

# **THE ROLE OF SPAIN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – CUBA RELATIONS**

A Qualitative Research on Spain's Contribution to the  
European Union Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
Towards Cuba



MELIKE EBIT

Master Thesis in European Studies  
Specialization Latin American Studies  
Supervised by Lise Rolandsen Agustin

Aalborg University

# **THE ROLE OF SPAIN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – CUBA RELATIONS**

A Qualitative Research on Spain's Contribution to the  
European Union Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
Towards Cuba

- Master Thesis -

Student: MELIKE EBIT

Master`s Programme: EUROPEAN STUDIES

Specialization: LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

Supervisor: LISE ROLANDSEN AGUSTIN

Associate Professor

Department of Culture and Global Studies

Number of keystrokes: 166.525 (69,4 pages)

31 July 2014

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internacional Para el Desarrollo
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission
ICP	Interuniversity Cooperation Programme
MEP	Minister of European Parliament
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comun del Sur
MS	Member State
PES/PSE/S&D	Party of European Socialists/and Democrats
PIFTE	Ibero-American Specialized Technical Training
PJCC	Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
PP	Partido Popular
PPE-DE/PPE/EPP	European People's Party/Christian Democrats
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
UN	United Nations
US/USA	United States of America

## **Table of contents**

### **ABSTRACT**

#### **Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION**

- 1.1 Problem formulation and hypothesis
- 1.2 Problem area
- 1.3 Delimitations
- 1.4 Literature review

#### **Chapter 2: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN**

- 2.1 Methodological strategy
- 2.2 Type of method and data
- 2.3 Validity, reliability and critics
- 2.4 Synopsis

#### **Chapter 3: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

- 3.1 Social constructivism
- 3.2 Liberal institutionalism
- 3.3 Limitations of theories

#### **Chapter 4: THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY**

- 4.1 The EU institutions and actors involved in the process of foreign policy decision-making
- 4.2 The EU as a normative international actor

## Chapter 5: **THE EUROPEAN UNION - CUBA FRAMEWORK**

5.1 The evolution of the EU – Cuba nexus

5.2 The Cocktail Wars

5.3 Sakharov Prize winners from Cuba

5.4 The Member States

## Chapter 6: **SPAIN –MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA?**

6.1 Spain and Cuba – bilateral relations

6.2 The importance of Spanish EU Presidencies and variations in Spain`s attitude towards Cuba

6.2.1 The 1989 and 1995 Socialist Presidencies

6.2.2 The 2002 Conservative Presidency

6.2.3 The 2010 Socialist Presidency

6.2.4 Spanish Socialist Worker`s Party (PSOE) and People`s Party (PP)

6.3 Spain within the EU institutions and foreign policy decision-making regarding Cuba

6.3.1 The Council of the European Union decisions

6.3.2 The European Parliament debates

6.4 Starting negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba – conditions

## Chapter 7: **CONCLUSIONS**

7.1 What are the possibilities for individual Member States to influence the EU foreign policy decision-making?

7.2 How could Spain further participate in strengthening the relationship between the two political actors? *Perspectives*

## **ABSTRACT**

The European Union foreign policy is a vast area whose objectives refer to promoting international peace, democratic principles and cooperation. Its most challenging mission is to develop dialogue with non-democratic states, such as Cuba.

The purpose of this master thesis was to explore a social constructivist approach completed by a liberal institutionalist view of the European Union – Cuba nexus through the contribution of Spain as a Member state. For the exploration of this field, given the particularity of the problem, the research process consisted in a qualitative investigation through the case-study method, using interpretive techniques on the data.

The process of foreign policy decision-making within the European Union institutions has been explored in order to determine how the actors construct their interests and policies, which was more obvious with the Spanish Members of European Parliament.

Based on the analysis, Spain has demonstrated its role of mediator between the two political actors and the potential to influence the European Union policies towards Cuba to some extent, under particular conditions.

The Spain – EU – Cuba triangle represents a complex framework that highlights the connection between national and European dynamics, the balance between the Council and the Parliament, as well as ideological clashes generating different kinds of policies.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The relations between Spain and Cuba are characterized by a complexity of historical, sociological, cultural, political and economic factors. First of all, Cuba is a former colony of Spain, its official language is Spanish and there have been many investments that Spain made on the Cuban territory during the last decades. These aspects improved their connection; therefore, it can be said that, having a strong basis of their cooperation, Cuba has developed ties with Spain more than with other state within the European Union. Cuba sees the EU as a potential ally - a key source of investments, imports and aid - that is willing to help, but still having many demands, especially when it comes to the regime change – democracy and human rights. Thus in this regard, Spain can represent a very important source of political and economical benefits for Cuba by strengthening their regional and institutional ties with the EU.

Despite their close relationship, the political attitude of Spain within the EU policy has generally presented variations in its position towards Cuba. In general terms, there have been many changes in Spain's national foreign policy, its position has been alternating in the EU between requesting cooperation policy with Cuban government and punishment for the way it acts with its people.

Cuba is known as the only country in the Latin American region that has an authoritarian – communist regime since 1959 under the rule of Fidel Castro and of his brother Raul Castro since 2008. It is also the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that does not have a formal agreement with the EU.

The main obstacle that the EU has encountered in establishing a bilateral agreement with Cuba is the lack of democracy and of progress in the situation of human rights - political and civic rights and political reforms, as well. There have been several attempts of cooperation between them, but these were cancelled due to Cuba's actions.

The relations between the EU and Cuba are currently limited to the Common Position and the Council Conclusions that provide a regular assessment of the position, which is updated every six months. This document was a step that Spain made in 1996 and currently it makes efforts within the EU to change or cancel it. Therefore it is crucial to explore the aspects of Spain's changes and what identity it

reflects within the EU. Given that the EU has to show one single voice represented by its foreign policy, it has proved inconsistency towards Cuba several times, producing confusion on the international stage and especially with its interlocutor. The aim of this thesis is to explore the reason of the changes that Spain has shown within the EU structures regarding Cuba and if these changes have had any influence on the EU foreign policy decision-making about Cuba.

I chose to explore this topic because it is an interesting subject of the international politics field that has an impact on present time. I find it interesting and challenging, given that the thesis brings into discussion important concerns of the EU – Cuba nexus, exploring a particular problem of this topic in which the main political actor of the case-study is Spain and the implications of its relations with each of them. The framework represents the situation between two opponent ideologies that are making efforts to cooperate with the central focus on Spain to discover if the bilateral relations it has with Cuba are able to influence in any way the EU foreign policy towards the Island and if Spain has indeed a role of intermediary, how it contributed to the strengthening/worsening the relations between the two political actors.

### **1.1 Problem formulation and hypothesis**

The aim is to discover whether a Member state is able to influence the EU policy-making under special conditions and, in my particular case, to explore if Spain can shape the EU policies with regards to Cuba and to what extent. Therefore this dissertation paper's research question is:

**How did Spain's identity reflect in the European Union foreign policy decision-making towards Cuba, after 2003 until present?**

In order for the analysis to provide a relevant and credible answer to the question, I will formulate a hypothesis that will have to be validated or falsified through the research process by interpreting the data using social constructivist and institutional liberalist views:

***Spain has the potential of influencing the EU foreign policy decision-making towards Cuba.***

Testing the hypothesis will be possible by providing answers to the sub-questions of each subchapter from the analysis part:

- *What does the Spain – Cuba bilateralism imply?*



- *What policies regarding Cuba did Spain follow during its four EU presidencies?*
- *How unitary are the Spanish representatives' positions in the Council and the EP regarding foreign policy towards Cuba?*
- *How do other MS react to Spain's position towards Cuba?*
- *What conditions are there for the negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba?*

## **1.2 Problem area**

It is necessary to set the area of the problem in order to explain what the focus of the thesis is and who the important actors are in this framework of the conducted research.

The analysis will discuss the implications of three political actors – Spain, Cuba and the EU within the same context. Given the particularity of the Spain – Cuba relations, the emphasis will be put on the contribution that Spain brings in the foreign policy decision-making process of the EU; especially on what positions it takes towards solving the Cuban problems.

The starting point of the research is the hypothesis considering Spain the central element that leads the creation of the EU common identity in terms of foreign policy towards Cuba. Thus Spain will be analyzed as a part of the EU framework and, to a larger extent, actions of the EU policy concerning Cuba are to be taken into consideration in order to see to what extent it is compatible with the Spain's requirements and if Spain is somehow giving incentives in creating a certain EU policy towards Cuba.

The other political actor, the Cuban government's actions are blamed of not respecting the democratic principles. Therefore, I find important to briefly explain the problems for which the EU has sanctioned Cuba and, more importantly, providing an explanation of the EU conditions to soften the relations with Cuba.

## **1.3 Delimitations**

The case study will be concerned with analyzing only Spain within the EU entity with regards to Cuba. The EU institutions that the analysis will refer to are the Council of the EU and the EP because these are the most reliable in providing

relevant material for conducting the interpretation about Spain. This means that the Spanish EU presidencies will be an important element in the research process, discovering how they managed representing the EU and what consequences these actions had on their relations with Cuba. In the EP it is also important to specify that only the Spanish MEPs' statements in the debates about Cuba will be analyzed, regardless of their political affiliation; and, for deeper particularization, amongst them, only the conservatives (EPP) and the socialists (PES) will be taken into account, because they represent the most powerful parties within the EP. The purpose is to emphasize the ideological differences that raise the possibility for Spain not to form a clear identity and policy about Cuba.

Given that the focus is on Spain, the other MS will be discussed only to offer a perspective upon the support that it has inside the EU regarding its solution proposals about Cuba. At the same time, Spain will be analyzed as part of the EU; therefore it is not relevant to discuss it as a separate entity. I found important to make this reference in the beginning of the analysis part in order to identify its own interests with Cuba to offer more clarity upon the impact it can have on the EU policies.

It is important to give an overview on the EU – Cuba relations in order to understand how the situation has evolved and also Spain's role in the framework, but this presentation will be as brief as possible and will not involve US, although it is an important actor regarding its embargo against Cuba.

Regarding Cuba, the research will not concern its internal affairs and further problems, but only those that the EU consider impediments in signing a political agreement – lack of democracy and violation of human rights, stressing out the events after 2003, which will be presented separately. Moreover, the process of EU foreign policy making will be explained, but only to give an explanation of how the EU can spread its democratic values.

As it can be observed, the particularity of the problem explains itself the choice of the case study as strategy.

## CHAPTER 2

### METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The importance of the methodology chapter consists in presenting the structure of the thesis. Elements of research design, methods, as well as ontological and epistemological considerations, which are relevant for the thesis, will be described throughout this chapter in order to provide the theoretical analysis and transparency of how the research has been conducted.

#### 2.1 Methodological strategy

First, it is important to give a clear image upon the notions of *ontology* and *epistemology* because “they shape the approach to theory and the methods which the social scientist utilizes (...) they are related, but need to be separated.”<sup>1</sup>

*Ontology* is defined as the theory of being, concerned with the question of whether there is a reality that exists independently of our knowledge or constructed by social entities.<sup>2</sup>

Two theoretical approaches have been chosen in analyzing the EU foreign policy in case study of Spain and exploring the problem formulation: the main approach is *social constructivism*, completed by the *liberal institutionalist* theory. Hence, a theory triangulation will be used in doing the evaluation, according to Patton, which means setting more perspectives to the same data.<sup>3</sup>

In order to explore to what extent is Spain able to influence the EU policies, from the social constructivist standpoint, it is necessary to analyze how the Member states construct their interests through social interaction within the EU institutions, based upon norms, rules and values in order to form a common EU foreign policy towards Cuba and if the Spain's word has weighted more. The theoretical focus is social constructivism because a normative interest in promoting social change can be identified, given the norms that rule the EU institutions and that made the MS decide upon the restrictive measures adopted against Cuba.

---

<sup>1</sup> David Marsh, Paul Furlong, Ch.1: “A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science” in “Theory and Methods in Political Science”, Ed. By Marsh, D., Stoker, G. Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp.17-18

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18

<sup>3</sup> Patton in Robert K. Yin, “Case study research: Design and Methods”, Third edition, SAGE Publications, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol.5, 2012, pp.100-101

The liberal institutionalist view offers a complementary explanation of the role that Spain has in the EU - Cuba relations, by taking into consideration the principle of cooperation that the MS need to respect in order to reach a decision and project the EU common policy towards Cuba and how this single voice has been reflected towards Cuba.

There are some aspects in which the two theoretical approaches have similarities and thus, can be complementary. Seen through the social constructivist lens, the Spanish initiatives within the EU policy are in a continuous process of construction and reconstruction, adapting to the context, which means constant change; this is also one of the important processes in the liberal institutionalist view.

Social constructivism explains that the purpose is to shape a common EU foreign policy based on the values and norms of democracy and human rights through interaction among the MS in order to establish their interests. On the other hand, the institutional liberals put emphasis on respecting the rules and laws in order to cooperate within an international organization such as the EU in decision-making of its foreign policy. Thus, according to both theoretical approaches, restrictive aspects are important: for social constructivists – norms and values - with a moral and social dimension; for the liberal institutionalists – rules and laws – a legal dimension.

This theoretical framework, applied to this case, means constructing the reality (the EU foreign policy) through ideas and mutual interests as results of social interaction among the MS with the Spanish incentives by developing cooperation in an institutionalized environment.

I find relevant to include elements of soft and hard power and the “stick and carrot” policy in exploring the problem, given the variations that have been observed in the EU foreign policy regarding Cuba in order to establish what contribution Spain had in softening/hardening the situation with the Island.

*If an ontological position reflects the researcher's view about the nature of the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we can know about the world and how we can know it; literally, an epistemology is a theory of knowledge.*<sup>4</sup>

Within epistemology I approach the problem from an *interpretivist* (hermeneutic) view, which consists in the perception of the world as constructed through social phenomena; the focus is put upon the meaning of behavior.

---

<sup>4</sup> Marsh and Furlong, *op.cit.*, p.19

The aim in my research is to understand a real-world problem – if the EU foreign policy regarding Cuba is shaped by Spain and if it is the case, to what extent; to understand the reason of variations that took place between them and what was Spain's contribution to that (in the Council and in the Parliament). It is important to mention that it is not possible to generalize for every MS, given that there are particular entities and conditions put forward in this problem – analyzing the EU foreign policy decision making towards Cuba through the lens of Spain.

Therefore, interpretation is necessary in political sciences and, especially in the exploration of this problem, in order to understand how the EU policies about Cuba are decided and if there are any consequences in the EU framework of the Spain – Cuba bilateralism.

*Hermeneutics* is the theory of interpretation and understanding. “It argues that we need to understand the meanings people attach to social behavior. So, hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions”<sup>5</sup> or “with the theory of and method of the interpretation of human action.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, it involves the actors, conditions and the social, cultural, political, economic context in which the actions have been taken.

That is the reason of observing the evolution of the EU – Cuba nexus and what did Spain in order to maintain these relations open by mainly interpreting official documents of the EU institutions, particularly, the Spanish MEPs statements within the EP and the reports of the Council concerning Cuba. In this regard, it needs to be added that *double hermeneutic* can be observed: “The world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level).”<sup>7</sup>

## **2.2 Type of method and data**

Given the ontological and epistemological considerations mentioned above, the type of research I am conducting in my thesis is *qualitative*. From several definitions, the most suitable seems to be the next one: “Qualitative research involves

---

<sup>5</sup> Bevir and Rhodes in Marsh and Furlong, *op.cit.*, p.27

<sup>6</sup> Alan Bryman, “Social research methods”, 4th edition, Oxford, 2012, p. 28

<sup>7</sup> Marsh and Furlong, *op.cit.*, p.19

any research that uses data that do not indicate ordinal values,”<sup>8</sup> meaning that the type of data used consists of text, images or sounds, emphasizing “words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.”<sup>9</sup>

I chose the *case study* as method of my qualitative research because I consider this the most appropriate method due to the uniqueness of the actors and conditions. The case study is defined as “*an empirical inquiry which:*

- *investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when*
- *the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.*”<sup>10</sup>

In other words, the contextual conditions are very important in analyzing the problem, given, for instance, the particular circumstances that made the Spanish government change its attitude towards Cuba and the EU’s as well – the political parties in power; or the violation of human rights in Cuba which determined the EU to apply restrictive measures.

According to the research questions, there are three types of case study: exploratory (answering to “what” question), descriptive and explanatory (“why” and “how” questions). Therefore, given the research question of this thesis, the case-study method with *descriptive* and *explanatory* qualities<sup>11</sup> will be used, taking into consideration the hypothesis that needs to be tested as well and, in order to do that, a thorough analysis of the phenomenon is required to validate/falsify it by providing a relevant explanation. The main weakness of the case studies, as mentioned above, is the inability to provide generalization in other cases, given the particular aspects.

In order to provide relevant information, primary and secondary data will be collected in order to answer the research question, referring to Spain, the EU and Cuba. As primary data, relevant documents concerning the case study will be used in the analysis and discussions upon the matter. These consist in official EU documents: transcripts of the debates from the EP plenary meetings, statements of the MEPs or the EU press releases, questions and answers between the Council and the EP, official

---

<sup>8</sup> Nkwi, Nyamongo and Ryan in Greg Guest, Emily E. Namey and Marilyn L. Mitchell, Ch.1: “Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Science” in “Qualitative research: Defining and designing”, SAGE Publications, 2013, p.3

<sup>9</sup> Alan Bryman, *op.cit.*, p. 36

<sup>10</sup> Robert K. Yin, *op.cit.*, p.13

<sup>11</sup> Charles Schell, *The Value of the Case Study as a Research Strategy*, Manchester Business School, 1992, p.5, <http://www.finance-mba.com/Case%20Method.pdf>

EU institutions webpages, official webpages of the Spanish parties, strategic and action plans, legislation, annual reports, material from the EU website archives and mass media outputs.

Secondary data will be analyzed as well, to give another interpretation or for further discussions on the authors' statements: academic books, published scientific articles, journalistic sources and the VoteWatch website that keeps track of the EU institutions. Secondary data provides a valuable material for confirming or infirming the findings or interpreting it from both theoretical perspectives – applying a double hermeneutic in this case, as explained above.

### **2.3 Validity, reliability and critics**

In order to meet quality, validity and reliability are important criteria that must be taken into consideration in qualitative research, depending on each other.

Validity is difficult to define in qualitative research, but generally it refers to whether <<you are observing, identifying, or “measuring” what you say you are>>. <sup>12</sup> In other words, the findings are valid if they reflect correctly and in a proper manner the context of the case study.

Reliability refers to the condition that the conclusions of this thesis being identical with the ones of another research conducted upon the same case study with a similar methodology. It also implies trustworthiness – what are the feasibility and the credibility of the findings. <sup>13</sup>

Qualitative research is often considered to be too subjective, given the fact that it is emphasizing the word, the meaning and the interpretation of the researcher can many times be perceived as not reflecting the reality, but one's own perceptions.

The theory and data triangulation used in the research offer a major level of probability for these criteria to be met and manage to limit the author's subjectivity upon the case study. The interpretation from two theoretical views of the primary data has the purpose of presenting the phenomenon from two different standpoints; the secondary data is collected as a confirmation, in some cases, of the findings or as a starting point of further discussions upon certain ideas relevant in answering the research question.

---

<sup>12</sup> A. Bryman, *op.cit.*, p. 390

<sup>13</sup> *Idem*

In order to provide a good analysis, the theoretical approach must be correlated with the empirical part. In this case, within the liberal institutionalist framework, the EU institutions are very important to be analyzed regarding their roles and positions in the foreign policy making process towards Cuba: how are the debates created and maintained between the representatives of the MS, what are the conditions and decisions made by the EP and the Council of the EU, how the governments perceive the situation.

The social constructivist approach is essential in this case because it shows how state's interests are constructed through debates, talks – interaction, within a formal and institutional environment of a unitary actor which is the EU. Given that the focus of the thesis is how the EU is functioning and how decisions are made on the foreign policy level, this is also the reason of emphasizing the social constructivist theory that explains best these actions. Also the liberal institutionalist theory explains the multi-level cooperation that needs to be achieved inside the EU structures: first, on the level of each institution – EP and Council; then there must be an inter-institutional cooperation in order to form a unitary EU policy to project towards Cuba which, depending on the nature of the foreign policy, refers to the aspect of cooperation with the Island.

The descriptive part is necessary in order to provide a better understanding of the case study with emphasis on the EU external policy regarding Cuba, while Spain will provide the important interpretation upon the matter, will be the subject of the analysis itself. The explanatory aspect will be conducted in the analysis chapter.

## **2.4 Synopsis**

As mentioned above, the purpose of the analysis is to explore a social constructivist complemented by a liberal institutionalist explanation of the role that Spain is playing in the EU foreign policy decision-making regarding its relations with Cuba. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to discover what kind of benefits Cuba can provide for the EU and Spain in particular.

The thesis is structured in 7 chapters and multiple subchapters that concern the same topic and contribute to answering the research question, by testing the hypothesis.



The first chapter is the introductory one, presenting the interesting points of the relationship between Spain and Cuba within the EU framework and raising the problematic aspect of this bilateralism in contributing somehow to the EU foreign policy decision-making. It also includes the formulation of the research question, the hypothesis that must be tested and the limits that shape the problematic area of this thesis.

The second chapter presents the methodological framework of the thesis in order to offer transparency and clarity upon how it has been created: what type of approach, method, data and strategy lead the research process.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to defining the concepts used in the analytical part and setting the theoretical considerations by exploring the social constructivist approach, as well as the institutional liberalist theory with elements of soft/hard power. The main characteristics of each theoretical approach will be presented in order to clarify the views of each of them.

The fourth chapter is concerned more with the EU institutions and procedures, by defining elements of its foreign policy and explaining how it is decided among the MS, mentioning also the important characteristics of the CFSP pillar.

The next chapter provides a presentation of the context of the EU – Cuba relations, the conditions of their rapprochement in the 1990s and their evolution until nowadays, offering an overview of the nature and variations of their bilateralism, only as a background for the main concern of this thesis.

Chapter 6 represents the analysis of the case study, the interpretation of the data regarding Spain. First, it is important to mention that Spain's attitude will not be considered a single unitary position on a national level, given that the analysis will not resume to the Council, but will refer to the EP as well. It is necessary to observe if the Spanish national interests are compatible with the ones that the EU has, in order to determine the Spanish government's behavior addressed to the Island and to find a relevant explanation for the variations that Spain has proved in its attitude towards Cuba, especially after 2003.

Another element to discover and explore is the importance that the Spanish presidency showed to strengthening the relations with Cuba and how the ideology of the party in power influenced the EU direction at the time. Given the complicated situation regarding the human rights abuse and lack of democracy in Cuba – which


are the most important values for the EU, their relations have had ups and down many times.

Analyzing Spain means a complex process of interpretation on a institutional level, more specifically, of its activity in the Council and the positions that the Spanish MEPs adopted in the debates about Cuba, but implies an inter-institutional dimension in order to establish if there is a unitary voice of Spain in both EU institutions that can be projected as Spain's identity inside the EU when it comes to Cuba. And to a larger extent, actions of the EU policy concerning Cuba are to be taken into consideration in order to see to what extent it is compatible with the Spain's requirements and if Spain is somehow giving incentives in creating a certain EU policy towards Cuba.

Given that the analysis will emphasize mainly the events starting from 2003, the last part will be focused on the recent event that has taken place at the beginning of this year, when both parties – the EU and Cuba agreed to start negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and discuss the conditions that the European Commission had established in order for this further cooperation to happen.

The final chapter presents the conclusions of the findings and aims at putting forward several perspectives about Spain's further relation with Cuba and its effect in the EU framework.

The next scheme will illustrate the main idea of the thesis – that Spain as a Member State has representatives in the Council and Parliament and these institutions have to reach a consensus upon the policies, regardless of the national interests of Spain.



## CHAPTER 3

### CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

I consider it is essential to define and discuss the implications of the main concepts and theoretical approaches that were used throughout the investigation in order to offer a complete explanation and a coherent interpretation upon the empirical data.

#### 3.1 Social constructivism

In this thesis the main theoretical approach used in explaining how the foreign policy is created within the EU is social constructivism - which asserts that world politics is “socially constructed”, meaning that it is based on two main ideas: “that the fundamental structures of international politics are rather social than strictly material (...) and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior.”<sup>14</sup> The international system is not just “out there”; it is constructed through the socialization process, through ideas and not material objects.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, the emphasis is put on the social dimension and it looks into the process of states’ constructing their interests through social interaction.

Wendt considers that: “Identities are the basis of interests (...); they define their interests in the process of defining situations,”<sup>16</sup> meaning that their identities are shaped depending on the interests they have in a certain context; their actions is what defines them, leading them to the perception in a particular way by the others.

Risse and Sikkin have the same opinion of the correlation between the identities and interests of the actors on the international stage,<sup>17</sup> given that wishes and preferences depend on the idea of defining the actor itself in the first place – what kind of power it holds, what potential it has and so on; there is a complementarity between these two notions. Identities are also important for the social division

---

<sup>14</sup> A. Wendt, *Constructing International Politics*, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, 1995, pp. 71-72

<sup>15</sup> Robert Jackson, Georg Sørensen, Ch.6 – “Social Constructivism” in “Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches”, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 162

<sup>16</sup> A. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, International Organization, Vol.46, No.2, 1992, p.399

<sup>17</sup> Th. Risse, K. Sikkin, Ch.1 “The Socialization of International Human Rights into Domestic Practices: Introduction” in “The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change”, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.8

between “we” and “others“, including a matter of inclusion and exclusion in this regard.<sup>18</sup>

As mentioned, interests are an important element of social constructivism; constructivists theorize about the meaning of the absent interests as well; they consider that missing interests are created as “produced absences, omissions that are the understandable product of social practices and structure.”<sup>19</sup> An identity implies certain structures and actions and a level of consistence must exist between these social structures and the interests of the actor.

According to the constructivist approach, state interests are made mainly of systemic structures consisting in social relationships; furthermore, social structures have three main characteristics: shared knowledge, material resources and practices. These components are dependent from each other in the context of producing social structures.

First, as Wendt explains, social structures are represented by “shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge. These constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual.”<sup>20</sup> In order for shared knowledge to exist, there must be a dependence of social structures on ideas - which leads to the similarity with idealism in this sense. This means that the main element that makes the structure *social* is the intersubjective quality.

Second, the social constructivist admits that material resources are part of the social structures as well, but these structures receive a meaning in actors’ perceptions, as a result of shared understandings, in contrast with realists who prioritize materiality over sociality. The material resources as simple objects do not make sense; they have to be given a meaning by the social structures. Therefore, the material forces are important for the actors as well, but they are only instruments; they rely on the ideational basis that leads their use - the ideas and beliefs that give them a particular significance.<sup>21</sup>

The third element in the existence of a social structure is represented by the practices; ideas and material capabilities are not sufficient for creating social

---

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*

<sup>19</sup> *Idem*

<sup>20</sup> A. Wendt, *Constructing International Politics*, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, 1995, p. 73

<sup>21</sup> *Idem*

structures, but the process itself between the actors is a main component because this is the framework in which the social structures can exist.<sup>22</sup>

The importance of social practices stands in “its capacity to produce predictability and so, order.”<sup>23</sup> In the context of a socially constructed community, social practices can increase confidence regarding their actions and consequences in relation with the others. Karl Deutsch believes that an actor cannot act accordingly to its identity and be perceived in a certain way until “the relevant community of meaning (...) acknowledges the legitimacy of that action, by that actor, in that social context.”<sup>24</sup>

Although this theoretical approach supports the idea of constructing and reconstructing the reality, which means that change is possible, but is not a mandatory feature - as Wendt explains – because social structures can constrain and, thus, make transformative strategies impossible. This can be linked to the collective nature of the social structures that refers to the fact that there is a multitude of actors involved and “structural change depends on changing a system of expectations that may be mutually reinforcing.”<sup>25</sup>

For instance, the political actors within the foreign policy field are constrained by social structures on a national, as well as international level. In this way, their socially recognized competence is defined, clarifying the limits regarding domestic and international political and economic spheres of practice. Ashley also considers that the practice of foreign policy depends on the existence of intersubjective “precedents and shared symbolic materials – in order to impose interpretations upon events, silence alternative interpretations, structure practices, and orchestrate the collective making of history.”<sup>26</sup>

One of the fundamental principles is that actions towards other actors or objects in general take place depending on the meanings that those have for them, how they perceive them. An actor will behave in a particular way with a friend compared to an enemy. “Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific

---

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74

<sup>23</sup> T. Hopf, *The promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory*, International Security, Vol.23, No.1, 1998, p.178

<sup>24</sup> K. Deutsch in Hopf, *op.cit.*, pp. 178-179

<sup>25</sup> A. Wendt, *Constructing International Politics*, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, 1995, p.80

<sup>26</sup> R. K. Ashley in Ted Hopf, *op.cit.*, p.179

understandings and expectations about self – by participating in such collective meanings.<sup>27</sup>

For instance, states can have multiple identities such as *sovereign*, *imperial power* and so on; and each of these identities is given by the other actors in the context of categorizing them in the theories that they hold about themselves and one another, constituting “the structure of the social world.”<sup>28</sup>

There is interdependence between the notions of *identity* and *roles* as well. Roles are given on the basis of who the actors are, shaping their perception in a specific way. Hence it is crucial for the actors to succeed in playing the roles that they are attributed in order to be able to define the interests and situations, without any identity confusion.<sup>29</sup>

As mentioned above, norms are also important in the construction of identities and interests because social identities are constituted by norms, giving the national interests their meaning. They consist in defining an identity through the actions that would make the others recognize it and react in a particular way.

Finnemore has an interesting constructivist approach in this regard, with identities and interests of states as a starting point, but highlighting the importance of the norms of the international system which are able to shape states’ identities and interests. She considers that:

*The fact that we live in an international society means that what we want and, in some ways, who we are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others. These social realities are as influential as material realities in determining behavior.*<sup>30</sup>

This also leads to the idea that international institutions are crucial in diffusing the norms in order to shape identities and interests of actors.

In the foreign policy area, constructivists consider that *institutions* are “reified sets of intersubjective constitutive and regulative rules that, in addition to helping

---

<sup>27</sup> A. Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.2, 1992, p. 397

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p.398

<sup>29</sup> *Idem*

<sup>30</sup> M. Finnemore in R. Jackson, G. Sørensen, *op.cit.*, pp.169-170

coordinate and pattern behavior and channel it in one direction rather than another.”<sup>31</sup> And they also help in setting new collective identities, shared interests and practices.

Therefore, the contribution of social constructivism in foreign policy decision-making consists of three elements. The first one refers to the understanding of interests through a process of social interaction in which the material forces have their importance, but the social context is prioritized. Second, it refers to the understanding of decision-making through discussions and debates between actors with the aim of discovering their interests. This leads to the next idea that refers to the evolution of states in an interactive multi-level framework<sup>32</sup> – on a national and international level.

### 3.2 Liberal institutionalism

Given that the foreign policy decision-making is shaped in the institutionalized environment of the EU, I find necessary for the theoretical framework of this dissertation paper to include the liberal institutionalist theory as well. This claims that institutions represent the key to increased cooperation among states and that “the emphasis should be placed on global governance and international organizations as a way of explaining international relations.”<sup>33</sup>

First, liberalism presents several characteristics such as – individual freedom, political participation, private property and equality of opportunity – that are shared by all democratic states. Of all these principles, a liberal state is mainly defined by the principle referring to the importance of the freedom of individual. The idealist dimension is outlined in the consideration of treating the actors as ethical subjects and not as means, which is a similar aspect with social constructivism. Fundamentally, the extension to liberal institutionalism consists of promoting these basic liberal principles beyond the national level in the framework of institutions.<sup>34</sup>

The main idea consists in that the international system is based on rules, norms and principles and they govern the interaction of the actors. This restrictive

---

<sup>31</sup> Ruggie in Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and Debates” in *Handbook of International Relations*, contributors: Walter Carlsnes & Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons, SAGE Publications, 2013, p. 25

<sup>32</sup> *Constructivism and Foreign Policy*, PowerPoint presentation, [http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/f09\\_courses/425f09\\_constructivism.pdf](http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/f09_courses/425f09_constructivism.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> R. Devitt, *Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?*, University of Melbourne, April 2010, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/>

<sup>34</sup> M. Doyle, St. Recchia, “Liberalism in International Relations”, published in *Bertrand Badie, Dirk-Berg Schlosner, Leonardo Morlino-International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2011, p.1434

framework is necessary in order to ensure an appropriate environment in which the principle of equality among actors is respected and they are able to develop an interaction in order to reach an agreement. Cooperation is seen as a central method of protecting interests for the states.<sup>35</sup> Therefore it is required to give a relevant definition of this notion.

Cooperation is considered by the IR scholars as “occurring when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”<sup>36</sup> This definition implies two elements – that the actors’ behaviour is directed towards specific goals and that its outcome provides the actors with rewards or gains. There are several ways in which cooperation can be achieved: it can be *tacit* – occurring without explicit agreement; *negotiated* – which implies a bargaining process where actors present their ideas that have a certain impact within the given community; or *imposed* when the stronger party is forcing the other party to alter its policy and it adjusts its own policy as well in order to have mutual gains.<sup>37</sup>

Institutional liberals sustain that international institutions can help promoting cooperation between states through international norms and instruments are used to implement policies in order to govern in an effective way. Power is important, being exerted by institutions with a crucial role in cooperation among states “that enhances the interests of most, if not of all, people.”<sup>38</sup>

In order to categorize the type of power that the EU is using with Cuba, it is important to explain the considerations of both terms of *soft* and *hard* power. In the terms of Joseph Nye there is hard power – based on making use of force and coercion, making someone do something. In opposition to hard power, there is soft power based on cooperation in order to achieve something.

Soft power is, according to Nye, “the ability to get others to want the outcomes that you want and more particularly the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion,”<sup>39</sup> by its strategy of influencing countries in a friendly manner without threatening or using military force.

---

<sup>35</sup> R. Devitt, *op.cit.*

<sup>36</sup> R. Keohane in H. Milner, *International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses*, Review Article, Cambridge University Press, World Politics, Vol.44, No.3, April 1992, p.467, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010546?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

<sup>37</sup> *Idem*

<sup>38</sup> R. Keohane, “Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism”, *International Relations*, vol.26, no.2, June 2012, pp. 126-127

<sup>39</sup> J. Nye in M. Gomichon, *Joseph Nye on Soft Power*, 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>



*This second aspect of power – soft power – which occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.*<sup>40</sup>

Therefore, the concept of soft power is close to the liberal tradition, even if "there is no contradiction between realism and soft power."<sup>41</sup> Soft power emphasizes the possibility of cooperation, in opposition to hard power; not military power, but the power of ideas.

Furthermore to the idea of cooperation between states, there are three solutions that liberals propose to solve the problem of war. The first one is that democratic states maintain peaceful relations with other democracies because such a system is characterized by the possibility that people benefit from the basic freedoms and can claim peaceful means for reaching goals. Democracies are therefore more inclined to use soft power rather than hard power. Furthermore, Nye asserts that even in case of difficulties, a democratic state will not lose its soft power. For instance, "in democracy, the presence of dissent and self-criticism can be beneficial: it enhances the credibility of messages."<sup>42</sup> Thus, when a policy is criticised, it may produce some soft power as the people from other countries may see that as a proof of authenticity and as a sign of freedom of speech.

Economic interdependence, as the second solution to the problem of war, implies constraining states to cooperate with others from an economic point of view. This seems more to be coercion rather than attraction and this option would be therefore closer to hard power than soft power. According to Nye, it is probable that a state that has significant economic resources will exert pressure and change the behavior of other weaker actors, economically speaking. However, economic resources can produce soft as well as hard power. They can be used to attract as well as coerce. Thus, a free trade economy will produce soft power, as it will attract others to its model.<sup>43</sup>

The third solution posed by liberals to the problem of war is represented by the international institutions. They promote and engage in peaceful relations, respecting the principle of cooperation through common rules and norms. Nye agrees with this

---

<sup>40</sup> J. Nye, *Soft Power*, Foreign Policy, No 80, Twentieth Anniversary, 1990, p.166

<sup>41</sup> *Idem*

<sup>42</sup> J. Nye in M. Gomichon, *Joseph Nye on Soft Power*, 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>

<sup>43</sup> *Idem*

argument and without forgetting that cooperation is difficult to achieve; he asserts, with Robert Keohane, that the simple establishment of institutions enables them to last: "a set of networks, norms and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange."<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, Nye affirms that "institutions can enhance a country's soft power." Indeed, they are likely to promote a country's values, ideas, policies, both with other members and countries outside the institution. Therefore, "if a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others." Thus, as presented by Joseph Nye, soft power adopts a lot of liberal theory and particularly of liberal institutionalism.<sup>45</sup>

Given that the analysis of the case study will also use terms such as *constructive* or *conditional engagement* illustrating the balance between the two approaches of the EU foreign policy towards Cuba initiated or not by Spain, it is necessary to explain them in order to have an effective operationalization. These are terms used in the foreign policy making and define the main kind of policies adopted towards another political actor.

Constructive engagement is perceived as "an approach to security and strategy concerns; (...) it is rather a method or process for implementing policy" and its basic idea refers to a foreign policy method "that lies between isolation and direct confrontation" and it is implemented by institutions. An important element implied is change – as an outcome of the adopted policy. Constructive engagement is based on the idea that it is possible "to mediate to apply pressure that will result in constructive change."<sup>46</sup>

On the other hand, conditionality refers to the "use of fulfillment of stipulated political conditions as a pre-requisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most-favored nation treatment, subsidized credit, or membership in coveted regional or global organizations."<sup>47</sup> In the international relations sphere there are two types of

---

<sup>44</sup> R. Keohane and J. Nye in M. Gomichon, *op.cit.*

<sup>45</sup> J. Nye in M. Gomichon, *Joseph Nye on Soft Power*, 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>

<sup>46</sup> Coker in I. Vodanovich, *Constructive Engagement and Constructive Intervention: A Useful Approach to Security in Asia Pacific*, Focus on the Global South, University of Auckland, New Zealand, <http://focusweb.org/node/1254>

<sup>47</sup> P. Schmitter in J. Petrovic, *Stick and carrot: All you wanted to know about the policy of conditionality but didn't dare to ask*, Public Policy Analysis, Western Balkans Security Observer, No.4, January 2007, p. 55

incentives – positive - such as reward or promise - and negative – punishment or threat.

These types of engagement are implying the *stick and carrot policy*, which refers to a combination of rewards and punishments in order to induce change in behavior. The stick is illustrated by the hard power, more specifically, conditional engagement which emphasizes the necessity of coercion - particular inducements for change of behavior; there are several forms of illustrating it such as: punishment by withholding which is the lowest degree of coercion or forcing a state under the use of force. The carrot implies soft power, by using attraction and persuasion as a method of inducing change of behavior for actors and can be, for instance, “public promise of a reward to a model or a mode of cooperation with the international actor, or admission to membership in the case of an international organization.”<sup>48</sup>

To sum up, the theoretical framework consists mainly in social constructivism and liberal institutionalism in order to explain the EU foreign policy and its implications. The importance of social constructivism lies in explaining the construction of actors’ identities and interests, especially Spain; while liberal institutionalism prioritizes cooperation, both claiming the importance of norms and rules, as well as change.

### **3.3 Limitations of theories**

Regarding social constructivism, given that it is a theoretical approach and not a theory, a weak point might be the fact that it relies on a multitude of notions specific to sociology or psychology that has human behavior as central element. This puts forward a challenging task of adapting this approach to the realm of international politics, by offering a relevant explanation of how identities and interests are constructed within the EU through processes of social interaction, by forming their identities and interests together.

In spite of the debate between liberalism and realism, it seems that in the case of liberal institutionalism, it shares a few elements with the realist theory, which creates confusion when interpreting the empirical data. For example, one of the similarities is that they are both rationalistic, considering that states operate rationally

---

<sup>48</sup> J.Petrovic, *op.cit.*,p.55

within the international institutionalized system, under particular conditions, having as guidelines EU principles, values and norms.

But, moreover, I consider that the chosen theoretical approaches use different and relevant explanations of essential elements of the case study, offering more clarity and reliability on the research process.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **4.1 The EU institutions and actors involved in the process of foreign policy decision-making**

This section aims at explaining the procedures of the foreign policy decision-making inside the EU and what are the contributions of each institution to this process. But first, a definition of the “foreign policy” term is needed:

*We define foreign policy as that area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behavior of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals.*<sup>49</sup>

EU foreign policy must not be confused with EU external action; the former comprises the CFSP, the Community political external relations and EU trade, enlargement, humanitarian aid and neighborhood policy; while the latter represents a part of the Union’s external action, it is a subcategory of it.<sup>50</sup>

The main objectives of the EU foreign policy are preserving peace and strengthening international security, promoting cooperation, developing and consolidating: democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>51</sup>

The institutional structure of the EU was based on three pillars: the EC pillar which referred to the policies concerning the area of the EU; the second one was the CFSP/ESDP related to foreign and security policy and peacekeeping; the third one, PJCC – police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Given that a strong interaction and cooperation was needed in order to develop the EU foreign policy, the pillar system had often become less relevant. Thus an important change intervened, at least regarding foreign policy cooperation - Lisbon Treaty (2009) simplified this structure, reducing it to a single institutional framework, officially creating the EU entity.<sup>52</sup> Other changes were creating the post of the EU High Representative for

---

<sup>49</sup> Stephan Keukeleire, Jennifer MacNaughtan, “The Foreign Policy of the European Union”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p.19

<sup>50</sup> Jonas Paul, *EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Will the New High Representative and the External Action Service Make a Difference?*, Center for Applied Policy, Research Group on European Affairs, No.2, June 2008, pp.6-7

<sup>51</sup> European Union – Foreign & Security Policy, [http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm)

<sup>52</sup> Glossary: Pillars of the European Union, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/glossary/eu\\_pillars\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm)

Foreign Affairs & Security Policy and the European External Action Service – which is the EU’s diplomatic corps.<sup>53</sup>

The Union is characterized as “single by name, dual by regime, multiple by nature“ which means that foreign policy decision-making is a complicated process developed in a single institutional framework, governed by two different policy-making regimes. The first is the Community method, based on the principle of a common interest and the second one is the “intergovernmental method“ whose principle is that “governments retain control over policy-making“<sup>54</sup> and characterizes the CFSP. This means that governments need to cooperate in the institutionalized framework of the EU in order to create and elaborate foreign policy.

The *European Council* has a major role in the strategic development of the Union’s foreign policy. It brings together the Heads of State and Government of the member states with their Foreign Ministers, the President of the European Commission and one Commissioner, as well as the High Representative for the CFSP, being chaired by the President of the European Council. Its role regarding the CFSP refers to defining “the principles“ and “general guidelines“ and decides “on common strategies to be implemented by the Union”, made on consensus.<sup>55</sup> The European Council is more an institution that brings new strategies and offers incentives with regards to other regions, by “inviting“/”asking” the other actors for further elaboration on the topics rather than being a decision-making actor. The importance of the European Council meetings stands mainly in “making crucial intergovernmental and inter-institutional bargains (...) and conferring the legitimacy and visibility on decisions and policy documents.”<sup>56</sup>

The *Council of Ministers (of the EU)* is the other main institution in which political consensus and directions regarding CFSP are developed and concerned with its formal mechanics. The Foreign Ministers meet once a month – the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) where unanimous agreement among all MS is required in order to adopt a CFSP decision. These structures are supported by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of ambassadors from the MS. “The PSC monitors and assesses international affairs relevant to CFSP, provides input into CFSP decision

---

<sup>53</sup> European Union – Foreign Policy & Security, [http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm)

<sup>54</sup> S. Keukeleire, J. ManNaughtan, *op.cit.*, p.67

<sup>55</sup> Art.13 TEU in S. Keukeleire, J. ManNaughtan, *op.cit.*, p.68

<sup>56</sup> S. Keukeleire, J. ManNaughtan, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69

making, and monitors the implementation of CFSP.<sup>57</sup> Given that this institution represents the 27 MS and their interests, it has to make sure that the actions of CFSP area are under their supervision and also is concerned with strengthening the systematic cooperation and coordination between the national foreign policies; it is mandatory for them to respect the CFSP principles and consult each other upon matters of general interest within the Council.<sup>58</sup> The aim is to get to a consensus and a common EU interest. The role of the *Presidency of the Council* is representing the EU in matters regarding CFSP; consulting and informing the EP; conducting political dialogues with non-EU countries under the troika format – the Presidency, the next MS to hold the Presidency and the High Representative, operating with the Commission. It rotates every 6 months, which can generate confusion when it comes to implementing policies and conducting negotiations with third parties in the sense that:

*The Presidency also has an ambivalent 'European' statute. It is in essence a national actor even if it does temporarily assume a European role. Although the member state holding the Presidency is expected to promote and defend common European interests, it inevitably relies on its established relationships to do so, and will still be influenced by national interests and preferences.*<sup>59</sup>

The HR/VP's role is assumed by Baroness Ashton since 2009 and, besides assisting the Presidency, she has to be responsible for external action area, by contributing to the formation, preparation and implementation of the policies regarding third parties and also has to assume the role of full coordinator within the Commission.<sup>60</sup> The EEAS has been created in order to help the HR/VP in fulfilling her mandate and it functions by working in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the MS formed by official from relevant departments of the General Secretariat, the Commission and their staff.<sup>61</sup>

The *Commission* has a limited role in the CFSP area; according to the ambiguous statement in the TEU, the Commission has to be “fully associated“ to the

---

<sup>57</sup> Derek E. Mix, *The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy*, Congressional Research Service, April 2003, p. 6

<sup>58</sup> S. Keukeleire, J. ManNaughtan, *op.cit.*, p.70

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p.79

<sup>60</sup> Adam Hug, *Europe in the World: Can EU Foreign Policy Make an Impact?*, Foreign Policy Centre, 2013, pp. 13-14

<sup>61</sup> S. Keukeleire, J. ManNaughtan, *op.cit.*, p.81

Presidency's tasks about CFSP, meaning that the Commission's level of involvement is set by the Presidency.<sup>62</sup>

The *EP* does not have a major role in the EU foreign policy decision-making; some of its important actors are the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs, its subcommittees on Human Rights and on Security and Defence and other delegations and special committees for interparliamentary dialogue and diplomacy in case of Association Agreements or Partnership Cooperation Agreements. In the CFSP framework, the EP's role is a marginal one – “a (very limited) consultative role”, given that the Presidency and the Commission are to keep the EP “regularly informed” about the basic aspects and developments in the CFSP.<sup>63</sup> The EP's further actions consist in writing own-initiative reports, resolutions, parliamentary questions and recommendations to the Council.

However, the EP benefits from two instruments for influencing the EU foreign policy decision-making: the consent procedure, meaning that the EP must agree on a Council draft act regarding different types of agreements. Several times, the EP chose to refuse/delay its assent as a protest regarding problems with non-EU states, mostly human rights and democracy related. The other foreign policy tool is its role as one of the two budgetary arms of the EU, the other one being the Council and this has often generated tensions between them. The EP voice has influenced the EU foreign policy through its focus on dimensions regarding democratic principles in its questions to the Council, its Annual Report on Human Rights in the World, its Sakharov Prize award. Furthermore, this leads to the idea that, given the limited role of the EP in the CFSP area, the EU framework has a “democratic deficit”.<sup>64</sup> This means that the EU lacks of consistency at institutional level, not being able to agree on certain policies and reflect the EU common objective/interest.

One of the four types of Decisions considered CFSP tools are the Common Positions, as present in the case study, that mainly state the EU's objectives and define a collectively agreed diplomatic approach to a particular region or country. By using these types of CFSP Decisions, the EU addresses a problem related to a foreign

---

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p.92

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.94

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.95-96



government that does not respect the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of law, or international law.<sup>65</sup>

## **4.2 The EU as a normative international actor**

The EU entity has been established on democratic principles and its functions on the basis of several core values – “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights”<sup>66</sup> – defining the main objectives of the Union as well. Promoting peace and stability and constructing a world based on respect for human rights, democracy, rule of law represent the normative dimension of the EU.

These are also the core values that guide the formation and implementation of EU foreign policy. All of them are considered universal values of which some are practiced, others not. The EU considers that its interlocutors should prioritize the importance of democracy as well. The reason simply lies in its definition – the EU is perceived as a political entity founded on democratic principles and cooperation with states that have other regimes brings many difficulties.

*The European Union has an identifiable and coherent international identity that is not a synonym for ‘foreign policy’ or ‘external relations’ (...) In defining the concept of international identity there is an interrelated requirement to explore how this international identity is both constructed and represented.*<sup>67</sup>

In other words, it is expected from the EU’s side to have a reaction when foreign governments are not respecting fundamental rights, because the EU is represented by these norms. For the EU to achieve its purpose and spread its values, a powerful internal cohesion must exist in order to be reflected in the exterior and a complex process of constant interaction between the internal and the external structures and policies as well. The importance of these norms is that they make possible the process of the EU’s identity construction on the international stage.

---

<sup>65</sup> Derek E. Mix, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8

<sup>66</sup> A Europe of rights and values, Treaty of Lisbon, [http://europa.eu/lisbon\\_treaty/glance/rights\\_values/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/rights_values/index_en.htm)

<sup>67</sup> Manners and Whitman in Sonia Lucarelli, Ian Manners, “Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy”, published by Taylor and Francis, 2006, p.209

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION – CUBA FRAMEWORK**

Before introducing the analysis part, it is necessary to make a brief presentation about how the relations between the EU and Cuba have started and how they evolved in order to place the essential actor – Spain - in the middle of the interpretation process, but in relation with the given context.

#### **5.1 The evolution of the EU – Cuba nexus**

The EU has had a complicated political relationship with Cuba since the beginning and one basic reason is that they present fundamental ideological differences, based on distinct principles and governmental systems. Therefore, the EU policies have been characterized by variations from constructive to conditional policy depending on several elements such as the actors involved, the internal situation of Cuba and so on.

The EU – Cuba nexus has begun in the early 1990s, given the hard situation of Cuba at the time: losing its main partner – the Soviet Union, Cuba suffered a severe economic crisis. Since then, the EU has become an important support for Cuba.

In 1993, the EU began to provide humanitarian aid to Cuba through the European Union's Humanitarian Office and support initiatives and projects that would make Cuba a more open society. During the Spanish presidency, the EU started to make efforts in the sense of normalizing the relations with Cuba; thus, the EU adopted the “exploratory talks” with Cuba in order to set an appropriate framework for initializing cooperation.<sup>68</sup> In November 1995, on the recommendation of the EP, a EU Troika went to Havana for a discussion with the Cuban government about further cooperation. Even if the report was encouraging for further negotiations upon the matter, there was the problem of democratic principles that was the impediment for collaboration. In order to deepen the relations, a political change was necessary, according to several reports of the Commission and the Council.<sup>69</sup>

The main objective of the EU approach was to achieve democratization and respect of human rights, but the EU did not commit to a framework that would help

---

<sup>68</sup> Vassiliki Tzivelis, *The European Union's foreign policy towards Cuba: It is time to tie the knot*, University of Miami, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 6, No 7, 2004, p.660

<sup>69</sup> European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union - Directorate B, Briefing Paper: *EU Policy Towards Belarus and Cuba: A Comparative Analysis*, Brussels, February 2009, p.8

the Island reach these, a lack of institutionalization was identified. Certain and effective outcomes were difficult to reach without clear, long term goals and projects to sustain these objectives.<sup>70</sup>

This policy made the EU reduce its commitment to provide Cuba with development aid, given the dramatic reduction in Community aid, from 30 million ecus in 1995 to 8 million ecus in 1997, coinciding with the adoption of the Common Position. An EU official confirmed that “the dramatic reduction of aid was a clear political move.”<sup>71</sup>

The conditionality that the EU imposed on the granting of a formalized framework of cooperation was somehow opposite to its commitment to a cooperation of favoring political and economic progress in Cuba.

In 1996, at the Spanish Prime Minister’s initiative, a Common Policy was signed between the EU and Cuba which put pressure for a radical change of the EU position towards Cuba. As a result, there was a change of policy that was characterized as a dramatic and harsh towards Cuba. It claimed that:

*The objective of the European Union in its relations with Cuba is to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people.*<sup>72</sup>

In 2000 the Belgian presidency had engaged in great efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. In order to precipitate a closer relationship, the Belgian Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Louis Michel, holding the presidency of the EU, visited Havana in 2001. This period was satisfactory, being called “honeymoon”.<sup>73</sup>

Inconsistency in the EU’s behaviour has been noticed with the beginning of the Spanish presidency in the first semester of 2002, when Jose Maria Aznar announced suspension of Spanish assistance to Cuba, except for humanitarian aid. Many opinions are in the favor of the idea that the Spanish leader put in jeopardy the special relationship it had with Cuba. Given that the presidency is important for the promotion of individual member states’ interests, many oscillations in the EU’s

---

<sup>70</sup> V. Tzivelis, *op.cit.*, p.660

<sup>71</sup> *Idem*

<sup>72</sup> *European Union: Council of Ministers Common Position on Cuba*, International Legal Materials, published by American Society of International Law, Vol.36, No.1, January 1997, p.214, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20698650?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

<sup>73</sup> V. Tzivelis, *op.cit.*, p.667

representation of its position to Cuba have been observed.<sup>74</sup> In the same year, the EU announced the opening of a full Delegation in Havana which was inaugurated in March 2003 by the EU Commissioner Poul Nielson.

## 5.2 The Cocktail Wars

March 2003 in the Cuban context defines the Black spring when the government imprisoned 75 political dissidents in 29 trials with "sentences ranged from 6 to 28 years with the average being 15-20 years" and the conditions in which these trials took place rose serious concerns, in the conditions of denial of access for the EU ambassadors. Also, three people accused of kidnapping a boat were executed.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, the EU needed to react to these events and on 5 June 2003 imposed several restrictive measures.<sup>76</sup>

After two years, the EU's restrictive measures on Cuba were "temporarily suspended" in January 2005, by releasing 14 of the 75 jailed Cuban dissidents.<sup>77</sup> When the European Council reviewed in June 2007 the suspended measures and the Common Position, no changes were made. Still, the EU offered Cuba the opportunity to send a special delegation to Brussels to discuss all matters of mutual concern. After Fidel Castro resigned for health reasons and was replaced by Raúl Castro in February 2008, some reforms were introduced in the country. Given that on 4 March Cuba signed two UN human rights pacts, the EU aid commissioner stated later that: "the time is right for the EU to begin a dialogue with Cuba towards normalizing ties and removing sanctions."<sup>78</sup>

In the following months, there were further developments which improved economic freedom in Cuba, and Raúl Castro released a number of political prisoners. At the European Council meeting in June 2008, the EU decided at Spain government's recommendation, that the restrictive measures would be removed, but subject to a review a year later at which time Cuba must meet several criteria in the field of human rights and democratization.

---

<sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*, p.668

<sup>75</sup> Joaquin Roy, *The European Union perception of Cuba: from frustration to irritation*, University of Miami, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, pp.17-18

<sup>76</sup> These will be presented and analyzed in chapter 6.3.1

<sup>77</sup> PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2636 Council meeting -Mr. Jean Asselborn, Brussels, 31 January 2005,

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/es/gena/83659.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/es/gena/83659.pdf)

<sup>78</sup> *EU Policy Towards Belarus and Cuba: A Comparative Analysis*, op.cit., p.9

A stable period followed until the death of a dissident in 2010, when the situation became tensioned again, leading to the EP resolution against Cuba and demanding the release of political prisoners.

Currently, negotiation directives for bilateral Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement have started between the two actors – which is clearly a progress of their relationship.

### 5.3 Sakharov Prize winners from Cuba

*Sakharov Prize* is “the highest tribute to human rights endeavours the European Union accords. The Prize is awarded annually to honour individuals or organisations for their efforts for human rights, fundamental freedoms.”<sup>79</sup> All the winners represent people who protest in different ways against the Cuban government.

- **2002** - The first official move that the EP has done in showing its disapproval towards the Cuban regime was made in 2002 when the political activist and dissident Oswaldo José Payá Sardiñas was awarded with the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. The speech that he gave in the EP has pointed out the most important principles that led him in forming the Varela Project under the manifesto “Todos Unidos”– desire for “the right to rights”, respect for all the Cubans, openness and solidarity, mentioning that his aim is not to condemn the Cuban government, but to reach the change that Cuba needs.<sup>80</sup>
- **2005** – The Sakharov Prize was won by Damas de Blanco – Ladies in White as a way of acknowledgment of their efforts and actions of defending the fundamental freedoms in Cuba. This group was formed in early 2004 of women who are relatives of the political prisoners and they brought international attention through peaceful protests by wearing white as symbol

---

<sup>79</sup> Sakharov Prize Network, European Parliament, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/sakharov/prize\\_en.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/sakharov/prize_en.html)

<sup>80</sup> DEBATES: Award for the Sakharov Prize for 2002 - Oswaldo José Payá Sardiñas, 17 December 2002, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20021217%2bITEM-014%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

of the innocence of the imprisoned; they require immediate and unconditional release of the dissidents.<sup>81</sup>

- **2010** – The winner was Guillermo Fariñas, an independent journalist and political dissident that suffered of hunger strike as a method of protesting against violation of human rights. He ended his 135<sup>th</sup> day of hunger strike when the Cuban government announced the release of 52 prisoners, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2010.<sup>82</sup>

The Sakharov Prize is an incentive and an action of the EP aiming at encouraging people to stand up and fight for the human rights and freedom of thought. It reflects once again the importance that the EU is giving to the democracy and freedoms. From a theoretical point of view, it is a method of rewarding, of compensation for those who bring remarkable contribution in this regard, being an inspiration for an entire generation. This official reward is perceived as a way for the EU to promote its principles and values. And given that Cuban dissidents have been awarded three times with this Prize, this only reflects the emphasis that the EU is putting on its nexus with Cuba.

To sum up, the EU – Cuba framework is characterized by a complexity that raised many questions and produced confusion especially regarding EU foreign policy - which often has simply been difficult to be understood, by showing notable changes in the reflected identity. It is clear that Spain is an actor whose presence has been very valuable within this context, by taking many initiatives in Cuba direction, regardless of their effect.

The next chapter is concerned with the case study, analyzing more thoroughly the role of Spain in the context of the EU – Cuba relations after the 2003 events in order to test the hypothesis formulated above.

---

<sup>81</sup> Sakharov Prize Laureat 2005 – Award of the Sakharov Prize to the Damas de Blanco, Draft by Human Rights Actions Unit, HRAC Documentation for AFET-DEVE-DROI joint meeting on 23-4-2013, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/afet/dv/20130422\\_1damas\\_/20130422\\_1damas\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/20130422_1damas_/20130422_1damas_en.pdf)

<sup>82</sup> PRESS RELEASE – Human rights: *Guillermo Fariñas – winner of the 2010 Sakharov Prize*, European Parliament News, 21-10-2010, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20101020IPR89528/html/Guillermo-Fariñas-winner-of-the-2010-Sakharov-Prize>

## 5.4 The Member States

The matter of serious breach regarding human rights in Cuba, especially after 2003, has generated mainly the same reaction amongst the Member states within the EU – and that is the condemnation of the Cuban government for the bad treatment to its people. The problem was identified and the wanted outcome was obvious for everybody – the EU had to act in order to ensure an efficient transition towards democracy for Cuba.

Each MS perceived differently the actions of the Cuban regime. Some of the MS chose to have a more tolerant approach; others, on the contrary, let themselves driven by a more drastic policy based on restrictive measures. Basically, it may depend on to what extend each state develops bilateral relations with the Island. Obviously there are representatives of the countries that are subjective to some point – presenting and defending their national interests, especially in the Council; that is the reason of debates and votes in the EP.

Based on the evaluation of the Common position in 2006, Susanne Grätius made a categorization of the EU MS in her analysis on this matter and found four types of states.<sup>83</sup>

1. The “**advocates of human rights**” – the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, which put emphasis on respecting the human rights above all. The author explains that their reluctance towards Cuba is not based on ideological matters or differences – because all of them are democratic states, but on those of principles and norms, given that their foreign policies are led by conditionality about ethical criteria. These states have reached a certain high level of development of their societies based on democratic principles and that is the reason of putting so much emphasis on them. The states reflect this objective attitude in the EU institutions by having a stricter position while treating problems of fundamental rights in Cuba.
2. The “**engaged**” states – Spain, Belgium, Italy, France, Portugal - which are led by Spain in this regard; their aim is to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between the two political actors and to distance the EU policy from the rough policy adopted by the US towards Cuba for many decades.

---

<sup>83</sup> Susanne Grätius, *¿Es la Posición Común de la UE sobre Cuba una estrategia válida?*, FRIDE, Madrid, 2006, p.2, <http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2006/8749.pdf>

These states proved to adopt more of a defender role for Cuba and one of the main reasons is that there are also national interests in the middle, bilateral relations being developed between them and Cuba.

3. The “**Atlanticists**” – are the ones that tend to align with the Washington policy because they partially identify themselves with the US, politically and ethically speaking - the UK, Germany and Austria - and they disagree with the concept of cooperation with Cuban government.
4. The “**hardliners**” – some of the wave of East European states that became EU MS in 2004, driven by the Czech Republic in opposing Cuba. According to Gratius, they are favoring the US policy and the adoption of sanctions for Cuba. One of the main reasons is the fact that these countries had experienced the government of a socialist regime until 15 years ago and being driven by this ideology made them underdeveloped in many aspects and had important effects on their evolution ability and capacity of transition to democracy.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> *Idem*



## **CHAPTER 6**

### **- SPAIN -**

#### **MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUBA?**

Seen from EU – Cuba relations' perspective, Spain is an active player in this direction, whether positively or negatively. The aim is to discover further if Spain's policy is contributing to some extent to the creation of the foreign policy of the EU towards Cuba, by influencing it. Therefore, the next hypothesis will be tested by providing a social constructivist explanation of the implications Spain has in the EU foreign policy decision-making towards Cuba by emphasizing the national – European dynamics and how it is created.

*Spain has the potential of influencing the EU foreign policy decision-making towards Cuba.*

By testing the hypothesis, the answer to the research question will be provided:

**How did Spain's identity reflect in the European Union foreign policy decision-making towards Cuba, after 2003 until present?**

The next subchapters are covering aspects of Spain's involvement in the EU system in order to answer to each of the questions that will eventually help to reach a validation/falsification of the formulated hypothesis.

#### **6.1 Spain and Cuba – bilateral relations**

*What does Spain – Cuba bilateralism imply?*

The focus is to analyze the bilateral relations that Spain has as a single actor with Cuba, what interests it has towards the Island and how is trying to pursue them – softening the interaction with Cuba to reach a cooperation agreement through the EU or hardening the conditions regarding human rights and democracy.

As mentioned before, Spain and Cuba have strong ties, which is given primarily by the cultural aspects that Cuba is a former colony of Spain, having a strong Spanish mark imprinted in the Cuban culture and that the official language in Cuba is Spanish.

From an economic point of view, Spain is the third most important trade partner of Cuba with 9.8%, after Venezuela and China, given the fact that it is a main

investor in the tourism industry. It is also one of the most valuable donors for Cuba, offering around €12 million per year (and around €45 million as a MS).<sup>85</sup>

After losing its main partner - the Soviet Union, Cuba began to prioritize a policy of attracting investors. Therefore, Spain was amongst first a few states that made a bilateral cooperation agreement with Cuba in 1994.

The official document – “Agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments” – was signed in Havana on 27 May 1994 and came into force on 9 June 1995, which was the date when both states notified each other of the fact that they had completed their constitutional formalities. The purpose of the agreement has been explained by referring to the next objectives:

- *desiring to intensify economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both countries*
- *seeking to create favourable conditions for investments made by investors from each Contracting Party in the territory of the other, and*
- *recognizing that the promotion and protection of investments in accordance with this Agreement will stimulate initiatives in this area*<sup>86</sup>

During the 1990s, the Spanish investments expanded fast on Cuban territory, which transformed Cuba towards the end of this decade into a “respectable market for Spanish industrial exports”.<sup>87</sup> Spain has an important role to play in the tourism field, which represents an essential source of income for Cuba. There are many Spanish hotel chains – Iberostar, Iberian Travel - led by Sol Melia group, dominating the tourism industry of Cuba.<sup>88</sup>

The 2000s have also been fruitful in terms of Spain – Cuba collaboration. For instance, a series of agreements between Repsol-YFF, a Spanish-Argentine oil and energy company and Cuban state-owned Cupet have been signed including “exploration, production, refining and marketing of oil products, as well as development of natural gas and production of electricity.”<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> Republic of Cuba – *European Union, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme* for the period 2011-2013, 24 March 2010, p.13

<sup>86</sup> Spain and Cuba – *Agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments*, Havana, 27 May 1994, Vol 1902, I-32428, p.2

<sup>87</sup> Eric N. Baklanoff, *Circumventing the Embargo: The Strategic Context of Spain's Economic Relations with Cuba*, Cuba in Transition, ASCE, 2001, p. 302, <http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume11/pdfs/baklanoff.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> *Idem*

<sup>89</sup> *Idem*

According to the Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme,<sup>90</sup> their cooperation had never been stopped - despite the events in 2003 and the sanctions that the EU put on Cuba suspending any activity - especially regarding Spanish regions or universities, that include scholarships – “amounting to some €15 million per year during 2003-2007”.<sup>91</sup>

Furthermore, the relations had strengthened by signing an agreement in 2007 through the Spanish Cooperation Agency (AECID). Therefore, their cooperation has increased since then – “between 2007 and 2009, €45 million were committed at central level through AECID and €38 million in decentralized cooperation.”<sup>92</sup>

The funds that AECID provides are focusing on several sectors:

- *Rural Development Programme for Eastern Cuba/ Rural East Program*, set to function from 2010 until 2014; its purpose is to encourage the local development processes that are sustainable and equitable promoting the use of the resources in rural area of eastern Cuba.
- *Environmental sustainability, combating climate change and habitat* provides another sector that is essential for the construction of a process of social, economic development and environmentally sustainable approach to the Strategy for Environment and Sustainable Development of the Spanish Cooperation.<sup>93</sup>
- *Social Development Program* aims to reaching a high level of social development and to strengthening the basic social services in Cuba on key matters such as education – where the main goal is to develop the national education system - and health – wanting to improve the health of the Cuban population.
- Equal opportunities between women and men is a development goal; therefore, the objective of the *Gender in Development* sector of the AECID in Cuba is to contribute to achieving the full realization of the

---

<sup>90</sup> The Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Cuba (2011-2013) was an official agreement between the Commission and Cuba for cooperation during 2011-2013, that set the strategic framework regarding funds of aid due to the problems with hurricanes, which are estimated around € 20 million, under the EU Development Cooperation Instrument.

<sup>91</sup> Republic of Cuba – European Union, *Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme* for the period 2011-2013, 24 March 2010, p.28

<sup>92</sup> *Idem*

<sup>93</sup> AECID, Oficina Técnica de Cooperación, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo – Cuba, Cooperación Bilateral, <http://www.aecid.co.cu/programas.html>

rights and citizenship of women through empowerment, which is also considered a mechanism to overcome poverty, injustice and inequality of the women in gender relations.<sup>94</sup>

- AECID is concerned with the conditions of living in Cuba – which is addressed through the *Heritage Development Program*, pursuing the objectives of human and social development priority for creating and improving living conditions from which the poor population would mainly benefit
- *Interuniversity Cooperation Programme* (ICP) aims at developing the educational and research system providing four types of grants in order to improve the Cuban universities: joint research projects; training projects; preparatory actions and integrated actions for scientific and institutional strengthening.<sup>95</sup>
- *Ibero-American Specialized Technical Training* (PIFTE) is another program whose objective is the education and training of human resources in the public institutions of Latin America and institutional strengthening through development policies in each area of the public sector. Cuba participated at every PIFTE event that took place at the training centers and in Spain, as well.<sup>96</sup>

An important linkage between the two is also the migration from Cuba to Spain of the recent decades. It has been reported in 2007 that a major increase has been observed in the Cuban migration process during the last decade and that main country of destination for Cuban people in the EU is Spain, represented by a majority of young people between 20 and 40 years old. Therefore, social constructivism explains the migration flow having an important impact on cultural aspect by developing interaction between people belonging to different societies and, more especially, under distinct political regimes.

From a liberal institutionalist point of view, Spain is making efforts in order to develop viable cooperation with Cuba through agreements that would provide the norms and rules and would form the relevant and appropriate framework for their relations. The institutions mentioned above are the instruments that are taking action

---

<sup>94</sup> *Idem*

<sup>95</sup> *Idem*

<sup>96</sup> *Idem*

and trying to materialize the ideas by creating projects that can provide mutual benefits.

As observed, Spain and Cuba have had important elements to share and their bilateral relations have strong grounds. The historical and cultural aspects form a social context for the closeness between the two countries, with regards to their people. On the other hand, this link has been extended to the material resources as well – their cooperation is grounded on the purpose of obtaining mutual gains, given the Spanish investments and Cuban accessible conditions of work. Therefore it is a win-win situation.

Given that the relationship between them has been explored and Spanish interests in Cuba have been identified, furthermore, it is necessary to show the the implications of Spain within the EU, which will be analyzed starting with exploring how the situation has evolved regarding Cuba, in the context of the Spanish Presidencies within the Council, by emphasizing the differences between the main political parties.

## **6.2 The importance of Spanish EU Presidencies and variations in Spain`s attitude towards Cuba**

In this sub-chapter the answer to the next question will be developed:

***What policies regarding Cuba did Spain follow during its four EU presidencies?***

Spain has held the presidency of the Council of the European Union four times until present. The first two of them were during January-June 1989 and July-December 1995 held by the socialist Felipe Gonzalez. The Spanish EU Presidency of 2002 (January-June) was held by the conservatives with Jose Maria Aznar as a representative and the last one, in 2010 (January-June) – by socialists (Jose Luiz Rodriquez Zapatero). Therefore, three times out of four, the socialist ideology was in power and, at least theoretically, more in favor of the communist Cuba than the conservatives.

Each of these presidencies has functioned under different circumstances and in distinct conditions. There was a mix of remarks regarding the outcomes of the Spanish presidencies terms, which have been visible each time, showing their

importance and the way they managed to shape the situation with Cuba in the way that the heads of Government considered best at the time.

It is important to mention that the ideologies of the parties that were in power at the time of every presidency have managed to indicate the direction for Spain with regards to Cuba, meaning that there have been crucial variations in Spain – Cuba relations which produced a lot of tension between the leaders, at some point. For instance, the PSOE leaders have tried to approach Cuba by finding a solution that included cooperation to soften the ties with the EU, even despite the difficult situation regarding the problems with human rights and democracy and not agreeing with the drastic measures taken in Cuba. On the other hand, the conservatives did not show any kind of willingness, being determined not to let Cuba unsanctioned upon these matters.

### **6.2.1 The 1989 and 1996 Socialist Presidencies**

In 1989, Spain held the presidency for the first time and the aim was to demonstrate certain ideas – first, that it has potential and it is worthy of this chair and second, that it is truly a powerful country after a short period since its accession in 1986; not among the big and powerful states and not among the small and weak ones either, but a state that would be taken into consideration. The purpose was built on the basic idea that Spain was a country coming out of a dictatorship from almost a decade and a lot of political and economic reforms and struggle given its isolation, focusing on foreign exposure.<sup>97</sup> Spain saw an opportunity at that time to move towards modernization, progress and to prove it through the Spanish presidency of the EU Council.

Spain's situation can be effectively explained by the liberal institutionalist theory, given that, along with its EC membership, it gained a status that allowed cooperation with the other Member states mainly under the rules and norms of an international institution.

Therefore, the socialist Gonzalez took the chair for 6 months and presented an ambitious set of priorities and key issues for directing the EU policies. Given that the EU relations with Cuba were very uncertain, from the perspective of Spanish

---

<sup>97</sup> Manuel Balmaseda and Miguel Sebastian, "Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May Not Be Enough" in "Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years", editors: Sebastian Royo, Paul Christopher Manuel, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp.196-197

presidency, Spain did not take actions for approaching Cuba directly within the EU framework. The only contact was through the interest that Spain had in the whole region of Latin America and the technical and financial cooperation it had provided, according to a report for the Commission. It is stated in the paper that the implementation in this area has been made properly, but improvements are still needed.<sup>98</sup>

It would have been expected for the socialist power of Spain to draw more EU attention on Cuba, given the partial ideological similarities, but in a much softer way. But the first Spanish EU Presidency did not have a direct approach towards this country because it made efforts to create its identity within the EU. It has to be once again taken into consideration that the accession of Spain in the EU was still recent (1986), not sufficient for forming its own image to be perceived by the MS and demonstrate its abilities of initiator of policies.

Even if it concerns only Spain, it is important to mention that from the 1990s onwards, the relations between Spain and Cuba have been considered as complicated due to certain events, in order to give a better insight of the next actions that Spain took regarding Cuba within the EU. For instance, in July 1990, the tension became obvious given the situation that took place in Havana when the Spanish embassy had been occupied by Cuban asylum-seekers. As an outcome of this event, the Spanish People's Party called for a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The year of 1995 was very significant for Spain because the second EU Presidency meant a change of its perception as a MS – the socialists wanted to change the strategy, but continue his European policy. The first presidency consisted in a strategic policy of accommodation and proving its efficiency and reliability as a European partner, which ended with an interesting statement of Spain:

*Now we know how a Presidency works and the importance of pacts in order to obtain agreements on the major issues and we can participate in the day to day negotiations and decisions with a knowledge of the internal dynamics of the E.C., and more fluid personal contacts between our officials and their colleagues in the other Member States, in the Commission, the Council or in Parliament.*<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>98</sup> 1319th Council meeting, Development Co-operation, Brussels, 16 May 1989, President: Mr. Luis Yanez Barnuevo, State Secretary for International Co-operation and Latin America of the Kingdom of Spain, p.10

<sup>99</sup> Fernández Ordóñez: *The E.C. Presidency: Experiences of Spain*, pages 18-20 of European Affairs, num. 311989 in Francesc Granell – Director General DGVIIID de la Comision de la Comunidad

Given that this time was the second presidency, Spain wanted a change of status – being recognized as a European power. After 6 years since the first presidency, it wanted to consolidate its identity within the EU. At the same time, a turn in its own policy occurred because Spain started to take more into consideration its national interests than it did in the 1989 term.

It was also different because Spain had trespassed a period of economic development and heavy modernization under a policy of liberalization. Therefore, from a liberal institutionalist point of view, mutually beneficial cooperation was taking place on matters including security, finances and trade, but on the basis of it were self-interest and reciprocity.

Therefore, at the domestic level, Spain was moving fast with Cuba through the economic agreement that has already been discussed in the first sub-chapter, but at the EU level, Spain was cautious by taking small steps. That is the reason for approaching the Latin American area first: “It was labeled a ‘Latin American Presidency’ marked by the launching of the so-called “Fourth Generation” Agreements with Mexico, Chile, and MERCOSUR.”<sup>100</sup>

Given that the EU – Cuba relations had just started to be closer, Felipe Gonzalez has been responsible for the first two Spanish EU Presidencies and for making a good image of Spain within EU, but especially regarding Latin America and, in this case, Cuba by emphasizing a constructive engagement with it through aid cooperation and its economic investments. The EU troika (to which Spain participated) that visited Havana in 1995 for discussing a further cooperation agreement had a good result: “The report of the Troika, although encouraging Cuba to cooperate with the EU, acknowledged that further reforms were needed.”<sup>101</sup>

The socialists had a good strategy – in the first place, they did not extend their area of concern towards foreign countries (Cuba) because, Spain had to fit in the EU framework first, to construct its identity along with the other MS, to keep up with them and reach the position in which it could make suggestions regarding foreign policy. The second term was to continue this strategy, this time by showing its quality of initiator in foreign policies in the Latin American countries, making a slow, but

---

Europea, *Aims and outcome of the first Spanish presidency of the Council of the European Communities*, p.111

<sup>100</sup> Jose Antonio Sanahuja, “Spain: Double Track – Europeanization and the Search for Bilateralism” in “The Europeanization of National Foreign Policies towards Latin America”, Edited by Lorena Ruano, Routledge, 2013, p.48

<sup>101</sup> V.Tzivelis, *op.cit.*, p.661



secure progress towards Cuba through means of interaction with the Cuban representatives.

### **6.2.2 The 2002 Conservative Presidency**

On the background of the 11 September 2001 events in USA, the fight against terrorism became a priority in the international relations. Therefore, security took place in the Spanish government's agenda and started to act in order to show its support towards the US, even in the aspect of supporting its actions of foreign policy such as the intervention in Iraq.

On these events as background, the Spain's Popular Party came to power holding the third EU Presidency in 2002 and his policy has been characterized as being one of continuity and change. Its different ideology – a conservative one – has influenced Spain's decisions and actions heavily. It can be considered as the element that brought change in the social structure of the EU.

Until the third EU presidency of Spain, some important events occurred. From March 1996, People's Party took office in Madrid and there has been a radical change in the Spanish policy towards Cuba domestically. One of the first actions was to suspend the official aid to the Island. This attitude was reflected at the EU level as well. On the consideration that Cuba should make more political concessions, Aznar presented a proposal of a Common Position between the EU and Cuba, as discussed in a former chapter.

The talks that were generated on this topic have eventually reached signing the Common Position in 1996. This step was of great significance for both parties politically and economically speaking, whether in a positive or negative way, forming the first official and concrete proof of the progress of their nexus.

As mentioned above, the Common Position was the incentive needed for further cooperation. This whole new approach in the EU affairs and mostly towards Cuba was especially directed to human rights problem and lack of democracy. But, seen from another angle, the Common Position did not leave too much space for the other party – Cuba, being constrained by conditions that referred to its regime. In other words, by applying the theory, it means that the Common Position represents an instrument of hard power, a material resource with meaning – the meaning of

conditionality, implying that the EU is a more powerful actor that has the right to put conditions for cooperation.

Given that this was his proposal, it meant that Aznar did not show such tolerance to Cuba regarding these aspects as Gonzalez did, despite his disapproval of the Castro regime`s violations, as well.

An important proof of this is during the 6<sup>th</sup> Iberoamerican Summit in Santiago de Chile 10-11 November 1996, when PSOE was already in power in Spain. At the time Aznar made his point very clear that he is not an enemy of Cuba itself, but he declares himself against the Cuban government. Aznar stated that his intentions are to have an active and progressive policy towards Cuba, but in order for that to happen, some modifications from Cuba`s side are needed, such as a gesture of political openness, softening the regime and being more tolerant about people`s rights and freedoms. He completed that if Castro makes a move (democracy), he would also make a move (aid), which would mean support from Spain and, by extension, from the EU as well.<sup>102</sup>

This example illustrates the statement of the Aznar government towards Castro before its EU Presidency, which makes the situation clear about the intolerance of Spain. This approach is clearly one of hard power that proposes another kind of cooperation. By this, he clearly made a move of hard power by pushing Cuba into softening its regime, by putting conditions and somehow constraining the other party to allow them to reach their goals.

It is important to mention that the attitude and the actions Aznar took against Cuba had already formed a negative perception of the Island and, on this background, the events from 2003 have been more than sufficient – an incentive – for the EU to take action in the sense that there were restrictive measures taken against Cuba in order to release the prisoners, another proof of making use of hard power, by punishments.

In 2013, in the context of a meeting to pay posthumous homage to Oswaldo Paya, he made a reference to the EU policy towards Cuba, emphasizing once more how the conservatives perceive the situation, eliminating any possibility of cooperation:

---

<sup>102</sup>RTV-ES Video: Informe Semanal – *El intercambio de corbatas de Aznar y Castro marco la VI cumbre iberoamericana*, 2010, <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/informe-semanal/intercambio-corbatas-aznar-castro-marco-vi-cumbre-iberoamericana/950059/>

*The spirit and the foundations on which the European Union's 'common position' toward Cuba relies upon, must live on. The EU cannot have a normal relationship or cooperate with Cuba without an effective and verifiable respect of human rights, political pluralism and freedom.*<sup>103</sup>

Conservatives eventually reflected their intolerance towards Cuba, considering that turning the *carrot* that Spain had been using during the two previous EU presidencies into *stick* is a more effective option for the openness of the Cuban regime towards democracy, being forced by the pressure of the EU. The whole time that Spain was ruled by the conservatives, its policy has proven a tendency of using tools that would coerce Cuba to change its behavior.

### **6.2.3 The 2010 Socialist Presidency**

The Zapatero government of PSOE can be characterized by attempts of re-approaching Cuba, which was very difficult to achieve on the background of the methods that Aznar used to coerce the Island.

Besides that, it was also the pressure of having to fully function under Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009; Spain's duty was very difficult by making sure of conditions that would not "create tensions with the new institutional settings."<sup>104</sup>

Zapatero aimed at returning to a constructive engagement, but the situation was still on fragile ground given that there had been only two years since the EU showed some willingness in terms of lifting the restrictive measures against Cuba. And it was also the internal situation of the EU – the economic crisis – that had to be solved. But since Cuba's leader had become Raul Castro, the regime seemed to be more tolerant, given that a number of prisoners were released.

It can be said that, from a constructivist point, Zapatero's goal is to initiate debates, discussions within the EU to improve the external situation with Cuba regarding economic and political matters. He is also taking into consideration the national interests, aiming at generating processes that would allow the MS to construct and to agree through cooperation for the approach that seems the most

---

<sup>103</sup> Jose Maria Aznar Speeches - *Aznar's Address the homage to Oswaldo Paya in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 10.09.13*, p.3,

[http://www.fundacionfaes.org/uploaded/INTERVENCIÓN\\_AZNAR\\_HOMENAJE\\_PAYÁ.pdf](http://www.fundacionfaes.org/uploaded/INTERVENCIÓN_AZNAR_HOMENAJE_PAYÁ.pdf)

<sup>104</sup> Anna Naab, *The Spanish Presidency and its influence on EU-Latin American Relations*, CAP Aktuell, Nr.1, Februar 2010, p.2

appropriate with regards to Cuban regime – if EU should return to imposing restrictive measures until their conditions are satisfied or make use of a constructive engagement.

Zapatero`s attempts of reshaping Spain`s foreign policy consisted in initiating talks within the EU that would take further the cooperation with Castro, but this approach was unsuccessful and Spain founds itself in minority in the Council.<sup>105</sup> Another purpose that the PSOE leader had was to bring to discussions the possibility of a change of the Common Position that was signed in 1996.

Although his intentions were basically directed to a good relation with the Island, especially with the advantage of a bit softer regime of the new leader, Zapatero`s efforts of only six months of presidency did not have fruitful results at the time in the front of the hesitant representatives of the MS.

#### **6.2.4 Spanish Socialist Workers` Party (PSOE) and People`s Party (PP)**

The alternation of the PSOE and PP governments has had important effects in the Spanish foreign policy and, implicitly, on the EU level. While the PSOE had aimed at developing a constructive engagement with Cuba and ease the EU reluctance given the Cuban regime, the PP government acted quite the opposite, even being the initiator in several actions against Cuba. The reason stands in the different ideologies that they embrace.

On one side, the leaders of the Spanish Socialist Workers` Party – Gonzalez and Zapatero – tried to maintain cordial relations and to emphasize engagement over sanctions with Castro. This is generated from the ideas and values that are, to some extent, similar and closer to the Cuban regime. The PSOE is a centre left, progressive and social-democratic party, meaning that among their considerations, they see the *state* as being the central notion in a society, with the purpose of defending the interests of the working class.<sup>106</sup> They are looking to provide social equality and improve aspects related to the social sphere such as: education, health care, public services and immigration.

---

<sup>105</sup> Ignacio Molina, *The 2010 Spanish EU Presidency: Trying to innovate Europe in troubled times*, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm, 2010, p.67

<sup>106</sup> PSOE Official webpage,  
<http://www.psoe.es/ambito/ideasyvalores/docs/index.do?action=View&id=97474>

Therefore, even if the Cuban regime is a communist one, there are a few mutual elements between them from which the most obvious one is the importance of the working class. This has been an important incentive in the political support that Spain has shown to Cuba within the EU institutions.

On the other hand, the PP is totally opposed to it. It is defined as a centre-right conservative and Christian democratic party<sup>107</sup> and it is known for its strong *Atlanticist* ideology. The PP is emphasizing its policy around liberal economic considerations, limiting the state intervention in the economy. They declare themselves against immigration. Issues such as privatization, capitalism and reduction of the policies in the social sphere are the key elements in their beliefs. In this respect the PP is much alike the USA policy. It is not a coincidence that Aznar has presented the proposal of the Common Position in 1996 – the same year that the Helms-Burton law has been adopted regarding Cuba.

At the EU level, these ideological differences have demonstrated inconsistency in the Spanish foreign policy and made unclear the position with the Island. Spain has benefited from closeness to Latin America and, especially, to Cuba, which had many times offered it a liberty of initiating policies in the EU framework. And the contradictions it has proved until present in its policy show that Spain has a different identity along with every different government in power.

PSOE saw the national interests compatible with the EU ones, having the purpose of building a new identity for Spain in terms of Europeanization; on the other hand, the conservatives did not identify a match between the national and EU interests, aiming at closer ties with the US. They considered building the identity of Spain through economic achievements, not political ones. And for PP, another aspect of great importance was security, and hence, the integration of Spain in the NATO structure was vital for Aznar.

The identity that Spain presents is of a political actor that has the potential of facilitating the communication between the EU and Cuba; in other words, it can provide the most efficient way to spread the values that the EU is based on and promotes. And in Cuba there are the human rights problems and lack of democracy that have always represented an obstacle for their collaboration.

---

<sup>107</sup> PP Official webpage, <http://www.pp.es/>

Spain`s uniqueness is given by the fact that it plays a key role in generating and developing the EU policies towards Latin America and, especially, Cuba. Its main distinctiveness is that Spain has maintained a foreign policy that would relate with the EU decision-making and promoting its own interests within the EU, at the same time. This has been possible by actively participating in the debates and foreign policy decision-making within the EU institutions, regardless that the interests have been different from one government in power to another.

Since it became a MS in 1986, Spain has been going through several processes of transition. First of all, coming from a restrictive regime, it has put efforts in fitting into the EU framework along with the other Member states. As Sanahuja considers, Spain has experienced a process of *downloading* – the Europeanization of Spain - EU norms, rules and values and *uploading* – its goals in terms of foreign policy and a “Ibero-Americanization” of the EU<sup>108</sup>, which consisted mostly of initiating a cooperation between the EU and Cuba. Therefore, Spain had to redefine its identity and role within the EU to be able to have a foreign policy that would align with its domestic and EU interests.

From a social constructivist point, the foreign policy of a state defines its identity, what it represents, the regime it has adopted, what kind of values and rules does it follow in order to maintain its status on the international stage and in its external relations. Spain`s attempts are aiming to successfully shape its attitude and relations with Cuba taking into consideration its EU membership as well. As a consequence, its interests are constructed based on the social dimension in the framework of the EU. It has to protect its investments in Cuba, but it also has to take into consideration the supranational aspect, given the difficulties that this country presents according to the EU law and values – the institution that it is a part of.

From a liberal institutionalist standpoint, the aspect of cooperation is crucial. In this case study, in order to reach a mutual agreement inside the EU institutions with regards to the situation with Cuba, the MS must discuss and find a solution that would benefit the EU in the first place, meaning that that the MS seek to gain as much as possible from the relation with Cuba and for that, they look to find the best approach in order to put the grounds for an official cooperation agreement with the Island.

---

<sup>108</sup>J.A. Sanahuja, *op.cit.*, pp. 39-40

The main problem is that Spain does not have a specific policy concerning Cuba and this is originated from the fact that there have been so many changes and ups-and-downs in their nexus and therefore, it is difficult to define it. As mentioned above, the governments that were in power at different times in Spain have imprinted somehow the policy with the Island. For example, the drastic turn with Aznar meant the end of the constructive engagement that the previous government had been developing with Cuba.

The outcomes of this hardening of the Spanish bilateral policy towards Cuba were the adoption by the EU institutions (uploading) of this attitude by signing the Common Position in 1996, which was afterwards downloaded by the other MS. But it seems that the Common Position has been a restrictive act in this regard, because, although it was the first official document that stated a link between the EU and Cuba, it had put many conditions regarding the Island, mainly referring to improvements on its internal situation. The fact that the new policy the socialists were proposing when they came in power again did not echo inside the Council can be explained by the fact that the MS have *downloaded* the former Spanish conditional policy with regards to Cuba. The difficulty to adapt to these changes lies in the big difference of the policies that Spain shows with each government.

The main points of this sub-chapter are referring to the fact that the balance between hard power initiated by the conservatives and soft power used by the socialists has produced confusion about Spain's identity within the EU and, at a complex level, in the Cuban government, as well.

The next chapter analyzes the internal situation of the EU institutions with concern to the situation in Cuba after 2003 and the possibility of signing an official political agreement.

### **6.3 Spain within the EU institutions and foreign policy decision-making regarding Cuba**

*How unitary are the Spanish representatives' positions in the Council and the EP regarding foreign policy towards Cuba?*

The institutions of the EU have treated the subject of Cuban regime's matters which they consider problematic as one of the main concerns of the EU's external relations, especially since 2003, when the Black Spring had occurred. The official

opening of the EU Delegation in Havana was a sign of willingness from the EU's side of opening bilateral talks and rapprochement with Cuba.

From an institutional liberalist perspective, the permanent representatives of the EU in Cuba meant a step forward to their cooperation, the EU increased its possibilities of spreading its democratic values and basically, considering it a facilitator in the positive influence it could have on the Cuban regime.

But this seemed to have no significance from the moment that the dissidents have been imprisoned. The EU considered this a serious violation of fundamental freedoms and therefore, took action immediately by imposing restrictive measures regarding Cuba. Despite the fact that between the two parties there is no political agreement yet, the EU considered these violations to be unacceptable. Starting from the idea that the EU itself has been built on democratic principles, in order to maintain peace through cooperation, these elements remain the most important for defining a framework, which includes the EU. And considering that Cuba did not respect these crucial conditions, a lack of balance that had already existed was emphasized in their relations – democracy vs. communism.

### **6.3.1 The Council of the European Union decisions**

The Council's reaction regarding the situation in Cuba after the events of March 2003 was more aggressive than it had been until then, because, according to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece (the state which held the EU presidency at that time), the EU condemned firmly these actions, demanding the immediate release of the prisoners. It has also been stated that: "These latest developments which mark a further deterioration in the Human Rights situation in Cuba will affect the EU's relationship with Cuba and the prospects for increased cooperation."<sup>109</sup>

On 5 June 2003, the Greek EU presidency made an official declaration on behalf of the EU and the acceding states as well showing its regret about the Cuban events:

*The EU, deeply concerned about the continuing flagrant violation of human rights and of fundamental freedoms of members of the Cuban opposition and of independent*

---

<sup>109</sup> PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2501<sup>st</sup> Council meeting -Mr. Anastasios Giannitsis, Luxembourg, 14 April 2003, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/75419.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/75419.pdf)



*journalists, being deprived of their freedom for having expressed freely their opinion, calls once again the Cuban authorities to release immediately all political prisoners.*<sup>110</sup>

The restrictive measures the EU imposed are the following:

- *limit the bilateral high-level governmental visits*
- *reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events*
- *invite Cuban dissidents at national days' celebrations*
- *proceed to the re-evaluation of the EU common position*<sup>111</sup>

This approach of the EU can be seen as a turning to the *stick* policy by applying punishments to the Cuban regime as a form of hard power, trying to induce a change in the behavior of the communist state by respecting the fundamental rights of people and democratic principles, in order to re-launch their talks for a further cooperation.

While during the year of 2003, the Council was strict in its declarations by condemning without questions the measures that the Cuban regime is taking with the dissidents and emphasizing the aggravation of the abuse in this regard, in the next evaluations of the human rights issue in Cuba, the EU started to advance the possibility of maintaining a dialogue for cooperation with Cuba. In the next several reports, there have been statements from the Council that:

*Constructive engagement remains the basis of the EU's policy and that it would reconsider a cooperation agreement under the condition for Cuba of releasing all the political dissidents and improving the human rights matter.*<sup>112</sup>

A certain situation during a UN General Assembly meeting in New York has made Cuba look even worse in front of the EU when Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos approached his Cuban counterpart to release a certain dissident and a famous writer – Raul Rivero; and the response from Perez Roque was that if members of the opposition were to be invited at the Spanish embassy in Havana for the Spanish national day, 12 October, no prisoner would be released. Regarding this situation, the conservative Jose Ribeiro e Castro addressed a question

---

<sup>110</sup> PRESS RELEASE: Declaration by the Presidency, on behalf of the European Union, on Cuba, Brussels, 5 June 2003,  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/76075.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/76075.pdf)

<sup>111</sup> *Idem*

<sup>112</sup> Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities, Brussels, 22 April 2004,  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%208412%202004%20INIT>

to the Council about details of this event. He stated: “The situation described represents unacceptable blackmail“, which put Cuban leaders once again in a very bad light. And at the same time, given that the Zapatero government was making efforts in order to restore good relations with Cuba the conservative has implied that this is be a pressure to which Spain would yield. But the Council`s response to this situation was limited, suggesting that it is a debate that concerns only Spain.<sup>113</sup> Given that this occurred with no implication of the EU and out of its context, during a UN meeting, it is clear that it does not concern the Council and only the Spain national institutions.

In 2005, the EU has decided to suspend its restrictive measures against Cuba given that a number of prisoners were released, stating one more time that the EU is prepared to strengthen ties with Cuba if the internal situation would be solved.<sup>114</sup>

After two years, when Raul Castro became the Cuban leader, the MS that made a move with the purpose of easing the tension between the two political actors – the EU and Cuba - since 2003 was Spain with the visit of Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos who stated:

*Today we start a new phase in which we will express our opinions, which do not always converge but always seek understanding, through firm, open dialogue(...) It is absolutely unthinkable for Spain not to maintain, defend and develop an intense, constructive and policy of dialogue with Cuban authorities (...) And we also hope to discuss what the relations between the European Union and Cuba should be, given the international context.*<sup>115</sup>

Spain had the main purpose to begin to cooperate in order for the both parties – the EU and Cuba - to obtain advantages from a political and economic point of view, which coincides with the liberal institutionalist principles.

From a constructivist perspective, for Spain was very difficult to be taken into consideration and to initiate a more tolerant view upon the Castro regime within the Council, especially in the first few years after the events of the Black Spring. The reason for this is that Spain was passing through major changes domestically once again, given that PSOE came to power in 2004 under the leadership of Zapatero and

---

<sup>113</sup> WRITTEN QUESTION AND REPLY – Cuba – blackmailing Spain and the EU, Brussels, 10 February 2005, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2004-2493+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=SK>

<sup>114</sup> PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2636 Council meeting -Mr. Jean Asselborn, Brussels, 31 January 2005, <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiqués/2005/01/3102asselborn-cuba/index.html>

<sup>115</sup> CubaHeadlines: *Spanish foreign minister visits Cuba for better relations*, 04/03/2007, [http://www.cubaheadlines.com/spanish\\_foreign\\_minister\\_visits\\_cuba\\_for\\_better\\_relations.html](http://www.cubaheadlines.com/spanish_foreign_minister_visits_cuba_for_better_relations.html)

was starting the process of transition in its foreign policy as well. Spain was practically beginning to build a new identity under the principles of the new government – that needed to be reflected in the external policies and inside the EU institutions.

With Spain being an initiator for the normalisation of the relations and as a continuation, 2008 was the year that made possible the closeness between the EU and Cuba, given by the incentive of the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel's visit in Havana. He described the meeting with the Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque as "positive and encouraging", stating that the main goal of this visit was a constructive dialogue/engagement with the government of Raul Castro and that their meeting has treated topics of mutual interest such as human rights or climate change.<sup>116</sup>

But important efforts had to be made, on the background of conservatives' harsh measures against Cuba. In other words, Spain had a major responsibility because the new government had to change and correct the mistakes of the former one. Therefore, it can be said that it had lost its credibility to some extent in front of the other MS.

The most important thing to stress is that Spain has once again been the actor that played a key role in making an approach towards Cuba and made an advantage out of its double status - of a singular state and a MS. Therefore, the Spanish government's actions and initiatives with regards to Cuba have been crucial in terms of the EU policy.

### **6.3.2 The European Parliament debates**

The EP is the institution within the EU framework that reflects best the democratic principles through its own nature – of discussions in order to represent the rights and fulfill the will of people through legislative power. Therefore, this context is more favorable to discovering and exploring the contribution of Spain vis-à-vis the EU-Cuba relations through its members of the EP (MEPs) by analyzing their speeches, opinions, arguments of sustaining or acting against Cuba.

Seen through the lens of social constructivism, the purpose of the debates within the EP is to construct mutual interests among the MS, to discuss and reach

---

<sup>116</sup> EurActiv: *Louis Michel visits Cuba , favors end of diplomatic embargo*, La Havana, 08/03/2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vM484M0HSNs>

decisions that are reflected in the resolutions that would influence the EU-Cuba relations.

And the social constructivist view is effectively completed by the liberal institutionalist perspective given by the fact of providing the proper framework of cooperation between MEPs through debates.

The rules and norms have an important role - especially in the EP which represents the legislative power in the EU - that being the reason of putting so much effort within the EP and through consultation with the other EU institutions.

Eventually, this theory is applicable in this case because, as it was already mentioned, the purpose of the EP and the EU – in general - regarding Cuba is being able to reach a beneficial political agreement that could favor both parties. And the EU means all the MS, implicitly, Spain. According to liberal institutionalism, Spain is looking to maximize its gains about Cuba in their bilateral relations, and, in this context, it has to seek the best approach towards Cuba and make its position clear without harming its own relation with the Island.

Given the serious problems that Cuba had raised worldwide in 2003 regarding human rights, this topic was obviously a priority amongst the debates within the EP. Furthermore the statements of the Spanish MEPs will be analyzed and how they are approaching the Cuban internal situation in the context of the democratic EU.

In the EP framework, the political affiliation of the MEPs is the most important aspect. They bring different arguments, although the main problematic aspect of the violation of human rights by the Cuban government is mainly condemned with a single voice, the difference lies in the approach: the conservatives want to adopt hard power, while the socialists are aiming at a constructive engagement with the Cuban government. The focus is discovering the solutions that the Spanish MEPs propose through their speeches in order to reach an optimal solution in the Cuban problem. Given that in the EP, the representation of the political affiliation is more important than that of the MS, the conservative/socialist perspectives – regarding Spanish MEPs - will be more relevant; hence, this part of the analysis will rely more on this aspect, stressing out the differences between the parties and the way each perceives the situation of Cuba.

### ***1. Human rights in Cuba - 10 April 2003***

For instance, one of the most important debates regarding Cuba after the March 2003 crackdown in Cuba took place in order to discuss what the EU's position would be in this situation. Therefore, on 10 April 2003, the MEPs brought their statements forward to decide upon the resolution upon human rights in Cuba and eventually, create an official reaction in the name of the EU.<sup>117</sup> Some of the main points of the EP resolution were: condemning the events in Cuba, calling the immediate release of the dissidents, urging "the Council and the Commission to continue their efforts to promote positive change in Fidel Castro's regime on the basis of the universal principles concerning respect for human rights and democratic values".<sup>118</sup> The last aspect - "positive change" - has different meanings for the MEPs: the conservatives think it is better to take a clear opposite position in front of these actions of the Cuban government, using the hard power instrument of putting Cuba's request for Cotonou Agreement<sup>119</sup> on hold; while the socialists choose to enhance a constructive engagement with the Cuban leaders.

The Spanish PPE-DE<sup>120</sup> MEP, Jose Ignacio Salafranca Sanchez-Neyra made clear his point of view by condemning the human rights violation in Cuba and making reference to the political dissidents that had been imprisoned unfairly. His strong arguments consisted in reminding the sentences of some of the political dissidents and emphasizing that a nonexistence of a political agreement between the EU and Cuba is due to this kind of "regrettable events" that usually happen there. The politician ended his statement by suggesting the firm condemnation of the Cuban regime and solidarity with the Cuban people in the name of freedom.<sup>121</sup> He makes reference to the principles as the basis for any interaction between the EU and Cuba, excluding the latter state for any possibility of cooperation.

The other Spanish representative of PPE-DE who participated at the debate was Concepcio Ferrer and she adopted basically the same firm position as her

---

<sup>117</sup> EP resolution on human rights in Cuba, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0191+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

<sup>118</sup> *Idem*

<sup>119</sup> Partnership agreement between the EU and developing countries – ACP countries

<sup>120</sup> Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats – 20 July 1999 to 22 June 2009

<sup>121</sup> Salafranca Sanchez-Neyra (PPE-DE), *Human Rights in Cuba* - Debates, Thursday, 10 April 2003, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20030410%2bITEM-007%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

colleague Salafranca with the mention that the approach should be taken further than just condemning. Her suggestion was to reject Cuba's request to participate in the Cotonou Agreement "if by the time the request comes up for consideration repression still persists and those detained have not been released",<sup>122</sup> proposing a conditionality consisting in a negative incentive.

From another angle, the Spanish PES representative in the debate, Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez began by stating that agrees with condemning these events, but during his speech, he tried to be more tolerant and put the Cuban regime in another light – the one of the victim of aggression of the US. He went even further by mentioning the nature of the foreign policy of president's Bush which was taking a more aggressive turn and, hence, the MEP made reference to the possibility of a US military invasion – "given the philosophy of pre-emptive wars which is now the official doctrine of the White House"<sup>123</sup> - and the necessity of Cuba to act by adopting certain defence mechanisms that may not be the best choice, as happened with the events. His approach was to find a logical explanation of the Cuban regime's behavior. By mentioning the word "defence" that has a strong moral dimension, Martinez implies the fact that Cuban government's actions are based on its insecurity regarding US, putting Cuba in a position of victim that acted in order to defend itself.

As a comparison between the two points of view – PPE-DE and PES – Salafranca and Ferrer adopted a tougher position, reflecting the general attitude of the conservatives towards the Cuban regime, while Martinez gave a totally different picture of the events. They transmitted quite clear the standpoint of their political affiliation by adopting this attitude. Conservatives are more open to the capitalism and relying more on economic relations – which is obvious in their speeches when suggesting that Cuba's request of joining the Cotonou Agreement has to be rejected, considering that this is the most important aim for Cuba at the moment. Theoretically speaking, this proposal is an approach that is very close to hard power by implying that this would be a way of limiting or even isolating the Island - a sort of punishment for the Cuban leaders. In this way, this demonstrates the closeness to the Atlanticist behavior that Aznar had at the time - especially in Salafranca's firm condemnation - trying to have a similar approach towards Cuba.

---

<sup>122</sup> Concepcio Ferrer (PPE-DE), *Human Rights in Cuba* - Debates, Thursday, 10 April 2003, Strasbourg

<sup>123</sup> Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez (PES), *Human Rights in Cuba* - Debates, Thursday, 10 April 2003, Strasbourg

In his speech, the PES politician Martinez stated:

*We cannot endorse the arrests and trials taking place in Cuba. We certainly condemn them. Nonetheless, we feel it is wrong to take these events out of the current context within that country. It is unfair and often perverse to do so.*<sup>124</sup>

It was obvious that the tolerance was the main message, the one that PSOE is transmitting generally to Cuba. He proposes a kind of soft power by adopting a permissive attitude, seeking solution in cooperation with the communist government. The explanation he provided for the Cuban government's behavior was related to the US opposition – this element proved the difference of perspectives and ideologies between the parties – while PP is an US follower, PSOE totally opposes its policy. That brings in discussion the next point – the fact that the PES politician proposed as solution a further cooperation between the EU and Cuba. From a liberal institutionalist point of view, Martinez practically suggests that through the EU, cooperation provides the main method of solving the problem and it should be a priority, especially in this context; isolation of the Island should not be taken into consideration at all.

The EP framework forms a social structure in which the actors – the MEPs – have shared knowledge about the situation in Cuba and shared expectations in the sense that they see that there will be a change about Cuba, whether bad or positive; but they do not share the understandings because they the two political parties interpret differently the way to Cuba's progress.

Eventually, the EU decided in June 2003 to apply the restrictive measures upon Cuba, considering a grave breach of fundamental rights. Eventually the EU adopted for a conditional policy by applying these sanctions to Cuba. There have been four important resolutions taken by the EP until the present: in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2010.

## ***II. Situation in Cuba – 16 November 2004***

The conservatives maintained their firm position by denying the need of a positive change in the EU's attitude by reducing/lifting the sanctions arguing that a EU policy change should be the result of a Cuban internal situation change, while the PES representatives' views are completely different. They consider that a change in

---

<sup>124</sup> *Idem*

the EU policy is necessary – Martinez speaks about the change in the way EU is perceiving the Cuban problem - too drastic in comparison with other countries, by suggesting a discriminatory attitude that could be associated with the US policy. Garcia used the same approach by using another argument – the necessity of a change in the case of the Common position, which should be a priority, given that being in the same framework since 1996 has only worsened the relations. Eventually, the mutual condition that they presented for progress was cooperation.

The debate was opened with a statement of the Commissioner Nielson who sustained that situation in Cuba is starting to have a good direction given the fact that Cuba had released some of the political prisoners and the solution is to maintain a policy of constructive engagement based on the Common position since 1996, stressing at the same time the importance of the EU Delegation in Havana.

In this context, the conservative Salafranca (PPE-DE) restated his opposition towards easing the measures taken against Cuba, arguing that releasing all the prisoners is needed in order to be speaking of a change. He made his point by using radical terms about what is suggested through these resolutions: “To cooperate and talk with the villains and mock the victims? To be complacent towards those who oppress them? To seek a policy of appeasement and friendship with tyranny?”<sup>125</sup> He referred also to the fact that Oswaldo Paya, the Sakharov Prize winner of 2002, has not been allowed by the Cuban government to attend the ceremony.

Another conservative, Antonio Lopez – Isturiz White, maintained this position against Cuba, completing his former speech in which he accused the Spanish government of certain activities such as “behind-the-scenes maneuvering” by “providing Fidel Castro’s bloodthirsty Communist regime in Cuba with oxygen.”<sup>126</sup> But, above all, he stated that a political transition towards democracy would be possible with the first step of ceasing the violence against the dissidents. Eventually, he ended by asking to his colleagues to support him in these ideas.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>125</sup> Salafranca (PPE-DE), *Situation in Cuba* – Debates, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20041116%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

<sup>126</sup> Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White (PPE-DE), *One minute speeches on matters of political importance*, Monday, 15 November 2004, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20041115%2bITEM-013%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=1-038>

<sup>127</sup> Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White (PPE-DE), *Situation in Cuba* – Debates, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg



On the other hand, Martinez (PES) offered another perspective of the situation, by bringing into discussion the fact that the EU policy shows a stricter attitude with Cuba than with other states - such as China, Iran, Israel, Syria - that present similar problematic aspects regarding human rights and there should not be a differentiation between them. He states that:

*The European Union's dialogue and cooperation with all the countries of the world includes a chapter on the human rights situation. It is an extremely important chapter, but there are others. Only in the case of Cuba is the human rights chapter exclusive, precluding any other chapter, which should exist in our relations with that country. Furthermore, with all the countries of the world, the European Union's dialogue and cooperation is aimed at overcoming shortcomings in the field of human rights. Only in the case of Cuba do those human rights shortcomings become a prior condition, preventing dialogue and cooperation.*<sup>128</sup>

In other words, the politician makes reference to the idea that this approach could be considered as closer to the US policy – that the EU itself is condemning and hence, minimizing its credibility, claiming once again that the solution is further dialogue and cooperation between them.<sup>129</sup>

His PES colleague, *Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo García*, considered that a condition for the progress in the relations with the Island is related to the Common position – whether it should be changed or not, but emphasized the necessity of its evaluation. His argument aimed at simplifying the situation and limiting the difficulty of the MS deciding upon a common EU policy towards the Castro regime to the EU framework.<sup>130</sup>

In this debate as well, the opposition between the two parties was obvious in showing the different approaches that the EU should engage into regarding Cuba. The main observation is that the arguments were different this time, especially from the PES side, given that the problem is the same – human rights in Cuba, but highlighting the Common position's contribution in the Cuban situation.

As it can be seen, the notion of "change" is perceived in different ways. One party – PPE-DE – considers that Cuba is unworthy of this action; while the other one – PES – sees it as a necessity which should be an incentive from the EU's side.

---

<sup>128</sup> Miguel Angel Martinez Martinez (PES), *Situation in Cuba* – Debates, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg

<sup>129</sup> *Idem*

<sup>130</sup> Luis Barnuevo Garcia (PES), *Situation in Cuba* – Debates, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg

Furthermore, this idea can be linked to the institutional liberalism given that the EU – as an international institution – has to maintain its relations with Cuba in particular conditions depending on the evolution of their nexus. According to the theory, the EU is the one with a superior status between the two political actors by its own nature – international institution – in which cooperation is the central focus. Therefore, in other words, the Spanish PES representatives` opinions are relevant by suggesting that the EU should make the first step by easing the situation and returning to a constructive engagement with the Island.

According to the VoteWatch website<sup>131</sup>, from the Spanish MEPs, there were:

- 24 socialists (1 vote against, 1 non-voter and 1 absentee) ➔ **22 votes**: 21 PES members have aligned to the political party they belong and to the national majority, the way that colleagues from the same MS have voted.
- **24 conservative votes** that proved to be loyal to their ideological affiliation and rebel to their national majority
- 6 MEPs belonging to other parties

Regarding the national cohesion, in total, there were 54 Spanish MEPs, having 2 non-voters and 1 absentee, thus 51 Spanish votes including 26 who voted the same as their co-nationals and 25 rebel votes resulting a level of 26,47% of the national delegation voting as a block. It is necessary to take into consideration that there were also MEPs from other parties, but this will affect the percentage only to a small extent. Therefore the ideological criteria ruled over the nationality, as expected in the EP framework.

Eventually, the EP resolution<sup>132</sup> appeared to be quite different this time, because it has been made a reference to another actor: “Stresses that the current embargo imposed on Cuba by the USA is counterproductive and should be lifted.” Besides condemning the actions of the Cuban government, through this statement, the EP decision implies that the hard power that the US is using against Cuba through

---

<sup>131</sup> Situation in Cuba – Roll-call Vote, VoteWatch.eu website, [http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx\\_vote\\_details.php?id\\_act=97&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_tara=&vers=1&order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&order=ASC&last\\_order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro\\_tara\\_id=8&euro\\_grup\\_id=&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=](http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=97&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=&euro_vot_rol_euro_tara=&vers=1&order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&order=ASC&last_order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro_tara_id=8&euro_grup_id=&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=)

<sup>132</sup> *Situation in Cuba* - European Parliament resolution on Cuba, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2004-0061&language=MT>

isolating it from an economic point of view is damaging; this idea is contrary to the liberal institutionalist principle of cooperation between political actors.

In 2005 the EU has announced the temporary suspension of the restrictive measures, which was a reaction to the first move of the Cuban government of releasing some of the dissidents.<sup>133</sup>

### ***III. Cuba – 2 February 2006***

In 2006 heated discussions were generated by another wave of prisoners and by the fact that the Cuban government did not allow the members of the Ladies in White group –which were the winners of the Sakharov Prize in 2005 - to be present at the ceremony, as in the case of Paya in 2002.

The problem was mainly the same, but the EP put it from a different perspective – that Cuba wasted the opportunity that the EU had offered to prove itself. The incentive for this debate was represented by the MEPs from the ALDE group have risen, given the following:

*In January 2005, the Council changed its policy towards the Cuban Government (...) The hope of a more open attitude from the Castro regime side has apparently not been fulfilled. On the contrary, the human rights situation has deteriorated.*<sup>134</sup>

As a proof of this, the Council presented the situation as "no satisfactory progress on human rights in Cuba."<sup>135</sup> In this situation, the EP had to launch another round of discussions in order to reach to a consensus upon the further EU policy through voting the resolution.<sup>136</sup>

The conservative MEP Salafranca spoke on the behalf of the PPE-DE group and has implied in his statement that these effects are the obvious ones in the context of the suspension of the restrictive measures by the EU in 2005, highlighting once again the strong opposition of the conservatives to this, showing its disagreement with the way that the Council acted by suspending the restrictive measures:

---

<sup>133</sup> PRESS RELEASE: *Cuba – Council conclusions*, General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 31 January 2005, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release PRES-05-14 en.htm?locale=en>

<sup>134</sup> *EU position towards the Cuban Government*, ORAL QUESTION WITH DEBATE pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure by Graham Watson, Cecilia Malmström, Emma Bonino and Marco Pannella, on behalf of the ALDE Group to the Council, 7 December 2005, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+OQ+O-2005-0112+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=ro>

<sup>135</sup> *Idem*

<sup>136</sup> *Cuba - European Parliament resolution on the EU's policy towards the Cuban Government*, 2 February 2006, Brussels, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-0042&language=RO>

*I would like to remind you, Mr. President-in-Office of the Council, that when you approved the lifting of the measures that accompanied the Council's common position, you called for the immediate and unconditional release of the people who had been detained, and now their situation has worsened.*<sup>137</sup>

In this debate there is an important observation regarding the PES group's Spanish MEPs. This time, they did not seem to reflect a unitary vision of the events. Raimon Obiols i Germa spoke in the name of the PES group and admitted the difficult situation that Cuba presents, but considers that through dialogue instead of isolation, progress can be achieved. Furthermore, PES suggests that the Council should have two priorities in this regard:

*Firstly, to continue to call strongly for human rights to be respected in Cuba, the release of prisoners of conscience and of the peaceful opposition and respect for democratic freedoms and, secondly, to maintain and increase relations and dialogue with all of the political and social sectors in Cuba that are involved or interested in relations with Europe and the development of the country and the inevitable changes that we are going to see in Cuba in the near future.*<sup>138</sup>

The MEP Martinez seemed to be having a different position from the PES leader and his colleagues. According to him, there is much emphasis on the human rights problem, without taking into consideration other achievements of Cuba, such as its actions of cooperation with other Latin American countries or: "208 000 blind people from those countries had had operations in Cuba free of charge." Martinez finds the resolution "pointless" and considers that it reflects a weak EU, substantially losing its credibility on the international stage. Emphasizing again that this approach would represent "an extension of the interests and strategies of the Bush administration", the MEP sees this resolution only a way to discriminate Cuba.<sup>139</sup>

Although the PES identity was partially altered by different positions of the members and the group did not show such a powerful cohesion this time, the attitude towards Cuba was basically to defend it, but in different ways – Martinez in a more passionate way by mentioning Cuba's successes in other domains, while other PES

---

<sup>137</sup> Salafranca (PPE-DE), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 1 February 2006, Brussels, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20060201%2bITEM-013%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

<sup>138</sup> Raimon Obiols i Germa (PES), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 1 February 2006, Brussels

<sup>139</sup> Martinez (PES), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 1 February 2006, Brussels

members agreed with the resolution, but encouraged the Council to maintain its cooperation with Cuba.

Regarding the voting results<sup>140</sup>, there were:

- 24 socialists (1 vote against, 3 non-voters) ➔ **21 voters**: 20 PES members have aligned to the political party they belong and to the national majority
- 24 conservative (4 absentees, 1 non-voter) ➔ **19 voters** that proved to be loyal to their ideological affiliation and their national majority as well
- 6 MEPs belonging to other parties

From the 54 Spanish MEPs (5 non-voters and 4 absentees), there were 43 who voted the same as their co-nationals and 2 rebel votes resulting a level of 93,33% of the national delegation voting as a block. Even with the percentage given by the 6 MEPs from other political parties, this would not change the fact that this time, the voting for this resolution has proved a high level of national cohesion in the Spanish case, showing a unity in their interests regarding Cuba.

Eventually, the 2006 resolution was adopted; its main points referred to the release of prisoners, the EP urging

*(...)the Council and the Commission to continue to take whatever action is necessary in order to require the release of political prisoners and to ensure that an immediate stop is put to the harassment of political opponents and human rights defenders.*<sup>141</sup>

Other conditions were the condemnation of travel ban on the 2005 Sakharov Prize winners – Damas de Blanco and renewal of its invitation to Oswaldo Paya, but it did not bring any major changes; therefore, another round of debates and votes took place in 2007 when the same problems were discussed – urging Cuba to release its political prisoners.

#### **IV. Cuba - 10 March 2010**

Despite the fact that the leader had changed in Cuba, no crucial changes have been observed, indeed some of the political dissidents were released, but the treatments continued.

---

<sup>140</sup> Cuba – resolution Roll-call vote, VoteWatch.eu website, [http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx\\_vote\\_details.php?id\\_act=1336&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_tara=&vers=1&order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&order=ASC&last\\_order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro\\_tara\\_id=8&euro\\_grup\\_id=&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=](http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=1336&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=&euro_vot_rol_euro_tara=&vers=1&order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&order=ASC&last_order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro_tara_id=8&euro_grup_id=&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=)

<sup>141</sup> Cuba - European Parliament resolution on the EU's policy towards the Cuban Government, 2 February 2006, Brussels

The EU answered to this step with lifting the restrictive measures against Cuba in 2008 and also gave an opportunity to Cuba to prove another kind of dictatorship.

But a new wave of protests appeared when one of the political dissidents – Orlando Zapata – died of hunger strike. This was another sign that the situation had been aggravated in Cuba. This generated a heated debate in March 2010 and many MEPs, especially those who were representatives of the parties – conservatives in this case - that wanted to punish Cuba in a drastic way and responded firmly in front of the other EU institutions about not taking into account their statements in the previous debates and easing the relations with the Cuban regime.

For instance, Salafranca tried to emphasize the loss by reminding the House of the 2002 Sakharov Prize winner's words in the EP and the ones of 2005 – Damas de Blanco - who were not able to benefit from their fundamental rights and be present at the ceremonies. He condemned firmly the death of Orlando Zapata and encouraged the EU to show its solidarity with the Cuban people: "Now we will unfortunately not be able to hear the voice of Orlando Zapata, but soon we will be able to hear the voices of many more Cubans."<sup>142</sup>

His PPE colleague, Francisco José Millán Mon, talked about the breach of the main democratic principles and the status of Common position which, in his opinion, is not negotiable at the moment, despite the Spanish government's or, more clearly, the socialist's Zapatero wish to cancel it,<sup>143</sup> referring to the efforts of the socialist to return to a constructive engagement with the Island.

On the other hand, Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo García spoke in the name of the S&D<sup>144</sup> group urging the EP to focus on the human rights problem and leaving the Common position aside for the moment:

*For the moment, let us not enter into a subject that divides us: whether the common position should be maintained or not. Let us focus now on saving lives and on human rights. Let us also open up a period of calm reflection in which we seek out points of agreement on future policy regarding Cuba.*<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>142</sup> Salafranca (PPE), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20100310%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>

<sup>143</sup> Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg

<sup>144</sup> Official abbreviation for the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament since 23 June 2009

<sup>145</sup> García (S&D), *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg

He also motivated this request as a condition for the EU not being associated with the policy of “Yankee imperialism”. Another element the MEP pointed out is the need of not accusing the S&D of being an accomplice of the Cuban communist regime, in the idea that this judgment is often made, given the partly similarities in their ideologies.

Maria Muñoz De Urquiza (S&D) considered this event an incentive for acting and stop talking about the human rights. In this regard, her suggestion referred to the Common position framework, explaining the necessity of evaluating and eventually changing it, given that this document currently is an “outmoded, outdated instrument adopted last century by 15 Member States of the European Union” and at the time the EU was enlarged to 27 MS. The Spanish MEP aimed at convincing the House of the need of a new mechanism of constructive engagement with Cuba, given the new context, motivating that the Spanish government’s success in rapprochement with Cuba lies in this approach – dialogue and cooperation.<sup>146</sup>

It is clear that in this context, the gravity of the situation generated a more emphasis on the values and human rights than ever. Both parties PPE and S&D showed their compassion and regret for the tragic event and shared the idea that an action must be made in order to put an end to this situation, but it seemed their approaches were different again.

Regarding the results of the voting process, the data from VoteWatch<sup>147</sup>:

- 21 socialists (1 non-voter, 1 absentee) ➔ **19 voters** have aligned to the political party they belong and to the national majority
- 23 conservatives (1 vote against, 4 absentees) ➔ **19 voters**: 18 EPP members proved to be loyal to their ideological affiliation and their national majority as well
- 6 MEPs belonging to other parties

From the 50 Spanish MEPs (1 non-voter and 5 absentees), there were 42 who voted the same as their co-nationals and 2 rebel votes resulting a level of 93,18% of the national delegation voting as a block. In this situation, the national cohesion has resulted a high level.

---

<sup>146</sup> Muñoz De Urquiza (S&D), Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg

<sup>147</sup> Cuba – vote for resolution, <http://term7.votewatch.eu/en/cuba-joint-motion-for-a-resolution-vote-resolution-text-as-a-whole.html###vote-tabs-list-1>

Seen through the lens of the social constructivism, the reference PPE members made to the EU system of values illustrates the importance that the PPE group gives to the improvements on human rights and democracy, which are the main values of the EU political entity. And in this regard, they were on the same side with the S&D group. The values and ideas uniting the MEPs in the House create the environment that generates a certain responsibility of the EU towards the Cuban people.

The mutual element they realized in these circumstances is that the EU needs a change in attitude, behavior towards the Island. And also, the EU is superior in the sense that it is an international institution and has the power of disseminating values, ideas and norms and also instruments in order to facilitate this spreading and adjustment to them.

The difference stands in the approaches. The Spanish conservatives consider they should not make concessions when it comes to the human rights and democracy issues, given that in the past, the EU has shown tolerance towards Cuba and its leader has given nothing in return. In other words, it can be said that the scenario - in which the easy-going EU backs off and Cuba starts to solve its internal problems regarding fundamental rights and democracy – did not have an satisfactory outcome for the EU, on the contrary, it led to its loss from the point of view of spreading and applying the EU values, according to the conservatives.

Given the emphasis the conservatives put on the economic part, it is obvious that they see the practical aspect – if Cuba does not align to the EU requests, it will have to be punished (based on the Common position) and if it respects the EU demands, it benefits from political and economic perspectives. Therefore, it is a conditional agreement that limits Cuba.

On the other hand, the Spanish socialists consider that it is time for a change and they see the cooperation as the only solution. The constructive engagement they put forward in most of their statements illustrates the principles that PSOE is based on, especially regarding Cuba. It is important to mention that the socialists do not necessarily underline the actual outcomes of the EU – Cuba and they tend to be more tolerant, given the fact that the EU represents a political actor which has more power than Cuba as a state as explained above – therefore the socialist ideology in which the state is a primary element, their tendency is to be more understanding towards Cuba.

As seen above, the main advantage is being able to see the basic differences about Cuba between the parties – Spanish PPE and S&D representatives (on the



national level – PP and PSOE) – regardless of their nationality. This context proves that the principles and norms of every ideology are more important than the country of origin – MEPs must be united /in opposition in their opinions or approaches for the people whose interests they represent.

## **6.5 Starting negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation**

### **Agreement with Cuba – conditions**

#### ***What conditions are there for the negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba?***

The balance seems to have appeared after 2009 - with an improved institutionalized framework - having Catherine Ashton as the HR/VP who has managed to reach an agreement for cooperation between the two political actors eventually.

The situation between the EU and Cuba evolved in the sense that in the beginning of 2014 the *official agreement for an agreement* has been adopted. On 10 February, the Council has adopted the directives for negotiating for bilateral Political Dialogue and Co-operation Agreement with Cuba. According to the press release, Lady Ashton stated that she is confident in the progress of the situation, but despite that, the conditions regarding the human rights from the past are given the same importance. The EU considers that strengthening the relations between the EU and Cuba facilitates the promotion of the democratic values.<sup>148</sup>

There have been another two attempts of this kind of rapprochement in 1995 and 2000, but with no success. But the current situation seems to be different, at least in the opinion of Susanne Grätius who identifies several essential factors that are in the benefit of Cuba: the support that supposedly Cuba has from other Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico – trade partners of the EU; the current modernization process in Cuba; the signs of change from the US side, given that Obama administration is more pragmatic and more open towards Latin America, which is encouraging and also a proof of progress in its vision regarding Cuba.<sup>149</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> PRESS RELEASE – Council of the European Union, Catherine Ashton: *Council adopts Negotiating directives for bilateral Political Dialogue and Co-operation Agreement with Cuba*, Brussels, 10 February 2014,

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140946.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140946.pdf)

<sup>149</sup> Susanne Grätius, *Engaging Cuba*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2014, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert\\_13\\_Engaging\\_Cuba.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_13_Engaging_Cuba.pdf)

The first round of negotiations on a bilateral agreement on Political Dialogue and Cooperation between the EU and Cuba has already taken place in Havana on 29-30 April. The representatives of the parties were the EEAS Managing Director for the Americas, Christian Leffler and Cuban Deputy Minister, Abelardo Moreno. The focus of the meeting consisted in setting the modalities and the main elements for negotiations. “An understanding was also reached on the overall structure of the agreement, after which the parties held a first exchange of views on the main chapters and elements.”<sup>150</sup>

The progress in the context of this constructive engagement that is starting to materialize by pursuing small steps is a very different approach that the EU started to show towards Cuba. In this way, the EU has demonstrated its commitment to helping Cuba in its transition to democracy, offering also an instrument to implement these policies and not only make requests to Cuba and expect it to comply.

Furthermore the final conclusions of the case study will be presented, in order to set the validity of the hypothesis and shape an answer to the research question.

---

<sup>150</sup> PRESS RELEASE: *EU and Cuba launch talks on new agreement*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/2014/050514\\_cuba\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/050514_cuba_en.htm)

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

#### **7.1 What are the possibilities for individual Member States to influence the EU foreign policy decision-making?**

The complexity of the European Union foreign policy decision-making is given mainly by the fact that there are two dimensions involved, two levels of context in order for the policy to be materialized.

The first one refers to the EU framework. Constructivism explains that the first level consists in how MS interact within the EU structures and how they construct the type of policy they would adopt in the external area. The procedures, as seen, are aiming at providing collaboration for consensus in order to project a unitary voice out of the EU; but the difficulty lies in the clash between interests that reflect the ideological differences (in the EP, as well as in the Council).

The second level of context refers to the external area - what particular policy has been adopted and based on that, what instruments are going to be used in approaching the non-EU actor, mainly how is the specific policy going to be implemented. In addition to this, the political regime of the EU's interlocutor is an important factor because it is much accessible for democracy to get along with democracy than with socialism.

As this case study has shown, when there is a situation of ideological frictions - as the EU with Cuba, given their different meanings on the same principles – and cooperation between them is sought, there must exist an intermediary actor, a mutual entity that has developed activities with each of the parties and in this case, that is Spain.

That does not imply the fact that the mediator can act only positively. Spain has demonstrated that during the times of progress with Cuba, but also of conditional engagement, these policies towards Cuba have been developed on the basis of Spanish incentives. Whether proposing use of tools of hard power, coercive measures like the Common position or developing rapprochement through opening EU Delegation in Cuba, these were policies that the EU adopted eventually as punishments or rewards, at Spanish suggestion or recommendation, depending on the power at the time.

Spain's approach as a MS towards Cuba after several years from accession seems logical in the sense that it needed to fit in the EU framework first. It trespassed a complex transformation because needed to be able to form its own identity within the Union and to complete its modernization process before initiating any policy, which lasted a few years. During first years, the socialist strategy was to fulfill its national interests, which meant self-development. Spain had to go through a process of downloading the EU structures: norms, values and procedures in order to construct its image within the EU, before uploading any incentive or policy.

This idea confirm the liberal institutionalist view that the importance of the international institutions stands in the fact that they are able to transform state identities and interests. Furthermore, once integrated in the EU, Spain has to act in order to obtain mutual gains - for the Union, as well

Afterwards, on the background of bilateralism between Spain and Cuba, as an effect, the former actor made a step further to the Island, by consolidating its identity of developed MS. This was also an opportunity for Spain to demonstrate its ability of engaging policies on behalf of the EU.

Within the EU structures, Spain is split in order to make effective decisions. In the Council the alternation of the Spanish governments showed to have implications in the EU framework because confusion was created not only with Cuba, but also inside the EU, given the different strategies of Spain's governments. An actor is normally perceived in a certain way as a result of its actions, what does it provide in a certain social context. The change that the conservatives have brought regarding Cuba meant a drastic turn point in the EU policy, which had been transformed from constructive to conditional in a short time, meaning opposite approaches.

In the context of the Parliament, the concept of social interaction has been explained and applied. The debates provide the environment in which social knowledge is interpreted and meanings are given, perceptions are formed because the EP is the only EU institution with a high level of transparency. Even if the two political parties are separated by their political affiliation, there are situation which confirm that they can agree, according to the votes. In two out of three voting procedures, the cohesion regarding national majority has shown a very high level.

As presented in a previous chapter, the EP has a limited role when consulted about the foreign policies, but its role is important in the fact that the Council needs the EP's consent on its Draft in order to be adopted. Given that the EP is the

quintessence of the democracy by representing the interests of people, it seems a bit unrealistic that it does not share the same role as the Council or Commission, meaning that the possibility for the national interests to be pursued increases in the foreign policy decision-making.

The international norms in this case study have shown to be extremely important because it shaped the actors identities by coercing them or conditioning them somehow, such as the Common position which, in spite of being an official document between them, it imposed the status of Cuba as tolerated in relation with the EU.

Therefore, Spain can influence EU policies towards Cuba, as it has been proved in the positive and negative sense; but it cannot be generalized for any MS that it is able to influence the EU foreign policy making because there are some criteria in this case study: Cuba is a former colony of Spain, they have strong cultural ties which have evolved in bilateral economic investments providing benefits to each of them; they develop cooperation on a high level, beyond the political problems. Another element is that Cuba still represents the only state in the Latin American region that did not sign a cooperation agreement with the EU.

Under all the conditions presented above, the hypothesis formulated in the first chapter claiming that Spain's contribution to the EU foreign policy making on Cuba has a significant role was confirmed through the analysis.

## **7.2 How could Spain further participate in strengthening the relationship between the two political actors?**

As demonstrated, Spain's involvement in the EU policies towards Cuba has been reflected in many occasions until present. On the background of beginning to construct a favourable context for the negotiations for a political dialogue, the EU and Cuba are acting progressively.

A first step that Spain could make in strengthening the relationship between the two political actors, or at least, in continuing the negotiations, would be to be more involved in the process, to mediate and to supervise the actions.

The present EPP Prime Minister Rajoy, who was elected in 2011, will be in power until 2015, when it is possible for some changes to occur regarding the evolution of this political agreement, depending on the elected government.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

\*Cover pictures: Spain – EU flags: <http://www.dw.de/eu-presidency-power-sharing-takes-effect/a-5070917>

Cuba: <http://cubaflag.facts.co/cubaflagof/cubaflag.php>

1. 1319th Council meeting, Development Co-operation, Brussels, 16 May 1989, President: Mr. Luis Yanez Barnuevo, State Secretary for International Co-operation and Latin America of the Kingdom of Spain
2. A Europe of rights and values, Treaty of Lisbon, [http://europa.eu/lisbon\\_treaty/glance/rights\\_values/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/rights_values/index_en.htm)
3. Adler, Emanuel, “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions and Debates“ in *Handbook of International Relations*, contributors: Walter Carlsnes & Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons, SAGE Publications, 2013
4. AECID, Oficina Técnica de Cooperación, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo – Cuba, Cooperación Bilateral, <http://www.aecid.co.cu/programas.html>
5. Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities, Brussels, 22 April 2004, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%208412%202004%20INIT>
6. Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White (PPE-DE), *One minute speeches on matters of political importance*, Monday, 15 November 2004, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20041115%2bITEM-013%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=1-038>
7. Aznar, Jose Maria - Speeches - *Aznar's Address the homage to Oswaldo Paya in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 10.09.13*, <http://www.fundacionfaes.org/uploaded/INTERVENCIÓNNAZNARHOMENAJEPAYÁ.pdf>

8. Baklanoff, Eric N. *Circumventing the Embargo: The Strategic Context of Spain's Economic Relations with Cuba*, Cuba in Transition, ASCE, 2001, p. 302,  
<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume11/pdfs/baklanoff.pdf>
9. Balmaseda, M. and Sebastian, M, "Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May Not Be Enough" in "Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years", editors: Sebastian Royo, Paul Christopher Manuel, Frank Cass, London, 2003
10. Bryman, Alan, "Social research methods", 4th edition, Oxford, 2012
11. *Constructivism and Foreign Policy*, PowerPoint presentation,  
[http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/f09\\_courses/425f09\\_constructivism.pdf](http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/f09_courses/425f09_constructivism.pdf)
12. *Cuba* - European Parliament resolution on the EU's policy towards the Cuban Government, 2 February 2006, Brussels,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-0042&language=RO>
13. *Cuba* - European Parliament resolution on the EU's policy towards the Cuban Government, 2 February 2006, Brussels
14. Cuba – resolution Roll-call vote, VoteWatch.eu website,  
[http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx\\_vote\\_details.php?id\\_act=1336&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_tara=&vers=1&order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&order=ASC&last\\_order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro\\_tara\\_id=8&euro\\_grup\\_id=&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup](http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=1336&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=&euro_vot_rol_euro_tara=&vers=1&order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&order=ASC&last_order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&limit=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro_tara_id=8&euro_grup_id=&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup)
15. Cuba – vote for resolution, <http://term7.votewatch.eu/en/cuba-joint-motion-for-a-resolution-vote-resolution-text-as-a-whole.html###vote-tabs-list-1>
16. CubaHeadlines: *Spanish foreign minister visits Cuba for better relations*, 04/03/2007,  
[http://www.cubaheadlines.com/spanish\\_foreign\\_minister\\_visits\\_cuba\\_for\\_better\\_relations.html](http://www.cubaheadlines.com/spanish_foreign_minister_visits_cuba_for_better_relations.html)

17. DEBATES: *Award for the Sakharov Prize for 2002* - Oswaldo José Payá Sardiñas, 17 December 2002, Strasbourg,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20021217%2bITEM-014%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
18. Devitt, R. *Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?*, University of Melbourne, April 2010,  
<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/>
19. Doyle, M., St. Recchia, “Liberalism in International Relations”, published in *Bertrand Badie, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Leonardo Morlino-International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2011
20. EP resolution on human rights in Cuba,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0191+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>
21. *EU position towards the Cuban Government*, ORAL QUESTION WITH DEBATE pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure by Graham Watson, Cecilia Malmström, Emma Bonino and Marco Pannella, on behalf of the ALDE Group to the Council, 7 December 2005,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+OQ+O-2005-0112+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=ro>
22. EurActiv: *Louis Michel visits Cuba , favors end of diplomatic embargo*, La Havana, 08/03/2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vM484M0HSNs>
23. European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union - Directorate B, Briefing Paper: *EU Policy Towards Belarus and Cuba: A Comparative Analysis*, Brussels, February 2009
24. European Union – Foreign & Security Policy,  
[http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm)
25. European Union – Foreign Policy & Security,  
[http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm)



26. *European Union: Council of Ministers Common Position on Cuba*, International Legal Materials, published by American Society of International Law, Vol.36, No.1, January 1997, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20698650?origin=JSTOR-pdf>
27. Fernández Ordóñez: *The E.C. Presidency: Experiences of Spain*, pages 18-20 of European Affairs, num. 311989 in Francesc Granell – Director General DGVIIIID de la Comision de la Comunidad Europea, *Aims and outcome of the first Spanish presidency of the Council of the European Communities*
28. Glossary: Pillars of the European Union, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/glossary/eu\\_pillars\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm)
29. Gomichon, M., *Joseph Nye on Soft Power*, 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/08/joseph-nye-on-soft-power/>
30. Gratius, Susanne, *Engaging Cuba*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2014, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert\\_13\\_Engaging\\_Cuba.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_13_Engaging_Cuba.pdf)
31. Gratius, Susanne, *¿Es la Posición Común de la UE sobre Cuba una estrategia válida?*, FRIDE, Madrid, 2006, <http://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2006/8749.pdf>
32. Guest, Greg; Namey, Emily E; Mitchell, Marilyn L, Ch.1: “Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Science” in “Qualitative research: Defining and designing”, SAGE Publications, 2013, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010546?origin=JSTOR-pdf>
33. Hug, Adam, *Europe in the World: Can EU Foreign Policy Make an Impact?*, Foreign Policy Centre, 2013
34. Jackson, Robert; Sørensen, Georg. Ch.6 – “Social Constructivism” in “Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches”, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Oxford University Press, 2006
35. Keohane, Robert, “Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism”, *International Relations*, vol.26, no.2, June 2012

36. Keukeleire, Stephan, MacNaughtan, Jennifer, "The Foreign Policy of the European Union", Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
37. Lucarelli, Sonia; Manners, Ian, "Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy", published by Taylor and Francis, 2006
38. Milner, H., *International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses*, Review Article, Cambridge University Press, World Politics, Vol.44, No.3, April 1992
39. Mix, Derek E., *The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy*, Congressional Research Service, April 2003
40. Molina, Ignacio, *The 2010 Spanish EU Presidency: Trying to innovate Europe in troubled times*, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm, 2010
41. Naab, Anna, *The Spanish Presidency and its influence on EU-Latin American Relations*, CAP Aktuell, Nr.1, Februar 2010
42. Nye, Joseph, *Soft Power*, Foreign Policy, No 80, Twentieth Anniversary, 1990
43. Paul, Jonas, *EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Will the New High Representative and the External Action Service Make a Difference?*, Center for Applied Policy, Research Group on European Affairs, No.2, June 2008
44. PES officials, *Situation in Cuba – Debates*, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20041116%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
45. PES officials, *Cuba – Debates*, Wednesday, 1 February 2006, Brussels, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20060201%2bITEM-013%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
46. PES officials, *Human Rights in Cuba - Debates*, Thursday, 10 April 2003, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=->

[%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20030410%2bITEM-007%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN](#)

47. Petrovic, J., *Stick and carrot: All you wanted to know about the policy of conditionality but didn't dare to ask*, Public Policy Analysis, Western Balkans Security Observer, No.4, January 2007
48. PP Official webpage, <http://www.pp.es/>
49. PPE officials, *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20100310%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
50. PPE-DE officials, *Cuba* – Debates, Wednesday, 1 February 2006, Brussels, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20060201%2bITEM-013%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
51. PPE-DE officials, *Human Rights in Cuba* - Debates, Thursday, 10 April 2003, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20030410%2bITEM-007%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
52. PPE-DE officials, *Situation in Cuba* – Debates, Tuesday, 16 November 2004, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20041116%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
53. PRESS RELEASE – Council of the European Union, Catherine Ashton: *Council adopts Negotiating directives for bilateral Political Dialogue and Co-operation Agreement with Cuba*, Brussels, 10 February 2014, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140946.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140946.pdf)
54. PRESS RELEASE – Human rights: *Guillermo Fariñas – winner of the 2010 Sakharov Prize*, European Parliament News, 21-10-2010, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20101020IPR89528/html/Guillermo-Fariñas-winner-of-the-2010-Sakharov-Prize>

55. PRESS RELEASE: *Cuba – Council conclusions*, General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 31 January 2005, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_PRES-05-14\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-14_en.htm?locale=en)
56. PRESS RELEASE: Declaration by the Presidency, on behalf of the European Union, on Cuba, Brussels, 5 June 2003, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/76075.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/76075.pdf)
57. PRESS RELEASE: *EU and Cuba launch talks on new agreement*, [http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/2014/050514\\_cuba\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/050514_cuba_en.htm)
58. PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2501<sup>st</sup> Council meeting -Mr. Anastasios Giannitsis, Luxembourg, 14 April 2003, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/75419.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/75419.pdf)
59. PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2636 Council meeting -Mr. Jean Asselborn, Brussels, 31 January 2005, <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiqués/2005/01/3102asselborn-cuba/index.html>
60. PRESS RELEASE: General Affairs and External Relations – 2636 Council meeting -Mr. Jean Asselborn, Brussels, 31 January 2005, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/es/gena/83659.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/es/gena/83659.pdf)
61. PSOE Official webpage, <http://www.psoe.es//ambito/ideasyvalores/docs/index.do?action=View&id=97474>
62. Republic of Cuba – European Union, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2011-2013, 24 March 2010
63. Risse, Th., Sikkin, K. Ch.1 "The Socialization of International Human Rights into Domestic Practices: Introduction" in "The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change", edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, Cambridge University Press, 1999

64. Roy, Joaquin *The European Union perception of Cuba: from frustration to irritation*, University of Miami, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003
65. RTV-ES Video: Informe Semanal – *El intercambio de corbatas de Aznar y Castro marco la VI cumbre iberoamericana*, 2010,  
<http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/informe-semanal/intercambio-corbatas-aznar-castro-marco-vi-cumbre-iberoamericana/950059/>
66. S&D officials, Debates, Wednesday, 10 March 2010, Strasbourg,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20100310%2bITEM-012%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN>
67. Sakharov Prize Laureat 2005 – Award of the Sakharov Prize to the Damas de Blanco, Draft by Human Rights Actions Unit, HRAC Documentation for AFET-DEVE-DROI joint meeting on 23-4-2013,  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/afet/dv/20130422\\_1damas\\_/20130422\\_1damas\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/20130422_1damas_/20130422_1damas_en.pdf)
68. Sakharov Prize Network, European Parliament,  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/sakharov/prize\\_en.html](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/sakharov/prize_en.html)
69. Sanahuja, Jose Antonio, “Spain: Double Track – Europeanization and the Search for Bilateralism” in “The Europeanization of National Foreign Policies towards Latin America”, Edited by Lorena Ruano, Routledge, 2013
70. Schell, Charles, *The Value of the Case Study as a Research Strategy*, Manchester Business School, 1992, <http://www.finance-mba.com/Case%20Method.pdf>
71. *Situation in Cuba* - European Parliament resolution on Cuba,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2004-0061&language=MT>
72. Situation in Cuba – Roll-call Vote, VoteWatch.eu website,  
[http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx\\_vote\\_details.php?id\\_act=97&euro\\_vot\\_valoare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_tara=&vers=1&order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&order=ASC&last\\_order\\_by=euro\\_parlamentar\\_nume&limit](http://term6.votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=97&euro_vot_valoare=&euro_vot_rol_euro_grup=&euro_vot_rol_euro_tara=&vers=1&order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&order=ASC&last_order_by=euro_parlamentar_nume&limit)

[=0&offset=0&nextorder=ASC&euro\\_tara\\_id=8&euro\\_grup\\_id=&euro\\_vot\\_val  
oare=&euro\\_vot\\_rol\\_euro\\_grup=](#)

73. Spain and Cuba – *Agreement on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments*, Havana, 27 May 1994, Vol. 1902, I-32428
74. Tzivelis, Vassiliki, *The European Union`s foreign policy towards Cuba: It is time to tie the knot*, University of Miami, Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 6, No 7, 2004
75. Vodanovich, I., *Constructive Engagement and Constructive Intervention: A Useful Approach to Security in Asia Pacific*, Focus on the Global South, University of Auckland, New Zealand, <http://focusweb.org/node/1254>
76. Wendt, A. *Constructing International Politics*, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, 1995
77. Wendt, A., "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", International Organization, Vol.46, No.2, 1992
78. WRITTEN QUESTION AND REPLY – Cuba – blackmailing Spain and the EU, Brussels, 10 February 2005,  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2004-2493+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=SK>
79. Yin, Robert K. "Case study research: Design and Methods", Third edition, SAGE Publications, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol.5, 2012