



AALBORG UNIVERSITY

**Civil-Military Cooperation in Conflict Management and Peace
Process: Determinants and Sources of Friction; Kenya Defense Forces
and Disarmament in North Rift**

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Abstract

This thesis is about the civil-military cooperation in the disarmament exercise carried out by Kenya Defense Forces in collaboration with other civilian actors in North Rift region in Kenya under the name Operation *Dumisha Amani* (Maintain Peace). The thesis has used four key hypothesis to establish the relationship between the differences in organizational structure, decision making procedures and information handling practices as well as trust issues on how they impact on the cooperation between the civilian and the military. The data has been qualitatively collected from the key informants operating in the region and military officers as well as desk research on how the differences impacted on cooperation. The organization theory has been used to analyze the different factors that influence the tendency of organizations to either cooperate or abjure it. Key insights from the theory including issues of uncertainty based on the differences in core goals, organizational structures as well as costs and limits set by hierarchies have been discussed. The data has been presented using frames and the findings have been discussed. Finally, the paper has concluded that indeed differences in organizational structure, decision making procedures and information handling procedures as well as trust impacted negatively on cooperation by preventing easy flow and interaction between the actors. The failure to establish a formal forum for cooperation has particularly stood out as the most misnomer in the Dumisha Amani operation.

List of Abbreviations

CBOs	Community Based Organizations
ESDP	European Security Defense Policy
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority and Development
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organization
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
RECSA	Regional Center for Small Arms
SRSF	Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

Definition of Terms

- *Attitude*: this refers to mental predisposition of an actor that influences how he/she behaves and conduct activities with others.
- *Centralized Organization structure*: this is the concentration of power and authority at one point called the center.
- *Civil-military cooperation* is the working arrangements between the civil actors and the military based on competencies and trust.
- *Decentralization*: denotes the dispersal of authority or concentration of power from the center to the local levels.
- *Directive*: this denotes the decision making approach where the person in authority issues orders that he/she expects to be followed by all as the binding decision.
- *Disarmament*: this is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants (warriors) and often also of the civilian populations (UN Secretary-General, IDDRS, 2006; UN Doc A/C. 5//59/31, 2005: para 1).
- *Disjointed*: this denotes absence of continues flow.
- *Dumisha Amani*: This is a Swahili word that means maintain peace and was used to dub the military operation that was carried out in the North Rift region to disarm the pastoral communities living there from 2005.
- *Flexibility*: this denotes the ability of an actor to switch his/her activities and course of action with little or no hindrance.
- *Fluid organizational structure*: this denotes a structure that gives room for participation to all without regard to their positions within the structure.
- *Hierarchical organizational structure*: this signifies the classification or sub-division of centers of authority in an ordered manner with the lower centers being accountable to the higher centers.

- *North Rift*: This is the region lying on the north western part of Kenya consisting of Baringo, Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana Counties.
- *Scope of action*: this refers to the boundaries within which an individual is allowed to act based on his/her structurally defined position within the organization and the work environment in which he/she operates.
- *Trust*: this refers to ability of actors to have confidence that the other actors will behave as expected and do that which is required of them.
- *Warriors*: this is an age-group of young men who are in their late teens and twenties who organized themselves to protect the community and raid also other communities with the blessings of elders.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Overview

Civil-military cooperation in the management of conflict and peace process has been discussed in this study as a troubled cooperation with sources of conflict inherent in how the two groups of actors are organized. This study discusses the organizational differences of the two groups of actors by looking at how they are structurally organized. It analyzes how the two actors make decisions within their structures. The way in which information is handled by the military and civilian actors and the issues of trust and how they influence cooperation between the actors. Taking the case of disarmament in North Rift Kenya, this study has analyzed how the differences impacted on cooperation by looking at how in practice the differences can hinder effective cooperation. This study has finally concluded that the differences have a great bearing on cooperation with the structure and decision making procedures impeding effective collaboration at the theater by preventing the military from sharing the information they had with the civilian actors thereby fueling mutual suspicion.

1.2 Research Context, Problem and Argument

The end of the Cold War brought with it a new form of conflict that has shifted from the interstate to intrastate conflicts. This has come with challenges that have made it mandatory for a cooperative approach to conflict management and peacebuilding. The approach which involves civilian actors and military actors has seen the two complement one another in the operation areas to reduce suffering and loss of lives. The practice however is a new development in light of the contemporary security and development challenges. Olsen observes that, before the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, crisis managements only involved civilian instruments thereby, leaving no option for the combination of both the civilian and military instruments (Olsen 2011, 334).

It is opined that, the increase in the civil wars and ethnic strife in the period after the end of Cold War has demanded the relinquishment of traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement under chapter VII of the UN (Franke 2006, 6). This means that the role of the military in the peace process had to change from less passive to more active under peace enforcement framework. In the same vein, it is argued that, the nature of international conflicts in the 1990s did put the relief workers at risk. For instance relief workers were killed intentionally in Rwanda and Chechnya in 1997 (Winslow 2002, 37). The

inability of relief workers to do their work in the conflict situations called for the need to help them continue with their valuable work hence need for security protection.

It is out of such that Harris et al have argued that, for humanitarian agencies to continue aiding those affected by internal conflicts and regional warfare, then they must work more closely with the military (Andrew Harris 2002). In a similar vein, Miller has observed that, weapons have been accepted by the NGOs as a necessary evil to enable them reach their goals with the failure of other methods to provide a safe environment (Miller 1999, 191). From the foregoing therefore, the civilian actors working to aid those victimized by the warfare, must work with the military to achieve their objectives. The fact that their work and lives are put at risk makes even the cooperation with the military more desirable hence a need for cooperative arrangements.

The need for a safe environment for civilian actors in crisis situations is therefore, the first key reason necessitating cooperation between the civil and military actors. In his interview with a Canadian Officer in former Yugoslavia Winslow reports the lack of resources to meet both the military and humanitarian demands. Reporting that the officers were doing all they could “to keep all the balls in the air”. This indicates how pressing the situation can be in terms of resources in the attempt to balance things out while delivering on the mandate. Winslow concludes that, even though the military and the NGOs are strange bedfellows, their overlapping tasks and limited resources in areas of operation makes them stay in the sheets together (Winslow 2002, 50). The tasks which includes the restoration of basic infrastructure like roads, hospitals, schools et al using both military and civilian actors which in many cases are overwhelmed by the needs.

Stemming from the above, the complimentary roles of both the military and civilian actors in the effective management of conflict and peace processes is essential. Gentilini Fernando, while writing on Afghan lessons, quoted General McChrystal saying, “We need civilians, people who can advise us, help us, and support the reconstruction of the country. It can’t be the military telling me where to build a school or a well or install a road” (Gentilini 2013, 124). This means that, the need for cooperation is not only important to the civilian actors but also to the military. In the same spirit, NATO has lauded this cooperation as the interface intended primarily to improve coordination and reduce overlap between these two groups of actors (Franke 2006).

In Kenya, there has been inter-communal conflicts among the pastoralist living in the North Rift and in other arid and semi-arid regions. This has been observed to be so by the fact that, natural competition for scarce water points and pastureland in the areas they inhabit make them to be in

conflict (Manasseh Wepundi 2011). This kind of conflict has always been regarded as low-intensity conflict revolving around cattle raiding. However, it has been observed that, the nature of this conflict has been transformed by the inflow of automatic weaponry which has intensified its human cost and transformed an array of societal relationships (Mustafa Mirzeler 2000). It has been observed that, the use of small arms in the region is traceable to the pre-colonial time when Maji in south-western Ethiopia served as a gun market (Manasseh Wepundi 2011). The use of the guns in this conflict has claimed many lives and changed the societal relationships over the period.

This conflict by 2003 was reported to have displaced 164,457 people with women and children below 14 years forming 70% numbering 105, 500 (Ruto Pkalya 2003). This number has been growing annually and according to a report quoted by IRIN news agency by 2012, some 400,000 pastoralists had been displaced.¹ In November 2012, at least 40 police officers were gunned down in Suguta valley in a botched operation to recover stolen livestock. In a single incidence alone, it is reported that 12 schools were closed down with teachers fleeing insecurity.² The conflict fueled by availability of small arms and light weapons here lead to complex situation that exceeds the coping capacity of any single group of actor.

Stemming from the above therefore, the military and civilian actors have been involved in the disarmament of these communities as a way of managing this conflict and the complex situation occasioned by it and the precarious livelihood of these communities. This region therefore, has witnessed various civil-military cooperation interventions since the year 2000 such as *Dumisha Amani I* (Maintain Peace) in 2005, Operation *Okoa Maisha* (Save Lives) as well as Operation *Chunga Mpaka* (Guard the Border) carried out in 2008 and *Dumisha Amani II* in 2010. There have been disarmaments in the past carried out by the colonial government and the successive post independent governments among these communities. However, these disarmament exercises have been characterized by high handedness on the part of the military and top-down approach without due regard to the local views and other actors.

It is for instance, observed that the third colonial disarmament which was carried out in Eastern Baringo at Kolowa in 1950 resulted in deaths of many and displacement of some group of people to Losiro Uganda (Mathenge 2006). The complexity of this conflict and failed disarmament exercises

¹ IRIN News Agency, 31 October 2012, '*Pastoralists too can be displaced*' <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96669/kenya-pastoralists-too-can-be-displaced>

² IRIN, 18 February, 2013, '*Rising Insecurity in Northern Kenya*' <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97499/rising-insecurity-in-northern-kenya>

led to the signing of the ‘Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (Nairobi Declaration) by ten states in 2000. This was followed by the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (the Nairobi Protocol)³ which came to force in May 2006. In similar vein, the states also agreed to establish a Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA) which has been able to develop, *Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament for the RECSA Region*.

It has been observed that the guideline address both the demand and supply side of the proliferation of the small arms in the region. They have been noted to have recommended that, ‘disarmament programs be thoroughly planned, have responsibilities clearly allocated among participating agencies, set clear benchmarks for success, set specific timelines and secure adequate resources (Manasseh Wepundi 2011). The operations that followed the development of the guidelines had to incorporate the multi-agency actions. Subsequently, this study seeks to investigate the cooperation between Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and civilian actors during the *Dumisha Amani II* (Maintain Peace) campaign. In so doing, the study will specifically aim to answer the following question: What were the points of friction and how did it influence the cooperation between KDF and civilian actors in the Dumisha Amani Campaign?

Dumisha Amani was a military operation carried out among the pastoralist communities in the North Rift region in Kenya. The goal of the operation was disarmament in the bid to manage the inter-communal conflict. The first phase of Dumisha Amani campaign was launched by the Kenyan government in May 2005. It involved the voluntary surrender of illegal arms carried out from May 2005 to February 2006. This was followed by another operation dubbed *Operation Okota* (Collect) which was a forceful phase and which occurred in April and May 2006. “This disarmament program also integrated development projects such as the restoration of infrastructure, and rehabilitation of water points” (Wepundi 2011, 27). This disarmament operation involving the KDF and other stakeholders had a broader objective other than just to disarm and restore law and order but to promote development as observed above.

In a similar fashion there came the Operation Dumisha Amani II which had its voluntary phase running from February 2010 and a forceful phase coming in April 2010 with a target of 50000 arms.

³ The signatories of the Nairobi Protocol are; Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Seychelles, Somalia and Republic of Congo.

This operation followed after the government had estimated that, Kenya's pastoralists had spent KES 1.1 billion (about US\$13,750,000) to arm themselves over the years, based on the number of firearms recovered from them.⁴ The design for this operation envisioned the inclusion of stakeholders who have been identified to include and not limited to, civil society organizations, region-wide inter-governmental agencies, local political leaders, the private sector, the mass media and, fundamentally, the local communities themselves.⁵

In order to address this concern, the study has adopted an empirical approach using four basic assumptions in answering the research question. The assumptions are: (I) organizational structural differences are friction points affecting cooperation, (II) the difference in decision making procedure affected cooperation as a friction point, (III) the difference in information handling practices as a friction point affected cooperation and (IV) trust level between actors as a point of friction affected cooperation. In order to fully comprehend how the two groups' of actors cooperated, the four key assumptions have informed the understanding of how they served as points of friction and consequently affected cooperation between the actors.

The study has adopted a qualitative research design. This is because it seeks to unearth the detail in the narratives about the points of friction and how they affected cooperation between the actors. Or as John Kuada argues that this design, "engages in detailed examination of cases." This method has also been chosen because, "it allows participants to express their feelings and offer their perspectives in their own words" (Kuada 2012). In this way the participants' views on cooperation among the actors will be elucidated. The study used semi-structured interviews to obtain the data. The snowball sampling approach was used as a technique in collecting data. This was chosen because the research question is about the network of actors and it is better suited for this kind of research (Bryman 2012, 424).

A thematic analysis of the data has been done followed by a discussion of the similarities and differences, as well as nuances, in order to answer the research question. The study has finally concluded that the organizational structure differences, the decision making procedures, information handling practices and trust impacted negatively in the cooperation. It has gone further to recommend

⁴ Daily Nation, 24 March 2010, "Pastoralists Spend Sh1.1 Billion on Arms

⁵ National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), *Consultative Forum on Peace and Security for Members of Parliament from Arid and Semi-Arid Lands*, Nairobi: NSC, November 2009

that the KDF in future operation needs to establish a formal forum for engaging the civilian actors as well as be willing to accept information from the civilian actors.

1.3 Rationale

The need for civil-military cooperation has been observed as an interface that helps to reduce overlap and duplication between the two groups of actors involved in the conflict situation. The need for this cooperation is important since the two different organizations operate under different rationale which make them enjoy different levels of trust with host communities hence making them differently positioned to comprehensively understand the host communities. This makes cooperation between them essential by helping to fill informational gaps and complement one another in realizing sustainable peace in the operational theaters.

This study is based on the need to understand how the differences between the civilian actors and military actually affect the cooperation in the operational theater. The focus being on how to reduce hurdles to cooperation arising from the inherent differences to ensure even a smoother cooperation. The focus on Kenya Defense Forces and their operation within the country is also of great interest since it helps to compare the challenges faced at the international level with UN Peace Enforcement missions. The talk of marginalization of the North Rift region and the need for development in the region as a solution to the security situation is also of interest. This means that the insecurity in the region call for the cooperation between the civilian actors and the military hence the need for cooperation.

1.4 Aim of the study

This study while employing the use of the four hypothesis as sources of friction between the military and the civilian actors, sets out to explore on how they impact on the cooperation. Looking at each hypothesis, the study provides grounds on which to compare the data gathered from the field to see how cooperation was either impacted on positively or negatively in the operations carried out by the KDF. The finding from the data has been used to draw a conclusion and suggestions have been made on how cooperation can be improved.

1.5 Thesis Outline

This study has an introduction which provides the research context, problem formulation, rationale of the study and finally the aim of this study. It proceeds to provide the determinants highlighting the importance of the cooperation between the military and the civilian actors. It then discusses the

hypothesis based on the writing of other scholars before discussing the methodology. It further, discusses organizational theory and its strands in understanding the behavior of organizations in relation to forming interdependence relations before presenting data and analyzing it. The data is presented in thematic frames and thematically analyzed. Finally, it provides conclusions based on the findings and suggestion.

Chapter 2: The Determinants and Points of Friction in Civil-Military Cooperation

2.1 Preview aims and scope

The need for cooperation between the military and civilian actors in peacebuilding has been desired since the end of Cold War. This cooperation is valuable since the nature of conflicts have changed hence the need for both the military and civilian competencies to help in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. In the post-Cold War era, conflicts have been observed to take a different form from that of interstate to intrastate. The latter has been observed as, normally centered on latent clashes among ethnic groups that are intermingled. Propelled by availability of modern weaponry in large numbers, the disputes are usually carried out by irregular and undisciplined troops difficult to single out from the larger population (Rietjens 2008).

This necessitates that the military and the civilian actors must act together to ensure that the peace process becomes a success. The military for instance is instrumental in ensuring, the protection of relief supplies in uncertain circumstances where acts of banditry may be carried out by armed groups or diversion of supplies as a way of denying aid from reaching their enemies (Abiew 2003). In the same vein, the normal living conditions which aid workers work towards restoring is very important for the success of military missions (Jenny 2001). The mission is only complete or is completed faster if the affected communities are able to live the lives they lived before conflict at least minimally. Further, the military provide information to the aid workers in relation to mined areas and combat locations among other security related information.

This relationship has been described to be taking shape at different levels. It is observed that, new relationships at policy levels have been forged between humanitarian actors and international security community. Humanitarian politics has today involved many military personnel from various countries, while issues relating to humanitarian affairs have been engaged in by NGOs who are involved in global conflict resolution and security (Slim 1996). This is a display of how the policy

makers have given recognition to the importance of the civil-military cooperation. Implying that despite the differences between these two groups' of actors their need for cooperation is not contested.

However, it has been noted that, the coexistence challenges of the humanitarian agencies and the military in peacebuilding is a well-known feature (Tardy 2009). This chapter therefore, outlines four hypothesis in relation to the difficulties that exist between the military and the civilian actors in their efforts to cooperate and effectively handle conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. This chapter in essence therefore, looks at organizational structure differences, decision making practices, information handling practices and issues of trust among the two groups of actors. Borrowing from the work of various scholars it analyzes how these difference have been conceptualized and discussed in the literature. It will finally conclude by highlighting key issues of contention in relation to the areas identified.

2.2 The Determinants

This study conceptualize determinants as those factors that necessitate the cooperation between the military and the civilian actors. The first factor is the change in the nature of conflict since the end of Cold War which marked a shift from interstate conflict to intrastate conflict. This kind of conflict which involves the use of modern weapons against a section of population which is not armed and is conducted by irregular fighters who pose more threat to even extinction of an ethnic group. The demands for peace in this kind of situation require the military and civilian actors to put their act together to ensure peace succeeds. For instance the military would be required to carry out tasks like disarmament and demining as the civilian actors participate in the integration of the combatants and providing them with alternative sources of livelihoods.

This change in nature of conflict means that the military according to their training may not effectively help in restoring peace and must complement their activities with those of the civilian actors to achieve their target of restoring sustainable peace. The civilian actors, have also in many instances found themselves unable to carry out their activities in the conflict zones due to security reasons hence the need for military to provide them with security. For instance in Afghanistan, it has been observed that, relief efforts were complicated by the Taliban, Al Qaeda loyalists as well as the neighboring governments to Afghanistan who presented security risk not only to aid workers but also to refugees (Andrew Harris 2002). This means that the civilian actors could not effectively do their work without the support of the military.

In the same vein, it has been observed that, protecting civilians is essential to military success despite being also the right thing to be done since, when civilians feel safe and secure, they throw in their weight behind their government by providing the crucial intelligence needed for targeting insurgents (Cohen 2011). This further elucidate the need for the cooperation between the military and the civilian host population which is necessary not only in helping the war to be won soon but also in force protection through the provision of intelligence. The need for civil-military cooperation is therefore an important effort in managing conflict and peace processes in the post-Cold War era. Despite the importance of this cooperative arrangements, there are several factors that hinder smooth cooperation as discussed below.

2.3 Sources of Friction

2.3.1 Hypothesis I: Organizational Structural Difference

The military and civilian organizations are organized differently and these differences impact on how they cooperate with one another at the operational theaters. However, it has been argued that, the military is neither homogenous nor monolithic body. There exist differences in military configuration, capabilities, levels of professionalism and competence among the militaries of the developed world as well as between the developed and developing (Abiew 2003). These differences have impact on how the militaries can effectively coordinate their act in a given situation to effectively and efficiently realize their mandate. Subsequently, the differences impact on the military performance. Although, these differences exist the military's share a lot in common which can be seen as features running across many of them on how they are organized.

On the other hand, it has been observed that, the concept of civilian actors encompass an array of entities which may differ much from each other and whose singly shared feature is them being none military (Tardy 2009). It has been argued that, humanitarian NGOs exist in large number that makes it hard to have an overview of their activities besides the need to coordinate them (Abiew 2003). The proliferation of the civilian actors and their large numbers in the peacebuilding process further complicates the situation since they are so diverse in themselves and their mandates as well. However, there are some common feature that cut across NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) which make comparison possible.

The first striking organizational difference between the civilian actors and the military is that the civilian actors are decentralized as the military is highly centralized. In relation to the civilian actors

and especially the NGOs, it has been observed that, they write their own charters and principles as well as determine their missions and mandate (Abiew 2003). This gives them the freedom to execute their mandate with a lot of flexibility since they are their own masters. The field officers in discharging their duties are able to act independently to achieve the desired outcome. In the same vein, it has been observed that, the decentralized structure of most NGOs presupposes all to contribute whenever and wherever needed their efforts and expertise regardless of their positions within the structure (Rubinstein 2003). This allows the civilian actors to have an opportunity to determine the course of events as the mandate is executed.

On the contrary, the military has a highly centralized structure with clear chain of command that require all to comply without fail. Colonel Bob Stewart as cited by William has noted that, the military are authoritarian, large, centralized, hierarchical and robust (Williams 1998). This points to the structural organization of the military as that which concentrates and consolidate power and authority at the top level. In similar fashion, it has been observed that, high value is placed by the military on command and control, discipline, accountability, clear lines of authority and prioritizes logistics i.e., assured functioning under the most hostile situations to carry out the tasks with the necessary force protection (Larry Minear 2000). This further elucidate how centralize the military is organized and how it functions to achieve its mandate.

Stemming from the above therefore, the rationale of operation between the military and the civilian actors stand also in stark contrast with the former having a hierarchical and the latter fluid rationales. Joel Jenny while observing this difference has argued that, the humanitarian organization and the army work under different rationales. Whereas soldiers have clear lines of command, operational orders and set of rules, aid workers are normally independent minded and hold substantial decision making power at the field level (Jenny 2001). The differences in rationale is an obvious source of tension between these two actors since one would work on the appropriate and adaptive measures to achieve the mandate whereas the other will have to wait for the order to come from the top organ.

In similar fashion, it has been observed that, less hierarchical are NGOs compared to the military and are not obliged to take instructions from individuals outside their group hence their cherished freedom of (Abiew 2003). The fact that they cherish the freedom has been observed as a source of tension between them and the military. Brigadier Cross provides the interesting example of Kosovo where military-led meetings were instinctively viewed with suspicion by NGOs, expecting those meetings

to be highly structured and for 'orders' to be given.⁶ This kind of suspicion brings to the fore how the difference in rationales between the two groups of actors serves as a source of friction hindering effective cooperation at the theatre.

The military has a vertical organization structure which provides clear chain of commands from the top to the bottom with clear lines of duties. However, NGOs have organizational structures which are horizontal and fluid premised on consensus approach giving field operatives considerable decision making authority (Franke 2006). This difference in relation to authority also impacts negatively on the cooperation between the military and the civilian actors. The military staff are constrained to the demands of the authority and must consult with higher authorities before swinging into action. On the contrary, the NGOs have the freedom to choose on the best way possible to get the mandate fulfilled based on consensus among the field staff on the most appropriate measures hence swifter in responding to evolving conflict situation.

The military's ability to mobilize massive resources and deploy significant numbers of personnel to anywhere virtually overnight has become the envy of many humanitarian organizations that often experience difficulty finding the necessary number of qualified staff to deploy (Franke 2006). This is another variance in organization which deals with the ability of the various organizational structures to mobilize and utilize resources for the required purposes. The fact that military organization have this high ability has always acted as a point of friction for two reasons. First the funding's of NGOs depend largely on their presentation by the media which they encourage to cover their work to help attract donor funds whereas the military would want to keep much of its operations secrets. Secondly, some NGO workers have blamed the military for having a lot of resources yet doing very little hence fueling the tension.

In tandem to the above, is the aspect of accountability since the source of resources used in these operations will determine who is to be accounted to. In this case NGOs have wide accountability to the donors, private institutions and local beneficiaries who monitor their work closely. To the military however, accountability is limited to defense ministries and parliament respectively and transparency limited to interests of national security (Franke 2006). This differences in the accountability is another source of friction between these two actors. The fact that the military do not account to the broad range of interest groups make them less aggressive in using resources to tackle the challenges of

⁶ T. Cross, 'Comfortable with Chaos – Working with the UNHCR and the NGOs: Reflections from the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Crisis', Paper presented at *Wilton Park Conference*, April 2001, p.21

transforming conflict as oppose to the NGOs whose funding depends on how best they adapt to the conflict.

2.3.2 Hypothesis II: Decision-Making Practices

The decision making procedures involves the steps through which the decision to undertake a particular action has to pass before it can finally be executed. This procedure has been viewed to differ between the military and the civilian actors. For instance, Robert Rubinstein has observed that, military has command structures which are centralized and vertical flowing hierarchically from top to bottom and clearly defined lines of authority. This he has argued is befitting the military since it enables it to, quickly respond as well as take fast and efficient decisions (Rubinstein 2003). This could be arguably due to the primary reason for the existence of the military which is to fight wars.

However, due to the changing nature of conflict and emergency situations decentralized decision making has been favored through the 'mission command'. At a local level a tremendous responsibility devolved on the battalion commanders and their junior officers in each of these operations as a result of the gap between the assigned mission and the requirement to establish order on the ground (Rietjens 2008). The gap that exist between the assigned mission and the actual situation in a complex security situation has sometimes called for the adoption of mission command which devolves decision making. However, this has not always been the case since this require high degree of trust between the commanders.

Military units, by their very nature, are trained to respond to and operate in a "low context culture"⁷ relying on directives, specific orders, and standard operating procedures that are communicated clearly down the hierarchy (Franke 2006). This elucidates the low adoption of mission command to be inherent in training which prepares the military to taking orders and directives. This stands in stark contrast with the decision making procedures of the NGOs which are more decentralized and promote participatory approach to decision making. It is observed that, the fluid structure of NGOs require everyone to make contribution of their efforts and expertise wherever and whenever needed despite the structural definition of their position (Rubinstein 2003).

This fluid structure which enables individuals to participate in decision making has been viewed to promote flexibility and adaptability of the NGOs communities in operation theatres. It is opined that,

⁷ Low context culture here means the proper lack of knowledge about the practices and customs of the host communities within which they operate in.

the promotion of participatory and collaborative working relationships by the relief and development agencies which presume informal management and the ability to swiftly modify objectives and activities to abrupt changes in civilian needs (Franke 2006). The informal management which promotes adaptability to situations as conflict unfold has made the NGOs and relief workers to be more responsive to the changing nature of conflict. This is very different with military who have to consult with their seniors before they can adopt a decision. This has been a source of conflict between these two entities with one blaming the other of inaction when the action was needed most.

2.3.3 Hypothesis III: Information Handling Practices

The access to information and sharing of information among partners is very important in operational theatres. This is because the military is more often sent to the area of conflict for a specified period of time. This means that missions are always time bound whereas the NGOs always establish long contact with the local population and work both to provide emergency services as well as implement development programs. The closeness of the military to the local population makes them to be privy to some information that the military may not be having. On the other hand the structural organization of the military and its resources enables it also to gather some information which are also of great use to the civilian actors. The sharing of information and access of information by the partners is of great important since the informational gap that exist between what has been gathered by the military and that of the civilian actors is only filled through sharing.

However, this kind of sharing has not been forthcoming between these two groups of actors. The military and its oath of secrecy may want to keep much of its operations under cover as much as possible whereas the NGOs may also want to keep vital information from the local communities as much as possible. This in itself hinders operations in the theatre. It has been observed that, the operational secrecy prevents the military from sharing information with NGOs, for instance on deployment and capabilities issues (Byman 2001). In the same vein, the NGOs are not only unwilling to share information among themselves but also with the military. This is particularly about the host government fearing it may complicate their operations in relation to access to crisis areas (Abiew 2003).

The lack of openness in sharing information has been for example identified to have caused trouble relationship between the civilian and military actors during the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It is observed that, UNMIL battalion singly decided to offer medical assistance to a hospital where the ICRC was already working. To avoid duplication of efforts, the ICRC eventually

decided to abandon its Programme and left the support of the civilian hospital to UN troops (Rana 2004). This shows how lack of information sharing can hamper smooth operation with parties unwilling to consult one another in the operation theaters. This is an example of a case where unilateral decision making by the military interfered with the smooth running of the programs of the civilian actors.

The misgivings between the military and the NGOs in relation to information sharing has kept each group less informed about the activities of the other hence hindering the smooth operations in the theatre. Subsequently, it has been argued that, it could be that the NGOs could simply not be aware of what the military is doing when they criticize the military for not doing enough (Winslow 2002). The lack of information about the other is a source of tension with competing demands hence one group will see the other as not doing enough due to lack of information about the clear mandate of the other. This can also make one think that the other will respond to a situation only to have none respond to it hence exacerbating human suffering and casualties.

The form in which the military receive information is always different with the form the NGOs always do. The military is used to the intelligence information package as such as well as orders and directives which is unusual with the NGOs. It is argued therefore that, the longer experience with the local communities by the NGOs makes them to have valuable insights that can be used by the military. The military has to be ready however, to accept information that is not packaged in the way they are used to seeing it (Winslow 2002). This further points to the benefits of sharing information at the theatre and as well the challenge that goes with different sources of information and their subsequent presentation. The more these different actors accept to receive information from the other the more efficient and effective their operations would be.

2.3.4 Hypothesis IV: Trust

Trust has been defined as the trait of believing in the honesty and reliability of others (Advanced English Dictionary). Reliability and honesty among actors pursuing same goal is very important since it is in itself a source of motivation. Trust has been conceived of to be of different types such as interpersonal trust which involves the trust between people. Some scholars divide this further into 'thick' and 'thin' trusts. 'Thick interpersonal trust is established in relationships based on strong ties and hangs on the personalities of the individuals involved (Khodyakov 2007). This kind of trust therefore involves emotional attachments between the familiar members in the relationship. Thin trust on the other hand has been seen as that which is between people who not so familiar with one another

but have interacted. This is a form process-based trust, that relies on weaker ties and based on experiences of reciprocity (Khodyakov 2007). People here are not having emotional ties but have interacted and believe the other party will behave as is expected.

He (Khodyakov) has gone further to argue that there exist another form of trust that is called the Institutional or System trust. This kind of trust is one that is based on the functioning of various organizations, institutions and systems. It follows from institutional arrangements that produce and sustain dependable behavior. The institutions conform the individual actor's behaviors to create the institutions' behavior which is more regular and predictable hence the trust. It depends on the perception of the institution as either being legitimate, has ability and technical competence to efficiently perform its assigned (Khodyakov 2007). The institutional capacity to discharge the task in question and legitimacy make the institution to enjoy the trust.

The first source of mistrust between these two groups of actors is the misunderstanding between them. The military has been observed to, lack proper understanding of NGOs in terms of their hierarchies, charters, modes of operation and distinctions as well as failure to recognize that what works with one NGO may not work with another (Abiew 2003). In the same vein, it is opined that, military hierarchies, organization and capabilities are usually poorly understood. The result is that unrealistic demands are always made on the military by the NGOs (Thornberry 2000). This lack of proper understanding between the military and the NGOs make them have unrealistic demand from one another. Taking cognizance of the need for capacity to undertake given work as ingrained in institutional trust, the failure of the other to live to the unrealistic demands definitely leads to mistrust.

Slim has observed that, differences exist among the NGOs in relation to size, capacity, mandate and levels of professionalism (Slim 1996). The differences which make some NGOs more competent than others in the theatre. The performance of the less competent NGOs has sometimes made the entire spectrum to be seen as incompetent. It is argued that the look, by the military of the work of NGOs which are less competent, inclines to color the perception of the whole spectrum of NGOs as incompetent and their actions as uncoordinated or disjointed (Abiew 2003). The diversity within the NGOs community is also a source of mistrust since the less incompetent NGOs do not live to the expectation hence making the whole community be castigated for being less competent.

The other source of mistrust between these two groups of actors is their orientations with military being a political and under direct control of the state whereas the NGOs are apolitical being guided by their own principles. Weiss has seen this as a source of conflict and opined that, the fear of

compromising their security, impartiality, neutrality or mistrust from past experiences has caused reluctance among NGOs in working with the military (Weiss 1999). The need to uphold the principles that make the NGOs and Relief workers humanitarian hinders their effective cooperation.

In the same vein, it has been argued that, by design military is for the pursuit of national political interests and to accomplish governmental objectives through the use of force hence military action is always political in nature (Franke 2006). This in essence means that the military is not impartial but serving the political interest of the government. They are therefore not treated as neutral in conflict situations. This stands in opposition to the NGOs who are guided by the principles of neutrality and impartiality hence the presentation of military as a partner in humanitarian work is accepted with a lot of misgivings. The fear of compromising their security by association with the military exacerbates the mistrust.

The different ways in which the two groups of actors respond to a crisis has been seen as another source of mistrust. In Miller's study he has noted that, "relief workers expressed the view that soldiers were there simply because they were ordered to be there. This in turn led some relief workers to feel morally superior to soldiers" (Miller 1999). The fact that military personnel are deployed to an area following an order from the government to help pursue some objectives makes them to be seen as inferior morally by the NGOs who go to the conflict zones out of their desire to help alleviate human suffering. The argument could be that if given opportunity to choose whether to be there or not then maybe few soldiers would be. This make the NGOs less trustful of soldiers since they are taken to be acting the way they do just because of the need to obey the command.

The other source of mistrust is the degree to which they interact and integrate their activities with the host communities. The difference has been expounded by Winslow as follows, the military prefer to do things for people and not with them. On the contrary, relief workers usually put themselves in the middle of the local population with few limitations whether physical or social between (Winslow 2002). This kind of cooperation with the local communities make them build trust with NGOs and make them question what the military would be hiding by keeping them afar. In similar fashion, it has been observed that, the hegemonic manner in which the some military personnel act towards the NGOs characterized by the attitude that they are the ones who understand the security situation (Abiew 2003). This further complicate the trust between these actors.

The NGOs and other civilian actors have a long term development agenda within the operational area whereas the military has a time bound mission which makes them be phased out as soon as the

situation begins to improve. This can be a source of mistrust. It is opined that, the long-term approach pursued by the aid workers might be misunderstood by soldiers who have been just deployed to the operation area for sluggishness and inefficiency (Jenny 2001). The lack of understanding of the nature of operation and differences in time frames can be a source of mistrust since the military may see the civilian actors as taking too long to accomplish an operation which to them should be accomplished as fast as possible. The approach that promotes community ownership and capacity building by civilian actors therefore can be misconceived by the military as a weakness hence mistrust.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Preview, aims and scope

This chapter provides the framework of how the research question under investigation has been answered. It serves to briefly introduce the research question and proceeds to provide the methods that have been employed to answer the question conclusively. It aims to place this research within the proper epistemological and ontological orientation and to elucidate on the research strategy adopted. It will serve to account for the chosen research strategy by qualifying the choice in comparison with other strategies which could have been adopted. Finally, it will provide the study limitations which sets the strict boundaries within which this research has been conducted.

3.2 The Target group

This study focusing on the civil-military cooperation targeted the civilian actors who included the members of the NGO community, members of other civil society organizations, public opinion leaders, government officials and faith leaders who operate and participated with the military in the disarmament exercises in North Rift. The military personnel who also participated in the disarmament exercise in the region were also targeted for interview. This in essence necessitate the adoption of qualitative design since this design allows for selection of informants key to this study as indicated above. The time constraint involved in conducting this study, made this choice better since it would make it to be more focused on the key participants hence falling within timeline.

3.2.1 Table 1: Presentation of participants

Interviewee Code Name	Age Range	Gender	Category	Date Interviewed
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Interviewee 1	30-40	M	NGO	March 3, 2015
Interviewee 2	30-40	M	CBO	March 5, 2015
Interviewee 3	40-50	M	Government/non-military	March 9, 2015
Interviewee 4	40-50	M	NGO	March 10, 2015
Interviewee 5	30-40	F	Government/non-military	March 12, 2015
Interviewee 6	50-60	M	Government/non-military	March 13, 2015
Interviewee 7	40-50	M	Opinion Maker	March 16, 2015
Interviewee 8	40-50	M	Opinion Maker	March 16, 2015
Interviewee 9	30-40	M	NGO	March 17, 2015
Interviewee 10	30-40	M	Military Officer (Active)	March 24, 2015
Interviewee 11	60-70	M	Military Officer (Retired)	March 29, 2015

3.2.2 Reasons behind the target group choice

The individuals who were targeted for interview were chosen based on their activities in the area under study and must in one way or the other participated in the disarmament exercises either as an individual or as part an organization. This was the key guiding principle for the choice of the civilian actors. They must have had contact both with the host communities working to promote peace and must have also worked with the military in the disarmament exercises. This means that the target group would be in a position to share their experience in regard to how they coordinated their activities with that of the military. Emphasis on the choice of the NGO community members as target

group was based on their objectives in the area with particular focus on peace building components and they having participated in the disarmament as stated above.

The choice of the government officials was based on the nature of their duties and responsibilities in regard to peace and security. The emphasis on put on those who had directly worked with the military in the disarmament exercises hence having knowledge and experience of how the exercise was conducted. This was done so because they would offer an informed insight on how they cooperated with the military and other actors in the region. In the same vein, opinion leaders targeted for interview are people of authority due to their social position, economic or political and could to a great extend influence their behavior of community members. Those who were specifically chosen were those who had participated in the discussion around disarmament and influenced their people in taking particular positions. They in addition must have worked closely with the military during the exercises.

Senior military officials were targeted as well as army commanders on the ground for interview. This is because the senior officials would provide their perspectives on how the disarmament exercises ware planned at the national level and what factors were put in place to accommodate civilian actors. Further, they would provide information how they coordinate the planning with other ministries at the national level including that dealing with Internal Security. In addition, they would also provide some insights on how they were coordinating with neighboring countries to ensure that the exercises were not going to put the border communities at risk. In similar fashion, the operational commanders were targeted because they are the actual people who coordinated their activities with those of the civilian actors and hence were better positioned to give insight on how the whole cooperative arrangement worked.

3.2.3 Challenges faced and reaching the target group

The first major challenge was access to key government officials since at the country has been having security challenges emanating from the terrorist. This made access to key government and military officials a challenge. This did not allow me to interview the senior government officers' in-charge of internal security in the area under study as well as key officials at the Ministry of Defense and even operational Commanders. However, I was able to interview a military officer who had participated in the disarmament exercise and had proper knowledge of how the exercise was conducted. This was very important since he helped to provide the information I could have missed completely by failing

to interview the military officers. His experience in the disarmament exercises was of great help to this work.

In the same vein, I also interview a retired Army Major who have had a lot of experience having participated in the disarmament in the region as well as having participated in other peace operations like in Yugoslavia, Liberia and Iraq. His wealth of experience was important in understanding how the civil-military cooperation worked during the disarmament exercises. He was also very instrumental in providing more information on how operations are planned and executed since he retired at a senior rank and had the exposure to operation planning's. Another challenge was the accessibility of especial local leaders since the place is generally insecure with some places demanding that you must have a police escort before you can access them. The escort which involves a lot of logistics and could impact negatively on the information from interviewees. In such situations phone calls were made to get information from the individuals who would not be access physically.

The sensitivity of the security situation in the country at this time also made many participants to have reservations in participating in this study. However, I assured them of protection of their confidentiality and they agreed to participate in the study. In the same vein, I did assure them that this study was only assessing the cooperation between the actors in the disarmament exercise and was not about the emotive gun ownership in the region. This further, made the participants more free to participate in the study. The unfamiliarity with the region was also a challenge even though I made calls to the list of organizations before visiting the study area, when I visited it was difficult to located offices. However, when I met one vehicle belonging to one of the civilian organizations I stopped it and the driver was willing to take me to the office location to meet the program coordinator who eventually linked me to other partners they were working with.

3.3 Method

This thesis adopts an Interpretivism as an epistemological stance. This is because it seeks to develop an understanding of knowledge from the interpretation of human actions and not abstract reality of the natural science. Or as Bryman puts it, "it is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action" (Bryman 2012). Since this particular research is about the human actions and needs to understand the subjective meaning of the actors involved in the disarmament hence best suited for this research.

In tandem to the above it will adopt an ontological consideration of constructionism. This ontological position asserts that, “social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors”. Since the activities surrounding disarmament involve social actors, with perceptions and ability to shape realities hence do not represent realities as external and independent of them makes it the choice for this research. Further it is opined that, “social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman 2012). The fact that the social actors are able to shape social reality from time to time like the alteration of the practices in disarmament makes this ontological stance of choice.

3.3.1 Research Design

This research has adopted a qualitative research design. This is because it seeks to unearth the detail in the narratives about the points of friction and how they affected cooperation between the actors. Or as John Kuada argues that this design, “engage in detailed examination of cases.” This method has also been chosen because, it allowed participants to express their feelings and offer their perspectives in their own words (Kuada 2012). In this way the participants’ feelings and views on cooperation among the actors were expressed hence proving the details needed to answer the research question conclusively.

Subsequently, diverse interviews, community meetings and observation was used in collection of the data used in this research. The semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted to obtain the data. This was chosen because, qualitative interviewing is flexible and responds to the direction in which interviewees take the interview and adjusting the emphases in the research as a result of significant issues that emerged in the course of interview (Bryman 2012). This flexibility was important in enabling the interviewees express their feelings and views freely hence providing in-depth information needed for this research. The room to move off target and follow on replies by interviewees offered by this method made it even more desirable.

The semi-structure was chosen over the unstructured in this research since it involves comparative study. This enabled me to have similar perspectives of the organizational structures of the different structured actors, decision making procedures as well as information handling practices. The fact that semi-structured interview allowed for asking of questions outside the interview guide made it appropriate for this study which is comparative. It has been observed that, “by and large, all questions will be asked and a similar wording will be used from interviewee to interviewee” (Bryman 2012). This enabled the research to be exhaustive in all the aspects it was investigating.

3.3.2 Data Sources and Sampling Technique

The chiefs and Assistant chiefs who are the representatives of the national government and in charge of the security in their areas of jurisdiction were interviewed. They are the chairpersons' of peace and security committees as well as development committees in their respective areas. They work closely with community members and elders to implement government policies and provide intelligence to the police. They also act as the focal point for interaction between the community members and the government agencies through their public meetings (*Baraza*). This in essence makes them be at the center of information hence very important for this research. However, access to them is a big challenge since they administer the remotes of the areas which are also violent and required police escort for access. The complex logistics of get police access made them to be interviewed by phone.

The military officers were also interviewed to get the information need for this research due to the fact that it focuses much on the civil-military interface. Despite the desire to interview as many relevant military personnel as possible, I only interviewed two military officers. The first one being a serving military corporal who participated in the disarmament exercise in the region and has also served as part of the African Union Mission to Somalia. These made him chosen for this research since he had the knowledge and experience needed for this research. He has both the current information about the organization and operation of the Kenya Defence Forces hence source of great insight for this research.

The Second officer is a retired Army Major who have a wealth of experience in the disarmament of the region as well as international experience. Having served as part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Yugoslavia as well as United States operation in Iraq his experience and knowledge was worth tapping into for this research. He was chosen particularly due to the technicalities of accessing the military which required an official permit from the government. Despite having applied for the permit it did not come in time hence the decision to tap into the knowledge of the retired Major who was more accessible and has the needed information for this work. The decision which has made this work gain valuable pieces of insight it could have missed from the military.

The community opinion leaders were also interviewed. These are individuals who command respect and sometimes following from their community members. The respect that emanates from their successes in business, education, politics and traditional medicine. They are always consulted on matters that affect the community members and their opinions shape the direction the community

takes in relation to such matters of concern. By the fact that guns are used to protect the community and also as a source of livelihood, the call to surrender them made it mandatory for them to be consulted. The opinion they hold about guns and whether they should be returned by the community always turn-out to be the community's position. This is why they were chosen for the research and their access was not difficult since they are also the gatekeepers for the community.

There were quite a number of civil society organization representatives who were interviewed. They have included, the representative of SIKOM Peace Network for Development which is a civil society organization operating in West Pokot county promoting peace and development. This organization is involved in disarmament exercises as well as mapping and recording of guns held by civilians in the region. This activity makes them distinctly unique for this research since their main focus of activities is the main focus of this research hence making their representative to be chosen for interview. It was very easy to access this organization since I just saw their vehicle stopped it and after explaining to the driver what I wanted I was let inside and taken to the office to meet the coordinator who readily accepted my request to interview him.

To know about other civil society organizations in the region and how to access them, I adopted the snowball sampling technique and asked the representative of SIKOM to tell me about other partners with whom they have cooperated in the disarmament exercise in the region and how I could reach them. He managed to link me to the representative of POKATUSA which is an organization dealing with the promotion of peace in West Pokot and Turkana Counties. This organization was particularly unique since it involved in activities cutting across the two rival communities of Pokot and Turkana. Consequently, provided more information due to its cross-border cutting activities. In the same vein, the representative of Inter-Governmental Authority and Development (IGAD) which run disarmament programs in this region with their representative having directly been involved in the activities with both the military and other actors was also interviewed.

Subsequently, the Tegla Lorupe Peace Foundation which promotes peace through sports and also took part in the disarmament exercises had their field officer interviewed. The long serving field staff who gave different perspectives of how they have worked with the military in the disarmament exercises proved very insightful to this research. Finally, the representative of ACTED was interviewed due to the fact that this organization has been at the center of promoting peace and development in this region making them to participate in activities including disarmament. The choice

of the snowball sampling approach for the civil society was favorable since the research question is about the “network of actors” (Bryman 2012).

3.3.3 Data analysis

Data analysis is the reduction of large corpus of information gathered by the researcher with the bid of making sense out of it. Subsequently, to make meaning out of the large information gathered from the field, thematic analysis of the data has been conducted. This method which involves the identification of themes that are recurring throughout the data has been used because of its “flexibility” which allows it to be used in different context (Bryman 2012). Themes have been built from the “codes identified in transcripts” (G. W. Ryan 2003). This has been presented in diagrams within this work. The transcripts have been read and reread to identify codes which have then been grouped to form themes relevant to this study. To demonstrate reliability in the development of themes in this work, the quotes from the original transcripts have been included. This is to show how coding of the entire data has been done.

3.4 Study Limitations

This paper focusing on conflict management and peace process shall only focus on this area. Further, it will focus only on disarmament as a process in conflict management and peace process hence it will not look into other aspects of the peace process. In the same vein, it will look only at how civilian actors and military actors have cooperate in the disarmament exercise. This is further limited within the North Rift region of Kenya and no other parts of the country. The fact that there have been changes in the disarmament practices in the country and in this region it will limit itself only to the Operation *Dumisha Amani I and II*. This means therefore that any cooperation between the actors under investigation not falling within the purview of the aforementioned operations shall not be considered.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspectives

Organization theory has been argued not to consist of a collection of facts but a way of thinking about organizations, people and resources and how they can be organized to accomplish as a unit a particular purpose (Hatch 1997). This theory is applied to this study since it offers insights on how an organizations cooperate with others to achieve specific objectives. Consequently, the need for cooperation between the military as an organization and the civilian organizations such as NGOs, CBOs and other actors is better explained by this theory. This theory and its strands offer an explanatory power of the reasons as to why an organization may want to enter into a cooperation with

another organization and the fears that the organization might be having in an attempt to cooperate. Subsequently, cooperation between the military and the civilian organizations can be understood by the use of this theory.

The organizations which operate in disarmament as a process in peacebuilding has made up what is called 'organizational field' as those organizations that work together to achieve the task of interest to a researcher (DiMaggio 1983). These organizations play roles that promote peacebuilding and therefore working towards a common goal of ensuring the establishment of sustainable peace. However, it is possible that they can also pursue their interests with little regard to the main goals. Organizational theory posit that these interests are helping the organizations in executing their core tasks hence making the organizations earn prestige from the publics (Thompson 1967). When organizations are seen to be doing what they are expected to be doing their level of prestige rise and this is one of the pursuits of each and every organization.

The need to execute core tasks, make rational organizations to be wary of uncertainty which can originate from the internal factors like the change in technology and external environment. The sources of uncertainty in the external environment incorporates the need to control the information that will enable the organization to continue performing core tasks. Embedded to this uncertainty is dependence on other organizations which can make it lose autonomy. This is what has been described as the need to maintain 'self-control' (Thompson 1967). This means that each and every organization entering in a cooperative venture would want to retain the sense of self control without over relying on others which would otherwise increase its level of uncertainty.

It is argued that, the desire to reduce the uncertainty is what makes the military to be reluctant to participate in peace operations (George 2005). This is because the activities around the peace operations are not directly corresponding to the training of the military which involves high-intensity combat. The fact that they are seen not to be doing their main task makes them not to enjoy the prestige they ought to have enjoyed while performing their main task as trained hence not in their organizational interest. The civilian actors have array of activities to accomplish within the peacebuilding framework and are interested in the long-term development of the conflict regions. This makes the civilians to do all that they can do to achieve their objectives which will make them have prestige. However, it is the nature of their work which make them not so good partners with the military.

Stemming from the above, the military has been observed to prefer accomplishing specific military tasks and avoid the long-term relations with the civilian actors (George 2005). This means that the military would want to do their work as fast as possible within the operation area and leave rather than develop relations with the civilian actors. This to the military is in their organizational interest since they will not lose their prestige. However, the demands of the complex situations require that they operate together to help reduce human suffering and casualties. But the organizational interests and uncertainty prevents them from fully cooperating to achieve efficiency.

The activities like disarmament and securing of the convoys as roles played by the military in the peace process viewed from the organizational standpoint makes the military to lose “proposition⁸” (George 2005). This is because it is not in the core mandate of the military as an organization which may not make it enjoy the prestige which is associated with wealth, size and power. The military being a rational organization therefore may want to avoid deeper involvement in these tasks. Subsequently, making them to shy away from the civilian actors whose core mandates the military support. Complains about the military’s inaction despite their presence on the operation theater can be understood from this perspective of avoiding deeper involvement into activities that are not in their core mandate.

An organization that trust another to deliver on its promises is likely to enter into an interdependence relationship with less uncertainty (Ranjay Gulati 1999). This means that organizations would want to enter interdependent relationship when they are sure that the other organizations are able to keep their promises. This is usually based on the past experiences where the organizations have lived to their expectations. Consequently, no source of mistrust from the failure to deliver on the promises. The military has often been seen as having failed to deliver on the promises by the civilian actors at some point. This has been due to the military’s consideration of the activities not to be falling within its core mandate hence need to avoid deeper involvement. This however, has been interpreted by the civilian actors as inability to live to the expectation thereby a source of mistrust.

Similar organization structure has been viewed to facilitate cooperation by promoting easy communication within an interorganizational structure. The military has been observed to have it easier to coordinate their activities with those of other organizations having hierarchical structures than flat structures (George 2005). This has been argued to be so by the fact that similar structures make it easier to develop common language and procedures of coordination (James G. March 1958).

⁸ Proposition means the right activities that go with the training that has been given.

This observation about the differences in the organizational structure of the civilian actors and the military is also important especially on how it serves to reduce uncertainty. From the foregoing, it is important to note that the similarities in the organization structures reduce uncertainty since it enables for development of common language and procedures which reduce interactional frictions within interdependence relations.

In the same vein, it has been argued that, if organizations have considerable control over their field staff as a result of their powerful headquarters be they national or international, it is likely that military leaders may have confidence in them to own their part of the bargain (George 2005). This implies that the autonomous or semi-autonomous nature of the civilian actors in the operation theaters lacking proper control from the above will to a low degree attract the cooperation of the military. This is due to the fear that they may not live to their expectation hence mistrust. This means that the mandated INGOs and NGOs stand a better chance to struck deals with the military as opposed to the local NGOs and CBOs.

Transactional Cost Economics as a strand of organization theory also provides insights on how interorganizational cooperation can be done. This strand conceive organizational structures as a product of economizing on costs of organizing and effecting contracts governing exchange (Lipson 2005). It posits that firms emerge and take the forms they do, since the exchanges carried out within the firm efficiently can be done within a hierarchy than the market. Consequently, the firm's boundaries are at the margin where the cost savings from the transaction within the firm are offset by the hierarchical authority's cost (Hart 1995). This means that the structure for cooperation should be a reflection of transaction cost efficiency relative to alternative means of cooperation in peacebuilding.

The civilian actors especially the NGOs fulfil their mandates by trying to be autonomous, neutral and impartial as possible. This makes them reluctant to take instructions from outside their organizations and treat with suspicion any attempts to integrate lest their freedom be compromised (Roberts 2010). This means that compromised freedom will increase the cost of transaction by making them vulnerable to attacks from the combatants hence making them lose staff members. It is observed that the attacks of United Nations and assassination of Margaret Hassan, director of Care International in Iraq exemplifies this (Tomb 2005). This kind of events makes the NGOs not willing to cooperate with the military since cooperation costs become so high.

On the other hand when the cost favor hierarchical cooperation mechanism, then such mechanisms are established. For instance, the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) by the United Nations' Secretary General in Namibia, Bosnia et al. In similar vein, it has been argued that, in cases where increased hierarchical arrangements leads to increased governance costs that outweigh prospects of reduced costs of opportunism, actors will avoid hierarchical arrangements (Lake 1999). However, due to the complexity of the complex peace operations with multiple actors, it has been argued that they may not be unitary rational actors (Lipson 2005). This therefore leaves the analysis of this transactional cost arguably insufficient to understand behaviors towards or against cooperation between civil-military actors.

Asset specificity which denotes the degree to which actors have invested in resources, capital or skills that is specific to a relationship which expands opportunism hence generating greater enticements to enact relations in hierarchical structures (Williamson 1979). The special training by the military and the challenging situation in the operation theaters which put lives of NGO workers at risk makes the NGOs be more willing to cooperate with the military. This is why it has been argued that despite them being strange bedfellows they must be in the sheets together (Winslow 2002). This followed after aid workers were deliberately attacked in Chechnya, Rwanda and Somali. The need for cooperation was therefore influenced by the military training to protect in such circumstances.

Networks is another strand of organizational theory that offers insights on cooperation. It has been observed that in a network, actors have sets of relationships with counterparts (e.g. suppliers, customers, competitors and complementary producers) (H. Hakansson 1996). This means that it involves a web like connection between actors. It is opined that Network is best suited to handle tasks and environments that call for flexibility and adaptability (Baker 1992). This has been observed to be so by the ability of Network to develop set of linkages both internal and external (Rietjens 2008). It is this ability of network that make it suitable to analyze cooperation at the operational theaters in complex peace operation. The need for flexibility and adaptability of the actors to fulfil their mandates through linkages both formal and informal hence its use in this analysis.

Network formation has been lauded by organizational theories for a number of reasons or variables. The first variable has been the degree of differentiation between the units to be coordinated. When the degree of differentiation is high between the units to be coordinated the network is seen to enable the firms profit more than in hierarchies (Rietjens 2008). In the operation theater where the military and the civilian actors operate with civilian actors having more flat and fluid organizational structure

compared to that of the military which is hierarchical then the organizational theories would prefer Network to other forms of cooperation. It is observed that, interaction potential between the military and the civilian actors is limited and characterized with mutual suspicion deriving from perceived absence of common goals and values as well as lack of common task and language discourse (Roberts 2010). This further augments the need for network as a coordination mechanism between the two actors.

The next variable has been that to do with the number of units involved. The greater the number of units to be coordinated the more the limit to the hierarchies to be established. It is observed that through networks firms are able to extend their activities beyond the limits of the hierarchies (Rietjens 2008). This is very instrumental in the case of peacebuilding processes since the limits created can create a loophole which can lead to massive losses of lives and property and can weigh in the gains made so far. For instance in Bosnia it is observed that, the rejection of the role of the UN and sharp separation of the military and the humanitarian organizations was based on the 'dual key' arrangements where both UN and NATO had to approve the use of air power and attacked targets (Ivo Daalder 1999). This did set limits of action whose impact was not pleasing to the parties hence the rejection.

The other two variables are those of intensity of inter-firm interdependence and complexity of interdependence activities both of which serve to stimulate formation of networks. The complex activities that are involved in the complex peace operations which required different skills and competencies therefore serve to promote cooperation between the actors. The civilian actors for instance may not have the skills to carry out demining of the areas and the military may not have the training to carry out humanitarian aid work. The two sets of activities are needed but cannot effectively be carried out by one actor hence the need for formation of networks to aid in the execution of the tasks in the theater. It is in this regard that it has been observed that, single firms have the likelihood of survival within a network of multiple firms (Rietjens 2008). This is basically due to the ability of the network to aid coping capacity of actors.

Trust between firms are also enhanced through networks which help to create relationships between actors. Constant and regular contacts established through networks serve to eliminate sources of mutual suspicion hence strengthening ties between actors involved. The mutual suspicion between the military and the civilian actors can effectively be addressed by the establishment of networks between the aid workers and the military personnel in the theater. It has been further observed that

networks helps in compensating for the weaknesses of the formal structures (Lipson 2005). Subsequently, networks serves to fill the gaps that rigid hierarchies create by enabling actors at times to bypass the structure and conduct activities which otherwise could have not been conducted. This is very important in a complex peace operation since the conflict situation keeps on changing requiring change in tact and manner of response.

The organizational theory and its strands are relevant to this study in several ways. First, it provides an insight on the reluctance to cooperate based on pursuit of prestige which is directly related to the training and skills an organization has invested in. The cold-feet developed by the military towards the civilian actors can be understood from the perspective of gaining little prestige from the execution of activities in the peacebuilding process. The pursuit of prestige therefore, has informed the behavior of military actors especially in wanting to perform time-bound specific tasks and avoid deep involvement with the civilian actors. External uncertainty which makes organizations abhors cooperation as is provided by this theory is also key to this work. This brings into focus the sharing of task and information as well as the decision making and organizational structures of the organizations.

The organizational structure and how it has been discussed by the theory is important to this study. The propositions on the organizational structural differences and how they influence is cooperation is of particular interest. The relationship between the organizational structure and trust is equally of importance. These combined provide valuable insights in understanding cooperation from the perspective of structures both organizational and decisional. It also helps in understanding the role that structure has on trust between partners in a cooperation a component which is of great interest to this work. The manner and level of control that the structures give over field staff and how this influence on trust and eventual cooperation is also important to this work.

The Transaction Cost Economics as another strand of this theory is important in helping to understand the cost implications of the cooperation based on core mandates and principles. The need to adhere to principles and security of staff of the civilian organizations compared with the benefits of cooperation with the military is made possible by this theory. This is particularly important since it relates to autonomy which each and every organization strive to maintain even though they would want to enter into a cooperative arrangement. Finally, networks offers insights on how to overcome the barriers erected by differences in organizational structures as well as establishment of trust needed for smooth cooperation between organizations. The study having a special focus on civil-military

cooperation in disarmament therefore gains a lot from the insights given by the theory in explaining sources of friction in this arrangement.


Chapter 5: Hypothesis Application

5.1 Preview, aims and scope

This chapter seeks to apply the hypothesis established in Chapter Two which has defined four possible sources of friction in the Civil-Military interface with the experience in Kenya. This chapter is dedicated to present a qualitative data gathered from the field to help explain how the four established sources of friction played out in the *Dumisha Amani* operations in Kenya. It will provide specific data using thematic analysis under each particular category of the hypothesis and analyze the data to establish whether the hypothesis held true to the situation in Kenya. The data shall be presented in diagrams which shall then be discussed to establish the contribution in the disarmament exercise in Kenya.

Hypothesis I: Organizational Structural Difference

Diagrams 5.1



The data above points to differences in the organization of the two different actors. The discussion of this data will show how in particular this difference in the organizational structure hampered smooth cooperation between the KDF and the civilian actors during the disarmament exercises. The first emerging theme from the data is that the civilian actors are decentralized. Decentralization as a concept denotes the dispersal of authority or concentration of power from the center to the local levels. Civilian actors can have the field offices, projects and programs decentralized with the field officers having the devolved powers to make decision and execute their mandates in the most convenient ways to them without the direct control of the central offices or headquarters.

Decentralization has featured prominently in the data with many interviewees from the civil society organizations either citing that the field offices or programs operated as semi-autonomous or autonomous in relation to central offices. For instance, one interviewee reported that, ‘we are working on our own programs here under our mandate’⁹. This means that the organization has given this particular field office the mandate to execute but the ways of executing the mandate has been left in the hands of the field office staff. This particular kind of structure offer flexibility when it comes to cooperation with other actors. As reported, ‘this [decentralized structure] gave us flexibility to work with them [other actors] without major hindrances’¹⁰.

In similar vein, field officers are offered the flexibility to respond to issues as they emerge since the power to make decisions are in their own hands. Couple with the fragile peace situations in this region which sometimes presents a gap between the strict mandate provisions and the actual demands in the region this kind of flexibility serve to work best. The need for adaptive strategies is therefore key in relation to the needs of the host communities. It is out of this kind of recognition that it was noted that, ‘we develop our programs according to the needs’¹¹. The needs driven approach to program development allows for flexibility which promotes cooperation with other actors. ‘We adjusted well’¹² the response to how this approach impacted on the cooperation with other actors.

The fact that some of these civil society organizations are locally found and based hence have all their decisions made at the local level. For instance it is reported that, ‘when major peace activities are going on here, our director and manager are always here with us’¹³. This means that decisions can be

⁹ Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 20015)

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

¹² Ibid

¹³ Interviewee 4, (Interview on March 10, 2015)

taken locally to promote adaptability and responsiveness to the evolving peace situation in the area. The decentralized structure of most civilian actors either in the form of field offices or programs enables them to be more flexible and adaptive to cooperate with other actors and adjust their activities to the needs of the host communities.

The fluid organizational structure also emerged as a theme. This structure denotes an organization which allows room to its staff to make decisions and contribute to the organization without due consideration of their structural position in the organization. This kind of structure allow junior officers to execute their mandates and make appropriate decisions in regard to the situation at hand without waiting for approval from their bosses. One interviewee noted that, ‘you are allowed to act and explain your decision later’¹⁴. This can help in preventing things from going wrong since you have the choice to take a decision. This further promotes flexibility and adaptability among the civilian actors.

The centralized organization structure emerged as another theme from the data. This was majorly used to describe the military. Centralized organization structure involves the concentration of power and authority at one point called the center. Under this structure, the authority must emanate from the center without which no action can be taken. It was noted that under this structure the common question asked is, ‘who allowed you?’¹⁵ This in essence means that before any action can be taken it has be approved by another hence the adherence to order and rank. It is noted that under this structure, ‘you must wait to hear from the superior officer and you cannot take any action before you get authorized’¹⁶.

The superior officer must authorized an action before it can be taken despite the location and knowledge of the officer in relation to the local situation at the operational theater. This kind of centralized structure therefore, is rigid and does not allow for innovation by the junior officers as well as provide room for adaptive strategies. It can also leave the junior officers frustrated at times due to the evolving nature of conflict in emergency situations hence the call, ‘if only we could be given little room to decide’¹⁷. This means that the situation may sometimes demand an action by the military but because they have to wait for orders from their superiors, they end up failing to respond promptly.

¹⁴ Interviewee 3, (Interview on March 9, 2015)

¹⁵ Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

Hierarchical organizational structure as a theme also emerged. This theme signifies the classification or sub-division of centers of authority in an ordered manner with the lower centers being accountable to the higher centers. It emerged that the military is highly hierarchical with several centers of authorities stemming from the Chief of General Staff to Lieutenant General to Major General down to private. The private is answerable to the corporal and the corporal to the Sergeant and the hierarchy continue to the Chief of General Staff. Under this structure order is given preference and an individual is not allowed to act out of order. This makes the military structure more rigid since an order cannot be bypassed by junior officers in command.

The civilian actors operating in this region have decentralized and fluid organizational structure from the data gathered whereas the military have centralized and hierarchical structure. The evidence from the different sets of structures means that the civilian actors are more flexible and adaptable to the evolving conflict situation. Subsequently, capable of adjusting their activities and programs to fit with those of other actors. In contrast, KDF being centralized and hierarchical is more rigid and inflexible to adapt their activities to those of civilian actors. This has been a reason behind the failure of effective cooperation between the KDF and the civilian actors.

5.2 Hypothesis II: Decision Making Practices

Diagram 5.2



Decision making is the procedure through which the need to act is evaluated and accepted. The evidence gathered from the field showed that during the operation and cooperation between the civilian actors and KDF, decisions were made differently by the two actors. The first theme that emerged in relation to decision making is the participatory approach this is an approach to decision making that allows for input from all stakeholders before the decision can be taken. This approach gives room to individuals to contribute their ideas to a decision making process with the end product being a reflection of the input by the key participants. ‘We always identify key areas of intervention with the directors and the staff’¹⁸. This shows that the decisions made are a product of deliberation by all in the organization together.

In similar vein, this approach is like a common feature running among many civilian actors. In another organization the staff interviewed reported that, ‘decisions on how to carry out the work is made here by the staff and the management’¹⁹. The decision making approach that allows for the input of all the workers who bring on board the different experiences they have had. This helps in providing insights on actual challenges that have been faced in the implementation of the previous programs hence a chance to improve. In the same vein the people who are going to implement the program are able to talk about the aspects they may not be happy with hence giving room for deliberations on how they can be improved for the better.

Directive is another approach to decision making whereby the person in the position of authority issues orders to the junior officers who are expected to obey the order as it is without questioning. This emerged as the most common way in which decisions are made within the KDF. As noted, ‘we work under order’²⁰. This means that the individual officers are only to obey what has been communicated to them and not ask any questions. This was cited as having an impact on the civil-military cooperation. It is argued that, ‘it is difficult to work with people who do not receive orders’²¹. This means that the military unable to act without orders found it difficult to work with the civilian actors who could take actions without any reference.

Problems specifically occurred after the joint community meetings which would see the civilian and military actors reach a resolution only for military to call Nairobi first. The civilian actors questioned their relevance in the meetings in the first place if they had to wait for someone who was not in the

¹⁸ Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

¹⁹ Interviewee 4, (Interview on March 10, 2015)

²⁰ Interviewee 11, (Interview on March 29, 2015)

²¹ Ibid

meeting to allow them to act or not. The difficulty in cooperation which was occasioned by this was the inability of military officers to discuss aspects they would have wanted changed based on the local situation. It was lamented that, ‘sometimes I would feel personally that I needed to have acted but I could not without permission’²². This seen from the perspective of cooperation would lead to a feeling of let down by the military. Despite that the local commanders having the will to act but unable due to lack of an order to that effect raised the question of the importance of their presence.

The scope of action is another theme that has emerged from the data. The scope of action which refers to the boundaries within which an actor can act in relation to the mandate in question. In other words it pertains to what an individual can do within the area of jurisdiction. The civilian actors have been showed to have a vague scope of action; this means that they are free to act as long as it serves to protect human life and preserve sources of livelihoods. It was reported that, ‘we could just work on the things agreed on at the field’²³. This means that lots of activities would be defined by the evolving situation at the operating theater and not fixed. This also offers a lot of flexibility to civilian actors to adapt their activities to those of others to promote cooperation and meet the changing needs of the host communities.

On the side of the military the theme that emerged is that of defined rules of engagement. This means that the military are not allowed to do what has not been specifically spelt out in the mandate. The question of ‘who allowed you?’²⁴ This means the military officer must only act within the prescriptions and any actions outside that must be accounted for and attract a punitive measure. The need to adapt to the changing conflict situation is therefore limited to the mandate guidelines hence anything beyond the mandate is also beyond the military action despite how pressing it could be. This was a source of tension because the military was at times being accused of inaction as people would lose their lives despite their presence.

The case is illustrated by the following lamentation by a journalist, ‘strangely, more than 48 hours after the attack, no security personnel were on the ground despite the heavy presence of military personnel at Kapedo trading center and thousands of police officers in Nginyang (Mabatuk 2015). This illustrates how civilian actors are left wondering about the inaction by the military in situations where they ought to have responded like immediately. If the military is on the ground and are not

²² Ibid

²³ Interviewee 4, (Interview on March 10, 2015)

²⁴ Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

able to respond quickly to a change in conflict dimension then the civilian actors begin to question the importance of their presence in the operational theater. The change might not be within the rules of engagement in the area hence need to consult with the superiors before taking action which might be too late.


Independent is another theme that featured prominently among the civilian actors in regard to decision making. The civilian actors indicated they were capable of taking decisions without consultation hence enjoying the freedom to swing into action when circumstances demanded so. Independent is the ability of actors to act on their own volition without fear of victimization. It is reported that, 'we are free to decide on how best to do the work that we are doing'²⁵. This is a clear demonstration of independence which offers flexibility that civilian actors enjoy in their execution of their mandates. This in essence means that individual actors will swing into action to save lives without waiting for authorization which may come when the life which was to be saved has been lost.

The final theme that emerged under the decision making practices is the unity of command. This refers to the decision making approach that follows a linear path from the top most officer to the subordinate officer. Under this particular approach, the decision are issued by the senior most officer and passed down through the ranks to the subordinate officer who execute the decision. The subordinate officer do not have the power to act on his own but to follow what has been commanded from the top. This makes the military to be rigid in their activities since the officers in the operational theater cannot act on their own free will but must wait for decisions from their bosses.

²⁵Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 2015)

5.3 Hypothesis III: Information Handling Practices

Diagram 5.3



Information handling practices involves how information flow within the organization and outside the organization. From the data presented above, two key themes have emerged in relation to information handling practices. Open access to information is the first theme that has emerged. This in essence means that the organization operating under open access to information will allow the information generated by the organization to be available to others as well as that obtained from partner organizations. In this region the evidence suggest that most civil society organizations and NGOs practice open access to information. In this regard therefore, most of the organizations are willing to share the information they generate and those they obtain from others.

The right to information was found to be a principle behind the information handling practices of many organizations. For instance it was reported that, ‘we believe in right to information and this makes us share the information we have’²⁶. The need to share information helps to create more room for sharing in the cooperation and is important in clarifying issues which might have otherwise acted as sources of suspicion and mistrust. ‘This area where we operate is risky so we cannot withhold information’²⁷. The fragile situation in the area of operation necessitate the sharing of information since this serves to keep other partners informed about the evolving conflict situation. This can go a long way in saving lives of the staff members as well as reducing casualties and erosion of livelihoods.

In the same vein, it has been observed that, ‘the security here is unstable so preventing people from reaching the information endangers their lives’²⁸. This explains the essence of sharing information in this particular environment. The conflict situation keeps on changing and partners must share information to ensure that all partners are informed about the evolving situations and the regions they may access as well as concentrated on. The need for staff protection is very important and this is guaranteed through the sharing of information. I observed that all the NGOs and Civil Society Organizations’ vehicles had signs forbidding people carrying firearms from boarding them. This sign I was told, ‘reassures community members that they do not associate with people who carry guns and can attack the community members’.²⁹

Open access to information in this particular environment helps to allay fears both among partners and community members. The fact that the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are key to these organizations the sign forbidding people carrying firearms from

²⁶Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

²⁷Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 2015)

²⁸Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

²⁹Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 2015)

boarding the vehicles is very important. This is because the same vehicle works across the rival communities and if the members are not assured that they do not in any way fuel conflict is when their staff using such vehicles can be safe. This communication is therefore very important for the actors to help build confidence with the communities without finding themselves embroiled in the conflict.

Secrecy is another theme that emerged from the data especially in regard to how information is handled by the military. Secrecy here refers to keeping under tight control of the information generated by the organization and that obtained from others with much restriction on who can access the information and who cannot. KDF practice secrecy and handles its information with a lot of caution determining who can access the information and how that information should flow and be guarded. ‘The information is highly guarded and can only be obtained from the Operation Commander who must also consult before giving any information’³⁰. This shows that the information cannot easily be accessed since even the Operation Commander must seek permission to release the information.

This makes the operation of the KDF to be opaque to other partners who also operate in the operational theater. ‘It is not very easy for someone outside the military to know about what we do but they can see for themselves’.³¹ This explains why the activities of the military remained opaque to the other actors in the region since they were only left to see what the military was doing. The attempt by civilian actors to receive information from the military has only enabled them get very ‘limited information’³² about the military. This did hinder effective cooperation between the military and other actors since the other actors could not get information from the military but were willing to give their own to the military.

This difference in information handling practices impacted on the cooperation negatively. It is reported that, ‘They were afraid and look at us with suspicion though that is how the military operate’.³³ The military because of the lack of openness caused fear among the other actors and suspicion. Fear and suspicion is not very healthy for cooperation since it leads to mistrust which can run so deep and can prevent honest sharing which is important for the success of any cooperative

³⁰Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

³¹Interviewee 11, (Interview on March 29, 2015)

³² This entails information that pertain to the safety of other actors but does not include operational details and other pieces of information the military categorize as classified information.

³³Interviewee 11, (Interview on March 29, 2015)

venture. ‘They thought we were keeping our activities too secret’³⁴. This means that the civilian actors would not be sure to predict the next move of the military which serves to increase the level of suspicion and fear hence hampering cooperation.

The civilian actors observed that, ‘to get information from the military is always difficult’³⁵. This means that attempts to reach the military for information was always frustrating hence this conclusion. The military was also faulted for not willing to accept information from the civilian actors. It is reported that, ‘, it was difficult sharing with the military since they came with wrong information and were not willing to change and accept our information’³⁶. This further served to frustrate the civilian actors since the military was not willing to share with them the information they were having and the limited they shared was seen to be ‘wrong’³⁷ and were not even willing to accept another narrative nor change their own. The information that the military had about the illegal guns in the area informed the kind of operation and mission they would undertake.

In similar vein, it was reported that, ‘the security agencies have not taken our piece of information serious in most cases which have ended up in deadly attacks’³⁸. This further means that even if the military accepted some information from the civilian actors, they did not act upon it so the conflict continued to escalate despite information to stop or reduce the severity of such conflicts. This further impacted on the cooperation negatively, leaving the civilian actors with the feeling that there is no need of sharing information. The failure to share nor to accept information from the civilian actors fueled suspicion of lack of commitment and acceptance in the cooperation. The natural result being either withdrawal from the partnership or playing lip service to the ideals of the cooperation hence collapse or failure of the cooperation to deliver on its expectations.

In the same fashion it has been reported that, ‘little was done to incorporate community views’ (Manasseh Wepundi 2011). The result being, ‘local leaders withdrew’.³⁹ Consequently, the civil-military suffered a blow by the withdrawal of opinion leaders from the host communities. ‘The military is not good since they enforce government orders and not willing to give people information

³⁴ Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

³⁵ Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

³⁶ Interviewee 3, (Interview on March 9, 2015)

³⁷ ‘Wrong’ to mean information that is not based on realities on the ground.

³⁸ Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 2015)

³⁹ Key Informant Interview on 15 February 2011 in Kacheliba: Reported by Manasseh Wepundi et al, in *Lessons From the Frontiers: Civilian Disarmament in Kenya and Uganda*; Nairobi, Saferworld Publication, May 2011.


about what they are doing'.⁴⁰The whole operation is seen as a top down approach that does not give locals an opportunity to share in hence the resentment of the military.

The 'failures to establish workable co-ordination in all areas between civilian disarmament facilitators and the security' forces was also blamed (Manasseh Wepundi 2011). There was no formal platform of engagement where the civilian actors would meet with the military to share information about the progress of the exercise and how it could be improved. This further hampered the cooperation since meeting was only informal hence the feeling of lack of proper recognition by the civilian actors. Effective cooperation must incorporate require formal coordination between the parties involved to enable them share and update one another on the activities of one another and how to improve on challenges. The lack of this therefore, serves only to undermine the effectiveness of the cooperation and its success.

⁴⁰Interviewee 5, Interview conducted on March 12, 2015

5.4 Hypothesis IV: Trust

Diagram 5.4



Trust among the actors refers to ability of actors to have confidence that the other actors will behave as expected and do that which is required of them. Trust is a relational concept and describe relations between actors who are working together on a course. In this case therefore, trust shall be discussed among the civilian actors who include the opinion leaders, the chiefs, civil society groups, NGOs and the military. The trust shall also be look into in relation to how the host communities viewed the actors based on their past experience with them and expectations. This broad approach to the concept of trust has been adopted to comprehensively unearth the expectations from all the stakeholders and how this influenced cooperation among the actors.

The first theme that emerged under trust is dominating which is an attempt to make one more visible than others due to lack of confidence in the other's ability. This according to the evidence from the data was very common with the military. 'Some of these organizations cannot do very good things but the military is able'⁴¹. This shows the lack of confidence that the military displayed towards the civilian actors. In the same vein, it was reported that, 'some do very shoddy work'⁴². This kind of statement means that the military while observing the work of the civilian actors even without proper understanding would dismiss them as incompetent hence wanting to take the lead.

The civilian actors were concerned with this kind of view and reported that, 'they tend to undermine our views without giving due consideration in relation to what they have and want'⁴³. This makes the military to be seen as difficult to work with hence the mistrust. Or as reported, 'you know these people you can't just trust them'⁴⁴. It is this kind of relationship and attempt by the military to undermine the civilian actors that has made the latter to distrust the military. This kind of believe by the military that they are the one who can do things better has made them very unpredictable to the civilian actors since they do not trust in the civilian ability hence could act contrary to the agreements made in joint community meetings.

In similar fashion, the military has noted that, the civilians are 'not able to recover reasonable number of arms'⁴⁵. This further exacerbates the mistrust between the military and the civilian actors. The source of mistrust here stemming from the failure to believe in the institutional ability of the civil society organizations to do the work of disarmament. This then makes the military to move in and act

⁴¹Interviewee 11, (Interview on March 29, 2015)

⁴²Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

⁴³Interviewee 3, (Interview on March 9, 2015)

⁴⁴Interviewee 2, (Interview on March 5, 2015)

⁴⁵Interviewee 10, (Interview on March 24, 2015)

an action that is interpreted as domination by the civilian actors. In cooperative arrangements there should be division of tasks based on competency to ensure effective delivery of services. However, in a situation where one partner do not only wants to listen to views from the other but even undermine their ability and activities only leaves the cooperation ineffective and failed.

The other theme that emerged from the data is transparency which means operating in a way that is open and predicted following the laid down rules of engagement. The evidence suggest that this was missing between the military and the civilian actors. It is reported that, ‘you can’t understand them since we were only meeting at the Chief’s meetings so we did not know much about what their intentions were’⁴⁶. This means that the military was not able to interact with the civilian actors to discuss about what they were doing and how they would do it. The civilian actors were just left guessing what the military would do next without having a prior knowledge of such actions hence mistrust.

In the same vein, it has been reported that, ‘they [military] just come and lock themselves at the airstrip and they don’t talk to anybody’⁴⁷. This act of the military excluding and making themselves inaccessible to the other actors also raised a lot of suspicion and mistrust. The inability to be accessed by other actors hinders trust between the actors. Open communication is important for promoting trust among the partners in the cooperation. The civilian actors have desired that, ‘if we can be open to one another and agree together on how thing are done then that can be better’⁴⁸. The need for openness from the side of the military is a plus in the cooperation since the civilian actors are already willing to cooperate to a large degree in the operational area.

The fact that the military was not transparent in their activities made the civilian actors also to withhold some information from them. The information about key witnesses could not be given by the civilian actors for the fear of victimization since the Witness Protection Law in Kenya is not clear. One civilian actor reported that, ‘we related well but with suspicion’⁴⁹. This means that the trust was lacking and critical information which could lead to guns whereabouts could not be given to the military. The fragile security situation in this area make even the chief to fear for victimization by his

⁴⁶Interviewee 4, (Interview on March 10, 2015)

⁴⁷ Ibid,

⁴⁸ Ibid,

⁴⁹Interviewee 1, (Interview on March 3, 2015)

people and could not give information directly. This is also due to lack of transparency and fear that the military would tell who exactly reported to them about the whereabouts of the guns and warriors.

The long term contact with the host community led to identification of another theme; deep-ties. The deep-ties which refers to the long and regular contact that have been developed and is developing between actors. The civilian actors tend to have a long term development agenda within the host communities hence establish the deep-ties. These ties enables the community members to confide in them making them privy to community secrets. These secrets after being given to them, they are expected to help in being the custodians of the secrets together with the communities. Their activities are therefore, closely monitored by the host communities to ensure that there is no betrayal to them.

This was also a thorn in the cooperation between the military and the civilian actors. The fact that the military in the past operations had earned a bad name in the manner in which they handled the past operations with accusations of mass casualties and all manner of inhuman practices, the host communities did not expect the civilian actors to cooperate with the military. It was noted that, ‘in 1984, they castrated men before their wives and made some to eat sand’⁵⁰. The military from the host communities’ perspective was an enemy who must not be given secrets hence close cooperation highly discouraged. It is reported that, ‘the community was like we are betraying them since we have stayed with them for long and knew their secrets and how could we work with the military again so we were reluctant’⁵¹.

The past operations and the manner in which they have been carried out has been decried to be part of the problem and not the solution. The governor of Baringo County Mr. Benjamin Cheboi, is reported to have stated that, ‘at times, the involvement of State security agents has only helped to fuel tension and conflict.....as their intervention almost always involves the perpetration of human rights violations, especially among the most vulnerable members of the community, notably the women and children’ (Kiprotich 2015). It is this kind of allegations of human rights violations from the state security agencies that has made the communities in this region to distrust security agencies hence anybody having deep ties with them must not be seen to be working closely with the military in this particular case.

In the same vein, the Member of Parliament for Moroto Constituency has been quoted to have observed that, ‘the operation is unsuccessful since the KDF officers are scaring residents who would

⁵⁰Interviewee 4, (Interview on March 10, 2015)

⁵¹ Ibid

be of great help in the disarmament processes.⁵² This is closely related to the high-handedness the military has been associated with. When the local people see the military they do not see partners to cooperate with but enemies to be resented. When the military show any sign of high handedness, the wedge between the military and the host communities even widen. The allegations of human rights violations associated with the operations are therefore working against the cooperation.

The deep-ties is presenting itself here as a challenge to cooperation between the actors due the host communities expectation and past experience with the military. In the same vein, it was reported that, ‘I did not want close association with the military since this could also make my community members to victimize me and warriors even to kill me’⁵³. The fear of victimization and death in the hands of the warriors hindered cooperation with the military. Individuals feared being singled out as responsible for cooperating with the military hence avoiding close association. For instance it was reported that, ‘even if I know someone has a gun it does not come from me because I fear also being attacked so I call elders and through elders we can now tell the military the link to the whereabouts of the guns so that am not victimized’⁵⁴. This fear is deeply rooted that even to give some critical information a community meeting must be called of elders to find a way of presenting information without an individual claiming responsibility.

The other theme that is emerging here is the government’s absence. This refers to the feeling that the government is not doing enough to provide security to the people and their lives. This makes the activities like the disarmament to be seen as occasions which are only to pass quickly into the past without solving the insecurity problem. For instance, governor Cheboi is quoted to have reiterated that, ‘we want the government to do more in terms of protecting the lives and property We cannot leave the people at the mercy of heavily armed community vigilantes, criminal gangs and gun-toting bandits’ (Kiprotich 2015). This displays that the government might not be doing enough to ensure that the people in this region are protected.

The people therefore only see disarmament as a threat to their own security since when they give guns away through the cooperation with the military, they will remain more vulnerable. For instance, an elder from the village of Lerata in Samburu has been quoted to have said, ‘our people were killed, our animals taken away; many families are poor now... We'll never repeat the mistake we made two

⁵² Samuel Kisika, Pokot MPs promise to recover remaining guns by Wednesday: Nairobi, My News24, 2014-11-11 <http://m.news24.com/kenya/MyNews24/Pokot-MPs-promise-to-recover-remaining-guns-by-Wednesday-20141111>

⁵³ Interviewee 5, (Interview on March 12, 2015)

⁵⁴ Interviewee 6, (Interview on March 13, 2015)

years ago'⁵⁵. This reiteration by the elder explains the failure by the government to protect their community after they had cooperated in the first phase of the disarmament exercise. His statements speaks of a resolve not to cooperate again in the disarmament since after giving out the guns they become so vulnerable to attacks from other communities who have failed to disarm.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Suggestions on How to Improve Future Cooperation

6.1 Conclusions

The civil-military cooperation in the Operation Dumisha Amani did not bear much fruit because of several factors. The first major factor is the organizational differences between the civilian actors and the military. The civilian actors are decentralized in their operations whereas the military has a more centralized operation structure. Therefore, the civilian actors were more flexible to adapt to the evolving nature of conflict and adapted their strategies to the unique needs of the communities. However, the military having a more centralized structure could not adjust their activities to adapt to the situation. This made them to be seen as less accommodative by the civilian actors. Resolutions emerging from joint community meetings attended by both the military and the civilian actors would not be implemented by the military before getting a clearance from the headquarters which made the civilian actors to begin to question their relevance in such meetings if they had no power to effect the decisions.

Further, the civilian-military cooperation also failed to bear much fruit in the disarmament exercise because, the military was not ready to accept the information about the illegal guns mapping in the area and their sources as provided by the civilian actors and instead insisted on the information they had come with. The information which was seen as 'wrong' from the civilian perspective made the cooperation difficult since the civilians felt unwelcomed by the military. Subsequently, the high handedness approach pursued in relation to the alleged 'wrong' information by the military was seen as overambitious hence leading to resentment of the military by the civilian actors and the communities. The civilian actors therefore felt that there was no need of sharing information with the military since it would either be ignored or rejected completely.

In the same vein, the civilian actors were not willing to give some information they considered to be putting particular community members at risk. This kind of information relate to witnesses who

⁵⁵ IRIN, *Your Guns or Your Freedom Please*: Samburu, May 7, 2010. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89060/kenya-your-guns-or-your-freedom-please>

provided key information to them based on the long term contact they have enjoyed with the communities. The reason behind this move to conceal information is due to the fear of victimization of the witnesses since the witness protection law in Kenya is not very clear making the civilian actors fear that it could be used against the witnesses. The host communities having trusted the civilian actors with their secrets expected them not to cooperate more closely with the military since it would be seen as if they were betraying the communities.

In similar fashion, the civilian actors saw the military to be dominating and wanting to control the relationship something they were uncomfortable with. The military wanted to lead the activities believing the civilians were not able to help them recover the highest number of guns within the shortest time possible. The lack of faith by the military on the ability of the civilian actors, made them ignored and rejected hence hampering cooperation. The past operations which involved the use of a lot of force against the civilians also made opinion leaders more reluctant to cooperate with the military since by cooperating they would be seen as betrayers of the community.

The time bound nature of military operations also made the cooperation less successful. This is because the individuals who would work more closely with the military would become more vulnerable to attacks immediately after the departure of the military. The fear of being attacked after the end of the military operation made community members more reluctant to work closely with the military. The military on the other side saw the activities of the civilian actors as disjointed and not able to yield positive results within the shortest time possible hence not to be trusted with the work.

In relation to the above conclusions the following suggestions can serve to promote civil-military cooperation in Kenya. First the military needs to adopt a decentralized command structure where the operational field commanders have the general objectives of the operation but are left to decide on how best to achieve such objectives. This will enable the military to be more flexible enough to accommodate the civilian actors. Secondly, the military should be ready to accept the information coming from the civilians despite not being used to such information to help build more trust between them. Thirdly, the military should be ready to share the information they have with the civilian actors. Fourth, the government of Kenya should also come up with clear laws protecting witnesses in this kind of situation to make the civilians more willing to give information they have about critical links that can lead to the success future operations.

Fifth, the government prior to such operations should create a formal interaction forum where the military and the civilian actors can share. This serves to ease communication and provide clarity about

the operations of both the actors. Further, this is important in sharing information and removing doubts between actors hence enabling trust to develop among the actors. It also helps to promote better coordination of activities which serve to reduce overlap and duplication. Sixth, the government should improve the security of the region so that the deployment of military is not misunderstood as a short-term reactionary measure which at the end of the day will leave the communities to their own devices for security. This will boost the confidence of the locals and will enable them cooperate more with the military.

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Appendices

1.1 Interview Guide

This is to address gaining access to organizations, the resources in the field, schedule of data collection and unanticipated events.

(a) Gaining access to organizations

Military side: I will drop an e-mail requesting for the interview with the military. Currently, there are also officers on the ground at Kapedo area in Baringo County and will also seek to access them and interview the commanders.

Civilian side: A visit to the region will give an access to the organizations in the region i.e. NGOs, INGOs, Community Based Organizations, community leaders including local politicians. They will be interviewed with the view of understanding how the points of friction shaped the cooperation between actors and how it can be improved.

NB: In cases where visits may not be made and face to face interview done, telephone and email interview will be conducted.

(b) Schedule of data collection

WHEN	WHAT
Week 1	Preparation for the Field Research
Week 2-4	Visiting Study Area and Interviewing Respondents
Week 5	Processing results of the Field Research
Week 6	Interview to gain missing Information

General questions

1. Did you participate in the disarmament exercise dubbed Dumisha Amani II?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No (*End the Interview*)
2. Which actor were/are you cooperating with?
3. When did you begin the partnership?
4. What is the position of your partnership?
 - a. Ended
 - b. Continuing
5. If (a) then when?
6. On which areas are you cooperating?

Hypothesis I:

7. What is the organizational structure of your organization?
8. Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?
9. What would you have done differently in the cooperation?

Hypothesis II:

10. How are decisions made in your organization?
11. Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?
12. What would you have done differently in the cooperation?

Hypothesis III:

13. How easy is it to access information from your organization?
14. Who handles information in your organization?
15. How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?

16. What would you have done differently in cooperation?

Hypothesis IV:

17. What was your perception of other actors?

18. Did you trust what they were doing?

19. How did this impact on your cooperation?

20. How did this impact division of activities?

21. How could this have been improved?

1.2 Data Analysis and Interview Transcripts

Interviewee	Interview Script	Initial Coding
1	<p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: We have a field office here headed by the Program coordinator and we have field officers working in the field. We have our headquarters in Paris France.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: We are working on our own programs here under our mandate and we adjust our programs to fit with those of others so this gave us flexibility to work with them without major hindrance.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: If we could be meeting together under a forum to share on what to be done and the new challenges it could have been better.</p>	<p>Field office</p> <p>Flexibility</p> <p>Meeting together</p>
3	<p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: We have our headquarters in Djibouti with several member states as members with several programs that are running in various parts of the region. In this region we have the conflict Early Warning System Program which I work as Field Officer. This program run most of its activities independently which allow me to respond to many issues in my capacity as field officer.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: You know when you are allowed to act and only explain your decision later then it is better like the organization allows me so I was able to adjust my field programs to run together with those of the military and other stakeholders.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Stakeholders needs to coordinate their activities well before so that the behavior of others would be more predictable.</p>	<p>Activities run independently</p> <p>Allowed to act</p> <p>Coordination of activities</p>
2	<p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: Our organization is a local civil society group with me as the Coordinator and I work with my board of directors and other staff in my office.</p>	<p>Local civil society group</p>

4	<p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: We develop our programs according to the needs and on decision made by myself and the board of directors who are very supportive and available. So it was not a big issue we adjusted well.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Reaching the field and just bumping on others is not very good so meeting prior and sharing is better.</p> <p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: We are here in a field office with our main office being in Nairobi with the director and managers. In this office am the coordinator as senior field officer and we work in the field trying to promote peace as we send report to Nairobi on what we have done.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: When major peace activities are going on here our director and the manager are always here with us during that time and so there was no problem since this is our area of operation.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: The military just come here and they just stay at the airstrip here without talking to anybody even if you want to talk to them you can't access them.</p>	<p>We develop</p> <p>Meeting prior and sharing</p> <p>Report on work done</p> <p>Present on the ground</p> <p>Want to talk</p>
10	<p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The Military is headed by the President who is the commander in Chief followed by the Chief of General Staff who is followed by Army Commander, who is followed by Lieutenant Colonel who heads a battalion, followed by a major, who is followed by lieutenant, who is followed by the Sergeant, who is followed by the corporal and finally the soldiers.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: You must wait to hear from the superior officer and so you cannot take any action unless you get authorized so it was difficult in some situations to work with others since we have to be directed on what to do.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p>	<p>Who is followed by</p> <p>Must wait to hear</p> <p>Room to engage</p>

<p>11</p>	<p>Interviewee: If only we can be allowed more room to engage others and act out of such.</p> <p>Interviewer: What is the organizational structure of your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: It begins with the president at the top down to Chief of General Staff, to Army Commander, to Lieutenant Colonel, to Major, to Lieutenant, to Sergeant to Corporal then soldiers. So you can see that we have an order to be followed since each level has authority of its own.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this have an impact on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: There are activities you can do without consulting Nairobi but they must not involve much of military resources when we are in an operation somewhere but most things come from Nairobi.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Maybe we get more room to work more at the operational level with other actors.</p>	<p>Order</p> <p>Top flow</p> <p>More room</p>
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Final coding	Initial Coding Framework
Decentralized structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field office • Activities run independently • Local civil society • Report on work done
Centralized structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who is followed by • Order
Fluid structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flexibility • Allowed to work • We develop • Present on the ground
Hierarchical structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must wait to hear • Top flow • Room to engage • More room
Formal Forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting together • Coordination of activities • Meeting prior and sharing • Want to talk

Hypothesis II

Table 1:

Interviewee	Interview Script	Initial coding
1	<p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The decisions are made here at the office but our field officers also make decisions on their own based on how best they feel the work would be done better. The major decision regarding establishing or abolishing of the entire office is the one done in Paris, France.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: We are free to decide on how best to do the work that we are doing and our field staff also do their best to ensure we meet the objectives so it did not interfere so long as the work was done at the end of the day.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: If all the stakeholders would have freedom to decide and we implement the decision in the field without being asked to wait it can be better.</p>	<p>on their own</p> <p>How best</p> <p>Asked to wait</p>
3	<p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The decision regarding what is to be done is made at the headquarters but the decision on how it is to be done is made at the field here.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how?</p> <p>Interviewee: I was able to move with the military liaison officers from village to village in persuading people to return the guns as well as participate in warriors' demobilization and compensation for the people whose animals were stolen under the restocking Programme. So I have the room to fit in many programs and arrangements.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: During the dry season some Pokot are in Uganda so the disarmament exercise should be done jointly within the region by the governments.</p>	<p>At the field</p> <p>Room to</p> <p>Done jointly</p>
2	<p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: We always identify key areas of intervention with the directors and staff then we implement them. The way they are implemented also depend on situation and circumstances prevailing at the moment.</p>	<p>Together</p>

4	<p>Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how? Interviewee: We are always able to work with others since we decide on most things locally here so sharing and working together has never been a problem to us. Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation? Interviewee: If we could divide the tasks among ourselves so that each stakeholder would be handling a particular issue it could have been very good.</p> <p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization? Interviewee: The work of the Nairobi office is just to link us with other donors and partners since it is easier to reach Nairobi than here. But, decisions on how to carry out the work is made here by the field staff and the management. Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how? Interviewee: we worked well since we could just work on things agreed on at the field and come later to the office and explain. Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation? Interviewee: It was difficult to work with the military since after agreeing on something at the community meeting they had to call Nairobi before doing it.</p>	<p>Decisions taken locally</p> <p>Division of tasks</p> <p>Together</p> <p>Doing things agreed on</p> <p>Call Nairobi</p>
10	<p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization? Interviewee: The decisions are made by the national security committee chaired by the president, then the decision is passed to the army commander, who pass the decision to the Battalion commander, who pass on the order to Company commander who then pass the order to a Platoon commander who pass the decision to the Corporal who finally pass it to soldiers (Askaris). Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how? Interviewee: You have to wait for order from above before you can act on anything. The common question being who allowed you? But also we only work much with the police and not the civilian as such. They are the military intelligence who are called liaison officers who work with the civilians ours is not to work with them. Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation? Interviewee: If only we could be given little room to decide it would be better.</p>	<p>National Security Committee</p> <p>Restricted</p> <p>Little room to decide</p>

11	<p>Interviewer: How are decisions made in your organization? Interviewee: Decisions are made by the president or parliament then passed to Chief of General Staff who communicate the decision to the Battalion commander who communicate it to Company Commander who communicate it to Platoon Commander who communicate it to the Corporal who finally pass it to soldiers.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did this impacted on how you cooperated with other actors and how? Interviewee: We work under orders and this make it difficult to work with people who do not receive any orders. I could decide to help with military resources but only to the extent that it was only limited.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in the cooperation? Interviewee: Sometimes I would feel personally that I needed to have acted but I could not without permission.</p>	<p>Top level</p> <p>Under orders</p> <p>Need for permission</p>
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Table 2:

Final coding	Initial Coding Framework
Participatory Camaraderie of command Vague scope of Action Independent Directive Unity of Command Defined rules of engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Together • Division of tasks • On their own • At the field • How best • Decisions taken locally • Doing things agreed on • Room to • How best • Call Nairobi • Little room to decide • Being asked to wait • National Security Committee • Top level

Integrated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restricted • Under orders • Need permission Done jointly
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Hypothesis III

Table 3.1

Interviewee	Interview Script	Initial Coding
1	<p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: It is very easy since we share information every morning with our field staffs and other stakeholders too. This area where we operate is risky so we cannot withhold information and we expect others to do so too.</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The information is handle by the coordinator but it is shared and gathered from staff and partners in this region.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: We have been able to provide information to all the other actors but the security agencies have not taken our piece of information serious in most cases which have ended up in deadly attacks.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: The military and other security agency should treat the information we give them more seriously.</p>	<p>Very easy access</p> <p>The coordinator</p> <p>Suspicion</p> <p>Proper handling of information</p>
3	<p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: When you want some information about our work here we give it to you</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: I do since am the one in the field and I gather it from the field so any information about the field here you can get it from me.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: I was able to share information with all other stakeholders in this region. However, it was difficult sharing with the military since they came with wrong information and were not willing to change and accept our information.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p>	<p>We give it to you</p> <p>Field officer</p> <p>Arrogant</p> <p>Sharing information</p>

2	<p>Interviewee: The military should accept also information from us so that they do not demand what is not in the community based on the wrong information they have.</p> <p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: We believe in right to information and this makes us share the information we have. But you know there is unclear witness protection law in this country so we cannot share information with the military or the police that leaves witnesses vulnerable in that we will not be doing very well to the community.</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: I do handle information here but majorly anybody can access and use that information since the security here is unstable so preventing people from reaching the information endangers their lives.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: We share our bit of information and we received from them though to get information from the military is always difficult.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Chiefs should be able to share the information about the guns they have in their areas so that we do not do double work again registering guns.</p>	<p>Right to information</p> <p>Program coordinator</p> <p>One sided communication</p> <p>Dublication</p>
4	<p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: If you want to know how we work here we just tell you and the things we do. We don't have a problem with that.</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The information is handled majorly in Nairobi since there is where we have our library and other things but here we can also give you what we have.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: Just like I told you during major operations the people working in Nairobi always come here and so you can get all the information you want so it was easy working with others though the military we would just meet them in the field while addressing public meetings that is when we would be told this is so and so.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p>	<p>We just tell you</p> <p>Manager/field officers</p> <p>Just meet them in the field</p> <p>Only meet in public</p>

<p>10</p>	<p>Interviewee: We should meet the military earlier before we get to the community not that we work together and only meet in public meetings.</p> <p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The information is highly guarded and can only be obtained from the Operation Command who must also consult before giving any information. We only share very limited information.</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: The information is handle at the Headquarters but is gathered by the military intelligence officers and can also be discussed at the County Security Committees with the Major and the military intelligence as members. So the major also handles it at the operational level.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: They thought we were keeping our activities to be too secret</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Interacting with others to share information which are not so confidential is not a bad thing.</p>	<p>Highly guarded</p> <p>Headquarter</p> <p>Too secret</p> <p>Share little bit more</p>
<p>11</p>	<p>Interviewer: How easy is it to access information from your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: It is not very easy for someone outside the military to know about what we do but they can see for themselves.</p> <p>Interviewer: Who handles information in your organization?</p> <p>Interviewee: I was handling the information about the operation but the headquarters must authorize me to use the information and give it to another person unless I felt it was not so much confidential.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on cooperation with other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: They were afraid and look at us with suspicion though that is how the military operate.</p> <p>Interviewer: What would you have done differently in cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: Improved contact and sharing in the field is not a bad idea.</p>	<p>Not very easy</p> <p>Major/ Headquarters</p> <p>Suspicion</p> <p>Improved contact</p>

Table 3.2

Final coding	Initial Coding Framework
Open	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very easy to access • We give it to you • Right to information • We just tell you
Secrecy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly guarded • Not very easy • Too secret • One sided communication • Suspicion • Arrogant
Disjointed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duplication • Sharing more information • Share little bit more • Improved contact

Hypothesis IV

Table 4.1

Interviewee	Interview Script	Initial Coding
1	<p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors? Interviewee: They only came but were not willing to take information from us despite having stayed here longer made me not to feel so good about them.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing? Interviewee: Somehow since you can't trust them fully. Mostly you just see them work without telling what they are doing and thinking of doing.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation? Interviewee: We related well but with suspicion.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities? Interviewee: We have asked them not to use force but let us deal with the community by collecting guns but you can't trust whether they will not go to the community themselves.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved? Interviewee: If we are informed about their activities and we can understand what they want to do then it could be better that is for the military.</p>	<p>Uneasy feel</p> <p>Somehow</p> <p>Suspicion</p> <p>Whether they will not go</p> <p>Informed about their activities</p>
3	<p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors?</p>	<p>Not that bad</p>

	<p>Interviewee: They are not that bad. Since we could work with them.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing?</p> <p>Interviewee: Yes I did since the roads they were building are complete and water pans functional.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: It made me feel like they are not that bad and we could work well.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities?</p> <p>Interviewee: Being very flexible I just walked side by side with them from village to village like the military liaison officers.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved?</p> <p>Interviewee: They tend to undermine our views without giving due consideration in relation to what they have and want.</p>	<p>Yes I did</p> <p>Not that bad</p> <p>Being very flexible</p> <p>Tend to Undermine</p>
2	<p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: You know these people you can't just trust them</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing?</p> <p>Interviewee: We did not know exactly what and what they were to do so you cannot be sure.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: We have just continued with our work of mapping guns and registering them so that if they cannot be returned then at least owners be known.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities?</p> <p>Interviewee: Our work continued but we asked to be allowed to talk to the community so that force is not used.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved?</p> <p>Interviewee If we can be open to one another and agree together on how thing are done then that can be better.</p>	<p>You know these people</p> <p>Just continued with our work</p> <p>To talk to the community</p> <p>Open to one another</p>
4	<p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors?</p> <p>Interviewee: The military is bad. They just come and lock themselves at the airstrip and they don't talk to anybody. And in 1984, they castrated men before their wives and made some to eat sand. They are bad.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing?</p> <p>Interviewee: You know you can't understand them since we were only meeting at the Chief's meetings so we did not know much about what their intentions were.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation?</p> <p>Interviewee: The community was like we are betraying them since we have stayed with them for long and knew their secrets and how could we work with the military again so we were reluctant.</p>	<p>Military is bad</p> <p>You can't understand them</p> <p>Reluctant</p>

10	<p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities? Interviewee: We took the task of convincing the community to return the guns voluntarily but the community was looking at us with suspicion.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved? Interviewee They should just do other reconstruction work and leave us to deal with the community.</p> <p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors? Interviewee: They are good but we did not interact so much so just believe they were doing a good job.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing? Interviewee: Yes but they are unable to recover reasonable number of guns.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation? Interviewee: This is why we had to go ourselves to collect the guns from the villages.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities? Interviewee: We left them to do other duties and we went in cordoned villages and mounted searches for guns.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved? Interviewee: You know we work on orders sometimes locals can plead that you give them some time but we cannot hesitate if we are ordered and we stay only for short periods.</p> <p>Interviewer: What was your perception of other actors? Interviewee: Some of these organizations cannot do very good things but the military is able and when we do it we do it once and for all.</p> <p>Interviewer: Did you trust what they were doing? Interviewee: Some do very shoddy work.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact on your cooperation? Interviewee: Mostly where we could help we just did our best and where we could not we just left.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this impact division of activities? Interviewee: We preferred to do much of the activities.</p> <p>Interviewer: How could this have been improved? Interviewee: Maybe the NGOs come as an organized group then we can see what to share with them.</p>	<p>With suspicion</p> <p>Leave us</p> <p>Are good but</p> <p>Unable to recover</p> <p>Go ourselves</p> <p>Other duties</p> <p>Work on orders</p> <p>Cannot do very good things</p> <p>Shoddy work</p> <p>Did our best</p> <p>Do much of the activities</p>
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Table 4.2

Final Coding	Initial Coding Framework
Dominating	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do much of the activities • Other duties

<p>Transparent</p> <p>Attitude</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reluctant • Tend to undermine • Go ourselves • Cannot do very good things • Open to one another • Whether they will go or not go • With suspicion • Suspicion • You know these people • Just continued with our work • Somehow • Uneasy feel
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Interviewee	Interview Script	Initial coding
5	<p>Interviewer: What is your perception of the military?</p> <p>Interviewee: The military is not good since they enforce government orders and not willing to give people information about what they are doing.</p> <p>Interviewer: Do you trust the military?</p> <p>Interviewee: No. The treated our people badly in the past and do not want to associate with them.</p> <p>Interviewer: How did this influence how you cooperated with the military?</p> <p>Interviewee: I did not want close association with the military since this could also make my community members to victimize me and warriors even to kill me.</p> <p>Interviewer: Which role did you play?</p> <p>Interviewee: I worked persuaded my community to embrace peace but did not ask them to return guns to the government in particular.</p> <p>Interviewer: What do you think should be improved?</p> <p>Interviewee: The government should embrace a multilateral approach and engage the community members in finding alternative sources of livelihoods. By employing adaptive strategies rather than linear strategies in seeking for the illegal gun solution in the region.</p>	<p>Is not good</p> <p>Treated our people badly</p> <p>Did not want close association</p> <p>Peace crusader</p> <p>Multilateral approach</p>
8	<p>Interviewer: What is your perception of the military?</p> <p>Interviewee: The military has not been so good especially for us here based on what they did in 1984 disarmament.</p>	<p>Not been so good</p>

7	<p>Interviewer: Do you trust the military? Interviewee: It is difficult to trust the military since they never interact with people to tell you what they want and expect you to do. Interviewer: How did this influence how you cooperated with the military? Interviewee: I accepted to help the military in doing the call for voluntary surrender of illegal guns despite having misgivings about them like that. Interviewer: Which role did you play? Interviewee: I move from place to place addressing public meetings asking for people to return guns to the government. Interviewer: What do you think should be improved? Interviewee: The military and other stakeholders need to have a prior meeting to arrange on how an operation should be carried out. The meeting can help clarify issues of concern between us the military.</p> <p>Interviewer: What is your perception of the military? Interviewee: Can't say that are that bad. Interviewer: Do you trust the military? Interviewee: To some extent yes. Interviewer: How did this influence how you cooperated with the military? Interviewee: Since we had a bad experience with the military in the 1984, I decided that we meet the then Assistant Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration the late Hon. Orwa Ojode to tell him how best we would work with the military and the police in the disarmament exercise and he granted us hearing and consideration. Interviewer: Which role did you play? Interviewee: I walk with the military commanders from one village to the next talking to people to voluntarily surrender the illegal guns they were holding. Interviewer: What do you think should be improved? Interviewee: There should be a more formal and regulated forum where we can meet and talk together as shareholders with the military and other civilian actors.</p>	<p>It is difficult to trust</p> <p>Called for guns surrender</p> <p>Addressing public meetings</p> <p>Prior meeting</p> <p>Not so bad</p> <p>To some extent yes</p> <p>Organize a meeting</p> <p>Moving from village to village</p> <p>Formal and regulated forum</p>
6	<p>Interviewer: What is your perception of the military? Interviewee: They are good we work with them well here. Interviewer: Do you trust the military? Interviewee: Yea they are able to help in providing security to us here.</p>	<p>Good</p> <p>Yea</p>

<p>9</p>	<p>Interviewer: How did this influence how you cooperated with the military? Interviewee: I have cooperated with the military from time and again in asking my people to return guns. Interviewer: Which role did you play? Interviewee: I invite people to a public meeting to come and even if I know someone has a gun it does not come from me because I fear also being attacked so I call elders and through elders we can now tell the military the link to the whereabouts of the guns so that am not victimized. Interviewer: What do you think should be improved? Interviewee: Meeting by all stakeholders before the community meeting can be very important so that proper coordination is achieved among them not just meeting at the public meeting.</p> <p>Interviewer: What is your perception of the military? Interviewee: Not so bad. Interviewer: Do you trust the military? Interviewee: Somehow I can say so. Interviewer: How did this influence how you cooperated with the military? Interviewee: I was skeptical about the military though and their activities. Interviewer: Which role did you play? Interviewee: Just talking to people about the benefits of peace and helping the victims of the violence get justice. Interviewer: What do you think should be improved? Interviewee: The military and other stakeholders should have a formal way of engagement in their area of operation.</p>	<p>Cooperated</p> <p>Convene a public meeting</p> <p>Prior meeting by stakeholders</p> <p>Not so bad</p> <p>Somehow</p> <p>Skeptical</p> <p>Peace crusader</p> <p>A formal way of engagement.</p>
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