometimes from French circles, sometimes in German academia – whenever critiques against fundamental discrepancies or contradictions in neo-liberalist societies appear, they often employ some select aspect of Marx or Marxist tradition.

As such, I wonder if it may yet be possible to deconstruct Marxism, into a core of theoretical and analytical insights which we might beneficially utilize in contemporary societies and their interplay. But to undertake such an enormous task satisfactorily within the time and space afforded seems almost impossible. Instead, I’ve opted to begin with what I believe to be of critical importance; testing the theses, formulated by Marx over a century ago, in modern societies. If we are to believe that there may yet be something of use in Marx’s writings, certainly we have to believe that the basic premises of Marxism can still be applied to modern societies.

1.2 Problem of Interest

Having indicated that the central premise at hand is to contest one or several fundamental theses of Marxism, we still have to establish how the basic premises of Marxism are connected to International Relations. Thoroughly speaking, this will be elaborated all throughout the entirety of the second chapter, but for the sake of the reader, I wish to superficially establish some basic premises and boundaries before they reveal themselves during the course of the two ensuing chapters.

First and foremost, I will be engaging with only one basic thesis of Marx, which Therborn has formulated elegantly as such: “[...] *the very form of organization of the state is a materialization of a particular mode of class rule.*” (Therborn 1978:25). What exactly this entails will be explored at length, but what we can preliminarily establish, is that a particular kind of network of social relations in a society¹ ought to produce a similar kind of network of social relations within the state and its connected organs². We can then extend this notion by hypothesizing that if the organization of the state affects its foreign policy (and why should it not?) then perhaps international relations can be explained through the concept of class. Thus we begin to approach what Marxism may potentially contribute to international relations; a different analytical apparatus pertaining to the state, which produces a different kind of answers than the prevalent models associated with realism, liberalism or constructivism.

As such, I’ve formulated a specific problem, which hopefully indicates both an interest in casting judgment on the foundations of Marxism, while exploring whether there are salvageable aspects of Marxism that may still contribute to our understanding of international relations.

Is it possible to develop a theory of International Relations based on the Marxist concept of the state?

¹ It pertains to a society – as opposed to generally - because class rule corresponds to a country’s organization, and not a universal division of labor. For my definition on class specifically see section 2.7.1.

² For a discussion of the term ‘state’ see section 2.7.2.

1.3 On the Problem Formulation

Although the question pivotal to my inquiry could be satisfactorily phrased as such, it is not without certain qualifications since it is intricately connected to the matter of Marxism in international relations altogether, for which quite a lot could be said. The reasons for these are manifold, and revolve around the fact that Marxism has not been a complete stranger to international relations and is immanently and originally intertwined with state analysis. Yet somehow, a discrepancy arises at a juncture in between, which causes Marxism in international relations to revolve around material or economic concepts³, while Marxist state analysis is primarily utilized in cultural and social research.

I could potentially question *why* I think this discrepancy occurs, but I find it fundamentally more pressing to first find out *if* it is possible to expand the Marxist notions of state and society to account for international influences. As I will attempt to illustrate, the concepts of state and society seem rather fixed in relation to each other in traditional Marxism, because of this, the question above involves a twofold operation: First I need a Marxist model of state analysis which can be expanded to understand the state as part of an international system and not exclusively a function of domestic class relations; second, I have to apply it in order to gauge whether this manner of analysis results in a different type of state actor than other theories of International Relations.

The reason I have to perform the first move is a pretty essential aspect underlying the structure of the dissertation: if the state organization is determined solely through national relations, then all international actors would simply be units of output based on domestic conditions. This is a senseless proposition because inter-state actors have to affect each other for there to be an international field of study to begin with. For this reason a large portion of this dissertation is concerned with trying to establish an international state unit that still relates to class, for it seems to me that if such a task is not possible, then there is no reason to attempt to formulate an international theory based on the Marxist concept of the state at all.

As such, throughout this dissertation it is important to distinguish between the two types of ties to international relations: the influence of international relations upon the organization of the state *vis-à-vis* the application of the organization of the state in international matters. I will reiterate this distinction in section 3.5, ensuing both theory and method, so that we may easily recognize how the two separate entities are intertwined in this particular endeavor.

Before proceeding to explicate on my methodical approach, however, we must embark on a theoretical detour in order to establish *what* basic premise of Marxism we may engage with and subsequently *how* such a task may be conducted. I beg, therefore, the reader's patience, as we revisit concepts of Marxism, before we can integrate practical matters, such as the actual relationship between the EU and China, which also plays a strong role in my evaluation of the possibilities of Marxism in contemporary theory of International Relations.

³ As illustrated by the prevalence of World Systems Theory and Dependency Theory which are both developed on Marxist foundations.

Chapter 2: Theory

Although it may be somewhat unorthodox to incorporate the theory prior to the method, I've opted to reverse the relations to make it more accessible. I've chosen to do so for two reasons: First of all because my approach relies on aspects of Marxism that are different from those of Dependency theory and World Systems Theory, which are likely the most prevalent Marxist-derivative theories in International Relations. This could cause some confusion if reading the method with those theories in mind. Additionally, readers unacquainted with Marxism will be introduced to Marxist terminology before seeing it utilized. Second, the method I'm employing is primarily based on Therborn's model, which is created on the basis of a Marxist thesis, as we shall see, to specifically elucidate the mechanisms that cause the thesis to hold true. For anyone unfamiliar with the thesis the object of interest for the method would be unknown, which I can only presume to make for dreary reading.

As such, in this Chapter I will first provide an overview of Marxism in theory of International Relations. The point of the rest of the chapter, then, becomes a matter of establishing how this approach is unique to the field. In order to accomplish this, I will first summarize some basic premises of Marxism from which I will develop a distinctive approach. The separation from mainstream Marxism in International Relations, if one could so call it, occurs in section 2.4 where I will distinguish myself from component-based approaches. Once this has been settled, I will engage with the issues associated with this approach, and last, establish some working definitions for the method on the basis of my specific approach.

2.1 Marxism in International Relations

While it is indeed part of the point of this dissertation to engage with the possibilities and actualities of Marxism in the field of international relations it would feel crude and incomplete to leave the reader without any notion of the field beforehand. This section does not aspire to exhaust the possibility of Marxism in international relations today, but rather to crudely summarize the theories and attitudes towards Marxism roughly between the 1970's and the time of writing, albeit not chronologically.

One very immediate sentiment in post-millennial texts on contemporary Marxism is how the popular decline of Marxism is in large part attributed to the end of the Cold War (Bidet & Kouvelakis 2008; Rupert and Smith 2002). This is explained at large by reference to the status of Marxism after the fall of the Communist blocs, since the central powers of the Soviet Union and its ilk drew extensively from Marxist social and economic conceptions. As such, they became inextricably linked as if fated to succeed or fail together, despite the fact that the truth-value of Marxism hardly can be dismissed on the basis of the failure of Stalin's dictatorship (Cox 2002:60). It simply reminds us that there continuously exists a gap between theory and praxis, despite our efforts to align the two (Poulantzas 2000:22-23).

Michael Cox (2002) begins with the emphasis on this very connection between historical materialism and the actualities of Socialism after 1989, calling it literally '*nonsense-on-stilts*' to deny the current difficulties of radical theory in general and Marxism in particular, and the downfall of the Soviet bloc (ibid.:59). He also shortly makes reference to Stephen Walt who suggested that Marxism has been replaced by constructivism as the polar opposite of realism and liberalism, which may be a correct assessment, but an unflattering move considering Marx' obsession with the fact that truth must be concrete, which he naturally inherited from Hegel. In order for radicals to justify their continued belief in Marxism certain intellectual moves are necessary: either one has to denounce USSR as the genuine Marxist article; or one has to assess that while

Marxism holds some faults, the downfall of the USSR does not invalidate all Marxist conceptualization and as such we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater; or, last, one can claim that the economic abilities of Socialism are not as strong as they are in Capitalism, and as such, USSR was slowly destabilized by its environment and not as a function of any internal policy (ibid.:59-60). These are not at all mutually exclusive, and the specific content of the argument may vary depending on the context it is relevant to.

While Cox proceeds to talk about contradictions in Capitalism and US hegemony, which bears only tangent relevance here, the attitude he seems to profess revolves around the political inability of radical theory. Indeed, the very last sentence labels radical theoreticians as *'well-informed rebels without a political cause'* (ibid.:71), which in conjunction with the rest of the article leaves the impression that the problem lies not with Marxist theory, but with its modern representatives. A last section of interest is the matter of how radicals handle the topic of globalization, from which three relevant responses seem to emerge: The first claims that there is nothing new about globalization at all, theoretically speaking Marx recognized that a feature of Capitalism was interdependence; this acknowledgement led to dependency theory and likewise to Trotsky's criticism of Stalin's belief that a Socialist nation could be erected amidst a Capitalist global economy (ibid.:64). A second stance claims that globalization is a poor conceptualization of what is actually happening, 'global' economy is a misnomer because it is dominated by specific countries which determine the flow of the rest, and as such the international system is still very much susceptible to control policies, at least by the dominating countries (ibid.:65). The third option is a very traditional line of thought, which aggressively engages with the inhumanities of market domination; growing inequality, increasing consumption, wasting resources at accelerating rates, etc. The result of which is global polarization which favors the powerful and the rich and enables them to perpetuate the conditions which favor them (ibid.).

A different perspective emerges from the writings of André Tosel (2008), who also subscribes to the link between the end of the Soviet Union and the end of the line for Marxism. However, it is important to note, that Tosel is not strictly writing about Marxism in international relations, but rather focuses on Marxism's decline from the 1970's and the removal of philosophy from the political sphere. Since he provides an excellent and concise review of the last stand of Marxism in general, I will not attempt to rephrase it:

*"The oeuvre of the great heretics and Communist philosophers experienced a final, transient blaze. György Lukács (1885–1971) contributed his last great work, *Zür Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Sein* (1971–3), while Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) published *Atheismus im Christentum* (1968), *Das Materialismus Problem. Seine Geschichte und Substanz* (1968), and *Experimentum Mundi* (1975). In Italy, publication of the original edition of the *Quaderni del carcere* (1975) of Antonio Gramsci facilitated a better appreciation of the philosophy of praxis, by differentiating it from the interpretation offered by Palmiro Togliatti (leader of the Italian Communist Party), and made it possible to assess its potential one last time. In France, Louis Althusser (1918–90) made the debate on a new extension of the materialist science of history and its forms a major element in the last international philosophico-political discussion of Marxism, with *Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants* and *Éléments d'autocritique*, both published in 1974. In fact, the shadow of 1968 held out the prospect of going beyond the old orthodoxy and even allowed for hopes that the project of an escape from Stalinism from the Left might be resumed, at a time when the issue of a revolutionary reformism centred on the rise of instances of radical democratisation was being posed."* (Tosel 2008:40)

Following this, several of the European Communist parties either disbanded or reformed to democratic leftist parties (ibid.). Tosel sees radical research continued, and, just like Cox above, recognizes a dissolving link between the research and its political ties; not simply in the political sphere, but also in the absence of a clearly defined working class⁴. Unlike Cox, though, Tosel blames Capitalist modernization rather than the neo-Marxists. What results is not strictly speaking a decline in Marxism, but a wealth of manifestations which he refers to as the ‘thousand Marxisms’ (ibid.:42). It’s important to recognize that the end of Marxism-Leninism as a unified theory, is merely a development of Marxism away from the notion of ‘*one true Marxism*’ (ibid.:44), although it seems that some consensus may be necessary as to what constitutes the minimal legitimate Marxist interpretation.

Another important point may be extracted from Tosel’s piece; though it is not about international relations, he argues that Marxism has been more international than liberalism, since it was conceptualized around “*the limits, contradictions and insufficiencies of the liberal order*” (ibid.:43). This suggests that the central powers of the neoliberal order tend to theoretically and practically center their attention on themselves and other powerful nations and unions of nations, while Marxism recognizes the situation of the less central figures of the ‘new world order’. As such, it is possible to explain the popularity of the Chinese government in Africa, considered perhaps the herald of a change to a world order which consistently undermines the poor south. Of course, to say that it is more international as such is not equivalent to saying that it is more prevalent in the field of international relations – it certainly is not.

A last, short, point which may be relevant, is that Tosel believes that ‘*as long as Capitalism dominates, it demands a critique*’ (ibid.:45), which I suppose is an obvious statement, insofar as any social scientist believes that any prevalent system or theory should be criticized. However, Marxism provides a particularly sharp criticism to Capitalism, and is – perhaps – in contemporary sciences, more apt to describe the development of neoliberal countries, than it ever was at describing the development of supposedly Socialist countries.

At this point, I wish to reiterate and revisit the initial point, that Marxism’s decline is connected to the end of the USSR. I have no ground to suppose that, generally speaking, this is a problematic statement, however, there may be reason to suspect that such a statement is less accurate for the field of International Relations. Primarily, such a suspicion might arise from the question: Has Marxism ever been prevalent in theories of international relations? Which seems a prerequisite for a decline. As such, I’m going to swiftly reference an article by Maclean from 1988, which is before the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the USSR.

In his article, Maclean argues that the separation of international economics and international politics, beginning as early as the 1960’s, is a consequence of intellectual attempts to keep out Marxism from the field (Maclean 1988:295). Indeed, the entire premise seems to be, that Marxist theory never carried much weight in international relations. The point is not so dubious that more effort should necessarily be spent towards this, however, in carrying out his argument, Maclean also engages with academic conceptions of Marxism which *a priori* remain relevant and as such I will include.

⁴ My working definition established in section 2.7.1. But it is merely a stripped definition, rather than an elegant working definition.

The overarching conclusion which Maclean attempts to counteract is that Marxism only has particular or specialized contributions to the field, and nothing at large to offer (ibid.:297). It would be difficult to elegantly carry out such an argument against Marxism at length though, given that neither his economic or philosophical conceptions deal with particularities, even if Marx does go into incredible detail with specific examples in his *Capital*. Often, attention is called to the fact that Marx did not specifically engage with international relations, but, according to Maclean, before WWI hardly any theories at all gave international relations devout attention (ibid.).

Another argument is that the categories – class, surplus value, etc. – utilized in Marxism are difficult to apply to international relations, rather than the central unit of the state, which is traditionally the unit of interest in such theory. Maclean then illustrates how Marxists have abstracted these terms and applied them in various instances of international theory (ibid.:298). Additionally, it seems fair to say that there is a well-defined concept of the state in Marxism, which involves such aspects as foreign policy, but the usefulness of this conception as a theoretical apparatus is a subject under scrutiny in this very dissertation. A last criticism, which I also attempt to engage with, is that Marxists are guilty of theoreticism, which has often rendered it difficult to concretize and perhaps somewhat unapproachable (ibid.). Probably a difficult accusation to refute, but ultimately the question must be whether or not it can be made more accessible, as opposed to if it has been that way up to now.

Last, we may quickly recognize the two most prevalent Marxist-derived theories; Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory (Wæver 1992:122). The former was a compositional movement which, during the middle of the 20th century, attempted to explain the poverty of the South through their economic relations to the West (primarily). The specific conclusions vary but they revolve around the concept of unequal trade which favors the West; a condition largely allowed through colonization and post-colonial ties (ibid.:107-110). Wallerstein developed Dependency Theory into World Systems Theory, which divides the world into center, semi-periphery, and periphery based on their production, and attempts to explain world history through this system of relations (ibid.:110-112). I won't go more into depth with these, because they are both component approaches to Marxist theory of International Relations, which displace the central object of the class struggle in the relations of production in favor of unequal commodity exchange. This is not to say that they are 'wrong', but simply that they operationalize Marx in a manner much different from what I intend.

2.2 The Relationship between the State and Class Rule

In this section I will first and foremost review the theory underlying the central analytical instrument at the core of this dissertation, insofar as it is relevant in relation to the methodical approach. This will in part mean illustrating the purpose of Therborn's analytical model, as well as arguing why we should believe the underlying assumption.

The Marxist conception of the state takes its departure in the thesis stating that the actual constellation of the state and its apparatuses is a materialization of the division of labor in the society in which it is embedded (Therborn 1978:25). As such, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat involves not merely a task of exchanging the government personnel, but also a transformation of the state organization, which is to say, the way in which it absorbs and manipulates inputs and creates policies. Marx and Engels (1969) phrased it thusly in the Communist Manifesto preface:

“In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.’” (Marx & Engels 1969:Preface, 1)

The lessons learned by the initial revolts against the bourgeois and the seizing of the state apparatuses by the proletariat provided the grounds for the development of aforementioned thesis, by illustrating that there is a relationship between the organization of the state and the given society it belongs to. It is this relationship that Therborn engages with in attempting to provide a systematic, analytical model for Marxist state analysis, to expose if and how social structures relate to the state organization (Therborn 1978:30). However, before I proceed to describe the analytical model which Therborn developed for this purpose – and which I will adopt for the analysis of the Chinese state – it may be advantageous to explore why we should believe this thesis to hold any explanatory value for real cases, such as the Paris Commune mentioned above.

2.3 Historical Materialism

In his “Culture and Materialism” Raymond Williams initially makes a move towards ontology when explaining base and superstructure in Marxism; *“It would be in many ways preferable if we could begin from a proposition which originally was equally central, equally authentic: namely the proposition that social being determines consciousness”* (Williams 2005:31). I shall imitate his approach in order to facilitate an understanding of which types of components belong in the base and what the superstructure entails. Inevitably, this section will set out from early incarnations of Marxism as phrased by a young Marx and end up with more matured concepts formulated later in his life, as such I urge the reader to maintain the distinction between the two given that some of the earlier formulations are ‘rougher’ than the more refined formulations of a more experienced Marx. However, by first succinctly recapitulating the development of Marxism and subsequently, in the following section, developing the notions to a point well after Marx’ death, we can much clearer differentiate between what is part of the base and what belongs in the superstructure. This is beneficial because the social formations of the 21st century do not equate those of the 19th century, and so we must adopt a dynamic understanding of the concept at hand.

First and foremost, it may be necessary to remind the reader, that at the time of development of Marxism, although science had begun to take hold, there was still a predominant amount of people who followed idealistic conceptions of nature and history. Whether or not this may to a greater or lesser extent still be true today is not of much importance here, but the manner in which academia still possessed scholars, such as Hegel⁵, who were not naturalists or materialists meant that much initial energy of Marx’ was devoted to separating state, society and cultural relations from predetermined configurations into social and historical processes which could be exposed (Redding 2014). Some of the most widespread ideas of this time, insofar as society and consciousness go, are – to my understanding and capability to judge so – Cartesian Dualism and Hegel’s teleological account of history. The former is a matter of separating matter and essence, which

⁵ Although Marx and Lenin managed to read Hegel materialistically, and as such utilize his ideas extensively in their own work, this was not Hegel’s own disposition.

is to say that there is a soul or an essence which determines who people are (Robinson 2012). The latter is a conception of history as 'pulled', not unlike the concept of destiny in many religions, by way of which there is a latent reasoning in history which can only be grasped at the end of history (Little 2012).

Now, one of the first things I like to remind people, when explaining historical materialism, is the simple notion already inherent in the wording; it is supposed to convey a *materialist* account of *history*, as opposed to a view in which history is guided by immaterial forces. As such, when Williams in the quote at the beginning of this section states the proposition that 'social being determines consciousness', it is meant as a revolt against notions which place consciousness as already given at the time of birth, rather than developed in relation to a person's environment. Marx initially developed this on the basis of figures such as Feuerbach and Buckle, who are forerunners of a social conception of history based on materialist principles; Indeed it was Feuerbach who pioneered the term '*Der Mensch ist was er isst*', or as it is commonly known today 'you are what you eat', to illustrate the causal relationship of nature onto man (Seligman 1901).

Despite the heavy influence of Feuerbach, Marx was not satisfied with the view that people were merely the result of their environment, since, he argued, the environment can in turn be shaped by man. Similarly, he objected to Feuerbach's view on religion, because religion likewise is a product of social history and not of nature *per se* (ibid.:626). As such, Marx gradually begins to develop a thesis based on materialist social conditions, rather than simply nature, by drawing from observations such as the difference between individuals of the French Revolution and individuals of classic antiquity, which he believed was caused by different economic and industrial circumstances (ibid.). Thus statements such as the following begin to emerge in his writings:

"Do these gentlemen think that they can understand the first word of history as long as they exclude the relations of man to nature, natural science and industry? Do they believe that they can actually comprehend any epoch without grasping the industry of the period, the immediate methods of production in actual life? Just as they separate the soul from the body, and themselves from the world, so they separate history from natural science and industry, so they find the birthplace of history not in the gross material production on earth, but in the misty cloud formation of heaven." (Seligman 1901:626)⁶

It is from this point of view, that the historical materialism of Marx begins to move towards an economic view of history, rather than strictly naturalistic. In his 'Misery of Philosophy' he argues that how private property is conceived is somehow associated with social relation and that social relations in turn are associated with the productive forces of society (ibid.:629). Expounding upon this notion, he continues to show how social relations are shaped by productive forces, by relating technological advances to social relations; "*The hand mill creates a society with the Feudal lord; the steam mill a society with the industrial Capitalist*" (ibid.:629). The idea, here, is that certain types of production technologies (productive forces) almost automatically assume a certain work relation around them, in order to utilize them effectively; some people own them, some people instruct how to use them, some people work them, etc. Altogether, these work relations do not just isolate themselves to the workplace; they seep in to all manners and forms of life

⁶ In this section, on historical materialism, I will be quoting Marx but attributing the quote to Seligman. This is due to the fact that Seligman made the translations from German materials which I found it difficult to acquire.

by creating beliefs, ideas, behaviors, principles, and so on, which are in concordance with their place in the economic relations.

Ultimately we end up with a statement of historical materialism, through the lens of Marx, somewhat like the following: Because humans become intertwined with the social structures present in societies, and because the survival of humankind is dependent upon our ability to sustain ourselves, the economic life which is fundamental to the preservation of the society, inevitably ends up defining the lattice which individual life is demarcated by (ibid.:613).

It is quite apparent that the historical materialism of Marx is at once much more economic than materialist, when considered in modern eyes, although concomitantly becomes materialistic when economy is interpreted as Marx originally did. Whether it is one or the other is exclusively semantic, I merely intend to clarify that any confusion aimed at the term 'materialism' once detracted into Marxism is not entirely misplaced, as it has more in common with its roots than its ending point.

However, what isn't semantic is this: if the Marxist state conception pertains to fundamental causal relations in society, they should hold analytical value outside the field of economics (where Marxism currently resides in an almost dormant fashion) such as in International Relations.

2.4 Infrastructure and Superstructure

"On the various forms of property, on the conditions of social existence, there rises an entire superstructure of various and peculiarly formed sensations, illusions, methods of thought and views of life. The whole class fashions and moulds them from out of their material foundations and their corresponding social relations. The single individual, in whom they converge through tradition and education, is apt to imagine that they constitute the real determining causes and the point of departure of his action." (Seligman 1901:632)

Now, a very common term to come across in Marxist theory is 'determine' or, its extended version, 'determine in the last instance', the latter being an attempt to remedy the hard causal relation connotated by 'determine'. What is commonly (although not exclusively) written in the German texts of Marx is the term '*bestimmer*' (Williams 2005:31), which does not relate to the causal, one-way determination that, at the time of his writing, dominated views of how nature determined man. Marx was revolting against this notion by utilizing a term that relates to how external limits and pressures can 'determine' the outcome of something, without being the cause and without it being certain in the presence of other, stronger determining factors (ibid.31-32). Hence the development of the term 'determine in the last instance' which is what I utilize to connotate the latter.

To give a relevant example of this, we can say – as the relationship between infrastructure and superstructure classically states – the infrastructure determines, in the last instance, the superstructure: in the case of China, there have been extensive economic reforms for over 30 years but an absence of political reforms; if one determines the other how is this possible? Well, if there is another, stronger, variable present which can account for the development, then the term 'determines in the last instance' allows for such an explanation. In this case, we could hypothesize that China postpones political reforms because historically, political reforms have been accompanied by political and social unrest which takes much time

to stabilize and causes economic regression. Thus, the social circumstances which would normally adapt new political configurations to keep up with the economic developments are overwritten by a fear within and outside of the state. From within since it might instigate a democratic revolution which would almost certainly bring about the expulsion of current personnel; from outside because the population fears that the economic achievements of the current party might be undone by the turmoil which could ensue, should a democratic evolution take place. However, 'in the last instance' also inherently suggests that eventually these contextual circumstances cannot contain the increasing discrepancy taking place between the two.

Marx did not go into depth with these 'other' specifications, but merely acknowledged the existence of them, for now, so will I⁷.

Instead, now that we've established the relationship between the economic base⁸ and the superstructure, it seems ideal to explore the 'contents' of the two. Content, however, is a somewhat deficient word in this context because it gives the impression of a preconfigured set of items and values which comprise the base. This is not the case as the content of either is dependent upon the context of the society as a whole, and the content is at no point uniform, because it carries in itself contradictory forces at any one time (Williams 2005:34).

Strictly speaking, the base is supposed to comprise the productive forces and the relations between them, into what could be called '*the real social existence of man*' (ibid.:33). But naturally there is no general or universal social existence of man, which means that we have to move towards a conception of the base revolving around specific activities of people in social and economic circumstances. I've made extensive references to Raymond Williams in this section, and with good reason, because he alters the conception exactly in this direction, and so we shall rely heavily on his contribution to the terms. The following quote is rather lengthy, but I cannot phrase it more concisely than Williams himself.

"Clearly what we are examining in the base is primary productive forces. Yet some very crucial distinctions have to be made here. It is true that in his analysis of Capitalist production Marx considered 'productive work' in a very particular and specialized sense corresponding to that mode of production. There is a difficult passage in the Grundrisse in which he argues that while the man who makes a piano is a productive worker, there is a real question whether the man who distributes the piano is also a productive worker; but he probably is, since he contributes to the realization of surplus value. Yet when it comes to the man who plays the piano, whether to himself or to others, there is no question: he is not a productive worker at all. So piano-maker is base, but pianist superstructure. As a way of considering cultural activity, and incidentally the economics of modern cultural activity, this is very clearly a dead-end." (Williams 2005:34-35)

⁷ For those interested, this issue will be addressed in section 2.6.

⁸ I use economic base and infrastructure interchangeably; they refer to the same productive forces.

The reason Williams refers to this as a dead-end, is due to the fact that this rigid analytical approach is based on less specific and more general notions of Capitalist commodity production. The pitfall of this notion is that it becomes easy to dismiss certain aspects of society as part of the superstructure, and thus determined and not determining. Instead, it would be beneficial and more flexible to remember not merely the production within society, but the reproduction of circumstances within society (Williams 2005:35). Althusser wrote extensively on the reproduction of labor power, the brunt of which includes a reproduction of both skills necessary to perform in the productive constellations as well as reproducing subjugation to ruling ideology (Althusser 2008:7). So for any society we need to account for specific organizations between and within structures in relation to the social intentions associated with that society. Doing so, we will see that there is the intention, the ideology, of the ruling class which contributes to the reproduction of the material circumstances, but these are often hailed as natural or preferential (Williams 2005:36; Althusser 2008: 19-20, 30, 44). The relevant exemplary of this in Europe would be the practically unquestionable status of democracy, hailed as the advanced end-point of politics, but which is in fact – from this point of view – a dominating ideology which is necessary in the reproduction of the productive forces.

Certainly, if the dogmatic nature of the Ideological State Apparatuses⁹ (ISAs) and certain parts of the politico-legal structure are not actively and repeatedly highlighted and repudiated, then the class character of society disappears altogether (Williams 2005:37). At this point Williams and Althusser divide their terms; where Williams invokes Gramsci's hegemony, Althusser prefers ideology, despite the fact that they use them very similarly. I will use the term ideology to limit the breadth of my terms, but it is not dissimilar to Gramsci's hegemony for those who are more familiar with the term¹⁰.

The important notion in this regard is that ideology is not produced and reproduced in society in an apparent or obvious manner. I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. Althusser phrased it as such: "*One of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, 'I am ideological'*" (Althusser 2008:49). Democratic, neo-liberal societies go to great lengths to conceal this fact, by reiterating the notions of personal freedom and by producing deceptive liberties such as free choice between one brand or the other, or parties that represent largely regional interests rather than fundamental political differences (Marcuse 2002:43; Ranciere 2014:30). But make no mistake, freedom from ideology is a sociological absurdity, *there is no practice except by and in an ideology* (Althusser 2008:44). If it were an obviously imposed system of meaning and practice from the dominant to the dominated classes, which could be easily discarded, then societies would be much easier to change than they have ever been in praxis (Williams 2005:37).

This is, however, not to say that the system is a static system constantly reproducing the same thing. Quite the contrary, this relates back to the dynamic nature of the entire organization of society due to how history and culture are incorporated into new and evolving themes to consistently fit with material and social developments (ibid.:39). Additionally, there are forces which are deemed alternative, or even oppositional to the dominant ideology, the presence of which is derived and explained only from specific

⁹ The notion of ISAs is an Althusserian rather than Marxist concept, but a useful development nonetheless. It divides the concept of repressive apparatuses in two: physically repressive (Police, Courts,...) and ideologically repressive (Schools, Media,...). We won't concern ourselves much this distinction because I will not categorize all state apparatuses as repressive, but I will utilize the fact that certain apparatuses have ideological effects.

¹⁰ The only benefit to hegemony over ideology is that it implicitly suggests a relationship of domination.

historical context, and its legitimacy a function of exact social and political circumstances (Williams 2005:40). Although fairly abstract in nature, the interesting addition is this: Williams proposes that the sum of these alternative forces might not penetrate the borders of central corporate definitions (ibid.). But, now, this conceptualization has to be concretized, which is no small task and which, luckily, I will not have to perform currently, since it has already been executed by more than capable minds.

On the one hand, one could go about this, by saying that what is produced by cultural practice is a row of material objects for consumption, enjoyment, etc. (as Marx assumed) after which we can identify the components of these. These components will stem from, and thus analytically establish, the economic base of a society at a particular point in time. Williams, meanwhile, urges us to disregard the rigid view of components and commodities as cultural products, and instead analyze *'the conditions of a practice'* (ibid.:48). A reader well-versed in the subject might recognize the component approach in theories such as those of Wallerstein's 'World Systems Theory' and its production chains. I've favored William's approach, which is akin to that of Therborn, who operationalizes the economic base, of any type of society, into three aspects: *"the distribution of the means of production, the goal of production, and the structure of the social relations that link the immediate producers to one another and to the appropriators of the fruits of their surplus labour."* (Therborn 1978:42)

To give an example of this, we can make some rough general claims about Feudal societies and subsequently draw some conclusions about the superstructure. This should, accompanied by the above sections, illustrate how base and superstructure are related and consequently why we might believe the thesis claiming that the state system derives characteristics from the class relations of the society it is embedded in.

First off, the *'distribution of means of production'*, is under Feudal class rule a matter of distribution of land to landlords who are granted their title based on inheritance or they have achieved good standing with a superior lord through other means (ibid.). Meanwhile *'the goal of the production'* is largely a matter of noble consumption (ibid.), with the exception of the necessary goods for the maintenance of the producing class, of course. Last, *'the structure of social relations...'* is based on non-economic mechanisms such as kinship or military power (ibid.), which heavily dictates one's place in the social structure. Once this basic groundwork of the economic base has been laid, we might make some simple assumptions about the superstructure associated with it. Increasing production is largely a matter of military expansion, since overpowering of land means seizing the 'means of production', and absent science it is almost exclusively the only way to increase production. The importance of kinship causes marriage to hold economic and political value, likewise, manners and maintaining personal relationships is of great importance (ibid.). The amount of conclusions which can be drawn depends heavily on the scope of the analysis it is based on, as with most research, but hopefully this example will suffice insofar as showing how the theory relates to praxis.

Having finally tackled the ontological and categorical foundations of the analytical apparatus, derived from Marxism, we might return to the thesis as stated in the beginning of the chapter.

2.5 The Resulting Thesis

I initially recited the claim that the state organization derives characteristics from the class division of the society it belongs to. I then proceeded to show the development of Marx from historical materialism and into its more economic terms, so that we may understand the terms infrastructure and superstructure. After revisiting those terms, it finally seemed plausible to show the relationship between them and thus substantiate the thesis.

Relating this back to the Paris commune, we can see how a proletarian revolution is unsuccessful if it maintains a bourgeois state organization, because this creates a discrepancy between the factors which are supposed to correlate (in the absence of a context specific variable with stronger explanatory value) (Therborn 1978:35). The same goes *vice versa*; if a largely proletarian state attempts to privatize commodities and firms while distributing land to peasants it is, at best, ineffective, and, at worst, highly disruptive of economic and political growth by destabilizing the relation between the two. Solnick (1996) lends to this conception, by arguing that the downfall of Soviet Russia was largely due to how decentralization caused state-associated agents to become more resourceful than the central government and proceeded to act as rogue governments. China, meanwhile, has not succumbed to disorderly or disjointed organizational consequences as a function of their decentralizing policies, which is another reason why the Chinese state is such an apt subject for analysis, in order to reevaluate the truth value of the Marxist thesis in the light of recent events which – on the surface – seem to contradict it.

2.6 Problem of Specification

I mentioned, during the explication of infrastructure and superstructure, that Marx rather quickly remarks how there may be context-sensitive specifications which give rise to variations in the manifestations of politico-legal life, other than merely the class relations. This establishes an opportunity to presently connect the dots between the inclusion of international influence into the Marxist framework in the present dissertation, and the absence of concrete specifications of factors which can overrule the determination of the superstructure by the base in Marxist theory. Before proceeding, it seems proper to include – in its entirety – the paragraph in question:

“The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers – a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power – in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of state in each case. This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same in its major conditions – from displaying endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analysing these empirically given conditions.”

(Marx 1991:927-928)

The first half of this is altogether the most complete statement of the Marxist thesis I've come across, and as such feels appropriate to include now that we've familiarized ourselves with the terms involved. After succinctly stating the thesis, he proceeds to indicate that several roughly similar economic bases may give rise to countless variations as a function of contextual specification. Although it is difficult to object against the statement *per se*, it is hard not to feel that he simply grazes the issue without substantially explicating the intricacies which must necessarily accompany such a statement. Such an omission makes it difficult to analytically incorporate or utilize Marxist theory in any field, because it puts the burden of discovering and explicating these specifications on the analyst. But doing so requires an extensive amount of work, because first one has to concretize what kind of specifications might be found, which then has to be operationalized to be tested, after which one has to theoretically relate it back to the given subject. This presents at least two problems with Marxism in international relations as of right now:

1) It requires significant amounts of time to perform analysis within Marxist framework because of the scarcity of analytical models, and to a certain extent the fact that they are largely outdated, causing them to need reformulations or contextualization.

2) If the analysis of the state becomes too context-sensitive then international analysis quickly escalates to incomprehensible sizes. For the dissertation at hand, I'm only going to analyze the Chinese state in order to make some general predictions for how they may act internationally. Further development would be needed to abstract the most critical aspects of determining state organization in relation to theory of International Relations, while abandoning the variables which hold little explanatory value.

Although I would be thrilled to provide a generalized model, I am unable to extract the most important aspects of the model before actually applying it. In a quite contrary move, I'm going to attempt to formulate a specification which seems to be crucial for Marxism, particularly in post-modern societies, namely that of international influence. International influences to both infrastructure and superstructure are an extensive matter, and in the ensuing analysis I limit myself not just to the influence from EU to China, but to select aspects of EU-China influence which should illustrate (but not exhaust) the complexity and types of influences. Since I only engage with an analysis of the Chinese state, this is surmountable, but when dealing with more states the model would have to be refined and simplified.

The problem of specification is, I believe, a critical aspect of modernizing Marxist theory, and it is crucial that such a task is even possible in order to revitalize Marxist theory and it will be an essential point to revisit when finally discussing the core problem of this dissertation post-analytically.

2.7 Definitions of Key Terms

On the basis of the theoretical foundation, it seems appropriate to establish some working definitions for the terms which are central to the analysis. The terms 'state' and 'class' are problematic, because they inhabit common speech and belong to several theoretical strands, as opposed to terms such as 'superstructure' which possesses all but an exclusivity to Marxism.

2.7.1 Class

The term 'class' in Marxist theory might be one of the most extensively contested terms in academia, given that it has enjoyed debate roughly since its conception until now; few terms can claim to have been unsettled for over a century. As such, how do we elegantly engage with the topic without referencing a long and seemingly endless debate? I wish I knew. The simplest solution, for the analysis alone, would be to simply maintain a rigid class definition, because the implementation in relation to China is a lot simpler than for neo-liberal countries. But insofar as attempting to approach a methodical, concrete Marxism which would be universal, such a move would be a crude one. Unfortunately, I have to humbly admit that I have not been able to establish a flexible model to identify classes, and therefore will have to rely on theoretical distinctions. For posterity, I believe that – just like the problem of specification – the problem of class would benefit greatly from a model which embraces the plasticity and dynamics of classes in modern societies.

Disbarring a concrete model, what we can establish is that we can distinguish two overarching class categories: Economic and political, or, as they are sometimes referred to, a class in itself and a class for itself (Andrew 1983). Everyone belongs to an economic class, since the economic class is exclusively a matter of one's position in the economic constellations within a given society (ibid.). Such positions are difficult to pinpoint with any accuracy, but roughly what I believe to be of central importance here is: 1) the distinction between owners of productive means and the people who utilize them. 2) The distinction between workers who possess specialized knowledge and those who are, to phrase it bluntly, easily replaceable. Possessing specialized knowledge can both be a matter of being able to use and program a factory robot and the ability to organize workers efficiently. Previously, it may often have been the owner of the means of production who organized the workers as he saw fit, but recent developments have seen an increasing need for 'middle-sections' of human resource personnel who do not own the means of production, but organize specialized research groups – these intermediary leaders can be considered to possess specialized knowledge.

Political classes, meanwhile, are not universally ascribed to everyone; they are rather the function of individuals from an economic class who unite for some political purpose (ibid.). It is tempting to argue, that people unite, politically speaking, across economic classes on the basis of other key areas more important to them than their economic position. But in traditional Marxism, we have to consider this secondary and cannot acknowledge them as a political class, instead, they are competitors, and such competitions distracts them from becoming a legitimate political class, and thus remain simply recognized according to their economic status (ibid.:581). For post-modern ears this likely sounds atrocious, but it has to be understood in a perspective in which democracy is not the final and only manifestation of political ideology. A class is only a political class in a democratic country, if it opposes the democratic system as a whole. I find this rigid and unintuitive, and luckily irrelevant to state analysis in international relations.

Ultimately, by eliminating archaic concepts, like the political class and class consciousness, we end up with a stripped version of class which suffices when analyzing states in international relations. I believe this to be true through a very simple logical maneuver: The economic classes, not the political classes, are relevant in relation to identifying the economic base of a society, which we have established determines the superstructure, even if it needs specification. If we are interested in understanding the foreign policies of any given state, we are not concerned with contradictory class forces against the dominating political ideology of that state, unless it somehow influences its foreign policy (and, I admit, I cannot preemptively exclude that it might). I suspect that the creation and distinction of a political class is much more necessary in cultural analysis, where it might affect domestic political outputs. Effectively, I contest that we (international relations theoreticians) may adequately employ this stripped concept of class, until a fully developed and appropriated formulation might emerge.

2.7.2 The State

“The Marxist tradition is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire (and in all the later classical texts, above all in Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune and Lenin’s on State and Revolution), the State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. The State is a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to Capitalist exploitation).” (Althusser 2008:11)

Thus writes Althusser on the definition of the state, illustrating quite concisely how the Capitalist state in Marxist theory is a matter of repression of the proletariat in the economic interests of the ruling classes. It is for this exact same reason that I am under the impression that it fundamentally carried out a much better understanding of Capitalist than Socialist countries. At any rate, the class struggle revolves around the possession of State power in order to control the means by which interests are materialized, which is to say, the repressive (and ideological) apparatuses. State power is a more universal notion than state apparatus, and when the proletariat achieves state power they are free to deconstruct the bourgeois apparatus and, initially, replace it with a proletariat state apparatus, until eventually they may set in motion the obliteration of the state and all its apparatuses altogether (ibid.:15).

As if the concept of class was not already problematic enough, we are now dealing with a state definition which is wholly unsuitable for a case such as the Chinese state. But with the abolition of the concept of a political class which I just performed, what use is this concept of the state? Instead, let us engage with an abstraction of this which treats the state and its apparatuses as properly descriptive, so that we may still conceive of the notion of state power, but not in relation to its normative dimensions. Roughly, what this will end up looking like is a series of organs associated with state power, which are for either regulatory or ideological purposes. There seems to me to be no reason to predefine exactly which apparatuses are state-associated, the only necessity is to understand how to identify and examine them.

My analytical model, adopted from Therborn, does not afford us this luxury unfortunately. Additionally, attempting to develop it to be able to would cause it to be incomparable to Therborn’s analysis, which would effectively eliminate my ‘control group’. We have not broached the topic quite yet, but as we will see during the course of the next chapter, it remains necessary to retain some loyalty to the method I’ve

adopted and Therborn himself explicitly states that likely the most problematic aspect of his model is that it conceives of the state apparatuses as one unit. I see no remedy to this, without building a model from the ground up. Instead I adopt a model which compares it to an organization, as depicted in section 3.2; analytically speaking, this definition is all that matters, what is provided here, meanwhile, is interesting in relation to discussion of Marxism in theory of International Relations as a whole.

Ultimately I want to acknowledge three things insofar as this definition goes: 1) state power and state apparatuses should remain two distinct and focal terms in relation to state theory; 2) doing away with normative dimensions of Marxism – embedded in terms such as class struggle and state theory – is a positive development for theory of International Relations; 3) The organizational view suffices for preliminary analyses, but a development of the concept is needed as a matter of accuracy.

The third point naturally poses an implicit criticism to the dissertation at hand, since ideally I would rebuild the model to be oriented towards foreign policy output in particular, but, again, extensive rebuilding eliminates the possibility of attempting to reinforce or falsify the Marxist thesis. This has the unfortunate consequence that not all aspects of the analysis performed will be possible to relate back to theory of International Relations! As such, it is important to remember that even if the analysis suggests that there is a poor relation between class and state organization, it indirectly affects theory of International Relations by proposing the conclusion that we should *not* utilize Marx' theory of the state.

Chapter 3: Methodology

During the course of this chapter I first establish the case of the Chinese state as a deviant case study and elaborate on the problems associated with the Chinese state as a case. I then explain Therborn's model which I will apply for this case study, followed by its deficits. I then try to counter one of these deficits through the inclusion of an international input variable.

3.1 The Deviant Case Study

In a most general manner, we may consider case studies to be extensive engagement with a particular case in order to produce detailed documentation (Bryman 2008:52). It is neither qualitative nor quantitative exclusively, and often utilizes both in order to get as detailed a picture as possible (ibid.). In social sciences there has been a longstanding common conception that case studies are, at best, too contextual for theory-building or, at worst, irrelevant (Lijphart 1971:691; Bent Flyvbjerg 2006). These assessments are based around the presumption that a single case study cannot be generalized to any other context than that from which it was conceived. This is in and of itself an indisputable assessment; in the absence of any kind of comparative parameter, any conclusions drawn from a single case are impossible to verify. These arguments follow – quite rationally, it is true – from the early 20th century shift from verificationism to falsificationism, heavily impelled by philosophical figureheads such as Karl Popper (Fearn 2001). Where verificationism (as the name implies) is based on drawing from instances which confirm a given hypothesis, falsificationism contends that we should rather concern ourselves with how to disprove the hypothesis; if a single case study cannot provide the grounds for a theory, then neither can it provide the reasoning for its own refutation.

Concordantly it should logically entail, at the very least, that case studies can, in conjunction with other case studies conducted with similar methodology, provide the basis for generalization (Bent Flyvbjerg 2006). But, if we are to satisfy the late Popper, we should additionally assert that case studies can provide the death knell of a theory if it provides indisputable evidence which is incompatible with the theory it is testing. More importantly, in the same manner of thinking, they can occasionally provide specifications to general propositions, which are necessary for the formulation of more exact propositions (Marsh 1964). Robert M. Marsh illustrates this by citing several examples of theses which held in their original formulation when tested upon Western societies, but when compared against studies of non-Western societies either needed specification to hold true, or failed to produce consistent results altogether (ibid.). Given this, it should prove interesting to hold the Marxist thesis¹¹, which Therborn preliminarily proved to hold true through an analysis of European states, against an analysis of the case of the Chinese state.

According to Lijphard (1971:691) case studies can be divided into two rough interest-groups; an interest in the case itself, or an interest in the case in relation to theory. As illustrated above, the interest, here, is to consider the case of the Chinese state in relation to Therborn's analysis of Western states, with the intention of confirming, weakening or improving the thesis inherent to historical materialism. As Therborn's analysis is conducted so extensively within the context of 1970's European states, it would seem a fairly redundant task to perform one analysis of a Western state 40 years later to see if it still holds true, given that it would only marginally affect the credibility of the theory, while a study of all European states is

¹¹ That the state organization is a materialization of the relations of class power in the society in which it is embedded, as elaborated throughout chapter 2.

beyond the scope of this dissertation. Inspired by Marsh (1964) it seems that the most fruitful endeavor would be to engage with a vastly different state system embedded in a different cultural and historical context, technically referred to as a 'deviant case study' or 'the unique case' (Bryman 2008:55). When considered in relation to theory, case studies are implicitly comparative (Lijphart 1971:693), and Lijphart equates the 'deviant case' – in this case China – to 'experimental groups' which are tested against an established 'control group' – in this case European states (ibid.) as analyzed by Therborn himself.

A different aspect of the matter of similarity is the difference in time; Therborn's analysis was conducted based on material from 60's and 70's Europe, whereas I will exclusively operate with data from the last decade, or my analysis of the Chinese state would not be very useful considering the incredible pace of development in China. Even if some scholars argue that political change is postponed in favor of economic development (Gallagher 2002; Sun 2012), it would not be methodically sound to diversify the timeframe of sources within one state analysis too starkly as it may create a distorted image if the input and outputs of the state are described twenty years apart. In relation to the timeframe between mine and Therborn's analysis, no issues should pertain to this temporal discrepancy considering that the Marxist thesis in question will be a relevant contribution to contemporary theories of International Relations only if it applies to, at least, all hitherto Capitalist and Socialist societies.

3.1.1 The Chinese State as a Case

I mentioned that a prerequisite for the compatibility of case studies is similarity in method, which is why I will be conducting my analysis by adopting the methodical structure utilized by Therborn – the specifics of which will be explicated in section 3.2. This analytical model requires certain particular information, which is not always equally simple to locate. Particularly in the case of the Chinese state which explicitly values the obscurity of the specifics of state matters. Because of this, in relation to certain analytical points, I will have to make do with vague or questionable material. As such, I attempt to clearly distinguish between what seems almost certain, what others believe, and what I believe.

All materials referenced in the Appendix contain a margin of error for the simple reason that no-one knows the extent of ideological mobilization on behalf of the Chinese state; all numbers could potentially be misleading. But since we have no alternative, we must proceed from the standpoint that they are valid, while remaining cautious towards the conclusions which can be drawn. For by far the largest part of the analysis, I don't have the specific information necessary at all, which means that I've opted to utilize materials related to matters that are somehow associated to the information required by the analytical model. This produces a problem of validity, because for large parts of the analysis I need to deduct the facts of the matter, which leaves ample room for misinterpretation or rushed judgments.

To make matters worse, the factors which need to be analyzed in Therborn's model are conditions which are related to the organization of the state, but not directly constitutive of it. This means that based on my previous deductions, I have to deduct the class character of the state – a messy state of affairs! However, since this awkward problem is derived from the nature of the state and not the method, we must remember that the room for error is inherently greater when analyzing the Chinese state. This is true for me as well as any other scholar, who has not had the opportunity to observe the functioning of the Chinese state and its apparatuses firsthand. Meanwhile, the conclusion to the problem fortunately does not necessitate a great specificity in the conclusion of the analysis.

3.2 Therborn's Analytical Model

In this section I will initially recapitulate and contextualize Therborn's analytical approach after which I will modify his methodology to account for a lack of international input, simultaneously attempting to critically minimize the alterations or deviations from Therborn's analytical method.

The analytical model for the state developed by Therborn is an explanatory model which seeks to "elucidate the way in which the class character of the state apparatus is determined and revealed" (Therborn 1978:35), which is to say, it is an attempt to operationalize and systematically approach the Marxist thesis in concrete terms. Therborn's momentum originates in a conception of the state, which depicts it as organs embedded in a wider context with reciprocal relations, rather than as a detached structure with its own internal goals distinct from those of society. Therborn illustrates the difference between conceptions of organizations as; pictured on the left in Figure 1, an organization, which, disregarding its environment, is oriented towards a goal; and on the right, an organization, which creates outputs based on inputs from the environment. The understanding of the state as the latter is a necessity for Marxist analysis, given that for there to be a relationship between class and state, there has to be an integral relationship between the state and its environment.




Figure 1 (Therborn 1978:38): Illustrating two types of state-environment relations.

At first glance, the model appears fairly similar to models derived from Systems Theory, particularly David Easton's famous 'Demand-System-Policy' model¹². However there are some minor apparent differences, based on some quite remarkable theoretical differences: the inputs in Therborn's model do not simply come in form of demands from the population, but also from government observations of their environment. The transformation process is explained in relation to class character, which means that other than organs and personnel, the interests of classes play a significant part of the process. The outputs are not just policies, but also more intangible outputs, typically associated with ideological matters.

¹² See Easton (1957) for more information.

Another difference is the absence of a feedback loop, which naturally become harder to define, when the inputs and outputs incorporate contain less concrete objects of interest. It is hard to fault Therborn for not including it in the model, because the Marxist theory of the state doesn't specify the relation between the output and the feedback, except – as we established – the infrastructure determines, in the last instance, the superstructure. Nothing more general can be said for this proposition, because the rest is completely contextual. While the model does not illustrate it, there is *some kind* of feedback, but it's important to note that this is a matter of economic development producing class relations in society, which affects the organization of the state structure. As we will see in this very section, Therborn's model is not concerned with the *content* of inputs and outputs, but rather with the *mechanisms associated* with inputs and outputs. The mechanisms associated reveal the contextual determination; they are the means to identify how exactly, in detail, the economic base determines the superstructure.

Although unique as an organization, due to its ability to perform certain functions such as national defense, law formulation and enforcement of said laws (ibid:37), the state, here, must be considered in more general terms than, for example, the traditional 'three pillar system', and similar conceptualizations, since state models which revolve around specific types of state organization would serve to disengage from the general truth-value of the thesis in question; the inapplicability of which would disallow the testing of the supposedly general statements on other types than the prototype on which it was originally conceived. Therborn avoids this theoretical fallacy by abstracting the conception of the state to simpler terms, namely as an organization of inputs, transformation and outputs (ibid:38). The point, then, is to relate these to the continuous societal developments which provide (some of¹³) the inputs and receive (some of) the outputs (ibid.).

Therborn then continues to define the formal content of inputs, transformation and outputs, by analogously relating it to a generic productive organization, which consists of work materials which are to be manipulated by personnel, energy and technology so as to generate some kind of product (ibid.). As such, an overarching configuration begins to emerge in which there are four general factors to consider (ibid:39):

1. Organizational tasks, which can be something as specific as soldering components onto a motherboard or something as multifaceted as handling criminals.
2. The personnel necessary to carry out the tasks, and especially in modern organizations, the difference in personnel, which in Marxist terms primarily distinguishes between the dialogical relations between mental and manual labor (Marx & Engels 1998:50).
3. The necessary resources to sustain personnel and technology, which consists of monetary as well as material inputs when such are to be utilized.

¹³ Provided in parenthesis since the original text does not make the specification, but it *is* as necessary specification, exactly to avoid the misconception of a given society and the belonging state as an enclosed system.

4. "The organizational technology", which is a general way of referring to the procedures associated with the transformation from input to output. This does not only mean the technical "one, two, three" of assembling a car, for example, but also includes the bodies associated with taking in inputs, the bodies they deliver it to, and the fashion in which they do so. This distinction is important to keep in mind, as the technology of the state is less so a matter of physical technology *per se*, but more so of the arrangement between organs of the state and how inputs from the population or other states is absorbed and subsequently handled.

Before proceeding to the concrete analytical inputs and outputs to be analyzed, allow me to elaborate on this notion of technology when analyzing the state as a productive organization. This is necessary because, as Therborn states, "*Technology differs from the other variables of the organization system in that it is not part of the same input-transformation-output process.*" (Therborn 1978:40). Although the technology enters the organization from the surrounding conditions of the state, the technology itself is not manipulated to create any output, but rather *applied* in the process of transforming other inputs to outputs. An exemplary way of putting it is that in a society in which tasks are handled by specialists in a chain of production, if the Marxist thesis holds true, the state is likely to reflect this by delegating inputs to organs devoted to tasks of that particular type, e.g. 'Ministry of Defense', 'Ministry of Health', etc. The technology associated with this consequently becomes a matter of "*institutionalized social relations of command and compliance, leadership and execution*" (ibid. 40-41); modes of conduct within the state which reflects the ways in which private organizations ensure productivity.

The notion of organizational technology intertwines closely with the thesis of historical materialism, which is different from the variables present in the analysis; it is how the thesis relates to the processes and mechanisms to be analyzed. By engaging with the input and output mechanisms, and the processes of transformation present within the state, it is possible to determine the nature of the organizational technology and thus, by matter of comparison, falsify or reinforce the thesis in question.

Now, on the basis of an overarching scheme of organizational functioning just described, Therborn establishes nine tangible variables which enable the type of inquiry which is concordant with a case study of the state, rather than an exclusively theoretical disquisition. These are stated exactly as such (ibid:39):

Input mechanisms:

1. Principles regulating the type of task dealt with by the state;
2. Criteria of personnel recruitment to the state apparatuses;
3. Modes of securing state revenue;

Processes of transformation:

4. Modes of decision-making and handling of tasks;
5. Patterning of organizational positions and of relations among their incumbents;
6. Modes of allocation and utilization of material resources;

Output mechanisms:

7. Patterning of decisions and practices of the state
 - a. Towards other states
 - b. Towards the society which it is part;
8. Patterning of relations of the state personnel
 - a. With the personnel of other states
 - b. With the members of the same society;
9. Modes of outflow of material resources from the state.

These same categories will be utilized in the analysis of this dissertation, albeit with an extra variable as described later in this very chapter. First, let us engage with some of the terms and shortcomings of this analytical model.

3.3 Conditions of Therborn's Analytical Model

First and foremost, the analytical model depends on the causal relation between class and state organization. This is not an omission but rather a premise of the matter altogether; if there is no empirical 'link' which exposes the relationship between class character and state constellation, or if better variables than class struggle and class power should appear, then the logical and empirical consistency should be exposed in the conclusion. Having the privilege of already knowing the conclusion to Therborn's own analysis conducted largely on 1960's Europe, it is safe to say that there is certainly some kind of relationship. The point, here, is to then see if this extends to different contexts, or if the validity of the thesis depended on some contemporary circumstance which is no longer present. It goes without saying that this case study in no way guarantees the universality of the thesis or disproves it entirely, but it could extend it some explanatory power if it held true for the case of China.

Another aspect, which I gracefully glazed in the previous section, is that once the analysis has been conducted as described it is just a simple matter of comparison, but in praxis it is not. In order to specifically provide something to compare it to, one would have to conduct an equally exhaustive analysis of the state of class division in society. Unsurprisingly, I cannot possibly hope to carry out such a task, but given the lack of information available from within the Chinese state apparatus, the accuracy with which I can pinpoint the organization of the state is going to be rough. As such, providing a highly accurate analysis of the class character of the Chinese society would be a fruitless endeavor.

Instead I've opted to define the Chinese class character as such: It is divided between highly complex, skilled work teams which are located primarily in Beijing and the Yangtze River Delta, which reflect neo-liberal norms of private work relations. Simultaneously, there is a dispersed rural population and an exploited working class inhabiting most of the mainland areas, which reflects uneven development throughout China. The basis for this conception rests on extensive academic engagement with China and that there is little dispute in the overarching tendencies just mentioned, see – for example – Fan (2008), Henderson (2009), or Wright (2010). Additionally, China's own 12th five-year plan, states that assembly businesses located in coastal areas may have to migrate to mainland China, due to wage-increases in eastern regions¹⁴, which strongly supports this conceptualization.

It is important to remember that establishing the class character of the society is irrelevant to theory of International Relations and only necessary for this particular analysis because I am simultaneously testing the validity of the thesis and attempting to approximate how to adopt the model for purposes of international relations. This means that analyzing social class relations outside of the state would not be necessary for Marxist state-based analysis in general. We simply have to assess the validity of the basic premises before devising an analytical model which takes for granted the relationship between social classes and state organization.

One distinctly problematic shortcoming is the absence of complex understanding of the levels of integration of the state and its state apparatuses. Therborn mentions this limitation himself, by illustrating that the governmental, the administrative, the judiciary and the repressive apparatuses respectively comprise a number of different organs of which the integration of the single units varies considerably (ibid:41). In effect, considering the state as a single unified structure should not be problematic *if* the analysis of the variables is conducted throughout the different organs and not solely in one or the other, as this should provide a general picture of the organizational character. In terms of state analysis *per se*, it cannot be assumed that separate organs exhibit equal class characteristics. In terms of proving or disproving the thesis through a case study, as is the case at hand, it should prove sufficient (again, *if* conducted in an adequately broad manner).

Another, more peculiar inadvertence is the absence of an input variable which engages with foreign matters. The model clearly accounts for outputs in the form of foreign policy formulation and action, which should implicitly indicate that the output of one state potentially becomes the input of another. Moreover, Therborn also readily states that "*Particular social formations are part of a wider international system, and are modified by profound changes elsewhere within it*" (ibid:46), but fails to incorporate this notion into concrete variable terms and rather leaves it to theoretical acknowledgement. The difficulty in doing so, of course, is not miniscule, given that the classical conception of infrastructure and superstructure foregoes international relations in the favor of clarity, and as such only implicitly suggests an international influence to the superstructure through international influence to the economic base. Such a conception must inherently prove erroneous considering that interstate relations take up significant energy in terms of state activity.

¹⁴ Plan overview available, as of 29-05-2015, here:

<http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Overview-201104.pdf>

Extending this notion, there are additional foreign influences, especially in modern societies, where not only will states affect other states, but so will the populations and private spheres of other nations, not to mention international institutions. As such we return to the variable which needs to be added to the aforementioned analytical model, an input variable which contains these types of influences. It is important to explicate, that the type of influence here is not identical to a productive organization receiving materials from another country. First, because materials for production are imported as part of a two-way deal, while international influences will make their way to a given state whether they want it or not. Second, because exposing production lines is a simple matter of causally mapping each step of the production to the finished product, while deciphering how international influences causes states to react is a matter of overdetermination rather than causation: consider how states respond to nuclear arms production in other nations; some will try to discourage it, some will respond with aggression and some will ignore it.

Given this, the variable is not simply a matter of considering the outputs of other states, but needs to be much more inclusive in nature. I've opted to call this '*Principles determining responses to the international environment*'. This variable suggests that states respond not only to explicit statements made from international sources, but that states similarly need to engage with conducts of other states in ostensibly national concerns but which may eventually directly or indirectly influence the state in question.

It should be mentioned immediately that I will not be able to engage with every aspect of which this variable concerns in the present dissertation, since this would magnify the scope beyond the time and work-frame afforded. As such, I've decided to limit this variable to European influences, which will provide an opportunity to illustrate cases of influences from states, populations and international organizations, which should illuminate if the organization of the state can be linked to other types of class relations than the domestic division of labor. In practical terms what this *could* look like, is one state adopting the standards of another state because of the success it had in that environment. In this case, this would not falsify the thesis insofar as it claims that the state is a crystallization of class organization – it simply means that the thesis also needs to be able to account for the alien case, in which the state essentially is a crystallization of *another country's* class organization. This is precisely why the international influence is such a necessary addition to the analytical model when applied to modern states.

3.4 The European Influence

Methodologically speaking, identifying whether there might be reason to believe that international relations could have affected the class character of a state, is a different matter from the other analytical aspects. First of all because the other factors are expressions of the organizations of the state, whereas this is a determinant, but also because the sole thrust behind it relies on defying the original thesis; it inherently suggests that the relationship can become distorted.

A distorted relationship means that the class relations of society are insufficient to explain the organization of the state, but develops the thesis into a matter of state organization being determined by international and domestic class relations. While the original thesis suggests that there must be a positive correlation between the two conceptual groups involved, the international class character can have a negative correlation. For example, if the Chinese are as opposed to individualism as we (in the West) are to their disregard for human rights, then there might be reason to suppose that the Chinese government could

attempt to reinforce their current position, in order to counteract European interests to democratize China, by overcompensating, and as such disjoint the original relationship.

It is possible to treat it as an input variable proper, although such an approach requires perfect clarity in state selection of international matters to engage with, and which processes determine their rank in terms of urgency and how many resources the state is willing to spend on the issue. I cannot hope to attain such clarity in the case of the Chinese state. Fortunately, since I am introducing this variable on my own terms, it would seem in concordance with good scientific conduct to attempt to isolate it, that we may better evaluate its analytical worth without having to disentangle it from the remaining analytical insights. For this reason I've opted to perform it at the tail-end of the analysis, where it will be treated as a modifier for the identified relationship.

Before mentioning the two cases of interest which I intend to draw upon in my analysis, it is important to establish a particular qualifier: While I am interested in the influence of the institution "EU" which signifies the European Union, I am not solely interested in the affairs of states currently part of the union. First of all, this is important because – to a large extent – states which are part of the EU have primarily economic ties to China, while the ideological concerns such as human rights and rule of law are increasingly becoming a matter for the European Union itself. This does not present a problem though, given that European countries are sufficiently historically, culturally and economically intertwined that they provide a similar counterpart to the Chinese model. What ultimately matters is that we can trace the foreign influence on the class character of the Chinese state.

In practical terms, my engagement with EU will rely primarily on two entities; the European Union as an institutional influence, and Norway as a national influence. Between EU and China, there are a lot of different cases, such as arms embargo, trade relations or the effects of FDI between the two, but because the relationship between the two is so well-documented, rather than try to pick one representative case, I will utilize the fact that many scholars have already made conclusions based on analyses of a diverse base of interactions. In relation to Norway, however, one is not afforded the same luxury, and this is true for most European nation-specific interaction with China, and as such I've attempted to isolate a case in which the actors and motives are as easily deductible as possible. This led me to include the incident of the Nobel Peace Prize going to convicted Chinese citizen, Liu Xiaobo, in 2010.

3.5 The Method in Summary

By adopting Therborn's analytical model of the state, designed specifically to reveal the class character of the state organization by treating the state as a productive organization of tasks, personnel, resources and technology, I intend to conduct a deviant case study on the Chinese case. Before analyzing, I've supplied the model with an additional analytical dimension based around international influences, although in praxis this will only include select aspects of influences from the EU. The actual analysis will be conducted in terms of inputs, transformation and outputs as described in section 3.2; the added international influence being a subsequent modifier. The analysis then performs two functions, which may seem separate, but which are actually closely related. The primary function, quite simply, is to evaluate whether Marxist state analysis holds any explanatory power in international relations, preferably of a kind not already covered by existing

models. The secondary function is to reinforce or weaken the Marxist thesis which claims that state organization is determined, in the last instance, by the division of labor in the society it belongs to¹⁵.

The latter, secondary, function is intimately connected to the primary, because it serves as an evaluation tool: if the thesis doesn't hold, why build a theory? The analytical model I use is developed on Western countries and presumably the thesis holds and has explanatory power in the context of its conception, but if it fails to illustrate a link between class relations and state organization, then it disproves the universal application of the Marxist thesis (depending on my capabilities to identify said link, of course). Thus, should the analysis fail to produce such a link, it means one of three conclusions:

- That indispensable information or variables were excluded, which are necessary to correctly assess the state organization in relation to its environment.
- That the model only holds explanatory power in relation to Capitalist states.
- That the model holds no explanatory power outside of the specific context of 1960-70's EU in which it was developed.

Necessarily, there is a certain amount of leeway between the second and third option, which could mean that in actuality it could land somewhere in between, or indeed, it may even be that the model has no explanatory power and the initial analysis conducted by Therborn himself in Europe was actually performed incorrectly. I find this latter option a difficult premise to proceed from, but attempting to recognize all options beforehand seems, to me at least, to be universally beneficial. At any rate, it should be clear that the secondary function helps evaluate whether or not the analysis holds true, but is incapable of evaluating the actual value of the result. In order to attempt to assess the worth, I will engage in an extensive discussion after the analysis, pertaining specifically to my evaluation of the possibilities of utilizing Marxist conceptions of the state in theory of International Relations.

Before initiating the analysis, I want to reiterate that there are two distinct ways in which International Relations are related to the analysis. The first is the way in which the European influence is incorporated in order to correctly analyze the state *qua* state, since I believe it to be a necessary addition to the Marxist concept of state. The second is how to apply this analysis to understand the state *qua* international actor. It is important not to confuse the two since the latter is the object of the problem formulation, but the former is necessary to provide correct information upon which to establish a theory of International Relations based on Marx' conception of the state. Consequently I am *not* making a model for a Marxist, state-based international theory; I am testing the waters to assess whether or not I believe it to be worthwhile or even possible to do so.

¹⁵ If the added variable of international influence proves useful, perhaps it would be more apt to say that the state organization of a given society is determined, in the last instance, by the domestic-international environment to which it belongs.

Chapter 4: Analysis of the Chinese State

Besides performing the analysis as established in Chapter 3, I will shortly, at the beginning of each subsection, specify the object of interest, which in every case will be based on Therborn's (1978) distinction between Capitalist and Socialist states respectively. I have opted to explicate this here, rather than prior to, so that the reader may freshly recollect what is of importance in each step of the analytical process. Additionally, this allows us to quickly assess what information is of importance, to avoid long-winded analyses of little substantial value. I wish to reiterate that the Chinese state does not openly divulge information about internal processes, and as such, I will attempt to keep a clear distinction between facts of matter, what others have found, and what is my own personal conjecture.

4.1 Input Mechanisms

4.1.1 Principles Regulating the Type of Task Dealt with by the State

It's pretty important to understand, that the general tasks of the state, whether defined through use of Rousseau or Machiavelli, is not of utmost importance here; we are not interested in assessing the moral obligations of the state or its unique task of policy-formation. Instead, we're interested in the type of tasks and the relative ranking of tasks, because it plays into an assessment of the border between private and public. The exact data is not available, but we can theorize on the basis of some premises. First and foremost, I am familiar with two overarching approaches to policy-initiation in China: Regional testing (Heilmann 2008) and Policy sponsoring (Hammond 2009).

Regional testing is the concept behind the term 'crossing the river by touching the stones' commonly used after the 90's ensuing Yun's chairmanship. What this process actually entails is decentralized experimentation, which gives local officials some practical leeway to attempt to solve problems in unconventional ways. If a municipal government achieves positive results on the basis of a unique policy, feedback is provided to the central state, which may then decide to reject the policy or implement it nation-wide. Largely, this method is a matter of implementation of overarching goals defined by, I assume, the Politburo and its Standing Committee (PSC). Another way of phrasing this, is that the overarching goals and directions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and thus for China, are decided by the uppermost political circles, while the post-Mao reforms allowed local policy innovation in order to see how to best achieve those goals (Heilmann 2008).

Tanner (1995) described the process of policy-formulation in the Chinese state as a multi-stage, multi-arena system. The reason for this, is that no single body possessed monopoly on legislative initiative, which means that policy formulations could come from anywhere within the government structure. However, such knowledge is practically unworkable, and I've decided, instead, to utilize more recent theorizing which is closer related to the type and ranking of tasks within the state. 'Policy sponsors' is a concept utilized by Daniel Robert Hammond in his 2009 Ph.d on policy formulation in People's Republic of China (PRC), which revolves around actors who are not simply capable of a policy formulation, but possesses the means (material, political, temporal) to potentially push them through to implementation. This is not to say that they can consistently implement any policy they desire, or that a policy has the intended outcome in praxis, but rather to underline the necessity of influential interest in a policy – especially in the absence of democratic interest.

“As demonstrated by Lieberthal and Oksenberg the way the Chinese state is structured means that any policy needs to navigate these various levels of fragmented institutionalised interest. As noted the result is an incremental policy process dominated by consensus building based on the interests of individual officials and bureaucratic organisations. The impact that state institutions can have is, therefore, important to any consideration of policy processes in China.”
(Hammond 2009:39)

While this does grant some insight into superficial class relations within the state, we need to supplement it with qualitative content of these policies. The most accurate and recent manner to gauge this, that I am aware of, is through the 12th five-year plan¹⁶, but because these are publicly available documents they may selectively omit certain functions within the state, such as ideological mobilization. Indeed, on the basis of that alone one would be hard pressed to differentiate between the Chinese state and European States (apart from the repeated use of the term ‘Socialist’). Focus on scientific and technological progress, economic prosperity, higher value-added tax, and lower CO₂ emission echoes throughout the entire document. This goes hand in hand with Heilmann’s (2008) assessment that the economic reforms changed the overarching political goals of China from completing Socialist transformation and into a quantifiable goal of quadrupling China’s GDP between 1980 and 2000.

On the basis of this, and my academic familiarity with China, I’m going to assume that political tasks dealing with ideology and public mobilization take a backseat to policies concerning economic development. The actual prevalence of ideological concerns within the state remains difficult to estimate, but confirms its own existence through explicitly ideological apparatuses, such as Chinese schools and media. While this, *per se*, suggests that Capitalist norms are already more ingrained than Socialist ones within the Chinese state structure, we must refrain from premature conclusions and postpone judgment until a wholesome image emerges.

4.1.2 Criteria of Personnel Recruitment to the State Apparatuses

The recruitment process in Capitalism is not entirely dissimilar to technocracies; the possession of skills learned from education rather than labor experience is the predominant necessity. Insofar as it is coupled with democracy, being able to establish rapport with significant amounts of the population is a desirable trait. In Socialism, the most important aspect is to be able to represent a class, although expertise still plays a role in terms of delegations of tasks. The ability to exist as a public figure is not strictly necessary, but Socialist state personnel undergo political-ideological training for ideological mobilization purposes.

It is practically impossible for me to say whether Chinese state personnel are subject to any formal training of any kind during their hierarchic ascension, since the exact recruitment process is fairly secretive. According to Eric Li¹⁷, the Chinese recruitment process is based on Meritocracy, which supposedly involves promoting from lower levels of government up to the center. Technically speaking, an informal hierarchy based on expertise, experience and previously successful policies, among other things, is the basic premise

¹⁶ The five-year plans are centrally established guides for development lasting 5 years in scope. The 12th and latest can be located in English, as of 29-05-2015, at this URL:

<http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf>

¹⁷ During a ‘TED talk’ available, as of 29-05-2015, at this URL:

http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_systems?language=en#t-926261

for promotion within the state organs, but the process is complicated by the inclusion of so-called 'princelings' who obtain influential positions through their ties to senior members (Martin 2010). This creates two types of problematic: First, the ability for 'princelings' to even exist suggests that Aristocratic mechanisms persist within the recruitment protocol, which is clearly more Feudal than Socialist. Second, there seems, to me, to be no reason to suppose that the promise of promotion for a local government official correlates with ability to represent a social class. Nor do they necessarily maintain interest in representing the local community they originated from, once they are promoted. The genesis of the Meritocratic system does seem to rest with the Chinese, although in the shape of the teachings of Confucius (Qing 2013); a philosophy deeply rooted in Chinese culture and history, way before the birth of Marx.

Another indicator we may use is a chart over the National People's Congress, included as Appendix Item A. However, it is uncertain whether the NPC is at all a good indication of the configuration of the CCP, since the NPC is a parliament-style government unit of around 3'000 people not at all equivalent to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. What seems to be the case is that the amount of workers and peasants is slowly decreasing, which would be the part of the NPC most easily identifiable as representing a class. Cadres, meanwhile, increase in numbers, but are indicative only of Meritocratic characteristics. According to Li, 5 of the 25 members of the Politburo are princelings and the rest have worked their way up; which could be workers, cadres or intellectuals. He continues to mention that 'even a smaller percentage of the PSC' is comprised of princelings, which is still 20% of the utmost elite and <20% of the top party officials who enjoy Aristocratic privileges.

4.1.3 Modes of Securing State Revenue

This section will be brief, so for the introduction I will simply mention that Capitalist states primarily rely on individual and corporate taxes, customs, and duties for income (Therborn 1978:85), as opposed to Socialist countries which rely on surplus value and turnover tax from the sale of goods (ibid.:86). Based on the figures in Appendix item B, we can see that while individual income tax remains low, both the business (local government) and corporate (central government) taxes, as well as the value added tax, provides the largest proportions of total government income.

This does not solidly place China within the territory of either model, rather, China illustrates what we might expect from a Socialist country performing economic reforms based on neo-liberal principles; that they are in between. This also corresponds to my assessment of the Chinese social class organization in section 3.3: China contains both neo-liberal, specialized workforces in the rapidly developing coastal areas, a heavily exploited working class comprised of dispersed inland populations, and rural populations exploited in urban areas for cheap assembly due to the rigid nature of the *Hukou*¹⁸ system.

¹⁸ The Hukou system is a control measure to ensure that the entire rural population cannot move to the cities. As such, rural and urban residents are explicitly labeled as either, and cannot freely move between rural and urban zones. Because the rural populations have trouble creating enough jobs since they are less educated, they often attempt unlicensed work in the cities, but with no rights to defend them they suffer abysmal conditions.

I acknowledge the difficulties associated with dissolving this system, and early reports on the reforms are positive on the developments in this regard, see for example: Fan Zhai and Thomas W. Hertel (2004): "*Labor Market Distortions, Rural-Urban Inequality, and the Opening of China's Economy*".

4.2 Processes of Transformation

4.2.1 Modes of Decision-Making and Handling of Tasks

The particular way in which tasks are handled within the state, is not strictly speaking the same as organizational technology, but is rather determined by it. To simplify this abstract statement, we might relate it to the common, neo-liberal state, which possesses bureaucracy as a dominant organizational technology, and the way in which the input tasks are handled is through pluralistic specialized offices. As such, the idea is to understand the delegation of tasks throughout organs, and factors which determine its momentum, to conclusively deduct the nature of the technology through its manifestation.

Proceeding from our knowledge from the input of tasks, we know that the progenitors of policy content are decentralized experimentation in relation to centrally defined goals, and policy sponsors. The former will require more explication in order to provide useful information, but the concept of policy sponsors is such a proponent of inequality that I would equate it to Feudal norms over both Capitalist and social norms, given it discriminates geographically, economically, ideologically and insofar as lineage comprises political connections, it even carries an Aristocratic dimension. Without more knowledge about the specifics of this process and its original intention, it is difficult to assess exactly what this means in relation to the class character of society. In fact, I would argue that this is much more easily explained through reference to the absence of political reforms, which causes a fossilization of older modes of organization that remain in the political system.

Instead, I would like to direct the reader's attention to Appendix Item C, which strictly speaking compares the policy process of two eras, but for the matter at hand we are only concerned with the latter period. This touch-and-go process of policy innovation is exemplary of Socialist forms of organization, although it might be argued that it undermines its own historical conception. The establishment of local authority under general directive is a form of organization aimed at empowering the dictatorship of the proletariat, by displacing the traditional understanding of power relations. Recall, here, the process of obtaining state power in order to initiate an eventual proletariat overthrowing of the state apparatuses altogether; the tension between central legislation and proletariat power is incompatible (what type of government would make legislation to revolt against itself?). Thus, Marxist theory conceived of a dynamic relation between municipal and central governments which overwrites rigid hegemony.

Meanwhile, for a contemporary China undergoing rapid economic development, which has chosen to evaluate municipalities primarily on economic factors (Dong, et al. 2013:164), it is likely to do quite the opposite. It provides incentives for local leaders who desire promotion to extort the local populations to their own advantage, which is why municipal governments are generally loathed (Martin 2010), while the central government enjoys extensive support (Wright 2010).

4.2.2 Patterning of Organizational Positions and of Relations among their Incumbents

The biggest difference between the organization of organs and their personnel in Capitalism and Socialism is embodied in the way they attempt to avoid centralization of power. In Capitalism the distribution of power is performed through a dissemination of apparatuses that is appointed a specific area of jurisdiction, and is subsumed under either the legislative, judiciary or executive branch of government; in Socialism, distribution of power occurs through a series of overlapping personnel within bodies, in which the higher officials of one organ are subjugated to their administrative subordinates in other organs. The overview below is primarily based on Martin (2010), as well as lectures I attended in Beijing and Aalborg.

The Chinese political system has, first and foremost, two parallel, vertical structures, which its organs are associated with: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government structure. Within each, organs are distributed both vertically and horizontally, but generally speaking the CCP is superordinated to the government bodies. The personnel within each are not distinct to it, as they tend to intertwine both in lower and upper levels; e.g. a member of the Politburo Standing Committee could potentially hold a position in the Central Military Commission concurrently. Unlike its ideal, the intertwining networks rarely keep each other in check, and although holding several prominent positions is frowned upon, the mechanisms in place to prevent it from happening are quite lackluster.

Technically speaking, the uppermost body of the Chinese state is the National People's Congress (NPC), but it consists of 3000 members who meet annually for two weeks in a parliamentary-style setting. For this reason it is often considered a formality which simply reinforces decisions made by senior CCP members prior to the assembly. Practically speaking, the real power is considered to be placed within the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The politburo is somewhat shrouded in secrecy; its members vary and they are not known to meet consistently, and are thus thought to only be involved in core issues. The PSC, meanwhile, houses a political elite containing much practical power, formulating and delegating tasks to the Secretariat. The PSC also embodies the ideological split between the Capitalists ("elitist") and Socialists ("populist").

The aforementioned Secretariat is the primary executive branch associated with implementation of policies, but since China has approximately 34 provincial, 300 prefecture, 3'000 county, and 40'000 township governments, they are allowed some flexibility in their exact implementation. However, most domestic criticism of the government structure is directed at the municipal and county-level governments, suggesting that the dissemination of power is subject to a discrepancy. Altogether, the corruption within the central elites and the criticism of decentralized, local governments suggests that it has been constructed in a manner that allows for exploitation of systemic imbalances for personal gains.

4.2.3 Modes of Allocation and Utilization of Material Resources

Insofar as spending within the state-government structure goes, I was unfortunately not able to locate anything of use. It seems likely that such information is not divulged beyond the people responsible.

The difference we would be interested in locating is whether the funding within the state is supplied to the state ministries and its apparatuses, or whether it is an extensive reallocation process as part of a planned economy. The part utilization of SOEs and certain zones as economic development zones might suggest that it is a bit of each, but without any concrete numbers pertaining to the balance between state and SOE funding any speculation is as good as the other.

4.3 Output Mechanisms

4.3.1 Patterning of Decisions and Practices of the State towards Other States

Foreign policy is a somewhat tricky matter in this analysis, because the class character of the state is more easily revealed by a state's actions towards a state of similar disposition. However, Socialist and Capitalist states are embedded into the same international system and increasingly have to adapt and compromise, but in Therborn's analysis, we understand foreign policy as "*the external pursuit of the policies of a given ruling class*" (Therborn 1978:97), which is to say, it's an extension of the organizations interests.

Pinpointing this with any accuracy is actually a problematic matter, because there are three overarching evaluations on Chinese foreign policy (Lanteigne 2009): The first assesses that China is increasingly proactive and as they develop, they continue to improve their ability to produce foreign aid; a second strand believes that China is more reactive, and accuses them of aligning their policies with strong states in order to reap the benefits of good ties with dominant nations; and a third conceptualization sees China as completely freeloading, by simply gaining the benefits of, for example, EU trade or WTO accession, without contributing. I strongly assume there must be some truth-value to many of these assessments, depending on the aspect of China's foreign policy one looks at. Indeed, I find it highly believable, that China's foreign policy tends to vary a lot depending on context given that 1) The amount of actors involved in the process of foreign policy has increased (ibid.), and 2) China does not rely on strict a legal framework for the formulation (Hammond 2009). The conjunction of these two criteria may easily concoct different types of solutions, even for similar situations, depending on the specific personnel, organs and sponsors associated.

For the same reason, establishing patterns for the practices of the state is a peculiar matter, except to say that no one – to my knowledge – has conceived of a way to understand their practices as a function of a consistent underlying model, unless that model incorporates irregularity such as the concept of policy sponsors. However, in choosing to abide by the rules of the international playing field, China utilizes typically Capitalist means of interaction; boycotts, blockades, and similar economically minded strategies. Of course, as Lanteigne puts it, "*China has neither the desire nor the capability at present to create alternative international rules and norms*" (Lanteigne 2009:29). Because of this China has focused much attention to its international image, and has utilized incredible amounts of resources in the name of soft power, such as is the case of the Confucian institutes which populate the better part of the world¹⁹.

The fondness for soft power seems a logical development for China; on the one hand, the Chinese state inherently focuses on matters of ideology, which is practically indistinguishable from the concept of soft power, and on the other hand – whether by choice or by desire – China has stated several times, that they aim for 'harmonious development', which means that they intend to refrain from militaristic aggression. Whether they have adhered to this principle or not in relation to their neighboring states since then is another matter. The point is rather that China is constrained by a network of relations better explained through theories of interdependence than through class, because the clash between the West and the East has taken place on an economic playing field to a much larger extent than an ideological one. And yet again, the Marxist analysis has proved much more apt at delivering a criticism of Capitalism and its modern neo-liberal guise, than explaining Socialist developments.

¹⁹ For a list of Confucian institutes by country, as of 29/5-2015, see: <http://confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/institutes.shtml>

4.3.2 Patterning of Decisions and Practices of the State towards the Society which it is Part

Of utmost importance to identify in the domestic policy outputs, are the overall characteristics which distinguish the type of state intervention. Capitalist states tend to formulate judicial policies around the market, and attempt to develop the work force through training and research facilities²⁰. The Socialist state, by comparison, concerns itself primarily with ideological outputs, while specific law decrees are established in a decentralized fashion to avoid a legal hierarchy. Another interesting feature is that policies can be aimed at classes, rather than being universally applicable to all citizens, in order to keep privileges in check.

I have already proposed that the Chinese government seems to decreasingly focus on ideological mobilization, although the exact extent is – for obvious reasons – not public or even quantifiable (resources spent poorly correlates with efficacy in terms of ideology). I have also mentioned the *Hukou* system (rural/urban divide), which applies particular legal and practical conditions to at least two particular classes. But such utilization of class-specific law is quite opposite to classic Socialist doctrine, and I would equate it more with the Feudal state than either the Capitalist or Socialist state. Perhaps the most exhaustive look at Chinese domestic policy patterns are supplied by Ziaoguang & Heng (2011), who cross examines six control variables, each consisting of 5 or 6 possible types of control, with five overarching types of social organization with several sub-types. Their incredible, albeit slightly disorienting, charts are attached as Appendix Items D-1, D-2, and D-3 respectively.

I'm going to directly reiterate what, to my mind, are the most important findings. For every control measure pertaining to the same social organization, I will separate conclusions with semicolons. Periods denote the transition from one social organization to the next.

The labor unions are top-down orchestrated; the government assigns a responsible department which decides in crucial matters; the government controls the resources; working personnel is decided by responsible ministry; tasks are decided by the responsible department. Trade associations are encouraged but not established by the government; it is associated with a department; the responsible department has to approve important decisions; human resources are organized by the responsible department. NGOs function in a matter similar to the Capitalist NGOs. Political opposition groups are strictly prohibited. The latter two speak for themselves, but let us elaborate on the former two.

The exact state of labor unions in Marxism depend upon the specific stage of Marxism, but labor unions should never theoretically be subordinated to a central state department unless the state is in the process of arming the workers to overthrow the state itself, but this was never expected to happen in theory or in praxis. Insofar as the Chinese state claims to be able to represent the Chinese population's interests, the concept of labor units subordinated to state departments could be thought to preserve the integrity of the organization. Alternatively, since the overthrowing of the state by the union of exploited laborers is part of classic Marxist doctrine, it is not farfetched to imagine that monopoly on labor unions incapacitates their ability to organize against the state. While neither is classically Socialist or Capitalist, the latter interpretation is certainly reminiscent of Totalitarian regimes.

²⁰ Quite simply refers to all schools, which are developed in order to make the students thereof prepared for a particular type of labor.

The matter of trade associations is somewhat simpler, and corresponds to the economic development signified thus far. The state is involved in trade associations insofar as they believe that they can assist companies in making efficient decisions based on planned economy experience. SOEs, then, have direct ties to the government, while private companies can have second-degree ties to the government. It is currently more indicative of Socialist organization, but – I presume – the state is fairly committed to this ideal, especially if the formerly mentioned EU report is correct in assessing that it is deepening state integration. No matter which approach one takes to Chinese state-market relations, it is certain that their desire to remain ‘Socialist’ enforces them to attempt to keep the market in reins. Unfortunately, according to Brown (2014) the latter half of the reform period has caused increasing inequality as the top politicians continuously place themselves in prominent positions in SOEs, which – in a backwards way – could be interpreted as giving the market extensive access to the political sphere, depending on the self-interest of the actors embedded in both.

4.3.3 Patterning of Relations of the State Personnel with the Personnel of Other States

It’s a fairly complicated matter to deduce the class character of the state through its personnel patterning with other countries, when the countries in question do not possess similar governmental structures. Theoretically, Socialist countries in close approximation would have a ‘proletarian internationalism’, which signifies an international class organization, erected around the worker’s interests. China’s current position (as a developing country relying on technological and economic ties to the West) puts them in a poor position to act ideally, as they practically have to obey the formal rules of international communication already established prior to their engagement. Another way to express this is to emphasize that China cannot actually, in praxis, possess an inter-state patterning of personnel which signifies a Marxist class character of the state. This is not actually an issue inherent to the model, since it is meant to be universally applicable, but rather a commentary on contemporary normative imperialism and the nature of ideology since those are the factors which predetermine the outcome.

A lot is written on Chinese foreign policy, and because the nature of the subject requires that the Chinese interact with the outside, we are granted *some* insights into the process, yet the Chinese go to great lengths to conceal certain aspects given their focus on state sovereignty. But we know that a development is taking place in this regard; it used to be a central, clustered elite which dictated foreign policy, but an increasing amount of actors now bureaucratizes this process (Lanteigne 2009:19). These actors also include businesses, NGOs and lobby groups (ibid.:24), which would not traditionally be associated with Chinese policy. I would assume this to be an attempt to compensate for problems inherent to the Chinese political system, since the foreign policy apparatus of 1950s required different traits than those of today, but in the absence of political reforms it grew to incorporate tangentially associated organs and experts. This could be a trend in many aspects of Chinese political organization, considering their aversion to so-called ‘personality cults’ after Mao.

Technically speaking, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) is the foremost political organ insofar as foreign policy goes, yet the primary policy towards significant international entities for China (US, Russia, EU, Japan) is still formulated within elitist circles (ibid.), presumably the Politburo and the PSC. The MoFA, instead, are concerned with decisions relating to less important objectives, such as routine decisions pertaining to smaller states (ibid.:26). While central elite personnel often venture abroad to discuss politics

in India, Russia or the US; and while the MoFA consistently maintains formal contact with public representatives of other countries, the most important aspect is this:

“Many [Chinese] think tanks of various sizes exist today which focus on international relations, including multi-factional ones such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) as well as the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). These groups and others have expanded their visibility and maintain contacts both with Beijing and with international actors, acting as data centres, research centres, consultants and producers of policy publications for the public and for internal (neibu) briefing purposes.” (Lanteigne 2009:29)

Unsurprisingly, we see that the development of the foreign policy apparatus in China adopts the Western standards: Institutional networks and representatives of the country (as opposed to class). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of which is that it illuminates just how normalizing globalization is, rather than what it says about the class character of the state.

4.3.4 Patterning of Relations of the State Personnel with the Members of the Same Society

Strictly speaking, under Capitalism, anyone who enjoys a position as a minister is prohibited from concurrently holding a private post or interest. Politicians may need to establish good relations with large amounts of the public, but once elected they are not accountable to the public. Therborn manages a particularly striking passage on the polar opposite:

“Under Socialism, the state has to strive in the opposite direction to that of the Capitalist state: to break down barriers that separate and insulate its personnel from the working class; to subordinate itself, as far as possible, to the organizations of the class. It is only in this manner that the ‘withering away’ of the state can become a reality.” (Therborn 1978:108)

There is not much to be said here that is not already obvious from the previous sections of the analysis; the social, economic and even geographical²¹ distance from the Chinese citizen to the Chinese politician is incredible, almost unbreachable, if not for the frequency with which the uppermost elite graces the media with their presence. Without having any data on the salaries of Chinese politicians, I feel confident claiming that the wage disparity in China between the average politician and the average working citizen far surpasses the discrepancy of any European country²². The ivory towers of Chinese politicians shows no evidence of displacing power relations, in fact, it is not uncommon to read that the latter half of the economic reform period has actually accelerated their capital accumulation (Brown 2014; Qinglian 2002).

Another aspect is the concept of cadres, who are supposed to be functionaries that lead and represent people who perform appointed tasks. The cadre himself is both part political body and part worker, whose finest objective is to encourage *“the leading role of the working class and its party”* (ibid.:109). But in Marxism he is not paid for his efforts – not as a worker or a political representative – rather his material

²¹ Beijing, where most of the political elite are located, is far displaced from the poor, rural inland and western regions.

²² Incidentally, subsequent to writing this claim, a colleague directed my attention to this article:

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers>

needs are the concern of the party. In China, they are state agents and represent their village community; the government neglects village affairs, expecting cadres to provide public goods. But because they receive a salary and are then expected to take care of the village, they often prefer self-interest over community interest (Kung, et al. 2009). While they are certainly closer to the Chinese citizens, their presence is insignificant compared to the distance to the center, where key political objectives are initiated. By giving cadres personal incentives, it completely eliminates the point of their inception to begin with; now neither the cadres nor the party members are personally invested in the well-being of the working class, except perhaps by proxy or empathy, neither of which constitutes real Socialist organization.

4.4.5 Modes of Outflow of Material Resources from the State

The differences here between Socialist and Capitalist is perhaps easiest understood through a triangulation including the Feudal state. Normally we associate consumption with Capitalism, but in terms of resource expenditure it is the Feudal state which is consumptive. The Feudal state is consumptive in the sense that the central elite tends to consume income by procuring exotic foods and items for itself. The Capitalist state, rather, is a redistributive system which reallocates resources between sections of economy and social classes, such as when the sick or the old acquire the means of sustenance from wealthier citizens through the indirect means of taxes and duties. The Socialist state spends most of its resources on productive prospects, since the state is responsible for the economy and for procuring the means of production. The state has to spend a significant amount of money to ensure the import of material and technological necessities for prosperity.

In Appendix Item E, we can see that the most prominent government expenses across central and local governments are (by order of highest expenditure): 1) Education, 2) Social Security, 3) Public Services, 4) Agriculture, forestry, and water conservation, 5) Urban and rural community affairs. The government expenditures are wholly redistributive and quite indistinguishable from those of Capitalist economies. The tipping point for expenditures, I would assume, hinges on whether the society in question maintains private property or not. Insofar as there is a private market, the state is presumed to conduct entirely different services and counteract entirely different social forces.

4.4 Principles Determining Responses to the International Environment

In this section, as established in Chapter 3.4, we're interested in determining international influences which could disjoin the determined relationship between class rule and state organization, which, for the purposes of this analysis has been limited to European interaction.

Initially, it is important to clarify that while I utilize a European report and subsequently criticize it for evaluating China based on self-interest, it is not because this is the 'one true interpretation'. Naturally, a realist would assess that, yes, EU is acting in self-interest, but they are also correct in assessing that so is China. Since there is no superstructural Marxist theory of International Relations²³ this becomes a tricky matter, because utilizing realist, liberalist or constructivist explanations undermines the possibility to produce new, useful answers. This is not an issue for all other points of the analysis, with the possible exception of section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 (those concerning foreign policy) in cases where a state's foreign policy process and personnel patterning is not publically documented. But this variable introduces to us a new type of problem: it has to be accommodated by a superstructural Marxist interpretation of other states' affairs, which – although not impossible – is such an expansive task, that one could consider it a case study of the whole world. I'll expand on this notion in Chapter 5.

This creates an awkward problematic. I've stated in chapter 4.3.1, there are three overarching interpretations of Chinese foreign policy conduct, which are all possible to further reduce to different circumstantial interpretations. For example, we may assess that China is indeed freeloading: is this an intentional, selfish move? Or do they genuinely think that the relationship is a balanced one, perhaps legitimized by considering their Confucian institutes a gift, rather than a soft power move? Or rather, are they in a structural circumstance in which they are unable to perform otherwise? The multitude of possibilities associated with each interpretation in relation to each explanation thereof, quickly branches beyond the scope at hand. I do not consider any of them illegitimate, but because it is not documented how international matters are gathered, formulated and processed within the Chinese state, I will need to devise a Marxist explanation which is consistent with China's actions towards EU and European states²⁴.

I will, first and foremost, proceed from the assumption that European engagement with China is above all about promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights in China, as well as liberalizing their economy. I find this a difficult assessment to contest, especially since a 2009 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) explicitly states so (Fox & Godement 2009:1). Because of this the EU – or, at the very least Godement – feels exploited by China; EUs policies towards China are labeled as “unconditional engagement”, which is a term that signifies the ease with which China can reap economic benefits from EU while still making it problematic for European companies to enter China, which has caused the EU a trade deficit with China of €169 billion (ibid.:2). The report states that:

“China has learned to exploit the divisions among EU Member States. It treats its relationship with the EU as a game of chess, with 27 opponents crowding the other side of the board and squabbling about which piece to move.” (Fox & Godement 2009:3)

²³ Recall, as mentioned in Section 2.4, that World Systems Theory is a component approach, as well as dependency theory on which it is built.

²⁴ Ideally, one that is consistent with all cases of international interaction.

Altogether, the picture painted is one of an extremely assertive and effective China, which has managed an aperture for receiving technology, business, investment, etc. while denying ideological influence or interference into territorial disputes in Taiwan and Tibet (ibid.). Which seems curious, if Lanteigne (2009) correctly assessed that the amount of actors incorporated into the foreign policy process in the Chinese state is increasing. Of course, we have to evaluate this in the light of an institution which has as its primary goal to interfere with the status quo of China, and as such have reacted negatively to China's unwillingness to comply²⁵. Ultimately, the report speculates that China considered its WTO accession conclusive to its economic development, rather than the beginning of it (Fox and Godement 2009:11).

The lack of even incremental Westernization in China can certainly be ascribed to a rigid, Totalitarian regime which manipulates its environment to its favor and consistently refuses to compromise on geographical matters. Meanwhile I find it unlikely that the Chinese government is able to maneuver so elegantly, but even more importantly, I think that dogmatic self-perceptions of democracy as the end-all and be-all of politics causes a backlash, perhaps quite opposite to what the EU intended to accomplish. Because if the EUs objectives are so publicly and proudly announced, then it is safe to assume that the Chinese are well aware of it too, which from their perspective cannot be interpreted as anything less than cultural imperialism.

At this point, I urge the reader to put themselves in the position of the Chinese government; we realize that a different culture is trying to impose its norms on us, but we are completely dependent upon their economic ties for continuous development. When Fox & Godement accuse China of regressing by increasing economic government intervention (ibid.11), they completely disregard the fact that this can be interpreted as an action of reinforcement stemming from fear of ideological invasion. This assessment stems from three interpretations of the relations between the Chinese public and the state: 1) that popular nationalism in China urges the government to act assertively and sometimes aggressively in international matters (Downs, et al. 1999; Zhao 2013). 2) That China has had a longstanding history of domestic turmoil during politically unstable periods (Such as the Civil War followed by the Cultural Revolution) causing them some anxiety towards political reforms. 3) This causes an assertive Chinese foreign policy on the basis of domestic insecurity. Such an explanation would certainly account for the interpretation of the EU, the actions of China, and is compliant with the discrepant class relations which we've seen thus far.

Another case which blots aspects of the Chinese foreign policy is that of Liu Xiabo, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway in 2010, due to his continuous attempts at promoting democracy in China. Naturally, European citizens find it despicable to imprison a peaceful protestor, and as such attempted to instigate his release. In response, the Chinese froze diplomatic relations with Norway, banned whole salmon imports from Norway, and stopped granting Norwegian citizens 72-hour transit visas. Even after demoting the Chairman for the Nobel committee this year, China has remained firm in their position towards Norway, claiming that it is up to Norway to initiate a gesture to regain positive relations²⁶.

²⁵ Additionally, the report mentions France specifically and China's threat to freeze trade relations due to France's stance on human rights and Tibet (Fox & Godement 2009:12), which makes it difficult to ignore potential personal interest.

²⁶ <http://www.thelocal.no/20150304/changing-nobel-chair-not-enough-to>

This is fairly consistent with the former assessment – that the Chinese government lashes out at attempts to invade their domain – but this particular case also shows the desperation on their part. The acts of the Nobel committee and the Norwegian government are not coordinated acts to overthrow the Chinese government, and the CCP knows this, but they are insecure enough that they need to perform a manner of punishment to dissuade populations from instigating pro-democratic talks in China. The results are restrictions based around what they can do, and not what is relevant. This does not necessarily mean that they feel that they have no other choice; China clearly illustrates some confidence stemming from the realization that access to their markets is a lucrative prospect for most European nations and they utilize it intentionally. In this regard, we may refer back to the Chess analogy of Fox and Godement; the Chinese state seems to fully appreciate that EU is easier to manage when approached with a ‘divide and conquer’ tactic, than when EU unites around an issue, such as is the case with environmental issues, the improvement of which has become part of China’s current five-year plan.

Through both types of interaction we see a common pattern, which is China’s immediate and harsh reaction once matters of ideology come up, which strongly indicates that China is aware of the frailty of balancing between economic reforms through neo-liberal principles and attempting to maintain a Socialist society. This awareness causes a reaction not dissimilar to a porcupine curling up to cover its weak spot; Norway and France’s stance on democracy, human rights and Tibet, caused China to significantly diminish economic ties because they realize that once the neo-liberal ball starts rolling it’s going to establish momentum. Thus, it is not a far cry to understand the absence of political reforms as a function of insecurity, which would bleed into the class character of the state by creating an anti-democratic disposition, while the division of labor is displaced towards Capitalist norms propelled onwards by the economic intermingling.

Chapter 5: Discussion of Results

In this last chapter, we're going to revisit the method through the analysis and relate it back to the original object of interest. This is going to occur in the following order: first I will quickly summarize the findings of the analysis section by section; second, I intend to draw a conclusion from the analysis, but, as we shall see, this can be a problematic matter; third, in section 5.2, I will relate the analysis back to the thesis and the problem at hand.

5.1 The Analysis in Retrospect

For this section each paragraph corresponds to a subsection of the analysis.

5.1.1 Inputs

The tasks dealt with by the state seem to originate from two sources: regional testing and policy sponsoring. The former bearing Socialist traits while the latter requires the interest of resourceful individuals or groups. Policy sponsoring cannot be said to be a Capitalist technology either, but rather a peculiar outgrowth of China's complicated and irregular political process. The content of tasks seems to favor economic growth over ideological mobilization, which is indicative of Capitalist states.

The personnel recruitment process is supposed to be a Meritocratic process, but with Aristocratic personnel possibly composing roughly 20% of the political elite I would be hard pressed to accept a Meritocratic conclusion. Even so, the Meritocracy in China seems better understood through concepts such as culture or history rather than Marxist understanding of class and state. If we interpret Meritocracy as a development of class rather than history, then we force reality into the rigidity of the method rather than fitting the model to reality.

State revenue seemed to be composed of a mix between Capitalist and Socialist methods and seems more indicative of a transition than a desired format.

5.1.2 Processes of Transformation

In the handling of tasks the Chinese state ostensibly mobilizes a formal Marxism through decentralized policy implementation, but the state technology allows for policy sponsoring which distorts the power relations. The issue arises from what seems to be an unclear and irregular process, which causes sponsoring to aid the policy in 'surviving' the different organs. The model looks somewhat like the Capitalist model of bureaucracy (Office hierarchy, units assigned areas of jurisdiction), but it seems that a lack of procedures and legal frameworks causes a manifestation different from Capitalism proper.

The personnel patterning, meanwhile, seems to suggest an apparent institutional setup inspired by Marx, but the economic reforms seem to continuously allow the elites to exploit systemic imbalances for personal profit. Some personnel enjoy positions within several ministries, but not as a patterning of subordinate and superordinate positions, causing an absence of mechanisms keeping power in check.

As for the allocation of resources within the state I was unable to locate any valuable data.

5.1.3 Outputs

As far as foreign policy goes the international playing field is economic (as opposed to ideological), and the Chinese foreign policy imitates this, whether it's to adapt or because they would prefer economic foreign policy over ideological emphasis seems unclear. Even if so-called 'soft power' initiatives resemble ideological foreign policies, the overall tendencies are much more readily explained by dependency than through class.

On the home front the Chinese state utilizes both legal and ideological measures of output. While it is tempting to label them in a transition away from ideological mobilization towards legal bureaucracy, I argued that their control measures over social organization are more indicative of Totalitarian regimes than Socialist or Capitalist.

Their international personnel patterning, like their foreign policy, seems much more readily explained by component approaches than class, as the Chinese are forced to integrate into institutions and have representatives of the nation whether through desire or need.

Domestically speaking, the distance between civil and political personnel is not only completely skewed, the gap seems to be increasing during the course of the reform periods. The isolation of political personnel is a typical Totalitarian move away from Socialism as witnessed in late Soviet Russia where politicians were supplied groceries from special outlets and chauffeured in armored cars (Therborn 1978:113). This causes political insensitivity to practical, everyday experiences of citizens and cannot be said to be a Socialist feature.

The expenditures of the Chinese state are quite similar to their Western counterparts despite the presence of SOEs, though they seem to be run like private enterprises but with government directive, causing them only to peripherally be part of the government output, but not considered as part of the output statistics *per se*.

5.1.4 The European Variable

In the case of China there is a strong Socialist internal pressure from popular nationalists and a strong democratic external pressure from Europe. China benefits from trade ties and technology imports from Europe, but they simultaneously require support from the population to avoid major revolt. The tension, in my interpretation, causes the Party to reject external ideological influence, by realizing the value of Chinese markets to EU (confirmed by the persistence of EU trade despite the deficits). This concurrently allows them to avoid internal pressure, which is likely favorable given that the Chinese state is more likely to be overthrown from within than by the EU. However, I should mention that it is equally valid to interpret the tension as increasingly rising and the Chinese state evolving Totalitarian methods in attempt to maintain power. The exact nature of interests and developments are unclear in this context, but what is important is that influence from the international environment can potentially affect the class character of the state, whether by necessitating certain developments or through influences to a nation's public.

5.1.5 The Organization of the State and its Technology

Altogether the picture emerging seems to illustrate Socialist and Capitalist technology, with implementations which causes certain vulnerabilities which are either ineffective or susceptible to exploitation. We see bureaucratic technologies but with poor legal frameworks and elites who hold important positions in several ministries, presumably allowing them to act as policy sponsors, distorting the relations between the Capitalist and Socialist spectrum towards Totalitarian and Feudal manifestations. Additionally, their cultural history values Meritocracy which has also made its way into the political system, making it practically impossible to determine the class character of the state. One certainly gets the impression of a political system in development, but are not all state systems in constant development?

5.2 Marxist State Analysis in IR Theory

5.2.1 Criticisms

Before even proceeding to the point of trying to establish a Marxist concept of the state which can operate as an international state actor, problems arise both associated with Therborn's model and the way that I attempted to approach this.

First of all, it is my personal opinion that the 'patchwork' approach to Marxism is problematic. Marx conceived of the whole of the social, political, and economic spheres – indeed all of society – as a 'totality' (Williams 2005:36). The exact nature of totality is still discussed, but the point of the matter is a type of interconnectedness; all parts of society are connected either directly or by proxy. The concept of base and superstructure is closely tied to this idea, but not totality in its complete form, because we should increasingly consider the whole world (and the universe for that matter) as the totality. Because of this, it's easy to see that base and superstructure, while actually born out of an attempt to avoid isolation of parts of society, ends up being a rigid structure that isolates the conception of society from the international system. I've attempted to remedy this, but such 'patchwork' is at best a temporary solution; the concept possesses many weak points which are better avoided by building a new theory from the ground up. Raymond Williams wrote on the concept:

"Now for my own part I have always opposed the formula of base and superstructure: not primarily because of its methodological weaknesses but because of its rigid, abstract and static character." (Williams 2005:20).

After having utilized the model Therborn developed around this concept I tend to agree. What is curious is that William's own dynamic concept, which I utilized as seen in section 2.4, is compatible with Therborn's model insofar as they both focus on the conditions of practice rather than the object of production. The notion is that this makes it a dynamic model, but my engagement with it seems to suggest that the concept of the economic base determining the superstructure attributes a primacy to constellations of labor (both physically within companies and generally in society). This sidesteps history, culture and international relations as 'specifications', but what happens when these variables much more readily explain the political organization than infrastructure? How am I supposed to interpret the presence of Totalitarian or Feudal manifestations within the Chinese political system, if not through a history of structural vulnerabilities and individual interests?

A related problem becomes visible in the case of the Chinese state, when every aspect of the analysis seems to point in different directions. The variables included are not 'weighted'; it would be absurd to count the variables and see whichever type of state organization is more prevalent than the other. Marxism seems to rely on an implicit understanding of development from Feudal to Capitalist to Socialist, which is easily dismissed, but the spectrum of analysis is still confined to an understanding of state technologies within ideal types of organization. We might accept an explanation of the Chinese state as more Capitalist than it is regularly considered by increasingly focusing on efficacy over equality. Yet how are we to devise a concise understanding of the state in relation to archetypical understandings of organization, when we identify Capitalist, Socialist, Feudal, Totalitarian, and Meritocratic values? In conjunction with the former, we see that such an effort seems futile. I agree with Williams that the concept of infrastructure and superstructure is rigid, but I believe it to be so fundamentally flawed that attempting to maintain the concept through patchwork solutions is not going to be a worthwhile endeavor.

In this regard there is also the matter of my own patchwork solution to the problem of international influences to the state organization. While I am positively surprised how easily one could likely assess the 'principles determining responses to the international environment' through a sample size of influences, I would still say that it requires specification. I see no reason to formulate such specifications while denouncing the use of the model it belongs to. Ultimately, during the course of international analysis, it would also quickly become a problematic variable no matter how it is formulated. This plays back in to the concept of totality, because the more the model is specified and applied the more the analysis simply escalates from attempting to explain or predict matters of international relations, to attempting to describe a theoretical picture of the world. A preliminary illustration might clarify this:




Figure 2: Causal relations in theory of International Relations based on Marxist state conceptions.

For each unit of analysis, we are concerned primarily with the determination of the infrastructure to the superstructure and the relations between superstructures, but we still have to acknowledge the reciprocal relations between every single unit of interest²⁷. As the model clearly indicates, this is a complicated matter. The patchwork approach is problematic for the same reason: adding a specification to a thesis is fine, but a continuous wealth of specifications to a model risks eliminating the difference between theory and reality. If a model requires input to the point of describing all of reality (as in a totality) it becomes practically impossible to utilize it to make predictions.

²⁷ In fact, I removed the indications of relations between State A and State C since it was already cluttered.

The concept of Class becomes problematic for much the same reasons as the concept of State above. Depriving it of normative aspects leaves it rather lackluster; being forced to describe the organization of the state through economic classes is a rather loose system, yet supplying it with specifications seems senseless if deprived of its relation to the class struggle altogether. The concept of deconstructing Marx seems to me to run into similar problems in many areas, where select aspects are picked apart for utilization in different kinds of frameworks. Ultimately, my own conclusion is that Marxism should not be considered based on universal principles to be salvaged, but is inherently best understood as a criticism of Capitalism; even the component approaches bear this connotation of exploitation!

This lends credence to Poulantzas' reasoning in "State, Power, Socialism" (2000), in which he argues against a general theory of state. I do not necessarily know if such is impossible, but since he is a Marxist, I understand the frustration in attempting to formulate a Marxist, general theory of the state. In his work we come to certain realizations, such as the fact that not all state apparatuses can be understood through political repression alone (ibid.:13). Additionally, a final understanding of causal relations between economic, political and ideological relations is impossible, because rather than being determined, they are from their conception bound by their mutual relation to each other, constantly defining and redefining the spaces of each other. For this reason, Poulantzas assesses that just as there can be no general theory of economy in all its forms, there can be no general theory of the state in all its forms (ibid.:19). What *can* be is a general theory of the Capitalist state, which I believe is the sphere in which Marxism resides; the object of orientation in the definitions and connotations of state and class in Marxism remain inexorably tied to the Capitalist mode of production.

5.2.2 The Marxist Thesis

Ultimately, without having been able to embrace the notion of building a Marxist, state-centric theory of International Relations, we come to the question of whether we should even accept the basic premise from which we began. Should we believe that the state organization is a materialization of the relations of class rule in society?

If we accept the notion that Marxism is not a theory of the state in general, then the thesis accordingly cannot be a general statement of relations between class and state in all societies. Strictly speaking my analysis of the Chinese state does not pose grounds for such a conclusion, yet I will propose a short answer.

I do not think that there can be a specific order of determination between state and class even for Capitalism in general. There are many manifestations of Capitalism in Europe and yet they derive from very similar conditions of production and exploitation. I still retain that it is imperative to understand the Capitalist state in relation to class struggle, but only insofar as the state is the battleground for it, rather than exclusively the apparatus of repression on behalf of the dominant classes.

Conclusion

I began this dissertation by distancing myself from Lenin's recognition of Marx, by allowing for the possibility of Marxism possessing relevance beyond the hope of a dictatorship of the proletariat. I operationalized this into an assessment of a basic thesis inherent to Marxist theory of the state, while coupling it with the possibility of erecting a model of international relations founded on the Marxist concept of the state. Since Marx' concept of the state is based on the same thesis this allowed me to engage with both prospects at once, culminating in the following problem:

Is it possible to develop a theory of International Relations based on the Marxist concept of the state?

I decided that the most efficacious manner to determine this, rather than attempting to sketch such a theory, was to engage with the basic premises by performing a Marxist state analysis. This would allow me to understand the extent to which I believe the Marxist theory of the state still holds true and possibly propose a rough draft for a Marxist, international state actor.

Before being able to approach a model of state analysis, it was imperative to understand the relationship between the terms state and class. In recounting the development from a materialist interpretation of history to an economic understanding of history (somewhat misleadingly still referred to as historical materialism), we see how not just nature, but also social systems, affect consciousness. Out of mankind's social - which is to say economic - circumstances arises ideology. Marx transferred these properties to class and state, by claiming – in an equivalent manner – that out of the economic base arises the superstructure. Subsequent to arguing how the determination of the superstructure by the base occurs, I relate it to the problem of specification which I base on Marx' own mention of cultural and historical contexts.

Having illustrated the theoretical basis, as well as how a state-centric method deviates from component approaches, I designate the Chinese state as a target for a deviant case study based on a Therborn's Marxist state-analysis model. The model is an attempt to elucidate the relations described in the thesis, which it attempts by understanding the state as an organization of inputs, transformation, and outputs. However, since an understanding of states through domestic relations exclusively causes a state actor only comprised of outputs, I operationalize the problem of specification as an aperture to include an understanding of the organization of the state in relation to the international environment. I add this variable to the inputs of the organization, however, for purposes of isolation I present it on its own to be able to clearly evaluate the usefulness of the variable in the analysis.

During the course of the analysis I find that the Chinese state displays traits of Capitalism and Socialism, as well as Feudal, Totalitarian and Meritocratic characteristics. The Chinese state system in particular contains some curious imbalances and vulnerabilities, which causes it to be susceptible to exploits for personal benefit. In many ways, the Socialist traits are detached from their roots; this is not inherently a negative assessment, given that Socialism may have as many manifestations as Capitalism, indeed, it would seem rational to presume so. However, poor legal frameworks surrounding the central bureaucracy and several prominent political positions held by a tightknit elite have increasingly separated the state personnel from the workers. Insofar as my own variable goes, it seemed to clearly indicate that international relations do affect the organization of the state, but lack of specification makes it difficult to determine exactly how. Since I eventually find it unlikely to be possible to use the Marxist state conception as a basis for theory of International Relations, I do not attempt to formulate these specifications.

The conclusion, that there can be no theory of International Relations derived from Marx' theory of the state, is based on four arguments; three of which emerge from my analysis, and one based on Poulantzas work which corresponds to my findings.

The first revolves around the notion that while it is possible to utilize the problem of specification to resolve the lack of international influence in the Marxist understanding of state organization, such an operation only stalls problems inherent to the basic premises of the relationship. It seems clear to me, that conceiving the superstructure as determined, in the last instance, by the economic base through analogy to consciousness arising out of material conditions is a logical misstep: the political system is not the sum of ideology arising out of the economic conditions of all individuals in a society. Marx assumes that poor material, economic conditions of a majority of laborers will cause them to 'shift the ideology', i.e. revolt. Because of this assumption it is impossible to salvage the descriptive aspects of the state from the normative aspects of the state in Marxism.

A second problem is the lack of variable weight. This is a problem more closely related to the analytical model than Marxism, but it is likely a function of a long-standing problem of Marxism: it harbors a theoreticism that is hard to concretize. The theoretical acknowledgement of factors involved in shaping the political manifestation is not sufficient to determine the organization of the state. Because of the overgrowth of influences on the Chinese state, it is impossible to evaluate in relation to a spectrum which revolves around the antinomies of Capitalism and Socialism. This presents a problem in assessing the variables: it is impossible to weigh them in relation to each other. Particularly when they so poorly fit the ideal types of Capitalism and Socialism as was the case for all personnel-related variables.

The third problem revolves around the cluttered relations that need to be considered when the causal relations are already difficult to determine. The original concept already understood the state as part of a totality in society, which is much too detailed a state model for understanding inter-state relations. I was initially hoping that it would be possible to reduce the amount of factors necessary to understand the actor only in international relations (without domestic relations). Yet it is impossible to detach the superstructure from the infrastructure and remain a Marxist. This causes a wealth of causal relations between the populations and state of all nations involved in a given analysis, which is highly impractical.

The last argument, advanced by Poulantzas in 1978 originally, is based around the impossibility of a theory of the state in general. The economic, political and ideological spheres are consistently intertwined in relations that are far too contextual to be formulated universally. Instead we should conceive of Marxism only as a theory of Capitalist states in general, while embracing the dynamics across all spheres of interest. This means that the Capitalist state is not simply the means of domination, it is simultaneously subject to political struggle. Rather than considering the state as a function of class relations external to it, the state is a manifestation of the class struggle which takes place both within and outside its organs and apparatuses.

It may be possible to expand the Marxist understanding of the Capitalist state to include foreign influences, and I think it becomes increasingly relevant to do so. Yet insofar as the basic premises of the state in Marxism can only be said to account for the genealogy of Capitalism, I also believe that there cannot be a theory of International Relations based solely on the Marxist concept of the state.


Bibliography

- Althusser**, Louis (1970): *"On Ideology"*. Verso Books.
- Andrew**, Edward (1983): "Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers", in *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 577-584. Canadian Political Science Association.
- Bidet**, Jacques & Kouvelakis, Stathis (2008): *"Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism"*. Brill.
- Brown**, Kerry (2014): *"The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China"*. I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Bryman**, Alan (2008): *"Social Research Methods"*. Oxford University Press.
- Christensen**, Thomas J. (2011): "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 54-67. Council on Foreign Relations.
- Cox**, Michael (2002): "The Search for Relevance: Historical Materialism After the Cold War", in (ed.) Rupert, Mark & Smith, Hazel (2002): *Historical Materialism and Globalization*. Routledge.
- Dong**, Bin and Torgler, Benno, (2013): "Causes of corruption: Evidence from China", in *China Economic Review*, Vol. 26, p. 152-169. Elsevier.
- Downs**, Erica Strecker & Saunders, Phillip C. (1999): "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands", in *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 114-146. MIT Press.
- Easton**, David (1957): *"An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems"*, Cambridge University Press.
- Fan**, C. Cindy (2008): "Migration, Hukou, and the Chinese City," in *China Urbanizes: Consequences, Strategies, and Policies*, edited by Shahid Yusuf and Anthony Saich, pp. 65-90. The World Bank.
- Fearn**, Nicholas (2001): *"Zeno and the Tortoise"*. Atlantic Books.
- Flyvbjerg**, Bent (2006): "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", in *Qualitative Inquiry*, vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 219-245. Sage Publications.
- Fox**, John & Godement, Francois (2009): *"A Power Audit of EU-China Relations"*. European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Gallagher**, Mary E. (2002): "Reform and Openness: Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy", in *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 03, pp. 338-372. Cambridge University Press.
- Hammond**, Daniel R. (2009): *"Explaining Policy Making in the People's Republic of China: the Case of the Urban Resident Minimum Livelihood Guarantee System, 1992-2003"*. University of Glasgow.
Url as of 29-05-2015: <http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1580/>
- Heilmann**, Sebastian (2008): "From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process", in *The China Journal*, No. 59, pp. 1-30. The University of Chicago Press.

- Henderson, J. Vernon** (2009): "*Urbanization in China: Policy Issues and Options*", China Economic Research and Advisory Programme.
- Lanteigne, Marc** (2009): "*Chinese Foreign Policy*". Routledge.
- Lenin, Vladimir** (1964): "The State and Revolution", in *Collected Works*, vol. 25, Progress Publishers.
- Lijphart, Arend** (1971): "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 682-693. American Political Science Association.
- Little, Daniel** (2012): "Philosophy of History", in (ed.) Zalta, Edward N. (2012): *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. URL as of 29-05-2015: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/history/#HegHis>
- Maclean, John** (1988): "Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of Mutual Neglect", in *Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 295-319. Millenium Publishing House.
- Marcuse, Herbert** (2002): "*One-Dimensional Man*". Routledge.
- Marsh, Robert M.** (1964): "The Bearing of Comparative Analysis on Sociological Theory", in *Social Forces*, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 188-196. Oxford University Press.
- Martin, Michael F.** (2010): "*Understanding China's Political System*", Congressional Research Service.
- Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich** (1969): "Manifesto of the Communist Party", in *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 98-137. Progress Publishers.
- Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich** (1998): "*The German Ideology*". Prometheus Books.
- Marx, Karl** (1991): "*Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*", Vol. 3. Penguin Books.
- Poulantzas, Nicos** (2000): "*State, Power, Socialism*". Verso.
- Qing, Jiang** (2013): "*A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China's Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future*". Princeton University Press.
- Qinglian, He** (2002): "China's Listing Social Structure", in *Index on Censorship*, Vol. 31, No.2, pp. 88-93. Sage Journals.
- Ranciere, Jacques** (2014): "*Hatred of Democracy*". Verso.
- Redding, Paul** (2014): "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", in Zalta, Edward N. (2014): *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. URL as of 29-05-2015: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/>
- Robinson, Howard** (2012): "Dualism", in (ed.) Zalta, Edward N. (2012): *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. URL as of 29-05-2015: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/>
- Rupert, Mark & Smith, Hazel** (2002): "*Historical Materialism and Globalization*". Routledge.
- Seligman, Edwin** (1901): "The Economic Interpretation of History. I", in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol 16, No. 4, pp. 612-640. The Academy of Political Science.

- Sewell, Rob** (2002): *“What is Dialectical Materialism”*. International Marxist Tendency.
 Url as of 29-05-2015: <http://www.marxist.com/dialectical-materialism-study-guide.htm>
- Shaoguang, Wang** (2013): *“Is the Way of the Human Authority a Good Thing? An Assessment of Confucian Constitutionalism”*, in Qing, Jiang (2013): *A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future*. Princeton University Press.
- Solnick, Steven L.** (1996): *“The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective”*, in *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 209-238, Cambridge University press.
- Sun, Yun** (2012): *“China and the Changing Myanmar”*, in *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 51-77. German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
- Tanner, Murray S.** (1995): *“How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking”*, in *The China Quarterly*, No. 141, Special Issue: China’s Legal Reforms, pp. 39-64. Cambridge University Press.
- Therborn, Göran** (1978): *“What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules?”*. Lowe and Brydone Printers Ltd.
- Tosel, André** (2008): *“The Development of Marxism: From the End of Marxism-Leninism to a Thousand Marxisms – France-Italy, 1975-2005”* in (ed.) Bidet, Jacques & Kouvelakis, Stathis (2008): *Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism*. Brill.
- Williams, Raymond** (2005): *“Culture and Materialism”*. Verso.
- Wright, Teresa** (2010): *“Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China’s Reform Era”*. Stanford University Press.
- Wæver, Ole** (1992): *“Introduktion til Studiet af International Politik”*. Forlaget Politiske Studier.
- Xiaoguang, Kang & Heng, Han** (2011): *“Graduated Control: Research on State-Society Relationship in Contemporary Mainland China”*, in (ed.) Zhenglai, Deng (2011): *State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective*. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
- Zhao, Suisheng** (2013): *“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn”*, in *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 22, No. 82, pp. 535-553. Routledge.

Appendix item A: NPC Composition, 2003



Source: Shaoguang (2013:151)

Appendix item B: Government Revenue Sources

(100 million yuan)

Item	Public		
	Government Revenue	Central Government	Local Governments
National Government Revenue	129209.64	60198.48	69011.16
Total Tax Revenue	110530.70	56639.82	53890.88
Domestic Value Added Tax	28810.13	20533.81	8276.32
Domestic Consumption Tax	8231.32	8231.32	
VAT and Consumption Tax from Imports	14004.56	14004.56	
VAT and Consumption Tax Rebate for Exports	-10518.85	-10518.85	
Business Tax	17233.02	78.44	17154.58
Corporate Income Tax	22427.20	14443.86	7983.34
Individual Income Tax	6531.53	3918.99	2612.54
Resource Tax	1005.65	45.34	960.31
City Maintenance and Construction Tax	3419.90	176.30	3243.60
House Property Tax	1581.50		1581.50
Stamp Tax	1244.36	455.55	788.81
Stamp Tax on Security Exchange	469.65	455.55	14.10
Urban Land Use Tax	1718.77		1718.77
Land Appreciation Tax	3293.91		3293.91
Tax on Vehicles and Boat Operation	473.96		473.96
Tax on Ship Tonnage	43.55	43.55	
Vehicle Purchase Tax	2596.34	2596.34	
Tariffs	2630.61	2630.61	
Farm Land Occupation Tax	1808.23		1808.23
Deed Tax	3844.02		3844.02
Tobacco Leaf Tax	150.26		150.26
Other Tax Revenue	0.73		0.73
Total Non-tax Revenue	18678.94	3558.66	15120.28
Special Program Receipts	3528.61	406.39	3122.22
Charge of Administrative and Institutional Units	4775.83	278.48	4497.35
Penalty Receipts	1658.77	45.43	1613.34
Other Non-tax Receipts	8715.73	2828.36	5887.37

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

Appendix Item C: Decentralized Policy Process

		Maoist Mass Mobilization Approach ([1928–]1943–1976)	Dengist Administrative Approach (1979–)
Steps in establishing “model experiments”	1	Make a thorough investigation of several locations	
	2	Select a location conducive to successful experimentation	
	3	Dispatch cadre “work team”	<i>Rely on local cadres</i>
	4	Nurture new activists and cadres in the location	
	5	Report regularly to higher-level Party organs	
Steps in “proceeding from point to surface”	6	Send in investigation teams from higher-level authorities	
	7	Confirm/revise/terminate local model experiment	
	8	Reassign original work team and local activists to surrounding locations	<i>[No work teams used]</i>
	9	Promote local model leaders to leading provincial or national positions	
	10	Launch an emulation campaign and intervisitation program	
	11	Give speeches, issue documents to spread the model experience	
	12	<i>[Formal legislation rarely enacted, 1957–78]</i>	<i>Enact national regulation/legislation</i>

Source: Heilmann (2008:28)

Appendix Item D-1: Type of Government Control

Control variable	Status of control variable	
A: The government attitude towards the establishment of social organization	a ₁ : The organization is established in a top-down way; a ₂ : The establishment of the organization is encouraged by the government; a ₃ : The organization is established in a bottom-up way and shall be included in the management system set by the government; a ₄ : The organization is established in a bottom-up way without governmental intervention; a ₅ : The organization is prohibited from registering as corporation aggregate, but the government tacitly consents to the social organizations existing as legal entity; a ₆ : The organization is prohibited from establishing, and the government bans the existing organization.	
B: The setup method of the government department concerning the management social organizations' activities	b ₁ : The government appoints a certain department in charge of the management; b ₂ : The government and social organization determine a business management unit after negotiation; b ₃ : No business management unit; the government manages social organization as corporation; b ₄ : The management of social organizations' activities is conducted by the unit to which the organization belongs; the government does not conduct direct intervention; b ₅ : Business activity is developed by the organization itself.	
C: The government control over the governance structure	C ₁ : Crucial decision making C ₂ : The appointment of the person in charge	C ₁₁ : Crucial decisions are made by the competent department; C ₁₂ : Crucial decisions are proposed by the organization and require the approval from the competent department; C ₁₃ : Crucial decisions are made by the organization. C ₂₁ : The person in charge is appointed by the competent department;

(Continued)

Source: Xiaoguang & Heng (2011:105)

		C ₂₂ : The person in charge is appointed by the unit to which the organization belongs;
		C ₂₃ : The person in charge is determined by the organization and government after negotiation;
		C ₂₄ : The person in charge is determined by the organization.
D: Resource Control	D ₁ : Funds control	d ₁₁ : The government specifies the funds source of the organization through laws and regulations;
		d ₁₂ : The government restricts the funds collection through administrative methods;
		d ₁₃ : The government supports the funds collection through administrative methods;
		d ₁₄ : The government does not intervene with the funds, but the organization needs to report the source to the competent department;
		d ₁₅ : The funds come from the unit to which the organization belongs without direct government management;
		d ₁₆ : The funds are arranged by the organization.
	D ₂ : Human resource control: staff, salary standard	d ₂₁ : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the competent department;
		d ₂₂ : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the unit to which the organization belongs;
		d ₂₃ : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the organization, but it needs to report to the competent department;

(Continued)

Source: Xiaoguang & Heng (2011:106)

	d ₂₄ : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the organization.
E: Control over daily routines	e ₁ : The daily routines are the tasks assigned by the competent department; e ₂ : The daily routines are supported by the unit to which the organization belongs; e ₃ : The content of daily routines are decided by the organization but needs approval from the competent department before implementation; e ₄ : The daily routines are decided by the organization, but it needs to report to the competent department after implementation; e ₅ : The daily routines are conducted by the organization.

Source: Xiaoguang & Heng (2011:107)

Appendix Item D-2: Type of Social Organization

Control method The type of the organization	A	B	C		D		E
			C1	C2	D1	D2	
SG federation of trade union	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₁
SG ironworks labor union	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₁
SK corporate labor union	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₂
SD corporate labor union	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₂
SY community neighborhood committee	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₁
XX community neighborhood committee	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₁	d ₁₁	d ₂₁	e ₁
YY chamber of commerce	a ₂	b ₂	C ₁₂	C ₂₂	d ₁₄	d ₂₂	e ₄
ZB trade association	a ₂	b ₂	C ₁₂	C ₂₃	d ₁₄	d ₂₃	e ₄
WS investment association	a ₂	b ₂	C ₁₂	C ₂₃	d ₁₄	d ₂₃	e ₄
YC district Christian church	a ₃	b ₁	C ₁₂	C ₂₃	d ₁₂	d ₂₃	e ₃
BD township Christian church	a ₃	b ₁	C ₁₂	C ₂₃	d ₁₂	d ₂₃	e ₃
FP foundation	a ₂	b ₂	C ₁₂	C ₂₁	d ₁₃	d ₂₃	e ₄
XY education institute	a ₅	b ₃	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₆	d ₂₄	e ₅
FZ briefing	a ₅	b ₃	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₆	d ₂₄	e ₅
RD painting and calligraphy research institute	a ₄	b ₄	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₅	d ₂₄	e ₅
SY waist drum team	a ₄	b ₄	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₅	d ₂₄	e ₅
QN hobby organization	a ₄	b ₅	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₆	d ₂₄	e ₅
Falun Gong	a ₆	b ₁	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₂	d ₂₄	e ₅

Source: Xiaoguang & Heng (2011:108)

Appendix Item D-3: Relationship Between Control (C-1) and Organization (C-2)

Corresponding pattern	Type of organization	Control method of the government over social organizations							
		A	B	C		D		E	
				C1	C2	D1	D2		
I	Labor union; Community neighborhood committee	a ₁	b ₁	C ₁₁	C ₂₁	d ₁₁	d ₂₁	e ₁	
					C ₂₂	d ₁₁	d ₂₂	e ₂	
II	Associations, chamber of commerce; GONGOs	a ₂	b ₂	C ₁₂	C ₂₁	d ₁₃	d ₂₂	e ₄	
					C ₂₂	d ₁₄	d ₂₃		
					C ₂₃				
III	Grassroots NGOs; Informal hobby organization	a ₅	b ₃	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₅	d ₂₄	e ₅	
			a ₄			b ₄	d ₁₆		
						b ₅			
IV	Church groups	a ₃	b ₁	C ₁₂	C ₂₃	d ₁₂	d ₂₃	e ₃	
V	Political opposition groups	a ₆	b ₁	C ₁₃	C ₂₄	d ₁₂	d ₂₄	e ₅	

Source: Xiaoguang & Heng (2011:109)

Appendix Item E: Government Expenditure

(100 million yuan)

Item	Public		
	Government Expenditure	Central Government	Local Governments
National Government Expenditure	140212.10	20471.76	119740.34
Expenditure for General Public Services	13755.13	1001.46	12753.67
Expenditure for Foreign Affairs	355.76	354.37	1.39
Expenditure for National Defense	7410.62	7177.37	233.25
Expenditure for Public Security	7786.78	1297.03	6489.75
Expenditure for Education	22001.76	1106.65	20895.11
Expenditure for Science and Technology	5084.30	2368.99	2715.31
Expenditure for Culture, Sport and Media	2544.39	204.45	2339.94
Expenditure for Social Safety Net and Employment Effort	14490.54	640.82	13849.72
Expenditure for Medical and Health Care, and Family Planning	8279.90	76.70	8203.20
Expenditure for Environment Protection	3435.15	100.26	3334.89
Expenditure for Urban and Rural Community Affairs	11165.57	19.06	11146.51
Expenditure for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Conservancy	13349.55	526.91	12822.64
Expenditure for Transportation	9348.82	722.99	8625.83
Expenditure for Affairs of Exploration, Power and Information	4899.06	453.68	4445.38
Expenditure for Affairs of Commerce and Services	1362.06	25.51	1336.55
Expenditure for Affairs of Financial Supervision	377.29	164.32	212.97
Expenditure for Post-earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction	42.79		42.79
Expenditure for Other Regional Assistance	158.54		158.54
Expenditure for Affairs of Land and Weather	1906.12	267.21	1638.91
Expenditure for Affairs of Housing Security	4480.55	404.73	4075.82
Expenditure for Affairs of Management of Grain & Oil Reserves	1649.42	905.14	744.28
Expenditure for the Principal and Interest of National Debts	3056.21	2315.41	740.80
Other Expenditure	3271.79	338.70	2933.09

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China