

THE POLICY POSITIONS OF EUROSCEPTIC RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES

**A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE UK INDEPENDENCE
PARTY AND THE DANISH PEOPLE'S PARTY**



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Abstract

In light of the financial crisis that swept across the European continent in the mid-2000s, the European Union is faced with a citizenry that is losing faith in the project. This has been visible in the opinion polls for the 2014 European Parliament elections, where so-called eurosceptic right-wing populist parties are expected to make huge electoral gains. These parties either wish to reform the EU, or for their countries to outright leave the organization. Even though they already started increasing their vote shares in the elections of 2009, there has not been much scholarly investigation into their exact policy positions on the European Union. It is this gap that the following research will begin closing, through a comparative case study of the *UK Independence Party (UKIP)* and the *Danish People's Party (DPP)*. The analysis answers the following question:

How do eurosceptic right-wing populist parties articulate their specific stance on the EU in the lead-up to a European Parliament election?

The research is conducted through a framing analysis, focusing on the approaches offered by Carol Bacchi (*What is the Problem Represented to Be?*) and Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing). This permits an exploration of the two parties' specific problematizations, how and why they have arisen, who the blame belongs to, what their solutions are, and what the public should act by doing. The analysis will also consider the employment of certain linguistic tools, such as metaphors and catchphrases. The empirical data consists of party documents and material from the debates in Denmark and the UK from the period January-April 2014, seeing as this was when the EP election debates began gaining prominence in the media.

In the analysis it is revealed that the two parties argue very similarly, despite their differing degrees of Euroscepticism, and both employ the following frames in their argumentation: *Threat to National Sovereignty*, *Threat of Immigration*, *Economic Concerns*, *Anti-Establishment* and *Democratic Deficit*.

The parties envision two very different solutions to their future relations with the EU, as UKIP wants the UK to withdraw from the cooperation, while the DPP advocates a kind of multi-track EU, where the member states are free to choose their degree of European integration. Yet, they

concur in seeing the nation states' loss of sovereignty and democratic rights as the overarching problems with the EU, and these sentiments are behind several of the problematizations that they identify in the other frames.

Both thus vehemently oppose the EU's moves towards closer integration and the idea of creating a "United States of Europe". The economic toll of EU immigration is also problematized by the two parties, as this will not only harm the nation's overall economy, but also the common citizens, who will have to accept diminished living conditions, as the immigrants can afford to accept lower wages. Yet, here again, their solutions differ. The DPP just wishes to introduce a welfare policy opt-out, whilst UKIP wants to leave the EU, so it can reclaim its borders and immigration policy, and introduce a system of work-permits. The DPP also wishes to reintroduce border controls, yet this is due to its wish of curtailing border-crossing crime.

The other economic concerns voiced by the two parties are mainly related to the problem of the high EU costs that the member states have to pay, and this representation has come about because neither of the two senses a unity between the EU member states. Moreover, both parties problematize issues related to the establishment, particularly their national politicians, who are accused of belittling, and even lying about, the effects of EU immigration. Unlike the DPP, UKIP also problematizes the societal gaps in the UK, and that the EU favors big business in its policies. Finally, in regards to the democratic deficit, both parties problematize the unrepresentative nature of the EU, as it is seen as being too distant a construct to be allowed to interfere with the domestic policies of its member states.

This, conflated with the wish to protect the nation's sovereignty, is in fact the main problem for both parties. The EU is seen as being too intrusive on the member states, as neither of the two perceives the EU to be a community in the same sense as they see their own nations.

Thus, besides being revelatory about the way the two eurosceptic parties articulate their positions on the EU, the research also shows that their main concerns about the EU correlate to a very high degree. This is particularly interesting seeing as they express different degrees of Euroscepticism, and envision diverging futures for their countries' EU membership.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	3
Problem Formulation.....	5
The Two Cases: UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Danish People’s Party (DPP).....	6
Postscript.....	8
Chapter 1: Introduction to the DPP and UKIP	9
1.1 Party Histories	9
1.2 Political Ideology.....	10
1.3 The Danish and British Political Parties and the Question of the EU	12
1.4 Thesis Outline	14
Chapter 2: State of the Art of the European Parliament Elections	15
2.1 The EP’s Low Voter Turnout and Salience.....	15
2.2 EP Election Campaign Contents.....	15
2.3 Voter Behavior and Party Types	16
Chapter 3: Methodology	18
3.1 Research Strategy.....	18
3.2. Framing Analysis.....	19
Determining the Problem.....	21
Linguistic Analysis Tools	24
3.3 Empirical Data.....	26
Chapter 4: The Concept of Euroscepticism	30
4.1 The Term <i>Euroscepticism</i>	30
4.2 Eurosceptic Parties	32
4.3 Political Issues Leading to Eurosceptic Stances.....	34
Threat to National Sovereignty	35
Democratic Deficit	35
Threat of Immigration	37
Economic Concerns	38
Anti-Establishment	38
Chapter 5: The Party Policies of the DPP and UKIP	39
5.1 Analysis Structure	39
5.2 The Two Parties’ Historical Positions on the EU.....	40

5.3 Analysis of the 2014 Party Positions of the DPP and UKIP	41
5.3.1 Threat to National Sovereignty	41
5.3.2 Threat of Immigration	50
5.3.3 Economic Concerns	58
5.3.4 Anti-Establishment	62
5.3.5 Democratic Deficit	66
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussion of Findings	72
6.1 Overall Comparison	72
6.1 Discussion of Findings.....	78
6.3 Conclusionary Remarks	80
Bibliography.....	82

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is experiencing a grave 'existential' crisis. In light of the Constitutional Treaty debacle of 2011, and the financial crisis that swept across the continent in the mid-2000s, growing concern about the legitimacy of the EU is voiced in several member states (Serricchio, 2013: 51). The economic hardships of falling growth rates, high unemployment and public debts which many European countries still face, have been partly blamed on the EU, and its politics of austerity. Moreover, this has led to a decrease in public trust in the EU, from 48 percent in 2009 to 31 in 2013 (Eurobarometer, 2013: 5). At the same time, the "permissive consensus" with which the public previously looked upon the European integration project is increasingly replaced with a "constraining dissensus" (Abbarno & Zapryanova, 2013: 581). This was for example visible in the French and Dutch publics' *No* to the Lisbon Treaty in 2005 (Fuchs et al., 2009: 9).

The public's dismay could have great political repercussions for the EU, seeing as the European Parliamentary Elections are coming up in May, 2014. It could potentially lead to huge changes in the political set-up of the European Parliament (EP), as opinion polls show that so-called *eurosceptic* parties are expected to win a major share of the votes in most countries where they are present (EuropeanVoice, 2014). These eurosceptic parties could threaten the future development of the EU, as they "favor either significant alterations to the EU institutional framework or secession from the EU altogether" (Breed, 2013: 74). However, there has not been much research looking into the actual arguments that these parties employ to express their exact positions on the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2007). This deserves closer scrutiny, and will therefore be the subject of this thesis.

It is very interesting that Euroscepticism is increasing when considering the countries in which it is present. One would expect the citizens of Greece, Spain and Italy to voice opposition to the EU's harsh budgetary measures, seeing as they were deeply affected by them. Big anti-austerity protests did appear in the countries in late 2012 (Cassidy, 2012), and today, the Italian *Five Star Movement* and the Greek *Golden Dawn* are also expected to do very well at the EP elections (EuropeanVoice, 2014). Yet, somewhat more surprising, scepticism is also growing in countries that went through the crisis comparatively unharmed. Thus, EU-critical voices in the shape of,

amongst others, the *National Front* in France, the *Party for Freedom* in the Netherlands, the *Austrian Freedom Party*, the *United Kingdom Independence Party* and the *Danish People's Party* are also anticipated to increase their vote shares (EuropeanVoice, 2014)¹.

What unites all of these parties is not only their opposition to the current state of the EU, but also that they, with a few exceptions, are populist right-wing parties (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013). Their specific party family has been defined in numerous ways, and various attempts have been made at finding its most encompassing names and conceptualizations (see for example Mudde, 2002; Grabow & Hartleb, 2013; and Surel, 2011).

Accordingly, scholars have used different labels for these parties and their positions, such as right-wing populist (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013); extreme right (Arzheimer, 2009); radical right-wing (Langenbacher & Schellenberg, 2011) etcetera. In this thesis, they will be referred to as right-wing populist parties, as it could be argued that the “extreme” and “radical” parties have a somewhat different set-up and political convictions than the right-wing populists (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 16). This, however, also complicates the attempt at giving an overall definition of the party group. Yet, generally speaking, right-wing populist parties introduced:

A refreshed and radicalised ideological mixture that particularly emphasised the issues of immigration or ‘foreign infiltration’, and combined them with the alleged abuse of welfare state measures by immigrants or the alleged threat to the national and cultural identity of the ‘heartland’ (Taggart 2000, 95). Moreover, right-wing populists mobilized popular support through their critique of the established political parties, which they accused of being completely remote from the lives of ‘ordinary citizens’ and of living in cosy, but insular, elite cartels (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 15).

This definition largely persists today, and one can still observe some shared themes and ideological positions amongst the parties, especially an exclusionary form of nationalism and an anti-immigration stance. The parties’ attitudes towards economic policies are more difficult to generalize about, as they “represent a colourful mixture of socio-economic demands”, some highlighting traditional liberal economics and others wanting to protect the welfare state, if not being outright protectionist (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 21).

When referring to *populism*, one often has direct negative connotations, but it just means a call for a more direct way of conducting the democratic process (Painter & Chwalisz, 2013: 9). One

¹ Opinion polls as of April 10, 2014.

definition of populism sees it as a political communication style, which either can be *thin* or *thick*. The thin definition just involve political actors who refer to the people when they talk, whereas actors employing the thick speak “about the people *and* combine this with an explicit antiestablishment position *and* with an exclusion of certain population categories” (Jager & Walgrave, 2007: 3). Hence, as proponents of thick populism, the right-wing populist parties want the power to return to the people, and therefore often call for increased direct democracy through referendums and elections (Painter & Chwalisz, 2013: 9).

Regarding the populist right-wing parties’ stance on the EU, most of them view critically upon the ever closer integration process taking place between the member states (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 9). As the aforementioned opinion polls on the EP elections showed, a growing part of the EU citizens seems to have similar worries, as they are expected to vote for this party group. In fact, the EP elections of 2009 already showed an increase in the vote for right-wing parties, an occurrence which scholars partly explained with the historical tendency for the right to “outperform the left in times of recession” (Gamble as cited in Hayton, 2010: 30).

Thus, it is of interest to explore what the eurosceptic right-wing populist parties’ exact stances are on the EU, as they could be effectuated, if they ‘win’ the elections.

Problem Formulation

It is therefore the aim of this thesis to explore how eurosceptic right-wing populist parties articulate their specific stance on the EU in the lead-up to a European Parliament election.

In order to answer this question, I will analyze the political statements of two of the identified parties from above, the *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) and the *Danish People’s Party* (DPP). In my analysis, I will investigate the following sub-questions, which should help me to answer the overall research question:

- What exactly are their concerns regarding the EU cooperation and development?
- What are the similarities and differences in UKIP and the DPP’s different degrees of Euroscepticism?

In order to answer the problem formulation, I will need to discern both the two parties' policy positions, but also how they are arguing their case towards the national electorate. As the period leading up to an EP election is where most focus is on the question of the EU in the member states, it is also this period that the thesis will consider. I have therefore decided to limit the period under scrutiny from January 2014 to April 2014. Firstly, this is due to the time and space constraints that disallow for the gathering of more data. Secondly, it is because of the significance of this period for the given parties and the EU elections. It is also the period where more in-depth and informative EU debates started appearing, for example the televised debate between Nigel Farage (UKIP's leader) and Nick Clegg (leader of the Liberal Democrats). In Denmark, there was no similar debate to the one in the UK, but *The Debate (Debatten)* on *Danmarks Radio (DR)*, for example, started focusing on the topic of the EU in late January, 2014 (DR, n.d.).

In the following section, I will introduce the selected cases, and explain the choice of them as the objects of study.

The Two Cases: UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Danish People's Party (DPP)

These two cases were chosen for several reasons. For one, it is due to the comparability between the two countries. Denmark and the UK have historically been rather skeptic towards the EU and the expansion of its supranational powers, which is expressed by both the politicians and citizens (Sørensen, 2004). Accordingly, both countries have chosen to stay out of certain EU policies and initiatives, including the EU's common currency, the Euro. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was also only ratified after several other opt-outs had been adopted.

Also, British and Danish public and political trust in the EU has always been lukewarm, leading the two countries to be referred to as the EU's "eurosceptic pair" (Sørensen, 2004: 1). Yet, as has been observed in several other EU member states, within the last part of the 2000s, the trust has plummeted further. Whereas 86 percent of the Danes trusted the EU as an institution in 2007, only 52 per cent felt the same way in 2012 (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013: 2). A similar picture is seen in the UK, as "those who 'tend not to trust' the EU has gone from 48 percent in 2004 to nearly 80 percent in 2012" (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013: 5). Thus, the two countries show rather similar tendencies in their relationship with the EU, allowing for their comparison.

As mentioned, UKIP and the DPP are expected to gather high levels of electoral support at the upcoming EP elections. In the EP, the *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) and the *Danish People's Party* (DPP), adhere to the same party group in the European Parliament; the *Europe of Freedom & Democracy* (EFD). It also counts other right-wing populist parties amongst its members, such as the Italian *Lega Nord*, the *Finns Party* and the *Greek Popular Orthodox Rally*. The party group emphasizes the importance of the nation state, and is clearly eurosceptic:

Committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation among Nation States, the Group favours an open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European superstate (EFD, 2009: 3).

Nevertheless, despite belonging to the same party family and EP group, their positions on the EU do differ. Both are skeptic about the European integration process, but whereas the DPP just wants to change the Danish relations with the EU, UKIP wants the UK to withdraw from the Union. This is also partly why these two parties were chosen.

However, it is not only due to a scholarly interest that I chose the two parties for my study. I find the two country cases to be particularly intriguing as I am a Danish citizen and I have lived several years in the UK. Therefore, I am well acquainted with both of the two countries' political systems, and it has been of great interest to me to follow the discussions about the EU, and how they seem to be affecting public opinion. Furthermore, I am very fascinated by the nature of right-wing populist parties, as I always have wondered how they can attract so many voters when they, in my opinion, at times come with very contentious statements and viewpoints. This is why I find it of high significance and interest to unravel what, and how, exactly they argue for their particular stances. It is of course also of a pragmatic benefit to me that I speak both Danish and English, which will ease the obtainment and analysis of data from the two countries.

Postscript

Seeing as the EP-elections took place on the 22nd and 25th of May, 2014 in the UK and Denmark respectively, it was not within the reach of the deadline to include the election results as an integral part of the thesis. However, the results should have a short mention, as the predictions of the opinion polls were correct, and both the *Danish People's Party* (DPP) and the *UK Independence Party* (UKIP) ended up "winning" the EP-elections. In fact, both parties received more than a fourth of the votes from their national electorates, giving UKIP 23 seats in the European Parliament, and the DPP four (BBC, 2014b). These results are very close to those witnessed by other eurosceptic right-wing populist parties, like the French *Front National* (25%), the Italian *Five Star Movement* (21%), and the *Freedom Party of Austria* (21%) (BBC, 2014b).

Despite the pro-European parties having won the most seats overall, it looks as if the eurosceptic gains are going to be taken very seriously by the leaders of the EU member states. Francois Hollande, the French President, has for example called for a scroll-back of the EU's powers, as he feels that the organization has become too complex and distant from the national citizens (BBC, 2014c). The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy has also announced that the European leaders will re-assess the EU's future agenda in light of the elections, and focus their attention on economic growth and jobs creation (2014d).

Thus, it would appear as if the eurosceptic parties' positions will have some relevance for the EU's future directions, which makes the conducted research of this thesis of even greater interest and value.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the DPP and UKIP

Upon closer examination of the parties and their structure, it becomes evident that they have very different party histories and national political strategies. In the following chapter, I will briefly introduce their origins, election results and policies, in order to give the reader an understanding of their political standpoint. This should also make it clearer why they are relevant to study and compare in regards to the topic of Euroscepticism.

1.1 Party Histories

The DPP

The *Danish People's Party* (DPP) (*Dansk Folkeparti*) was created in 1995 by earlier members of the *Danish Progress Party* (*Fremskridtspartiet*), who had defected from the party due to disagreements about its future direction (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008: 373). The Progress Party was founded in 1972 as a tax-protest party, and initially achieved good national election results. Yet, it suffered from a bad party organization, which led to electoral difficulties (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008: 373). The DPP leadership thus ensured that the party was managed from the top (Meret, 2010: 99), yet the party still had some initial problems constituting itself on the Danish political scene.

In its first national elections in 1998, however, the party won seats in the Danish Parliament (danmarkshistorien.dk, 1998). Yet, the real national breakthrough was achieved in 2001, where it became the third biggest party in Denmark (Folketinget, n.d.a). The *Danish Liberal Party* (*Venstre*) made the DPP its supporting party the same year, in order to be able to form the Danish government. This allowed the DPP to become an integrated part of Danish politics, and in the three consecutive elections (2005, 2007 and 2011), the party's results were stable, around 12-13 percent (Folketinget, n.d.a). The party has also had increasingly good election results at the EP elections, obtaining 15.3 percent of the votes in 2009 (Folketinget, 2014).

UKIP

The *UK Independence Party* (UKIP), on the other hand, was formed in 1993 as a single-issue anti-EU party (Wellings, 2010: 501). Its founder, Alan Sked, had created the *Anti-Federalist League* in 1992 against the pending Maastricht Treaty, and he decided to form a proper political party; UKIP

(Abedi & Lundberg, 2009: 78). Unlike the DPP, UKIP's party history has been wrought with tension, and it has had no less than eight political leaders since its creation (Usherwood, 2010). Some scholars therefore contended that UKIP would have difficulties establishing itself as a proper party on the national scene, due to its organizational challenges (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009: 85).

However, after some tumultuous years in the end-1990s (Usherwood, 2008: 256), UKIP has managed to make a name for itself in British politics. Yet, it has still not obtained a seat in the British Parliament, partly due to the British "first-past-the-post" voting system that divides the country into constituencies wherefrom the winning candidates are chosen. This means that even with a sizeable support across the country, smaller parties such as UKIP "do not get a proportional number of MPs because there are not enough votes concentrated in constituencies to let them win seats" (BBC, n.d.). Thus, at the elections of 2010, despite getting 3.1 percent of the votes, the party did not get in to the House of Commons (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 360). However, at the EP elections, the party keeps increasing its vote share: UKIP has gone from getting one percent of the votes in 1994 to winning 16.6 per cent in 2009, making it the second largest British party in the EP (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 360)

Hence, the two parties have very different origins and positions on the national political scene. A similar picture becomes visible when looking at their political ideologies, which, despite adhering to the same party type, do differ somewhat.

1.2 Political Ideology

There is some scholarly debate as to UKIP and the DPP's particular party type. Whilst relative agreement exists about the DPP pertaining to right-wing populist parties (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013), UKIP is more debatable.

The DPP

The DPP has several key positions that clearly situate it on the right-wing. For one, the party is very outspoken regarding immigrants and the wish for restrictions to their numbers (Green-Pedersen & Odsmalm, 2008: 373). Thus, when the party was the government's supporting party in 2001, it insisted on hardening the Danish immigration legislation (Meret, 2010: 100). The tone of the DPP's arguments also became increasingly harsh, especially against Muslim immigrants, who are seen as

a threat to Danish culture (DPP, 2009a). This is related to the party's self-perception. It sees itself as the protector of the Danish nation, culture and, particularly, values, which is visible in the party's manifesto of 2002. It states that party members "feel a historic obligation to guard the country, the people and the Danish heritage" (DPP, 2002)². Furthermore, the DPP has professed to safeguard the interests of the weak and poor in Danish society, referring to itself as the "real protector of the traditional Social Democratic values and principles in relation to welfare" (as cited in Meret, 2010: 143). These policy positions all clearly correlate with the definition of right-wing populist parties given above (See p. 4).

UKIP

Some still do not feel that UKIP quite fits the definition of a right-wing populist party (see for example Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 362). This is partly due to UKIP's origin as a single-issue party, but also because its positions differ slightly from other parties of the grouping. Yet, the party is clearly populist (see p. 4), and since beginning his party leadership, Nigel Farage has turned the party's focus towards the national level as well (Usherwood, 2010: 14). Hence, today, UKIP's policy proposals surround national, and right-wing, issues, such as liberalizations of the economy, cuts on immigration, lower taxes, crime reduction and libertarian measures (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 360). Particularly migration is a heated topic for the party, beginning in 2009-2010, and the then party leader, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, who for example wanted a burqa ban in some public areas, and spoke of Islamic extremism (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 376). Even though this narrative was not continued in the same tone by Farage, the party still sees migrants as posing a great strain on the British economy and infrastructure (UKIP, 2014). UKIP is also strongly nationalist, which is another trade-mark of most populist right-wing parties, and this stance will be further explained in the analysis (see p. 47). All of these points make UKIP adhere to the particular party group.

In order to understand the other Danish and British parties' different party positions on the EU, and wherefrom the two parties face competition on the issue, the next section will briefly introduce the parties and their stance on the EU.

² All translations are the author's own.

1.3 The Danish and British Political Parties and the Question of the EU

Denmark

In Denmark, most established parties, including the current government, support the EU membership, and wish to abolish the aforementioned opt-outs (Folketinget, n.d.b). Thus, both the *Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet)* and the *Liberal Party (Venstre)* advocate the EU cooperation, and so do the two smaller left-wing parties, the *Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti)* and the *Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)*. However, there are several eurosceptic fringe parties. One of these, the cross-political and single-issue party *People's Movement against the EU (Folkebevægelsen mod EU)* even wants Denmark to leave the EU (Folkebevægelsen mod EU, 2000). The left-wing party the *Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten)* opposes the EU in its current shape, as it is seen "as a vehicle of European capitalism, and especially to the building of a European state and the establishment of a European army" (Enhedslisten, n.d.). The *Liberal Alliance*, on the other hand, wants the EU to be based on the principles of "peace, freedom and free trade" and returned to something akin the earlier EEC (Liberal Alliance, 2014). This is somewhat similar to the DPP's stance, as it also calls for the rolling back of EU's power, yet with the main aim of safeguarding the nations' sovereignty. The Red-Green Alliance does not participate in the EP elections, and none of the other EU-skeptic parties are expected to win more than ten percent of the votes at the EP elections (Christensen, 2014 (as on April 29)).

United Kingdom

The situation in the UK differs highly from Denmark. Whereas the DPP has hardly any competition regarding Euroscepticism from the established parties, this is not the case for UKIP. The *Liberal Democrats* is actually the only established party that clearly voices its approval of the EU (Liberal Democrats, n.d). Both the *Labour Party* and the *Conservatives* have switched between favoring and opposing the EU several times in the span of British EU membership (Osborne, 2011). Currently, *Labour* favors the relations, yet stating that its "priority isn't leaving, but changing the European Union so that it can work to raise living standards for hardworking families in Britain" by creating "growth and jobs" (Labour, 2014). Its wish to reform the EU shows a somewhat skeptical attitude towards the organization. The governing party, the *Conservatives*, is split on the question: the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, wants the country to remain in the EU; yet party

backbenchers have pushed him to announce an In/Out Referendum for 2017 (Watt, 2011). This was heavily endorsed by UKIP that wishes the UK to leave the EU. This aim is shared with the extreme-right *British National Party* (BNP) which has similar political positions as UKIP (Ford et al., 2011: 205). UKIP, however, strongly denies any link due to BNP's contentious stances (Farage, 2014). Finally, the left-wing *Green Party* also endorses the referendum, but only calls for reforms of EU's structures (Green Party, 2013).

It has now been shown that the two countries are rather similar in regards to Euroscepticism, but also that besides being eurosceptic populist right-wing parties, UKIP and the DPP differ in their structures and organization. This, however, should not hinder the analysis of their stances on the EU. The interest of the study also derives from the fact that they oppose the EU to varying degrees, inferring that they are likely to argue their cases very differently, seeing as only UKIP wants the UK to withdraw from the EU.

1.4 Thesis Outline

In the previous section, I have introduced the focus of my research. I will thus conduct a comparative case study of two eurosceptic populist right-wing parties, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Danish People's Party (DPP), in order to answer my research question as to how eurosceptic right-wing populist parties articulate their specific stance on the EU.

In **Chapter 2**, I will review the already existing literature on the EP elections, thereby explaining previous findings on voter behavior and election trends, and the relevance of my research. This will lead into **Chapter 3**, where I will explain the methodological framework and my specific research approach. It will consist of a qualitative comparative case study of the DPP and UKIP. In the same chapter, I will also introduce the analytical approach, framing analysis, and how it will be employed to answer my problem formulation. Finally, my empirical data selection will be explained.

In **Chapter 4**, I will present my conceptual framework, consisting of an introduction to, and definition of, the term *euroscepticism*, and an exploration of the parties that belong under the category. This will lead into a discussion of the frames that eurosceptic right-wing populist parties previously have used to express their position on the EU.

Chapter 5 will consist of the analysis of the two parties' ways of arguing in both their party material and in the statements surrounding the current public debates. The chapter will thus provide an analysis and comparison of the parties' policies, and why they voice those particular concerns. Then, I will make an overall comparison of the two parties' problematizations, and therewith outline the differences and similarities in their stances.

Finally, **Chapter 6** will be an overall comparison, a discussion of the findings, and then the conclusion.

Chapter 2: State of the Art of the European Parliament Elections

Due to its cross-national and unprecedented political nature, the literature on the European Parliament (EP) elections abounds. Historically, the EP started out with having only nominal decision-making powers in the EU. Yet, today it scrutinizes the work of the European Commission, ratifies the EU budget and “acts as a co-legislator for nearly all EU law” (European Parliament, n.d.a.). Thus, as the areas of European cooperation have increased, so have the powers of the EP. Therefore, it has become a rather powerful and important EU institution.

2.1 The EP’s Low Voter Turnout and Salience

Nevertheless, compared to the national elections in the EU member states, the EP elections have a very low voter turnout: in 1979 68 percent of the European electorate voted, but the number has steadily decreased, and in 2009 only 43 percent went to the ballot boxes (European Parliament, n.d.b.). This can partly be explained by the lower voter turnout at the EP elections in the newest Eastern European member states (Trechsel, 2010: 5), but several of the old members also have decreasing numbers (European Parliament, n.d.b.). This is argued to be due to the low salience of the European issues to the member state electorate. Hence, the EP elections are not seen as being important, as they do not influence the allocation of executive power in the member states (Reif & Schmitt as cited in Trechsel, 2010:3). The EP elections are therefore also often referred to as *second-order elections* within the literature on the subject (Schmitt, 2005).

As the EP actually does hold some power over policies and laws affecting the member states, many researchers have looked into the behavior of those who *do* vote at the EP elections. This has for example been done by either focusing on the themes of the election campaigns, the voters and their party choices or the factors that affect the voter’s decision to choose a certain type of party over another.

2.2 EP Election Campaign Contents

In regards to the national EP election campaigns, scholars have studied if the policy topics of the debates are of a European or national nature (Kovář & Kovář, 2012). The tendency has strongly been to the latter, and this is explained in numerous ways. Some see it as a “strategic decision” of the main domestic parties “to keep Europe off the agenda because there is no internal consensus”

within the parties “about the question of European integration” (Adam & Maier, 2011: 432). Others suggest that the established parties fear a loss of their regular voters, if they clearly state their position on the EU. This has been referred to as a “best not mentioned strategy” by the British political scientist Tim Bale (2006: 388), a method he found the British Conservatives to make use of in the 2005 general elections, also to keep its Europhile party members silent in the debates.

Yet, a study of the 2004 campaigns in the UK and Denmark has shown that European issues *do* feature prominently in some parties’ campaigns here (Davidson-Schmich & Davidson-Schmich, 2005). In the Danish case, this was ascribed to the presence of single-issue anti-EU parties which only partake in the EP elections (such as the Danish *People’s Movement against the EU*), and in the UK, it was seen as being due to the “widely Euro-skeptic” nature of the electorate (Davidson-Schmich & Davidson-Schmich, 2005: 12).

2.3 Voter Behavior and Party Types

The demand side of the EP elections is also a frequently studied area, where scholars have explored the electoral behavior of voters. This has for example involved research on the specific deliberations when deciding their stance on the EU.

Many researchers have wondered about the many smaller, often single-issue, parties faring well at the elections. This is partly explained by the phenomenon of protest voters, who, discontent with the results of the party they normally vote for, choose to vote for a different party (Marsh as cited in Clark, 2014: 341). This was for example found in regards to the UK, where so-called “strategic defectors” voted for UKIP at the 2009 EP elections instead of their usual party, the Conservatives, in order to show their dissatisfaction (Ford et al., 2012).

Moreover, sociologists have also found a correlation between a person’s socio-economic position, and whether he or she supports European integration. Thus, the wealthiest, highest educated and skilled people tend to favor closer cooperation, whereas the opposite is the case for the people losing out in society (Gabel & Palmer in Serricchio, 2013: 53). Interestingly, this finding corresponds somewhat with studies on electors voting for populist parties, as these voters do

[...] not necessarily have to be affected negatively by social change or economic progress. Usually it is enough to fear that a deterioration of life, income and social status may follow from economic development and social change (Grabow & Hartloeb, 2013:24).

This could thus also partly explain the current situation, where there is an economic crisis and eurosceptic populist right-wing parties are expected to make huge gains at the elections.

Other studies have looked more on the voters' actual perceptions of the European integration process, and the effects of eurosceptic parties in this regard. Thus, research has shown that "Eurosceptic rhetoric by elites directly depresses support for European integration and specific EU policies among ordinary citizens" (De Vreese as cited in Zapryanova & Abbarno, 2013: 2). If this is the case, then what specific eurosceptic arguments is it that the voters are agreeing with? When looking through the existing literature on the topic, there seems to be a lack of exploration of the exact party policies of parties opposing the EU, a finding which has also been made by other researchers looking into Euroscepticism (Zapryanova & Abbarno, 2013: 7).

Furthermore, when trying to explain the public's diverse feelings towards the EU, and why they vary, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks argue that "one must endeavour to explain how Europe is constructed in political debate", and how Euroscepticism is cued by various political actors (2007: 125). This is partly what this thesis sets out to do, as it is already known that the DPP and UKIP are two eurosceptic parties, but wherein does their opposition lie, and how is this message passed on to the electorate?

So far, studies about the eurosceptic parties' particular stances have evolved around the eurosceptic political environment in a single country over time (see for example Lucia Quaglia's study of Italian parties (2013)), cross-country analyses using already gathered Manifesto data from databases (see for example Heinisch et al., 2010) and analyses of the more general party positions within a given country (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002). Yet, hardly any have made detailed analyses of a given party's actual arguments employed in the EP election debates.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In the following section, my methodological framework will be outlined. I will begin by explaining my social constructivist research paradigm, and then my methodological approach will follow. It will be a qualitative comparative case study of the DPP and UKIP. Then, I will introduce and outline frame analysis, the analytical approach for my research and how I will use it to guide my analysis. Finally, I will present the empirical data to be studied.

3.1 Research Strategy

As I wish to study the phenomenon of Euroscepticism, and how UKIP and the DPP communicate their eurosceptic messages to the electorate, this thesis will be written within the social constructivist paradigm. I thus wish to understand how the two parties “make sense of their world”, and how they employ language “to construct a social reality” (Fox et al., 2007: 10). This is in order to find out how they construct and represent their particular problems pertaining to the EU (see Bacchi, 2009).

Therefore, I will need a research strategy that allows me to analyze textual or verbal data from the two parties, and that permits me to focus on the exact meaning of the gathered information (Williams, 2007: 65). This means that my research will be carried out qualitatively. Quantitative research, on the other hand, often involves the analysis of a bulk of data, and has frequently been conducted in policy studies, for example by examining numerous cases at the same time, mainly with the help of computer software (see Chaney, 2013; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010 and Fisher Liu & Kim, 2011). Thus, conducting the research quantitatively could have permitted me to analyze more of the eurosceptic right-wing populist parties than a qualitative analysis would allow. However, as qualitative studies will allow me to get to the core of the statements, as it involves a much more careful reading of the data (Mudde, 2000: 22), that will be the approach of this research.

Doing a qualitative case study thus permits the researcher to approach a given phenomenon in a more in-depth manner, which should allow for a better understanding of the given case. Yet, this also implies that the generalizability of the findings may be impinged, as it is highly unlikely that the exact same results of the analysis of one eurosceptic right-wing populist party will apply to all

the others. The differences between all the parties are simply too large, as some policy stances depend on the situations in the parties' originating countries. The study of UKIP and the DPP will, however, provide certain indications about the argumentation style of their type of parties, and the concerns that they are raising. Thus, by explaining my specific research strategy, its context and parameters, and how I come to the conclusions that I draw, it should be possible for other scholars to replicate the study in regards to other eurosceptic parties.

Returning to the research approach, the analysis will more specifically be a comparative case study of the two parties UKIP and the DPP. A case study is "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context" (Yin, 2003: 13). This is also the aim of this thesis, as I wish to explore the phenomenon of euroscepticism, and how it is articulated by the two chosen parties within their political contexts. Furthermore, in relation to the comparative nature of the analysis, I have judged the two cases to be "similar enough and separate enough to permit treating them as comparable instances of the same general phenomenon" (Ragin in Thies, 2002: 353). Their similarities lie in the two countries' historically eurosceptic environments, and the fact that both parties are eurosceptic right-wing populist parties. The difference is in their degree of Euroscepticism, as UKIP wants the UK to depart the EU, and the DPP just wants the relationship between Denmark and the EU to change.

3.2. Framing Analysis

The main aim of the study is thus to analyze how the DPP and UKIP express their eurosceptic stances to the electorate. This means that I need to consider their specific rhetoric. Political rhetoric is a much researched field, and many different analytical methods could be used to find out how parties argue for their political standpoints. Amongst others, one could mention (critical) discourse analysis, which focuses on the construction of meaning (see Fairclough, 2013), argumentation theory, which looks at the building blocks of an argument (see Toulmin, 2003), and framing analysis, which considers the presentation of arguments, and the effects it has on the receiver (see for example König, 2005 and Chong & Druckman, 2007).

This thesis will employ the latter of the three, namely framing analysis. The approach was chosen because it allows for an exploration of the ways actors argue their case and because it is "a way of depicting and engaging the array of arguments and counter arguments that surround complex

social issues” (Creed et al., 2002: 35). Furthermore, it will aid me in “sort[ing] out underlying logics” of statements, and in “situating frames in context” (Creed et al., 2002: 35). This will help explain the rationale behind the given stance, and the ideas that the given party wishes to espouse. In the following section, I will first explain the concepts of *framing* and *frames*, and thereafter develop the framework for the analysis.

The term “to frame” was introduced in 1974 by Erving Goffman, in his book *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. He argued that people rely on certain cultural belief systems, and that the interpretive designs that the public creates through social experience are “frames that we use in our day-to-day experience to make sense of the world” (Volkmer, 2009: 408). Thus, he saw frames as constituting concepts and theoretical perspectives developed by individuals influenced by societal interaction, such as discourse, conventional rituals and advertising (Creed et al., 2002: 36).

Seeing as framing analysis has been used in research for some decades now, and within different scholarly fields, the approach has undergone much change since Goffman’s publication. Today, scholars in areas as diverse as organizational studies (see Hallahan, 1999 and Liu & Kim, 2011), social movement studies (see Benford & Snow, 2000), media studies (see Gamson & Modigliani, 1989 and Scheufele, 1999) and language and politics (see Lakoff, 2004 and Bacchi, 2000) make use of the approach. There is therefore no complete agreement as to its exact definition or effect on the audience (König, 2005).

As a point of departure, the American linguist and cognitive scientist George Lakoff defined the term *frame* accordingly:

Frames are the mental structures that allow human beings to understand reality – and sometimes to create what we take to be reality. [T]hey structure our ideas and concepts, they shape how we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and how we act. For the most part, our use of frames is unconscious and automatic – we use them without realizing it (as cited in Brewer, 2010).

Framing, then, is the act of creating a frame. The approach considers how texts or speech acts are built up, and how this may influence the audience or reader to think about an issue in a certain way, rather than another. Put in other words: “Framing recognizes the ability of a text³ to define a

³ Framing occurs in relation to any form of communication act.

situation, issue, and to set the terms of a debate” (Fisher Liu & Kim, 2011: 235). This means that the way a certain message is explained, or framed, influences how it is perceived and understood by the receiver. Thus, a well-expressed frame is a “problem-solving schemata, stored in memory, for the interpretive task of making sense of present situations” (Johnston in Vallaste, 2009:142). This occurrence was exemplified by Claudia Strauss in her study of conventional discourses relating to immigration and social programs in the United States (2012). Her research considered “vernacular ways of framing issues” (Strauss, 2012: xvi), and she found that common citizens sometimes said exactly the same things about a given topic, and that it seemed as if they all had “a large repertoire of these ready-made points, and the points often crossed ideological lines” (Strauss, 2012: xv). This implies that certain frames may have a big resonance in peoples’ minds.

However, a debate exists as to how the relationship between the message creators and receivers should be considered. Some, like Lakoff, contend that frames are created unconsciously, and are influenced by history, culture and society (Michalowski as cited in Bacchi, 2000: 47). Others perceive framing as being a more conscious choice. This is especially the case in media studies, where Robert M. Entman argues that framing is done to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52). Hence, the creator of the frames is seen as shaping them according to the particular elements that he or she wishes to highlight, whilst omitting the ones that are seen as “competing, distracting, or contradictory” for the argument (Hallahan, 2005: 341). This means that by putting an issue into a certain frame, there is only a limited ways it can be interpreted, and one can shape it to one’s own requirements (Hallahan, 2005).

Determining the Problem

Framing in politics works very similarly. Seeing as the political arena is a very competitive field regarding votes and support, the aim of framing is to obtain agreement from the audience. One can therefore talk about it as a “process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” (Nelson et al., 1997: 222). Thus, a politician will have to consider how best to get the message across, so as to convince the electorate about the importance of the given problem.

The perceived importance that the recipient places on the values or beliefs of the frame, and how it matches the individual's real-world experiences are for example considerations to take into account (Snow & Benford in McCammon, 2013). Hence, the political scientist Shanto Iyengar argues that "[a]t the most general level, framing refers to the way in which opinions about an issue can be altered by emphasizing or deemphasizing particular facets of that issue" (2005: 5). The politicians thus attempt to guide one's way of thinking by, for example, "highlighting certain features of the policy, such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values" (Chong & Druckman, 2007: 106). Therefore, when looking at statements, one must also recognize "the non-innocence of how 'problems' get framed within policy proposals" (Bacchi, 2000: 50), as the given frame may not only limit the understanding of an issue, but also limit the possible ways to act.

In order to identify the underlying thoughts of the policy creation process, Carol Bacchi has developed her own research approach to policies (2009). She calls it *What's the 'problem' represented to be?* (WPR) and it consists of six analytical questions for studying policies. Bacchi draws heavily on both Foucault's discourse analysis, but also the literature on framing, when analyzing how specific policies arise. Despite her approach being for *government* policies, there are elements of her methodology which will be utilized for the present research, as other political parties also make policy proposals and offer statements where their specific worldviews are visible.

One of her main contentions is that "it is inappropriate to see governments as responding to 'problems' that exist 'out there' in the community. Rather 'problems' are 'created' or 'given shape' in the very policy proposals that are offered as 'responses'" (2000: 48). Hence, one should conceive of problems as social constructions that reflect certain inherent understandings of the world (Bacchi, 2009: xvi). One should therefore look at the *problematizations*, and how certain issues are put forward as posing a problem to be dealt with, when discerning how a given policy or policy proposal has come about (2009: xii). However, Bacchi does not see policies as having been shaped with the aim of influencing public opinion, her approach should rather be employed "to identify deep conceptual premises operating within problem representations" (2009: xix). This implies that one should consider the assumptions and presuppositions about society which allowed for the creation of a particular meaning, which then again led to the development of a

given policy (2009: xix). These, she argues, could involve epistemological and ontological assumptions, which become “conceptual premises” or logics, including “deep-seated cultural values” (2009: xix). One should therefore also consider the ideological groundings of the party’s particular stance, as this will partly explain why a certain issue is seen as a problem.

Furthermore, Bacchi emphasizes the importance of considering the context in which the policy proposal has arisen. She finds it vital to have “a solid understanding of the background of the issue(s),” and how the issues relate to ongoing debates (Bacchi, 2009: 20). This is because discourses take “shape within specific historical and national or international contexts” (Shore and Wright in Bacchi, 2009: ix), that may also be represented in a revelatory way as regards the reasons for developing the problematization (Bacchi, 2009: 20). This could for example be the case with ‘globalization’; the perception of the implications of this specific process could reveal much about why and how a given ‘problem’ has been identified. Therefore, the analysis will also consider the specific context in which a policy proposal has arisen, and what implications this has.

Thus, for my analysis of the statements of the DPP and UKIP, I will use the first part of Bacchi’s analysis method. As I want to unravel how and why the two parties argue as they do, I will utilize the three first questions of her analytical framework. The last three of the six questions delve more into ways of criticizing the policy proposals, and the expected outcome and effects, and will therefore not be used here. I will thus concentrate on identifying:

- 1) What is the problem represented to be?
- 2) What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?
- 3) How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? (Bacchi, 2009)

The scholars Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) provide a similar approach to policy analysis in their research on collective action frames within social movements. They understand frames as “collections of idea elements tied together by a unifying concept that serve to punctuate, elaborate and motivate action on a given topic” (as cited in Creed et al., 2002: 37). There are three types of collections according to the two, namely *diagnostic framing*, *prognostic framing* and *motivational framing*, which are utilized by movement members to mobilize consensus and action.

Diagnostic framing is when the actors “negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change” and “make attributions regarding who or what is to blame” (2000: 615). Thus, it implies the identification of the problem, and who or what is to blame for its occurrence. Prognostic framing involves the possible solution to the problem, and which strategies to pursue in order to attain the goal. Solutions in regards to politics could for example be the introduction of more restrictive legislation or refusing new policy initiatives. The argumentation may also contain rebuttals, or *counterframes*, of the solutions offered by political opponents (2000: 617). Finally, motivational framing should be considered as a call to make people act, or to “urge others to act in concert to affect change” (2000: 615).

Even though this framework refers to the articulations of actors within social movements, I would contend that political parties make use of the same kind of frames when articulating their political stance. Benford and Snow state that social movements aim to “remedy or alter some problematic situation or issue” (2000: 616), which is exactly the same as political actors wish to do.

Combining the two outlined analytical approaches, it will be the task of the analysis of the DPP and UKIP’s policies to identify how they represent the problem and wish to solve it, by looking at:

- What is the problem represented to be?
- Which assumptions and presuppositions are behind the policy stance?
- Who or what is/are to blame for the problem?
- What is suggested as its solution?
- How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
- What course of action should be taken?

Using these sensitizing questions as my interpretative tool (Verloo & Lombardo in Dombos, 2012:7) will allow me to analyze what the specific stance is, how and why it has been identified by the messenger, and what is seen as its solution.

Linguistic Analysis Tools

In order to answer the questions outlined above, it will be of benefit to consider certain linguistic aspects of the texts as well. Scholars who have employed framing as their means of analysis have

argued that stylistic choices give a lot of information about the actual meaning of a text (see Lakoff, 2004).

Referring to media discourse, William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani found that frames may include metaphors, catchphrases, visual images and moral appeals. They state that these stylistic devices “suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole” (1989: 3). In other words; the use of for example a metaphor may be very revelatory as to the statement’s object. Moreover, George Lakoff also emphasizes the significance of metaphors in his work about politics in the United States. He gives the example of the term *tax relief* which the Conservatives successfully constructed and employed in their election campaign, as the associations accompanying the metaphor did not allow for effective counter-framing.

Moreover, the use of arguments appealing to moral sentiments is likely to be a visible component of the DPP’s statements, as has been shown in a previous study (Vigsø, 2012). Seeing as this line of reasoning is often employed by populist parties (Priester, 2012: 5), this is also likely to be the case for UKIP. To give an example, one can clearly see a moral appeal with regards to the so-called *welfare tourists*. Welfare tourism is a metaphor which refers to EU citizens, mainly Eastern Europeans, who are accused of only migrating to a country in order to claim the benefits that ought to belong to the nationals who have worked hard for it (Mahony, 2013). By using this particular term and definition, the messenger implies that the Eastern Europeans are doing something morally wrong as they exploit the welfare system.

In her work on policy analysis, Bacchi also outlines certain linguistic choices that can help explain the exact message. One of these is binaries, or dichotomies, such as national/international and worker/unemployed. By outlining an existing hierarchy between the two objects of a binary, a greater importance and value can be doted on one of them, and relationships which otherwise would be considered complex may be simplified (2009: 7). This, she states, will reveal if the messenger is attempting to conceal parts of our understanding of an issue. However, it can also be used to find out who is to blame for a given situation, and to whom the message actually is directed. Thus, in my analysis, I will also pay attention to the employment of linguistic devices that help give meaning to the text. They involve metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals and binaries.

I have now outlined my analytical framework, and I will use the defined analytical questions and tools in my analysis of the DPP and UKIP's party positions on the EU. In the chapter on the Euroscepticism concept (see p. 30), I will describe the frames that eurosceptic right-wing populist parties normally utilize in their arguments against the EU. I expect them to be amongst the frames that I will identify when reading through the data, and once the relevant data has been found, I can explore how the two parties frame their eurosceptic messages towards the public.

I will now explain the collection of empirical data, and how it will help me to reveal how the two parties, UKIP and the DPP, are arguing for their particular policy stances on the question of the EU.

3.3 Empirical Data

As I wish to carry out the research through a meticulous analysis of the identified data, I will follow the advice of the sociologist Hank Johnston (as cited in Vallaste, 2009: 144), and keep the material to be analyzed at a limited level, in order to permit for a thorough exploration. However, I still have to find enough data to distinguish the two parties' current main frames in regards to the EU. My data will therefore include both party material, but also data from the public debate, as this is likely to be the place where the parties express the stances related to the 2014 EP elections the most elaborately.

The two parties have very different data available regarding their political viewpoints. The Danish People's Party's webpage (www.danskfolkeparti.dk) is full of information about the party and its policy positions, and it contains several documents and brochures outlining both its domestic and European policies. UKIP's offered data (www.ukip.org) is much more limited, but it does include manifestos and party stances, yet only for the European and Local elections.

Despite the differences in obtainable information, I was still able to find relatively similar material for the two parties. As I wish to analyze the specific viewpoints of the two parties, I want to find documents expressing their current policy positions on the EU. Here, a party's work program is very useful, as it explains the party's goals with its policies, and what it intends to do to attain them. Therefore, I have decided to make use of the DPP's section on the European Union in the party's 2009 *Work Program (Arbejdsprogram)* (Appendix 1), as this is where the party explains its stance on the EU the most thoroughly. However, UKIP does not have an equivalent document

available. It did recently publish its *European Manifesto* though (Appendix 2), which will also be useful to examine, due to its nature as “an organizational statement of parties’ positions prior to elections” (Statham et al., 2010: 247). Party manifestos and programs have been criticized for not providing information about the specific ideology of a party (Mudde, 2002). However, as my main aim is to deduce what the two parties *currently* see as pertinent policy issues, party programs will live up to this, as they are argued to be “one of the best sources of party positioning and saliency of issues” (Meret, 2010: 50).

The two identified party documents (Appendix 1 and 2) will provide the more overall and party official level policy positions. However, it is probable that the policy issues from the work paper and the manifesto does not become part of the public mobilization or contestation of the two parties (Statham et al., 2010: 247), and other material is therefore required for the analysis. Furthermore, as I wish to find out what arguments they are employing to convince the electorate presently, it will be of benefit to study newsletters or party updates that outline the current policy concerns of the parties. Moreover, as “issues are made publicly visible to citizens” through the media (Statham et al., 2010: 246), this is also a good place to look for material.

As the EP elections are coming up fairly soon (end May 2014), there is now a wide variety of material available in regards to the actual EU debate. This not only includes TV and newspaper interviews, statements and debates, but also social media entries, such as those on Facebook. Both parties are in fact extremely active on Facebook, and particularly their leading EU candidates, Nigel Farage and Morten Messerschmidt, regularly post updates about their electoral campaigns and political viewpoints. Yet, as I wish to use the data that most coherently expresses the party’s viewpoints, I have decided to disregard the social media. Newspaper articles could provide some insight to the parties’ particular stances, but as journalists also frame topics in certain ways (see for example Scheufele, 1999), the research could be impeded. I will therefore also not employ newspaper material.

For the DPP, I have decided to use the party’s *Weekly Letters* or *newsletters* (*Ugebreve*) which are written by the party leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, and are available on the party’s webpage (<http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Ugebrev>). In these letters (Appendix 3-10), Thulesen Dahl outlines the party’s key issues for the given week, and what it wishes changed with the situation. This is

what makes them particularly useful for this study. Yet, seeing as the DPP also is very actively involved in politics at the domestic level, a part of the letters will not be relevant for this study, as they pertain to the national arena. Moreover, as previously explained (see p. 6), I have decided to narrow the period under scrutiny down to January 2014 to April 2014. Furthermore, whereas these documents explain the party's explicit stance on certain issues, there are also other areas in the debate that need addressed. I have therefore decided to include an interview of Morten Messerschmidt conducted by David Trads, the host of the Danish TV2 program *By Trads (Hos Trads)* from March 22nd, 2014 (Appendix 11)⁴. During the interview, Messerschmidt presents the DPP's stance on the EU, and it is therefore useful data to supplement the newsletters with. The inclusion of the views of both the DPP's party leader, Thulesen Dahl, and its leading candidate to the EP, Messerschmidt, will also allow for a deeper insight into the party's exact EU policy at present.

The material that I employ for the analysis of UKIP differs slightly from that of the DPP. UKIP does not have an equivalent to the DPP's newsletters, and, as already explained, the party webpage is sparse and inadequate with information about its current activities, particularly on the EU. However, Nigel Farage, who is both party leader, and the party's leading candidate for the EP elections, has been very active in giving public speeches and participating in televised debates on the question of the EU. Thus, the analysis of UKIP's position will consider four of the party leader's debate appearances, namely: a speech and Q&A session given at the London School of Economics (*These European Elections Matter*) (Appendix 11)⁵, a speech at a public meeting at UKIP's Party Conference in Torquay (Appendix 12)⁶, and the two highly publicized debates between Farage and Nick Clegg, the party leader of the Liberal Democrats, a pro-EU British party (Appendix 13-14)⁷. Even though some parts of the speeches do not relate to UKIP's European policies, the combination of these four performances provides a very good overview of UKIP's particular EU-stance, and how Farage frames it to the audience.

⁴ Available from: <https://nyhederne.tv2.dk/politik/2014-03-22-hos-trads-%E2%80%99eu-er-jo-g%C3%A5et-amok%E2%80%99>

⁵ Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRV03e-rXGI>

⁶ Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qdSIXeQZmNc>

⁷ Available from: <http://www.lbc.co.uk/watch-lbc-leaders-debate-live---26th-march-87667> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fd9rsmD4HiM>

Whilst having decided on this material selection as I believe that it will provide a holistic picture of the two parties' EU policies, it must of course also be acknowledged that it can "only partly measure what parties publicly articulate" (Adam & Maier, 2011: 438). Therefore, one could have identified much more material where the two parties' opinions are voiced, for example campaign material, as it is also very revelatory as to the core messages of a party, and therefore highly beneficial to analyze (Adam & Maier, 2011: 438). However, no EP elections material had appeared from either of the two parties in time for an inclusion in the analysis. What is more, they had also not been published at the time when the opinion polls started showing that the two parties were expected to do extremely well at the upcoming elections, and therefore it must be other sources that have informed the electorate.

Furthermore, when conducting the analysis, I will of course do my utmost to remain unbiased and value-free in my deductions and inferences, as this is what a reliable researcher should do. It is very hard to be completely unbiased though, due to the subjective nature of the human mind. I will, however, take my precautions, and for example refrain from evaluating the policy positions based on my own political convictions, and instead acknowledge that there are multiple ways of perceiving the world (Guba, 1994: 25). When possible, I will also support my analytical deductions with scholarly literature, and generally ensure that I use trustworthy sources as my references.

Chapter 4: The Concept of Euroscepticism

As explained in the introductory part of this thesis (see p. 9), UKIP and the DPP have both been characterized as eurosceptic right-wing populist parties. The two terms *right-wing* and *populist* have already been accounted for (see p. 4). This section will therefore first provide a definition of the term *Euroscepticism*. Thereafter, I will determine where Euroscepticism is found on the political spectrum, with a special focus on the right-wing. This will lead into a discussion of the specific issues, or *frames*, employed by the eurosceptic right-wing populist parties to argue for their position on the EU. As will be further elaborated upon, these are: national sovereignty, anti-immigration, economic concerns, democratic deficit and anti-establishment sentiments.

Hence, in the following chapter, I will begin by explaining Euroscepticism as understood and analyzed in the scholarly literature.

4.1 The Term *Euroscepticism*

In this section, I will introduce and define the term *Euroscepticism*, and how it has been categorized, investigated and understood in regards to the tendencies witnessed across the European continent. The literature on this term is continuously evolving, especially in the prelude and aftermath of European elections. Particularly the definition of the concept Euroscepticism, and the different degrees to which it can be found, have been controversial issues amongst scholars (see for example Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Sczcerbiak & Taggart, 2002 and Ray, 2004).

Euroscepticism is a widely studied facet of the European Union, partly because of the effects that an increased skepticism towards the EU may have on the European political landscape at large, if it should become an overarching sentiment. The term is a coinage of two separate parts, “euro” and “scepticism”, where the former refers to Europe or European integration, and the latter to “an attitude of doubt or a disposition of disbelief” (Hooghe & Marks, 2007: 119). Hence, the term broadly refers to citizens, political parties, movements or groups, who demonstrate concerns in regards to the EU-system, the EU’s political and institutional organization, its policies and/or its elected politicians.

Paul Taggart was among the first scholars to analyze the occurrence of Euroscepticism in party politics. In his seminal article *A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western*

European party systems, Taggart defined Euroscepticism as “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (1998: 366). However, this definition was quickly discarded by other scholars as being too broad, as it did not consider the different kinds of scepticism, and only entailed outright opposition (Fuchs et al., 2009: 20). Taggart had in fact acknowledged this latter part of the criticism in 1997, where he stated that: “All opponents of the EU are, at least, skeptical, but not all skeptics are opponents” (Taggart, 1997: 4). Thus, a differentiation should be made between those parties that wish for their country to outright leave the EU, and those that simply voice concern about certain aspects of European integration.

This distinction was further developed by Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak in 2002, who argued that parties could either have a *hard* or a *soft* eurosceptic stance (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). Their initial definitions of the two terms received a substantial amount of critique; it was for instance argued that they needed to be narrower in their scope, and that the difference between the two sides had to be clearer (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: 300). They therefore rephrased the definitions in 2008, and stated that:

hard euroscepticism is a *principled opposition* to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being *opposed to the whole project of European integration* as it is currently conceived (2008: 2, emphasis added).

Soft euroscepticism, on the other hand, does not involve a principled objection to the EU, but the parties in this category express concern about one or more of the policy areas, and this “leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU” (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008: 2). Moreover, it can also be expressed by the feeling that the ‘national interest’ does not correlate with the direction the EU is taking.

As its main *raison d’être* is for the UK to leave the EU, UKIP is clearly a hard eurosceptic party, and it has been so ever since its creation in 1993. The DPP, on the other hand, has a soft eurosceptic stance. In the late 1990s, it actually wanted Denmark to leave the EU, but changed this into a more moderate stance, in order to gain governmental influence. Now it just calls for the European integration process to slow down (Meret, 2010). The two parties’ viewpoints will become clearer in the analysis below.

Even though the differentiation between soft and hard Euroscepticism is widely recognized as providing an encompassing explanation of the various eurosceptic stances, and therefore often is employed as the measure for defining different parties (see for example Quaglia, 2013 and Ray, 2007), other scholars have also created frameworks for analyzing opinions on the EU. Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002: 300), for example, proposed a division that includes all parties, notwithstanding whether they support or oppose European integration. Thus, they analyzed parties' stances on the idea of the EU's European integration, and their level of support for its practice. This led to a differentiation between four different types of parties, namely *Euroenthusiasts*, who favor integration and further extensions of EU's supranational powers, *Europragmatists* (anti-integration, but favor extensions), *Eurosceptics* (pro-integration, but against extensions) and *Eurorejects* (against both integration and further extensions) (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002). Applying this framework to the two parties of the current study, one would find the DPP under the Eurosceptics, whereas UKIP would be amongst the Eurorejects.

Now that the varying degrees of euroscepticism have been explained, the focus will be turned towards the different groups of eurosceptic parties.

4.2 Eurosceptic Parties

Historically, Euroscepticism has always existed in the European Community. In the early days, it was limited to an opposition to market integration, but with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the European *Union*, the levels of scepticism mounted, as an increased amount of parties started opposing the European integration (Taggart, 1997: 4). This was because the Treaty increased the supranational powers of the EU, something which was seen as an infringement on the national sovereignty by several political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2007: 121).

However, it is not very easy to establish where exactly on the political spectrum so-called eurosceptic parties are to be placed, because there are several exceptions to each finding (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). Yet, beginning with the observations that Paul Taggart made in his article mentioned above, it can broadly be stated that euroscepticism is found on the outskirts, or periphery, of the Western party systems (1998: 383, see also Ray, 2004)⁸. Furthermore, in the

⁸ This thesis focuses on Western European Euroscepticism. For information about Eastern Europe, please refer to Kopecký & Mudde, 2002.

same article, Taggart identified eurosceptic stances within the following party categories: single-issue, protest, established, and factions within parties. Single-issue parties “exist only to express euroscepticism and to mobilise electors on the European issue” (Taggart, 1997: 11). Today, this party group includes the Danish *People’s Movement against the EU* (*Folkebevægelsen imod EU*). In the UK, the UKIP started off as a single-issue party, but with time, and especially since Nigel Farage became leader in 2006, the party has developed a party program which also includes national topics (Usherwood, 2010).

This latter point infers that some scholarly literature is too essentialist in its statements, as it does not take the parties’ potential shifts in ideology, party family, or developments in its life-course, into account, but instead assumes a static stance. Moreover, a party might also change its position due to the wish of obtaining more political influence, as has been witnessed by the DPP (see Meret, 2010). This makes it more difficult to make general observations on Euroscepticism, as the nature of the parties is ever evolving. Yet, Taggart’s findings still give quite a good indication of the current party groups that express anti-EU sentiments.

Thus, Taggart continues by defining established parties as (previous) government parties or “parties that have attempted to promote themselves as worthy of support because of their proximity to the governmental parties” (Taggart, 1998: 368). Several theories exist as to why these parties take on eurosceptic stances, and scholarly attention has focused much on the relationship between the government and the opposition. Nick Sitter, for example, argues that both may take on soft eurosceptic stances as part of their strategy towards their opponent (Fuchs et al., 2009: 14). However, there is one established party which continuously is found to be eurosceptic, namely the British Conservatives (Hooghe & Marks, 2007: 122).

Moreover, certain established parties have factions that feel skeptic about the EU. Here again, the British Conservatives is a good example: It should be considered a soft eurosceptic party, yet it has members that take hard eurosceptic stances (Lynch & Whitaker, 2013: 286). Yet, as already explained in the literature review of the EP elections (see p. 14), established parties normally refrain from voicing their outright support or opposition to the EU, as they worry about the reactions from the electorate.

Protest parties, on the other hand, oppose how the general political system works, and are also referred to as anti-establishment parties, as they “both reject and stand outside the established group of (usually governmental) parties” (Taggart, 1998: 368). They may have an anti-EU stance, but it is often not the main contestation of the party (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 12). Some argue that these parties are opportunists, who choose a eurosceptic stance in order to gain protest votes (Zapryanova and Abbarno, 2013: 9).

Today, the most ardent eurosceptic parties are still most commonly found on the outskirts of the political spectrum, be it left or right, and often counting examples such as communist, green, populist and far-right parties (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011: 363). Broadly speaking, one can say that the left-wing parties have generally contested the market-neoliberal positions of the EU, and the effects this has on social policies and consequently people (Heinen & Hartleb, 2014: 6), whereas the right-wing parties increasingly demonstrate concern about the national sovereignty questions arising from closer integration (Ray, 2004).

Scholarly exploration of the various party stances in the Western European EU member states has found that most eurosceptic parties nowadays are to be found on the right side of the political spectrum, as leftist parties are becoming increasingly moderate on their EU stance (Ray, 2014). This trend, and the fact that eurosceptic right-wing populist parties are expected to gain more votes than previously in the upcoming elections (EuropeanVoice, 2014), two of these parties, UKIP and the DPP, are going to be the focus of this thesis. The remaining part of this conceptual framework will therefore consider the literature on the party group.

4.3 Political Issues Leading to Eurosceptic Stances

It has now been established how the term euroscepticism is defined, its various degrees of expression, and where it is found on the political spectrum. This section will consider the topics, or frames, through which the eurosceptic populist right-wing parties are known to voice their particular critique of the EU. As UKIP and the DPP belong to this party group, it can be assumed that their arguments also will surround these frames, yet this is of course not necessarily the case.

Threat to National Sovereignty

Most right-wing populist parties previously saw the European integration in a relatively positive light, but their EU stance began changing in 1992 with the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (Mudde, 2002). As the EU member states increasingly pooled their national sovereignty on several economic and social issues, the EU has obtained a high degree of supranational power, and this is seen as a threat to the national sovereignty of the member states.

In order to understand why the populist right-wing parties feel a threat from the EU in this regard, it is important first to understand how they perceive the nation. To them, the nation is idealized, and made to become, in the words of Taggart, a kind of “heartland” in which “a virtuous and unified population resides” (as cited in Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5). This makes them argue in exclusionary terms, where they perceive of “others” as posing a threat to the “warm” and “safe” place that is the nation-state (Bauman as cited in Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5).

This particular take on nationalism is also referred to as “sovereignism” in regards to the relationship to the EU, as they call for a return of the national sovereignty which the EU is accused of having taken (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 5). Therefore, they voice an objection to the EU’s infringement by “recalling a time when the state [...] was able to bring its own solutions” (Levrat, 2013: 16). This is particularly expressed through a refusal of the EU’s perceived infringement on the state’s distinct policies (Katz in Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008: 3). Thus, the opposition to this alleged infringement should be seen as a way to restore the sense of “heartland”.

Democratic Deficit

The argument of the EU suffering from a democratic deficit is also a commonly heard critique from the eurosceptic right-wing populist parties (Surel, 2011: 3). Yet, when it comes to explaining wherefrom this questioning of the EU’s democratic credentials derive, there is some disagreement. Some argue that the parties see the EU as “an exogenous political system, controlled by a mostly technocratic elite and lacking the legitimacy conferred by universal suffrage” (Levrat, 2013: 16). This reference to the EU being “exogenous” is in line with the above mentioned idealization of the nation-state. Others hold that the parties’ criticism of the EU should

be perceived as a projection of the discontent mainly addressed at domestic elites and institutions (Krouwel & Abts in Hooghe & Marks, 2007:124).

The sentiment is expressed in several ways and towards several entities related to the EU, namely:

- 1) the more overall notion of the EU-system, its structure and procedures;
- 2) the EU institutions;
- 3) the EU-representatives and the European elite;
- 4) the national politicians and elites.

On a more general level, the EU's functioning as a political system is criticized for its procedures, which are regarded as too bureaucratic (Taggart & Szczerbak, 2002: 8) and cumbersome, particularly in regards to the legislative output (Surel, 2011). The centralization of the EU is also objected, as the sense has arisen that "political decisions have been (and continue to be) removed from the national arena and democratic control" (Ivarsflaten & Gudbrandsen, 2013: 3).

Moreover, much concern is directed at the effects that the lacking democratic credentials of the EU has on the national electorates. This is due to the parties' populist notion that a democratic organization should espouse "closeness to the people" (Hartleb, 2011: 40). The European citizens are argued to be prevented from participating in the formulation of policies (Zapryanova & Abbarno, 2013: 5). This view is partly due to the limited amount of elections on EU questions, but also because of the perceived distance between the EU and the common citizens. The lack in elections has thus led many parties to question the accountability of the EU, particularly since most of the EU-representatives are unelected (Zapryanova & Abbarno, 2013: 6).

These EU "bureaucrats" are criticized for being elitist (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 19). Furthermore, the term *eurocrat* is frequently employed in a little flattering way by the eurosceptic parties to denounce the activities of those exercising "control" over the European integration process (Taggart, 1997: 17). The national politicians, on the other hand, are often "portrayed as submitted conveyors of European anti-national dictates" (Meret: 2010: 77).

Threat of Immigration

In line with the above defined nationalist stance of the populist right-wing parties, they also express fears about the increased levels of immigration to the EU, as the EU's rule of free movement and the Schengen Accords permit for an easier entrance into EU-countries, both from other member states and outside of the EU (Surel, 2011). The right-wing populist parties do not wish for this occurrence, as they have an exclusionary take on populism (Priester, 2012), so they stress "the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments" (Jagers & Walgrave, 2013: 1). Often they also create a dichotomy between "us" (the national population) and "them" (others, such as (Muslim) immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities) (Betz as cited in Grabow & Hartloeb, 2013: 18).

Arguments along these exclusionary lines are increasingly being voiced in regards to the EU, as further European integration is perceived as posing a cultural threat to the nation states. Hence, the parties fear that the increased immigration levels may lead to multicultural societies, which could destroy the national identity. Yet, today, with the entrance of thirteen new member states since 2004, the critique is increasingly heard in regards to the economic threat that immigrants pose on the state's economy, in terms of the "granting of rights and social services to immigrants" (Surel, 2011: 4). Some parties thus accuse the immigrants of "exploiting the domestic welfare state [...] without any intention of taking care of themselves or 'of integrating' into the host society" (Grabow & Hartleeb, 2013: 18). This has also led to an eruption in welfare chauvinist arguments, which evolve around the idea that the "the fruits of the national economy should first and foremost (if not exclusively) come to the benefit of their 'own people'" (Mudde, 2002: 174).

Thus, in short, the right-wing populists "indict European integration for facilitating the erosion of the cultural and economic well-being of the host nation" (Abbarno & Zapryanova, 2013: 583), but also for the EU "showing itself incapable of responding to the threats which weigh on nation states" (Surel, 2011: 4).

Economic Concerns

Another issue which also raises concerns by the populist right-wing parties is the effects that an EU membership has on the economy of the member states (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 19). This topic is particularly relevant presently, where many European countries still are recuperating from the economic crisis that hit the continent in the mid-2000s (Abbarno & Zapryanova, 2013: 585).

One identified problem is thus the implications of having to share some economic policies with the other members of the EU. Thus, depending on the economy of the party's country, this critique is either directed at the stringent conditions that the EU impose when a state needs financial aid, or at the amount of money required to bail out other states (Abbarno & Zapryanova, 2013: 586).

Moreover, some parties oppose the membership costs of the EU, but also EU's own expenditure, and how it "consumes vast sums of money on its own but does not care for the real needs of the net contributors, that is, the people" (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 11). The EU's interference in the member state's economic policies had also been criticized (Abbarno & Zapryanova: 2013: 586).

Anti-Establishment

Anti-establishment sentiments are often voiced by right-wing populist parties, and are directed at both the political and economic elite (Schedler, 1996: 293), who are "accused of being completely remote from the lives of 'ordinary citizens' and of living in cosy, but insular, elite cartels" (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 15). Their oppositions with the establishment can for example be expressed through denouncements of the societal inequality, the deficits in participation, and the bad conduct of political institutions and their actors. Thus, the parties that express these concerns often act as the citizens' mouthpiece (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 15).

The most frequently identified concerns by eurosceptic right-wing populist parties have now been established. They involve: the desire to preserve the nation's sovereignty; a critique of the democratic deficit of the EU and its institutional set-up; the cultural and economic threat that immigrants are perceived to pose; a concern about the power that the EU has over the member states' economy; and, finally, an anti-establishment sentiment. Seeing as UKIP and DPP belong to the category of eurosceptic right-wing populist parties, it is highly likely that they will hold positions related to these issues, but potentially also to others.

Chapter 5: The Party Policies of the DPP and UKIP

5.1 Analysis Structure

In order to explore how UKIP and the DPP articulate their specific EU positions, the analytical tools identified in the section on framing analysis will be employed (see p. 20). In the investigation, it will be discovered how the identified problems are represented, who are to blame for the problem, which assumptions that lie behind the given positions, how the problems came about, how the problems should be solved, and which actions the electorate is encouraged to take. When searching for the answers to these questions, it is useful to identify whether there are catchphrases, moral appeals, metaphors, visual images and binaries, as they can reveal much about the intention of a statement.

First, the relevant parts of the empirical data must be identified. I will thus look at the DPP and UKIP's respective party documents, the *Work Program* (Appendix 1) and the *European Manifesto* (Appendix 2), and the political debates within their countries. The two party documents differ in both contents and lengths, and there is a five year gap between the publications. Yet, both account for their parties' intentions with the policy proposals, and allow for a comparison. Moreover, UKIP's manifesto was written during the same time as the election debate on the EU had started, and therefore contains very similar arguments as those employed by Farage during the discussions. Yet, there are also divergences, which the analysis will show.

As to the election debates data, the DPP's material consists of Thulesen-Dahl's *Newsletters* (Appendices 3-10) and Messerschmidt's interview with David Trads (Appendix 11), and UKIP's is Farage's speech at the LSE (Appendix 12), his speech at UKIP's Party Conference (Appendix 13), and the two televised debates with Nick Clegg (Appendices 14-15). The party documents and the data from the debates will thus be merged in the analysis.

Regarding the frames employed, I already established that the two parties are eurosceptic right-wing populist parties. Earlier (see p. 37), I assumed they would argue along similar lines as other parties found within this category, and this also turns out to be the case. Both the arguments of the DPP and UKIP evolve around the frames of *Threat to National Sovereignty*, *Threat of Immigration*, *Economic Concerns*, *Democratic Deficit* and *Anti-Establishment*.

The analysis will thus be conducted in the following manner: the two parties' historical positions on the EU will first be outlined. Then the actual analysis follows, in which the five frames will act as the headings for each section, and then be analyzed. Each section will contain first the DPP's stance, then UKIP's, and then a comparison of their stances in regards to that particular frame. The comparison will reveal whether they have similar political positions on the question of the EU or not, both in regards to the problems identified, and their solutions. After the last frame has been explored, an overall comparison will follow, followed by a discussion, and finally the conclusion.

5.2 The Two Parties' Historical Positions on the EU

This section will reveal that whereas the DPP's stance on the EU has changed substantially since its creation in 1995, UKIP's strong EU opposition has remained virtually unchanged.

DPP

The DPP has been skeptical of the EU since the party's creation in 1995 (Meret, 2010). Its predecessor, the *Danish Progress Party*, actually set out being favorable of the European cooperation, seeing the common market as a necessity for Danish prosperity (Meret, 2010: 136). Yet, as the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 would change the cooperation from a community to a *Union*, the EEC was seen as too bureaucratized, and too intrusive on the national sovereignty of the member states (Meret, 2010: 136).

This sentiment was carried forward by the DPP, and the ardent wish to protect the nation-state initially made the DPP a "strong opponent" of the EU (DPP, 1998). Yet, as the party wanted to gain influence in the Danish parliament (2001-2011), it moderated its stance (see Meret, 2010). Hence, despite the DPP still opposing the EU, it agreed to the Danish EU membership, and began refusing the prospect of a European *Political Union* instead (DPP, 2006). Thus, it insists that EU policies should only involve areas such as trade, the environment and technical cooperation (DPP, n.d.), whilst the member states must maintain their sovereign voices on issues such as foreign policy and finances. The DPP thus espouses "an anti-integrationist position aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty" (Meret, 2010: 139).

UKIP

UKIP derives from the *Anti-Federalist League* that opposed the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (Hayton, 2010: 27). Thus, from its inception, the single-issue party UKIP opposed the British EU membership, a position it has kept till today. Its *Party Manifesto* of 1997 states that the party is “Britain's only mainstream, democratic party committed to withdrawing the United Kingdom from the European Union and replacing membership by a free-trade agreement” (UKIP, 1997: 1). This standpoint was, and still is, based on an opposition to the bureaucratic and undemocratic nature of the EU, the cost of membership and the loss of national sovereignty that a membership implies. However, its main proposition is that the UK would be a stronger international economy, if it was independent of the EU.

Unlike the DPP, UKIP has been very consistent in its opposition to the EU. This can partly be explained by UKIP not having pursued the same extent of governmental influence as the DPP, but mainly focused on its EU-policy. Therefore it has not felt the same need to moderate its policies.

5.3 Analysis of the 2014 Party Positions of the DPP and UKIP

The EP elections took place on the 22nd and 25th of May, 2014 in the UK and Denmark respectively. The election debates began late January, early February in both countries, and have largely surrounded intra-EU immigration. In the following analysis, each individual frame will be looked at in the following order: *Threat to National Sovereignty*, *Threat of Immigration*, *Economic Concerns*, *Anti-Establishment* and finally, *Democratic Deficit*.

5.3.1 Threat to National Sovereignty

As explained in the conceptual framework (see p. 35), due to the right-wing populist parties' conception of nationalism, they have voiced concern about the EU's perceived infringement on the nations' sovereignty. This is also the case for both the DPP and UKIP. As will be shown, both parties see a problem in the EU's moves towards *ever closer Union*. Yet, whereas UKIP wishes to solve the problem by withdrawing the UK from the EU, so that it can pursue its own, independent trade deals, the DPP favors a 'multi-track Union', where the countries can freely choose the EU initiatives in which they wish to participate.

DPP

The DPP's opening statement in its *Work Program* (Appendix 1) is that it supports an "[o]pen and democratic cooperation between free and independent countries in Europe" (Appendix 1: 1). The wish for the countries to be "free and independent" is the key for understanding the party's EU stance, because the DPP problematizes the EU's increasing influence on the member states' sovereignty and decision-making processes. It could in fact be argued to be the party's main contention with the EU, when considering the data. This problem representation has come about due to the party's nationalist stance. The DPP adheres to the parties that want a return of the aforementioned "heartland" (see p. 35), and this is clearly visible in its emphasis on the Danish history and cultural heritage. An example of this is the party's election video of 2011, where the Danish nation's historical roots and values are seen as being uniquely Danish, and idealized (DPP, 2011). The DPP wants to protect this vision of Denmark, and therefore sees the EU as a threat to Danish sovereignty.

This problematization is visible in the party's worries about EU immigration. Here, it questions how much the Union actually should be allowed to interfere in the Danish welfare state (Appendix 11: 2), and the EU is blamed for making "a targeted attack on the Danish and other countries' social order" and for wanting to "undermine" the member states' rules (Appendix 8: 1). The member states are thus assumed to be incapable of doing anything against it, as they have ceded their power to the organization.

In 2009, the fear of losing sovereignty to the EU already made the DPP worry that the next step in the integration process would be a federal union (Appendix 1: 1). This concern was enforced by Vice-President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, in 2014, as she stated that the EU should endeavor to become the "United States of Europe", to ensure European unity and peace (Waterfields, 2014). This idea is highly problematized by both Messerschmidt (Appendix 11: 1) and Thulesen Dahl (Appendix 9: 1). A more centralized EU; "[w]here ever more things must be decided at the EU-level instead of in the individual nations" (Appendix 9: 1) is thus rejected. Instead, so Messerschmidt argues, "we must push some of the EU out of Denmark, so that the Danish Parliament (*Folketinget*) gets more influence" (Appendix 11: 3).

The DPP indirectly blames the entire EU-system for the current direction towards deeper integration, but also very directly criticizes the EU for not listening to those who raise questions regarding its increase in supranational powers. Instead, the EU “attacks” those who wish to “roll back the power that the EU gradually has taken” (Appendix 5: 1). This is seen as problematic, as “the EU-system ought to know that the EU exists on the basis of, and because of the citizens of the nation-states, and not the other way around” (Appendix 5: 1).

Besides blaming the EU, the DPP also castigates the Danish governing party, the *Social Democrats*. The party is accused of thinking that more power to the EU is the solution to all problems, whilst being “blind to [the fact] that precisely too much power to the EU is the actual reason for the very same problems” (Appendix 6: 1). The DPP therewith blames the government for willingly giving away Danish sovereignty to the EU.

Multi-Track Europe

To solve the problem of the EU’s increase in supranational power, and the further movements towards a European Federation, the DPP wants to curb the EU’s powers. In the *Work Program*, the DPP argues that the EU should only solve tasks that either: the majority of the European citizens wish solved by the EU; are necessitated due to their border-crossing nature; or would be advantageous to solve together because of economies of scale (Appendix 1: 1). Yet, the party also concedes that certain central EU areas should be kept, namely the free trade area, the customs union and the common technical minimum standards (Appendix 1: 1). As the EU’s powers go beyond that today, this statement implies that the party wishes the EU cooperation to be backtracked.

The party acknowledges that some countries, particularly those in the euro-zone, may want closer cooperation than hitherto, yet it should not be required for an EU membership. Instead, it will “show understanding of a European cooperation in several tracks” (Appendix 1: 2), where trade, the environment, and the technical cooperation is equal for all, but the members may join forces in other areas as well. The DPP suggests that the EU draws inspiration from the British Prime Minister, David Cameron’s, proposals on the subject (Appendix 7: 2): Originating at the EU Treaty discussions of 2011, Cameron has aired the idea of “revising the EU treaties to ‘repatriate’ powers

on social, employment and environmental legislation” (Waterfields, 2013). The solution thus entails a return of competences to the EU member states, and an option for the states to choose the initiatives in which they wish to partake.

As the DPP is a populist party calling for more direct democracy, it wants the Danish citizens to act by deciding what a Danish EU membership should look like (Appendix 11: 5). Moreover, Thulesen Dahl underlines the vitality of voting for parties of his conviction at the EP elections, as an EP “dominated by members, who wish the EU to be a sensible cooperation between sovereign states will act as a counterweight” to the federal ideas of the EU-representatives (Appendix 9: 1). Thus, the action required is to vote for the DPP, or similar parties. All of this should help ensure that the countries can remain “free and independent”.

UKIP

Just as the DPP, UKIP’s main problem with the EU is that the integration process has gone too far, as the EU has taken too much control of the country. UKIP represents the problem by arguing that the EU of today controls “areas we never thought imaginable” (Appendix 2: 4), and worrying about the EU’s movement towards “ever closer union” (Appendix 2: 4). Farage does acknowledge that it made sense for the UK to join the EEC in 1972 (Appendix 12: 1). Yet today, the EU is no longer “just the trading bloc we thought we signed up to” (Appendix 2: 4), as the cooperation is much more encompassing than in 1972.

Imposition of EU legislation

Thus, in the *European Manifesto*, UKIP problematizes the increasingly high level of EU legislation that the countries must adopt, referring to them as being an “imposition”, hence a burden, on the UK (Appendix 2: 4). An example of this impingement is about the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In line with UKIP’s general wish of harsher crime legislation (UKIP, 2014: 8), it is problematic that the UK was “forced” to sign up to the ECHR. Not only does it allow prisoners to vote (which UKIP is against), but it also prevents the UK from expelling convicted terrorists from the country (Appendix 2: 6). The party wants to solve this by withdrawing the UK from the EU, as the British Parliament then could introduce “fairer human rights laws” (Appendix 2: 6). With the word “fairer”, UKIP makes a moral appeal, and the EU sounds as the enforcer of unjust legislation, which can only be improved if the UK reclaims its sovereign rights.

Furthermore, UKIP looks at the EU's energy and environmental legislation with great concern. Verging on fear-mongering, the party lists EU law that could have dire environmental consequences for the UK (Appendix 2: 6). UKIP also predicts closures of the UK's oil and coal-fired power stations due to EU legislation, whilst job losses and environmental "disasters" in the coastal areas already occur. Moreover, the taxpayers would ultimately be hurt by the high implementation and subsidization costs. The solution to all of these problems is to "regain control" over the UK before it is too late (Appendix 2: 4). Leaving the EU would thus make it possible for the UK to "reclaim" its waters, abolish EU laws, and generally just ensure the pursuit of the population's best interests.

Just as the DPP, UKIP fears that these legislative takeovers will end in the EU becoming a federal state one day. The party also problematizes Reding's call for a "United States of Europe" (Appendix 2: 3), and the fact that "Europe is not a state; there is no desire anywhere in Europe for it to be a state" (Appendix 12: 4). With this, UKIP indirectly blames the EU for not considering the wishes of its citizens, as it ignores that the European "desire" of a Federation is non-existent.

UKIP holds the EU-system responsible for the current developments, as "the very concept of Europe has been taken and highjacked by those in Brussels for their own ends" (Appendix 12: 4). The UK's "hands" thus remain "tied" by the continued EU membership (Appendix 2: 4), as the EU hinders the UK from controlling its own country. The *Conservatives*, *Labour* and the *Liberal Democrats* are also blamed for supporting the EU's exercise of control over British politics (Appendix 2: 4).

As a solution to the problem of the UK's loss of control over its own legislation and decision-making powers, UKIP strongly advocates a British EU withdrawal. This should aid in "repairing" the UK, and "undoing the damage" that not only the EU has caused, but also the parties in the British Parliament, who did not end the EU's intrusions. Moreover, through the catchphrase "We want our country back" (Appendix 2: 3), UKIP furthers the urgency of a British EU departure, as it implies that the UK already has been taken over by the EU. UKIP's quest to leave the EU is also highly related to the party's vision of a UK independent of the EU.

The UK Outside of the EU

UKIP sees the EU membership not only as a problem for the UK's sovereign status, but also as one hindering the UK from becoming an important international power. This representation of the problem has come about due to the English nationalism to which UKIP adheres (Wellings, 2010). According to the political scientist Ben Wellings, the British EU membership in 1973 meant that parliamentary and popular sovereignty was both fused, and strengthened in importance. This eventually turned into hostility towards the idea of EU supra-nationality. Simultaneously, a feeling of nostalgia towards Britain's past of economic grandeur erupted, and 'Europe' began being seen "as the ultimate institutional expression of British and English decline" (Wellings, 2010: 488).

Thus, UKIP holds the EU-model to be a "hopelessly, desperately outdated, outmoded project" (Appendix 12: 11). Unlike the DPP, the party sees the EU's concept of a customs union as a 19th century construct, "based on building a club and protecting yourself against the rest of the world" (Appendix 15: 7). This is not seen as suitable for today's trade markets, and the EU is said to leave the UK "totally unfit to compete in a 21st century global economy" (Appendix 14: 9). UKIP assumes that the UK, unlike the EU, has good prospects for successful world trade, seeing as the country is the world's sixth largest economy (Appendix 2: 3). Yet, the EU membership makes the UK unable to negotiate its own, independent trade deals, as the EU acts as a unit when international trade deals are being negotiated, thereby inhibiting the UK's trade advancements (Appendix 15: 7). Farage assumes that many countries would be happy to negotiate with the UK outside of the EU (Appendix 14: 7), and it would permit the UK to negotiate "in the British interest", and not the EU's (Appendix 2: 6). A new trade approach is thus required, namely a "modern business approach, but one that is based on patriotic values" (Appendix 15: 1).

UKIP thus blames the EU for hindering Britain's global growth and grandeur, but also the British "career political class", which is representing a "tired status quo, defending a crumbling European Union that frankly isn't working anymore" (Appendix 14: 1).

In regards to the future UK-EU relations, UKIP does not assume that there is a risk of losing the EU as a trading partner, if the UK leaves the organization, as it is not in the EU's interest to lose the British market. This leaves the UK "in an incredibly strong position to negotiate an amicable exit and free trade deal under existing treaties" (Appendix 2: 4). Farage thus wants the UK and the EU

to continue to “trade and cooperate and be friends” with each other (Appendix 12: 11). Combined with his mention of the Swiss and Icelandic relationships with the EU (Appendix 15: 7), the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) seems like a potential solution for the party. In order to attain this goal, the action required is clear: the UK must have an In/Out Referendum, and the voters are strongly encouraged to vote for the latter (Appendix 12: 4).

Comparison

Despite having two very different reasons for opposing the EU’s increasing infringement on the member states, and thus also varying solutions to the problem, the DPP and UKIP problematize the issue remarkably similar. Both see a big problem in the EU’s increased interference in the national legislation of the member states, yet they represent the problem differently. Whilst the DPP argues that the EU is undermining national legislation, UKIP contends that the EU has taken over control of several aspects of British society. The problematization of the EU’s imposing supranationality is based in both parties’ assumption that the EU is becoming a federation. This would remove their countries’ self-determination, and this stands in staunch opposition to both of their nationalist stances.

Both parties thus vehemently dismiss the notion of the EU becoming a more political Union (Appendix 15: 1 and Appendix 11: 1). They both problematize that the EU seems to have taken over the reins of their countries, UKIP saying the control has been “highjacked” by the EU-representatives, and the DPP arguing that the EU believes it “knows best” in relation to policy, and “not the nation-states and their citizens” (Appendix 5: 1). Their ways of voicing the rejection of the federalization are quite different though. Messerschmidt, for example, simply states that the EU should not interfere in “finance policy, social policy, immigration policy, border controls and so on” (Appendix 11: 3). Farage, on the other hand, speaks much more forcefully, when encouraging the countries of Europe to “tear down these artificial structures and concepts of Europe that nobody has ever voted and no one wants for” (Appendix 12: 4). These two examples clearly show how the DPP’s rhetoric is constricted compared to UKIP’s, as it needs to maintain some positivity towards the EU, and cannot simply denounce the organization.

The problem of the EU’s increase in supranational powers is represented alike by the DPP and UKIP, when they argue about the size of the EU, and the incompatibility between the current

member states. They are both of the impression that the societal and economic differences between the 28 countries of today's EU are too big for the close cooperation to work. Messerschmidt explains that a closer Union is not the problem in itself, and could have worked, had the EU member states remained at the 15 of 1992 (Appendix 11: 4). Yet, as the EU now involves 28 countries with highly different social systems and labor markets, it is problematic that "we simultaneously have to have common rules in all areas" (Appendix 11: 4). Farage argues similarly when stating that the EU's rules about free movement "may have been okay when we were in with countries like [...] the Netherlands and France and Germany, with roughly similar living standards and hospitals and primary schools" (Appendix 14: 3). Thus, both parties hold that the EU enlargement does not correlate with the EU's policies.

Interestingly, both parties also problematize the idea of a European federation with a cultural argument. Messerschmidt refers to the cultural diversity of the Union citizens, and states that by moving towards a federation, the EU attempts "to remove those differences, which I actually find to be part of the beautiful thing about Europe, between the countries"⁹ (Appendix 11: 2). Farage similarly states that the "new sense of nationhood imposed [by the EU] against the will of diverse people" could lead to extreme nationalism and violence (Appendix 12: 6). Thus, none of the two identify a cultural, or national, unity across Europe, and instead argue that the nation-states should remain as they are.

The DPP's assumption about the EU not consisting of culturally equal countries has come about due to the DPP's perception of cultures as being unique, and worthy of protection from foreign influences (see Meret, 2010). UKIP's argument about the national diversity can also be explained by the party's particular take on nationalism. Thus, Farage states that UKIP is "unashamedly patriotic [...] we believe in this country, we have pride and self-respect in our nation, and we want to hand that down to our children and grandchildren" (Appendix 13: 3). Yet, the problematization remains: it would be wrong to remove the diversity of the EU member states, in order to create a federation.

⁹ forsøger at fjerne de forskelle, som jeg egentlig synes er noget af det smukke ved Europa mellem landene

The problem that the EU has taken over more and more control of the country is blamed on the EU by both parties. UKIP makes the organization sound as a villain with 'bad' intentions for the UK. The national politicians are also castigated for allowing the EU to become so intrusive, and for doing nothing to stop it. The DPP even argues that the *Social Democrats* have encouraged it. Yet, regarding the solution to the problem, the parties differ widely. UKIP calls for a British EU departure, so that the UK can regain control, and become a stronger economy, as it assumes that the UK will fare much better outside the EU. The DPP, on the other hand, wants to repatriate certain EU competences, and to introduce the option of opting out of the different EU initiatives.

These differing problem representations and solutions are due to their contrasting takes on nationalism. The DPP is mainly worried about preserving the Danish culture and historical values, and does not wish for the EU to destroy the cultural unity of the Danish state. UKIP, on the other hand, blames the EU for the demise of the UK's glory, and expects that leaving the EU will be prosperous for the country. However, both parties still find the trade deals between the member states to be beneficial for their countries. Yet, whereas UKIP's rhetoric infers that it wishes to become an EFTA member, the DPP wants Denmark to remain in the EU, seeing as it wants to stay in the customs union, an aspect which is not included in EFTA (EFTA, 2014). Moreover, whilst the DPP argues that Denmark's relations with the EU should not be a question of in or out, and Messerschmidt sees it as natural that the possibility of accommodating the EU-relations to the wishes of the nation exists (Appendix 11: 3). UKIP highly disagrees with this, and Farage does not see Cameron's proposal of returning power to the states as likely to succeed. This is both due to EU's rigidity on the topic, but also because Farage does not believe that Cameron actually intends to do as he says, since he so clearly wants the UK to remain in the EU (Appendix 12: 7).

The action to be taken is clear by both parties though; the citizens should make use of their electoral rights, and vote for either a British "Out" of the EU (UKIP), or parties questioning the EU's workings (DPP). The fact that both parties want more direct participation from the population clearly shows their populist natures, as they believe it ought to be the citizens themselves, who decide how their countries should be governed (see p. 4). The DPP even states that had the EU listened more to the citizens' concerns, the current EU crisis could have been avoided (Appendix 5:

1). UKIP is much more direct when stating that: “the best people to govern Britain is the British people themselves” (Appendix 14: 9).

These notions about the citizens’ direct participation in politics are also related to their critique of the democratic deficit within the EU. In fact, many of their arguments can be traced back to the problematization of the EU not being democratically representative. An example is the two parties’ criticism of the EU “imposing” its legislation on the member states without anybody being able to counter it, and what is worse, their national politicians seemingly not even wanting to. These issues will be further explored in the *Democratic Deficit* section, which will come at the end of the analysis, as many problematizations in the following sections can be traced to the democratic deficit perception.

5.3.2 Threat of Immigration

EU immigration is a topic that has made both parties strongly demand a return of the nations’ own decision-making powers. The European citizenship and the free movement of people within the EU mean that the member states have to treat the EU immigrants as national citizens in regards to social welfare. This has led several countries in Western Europe to question the EU’s power over the state’s welfare policies, and whether benefits should be available for EU immigrants (Milliken et al., 2014). The debate really set off in March, 2013, after ministers from Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK sent a letter to the European Commission expressing concern about some of their cities being put “under a considerable strain by certain immigrants from other member states” (EurActiv, 2013). Then, rather derogatorily, EU immigrants began being referred to as *welfare* or *benefit tourists* in both the media and by politicians (Mahony, 2013), implying that their sole purpose in going to another country was to make use of its welfare provisions.

Most of the problems identified by the DPP and UKIP in regards to EU immigration relate to the welfare provisions, and the economic strains the immigrants pose to the countries. This implies that the two frames of *Economic Concerns* and *Threat of Immigration* are present in the same argument. However, as the economic concerns were voiced in relation to discussions of immigration, they are included under this heading, despite actually pertaining to both. The debates in the two countries have thus evolved around the strains that EU immigration can cause

in relation to the economy and society at large. Yet, as the issue only has been debated within the last year, the DPP does not discuss it in its 2009 *Work Program*, but instead focuses on the EU's overall immigration policy towards people from third countries (i.e. non-member states).

DPP

Third Country Immigrants

In its 2009 *Work Program*, the DPP problematizes the EU's intake of third country immigrants (Appendix 1: 3-4). The DPP blames the European Commission for treating immigration as a sort of trade transaction, where the EU takes over "a share of the world's population surplus as a mixture of an economic and humanitarian project", in its quest to counter European labor shortage (Appendix 1: 3). The people arriving are thus argued to be dehumanized by the EU.

Moreover, the EU is also blamed for ignoring the migrants' "difficulties in adjusting to the culture and production of the given new society" (Appendix 1: 4). The DPP assumes that the immigrants might not be able to integrate into the host country. This particular way of representing the problem has come about due to the DPP's perception of immigration and culture. In short, the party wants to preserve the cultural uniqueness of peoples, and sees the meeting between "different cultures, which do not share the same principles, values and norms" as dangerous (Meret, 2010: 110). This danger perception becomes evident in the statement that the influx of immigrants could lead to a "destructive islamification (*islamisering*) of Europe" (Appendix 1: 4).

The party sees the EU's falling birthrates as its main reason for attracting foreign workers (Appendix 1: 4). The DPP proposes to solve the problem by making adjustments to existing policies, but also by having the EU member states make use of their own labor reserves. The countries that still would have a labor shortage should change their employment policy to a more "rational" one, based on the Northern European model (Appendix 1: 4). This should all help in limiting the numbers of immigrants to the EU.

EU Immigration

In the debates, the DPP does not argue against the intra-EU immigration in cultural terms. Instead, it has identified several other issues, which can all be traced back to its overarching problem, the

EU's open borders policy. Not only is the influx of immigrants perceived as a threat to the Danish welfare provisions (Appendix 8), and the Danish wage levels (Appendix 11), but the party also problematizes the rise in border-crossing crime (Appendix 3). Hence, the problem is not the culture of the immigrants, but their implications for the Danish welfare and societal models. The wishes to protect the Danish citizens and the welfare system, and to reduce crime are both key issues for the DPP (Meret, 2010), and partly explain why these issues are being problematized in the way that they are. The topic of EU immigration has thus become highly politicized by the DPP, and the issue is a reoccurring topic in the DPP's *Weekly Letters* (Appendices 3-10).

The DPP problematizes that the last two EU enlargement rounds have led to increased migrant numbers, and to ensuing strains on the public budgets and benefits, such as the State Educational Grant (*Statens Uddannelsesstøtte*) and the jobseekers allowance (*Dagpenge*) (Appendix 8: 1). The problem is worsened by the Eastern workers (*Østarbejderne*) providing an overall economic loss for the Danish state, despite this not being what the Danish Finance Ministry predicted (Appendix 7: 1). This does not surprise the DPP though, as it assumes that the lower wages and social provisions in Eastern Europe will make it very attractive to go to more generous welfare states, such as Denmark. Messerschmidt for example argues that "you come to Denmark and get child support paid for 2-3 children back in Bulgaria, well then you don't need a significant salary, because you can almost live for that!" (Appendix 11: 4). He thus presumes that all Eastern Europeans will act alike: come to Denmark, earn money, and ship it out of the country. A Dane, or Swede, as he continues (Appendix 11: 4), would not be able to live as comfortably in Denmark or Sweden whilst taking care of a family, as the money would not suffice. This turns the issue into one of fairness, as it is seen as unreasonable towards the Danes that a foreigner should be able to lead a comfortable life because the person can take the money elsewhere, whilst the Dane will stay in Denmark and struggle.

This directly relates to a second problematization, namely that of social dumping. As the Eastern European workers do not require as high wages to live comfortably, and thus can take the low-paid jobs, the DPP identifies the unemployed Danes as victims, as they are not able to compete (Appendix 4: 1). The problem is again represented as a matter of moral: It is not fair that a person from a poorer country can go to Denmark and pressure Danish wage levels. However, the Eastern

workers are not blamed for the problems. Instead, the Danish government is blamed for not taking the situation serious enough, and it is castigated for having downplayed the threats that the immigrants pose, and which now are beginning to be clear to all (Appendix 10: 1).

As a solution to the problems, the DPP proposes a Danish welfare policy opt-out. Messerschmidt outlines its wording: “Regardless of the provisions of the EU-treaties, Denmark can maintain Danish legislation on the allocation of Danish benefits, amongst these the qualifying principle¹⁰” (Appendix 11: 7). With this opt-out, Denmark would maintain its EU membership, protect its welfare provisions, and ensure that the ‘Eastern workers’ cannot exploit the Danish system. This proposal aligns with the DPP’s wish of the member state itself being able to choose the EU policies it wishes to take part in (see p. 44).

Finally, the DPP problematizes the rise in border-crossing crime due to the EU’s open borders policy (Appendix 3). The open border is assumed to be a “gift to the criminals” (Appendix 3: 1), as it makes it easier to commit crime in other countries. The party blames the introduction of Schengen for this, but also the Danish government, as it “quite irresponsibly obliterated the control which the DPP had gotten implemented” (Appendix 3: 1). The Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, is even accused of putting the EU’s demands before the security of the Danes, as “the Danes increasingly are subjected to border-crossing crime” (Appendix 3: 1). The DPP argues that given the good results when the *Liberal Party*-led government reintroduced the border controls in 2011 (Appendix 3: 1), the border controls are the best solution to the problem.

UKIP

As the topic of EU immigration featured very prominently in the British political debate in the months leading up to the EP elections (Milliken et al., 2014), many of UKIP’s arguments are found under this frame. Just as the DPP, the party strongly opposes the EU’s current immigration policy, as it leads to strains on both the welfare system and on public services, and to societal hardships for the British population. Yet, unlike the DPP, UKIP sees a clear way of solving the problems, namely to get the UK out of the EU, so that the border controls can be reinstated, and the UK can regain control over the immigrant numbers.

¹⁰ Uanset bestemmelser i EU-traktater kan Danmark opretholde dansk lovgivning om tildeling af danske ydelser, herunder optjeningsprincippet

A problem which is emphasized on several occasions by Farage is thus that an “unlimited” number of migrants can come (Appendix 2: 4). UKIP perceives the scale of EU migration to the UK to be out of control (Appendix 13: 2), seeing as not only people from *Eastern* Europe can come to the UK, but the borders are now open to 485 million Europeans, or the whole of the EU (Appendix 15: 4). Farage thus presumes that the people from the euro-zone countries who are “forced into poverty” will want to leave the area, leading to “a very big migratory wave from the Mediterranean into Britain over the next few years” (Appendix 15: 4). The problem is therefore that the UK might have to welcome an unprecedented amount of foreigners, as the inflow of people cannot be curbed and are seemingly limitless.

Like the DPP, UKIP thus also assumes that the higher living standards and welfare provisions of the UK will attract huge numbers, as: “You come here, the minimum wage is 9 times higher than it is in Romania, and within a few months you qualify for child benefit, for housing benefit, a health system that is infinitely better than the one at home, oh, and an education system for free for your children” (Appendix 13: 2). Like the DPP, UKIP makes it sound as if the immigrants just come for the benefits, and chose to go to the UK only because of them. Thus, “anyone in the EU can come to the UK and live, claim welfare and government services they have not contributed to” (Appendix 2: 4). The latter part of this statement situates the party amongst welfare chauvinists, as it does not want to share the state’s provisions with foreigners, as they are not seen as deserving it (see p. 38).

The problem of unlimited EU immigration is also partly represented to be the great challenges that the British working class are faced with. This group is assumed to suffer the most from EU immigration, as the influx correlates with already existent problems in the British economy. Thus, there is growing youth unemployment (Appendix 2: 4), and those employed are seen as in danger of either losing their jobs, or of having to accept lower wages. Hence, “for hundreds and thousands of people working in trades like the building industry, we’ve had a massive oversupply of labor, and you’ve seen your wages go down over the last ten years as the cost of living has gone up, and that is not fair for working people in this country” (Appendix 14:3). Thus, like the DPP, UKIP turns the problem into a moral appeal, as the party questions the fairness in people coming to the UK and further decreasing the living standards for parts of British society.

Interestingly, Farage continues this problematization by saying that a growing British white working class has appeared, “effectively as an underclass” (Appendix 15:5). This is because he worries about the effects of the open borders on British values in regards to the accommodation of foreigners: According to Farage, the UK has a historical “great record of racial harmony and integration” (Appendix 15: 5). It has thus “always been the most open-minded, the most accepting country of any other country in Europe [...]. But that has changed” (Appendix 12: 2). This change has occurred because the Eastern Europeans ‘push’ the British citizens into having to accept lesser means. Thus, Farage worries that a further inflow could lead the UK citizens to become exclusionary in their approach to immigrants.

Furthermore, as the high numbers of migrants will lead to a big increase in the UK population, it is assumed to put great strains on housing and public services, such as schools, the *National Health Service* (NHS), and even green spaces (Appendix 2: 4 and Appendix 15: 4). The party offers several possible solutions in order to alleviate these strains on British citizens. Social housing should for example only be offered to those people that have local family relations (Appendix 2: 6), thereby indirectly constricting immigrants from obtaining that particular offer.

The biggest blame for the problems is aimed at the government, which is accused of not having “lifted a finger to stop open door immigration of this scale” (Appendix 13: 2). The Conservatives *have* promised to introduce immigration targets, if they win the next elections (Barrett, 2014). Yet, this is seen as being “pointless” by Farage (Appendix 13: 2), as “[a]ll you are doing by having targets is conning the public that we actually have a degree of control over this” (Appendix 13: 2). Furthermore, the government is chastised for downplaying the importance of the citizen’s well-being and chances for advancement, and instead favoring big business and its wish of a cheap labor force (Appendix 15: 5). This clearly shows UKIP’s less than good opinion of the British government, and how the party is projecting itself as the protector of the citizens, something which is akin to the DPP.

Farage wishes to solve the economic and social problems by introducing an immigration policy based on a system of work permits. He thus calls for a similar policy as in Australia, as UKIP welcomes “immigrants to [the UK], we want people who’ve got skills, we want people who will

benefit us, we want people who haven't gotten serious criminal records" (Appendix 12: 7). It is therefore seen as a "crazy immigration policy" only to allow Southern and Eastern Europeans to come to the UK, because it jeopardizes the quality of the workers (Appendix 14: 4). Instead, citizens from all over the world should be allowed to enter the UK (Appendix 14: 4), provided they can offer the skills that are required. Furthermore, as a solution to the problem of unrestricted EU immigration, UKIP wants the UK to reclaim its border controls. This should reduce the numbers of immigrants, which, it is argued, also is what the public wishes done (Appendix 12: 2).

Farage argues that these two solutions only can be attained by departing from the EU, as "the truth of it is: we cannot be members of the European Union *and* have our own border controls *and* have our own immigration policy" (Appendix 13: 2). This highly contrasts with the DPP's stance, and appears as an extreme conclusion to draw, as the UK previously has been able to opt out of certain EU policies. Yet, as is stated in the *Manifesto*: "Outside the EU, we can manage our borders and decide who we want to come and live and work in the UK" (Appendix 2: 6). The point of deciding who is to enter the UK is where the policy counters that of the EU, as this would inhibit the EU's free movement of people. So again, the action is clear, people should vote no in an eventual EU referendum.

Comparison

EU immigration and its strains on the nations' welfare systems featured prominently in both countries' EP election debates, and the DPP and UKIP have not been silent on the issue. Except for the DPP's *Work Program*, the two parties yet again identify very similar problematizations. Both thus see the EU's open border policy and the ensuing EU immigration policy as the overarching problem in regards to EU immigration, and problematize the economic strains on the welfare systems.

Whilst problematizing the inflow of immigrants, both parties mention that the previous predictions had been wrong. UKIP thus ridicules the government's assumptions, as they were set much too low (Appendix 15: 3). The DPP argues similarly when stating that the numbers of Eastern workers in Denmark already now is the double of the numbers expected for the next decades (Appendix 10: 1). With these arguments, it is implied that both parties expect the numbers to run

out of control in the future, and become unmanageable for the member states. However, UKIP makes a much bigger point out of this “numbers problem”, and, as was shown above, continuously refers to the amount being uncontrollable.

They also both represent the problem to be that the national citizens will be detrimentally affected by the increased EU immigration. Some of the arguments employed on this matter are clearly welfare chauvinist, and based on the sentiment of fairness. Thus, besides the examples given above, the DPP argues that the migrant “first must earn the right to” claim Danish benefits before obtaining them (Appendix 10: 1). Farage similarly states that “[t]he benefits system is for citizens of this country, who’ve worked and paid here for years” (Appendix 14: 4).

Whereas the DPP’s representation has come about due to its ardent wish to safeguard the Danish welfare state, and to defend the weak in society (Meret, 2010: 111), UKIP’s stance requires some more exploration. This is particularly the case since the party refers to class differences becoming pronounced in the UK, an issue which the DPP does not mention at all. Thus, whereas the DPP supports the Scandinavian welfare state of universalism, which entails “equal access to benefits for all citizens” (DPP, 2009b), notwithstanding level of income, UKIP is an adherent to the means-tested and individualist version of the welfare state; the liberal model (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 141). The party thus states that benefits should be “a safety net for the needy, not a bed for the lazy” (UKIP, n.d.), which explains why its focus is on the poorer segments of society. Furthermore, the level of social inequality is also higher in the UK compared to Denmark, when based on the Gini coefficient (European Commission, 2010: 22). This could also partly explain why Farage makes a reference to the poorer segments of society in his argumentation.

Both parties base their problematizations on the assumption that the Eastern European workers will keep coming and making use of the good provisions within the two countries, whilst simultaneously being satisfied with earning lower wages. They also both blame the national governments for not having done anything to prevent the great strains identified. However, neither of the two parties blames the Eastern Europeans for wanting to go to their countries, as it makes sense for them to take advantage of the offer of better provisions (Appendix 8: 1 (DPP) and Appendix 13: 2 (UKIP)). It is very interesting that both parties argue in this manner, not wanting to put the blame on the Eastern Europeans, but in fact indirectly doing so by alluding to their ‘welfare

tourist' behavior of coming and claiming benefits, without having done anything to deserve it. This way of *othering* foreigners was previously seen as being a common trait of right-wing populist parties' rhetoric (see p. 37).

Yet, the two parties' solutions to curb the economic and social strains vary greatly. The DPP would like to introduce another Danish opt-out that would permit the country to have its own, independent rules regarding benefits. UKIP sees no other way of solving the problem than to leave the EU, as it wants an immigration policy that allows the UK to pick the most suitable immigrants for the jobs, also from third countries.

They do, however, agree on the reintroduction of border controls, albeit for different reasons. UKIP wants to put an end to the "unlimited" numbers of people it expects to otherwise enter the UK, whilst the DPP wishes to curtail further border-crossing crime, something that UKIP does not touch upon in the debate. However, previously Farage was very vocal in the debate about Eastern European criminals though. In September 2013, Farage for example referred to a "Romanian crime wave" flooding London (Travis, 2013). Yet, this rhetoric was accused of being scaremongering, and this is likely to have made Farage refrain from those claims in the 2014 debates.

5.3.3 Economic Concerns

As explained previously (see p. 38), right-wing populists have been found to criticize the toll that an EU membership has on the economies of the member states. This was highly visible in regards to welfare spending, but the two parties have also identified other economic problems. The DPP thus problematizes the EU's use of funds, and that wealthier member states are required to bail out the poorer, whilst UKIP sees problems in the high cost of the UK's EU membership and the country's lacking competitiveness. Both see the Euro as a problematic construct, and therefore negate the prospect of introducing the currency in their countries.

DPP

In the party manifesto, the DPP problematizes the EU's use of financial means. Yet, it reads more as allegations and outright criticisms than an actual policy issue to which the DPP has solutions. However, it is clear that the DPP assumes the EU incapable of handling finances, as it for example blames the EU administration for an "irresponsible management and direct waste of the European

taxpayers' money, widespread corruption and nepotism" (Appendix 1: 2). The bases of these accusations are not further elaborated upon, nor are the possible solutions. The DPP just says that it will "actively participate in fighting the big weaknesses" of the administration (Appendix 1: 2).

Furthermore, the DPP problematizes the size of the EU budgets. Thus, the party finds no "rational" reason for spending almost half of the EU's means on the agricultural policy, as there is no lack of agricultural products in the member states, and the structural funds are also criticized for being ineffective (Appendix 1: 2). As a solution, the DPP wants the member states to cover the budget costs themselves, and the EU budget should only be spent on necessary administration and big research projects (Appendix 1: 2).

Moreover, the DPP problematizes the great differences in financial policies across the EU, seeing as the EU's affluent and "responsible" member states have to bail out other, more reckless, states that have "neglected" to carry out the required reforms (Appendix 1: 2). The negligent member states are blamed for putting themselves in the given situation, something that the EU should not punish the responsible countries for. Here, the moral appeal to fairness is used to argue for a change in the economic policy of the EU member states.

Finally, the DPP sees a problem in the government's continuous support for the common currency, the Euro. This does not make sense to the DPP, seeing as Denmark would have had to pay a big amount of money to bail out Greece, had it been part of the Euro-zone (Appendix 6: 1). The party blames the Danish government for still wanting to introduce the currency in Denmark and for not recognizing that it is a "faulty construction" (Appendix 6: 1). Thus, without stating it explicitly, it is clear that the DPP strongly opposes the introduction of the Euro in Denmark. This stance aligns with literature on populist right-wing parties, where the Euro is generally "seen as a major historical error" (Surel, 2011: 4).

Hence, the DPP's problems with the EU in regards to economic concerns are mainly related to the entire EU-system as such, which is accused of conducting financial mismanagement, the EU constructs that cause financial strains, such as the Euro, and the bailing out of poorer, irresponsible countries.

UKIP

UKIP does not identify the same form, or amount, of economic problems as the DPP. Its main problems are the high costs of being an EU member, the UK's lack of economic competitiveness due to the EU, and, like the DPP, UKIP also opposes the Euro.

The party sees a problem in the high financial burden of the EU costs on the member states. UKIP employs the catchphrase that the EU is "costing us all [the UK taxpayers] £55 million per day in membership fees" (Appendix 2: 4), and in the debates, Farage states that: "That figure is a very low figure. The true cost of EU membership is many times that" (Appendix 14: 7). The problem is then represented as a matter of choosing between the well-being of the EU or the UK, because as the British economy is suffering, the "money would be better off spent here in this country" (Appendix 13: 2). UKIP argues that this problem should be solved by leaving the EU, so that the UK can recover economically, without having the burden of the EU's costs to worry about.

Furthermore, UKIP problematizes the EU's targets for the member states regarding energy consumption reductions, as the party feels it has made the UK uncompetitive in energy production. UKIP blames the EU membership for this development, as it argues that the EU's targets have made the UK government wrongfully focus on wind energy production. This has left the UK in an unfavorable position both regarding power prices and its manufacturing industries, compared to for example India and the US, who are relying on coal and shale gases respectively (Appendix 15: 6). Therefore, UKIP would like to solve the problem by ending the UK's adherence to the EU's energy policies, by withdrawing the country from the EU.

Like the DPP, UKIP also problematizes the potential introduction of the Euro in the UK, and also sees it as a highly faulty construct. Farage thus refers to the Southern Europeans as having "stupidly joined the Euro" (Appendix 15: 3), and now being "trapped in that idiotic euro-zone" (Appendix 15: 9). However, unlike the DPP, UKIP does not blame the British politicians for their *current* stances on the currency, but rather that they once did want the currency (Appendix 15: 9). This, according to Farage, "would have been a very bad mistake" (Appendix 12: 5), which clearly shows that UKIP is against the Euro's introduction in the UK.

Comparison

The analysis has shown that whilst also seeing it as problematic that the wealthier EU member states have to bail out those in financial hardships, the DPP mainly problematizes the EU's own use of financial means, both in regards to the administration, and the budget as such. UKIP, on the other hand, focuses more on the economic problems the EU membership causes the member states, both in regards to contributions, but also the losses due to uncompetitiveness. Both parties agree on problematizing the prospect of introducing the Euro to their countries though, due to the economic hardships that the euro-zone has faced.

Yet, despite problematizing EU's costs from two different angles, the DPP and UKIP see the problem alike: The nations' contributions to the EU are too high. UKIP says it directly by referring to the daily costs, whilst the DPP instead problematizes the high EU budgets, to which Denmark is a net contributor (Folketinget, 2013). Therewith, UKIP focuses on the problems from the national, British, level, whilst the DPP problematizes it from a more general, EU member state, level.

Except for the Euro problematization, their arguments are actually all structured this way. When expressing its economic concerns, the DPP thus frames it around a critique of the EU-system as such. This can for example also be seen in the DPP's contention that cutting down the budget is the only way to "come to grips with the substantial fraud regarding EU's funds" (Appendix 1: 2). Despite not saying who is actually conducting the fraud, the sheer act of insinuating that it takes place is enough to spread doubt about the morals of the entire EU. UKIP, on the other hand, represents the high EU costs as a matter of protecting the nation's economy and society against the EU. This sentiment is enforced by the assertion that the "taxpayer" is the financial source of the bill (Appendix 2: 6). The DPP also blames the EU for misusing the "taxpayers'" money (Appendix 1: 1), and this emphasis on that particular group of citizens is again to make it into a moral appeal, because why should the UK citizens pay money to the EU, when they need them themselves? And why should the Danes pay taxes to the EU, when they just end up being wasted?

Yet, it is hard to establish how the two parties have come to represent the problem of the EU's use of finances in this way, as their explanations are not very detailed. However, it is likely to be related to their stance on national sovereignty, and the fact that they perceive no sentiment of

unity across Europe. Therefore, they see no sense in having to finance an organization with which members they feel no common bond.

5.3.4 Anti-Establishment

When reading through the two party documents, it quickly becomes apparent that both employ a very value-laden and accusatory language towards the European and national establishment. For one, the DPP makes use of many moral appeals, such as referring to the EU and the national politicians as being “irrational”, “irresponsible” and “unfair” (Appendix 1). UKIP, on the other hand, strongly attacks the British government for being untruthful and deceitful, and also castigates the EU elite and big business. In the following section, these anti-establishment arguments will be further explored. Each analysis will start by looking at the problematizations in regards to the European level, and then the national.

DPP

Very interestingly, the DPP’s problematizations about the establishment differ highly between its manifesto and the debates. Thus, in the manifesto, the problems mainly relate to the EU representatives, whereas the attitudes of the Danish established parties are problematized in the debate.

In the manifesto, the DPP identifies several problems with the EU in regards to its management of finances, as was seen in the analysis of the *Economic Concerns* frame (see p. 60). This criticism is written in very strong terms, as the DPP blames the EU for squandering the money from the member states, thereby spreading doubts about the organization’s credentials. Also, by using terms such as “irrational”, “irresponsible” and the word “waste” itself (Appendix 1), the EU is made to appear very untrustworthy. Yet, as was also stated above, the DPP does not offer many ways to solve the problem of the EU’s irresponsible nature, and it is generally very hard to establish how this particular problematization has come about.

In the debates, the party’s anti-establishment sentiments are focused on the national level, and the DPP sees a problem in the other Danish parliamentary parties not having stated their exact stances on the issue of Danish EU membership (Appendix 9: 1). The Social Democrats are even castigated for “biding it out” (*lurepasse*), instead of just clearly stating their position (Appendix 6:

1). The problem is represented to be about the other parties wanting to avoid the alienation of their voters. Hence, in the eyes of the DPP, “it is not particularly interesting to listen to people, who do not know what they themselves think, or evades the question or speaks unclearly, because they know that they are not on the same wavelength as a majority of the voters” (Appendix 9: 1). This is contrasted with the DPP, which has been consistent in its stance, unlike the pro-integration parties that “have been caught in their own belittling and dishonest descriptions of reality” (Appendix 10: 2).

Furthermore, whilst problematizing Thorning-Schmidt’s conduct in Denmark’s relations with the EU, the DPP blames her of putting the citizens in second line, due to her wish of obtaining an EU top-post (Appendix 7: 2). Thus, she “does not want to upset certain key bureaucrats in the EU” (Appendix 3: 1). This implies that she puts her own career above the needs of the Danish citizens.

Thus, interestingly, the DPP takes a very hostile position towards the Danish government in the debates. This could be because the analyzed material is from the DPP’s own webpage, and Thulesen Dahl therefore does not feel that he needs to maintain a ‘polite’ tone in his policy positions. However, this kind of argumentation has also been witnessed in the public debate, for example in December 2013 in the Danish Parliament, where he used a similarly harsh tone towards Thorning-Schmidt (Haslund, 2013).

UKIP

Unlike the DPP, in both UKIP’s *European Manifesto* (Appendix 2) and the debates, the party employs a very hostile language against both the European and the British establishment. The party’s problematizations are not only in relation to the politicians though, but also big business and the wealthy sector of British society.

At the European level, Farage sees the EU’s conduct in relation to Italy’s financial crisis as highly problematic. He states that Silvio Berlusconi was removed as president because he publicly voiced concern about the Euro’s effect on Italy, and he was replaced with “[a]n unelected PM and former Goldman Sachs employee” (Appendix 12: 4). This undemocratic removal is blamed on “the unholy alliance that runs the European Union”, namely “big bureaucracy, big business and big banks” (Appendix 12: 4), who are accused of having pursued their own financial interests. Farage offers

no solution to the problem, but does say that it “tells me as much as I need to know about the European Project” (Appendix 4: 4). This infers that the EU departure still is the wished solution, as the EU consists of such scheming people.

The big business is generally found to be blamable by UKIP, as the party believes that EU law privileges this sector. Thus, UKIP problematizes that the EU and its legislation “is geared to help big businesses and prevent small ones from challenging them” (Appendix 2: 3). Big business is thought to “draft the laws for their own industry” together with the European Commission, and without “any degree of public vetting at all” (Appendix 12: 5). UKIP’s protection of small business was already apparent in its first *Manifesto* of 1997 (UKIP, 1997), and the party seems to be of the opinion that the sector provides the “backbone of the national economy” (Mudde, 2002: 175).

UKIP also problematizes the effects that increased immigration will have on the poor segments of society. Farage states that whilst the rich will not oppose the inflow, as they actually benefit from cheaper nannies, chauffeurs and gardeners, “it’s actually bad news for ordinary British workers and families” due to the economic strains that follow (Appendix 15: 4). With this dichotomy, Farage is not only condescending towards the rich, but also presumes that not all sectors of society will want to curtail the immigration. Moreover, a similar problem is seen in the British wind energy sector. Wind energy production makes the “rich richer”, but has the adverse effect on the poor (Appendix 15: 5). This problem appears unsolvable to Farage, as many leading UK politicians have relatives “associated with the wind energy industry” (Appendix 15: 5), and therefore will not be interested in ending the wind power production, and the ensuing increased societal gaps.

In relation to the national politicians, UKIP argues very similarly to the DPP. Farage problematizes the government’s nature, as it allegedly is behind “a whole series of lies and deceits” (Appendix 15: 11). UKIP, on the other hand, proclaims itself to be “the only party being honest about immigration, jobs and housing” in the *European Manifesto* (Appendix 2: 2). This problem of dishonesty is also seen in regards to the promised EU referendum, which the national politicians continuously postpone. Farage thus states that:

the elite’s club of career politicians and big business don’t want you to have a say. [...] Because they think you might give the wrong answer. They think you might say “no, we’d rather govern our own country”. And the sheer duplicity and deception of the political class on this issue really is a wonder to behold (Appendix 15: 8).

Here, the anti-establishment sentiment really shines through, as not only are the blamable people referred to as “the elite’s club of career politicians and big business”, but they are also seen as being dishonest and deceitful towards the citizens, and only having their own interests in mind.

Moreover, Farage sees it as problem that the “career political class” wants to make policies on issues they have never had to deal with themselves, because they have “never done a day’s work in their lives” (Appendix 13: 1). He contrasts this with his own background in the private sector (Appendix 14: 6), therewith distancing himself from them, and making himself seem more adept to talk about business-related issues.

In the endeavor to counter the establishment’s rule, Farage’s solution is clear: the UKIP-voters should “come and join the people’s army” in order to “topple the establishment who led us into this mess” (Appendix 15: 11). This should be done by the people voting “No” in the EU In/Out Referendum.

Comparison

Except from UKIP’s problematizations in regards to the increase in societal inequality and the prevalence of big businesses’ interests in the EU’s policies, the two parties’ standpoints are rather similar in regards to the establishment. Both thus see the EU’s nature as being flawed, the DPP by questioning its economic trustworthiness, and UKIP by problematizing its undemocratic conduct in Italy.

On the national level, it is interesting how both parties problematize the other parties’ conduct in the national parliaments, and how their rhetoric is surprisingly similar. Thus, both identify a problem in regards to the established parties, who are seen as ‘preventing’ their national electorates from taking a qualified stance as to which party to vote for, due to the parties’ missing position-taking. Thus, like the DPP, Farage actually also problematizes the lacking discussions about the UK’s future EU-relations. He blames Labour and the Conservatives of avoiding the EU topic because of their own, internal disagreements. Hence, “they’d rather not talk about it, and they’d rather conduct the European elections, not even discussing this question” (Appendix 14: 2). The two parties agree that the other parties only refrain from taking a stance because they worry what the citizens might vote.

Both the DPP and UKIP also juxtapose the other national parties with themselves, who *are* in fact listening to the worries of the electorate, who *have* voiced their position on the EU (DPP), and who *have* been honest about the effects of the EU's policies on the UK (UKIP). These statements must be considered implicit encouragements to the electorate to act by voting for the two parties at the upcoming elections, seeing as they apparently are the only ones who care about the well-being of the citizens.

5.3.5 Democratic Deficit

The last frame identified, *Democratic Deficit*, is, together with the *Threat to National Sovereignty* frame, the one to which the two parties' main problems with the EU pertain. This is because most of the above problematizations can be traced back to the sentiment that the EU is not democratically representative. The EU lacking from a democratic deficit, or lacking democratic representation, is actually the overarching frame in several of the parties' problematizations. Yet, it is not always expressed explicitly.

Hence, both UKIP and the DPP identify several problems in regards to the EU's lack in democratic credentials. Some of them are explicitly stated, and are directed at all of the four levels identified in chapter 3 (see p. 38). They are: the EU-system; the EU institutions; the EU-representatives and elites; and the national politicians and elites. In the following section, I will outline both the explicit and the implicit problematizations of the EU's democratic deficit.

DPP

The DPP identifies several problems related to the democratic deficit of the EU, but also of the national politicians. Regarding the EU, it criticizes the current state of EU democracy, the EU's wish of streamlining mass opinion and the unelected EU-representatives. In the debates, the DPP's problematization of a democratic deficit has not been blamed very much on the EU itself, but rather on the current Danish government, led by Helle Thorning-Schmidt and the Social Democrats.

On the more general EU-level, the DPP problematizes the undemocratic nature of the EU-system as a whole. Firstly, the DPP identifies a growing distance between the EU citizens and the

“societies’ power elites” at the national level, because of how the EU is run (Appendix 1: 1). It thus assumes that the EU’s take on democracy will spill over on the member states. Secondly, “[t]he EU-system’s demands for surveillance and control of the political process in the member states”, are seen as “overt attempts at streamlining the political opinion-forming and preventing the populations from exercising their democratic rights” (Appendix 1: 1). Thirdly, the fact that most EU-representatives are unelected is seen as very problematic if the EU federalizes, as it would introduce an “elite rule, which only formally is democratic and under all circumstances very far away from the citizens” (Appendix 1: 1). Thus, the EU is seen as an intrusive, controlling and distant organization, whose democratic take has had bad consequences for the state of democracy in the member states.

This distance between the EU and the member states is also highlighted by Messerschmidt, who problematizes that the EU now has the authority to decide over Danish legislation. Whilst discussing the potential Danish welfare opt-out, he states that:

[I]t is the Danish Parliament [*Folketinget*] that decides it, and that is much more democratic than if it is a bunch of judges who we don’t know and who have never been to Denmark and know the Danish welfare system, who have to sit and decide it, I think [...] It should be the Danish Parliament and not the EU that decides it (Appendix 11: 7).

This statement actually gets to the core of the DPP’s problem with the EU. The party does not see it as democratic that a distant organization such as the EU should be allowed to make changes to Danish policies. This problem will be further discussed in the comparison below, as UKIP takes a very similar stance.

As the EU is represented as a distant ‘controller’ of the member states, the DPP blames the national politicians for not countering the perceived infringements. This is for example seen in relation to the Danish welfare policies, where Thulesen Dahl questions if “it really makes sense to ‘be government’, if one can’t govern at all – if the decisions are made by officials in Brussels instead” (Appendix 4: 1). Later, he answers the question himself, when saying: “The truth is probably rather that the government’s own positions nicely align with the positions in Brussels – that is why the EU is used as a lever (*løftestang*) for the government’s own wishes” (Appendix 4: 1). Thus, the government could actually do something to stop the EU’s further infringements, but has just chosen not to. Moreover, in relation to EU immigration, the DPP blames the government

for blindly abiding to any of the EU's calls, without concern for the wishes of the population (Appendix 8: 1). Thus: "When the EU-system first has spoken – a true EU-woman acts by toeing the line [*makke ret*]. Then democracy and rule by the people [...] must take second place" (Appendix 7: 2). Thorning-Schmidt is strongly castigated here, and she is made to sound like a docile puppet in regards to the EU.

All of these identified problems should be solved by the opposition parties "putting the foot down" and saying enough is enough. The political power should lie by the population and the *Danish* politicians, not the EU (Appendix 8: 1). Thus, both the national and European political elites are referred to in a very negative way. With this, the DPP creates a sort of dichotomy between *us* and *them*, as it attempts to act as the mouthpiece of the common citizens against the elites. Therefore, the DPP calls for more direct participation of the population through elections, and for referendums on all major future EU decisions, so that the public can get its voice heard (Appendix 1: 1).

UKIP

UKIP's problematizations regarding the democratic deficit of the EU are somewhat similar to those identified by the DPP. Despite not giving as many explicit examples of the EU's undemocratic nature, the party's overarching problems with the EU is also that it is not democratically representative, and that it is too removed from the wishes of the citizens. Thus, like the DPP, UKIP sees a problem in the EU's legislation imposition, and the fact that it does not have the interests of the citizens in mind when making decisions.

Furthermore, UKIP also problematizes the lacking accountability and transparency of the EU, as the party states that its main aim of sending party members to the European Parliament is to "find out what [the EU is] up to" and what it is "cooking up" (Appendix 2: 3). UKIP thus assumes that the EU works independently of the member states' influence, and therefore requires watchdogs in the shape of UKIP to follow its every move.

Moreover, related to the *Threat to National Sovereignty* frame, UKIP blames the EU for exercising an "encroachment on our democracy" (Appendix 2: 3), as it has introduced "thousands" of EU laws in the UK, "over which our own parliament and the electorate can make no difference"

(Appendix 14: 1). This makes Farage argue very alike to the DPP, as he states that: “General elections have been rendered, frankly, quite impotent affairs, because we’ve given away the control of most of our country” (Appendix 15: 8). Thus, according to UKIP, the UK’s own democratic system has become defunct. The problem is worsened by the fact that “without using treaties” the EU has been able to “acquire yet more power at the center” in regards to the euro-zone countries (Appendix 14: 2). This centralization is looked at with great concern, as it means that the EU can increase its supranational powers without introducing new treaties, hence without the member states’ formal ratification. The EU-membership is thus seen as diminishing the nature and prevalence of British parliamentary democracy, which can partly be blamed on the national politicians, who have “given away” democracy to the EU (Appendix 15: 11).

UKIP wants to solve the problem by returning parliamentary democracy, so that the UK can regain control over British legislation. Seeing as “the best people to govern Britain are the British people themselves” (Appendix 12: 1), the British decision-making should be returned to them. For UKIP, the only way to attain this goal is to leave the EU, as “you cannot be a democratic, self-governing nation and a member of this political European Union” (Appendix 15: 1). Yet, in order for this to happen, a referendum must take place, and here, the citizens should act by answering yes to the question: “Are we to be a self-governing nation or not?” (Appendix 14: 1).

Comparison

The analyses have shown that both parties identify several problems in regards to the democratic deficit of the EU, and also that they share many of them. The DPP problematizes the entire undemocratic nature of the EU, and that the EU-representatives are unelected, and therefore not representative of the EU citizens. This problem of representativeness is also identified by UKIP. It actually partly explains both parties’ strong concern about the EU’s increasing involvement in the nations’ legislation processes, seeing as they do not consider the EU able to represent the wishes of the different member states. Thus, they both blame the EU for this perceived “encroachment” *and* the national politicians for having done nothing to counter the EU’s demands. Yet, their solutions vary highly: The DPP wants the political opposition to press for changes in the EU-relations, whereas UKIP insists that only through an EU departure can democracy be reclaimed.

However, both call for the populations to act by participating in elections, and particularly referendums on EU-related questions.

Thus, both parties identify problems in the EU-system being unrepresentative, too far away from the national levels, and having taken over too much of the states' legislative powers. These contentions are noticeable throughout all of the two parties' respective material, for example when they allude to the EU having a mind of its own, and certainly not having the EU citizens' interests in mind when pursuing its goals (Appendix 5: 1 and Appendix 12: 4). Both parties perceive the EU to be a sort of distant, even external, power forcing the member states to comply.

This sense of the EU being external has come about due to the two parties' similar ways of seeing the EU-relations. As was seen in the *Threat to National Sovereignty* frame, both parties have a nationalist desire to protect the interests of their countries. They therefore negate the idea of a "United States of Europe", in which all the EU member states become one, as they assume that the European citizens' sentiment of unity is non-existent. Moreover, neither of the two feels that the EU is an integral part of their respective countries' political system. Therefore it is not felt that the EU should have the right to have a say over the different member states' policies. This then explains how the representation of the EU as an unrepresentative, and thereby also undemocratic, organization has come about, but also that the two frames of *Threat to National Sovereignty* and *Democratic Deficit* are conflated.

Thus, UKIP's *European Manifesto* is actually just one big description of how the EU has taken over the control of the country, in practically all areas of policy (Appendix 2). Also, elsewhere, Farage states that "[b]y being a member of the European Union, we've lost the ability to govern our country, and to control our borders" (Appendix 14: 9). The DPP similarly states that: "The citizens are sidelined. The system dictates" (Appendix 8: 1), referring to the EU-system and its intrusive power, that takes no measure of the citizens it is supposed to act in the interest of. This problem is engraved by the fact that nothing is actively done to counter the developments, something which both parties blame their respective governments for neglecting to do.

This explains their vehement problematization of the EU's alleged "infringement" on their countries, as both now are left with the sense of being "unable to change the course of many laws that we don't like" (Appendix 12: 8). This is visible in the two parties' perceptions of EU legislation

in regards to the deportation of foreign criminals, and the imposing nature of the European Court of Justice. Thus, UKIP problematizes the fact that “we can’t deport foreign criminals because we’ve signed up to the say-so of a court based in Strasbourg” (Appendix 13: 1). The DPP, on the other hand, sees it as problematic that the criminals can return to Denmark as they please, because the EU legislation does not allow the guarding of the borders, even if the country would want it reintroduced (Appendix 3: 1).

Furthermore, a similar way of problematizing the lack in representativeness of the EU can be seen in UKIP’s problematization of the UK having to produce wind energy, something which is seen as counterproductive to British industry (Appendix 15: 5). Farage thus argues that the EU’s demands for cutting down emissions and introducing renewable energy sources are to “declare unilateralism” on environmental policy (Appendix 15: 5). This is to the detriment of the UK, as it makes it “as difficult as possible for our manufacturing industries to survive” (Appendix 15: 5). Thus, the problem is that the EU does not represent the interests of the UK when conducting policy. Interestingly, the DPP is actually positive towards the EU’s environmental policy, and the fact that “you can make common [EU] rules” in relation to it (Appendix 11: 3). However, this stance should be seen in relation to the context in which it was said. The DPP has generally not been known for its active attempts at improving environment policies. In regards to the EU, it therefore seems as if it sees the environment as a kind of “soft” policy, which is not as big an intrusion on Denmark’s own legislative powers as for example finance, social and immigration policies are (Appendix 11: 3). Therefore, the DPP actually does see the common EU environmental policies in a comparatively positive light.

Nevertheless, the DPP and UKIP’s problems with the EU’s undemocratic nature are highly related to, if not the reason for, the kind of relationship the two wish to have with the EU. As explained above, none of the two parties assume there to be a sense of unity amongst the EU member states, neither in political, social, economic or cultural terms. Therefore, what both actually seem to see as the solution is a Europe *between* the nations, and not *of* the nations. The DPP thus still wants to be a member of the EU, but with the right to opt-out of certain initiatives, whilst UKIP wants to be outside it, yet as an EFTA-member.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussion of Findings

6.1 Overall Comparison

The analysis of the DPP and UKIP's party policy positions on the EU has shown that despite having soft and hard eurosceptic stances respectively, the two parties show a rather surprising level of agreement in their stances. Both frame much of their critique of the EU around the perceived *Threat to National Sovereignty* and the *Threat of Immigration*, and particularly UKIP employs a very strong *Anti-Establishment* language. The parties express some *Economic Concerns*, yet not to the same extent, and these seem more like an extension of their overarching problems with the EU, namely that it is an unrepresentative construct, which development has gone too far.

The sentiment of the EU not being a democratically representative organization is implicitly involved in most of the two parties' problematizations in the other main frames. Thus, to understand the other problematizations, one must first understand how the two parties' representations of the *Democratic Deficit* and the *Threat to National Sovereignty* have come about, namely due to their particular nationalisms. The DPP is mainly concerned with maintaining Denmark's cultural and historical community, and looks to restore the aforementioned "heartland". The party has had to moderate its eurosceptic stance, as it wished to gain governmental influence, and therefore no longer wants Denmark to depart from the EU. Instead, it wants to introduce a sort of multi-track Europe, where the member states are free to choose the kind of relationship they want to have with the EU, therewith offering the countries much opportunity to protect their sovereign rights. UKIP, on the other hand, is "unashamedly patriotic", and assumes that the EU is the obstacle hindering the UK from returning to its earlier prosperous world status. UKIP therefore wants to withdraw the UK from the organization, so that it can pursue its own trade deals internationally, to be negotiated in the British interest.

Yet, even though the DPP and UKIP adhere to various forms of nationalism and envision two different pathways for their future EU-relations, it is both parties' strongest desire to uphold their country's sovereignty. This is why they find the EU's legislative "impositions" and the talk of creating a 'United States of Europe' highly problematic. The idea of a European Federation is not assumed to be viable though, as they do not assume that there is a sense of unity across Europe, which can partly be explained by their own strong feelings towards their nations. Moreover, it is

exactly this perceived lack of European unity that makes the two parties problematize the EU's legislative infringements. They thus both state that the EU and its open borders worked when it just consisted of 15 relatively similar countries. Yet, today, with 28 member states that have different social and financial systems, the EU is too diverse. This then infers that the EU-system cannot be representative, and therefore should not have the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the member states. Particularly not when it attempts to take over the national decision-making process, which is what both parties claim is taking place.

This problematization is particularly visible in the *Threat of Immigration* frame, where both parties highlight the great differences between the EU member states that make it so attractive for the Eastern Europeans to come and claim benefits in countries that offer better provisions. Within this frame, the two parties' respective governments are chastised for not countering the EU's demands, and just abiding to its calls. The two parties thus outline a list of societal and economic problems that will ensue due to the high increase in EU immigration. Especially the facts that the immigrants may claim benefits in the host country, and are willing to accept lesser wages are identified as being problematic by both the DPP and UKIP. This is because the national workers will have difficulties competing with the wage levels, and UKIP also highlights the presence of an underclass of white workers, whose dismay about the foreigners could lead to exclusionist tendencies. In their arguments about the tolls for the societies, both are welfare chauvinist, and thus problematize that the immigrants just come and make use of the better provisions without having contributed previously. Moreover, UKIP also worries about the British infrastructure and environment, while the DPP sees a big problem in the high increase in border-crossing crime.

These identified problems are considered rather insurmountable, and the DPP blames the EU for taking a rigid position about the free movement, and thus being impossible to negotiate with. Therefore, the DPP sees no other solution than to introduce a welfare policy opt-out, which would allow the Danish parliament to control the benefits legislation. UKIP, on the other hand, argues that the only solution for the UK is to leave the EU. This would mean that the UK could 'regain control' over its borders and legislation, and that work permits could be introduced, so that the best skilled immigrants would get picked for the jobs, notwithstanding if they are from the EU or

abroad. The DPP also wants border controls reintroduced, yet only in regards to curbing border-crossing crime.

The two parties' reasons for problematizing the *Economic Concerns* in regards to the EU's financial expenditure are a bit more difficult to discern, and particularly the issues that the DPP identifies seem more like pure allegations than problems that the party actually offers solutions for. However, both parties *do* see a problem in the member states having to pay such great amounts of money to the EU. Yet, they problematize it from two different perspectives. UKIP thus worries about the toll on the British economy, as the country could use its EU contributions for its own, national, financial hardships. The DPP, on the other hand, looks at the problem from a more overall, EU member state level, and castigates the EU for mismanaging its finances, and therewith the money the member states have paid to the organization. Both parties also concur that the prospect of joining the Euro is a very bad idea, due to the big financial crisis in the Mediterranean.

Particularly within this frame, the two parties' conceptions and assumptions about the EU become apparent. It is thus evident that neither of them has much faith in the organization, nor feels a close bond with the other member states, as they so vehemently oppose paying money to the budget. This sentiment is particularly clear in the DPP's problematization of the wealthier, "responsible", countries having to bail out the "negligent" countries now facing problems. These problematizations again relate to both the threat to national sovereignty frame, and the democratic deficit, because it shows the two parties' sentiment of the EU being too distant from the member states, and not the unifying force which the European representatives wish it to be.

However, differently from the DPP, UKIP problematizes the EU's energy consumption reductions targets, and their pressure on the UK's global competitiveness, as wind energy production is seen as constricting the country's manufacturing opportunities. Therefore, UKIP wants to solve the problems of high "membership fees" and lack of competitiveness by again calling for a British EU departure. This would remove the membership costs, and the UK could produce the kind of energy and commodities that it wishes. The DPP also offers a few solutions to the identified problems, yet none of them conflict with the party's EU membership. Most of the party's arguments in this frame, particularly in the *Work Paper*, actually appear as populist anti-establishment rhetoric.

Nevertheless, it is in fact UKIP that problematizes the most issues in regards to the *Anti-Establishment* frame. Thus, whereas the DPP only sees a problem in the EU's 'irresponsible' money management in the *Work Program*, UKIP problematizes the EU's "big bureaucracy, big business and big banks" (Appendix 12: 4), and their conduct during Italy's financial crisis. The role of big business in the EU is also problematized by UKIP, as it is argued to be privileged by the EU, leaving small business chanceless. Both parties' strong rhetoric against the EU again shows their lack in confidence of the entire organization.

Interestingly, UKIP also juxtaposes the British society's rich and poor in relation to EU immigration and wind energy. The party argues that due to the economic prospects, the rich will not want to neither curb immigration nor end the wind energy production, despite the harmful effects on the poor. These societal issues were not found to be argued by the DPP, something which relates to the two different welfare systems to which the parties adhere.

Yet, a big correlation between the problematizations is found in regards to the national politicians. Here, both parties are very vociferous, and both identify it as problematic that the established parties are dishonest, downgrade the effects of the EU membership on the member states and will not state their positions on the EU. These problems are juxtaposed with the DPP and UKIP themselves, who emphasize their own consistently correct conduct, the DPP in regards to stating its EU position, and UKIP by being honest about the effects of EU immigration.

Finally, both parties, particularly the DPP, also problematize the EU's *Democratic Deficit* very directly. The DPP thus sees a problem in the democratic nature of the EU, which is perceived as having a bad influence on the member states, partly because of the EU's wish to streamline mass opinion. A problem is also seen in the fact that most EU-representatives are unelected, which further adds to the sentiment of the EU not having the right to speak for the different member states, as this does not represent the kind of popular democracy that the DPP supports. However, the biggest problem that both parties identify in regards to the EU's democratic credentials is its interference in the politics of the member states. Both parties thus argue that the decisions of their parliaments are becoming irrelevant, as EU rule will prevail.

This occurrence conflicts highly with both parties' populist desire for the citizens to have the final say on the outcome of EU legislation. The non-existence of this possibility is therefore

problematized on numerous occasions by both parties, and they both present themselves and their take on democracy as the solution to these undemocratic tendencies. Assuming that an increase in direct democracy will heighten the representativeness of the EU, they call for more elections to take place, but also argue that a vote for them will ensure that there is somebody in the EP that keeps track of the EU's movements. Thus, the two parties call for their electorates to act by using their vote, UKIP for a no in the referendum, and the DPP for itself or equally minded parties at the EP elections.

Thus, it has been shown that UKIP and the DPP share many similar stances on the question of the EU. Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight the differences between the two parties. The most obvious one is of course that they advocate two different solutions for their overall concerns with the EU. UKIP thus wants the UK to withdraw from the EU, while the DPP wishes to reform the relationship, so that the country can choose the EU initiatives it wishes to take part in. As they have these diverging stances, UKIP can of course also make its opposition much more clear. This is visible in its manifesto, which overarching theme is the EU's take-over of British control, and also in UKIP's comparatively harsh critique of both the political and economical establishment. As already mentioned, the DPP cannot argue in such strong terms, because of its wish for governmental influence.

The country context is also relevant for explaining some of their differing stances, for example in regards to welfare regimes. Seeing as Denmark is a comparably more egalitarian society (based on the Gini index), the talk of class differences is not a commonly heard representation of Danish society. This is also not the case by the DPP, which does not argue along class lines, despite its role as protector of the weak in society. UKIP, on the other hand, takes a liberal stance on welfare provisions, and rhetorically projects itself as the protector of the common man against the establishment, and therefore argues along class lines.

The Party Positions in Relation to the Danish and British Electorates

Drawing the attention back to the introduction of this thesis, and the mention of the growing concerns of the European electorates (see p. 3), a similar picture is visible in regards to Denmark and the UK. As previously shown, both the Danish and British citizens have diminished trust in the EU (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013), and this concurs with their sentiments towards their national

governments (Skadhede, 2014 and Randall, 2014). Furthermore, a recent *Eurobarometer* survey (2014a and 2014b) has shown that the Danish and British populations express fairly strong concerns about some of those areas that the two parties highlight, namely immigration and unemployment. This insecurity can partly be explained by the UK and Denmark still recuperating from the economic stagnation that the financial crisis of the mid-2000s led to (Knight, 2013 and Overgaard, 2012).

In their problematizations, both the DPP and UKIP consistently shame both the EU and the government for acting against the wishes of the populations, and generally sow doubts about their countries' relations with the organization. Moreover, they both portray themselves as the only parties that take the concerns of the citizens serious, and seem to act as the mouthpiece of public dismay. This becomes particularly visible in regards to EU immigration, where the sense is created that the inflow of immigrants will lead to nothing but problems for the member states. All of these arguments combined mean that the two parties have been able to strike a chord with their electorates' concerns (Nissen, 2014). This could therefore partly explain why they both enjoy the prospect of good electoral results.

Future Perspectives for the DPP and UKIP

It will be very interesting to see what the future entails for the DPP and UKIP. As to their positions in the EP, both parties have been very silent about potential cooperation partners and political groupings. Yet, despite several of their EFD party group members joining forces with Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders' new eurosceptic EP group (Piedrafita & Renman, 2014), it seems unlikely that UKIP and the DPP will follow. This is because they find the *Front National* too extreme in its stances (Hvide Beim & Lauritzen, 2014 and Mason, 2014). Yet, as the two parties already now cooperate in the EFD group, this is likely to continue in the next session, particularly since they have very similar political standpoints, as the analysis has shown. Also, in the debates, Farage alluded to the idea of collaborating with Pepe Grillo and his Italian Five Star Movement (Appendix 12: 5). Notwithstanding, even though the eurosceptic right-wing populists are expected to make electoral gains in 2014, it is doubtful that any substantial changes to the EU's workings will ensue, as they have lacked the willingness to cooperate with each other in earlier EP sessions (Mudde, 2014).

However, with their predicted electoral gains, the two parties must have sent a very clear message to their national governments about the sentiments of the population regarding the EU. Thus, David Cameron could see himself forced to advance the date of the announced 2017 In/Out Referendum, an issue which parts of his party's backbenchers also are likely to pressure him on. The result of such a referendum is very hard to predict, seeing as election polls show that the public is split down the middle (Monaghan, 2014). It will also be interesting to follow the future development of UKIP's policy positions, especially since it is projected to make electoral advances in the next UK General Elections (Swinford, 2014).

In Denmark, the DPP's strong criticism of the EU immigration policy and its detrimental effects on Danish society could lead to increased pressure on the Danish government to re-assess the country's EU membership. Not in the sense of leaving the EU, but of cooperating with the other countries that have expressed wishes to reform certain aspects of the EU's *acquis communautaire*, such as the British PM Cameron's wish for a return of competences to the member states.

6.1 Discussion of Findings

The following section will contain some deliberations about the research and the methods employed. This surrounds discussions about future research prospects and the use of frame analysis, and an evaluation of the empirical data. Thereafter the thesis' findings will be summed up in the conclusionary remarks.

Future Research

There are certain research areas in relation to this study that could be of academic interest to further scrutinize. For one, this analysis has shown how the two parties frame the topic, and wherein *their* scepticism towards the EU lies. It would be very interesting to explore whether these arguments also are employed by the citizens who vote for the parties. This is especially relevant when considering the already existent theories on voter behavior, and the assumption that many voters of eurosceptic parties vote in protest of their usual party choices (see p. 15). Thus, by analyzing the electorate's positions on the EU, it could become clearer how much importance the actual party positions have, and also how best to frame an issue.

Moreover, it could also be interesting to investigate whether the two parties cooperate when planning their campaigns for upcoming EP elections. At the time of writing, UKIP and the DPP were in the same party group in the EP, and were found to give very similar arguments in their problematizations. Some of the catchphrases and words that the two parties use in the debates are practically identical or at least very similar, such as for example UK's statement "We want our country back", and the DPP's previously employed "Give us Denmark back" (*Giv os Danmark tilbage*) (DPP, 2008). It is therefore probable that they discuss campaign strategies with each other. This could be an intriguing study, because if it turned out that they do in fact collaborate on the campaign material, elements of the Europeanization of national party politics could be revealed. This would of course be somewhat ironic, seeing as the two parties both want to prevent this process from happening.

The Use of Frame Analysis as a Research Method

Through the employment of frame analysis, it has been possible to unravel the two parties' ways of arguing for their particular policy stances on the EU. However, there are certain observations in regards to particularly Bacchi's approach that need to be made. Whilst it was fairly straightforward to utilize Snow and Benford's research approach of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, this was far from the case with Bacchi's method. It is for example very difficult to deduce the underlying conceptual premises of a problem representation, particularly when you only have a limited amount of space and time available. This would probably also require a lot more data, as it is practically impossible to infer from the limited statements. Furthermore, besides the moral appeals, the linguistic analysis tools that were identified (see p. 24) were hardly present in the parties' rhetoric, and when they were used, it did not aid much in explaining the problem representation.

Nevertheless, mixing Snow and Benford's approach with Bacchi's was beneficial for grasping the two parties' specific stances on the EU, and the research did reveal many interesting correlations between their arguments and positions.

Material Evaluation

The empirical data used in the thesis has given good indications of the two parties' current stances on their countries' EU membership. As it was not possible to find identical types of documents, the material had to be of somewhat diverging natures. Thus, the DPP's problematizations in regards to the EU in 2009 could potentially be very different from today. However, as it is the policy document that the party publishes, it must be seen as still being valid. Furthermore, concerns could be raised about the language employed in the DPP's newsletters, as they were published on the party's webpage, and therefore potentially do not contain critiques which it would also voice publicly. Yet, the newsletters clearly explain the party's take on the current EU situation, which is why they were seen as appropriate to employ. UKIP's *European Manifesto* was also comparably short, but it was found to contain the party's key points in a very concise manner. Therefore, it was possible to deduce the two parties' stances from the documents and debates identified.

6.3 Conclusionary Remarks

The analysis of the *Danish People's Party* and the *UK Independence Party* has revealed how the two parties articulate their specific stance on the EU in the lead-up to a European Parliament election. It also showed that they employ remarkably similar arguments, notwithstanding the fact that they adhere to two different types of Euroscepticism, namely soft (DPP) and hard (UKIP).

They both thus see the biggest problem in the EU's powers having become too encompassing, which infringes on both their sense of national sovereignty and of democracy. As explained in the overall comparison, this problem is by far the most pertinent for both, and is the underlying rationale for several of their other problematizations as well. The two thus vehemently oppose the movements towards a United States of Europe, but whereas UKIP argues that the only way to avoid this from happening is to leave the EU, the DPP instead calls for a sort of multi-track Europe, where the members can choose which policies they wish to take part in.

The topic of EU immigration is also strongly debated by both parties, and both identify that the main problem is the constraints on the host countries' welfare systems. Using welfare chauvinist arguments, both see the national workers as the victims of the problem, whilst blaming the EU for its supranational power take-over, and the national politicians for again not acting against the EU.

Besides agreeing on the economic problems concerning welfare spending and immigration, the two parties voice somewhat different concerns in regards to the economic impact of the EU. The DPP problematizes the EU's squandering of its own funding, and argues against the mismanagement of EU finances, whilst also opposing that the wealthier member states have to be punished for the irresponsible behavior of the countries facing economic hardships. UKIP, on the other hand, problematizes that the EU hinders UK from being economically competitive. Yet, both agree that the member states pay too much to the organization, and that the Euro is a faulty construction, that never should be introduced in their respective countries.

It is by far UKIP which identifies the most problems related to anti-establishment sentiments, and its problematizations pertain to the EU, big business, the rich in British society and the national politicians, who are all referred to in very strong terms. The DPP accuses the EU of being untrustworthy, but otherwise only problematizes the conduct of the national politicians, and, like UKIP, finds it troublesome that they will not state their exact position on the EU, have been diminishing, if not outright lying about the effects of immigration. The DPP and UKIP both portray themselves as being completely different than the established elite, and thus more trustworthy.

The democratic state of the EU also gets an overhaul from both parties. The DPP identifies several problems pertaining to both the EU on an overall level, the EU institutions, the EU-representatives, and the national politicians. A problem which both identify is regarding the EU's imposition of legislation on the member states. Not only is this undemocratic from the side of the EU, but the national politicians are again blamed for not doing more to preserve the democratic rights of the citizens. The problems should be solved by letting the populations decide what their countries' future relations with the EU should look like. Moreover, the two parties present themselves as the population's mouthpiece, and strongly encourage the electorate to act by voting for them.

Thus, the particular stances of the two parties, and the differences and similarities between their positions have now been accounted for. It has been shown that the two parties have employed quite similar arguments to persuade the electorate about their policies. What now remains to be seen is what the actual electoral result will be, and how they will attempt to live up to their electoral arguments.

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