

Sophie Gregory

Development and International Relations

Masters Thesis

2 June 2014

**The Moroccan Narrative on Western Sahara:**A study on the strategic use of narratives

**Abstract**

This paper seeks to apply poststructuralist notions of discourse and identity to address the ability of discourse to shape narratives and thus become a tool of soft power. Focussing on Morocco’s foreign policy articulations within the theme of the conflict over Western Sahara, it will do so by analysing basic discourses in Moroccan foreign policy and examining how these are enmeshed to become narratives to be used strategically in the international community. I will then seek to understand why narratives have utility in persuading and attracting other international actors to a cause or issue, in this case support for Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. In investigating the foreign policy interactions between Morocco and the United States and Europe, I will demonstrate that Morocco strategically employs narratives to persuade the actors to provide support and legitimacy. I will then demonstrate how Morocco uses these narrative techniques to achieve desirable outcomes from strategic partners in foreign policy such as the United States and the European Union. These outcomes arguably are not only active policy positions, but the continuation of the narrative through repetition. This process of analysis will come to the comprehensive understanding of the motives and methods of employing strategic narratives.

Keywords: discourse; narrative structures; poststructuralism; power; Morocco; Western Sahara

Contents

[Table of Figures 3](#_Toc389399118)

[Table of Abbreviations 3](#_Toc389399119)

[Chapter 1: Introduction 4](#_Toc389399120)

[Problem Formulation and Research Question 4](#_Toc389399121)

[Chapter 2: Method 6](#_Toc389399122)

[Building research parameters 6](#_Toc389399123)

[Textual Selection 8](#_Toc389399124)

[Textual material 8](#_Toc389399125)

[Theoretical considerations 9](#_Toc389399126)

[Objectives and Biases 9](#_Toc389399127)

[Chapter 3: Theory 10](#_Toc389399128)

[Poststructuralism and Discourse 11](#_Toc389399129)

[The Radical Other 12](#_Toc389399130)

[The Ambiguous Other 13](#_Toc389399131)

[Articulations of Identity 13](#_Toc389399132)

[Political Identity Analysis Toolkit 14](#_Toc389399133)

[From Discourse to Narrative 15](#_Toc389399134)

[Narratives, Strategy, and Power 16](#_Toc389399135)

[Strategic culture: An introduction to soft power 16](#_Toc389399136)

[“Attraction, Trust, and Persuasion”: Narratives as a tool of soft power 18](#_Toc389399137)

[Aims and Outcomes 19](#_Toc389399138)

[Narratives as policy: the National Strategic Narrative 19](#_Toc389399139)

[Consolidating poststructuralism and power 20](#_Toc389399140)

[Chapter 4: Morocco and the Western Sahara 21](#_Toc389399141)

[Chapter 5: Analysis 26](#_Toc389399142)

[Identifying Basic Discourses 26](#_Toc389399143)

[Human rights 26](#_Toc389399144)

[Territorial Integrity 29](#_Toc389399145)

[Remarks 32](#_Toc389399146)

[Developing a National Narrative 33](#_Toc389399147)

[Metaphorical definitions 33](#_Toc389399148)

[Typology of the Scenario 34](#_Toc389399149)

[Remarks 38](#_Toc389399150)

[Narratives and Persuasion: Analysing Outcomes 39](#_Toc389399151)

[The United States as a strategic ally 39](#_Toc389399152)

[Europe and the EU 43](#_Toc389399153)

[Chapter 6: Assessment and Conclusion 46](#_Toc389399154)

[Bibliography 48](#_Toc389399155)

### Table of Figures

[Figure 1: Intertextual models (Hansen, 2006) 6](file:///C:\Users\Sophie\Documents\Thesis%20Whole%20EDIT.docx#_Toc389236109)

[Figure 2: Research design for the Morocco’s narratives on the Western Saharan issue (adapted from Hansen, 2006) 6](#_Toc389236110)

[Figure 3: Textual material 7](#_Toc389236111)

[Figure 4: Differentiation through comparison 11](file:///C:\Users\Sophie\Documents\Thesis%20Whole%20EDIT.docx#_Toc389236112)

[Figure 5: Sources of Strategic Culture (Lantis & Howlett, 2009) 16](#_Toc389236113)

[Figure 6: Hard power as defined by resources 16](#_Toc389236114)

[Figure 7: Power defined as behavioural outcomes 16](#_Toc389236115)

[Figure 8: Map of Western Sahara and the Berm 20](#_Toc389236116)

[Figure 9: Map of Linkages 27](#_Toc389236117)

[Figure 10: Territorial integrity identity map 29](#_Toc389236118)

[Figure 11: Temporal differentiation 31](#_Toc389236119)

[Figure 12: Foreign policy concerns of Morocco 38](file:///C:\Users\Sophie\Documents\Thesis%20Whole%20EDIT.docx#_Toc389236120)

### Table of Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| DCFTA | Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area |
| EU | European Union |
| FARA | Foreign Agents Registration Act |
| ICJ | International Court of Justice |
| MACC | Moroccan American Cultural Center |
| MACP | Moroccan American Center for Policy |
| MAP | Maghreb Arab Presse |
| MATIC | Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center |
| MINURSO | United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara |
| OAU | Organisation for African Unity |
| Polisario | Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro |
| SADR | Saharan Arab Democratic Republic |
| SC | United Nations Security Council |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States |

# Chapter 1: Introduction

“Morocco resolves not to allow, under any circumstances, the fate of the Sahara to be determined by the other parties' schemes and failed manoeuvres”(HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d)

The Western Saharan conflict has been ongoing since the latter part of the Twentieth Century. Initially involving territorial claims from two large African states Morocco and Mauritania, as well as an active indigenous movement seeking independence and regional disputes, it evolved from the Spanish decolonisation of the region and progressed into protracted stalemate. Contemporarily, the conflict is locked in a stalemate between Morocco, the Western Saharan recognised nationalist representatives the Polisario, and Algeria, adding tension to an already fraught region. Morocco intends for their autonomy plan to be accepted internationally, whereupon the Western Saharan southern provinces would have self-rule, yet still be under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco. The opposition to this is the argument that as part of the process of decolonisation from Spain, the Western Saharan people have the right to self-determination, as dictated by the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (United Nations, 1960). Morocco currently occupies the territory despite no resolution being forthcoming.

In this conflict, the parties are utilising the power of language and discourse to weave narratives to persuade the international audience to support their cause. As military confrontation is minimal, the conflict has become one of words and stories spun to attract international powers to support and pay attention to the parties in the conflict. Morocco is positioned in the legally weaker position, and yet still holds on to the territory. The power of the state narrative as a magnet to attract allies to the cause is utilised in Moroccan foreign policy. This study will examine the language of the state as deployed by Morocco.

### Problem Formulation and Research Question

This paper seeks to understand more than simply the discourses at play in Moroccan policy on Western Sahara. It will aim to analyse the motives behind such rhetoric being employed, and how these motives relate to recent outcomes in the region. As such, this project will develop through reasoned analysis and application of theory, and will lead to a conclusion on the research questions. The initial research questions are:

What basic discourses does Morocco use in relation to Western Sahara? How are they developed into national narratives?

With the final research question evolving to:

**Why are narratives used by Morocco as a strategic tool on the topic of Western Sahara in the international arena?**

The structure of the project will allow a flow through of ideas and concepts.

Chapter 2: Method will outline and explain the methodology and research design of the study, offering a defence of theories and presenting the qualitative sources of analysis. It will also illustrate the basis on which texts have been selected for analysis.

Chapter 3: Theory will introduce the ontology and epistemology of the concept of poststructuralism. It will define discourse analysis under the poststructuralist discipline, and will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis. It will then move on to discussing narratives and the utility of narratives as an element of power.

Chapter 4: Morocco and the Western Sahara will offer an outline of the conflict in a general manner, discussing key events in the history of the conflict and presenting a timeline of events to aid in understanding the content of the analysis.

Chapter 5: Analysis is split into 3 sections. Firstly, the chapter will seek to present the basic discourses found in contemporary Moroccan foreign policy centred on Western Sahara and the southern provinces. It will then move to a study on how these discourses can be part of a larger story used by the state as a persuasive tool. Finally, the analysis will discuss and analyse how these narrative stories are used in foreign affairs by Morocco, and will measure the outcomes that they achieve.

Chapter 6: Assessment and Conclusion will seek to bring the ideas and analysis together to answer the research question and close with any remaining remarks.

# Chapter 2: Method

A criticism of poststructural discourse theory is that it does not lend itself to empirical study; that in its vagueness it often becomes an arbitrary application of subjective conjecture of the researcher (Smith and Owen, Müller). These criticisms have been countered by Lene Hansen in the work *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War.* In this study, Hansen lays out a stringent methodology for the application of discourse analysis to a case. In doing so, she has provided a reasoned structure for the empirical examination of discourse.

This paper will be applying the research method of Hansen in the analysis as it is a tried and tested method, and provides the starting blocks for my own structure. Many of the concepts introduced in this chapter will have further explanation in the subsequent Theory chapter, and will be signposted as such.

### Building research parameters

In building up the research structure of this project, I need to clearly define the parameters of the study. This is in particular to ensure the adequate answering of the research question, as well as to avoid falling into the trap of trying to investigate ‘everything’. In structuring the research model, there are four important elements that need to be identified and defined before progression on to the analysis. These elements will also define the parameters of the study. These elements are the number of selves that will be analysed, the intertextual model that will be employed, the timeframe which the study will cover, and finally the number of events that the study will analyse (Hansen). I will discuss them in detail below, as well as providing explanation for why certain research choices have been made for this study.

The choice of Selves in the study is simply defined as how many states, nations, or other subjects are to be examined. This can be chosen to either be a single Self study, a multiple Self study which would compare different Selves responses to a single event, or a discursive encounter whereupon the Self and Other are both examined from each perspective (Hansen, 2006). This study will be using the single Self study, and the Self will be Morocco. The study can also be focussed around a number of events. Studies can utilise discourse around one key event, examine two or more events that are related by an issue, or study multiple events that are related temporally (Hansen, 2006). Again, in order to answer the research question, the research model best suited is a single event study based on the conflict over Western Sahara. The scope of this project will be limited in its timeframe, where, due to time and resource restraints, a timeframe of a single moment from 2011 to the present has been chosen to complement the research model.

Textually, this project uses the useful definitional tool from Hanson’s work. Hanson describes the texts that reach the goals of the analysis through a series of models as articulated in Figure 1. Model 1 focusses the analysis on official discourse provided by official texts and direct and secondary texts. This aims to illustrate the stability of official discourses on a topic. Details on textual selection will follow below, but here I will note that model 1 has been chosen as the main textual model, with elements of model 2 being incorporated into the analysis.


If we take the decisions made above, we can structure them into a research design that combines all the elements. A criticism often levelled at poststructuralism is that it lacks a comparative element (Katzenstein, et al., 1998). Most poststructuralist studies, however, will include more than one aspect in each research element creating an embedded comparison in the research model. Conversely, this study is limiting its analysis to a non-comparative level despite potential for criticism. This choice has been made as poststructuralist discourse analysis will form a platform for further analysis in this paper; complexities in the study will come from additional theoretical considerations. Thus, the research design becomes as follows:

Figure 1: Intertextual models (Hansen, 2006)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Number of Selves: |  | Intertextual Models: |
| Single: Morocco |  | Model 1: Official discourse  Model 2: Wider political debate |
|  | Why are narratives used by Morocco as a strategic tool to affect outcomes on the topic of Western Sahara in the international arena? |  |
| Timeframe:  Single moment from 2011-2014 |  | Number of events:  One: Western Sahara conflict |
|  |  |  |

Figure : Research design for the Morocco’s narratives on the Western Saharan issue (adapted from Hansen, 2006)

### Textual Selection

In selecting the texts for analysis I have chosen those that fit in Model 1 of the intertextuality models, supplemented by Model 2. This primary focus on official discourse will enable me to understand what the *state* is constructing as discourse and will allow me to analyse the state method and application of discourse and narratives in their language. The focus of this study will be on English language texts, as this is the primary form that foreign policy texts take. It also reflects the audience that is attracted to the texts as it allows for a larger international, Western, audience.

It must also be noted that much of the official text sources will come from the Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP). This is the official news source of the Moroccan state, and is not an independent entity. Therefore, it can be seen that, as the mouthpiece of the state, that articles published therein are taken to be official communications by the state. In the same way, texts from lobbyists in Washington DC, USA, are also seen to be official documents as the lobbying firms are run on a mandate from the Moroccan government, receive financing from the government, and act as a representative in political aspects of the government in the US.

Other press sources will also be considered in the wider reading but will not be relied upon for analytical discussion. Morocco does not have an entirely free press, and news sources in the country often practice self-censorship, especially in the area of Western Sahara (Human Rights Watch, 2006). However, as there is a degree of independence in the writings of these news sources, they will not be taken as the direct language of the state and therefore will not feature prominently in the analysis.

### Textual material

Based on the parameters set out above, and accounting for typology, the textual material that has been selected for analysis incorporates material from Model 1 of the intertextuality definitions. Locations of texts have been selected from English-language news sources. Resources such as AllAfrica and la MAP provide an extensive grouping of all English-language national news sources from Morocco, and as such are a valuable source of data. The table below lays out the material that will form the basis of the analysis.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Material | Temporal location | |
| Time of study | Historical material |
| General | * Statements and letters from the King * Official releases from parliament * Speeches made by the King * Speeches made by high ranking government officials * Articles from la MAP * Resources from officially sanctioned lobbyists * Reports on military expenditure * Additional material as required | * Speech from King’s coronation * Speech from Green March * Academic literature |
| Key texts | * 37th and 38th Anniversary of Green March speeches * Statement to Parliament |  |

Figure : Textual material

### Theoretical considerations

This project seeks to supplement discourse theory and analysis with further theories on narratives and power. While unconventional in their melding, I hope that by sympathetically applying these theories it will help create a textured analysis that will go further to answering my research question than using single theories. This project will use discourse analysis as the primary building block, and will complement this firstly with narrative structure theory, before finally applying aspects of power theory. I intend for this to move the analysis from ‘what is said’ to ‘what is meant’ leading to ‘how this is used’ and finally to ‘why this is used’.

### Objectives and Biases

This paper seeks to identify discourses and narratives in Moroccan foreign policy, and establish how they are used in the international arena. In saying this, it must be noted that this paper does not seek to assess Morocco’s role in Western Sahara, instead it seeks to assess how Morocco *articulates* its role in Western Sahara. Therefore, this paper will not be discussing the legal, ethical, and logistical elements of the conflict as a central part of the analysis, as these bare little aid to answering the research question.

Bias is a risk in discourse analysis. Meanings are intended to be observed rather than assigned. In order to minimise the effect of author bias, I present many examples as direct quotes to increase transparency with readers. In cases where indirect comments are presented for analysis, I have attempted to transcribe literally. Author inferences from texts have been kept to a minimum, and any such inferences will be expressed as such. Bias is unavoidable in academia; it is the task of the author to minimise their imprinting on the text as far as possible.

# Chapter 3: Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, International Relations theory has had a paradigm shift. The dominant theories of Liberalism and Realism have been challenged and have struggled to retain relevance as “universal” theories in the new global environment. The dominance of Kenneth Waltz’s theory on the balance of power and bipolarity as a continuing feature of world politics collapsed with the Berlin wall (Smith & Owens, 2008). The rise of globalization, the increase in participation of non-governmental organizations and transnational actors, and global issues such as climate change became issues that traditional theories such as Realism struggled to address. This meant that space opened in the academic arena for alternative approaches to be proposed, which classed themselves as more relevant to world politics in the new century.

In response to this change in theoretical environment it is relevant to discuss two ideas in political theory. Firstly is the transition from discussions around explanatory theory towards more consideration to constitutive theory. Explanatory theories see the world as something external and therefore untouched by theories relating to it; whereas constitutive theory is one that posits that theory helps shape the world that it is describing. Theory is no longer external to the study; instead it may itself construct how we see the situation. Classical- and neo-Realism are commonly termed to be explanatory theories in that they examine regularities in behaviour and draw conclusions from this in a manner akin to scientific study. In contrast, the emerging theories of the last twenty years can predominantly be described as constitutive. This distinction ties in with the second idea that must be introduced: the contrast between foundational and anti-foundational. Smith and Owens describe the differences here thusly:

A foundationalist position is one that thinks that all truth claims (about some features of the world) can be judged true or false. An anti-foundationalist thinks that truth claims cannot be so judged since there are never neutral grounds for doing so. Instead, each theory will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral position available to determine between rival claims. (Smith & Owens, 2008, p. 177)

This anti-foundational approach is the grounding of much critical theory such as post-modernism, post-structuralism, feminism, and post-colonialism. These ideas are important to note as they draw attention to assumptions on the nature of knowledge that impact on the discussion on discourse theory. They challenge the dominance of Realism in the exploration of knowledge and power.

This theory chapter will introduce post-structuralism as a theory that is constitutive and anti-foundational in its approach. Drawing on thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault, post-structuralism will be described below as a school of thought that places emphasis of the power of language. Following in this chapter will be an explanation of discourse theory, which will be applied in the analysis. I will also be introducing ideas of discourse and narratives as currencies of power, before closing with how narratives and discourses can be used strategically and transparently by states as part of national strategic narratives.

## Poststructuralism and Discourse

Poststructuralism emerged as an alternative approach to the study of international theory and embraced the constitutive and anti-foundational natures of theory as defined above. Poststructuralism is not without its critics. It is often seen as a weak theory; one that is unscientific in its research methods and struggles with empirical choices (Smith & Owens, 2008). However, Lene Hansen sets forth a methodological framework for poststructuralist studies which has been elaborated on in the previous chapter. Here I will seek to bind the methodological aspects of poststructuralism to the theoretical and bring a greater understanding of discourse theory as will be applied in the analysis.

The roots of poststructuralism can be traced back to the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. The nature of language, and the study thereof, was pioneered by Saussure in the late 20th Century. He posited that words themselves are not vocal identifiers linked directly to a referent that is predetermined in the natural order of things. Instead words are signs, and to understand them one must compare them with each other, rather than in relation to their referent (White, 1988). In this way, it is the difference between signs within a system of signs that imbue the signs with meaning. Thus, in this structuralist method, meaning is made possible by the systems of convention in which the elements reside and are able to act as signs (White, 1988). In practice, the comparison often takes the form of braking concepts down into binaries: woman/man, peace/war, short/tall. The signifiers are given meaning from what they are compared to, creating an understanding that is based around social conventions on what it means to be “man” and therefore the opposite is the meaning of “women” for example. Structuralism is then the study of the social phenomena which are the reflections on an underlying structural system of predetermined concepts (Müller, 2008).

Poststructualism takes this notion further; it seeks to challenge these binaries and break them down in order to show oppositions. Noted philosopher and thinker Jacques Derrida put forward that the world and a text are constituted in the same way; that is that the world “reflects the concepts and structures of language” (Smith & Owens, 2008) in a manner that he defines as textual interplay. In order to expose this construction, he posits a “general strategy of deconstruction” (Watts, 1991) in which he argued that language is a system of signs differentiated through comparison with each other, but its meaning is not established through the essence of the ‘thing’ (Hansen, 2006) but instead it is formed through juxtapositions whereupon one element is always favoured over its opposite (see Figure 4).

Michel Foucault’s work also forms the groundwork for poststructuralism. Foucault elucidates that as with Derrida in this sense, there always exists an ‘other’, which is marginalized, devalued or homogenized (White, 1988) and this other can exist in form as actors, groups or even as a form of the individual’s physical life. Derrida echoes this theme of ‘otherness’ in his deconstruction of binaries, and claims that deconstruction and questioning of binaries is essential in order to identify hegemonic Western thought; unquestioned binaries have characteristics of Western dominance over discourse (White, 1988). Deconstruction of binaries and hierarchies of meaning allows for an understanding that theory relies on artificial stabilities, which are produced by these seemingly natural oppositions.

Foucault suggests that a principle of reversal should be employed, with the repressed being rescued from its stifled position in Western discourse. Additionally, he added that a fundamental ‘inversion of signs’ would upend the inequal power balance and relationships reflected in language, particularly the ‘normal’ ideas that come from a privileged position in certain discourses (Watts, 1991).

Figure 4: Differentiation through comparison

developed

civilised

rich

rational

independent

underdeveloped

barbaric

poor

irrational

dependent

Poststructuralism is at its heart about accepting the constructions of identity that actors engage in, and analysing the mechanism that these actors use in order to construct their identities. Constructing identities and presenting these identities to an audience are used to present themselves as legitimate and their opposition as illegitimate or ‘wrong’. They are also used to legitimise policy and foreign policy responses. Here we will explore how the Other is used to construct identity based on difference and perceived threat. However, in practice it must be noted that it is not this simplistic; identity can be constructed through *degrees* of Otherness, and does not rely on the Self/Other dichotomy (Hansen, 2006). Identity can also be constructed through the articulation of more than one Other. The key concern is that identity is formed through differentiating and linking signs, and making the identity of the Self whole by building a comparison with the Other.

### The Radical Other

The radical Other is constructed in order to provide legitimization for security policies, and are presented as threatening identities which are detrimental or a threat to the national self. Historical examples of these Others are identities such as countries, communists, immigrants, and homosexuals (Hansen, 2006). These are Others who are constructed to threaten the very values and intrinsic identity of the good Self. The differences between the Self and Others are constituted as “evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical” (Connolly, 1991). The use of a radical Other in the defining identity of the Self allows a politicization of security and can legitimately bring security into the realm of policy. As Buzan et al. posit in their definition of the act of securitization, if a threat is presented as existential to the survival of the Self, then it allows the Self to take extraordinary measures to nullify the threat (Buzan, et al., 1998). It allows a greater escalation of response, and thus resulting policy against the Other can reflect this. For example, the United States domestic policy of internment of those of Japanese origin during the Second World War constitutes a policy response that is extraordinary, and yet determined on the identity of the Other.

### The Ambiguous Other

The radical Other is easily identified; it is the actor that is the very opposite of the values and identity of the Self. However, in understanding that there are degrees of Otherness, we can start to identify types of difference that can be seen, and how this constructs diverse identities of Self and Other. These articulations of less-than-radical Others (Hansen, 2006) are situated instead within a web of identities and not merely the self-other binary. Firstly, there can be an identity based on the transcendence of conflict; that difference and Otherness is formed from differentiation between the Self and conflict actors. Secondly, difference can be constructed from different regional groupings or ethnicities, and can for an identity through the integration of countries and people in a region. There can also be identities constructed through geographical difference, such as in the case of a country or identity with different cultural and geographical boundaries, which may absorb element of both but still see themselves as a separate entity. In this case, the country may use this placement to engage in favourable relationships with neighbouring countries. As well as these examples of ambiguous difference, there can also be the Other formed through differences within the Self identity. The Self can emulate a superior Other while still constructing its identity as a part of it, with the difference coming from a temporal displacement. The temporal Other can also be where the Other is a previous time of the Self, where the Self does not want to return to. A clear example of this would be the European Union, and its temporal other being the strife in the first half of the Twentieth Century.

### Articulations of Identity

In order to analyse the constructions of identity, one must begin by identifying explicit articulations of identity which take the form of terms that clearly constitute the Other or the Self. These articulations can take the form of words clearly used to describe an actor, such as evil, manipulative, aggressor for the Other, and contrasting terms for the Self. These become the signs that indicate meaning for the identities, and when placed in a larger system of signs can create an identity based on discourse. This process of building a bank of signs that can be used in discursive contexts can be described as linking and differentiating.

These constructions of identity can therefore be investigated through four questions: which signs are articulated by a discourse; how they achieve discursive stability; where instabilities between the signs might occur; and how competing discourses can interpret the same sign in different ways to different effects (Hansen, 2006).

This process of identity analysis needs some qualification. Identity is always relationally constructed, therefore there will always be an Other, and the Self will always be articulated through the Other. However, texts will not necessarily explicitly state these two concepts. Instead, there is an implicit juxtaposition of these oppositional binaries, meaning that the linking process is implied rather than stated. In some cases, discourses are repeated to an extent that the signing becomes established, and thus are not needed to be fully articulated in order to construct the identity. As Hanson states, the audience can “fill in the signs” (Hansen, 2006) when presented with a reference or topic. Articulated identities can also suffer from “discursive disappearance” (Hansen, 2006) whereupon they cease to be relevant over tie, as situations or policy changes.

Identities are not static, and in some ways can be contradictory within a discourse. Occasionally links can be put under pressure, either by oppositional actors or by events turning focus on these. An example of a contradiction could be for example in the area of human rights, whereupon the Other is termed a violator, and the identity of the Self is built around the difference between human rights violator and human rights observer (or even human rights champion). Here, if an event occurs that shows the Self committing a human rights violation, there is needed a political response and a reconstruction of the sign to absorb this event into the Self identity. A common response would be for the Self to reject this sign as against the national identity, but the fact that it exists exerts pressure on this process of linking and differentiating.

### Political Identity Analysis Toolkit

Hanson puts forward an analytical method for identifying and analysing identities in foreign policy discourse. Using the idea that identities are placed within the universal concepts of space, time, and responsibility, she argues that states build their identities through these modes. The dimensions become spatial identity, temporal identity, and ethical identity, and each is of equal weight with regard to importance in identity construction (Hansen, 2006).

Spatial identity is the process of defining an entity by its boundaries. Boundaries are constructed for identity formation. This is because identity is always relationally constituted, meaning that a spatially constructed entity needs to distinguish itself among other similar structured entities. Space and boundaries can be seen explicitly in countries and regions, where “France” or “Libya” are bounded identities associated with their country name. Elements of the political can be added to this identity construction when the boundaries become explicit yet still politically defined, such as in regional differentiation: Africa, Latin America, and so forth are political spatial boundaries. Spatial identity can also take advantage of abstract notions of political space to construct identities that become a mix of the territorial and the abstract political such as Roma (Hansen, 2006). Finally, terms can be implicit and abstract describing groupings that have political function; homosexuals, communists, immigrants, and fascists are examples of this bounding of identity via concept rather than territory.

Temporal identity is articulated through the expression of themes such as “development, transformation, continuity, change, repetition, or stasis” (Hansen, 2006). It is an analysis of understanding difference between discourse of progress and discourse of intransience. Identities can be seen to be backwardly displaced in time, for example if they are described as primitive or barbaric. Conversely, they can also be described as forwardly temporally displaced. This can be when the Other is seen as superior to the Self, and can be aspirational or attainable. In constructing foreign policy identities, this process of temporally locating the actors in the discourse is used to construct stories, showing how the Self changes over time, these becoming “narratives of how struggles, defeats, and conquests distinguish and build the Self” (Hansen, 2006). More will be discussed about narrative forming later in this theory chapter.

Identity in foreign policy discourse is always constructed around the concept of responsibility, whether to the Other or to national citizens as part of the Self. Responsibility is the articulation that the Self state must act, and indeed is the only actor in the position to act, due to an ethical issue. The ethical identity constructed through discourse can be identified through articulations of ethics, morality, and responsibility, and the articulation of the Self’s (non)responsibility towards the Other (Hansen, 2006). By constructing identity through an ethical lens, political leaders gain the power, authority and perceived legitimacy to take decisions with far-ranging consequences. This links in with the concept of securitization as mentioned above.

These three concepts provide the tools for applying these theories of identity and discourse to foreign policy texts. They are identifiers that will allow for a complete and accurate reading of texts, and take into account the varied and degrees of Otherness, Self, and identity that is contained within the language of states.

## From Discourse to Narrative

Discourse is, as discussed, the imbuing of meaning into language in order to build and shape identities. To supplement discourse as a concept, however, this project will be injecting the concept of narrative building in a political context into the analysis. Superficially, discourse and narrative may seem to be two sides of the same coin and in practice this can almost be seen to be the case. Yet there are crucial differences to the application of discourse and narratives to political action. To define the differences between discourse and narrative, we can turn to Haarstad and Fløysand who provide a useful differentiation:

“Discourse has been applied to denote a general exchange of meaning on a general theme that largely structures the way in which that particular topic is thought” (Haarstad & Fløysand, 2007, p. 294)

Whereas in contrast, narratives are:

“more specific perceptions or modes of explanation promoted by an actor or a group of actors.” (Haarstad & Fløysand, 2007, p. 294)

Narratives provide a structure for meanings and are a method of connecting non-random events. Within the political realm, they are more than independent objects. They are a process that can shape discussions and rely on agency to propagate. This then implies that they need more than a teller, they need an audience (Bottici, 2010). Therefore, it is more the *perception* of sequences of non-random connected events (Toolan, 1988) with discourse creating a perception of meaning and identity moving from a juxtaposition of facts towards a narrative. Narratives bring together non-random events and meaning is created out of them by the teller. This means that the teller can shape the narrative and in that it becomes a powerful tool to understanding the political world. They become “means both for world making and self making” (Bottici, 2010). In this way, drawing on identity construction concepts in discourse analysis, they are a means of constructing political identity in foreign affairs.

Fundamentally, narratives consist of the story (events that have happened) and the discourse (how the event is presented) (O'Neill, 1996). They contain a beginning, a middle, and an end, and it is this trajectory that enables narratives to provide meaning (Bottici, 2010). George Lakoff, a political science scholar who gained credence in the study of American politics and election campaigning, puts forward a theory around the use of metaphor in building a narrative structure that follows a relatable and traditional story formula (Lakoff, 1991). In presenting his analysis of the rhetoric behind the United States involvement in the first Gulf War, he iterated that states often are cast as people; that is, they are given shared characteristics of individuals. Therefore, it follows that:

“The most common discourse form in the West where there is combat to settle moral accounts is the classic fairy tale. When people are replaced by states in such a fairy tale, what results is the most common scenario for a just war.” (Lakoff, 1991)

The fairy tale can be utilised in discourse in any conflict, and has some common features. Firstly, that the cast is composed of a villain, a victim, a hero, and occasionally a helper. The victim and the hero can be the same person. The hero embodies the characteristics of the righteous; he undergoes trials and tribulations, and has to make sacrifices on his journey. The villain is inherently evil, and cannot be reasoned with (Lakoff, 1991). The narrative can be shaped into forms or scenarios that depend on how the cast is filled and what crime has been committed against the victim. The basic scenarios can be identified thusly: the ‘Self-defence’ scenario whereupon the villain threatens the hero and the victim, and so the hero must act to protect themselves; the ‘rescue’ scenario where the villain harms the victim, and the hero must fight to defeat the villain; the ‘overcoming obstacles’ form where the hero becomes the victim and must overcome numerous obstacles on its way to defeating evil; and finally the ‘achieving potential’ scenario where the hero achieves his special potential through hard work, bravery, discipline and willpower (Lakoff, 2006). The essential feature of these argument narrative structures is that they provide a framework upon which identity can be linked with culture, and will reinforce the resonance of arguments with the audience. While this theory is certainly Western-centric, it can be argued that in this study case the audience is predominantly Western and therefore a Western narrative form is best served to resonate with the audience.

## Narratives, Strategy, and Power

Discourse and narratives are interesting to explore on their own, but this project looks to expand these concepts and analyse how they can be used *strategically* to achieve foreign policy aims. In this section, I will look at where strategic culture is based, and then discuss Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, before drawing on this to present how narratives and discourse are actively used strategically by states.

### Strategic culture: An introduction to soft power

Strategic culture is the beliefs and assumptions that structure the choices that states make, particularly in the case of war (Rosen, 1995), and the “ideational milieu that limits behavioural choices” (Johnston, 1995 cited in Lantis & Howlett, 2009) and it is from this that predictions on strategic choice can be derived (Lantis & Howlett, 2009). Strategic culture finds its source in a number of political resources. Traditional strategic culture (see Figure 5) draws from the physical, political and cultural realms as potential sources of political culture.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Physical | Political | Social/Cultural |
| Geography  Climate  Natural resources  Generational change  Technology | Historical experience  Political system  Elite beliefs  Military organizations | Myths and symbols  Defining texts |

Figure : Sources of Strategic Culture (Lantis & Howlett, 2009)

Bringing power into the strategic realm, we can see that it is in itself a contested term. It can be simply be defined as the ability to affect behaviour to gain the outcome that you desire (Nye, 2011). It can be achieved through a number of means and draws on traditional notions of strategic culture as articulated above. This traditional, conventional power has been concerned with the military might and reach of a state, but in contemporary foreign affairs, conventional power “remains the main shield for most states, but the sword of choice for few” (Ferris, 2010). Bribery and threats can also be used to induce cooperation. This is what Nye defines as hard power (NYE). However, there is a second face of power that states employ to achieve their preferred ends. This term was coined as soft power in Joseph Nye’s 1990 work *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* In the words of Nye, soft power is:

“the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2011)

Soft power is sourced in the culture (including practices), commerce, government policies both domestic and foreign, and crucially, values, of the state. Taking elements from traditional strategic culture, soft power also seeks to cement itself into how the state perceives itself, through its values and culture. Traditional hard power is defined by resources; how resources are used to achieve outcomes (See Figure 5). The more accessible resources a state has, then the more power it can exercise in the international sphere.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Power = | Context | Skill |  |
| Resources >>>>>>> | Conversion strategy >>>>> | Preferred outcome |

Figure : Hard power as defined by resources

Soft power, however, is concerned primarily with the achievement of outcomes through attraction or coercion, and it is the outcomes by which power can be acknowledged.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Power = | affect others >  [scope] | re: something >  [domain] | by means >  [coercion, reward, attraction] | to preferred outcome |

Figure : Power defined as behavioural outcomes

Soft power is highly value led. It draws on common values, identities and situations to encourage support for the state. As Nye sums up:

"A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them." (Nye, 2004)

However, Nye stresses that soft power is not only wielded by the ‘good’ (Nye, 2011). Soft power is descriptive, not normative, and can be used by states who are not necessarily acting for the good of the people, region or world.

In soft power, it is the ends that shape the actions taken in foreign policy. The strategy employed by the state is picked to achieve the outcome that is desired, and can take the form of coercion, incentives, attraction, and persuasion. As Nye articulates, soft power is exercised through the ability to shape the preferences of others with the aim of attracting them to do what you want (NYE). In essence, an alternative name for soft power could be the power of attraction.

### “Attraction, Trust, and Persuasion”: Narratives as a tool of soft power

Within this typology of power, narratives play an important role. Narratives become the means through which states can put forward their position, with their “story” drawing on many elements of strategic culture. As such, narratives become the currency of soft power (Nye, 2004) and it is the story that becomes laden with value in the global arena. The narrative is currency, and as such it follows that the political application is a competition with the aim of enhancing a state’s own narrative and diminishing that of the opponent. It is a “contest of competitive credibility” (Nye, 2004) and thus global politics involves “verbal fighting” (Nye, 2004) between competing states and their narratives. It gives states and actors the ability to channel their arguments and actions into a framework that fits their agenda and their narrative. Non-state actors such as NGOs can also try to pressure a state into action. A technique that they can use is shame; in doing so they attack the state’s national reputation, around which a narrative may have been formed. The game is essentially to compete using the narratives in order to increase the self’s own soft power and to decrease that of their opponent (Nye, 2004).

In this environment, soft power is deployed strategically to achieve a goal. Moving away from the hard power tools of economic might and military strength, the tools of soft power are the closely related charismatic qualities of trust, attraction and persuasion (Nye, 2004). Persuasion in particular is key in constructing a narrative around an issue or agenda; narratives are framed to maximise the potential to persuade. Third parties are particularly a target of persuasion, either directly or indirectly, and are targeted with emotive appeals and complimentary narratives over logic and facts (Nye, 2004). When narratives use language that has an emotional or persuasive impact, it takes a form whereupon the state can select what direction it wants its story to take. In doing this, “some “facts” become important and others fall by the wayside” (Nye, 2004, p. 93). This allows a state to construct, and draw attention to, the narrative that best serves their agenda.

These narratives serve a persuasive and attractive purpose. However, they must be carefully tailored in order to be utilised effectively and achieve the desired outcomes. Firstly, the narratives must appeal to the mainstream (Nye, 2004). It is the mainstream media, academia, and popular culture that can propagate a narrative as well as the formal structures of government and officials. Narratives often appeal to the masses by focussing on national identity and history. An example to illustrate this is ‘America as the land of the free’. The discourse employed to form the narrative can be issue based such as ideas of democracy or freedom, and the language used repeats these meanings and entrenches them in society. However, there is a risk involved in constructing a narrative; if the narrative is discovered to be too obviously manipulative or exaggerated, it can be dismissed as propaganda, and thus it loses its persuasive power (Nye, 2004). It is then harder to compete in the global political narrative battle.

### Aims and Outcomes

As explained above, in power relations, it is outcomes that are most important. Soft power, through the persuasive and attractive use of narratives, may be employed by states, but it is always with an aim of achieving something. Outcomes are no longer determined by whose army wins, or who has economic dominance. In this context, it is whose story wins (Nye, 2004).

In terms of discourse, the story can be seen to have won if a meaning of language achieves hegemonic status (Hansen, 2006). The prescribed meaning of the word or concept is in line with the agenda of the state. As such, the ‘Other’ is universally understood to be as the state wishes it to be perceived, while the Self is in contrast identified as the positive opposite. Discourse can have different degrees of success in ‘winning’ the narrative battle however. It can also be seen to have had the desired outcome if these discourses or narratives are repeated by actors who have been targeted for persuasion or attraction; the actors who the state is looking to assert power on. This can mean that language or entire narratives can be repeated on the international stage, in comparison to those of competing ‘other’ narratives, which will be ignore or vilified.

### Narratives as policy: the National Strategic Narrative

The value of narratives in foreign policy is beginning to be recognised by states. A key example of this is the 2011 publication of *A National Strategic Narrative* by Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby, a retired member of the US Navy and a retired US Marine respectively, writing under the pseudonym Mr Y. This document was written as an official policy guide based on the United States’ changing national narrative in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 environment. The aim of the document is to articulate a story that all Americans can identify with (Slaughter, 2011) and as such pursue foreign policy based on a constructed “American” identity.

It is this presentation of the Self identity as a persuasive tool in itself that links it with discursive construction as discussed above. The strengthening of the articulation of the Self identity through a strategic document means that the signs are readily available for the national audience, and consequently, in the process of differentiation, grounds the language available for the United States to process conflict and Otherness. This document is policy-oriented; it is “intended to frame our National policy decisions” (Mr. Y, 2011). This agency in discourse and identity construction lends itself to expressions of soft power and persuasive techniques.

This document is referenced here not because this project will be studying America, but because it highlights that narratives, language, and identity are a crucial part of foreign policy. It also shows that states may not be acknowledging a national narrative strategy, but that it is a consideration in communication, policy, and international discourse. States are embracing the strategic power of discourse and narrative.

## Consolidating poststructuralism and power

At this point, it is relevant to explain the consolidation of post-structuralism and power. Poststructuralism is in its essence highly critical of theory, and in particular traditional IR theories. Power, on the other hand, is common parlance in IR theory and is seen as a grounding concept within Realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

Poststructuralism is an approach to the understanding and critique of international politics, and as discussed above, is focussed on identity, meaning and understanding. It is also tasked with challenging interpretations that are already considered an integral part of International Relations such as knowledge and power. Poststructuralism uses discourse analysis as a method for examining these interpretations and deconstructing the language of states. Discourse, then “refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell, 2013).

It is this linking of identities, relationships, and outcomes that show how a study on power can be consolidated with a poststructuralist approach. Power, as Nye describes it, is not part of the realist or liberal schools of thought; it merely is its own entity. Poststructuralism can approach a study on power in a critical way; it can deconstruct how power is used transparently by state actors. Power can supplement a discourse analysis by providing understanding on how discourse is utilised, applied, and strategically actioned in international political discussion.

# Chapter 4: Morocco and the Western Sahara

Western Sahara is an area south of Morocco with a long Atlantic coastline and land borders with Mauritania, Algeria, and Morocco. Currently, a man-made wall called the Berm runs the length of the territory splitting Western Sahara into a Moroccan controlled area on the west and a free zone controlled by the Polisario on the east. Figure 7 illustrates this region. The conflict over Western Sahara is complex and multifaceted. For further analysis and discussion on the issue I recommend Zunes and Mundy’s book titled *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution*, and Erik Jensen’s *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate?*. Here I will present the main issues and parties involved. The timeline below seeks to address the major events taking place during the conflict.



Figure : Map of Western Sahara and the Berm

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. During the period of the Western Sahara conflict, the heads of state have been King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI. Morocco has an elected parliament, although the King still holds executive and legislative powers, in particular in areas of the military, foreign policy and religion. The country has a unique culture with a mix of Arab, Berber and colonial European influence. Western Sahara has been recognised as a state by many countries and holds membership as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, in English the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro or Polisario, are the recognised representatives of Western Sahara by the United Nations (UN).

Morocco’s claim on Western Sahara is based around the nature of pre-colonial sovereignty in the region. This is partially territorial, but more importantly religious based on the shifting boundaries of bled el makhzen and bled es siba (Sater, 2010). That is, boundaries between the land of the makzhen, a structure of organisation with an elite house of power and a king as head, and the land of tribal rebellion, or simply, the difference between the space where the state exercises its authority, opposed to territory subject to the central authority of the country (Sater, 2010).

The monarchy saw a threat to its sovereignty as nationalistic political parties gained ground in Moroccan politics. As the process of decolonisation was occurring during this time, Morocco saw this as an opportunity to reclaim the Western Sahara from the Spanish colonial rule, partly to cater to this nationalistic sentiment (Jensen, 2012). However, soon realising that the UN process of decolonisation included a legal right to self-determination and that with Spain overseeing a referendum on self-determination would result in a lack of control of the process for morocco; it sought to stall the process. A UN survey also suggested that independence was the preferred option for the Sahrawi people, and that the Polisario were a popular and recognises representative of the people (Zunes & Mundy, 2010).

As part of the stalling process, Morocco took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, asking the question:

Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? (International Court of Justice, 1975)

The response from the ICJ was the following:

The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory. (International Court of Justice, 1975)

King Hassan claimed that this interpretation was in favour of the Moroccan claim, and it went as far as to legitimise it (Sater, 2010). He called on the people of Morocco to march into Western Sahara to claim their land from the Spanish colonial powers. This was named the Green March, and as a civilian movement there was little legitimate action that Mauritania or the Polisario could do to counter it. In fat, the Moroccan military played a limited role in the march, although secretly they entered the territory as support in case of an armed response. The march stirred nationalistic sentiment, but also played a role in changing the outlay of the discussions over the territory. It moved from one of decolonisation and self-determination to one of a regional, multi-party territorial dispute (Sater, 2010). After this, almost half the Sahrawi population went into exile in Tindouf, Algeria (Jensen, 2012).

The war in Western Sahara started with the Polisario focussing on Mauritania as their army was weaker than that of Morocco (Zunes & Mundy, 2010). However, after a coup in Mauritania in 1978, a peace agreement between the Polisario and Mauritania was signed. Morocco quickly moved to claim the territory vacated by Mauritania. Morocco constructed the Berm to maintain its position, and a military stalemate between the Polisario and Morocco ensued.

Negotiations over the conflict struggled to begin as Morocco saw the Polisario as a creation of Algeria, and therefore to enter into talks with the Polisario would be to recognise and legitimise them as a real entity. Morocco and the Polisario were also both presenting themselves as the sole representatives of the Sahrawi people; Morocco recognition of Polisario would negate their claim to this. The United Nations took on the issue of Western Sahara in 1988, and a cease-fire agreement including repatriation of Algerian refugees and a referendum on independence or integration was negotiated by 1991. However, the Polisario and Morocco disagreed on all elements of the deal. The UN had created MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, and it was this body that was tasked with organising the referendum on sovereignty. The referendum posed significant problems; most notably that while both sides agreed that the vote should be limited to native ethnic Sahrawis, the criteria on which these people should be identified was hotly contended. Polisario sought to use the 1974 census conducted by Spain, however Morocco argued that it was out of date. With accusations that Morocco was increasing the number of voters in order to “stack the vote in its favour” (Zunes & Mundy, 2010), the MINURSO process of assessing thousands of applicants to the referendum broke down by 1996.

Progress stalled, and then was abandoned by 2000. Two new proposals were discussed and presented to parties by the UN in the following years. James Baker, then- United Nations Secretary General's personal envoy to Western Sahara, set forward a ‘third way’ Framework Agreement that allowed for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for a period of five years followed by a referendum that did not explicitly offer independence. While Morocco was open to this agreement, Algeria and Polisario rejected it immediately. The second proposal was amended to define the referendum as on independence, integration or autonomy. Algeria and Polisario accepted this, Morocco did not (Jensen, 2012). By 2005, Morocco was drafting its own autonomy proposal which was submitted to the UN Security Council in 2007 and talks involving all parties followed. However, as Morocco had no intention of respecting self-determination, these talks fell apart. What has followed are periods of pro-independence protests in Western Sahara and a continued stalemate in the international sphere. Essentially, the conflict revolves around the “winner takes all” solution wanted from all parties, and for Morocco the autonomy solution would mean a military victory for the Kingdom (Sater, 2010). The timeline below underlines key events in the Western Sahara conflict.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Timeline of events (BBC News, 2014) (Reuters, 2008) | |
| 1884  1957  1973  1975 June  1975 November  1975 December  1976  1979  1980  1984  1991  2001  2003  2006  2007 August  2010 November  2011 July  2013 April  2014 February | Spain makes Western Sahara a colony.  Morocco brings claim on Western Sahara to the United Nations, based on centuries-old historical connections.  Polisario Front is established as sole representatives of Sahrawi people.  King Hassan takes claim to the World Court in The Hague. Court rules that some tribes have allegiance to morocco but ultimately the issue of sovereignty should be settled through self-determination. Spain will organise a referendum.  The Green March begins, with King Hassan mobilising 350,000 Moroccans and crossing into the territory.  Spain releases control of the region and transfers administration to Morocco and Mauritania.  Morocco sends troops to occupy the territory.  Spanish troops withdraw, Polisario troops backed by Algeria and Libya proclaim the territory as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.  Mauritania declares peace with Polisario and renounces claim to the territory.  Morocco annexes the area previously administrated by Mauritania.  SADR is admitted to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).  Morocco leaves the OAU.  Ceasefire is brokered by UN, ending fighting between Polisario and Moroccan forces.  UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is established to oversee ceasefire and monitor referendum.  Referendum on self-determination set for January 1992 is postponed due to disputes over voter eligibility.  Stalemate begins.  Initiative for Sahrawis proposed by UN and former US Secretary of State James Baker.  Deal would see autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for Western Sahara, with a referendum on self-determination after a transition period of four years. Voting rights would be given to Moroccan settlers who had been in residence in Western Sahara for over one year.  Polisario and Algeria reject proposal.  UN proposes Western Sahara become a semi-autonomous region of Morocco for a transition period of up to five years, followed by a referendum on whether the territory should become independent, semi-autonomous or integrated with Morocco. Polisario endorses the plan but Morocco rejects it, stating it will never give up sovereignty.  Morocco receives criticism from the UN on its human rights record in Western Sahara.  The Moroccan advisory council recommends autonomy initiative. Polisario dismiss proposal.  Two days of talks at the UN in New York end with no progress.  Moroccan security forces storm a protest camp in Western Sahara, which triggers violent demonstrations in regional capital Elayoun (Laãyoune).  King Mohammed VI scores a landslide victory in a referendum on a reformed constitution he proposed in response to Arab Spring protests.  Morocco cancels joint military exercises with the US over their backing for UN monitoring of human rights in Western Sahara. Morocco calls the proposed monitoring an attack on its sovereignty.  Morocco suspends judicial co-operation with France following a diplomatic row over lawsuits in Paris that accuse Morocco’s intelligence chief of complicity in torture. |

# Chapter 5: Analysis

The analysis will seek to utilise the theory presented in order to have a greater understanding of the issues surrounding the research questions. It will be structured in a way sympathetic to the structure of the research formulation. Firstly, it will seek to identify the basic discourses used in Moroccan official speech and text using the techniques and materials outlined in the Method and Theory chapters. Using these discoveries, it will then seek to understand the national narratives that are present throughout discourse, and the flow that these narratives take through Moroccan identity and history. Finally, it will bring these concepts together to examine how these narratives are employed in international relations, and why they are strategically used by Morocco in communication around the topic of Western Sahara.

## Identifying Basic Discourses

Basic discourses in conversations of the state present the underlying notions of constructed identity and established meanings that the state can draw upon to articulate meanings in a variety of situations. In deconstructing and analysing these basic discourses, we must understand that these are not the only discourses prevalent in the identity constructions of state language. However, these basic discourses can be seen as building blocks of meaning that can be used in other contexts; they also are highly populating in official texts produced by the state. This chapter will analyse two basic discourses that define the identities involved in the Western Sahara dispute.

### Human rights

Identifying basic discourses requires a wide reading of texts over the study time period. In undertaking this initial reading, the human rights discourse stood out as a major source of identity construction in the Western Sahara conflict. Moroccan official statements, official press, and other press sources all covered human rights abuses in the Tindouf refugee camps frequently and employed identity construction throughout. This section will be using the toolkit discussed in the Theory chapter to analyse this discourse.

The spatial dimension is about drawing a line around who constitutes an Other and how this differentiates itself from the Self and other actors. The text examined is an extension of the Self; it is the mouthpiece of the Self. From this, there are two key words that are used to spatially define the Other in this discursive exchange: Polisario, and Separatist. Neither truly fit the theoretical concept of radical otherness in their entirety; however they are constructed in this discourse to embrace radical elements. Polisario is not a state entity; it is an authoritative body without natural borders. The Polisario are the representatives of the SADR and to many states they are the recognised leaders of a potential self-determined Western Sahara state, and they are a recognised interested party in official talks on Western Sahara. In Moroccan discourse, however, the identity of the Polisario is innately politicized. The texts use Polisario as a descriptor; refugee camps in Tindouf (upon which much of the human rights discourse is centred) are described as Polisario- or Polisario-run camps in many instances (f.x. (MAP, 2011a) (MAP, 2011f) (MAP, 2011g) (MAP, 2011h)). Connecting the term Polisario directly with the refugee camps intermeshes any human rights abuses occurring in camp with a discursive identity of the Polisario. The texts state that within these camps the Polisario is engaging in torture (MAP, 2011c), embezzlement (MAP, 2011h) (MAP, 2011a), abuse (MAP, 2011f), and imprisonment (MAP, 2011g) (MAP, 2011c). This ties the concepts together so that they become signposts of meaning. Thus, anytime Polisario is stated in discourse, it links to this identity of them as human rights abusers. In addition, the link works the other way in that when a term such as embezzler or torturer is used in material about Western Sahara or the refugee camps, it links its meaning with Polisario.

In forming this identity of the Polisario Other, Moroccan discourse is active in displacing the Polisario temporally. A text articulates that the camps are “feudal”. Feudal systems connote a meaning based around a ruling lord and the poverty-stricken surfs who work for him, in order to increase his wealth (MAP, 2011f). Add this to the constant referral to camps rather than, for example, settlements, increases this identity of the Other being less modern, less developed than the Self.

The official discourse does not merely spatially define the Other through its given name; it also refers to the Polisario as “separatists”, often in a synonymous way. Polisario and separatist are used interchangeably in this discourse, and this further defines the identity of the Other in spatial terms, creating boundaries between the Other and the Self through linking and differentiating terms. “Separatist” itself is an interesting language term to use. The root of the word is from “separate”, denoting separateness between the Self and the Other. In fact, the very dictionary definition of separate is:

“not joined, connected, or combined; placed or kept apart; different from something else; not related” (Merriam-Webster.com, n.d.)

This, therefore, is an important distinction to make: in being called separatists, the Polisario (or Other) are apart, different, and not related to the Self. In building a discourse related to human rights, this clear articulation that the Other is apart from the Self ensures that an identity of the Other cannot be conflated as an element of the Self; the Self is different, the Self is not like the “separatists”.

Separatist is also a term embedded in language of conflict. Brigham Young University in Utah have long run a comprehensive corpus of the English language, providing details of how certain words are used in English language, for example in media, and how they are paired and linked with other terms. In utilizing the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), we can see the linkages of meaning that the term “separatist” has built in the English language. Commonly, separatist is used in conjunction with words such as war, movement, and army, and to a lesser extent but still significantly, rebel and guerrilla (Davies, 2008-).

Figure : Map of Linkages

While COCA does not seek to define meanings in particular discourses, it does allow us to see a larger pattern of identity around “separatist” created from notions of connection. Calling the Other “separatist” instead of the harder terms such as rebels therefore takes away direct implications of fighting and violence, but the link between the terms still resonates with the audience, and the meaning extends itself across concepts. A third aspect of spatial identity is also articulated in texts and is simpler in its construction although not in its relationship with the Self. Algeria is constructed as an Other, and is articulated as facilitating and passively condoning the human rights abuses in the camps. This is further discussed below.

If we refer back to the previous temporal situation, we can also use this temporality of the Other to build the identity of the Self, Morocco. Morocco highlights their difference to the Polisario. Many of the texts explicitly state that they are an example of good practice in North Africa (f.x. (MAP, 2013b)), as well as being praised for their progress in the areas of human rights (MAP, 2011i). This is crucial for building an identity that shows that it has the capacity for change; that it is a progressive and forward-looking entity, compared to the presentation of the static Other. The can even be identified a second Other within this area of the discourse. The United Nations, EU and other western institutions are presented as temporally placed forward as an aspiration identity that Morocco seeks to emulate and gain legitimacy from. This legitimacy is construed through articulations of relationships and partnerships between Morocco and these aspirational bodies. For example, the language used in reports of Francois Hollande’s state visit to Morocco:

“We are delighted to welcome the President of a great nation, France, a country for which Moroccans have a deep affection and great esteem,” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2013b)

“The special partnership between Morocco and France, an exemplary partnership that is marked by mutual trust, is opportunity-creating and enabling effective solidarity,” (MAP, 2013d)

Morocco in one sense is aspiring to be accepted as an equal in all areas by France, while also distancing themselves from the Polisario; in one instance looking to a forwardly temporally displaced identity, while attempting to detach themselves from the backwardly temporally displaced identity. This idea of the Self being able to change independently while the Other is static is also expressed through the comparison of Morocco’s human rights record with that of the human rights record of the Polisario. Morocco frames their human rights record as one of improvement through reform, “to promote […] close attention to the citizens' needs, to expand the scope of freedoms and to advance human rights in general” (MAP, 2013b) or merely a distraction from real issues, “[Algeria] attempts to divert attention from its own poor record on democracy and human rights by raising anew the situation of human rights in Morocco's Sahara” (MAP, 2011i) or merely does not address the issue at all in official discourse relating to human rights. In contrast, the Polisario human rights record is consistently referenced in conversations on Western Sahara. Throughout the human rights discourse Morocco presents that they are the only actor with the right solution to the Polisario’s treatment of Sahawis. Algeria is identified as ineffective and unable to compromise, even going to far as to be called irrational: "Algiers must also stop its irrational obstinacy to politicise human rights” (MAP, 2011i). The accusation of politicisation is counter to the actuality of securitization acts that Morocco is utilising. Morocco is stating that it is the *only* party in the Western Sahara conflict with the capacity to intervene and preserve human rights, and therefore it is its *duty* and *ethical responsibility* to intervene. It is imperative that other international actors such as the UN, EU and allies support it in these exceptional *ethical* actions. When Morocco turns Western Sahara, and its disagreement with the Polisario, into a human rights issue, it allows itself to use exceptional political means to counter the problem (Buzan, et al., 1998). This active securitization provides the political impetus to an ethical issue. Algeria, meanwhile, is negating on its international commitments to protect the population of Tindouf from abuse (MAP, 2011i) and the Polisario are self-interested and corrupt (MAP, 2011a).

### Territorial Integrity

This basic discourse differs from the above human rights discourse as it focusses more on articulations of the Self than those of the Other. That being said, the Other still plays an important role in providing the relational balance to the Self and the concepts held within. The identity discourse at play here is centred on the notion of responsibility but, in comparison to the human rights discourse, it is Self-centred. There are three strands of this responsibility discourse: territory, legitimacy, and people. All these elements are articulated in a speech by HM King Mohammed VI on October 11 2013. However, this is not the only source used in this section; the themes are echoed in much foreign policy published between 2011 and the present. These interlock and combine with temporal and spatial identity constructions (see Figure 9).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Spatial | Our Sahara  Our citizens  Territory |  | Foes  Enemies  Adversaries |
|  | Responsibility to protect | Responsibility to protect from | Responsibility to transform |
| Responsibility | Self | More legitimate than | Other |
|  | Moving Forward |  | Unable to transform |
| Temporal | Momentum  Stride |  | Status quo  Rigid |

Figure : Territorial integrity identity map

The spatial construction begins with clear articulations of how Morocco defines itself. The language builds a boundary around what is part of the Self and what is external to it. In constructing the conflicted area of Western Sahara as Ours, it embodies the qualities of the Self, and in addition also requires the same protection as the Self. The texts refer to ‘Our Sahara’ (MAP, 2011b) (MAP, 2013a), ‘Our southern provinces’ (MAP, 2011b) (MAP, 2013a), and ‘our country’ (MAP, 2013a). This level of ownership and inclusion is included in language such as ‘Moroccan Sahara’ (MAP, 2012b). This is underlining and defining what is inferred when Morocco uses the phrase “territorial integrity” (MAP, 2011b) (MAP, 2012b) (MAP, 2013a) (MAP, 2013c) and “territorial sovereignty” (MAP, 2011d). Morocco is drawing a line around an identity built on what constitutes their territory, and therefore the boundaries of the state and its influence without outside interference based on Westphalian notions of sovereignty (McGrew, 2008). Under this identity, it becomes the responsibility of the state to protect its territory from outside pressure.

The texts and speeches outline the boundary of the spatial identity and in doing so sets the boundaries of responsibility that Morocco articulates within these texts. As this section is titled, territorial integrity is a key tenet of contemporary Moroccan identity. This is articulated explicitly in texts, but is also implicitly articulated through the construction of the identity of the Other. Spatially, the Other is defined in explicit terms: “Algeria” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d) (MAP, 2011e) (MAP, 2013c) is a frequently occurring Other in Moroccan discourse, especially when related to the issue of Western Sahara. The historical friction between Morocco and Algeria has built an antagonistic relationship, particularly in the area of territorial integrity for Morocco. Morocco also implicitly references Algeria when articulating “other parties” or just “parties” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d) (MAP, 2011e) when discussing policy and changes in Western Sahara due to Algeria’s position as an active participant in international talks on the issue. With regards to ethical identity, Morocco explicitly expresses the threat that they construct the Other to be. Language such as “schemes and manoeuvres” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d) and “illegitimate stratagems” (MAP, 2013a) in relation to negotiations on Western Saharan sovereignty highlights the distrust; schemes links audience interpretation of meaning to scheming, synonymous with devious and calculating. In texts, Morocco also expresses concerns with untenable plans for self-determination (MAP, 2011f) as well as bold claims of “[Algerian] hegemonic designs in the region” (Al Arabiya, 2013). This presentation of a threat to the existence of Western Sahara as part of Morocco means that an act of securitization is taking place. In building this construction of an existential threat to the identity of the Self by the Other, Morocco is giving itself the political scope to use exceptional means to counter the threat. However, concurrent to this theme is also one that the dispute over Western Sahara is “artificial” (MAP, 2011b), (MAP, 2012b), and that it is formed from these schemes and manoeuvres of the other parties.

It is not just the external threat to the territory that Morocco constructs as an ethical identity. Moroccan discourse constructs a radical Other that has infiltrated the territory and is a threat to the citizens of Morocco as well as the territorial stability of the southern provinces. A report from the website of the parliamentary House of Representatives presents comments from the Minister of the Interior, Mohand Laesner. He structures a responsibility of the state to protect the citizens from “international activists” (Parlement Chambre des Représentants, 2013) that are seeking to provoke conflict, actions that are “financed by foreign media through the Polisario” (Parlement Chambre des Représentants, 2013). This threat is further articulated as a premeditated and calculated attempt at territorial destabilisation:

"[the provocations were] meticulously prepared, the main objective being to provoke the police to intervene and push to exploit the images in the media." (Parlement Chambre des Représentants, 2013) - Translated from French.

These Others are radical and articulated in harsh terms such as “foe”, “enemies” and “adversaries” (MAP, 2013a) and are linked directly to the threat to the Self through their “illegitimate stratagem” and “attempts to undermine our country” (MAP, 2013a). Texts also state these internal activists are directly targeting civilians with violence (Parlement Chambre des Représentants, 2013) and as such the state has a responsibility to protect them.

The concept of an ethical identity is based around a responsibility to act as the Self is the only actor with the ability to act. However, in the case of Western Sahara there are other actors who claim to be able to act in a way contrary to Morocco’s official policy. The Moroccan discourse, then, turns to a process of de-legitimisation of the Other’s claims to responsibility. This is done through establishing Algeria as an actor unwilling to act. Using identity constructions of a temporal nature, Morocco plays upon the differentiation and the meanings that they bestow:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Self | Other |
| (development) Stride (MAP, 2011b) | Rigid (MAP, 2011e) |
| Momentum (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d) | Status quo (MAP, 2011d) |
| Realistic/realism (MAP, 2011b) | Obstructionist/restrictive (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d) (MAP, 2011d) |

Figure : Temporal differentiation

The Moroccan discourse is constructed as an entity that is moving forward using movement words such as stride and momentum. In contrast to this, the Other is described in static terms. This identifies the Other as being temporally placed in a non-developmental and non-progressive state, compared to the Self which is developing and progressive. Importantly, there is implicit construction with this language that the Other cannot transform; it cannot make changes necessary to present a solution that would change the “status quo” (MAP, 2011d).

The territorial integrity discourse is focussed on the physical boundaries of the Moroccan identity including the southern provinces. Within these boundaries is a responsibility to maintain them. The spatial boundary of the Self, and of the self-drawn Moroccan borders, also dictates the ownership of the resources that the land holds. This is not elaborated upon much in the basic discourses as it is a contentious point on which to build an identity, however becomes a greater issue when structuring the narrative and applying the narratives strategically.

### Remarks

In building these basic discourses, Morocco has built itself a collection of signposts out of language that allow it to draw from any of these ideas of identity and relationship to invoke the response of the whole issue. It effectively is a scrapbook of meanings and identities that can be used to create persuasive discourses and narratives in foreign policy. In constructing identities of Self and Other based around an inherent Good and Evil, the basic discourses provide the resonant tools of understanding around subjects that directly relate to the Western Sahara conflict. In essence, they prescribe how the orator wants the situation to be read by the audience. The following chapter will examine how these basic discourses can go beyond single instances of meaning around a topic, and can be used to construct narratives shaped by the orator to strengthen, legitimise, and increase resonance with the audience.

## Developing a National Narrative

This chapter of the analysis will seek to apply the identity constructs that have been established in the previous chapter to Lakoff’s theory of argumentative narrative structure. As explained in the Theory chapter, Lakoff’s theory has been adapted to apply to identity rather than framing techniques, and here I wish to discover if this change can prove as illuminating as other methods. First, we will establish and identify the roles that Morocco casts in the narrative story and base these on the identities constructed in the basic discourses: hero, villain, victim, and helper. Then we shall seek to analyse the story forms that this narrative structure takes within the official policy texts of the Moroccan state. In addition, we will explore a new area of language that the state employs; rather than focussing just on the oratory of state representatives, we will add in state ‘body language’. As described in the Theory chapter, body language for the state can be “the movement of troops or undertaking military exercises” (Hansen, 2006, p. 23). It is the state entity establishing a non-verbal means of communication that can nevertheless be read and analysed as such.

The form that narrative takes can be more all-encompassing than discourse; where discourse refers to sets of meanings that states use, narrative is a form of organising these meanings into a coherent, organised structure that resonates with the audience.

### Metaphorical definitions

Forming this argumentation narrative involves the active construction of a fairy tale in discourse. To analyse this, we must break down the metaphorical definitions by answering a number of questions: “Who is the victim? Who is the villain? Who is the hero? What is the crime? What counts as victory?” (Lakoff, 1991). These questions provide the narrative structure that the scenario can unfold through, and can be used persuasively to justify action.

##### The Hero, The Villain, The Victim and The Crime

The roles in the narrative are filled by the actors in the international system that concern themselves with the Western Sahara conflict. In Moroccan discourse, the state is cast in the role of the hero. The identity of the hero is essential to deconstruct in order to analyse the ‘hero’s journey’ through the narrative. Morocco puts itself in the role of ‘hero’ in its discourse. As we learnt in the previous chapter, the hero is constantly transforming and moving forward; it is learning from its experience. It is also an ethical actor within its discourse. As has been analysed, Morocco constructs a responsibility for the protection of its citizens, its territory, and the citizens of Western Sahara and the occupants of the Tindouf refugee camps. This responsibility encapsulates the justifications for action against any threat to these parts of itself. This responsibility gives the hero the impetus for foreign policy action. The previous basic discourses also examined Morocco’s comparative construction of legitimacy compared to Algeria and the Polisario. The responsibility that Morocco has for its citizens and territory provides it with the legitimacy for action. It also constructs itself as the actor with the solution to conflict endorsed by other international actors such as the United Nations and the United Sates which provide the state with legitimation through association.

The villain of the narrative is the Other identities from the basic discourses; that is the Polisario and Algeria, along with other antagonistic actors seeking to harm Morocco. The villain is constructed as an enemy and a foe (MAP, 2013a) and is crucially unable to be negotiated with, evidenced with language such as “the other parties' lack of goodwill and persistent obstructionist schemes and manoeuvres” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d). Lakoff identified this lack of negotiation as essential in the building of an argumentative narrative (Lakoff, 1991) as well as cementing the villain as an opponent that is a threat to the hero.

Lakoff (1991) posits that the victim can also be the hero. In the case of Morocco, this can be seen to be the case; within this, the discourse articulates two victims that are part of the identity of the Self that are under threat from the villain. The first of these are the citizens of Morocco. Included in this victim construction are the occupants of the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. Morocco presents the camp occupants as part of Morocco insofar that Western Sahara is part of morocco. It therefore refers to them as citizens and constructs a responsibility over them as such. The second victim that exists within the narratives is that of Morocco, the state and territory.

The crime presented in Moroccan official discourse is twofold. The first is that of kidnap and torture; the kidnap of Moroccan citizens and their imprisonment in Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria. Morocco often states that they are unable to leave, and that they are kept against their will (MAP, 2014a) (MAP, 2011c) which follows the trope of a kidnap narrative. The torture element is articulated in texts which accuse Algeria of being complicit in torture of Sahrawi people, and accuse the Polisario of committing human rights abuses in Tindouf (MAP, 2011a). The other crime that is articulated is that of death threat, that is a threat to the territorial integrity of the Moroccan state and thus the survival of the Moroccan state as it is. Morocco expresses that it is existentially threatened by the villain, and that the state itself is at risk from the “manoeuvers plotted by the opponents of our territorial integrity” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2013a).

### Typology of the Scenario

Lakoff states that once the roles in the narrative have been constructed, the agent of the narrative then presents a ‘story’ that allows for the potential interactions to be explained. We can identify these narrative forms through the constructions that they employ. The typology of the narrative scenario will follow a pattern of story-telling that is familiar with the audience, and natural inferences are made based upon this (Lakoff, 2006). This section will identify the scenarios at play in Moroccan discourse, before analysing the ‘Journey’ that the hero takes in these scenarios as presented in official discourse.

##### The Scenario

The texts analysed present two scenarios based upon the typologies as put forward by Lakoff and examined in the Theory chapter:

**The Self-Defence Scenario**: Algeria is the villain, Morocco is the hero, Morocco’s territory and citizens are victims, the crime is a death threat, that is, a threat to the territorial integrity of Morocco.

**The Rescue Scenario**: Polisario, with the support of Algeria, are the villain, Morocco is the hero, Sahrawi citizens and refugee camp inhabitants are the victim, the crime is kidnap and torture.

To elaborate on these summations, it is evident that Morocco draws upon these scenarios in the official discourse. These two scenarios are not competing with each other; rather, analysis of the texts show that each scenario is presented dependent on the event, the agent of discourse, or the context of the official speech. For highly patriotic events, such as the anniversary speeches of the Green March, the Self-Defence scenario is employed (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a) (Royal Speeches, 2013a). The Green March symbolised the Moroccan liberation of the southern provinces from Spanish control, and therefore is a symbolic image of Moroccan nationalism; here, therefore, it is best placed to draw on patriotic concepts such as territory and Moroccan sovereignty. It also uses the Other villain of the neighbouring Algeria, contrasting the rise of Morocco as a kingdom to the differing path that the republic Algeria took in its decolonising process. This will be discussed further below, but is relevant to mention here. The Rescue Scenario, on the other hand, is used more in interactions with other state leaders and as statements during negotiations and talks on the conflict. Texts such as the response to the Argana café blast (Royal Speeches, 2013b) reiterate Morocco’s commitment to combating terrorism and other transnational issues. Text like this are aimed at international audiences, so the nationalistic discourse is absent and instead we can see a move human rights-oriented discourse approach using articulations from the human rights basic discourse. These scenarios may be used for different audiences, but as a whole they act to complement each other in the overall persuasive nature of Moroccan discourse and the Western Sahara conflict.

##### The Journey

In a national narrative, the hero’s journey to the fairy tale ending is not without its trials; and over the course of the 20th Century Morocco has faced many trials as a state, and the King, both Mohammed VI and his predecessor Hasan II, has faced challenges to his rule. This project is focussing on contemporary discourse, but the intertextuality and temporality of all discourse means that symbols and meanings are drawn from the history of the identity and continued through to the present. The journey element of the narrative therefore pulls many symbols of the hero’s identity and forms them into a story that supports the policy position of the state. These signs of meaning come from a larger pool of signs on state identity and are forged from the ‘glorified’ past.

The journey that Morocco has taken to secure the southern provinces as their territory takes a narrative form of its own. The historical background outlines this to some extent, but a key event in recent Moroccan identity was the Green March. The Green March was the culmination of Moroccan government politicking and a mass nationalist movement. The government encouraged a mass march into the southern provinces to claim the western Saharan land from the colonial Spanish enclave (Zunes & Mundy, 2010). The citizen march was supported by approximately 20,000 Moroccan troops, and the Polisario were unable to respond immediately. This was the beginning of the escalation of conflict between the Polisario and Morocco, however from this point Morocco gained territorial control over a large area of Western Sahara (Zunes & Mundy, 2010) (See map). The Green March is remembered yearly and has itself become an identity source and a symbolic resource. The King’s speech on the anniversary of the event is essential to the hero narrative, drawing on identities of the Self as a righteous and liberating entity. The reference to the martyrdom of Moroccan people encompasses a collective Moroccan identity around nationalistic language. Linking martyr to sacrifice and territory in speech builds the special identity of the Moroccan self while advancing the national history and narrative around the event:

“The memory of the martyrs who made the ultimate sacrifice to preserve our territorial integrity.” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a)

“Their territorial integrity for which they are mobilized and ready to make all sacrifices” (Royal Speeches, 2013a)

The nationalistic Green March language builds itself into the self-defence scenario of protecting the territory at any cost while building a narrative that is temporally consistent with the basic discourses. For example, the following articulation from King Mohammed VI exemplifies this:

“the glorious Green March, an epic national event which reflected the civilized approach chosen by Morocco to recover its Sahara.” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a)

This discourse echoes themes discussed in the previous chapter of Moroccan ownership of Sahara creating the boundary of responsibility that the Self has to its own. Using terms such as civilised to describe the Self temporally places it ahead of its opponents, who by process of differentiation must have an ‘uncivilised’ approach. It is important to the King to foster these nationalistic identities and to gain support of the people in order to strengthen his support from more areas than the military, as well as gaining legitimacy from popular support (Sater, 2010).

This nationalism ties in closely with the reforms that King Mohammed VI is undertaking in Morocco in response to the Arab uprising in North Africa. This reformation is a key contemporary element in Moroccan discourse. Official speeches make numerous references to the ‘new era’ (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012c) (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012b) of an ambitious, aspirational (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a) Morocco that is seeking to modernise and develop (MAP, 2011e) through democratic reforms (Royal Speeches, 2013b) and cohesion in society (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012c). Morocco is seeking to change from what it was and temporally place it in the future; a future defined by security (Royal Speeches, 2013b) and territorial integrity (HM King Mohammed VI, 2013a) (HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a). It flows from the nationalistic portrayal of the past, and temporally drives it forward into a reformed future, creating a story of the state and of the Western Saharan inclusion in the national identity worthy of protection.

However, reformation is not the only concern in the present. There is the ever-threatening presence of the Other that must be overcome. Morocco has a complex brotherly relationship with Algeria, however in relation to the Western Sahara conflict, the relationship is highly antagonistic. Perhaps best illustrated by Morocco is the construction of a wall in the 1980s that stretches 2700km at a height of one to three metres separating Algeria, the Moroccan-controlled provinces, and the Polisario controlled free zone (Basement Geographer, 2011). The berm is a physical representation of the territorial protection that Morocco has over Western Sahara. It stretches from Morocco in the north down through the disputed territory to the Mauritania coast in the south, dividing Western Sahara into the Moroccan occupied territory on west and a Polisario-controlled area on the north-east that borders Algeria and the east that borders Mauritania. It is one of the most heavily landmined areas in the world, a process that is highly disruptive to the livelihoods of the mostly nomadic native populations (AOAV, n.d.). It is also heavily fortified with a large troop contingent along the wall. As part of the narrative, the berm becomes a conflict point; a place where the hero can meet the villain, but crucially also a method of protecting the Self from the villain.

Continuing the conflict between the villain and the hero, there is an emergence of an arms race in the region (Touchard, 2013). The death threat scenario is played out through this strategic narrative; Moroccan discourse is concerned with the physical threat that their opponents pose to the integrity of the country. In King Mohammed VI’s words, insufficient action in the realm of reform and military investment might:

“Encourage our opponents to step up speed in their manoeuvers against our country” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2013a)

What has emerged is an ongoing conflict between identities that securitizes the issue of the Sahara, allowing Morocco to take extraordinary measures and use extraordinary rhetoric to counter this threat:

“Instead of waiting for our opponents to attack and then retaliate, we should corner them back into a defensive position. We should take the lead, anticipate and interact positively.” (HM King Mohammed VI, 2013a)

This is reflected in the body language of the state. Morocco has purchased fighter jets from the USA and Israel to counter the Algerian purchase of fighter jets, submarines, ships and tanks from sources such as Russia, China and Germany (UPI, 2013) (Touchard, 2013).There is the uncertainty whether the arms race is a justified policy brought about by the securitization of the threat of Algeria and territorial integrity or alternatively whether it is part of the narrative itself. As an action of the state, I posit that it can be seen to be both. The nature of the threat of Algeria to the existence of the united Morocco entitled policy response, however this response becomes part of the narrative as it is a state expression of insecurity and distrust. The Algerian military response furthers this identity of hero and villain insofar as it perpetuates the threat; this in turn imbues the narrative with substance.

Part of this narrative journey is composed of smaller victories over the villain; skirmishes in the war. These are used to further the narrative as part of the strategic use. As will be analysed in the next chapter, the recognition of Morocco’s claim over the territory is one of these skirmishes; in particular the enabling by international actors of Morocco using the resources that the territory provides. This is both woven into the narrative as evidence of Morocco’s legitimate claim over the region using territorial integrity discourse and self-defence scenarios, and is also a desired strategic outcome.

##### The Fairy Tale Ending?

The fairy tale ending is a phrase not used glibly here. It is the finale that the entire narrative is structured towards. The scenarios and the journey through the scenario as described above are constructed to present the solution to the problem. This is essentially “What counts as victory?” in the words of Lakoff (Lakoff, 1991). The narrative is the justification for the response to the villain, and aims to provide legitimation for the cause. In this case, the narrative for Western Sahara is moving towards the Moroccan autonomy plan as the only solution to the conflict.

The autonomy plan is articulated by a Morocco lobby as representing:

“An outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara.” (Moroccan American Center for Policy, n.d.)

Included in the outline are plans for a local elected legislature, majority representation in the region for Sahrawi and non-Sahrawi long term residents, control of local administration and public services, as well as having taxing authority. Funding would also be received from the central Moroccan government. Critically, the autonomous region would have full authority on some issues, however would have shared, limited or no authority on other issues. It is fully articulated that the central Moroccan government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over elements of sovereign authority including national defence, currency, postal, foreign affairs and religion. In these areas, the Monarchy holds special status and therefore authority is held above the level of local autonomy (Moroccan American Center for Policy, n.d.).

There are three elements from the narrative that are used to support the autonomy plan as the ultimate victory. Firstly, that the initiative is presented as a solution to the threat of territory incursion and disintegration as it is a legal and legitimate initiative that solidifies the sovereignty and territory of the Kingdom (MAP, 2011d). In this regard, it champions its international credentials, with the Foreign Minister Taib Fassi Fihri stating the plan as being: “described as serious and credible by the Security Council through six successive resolutions.” (MAP, 2011d). The autonomy plan is also put forward as the solution to human rights abuses:

"Morocco's autonomy initiative for the Sahara as the sole solution to the regional dispute that will put an end to the humanitarian tragedy and the denial of human rights endured by the populations held against their will in the Polisario-run camps of Tindouf" (MAP, 2011h)

This brings in elements of the basic discourses and the Rescue scenario. The responsibility of the hero is with the protection of the victim, and as such the fairy tale ending must come with this solution; a way to defeat the villain and rescue the entrapped citizens. In addition, the ethical dimension is emphasised again as the hero being the only actor able to act due to "a better understanding of the circumstances and considerations underpinning the issue of our territorial integrity" (MAP, 2013c). Finally, it is the mere linking of ‘autonomy plan’ and ‘solution’ as synonymous in the discourse that utilises the persuasiveness of the narrative to underscore the articulation that Morocco holds the solution to the conflict.

### Remarks

The narrative structures analysed here are not finite; they can be manipulated in ways to suit the situation and audience to achieve the highest level of resonance and connection. However, the basic principles remain the same: the hero is in conflict with the villain, the hero has had a hard treacherous journey, and the hero can give the victim the fairy tale ending it deserves. Particularly resonant with Western audiences, these narratives therefore are moulded to fit the Western story structure (Lakoff, 2006) and issues that are pertinent to Western powers. It is their application within these foreign policy discussions that dictate their intricacies, with the main structure appearing to stay the same (based on the textual analysis undertaken here).

## Narratives and Persuasion: Analysing Outcomes

Narratives can be used to structure a discourse, as has been shown in the above sections. However, their true utility becomes apparent when they are used to persuade and attract outside actors to do what the narrator wishes. Here we will be discussing the measurable outcomes that have resulted from the use of narratives in foreign policy discourse. Outcomes here are defined as policy positions, and vocal support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative. In addition, outcomes can also be seen to be verbal repetitions of the Moroccan narrative and discourses indicating that the narrative has ‘won’ the battle in that instance. Here we will examine the ‘power’ of discourse and narrative, and in doing so understand why Morocco employs narrative techniques in its discourse with other actors.

Morocco foreign policy is a complex network of relationships between other actors in the international sphere. The key players, highlighted in bold in Figure 10, are the USA, Europe and Morocco. But within this triangle of interaction, there are other relationships that are introduced primarily in support of a key connection. For example, Morocco and the USA also share a relationship with Israel, which Morocco has utilised over time as a narrative component in their connection with the USA. Additionally, within Europe, Morocco has closer ties to France over other EU member states, and therefore France becomes an important actor in their exercise of narrative power.

Israel

**Morocco**

**USA**

**Europe**

France

Figure 12: Foreign policy concerns of Morocco

### The United States as a strategic ally

Morocco’s foreign policy direction taken with regards to the USA does not primarily concern trade relations, although these do play a role. Rather, Moroccan foreign policy is concerned more with gaining diplomatic and military support for the autonomy initiative in Western Sahara (Sater, 2010). The relationship between the USA and Morocco has been as long as the USA’s lifetime as a nation; Morocco was the first country to recognise formally the United States as a country and independent nation in 1777 (Elalamy, 2013). The relationship is solidified by being the longest lasting uninterrupted friendship agreement, which began in 1787 (Sater, 2010). The Cold War was a time when Morocco was faced with the prospect of aligning with one of the superpowers. Despite North Africa not being a central area of contention in the conflict, there was pressure for states to either align with a super power or take a stand as part of the unaligned states (Willis & Messari, 2003). Morocco was less convinced by the atheist nature of the Soviet doctrine, and thus aligned itself with the West and the US (Willis & Messari, 2003). This alignment continued and has been exploited by both sides over the years. Notably, the US helped Morocco construct the berm across Western Sahara, a strategic move that enabled Morocco to successfully counter the Polisario’s reach in the territory (Sater, 2010). The US also provided Morocco with military equipment to help it achieve strategic military parity with Algeria.

It is a stable position in the Arab community and in the North Africa region that is attractive to the US. The Moroccan government understands this, and sees itself as an important ally in the fight against terrorism with the US (Elalamy, 2013). It uses this attractive position to gain legitimacy and influence with the US with regards to Western Sahara. But overriding all arguments is the positioning of ‘territorial integrity’ as the foremost policy issue, with all other aspects of foreign policy falling below that (Willis & Messari, 2003). In this sense, the ‘self-defence’ narrative is employed in order to shape the persuasive message of Morocco to the USA.

#### *Applying narrative strategically with Israel*

The relationship Morocco has with Israel is complex; it draws on Morocco’s historic Jewish population as well as its position as an Arab state. It is this complexity that the Kingdom uses to attract the US to its foreign policy decisions. Willis and Messari posit that the primary reason Morocco sought to befriend Israel was the attractive power this gave it with the US (Willis & Messari, 2003). A lot of the success of Hassan II in his cooperation with Israel was his focus on Morocco’s large Jewish community of Moroccan descent along with his belief in the ability of Jews and Muslims to live peacefully together (Willis & Messari, 2003). In this role, Hassan II was able to host inter-faith meetings that included meeting the Pope and other important Jewish and Israeli figures. Falling short of full diplomatic relations with Israel, Morocco did, in the 1990s, open liaison offices in Tel Aviv and Gaza while still condoning the Arab consensus that required the recognition of a Palestinian state.

Narratively, Morocco presented itself as a non-violence promoter and an actor willing to engage in dialogue in conflict (Sater, 2010). The Kingdom outwardly articulated its importance as a strategic ally in the Middle-East and North Africa as it had success in bridging the divide between the West and the Arab world, and amalgamated this into its national narrative on Western Sahara. In embodying qualities of the hero as an intermediary, it transferred these qualities to its national interests, and in turn it could use this strategically to attract the US to its autonomy initiative. In practice, this had the required effect. In 2006 the US brokered a release of 400 Moroccan prisoners of war being held in Tindouf (Sater, 2010), ‘rescuing’ them from the Polisario.

#### *Lobbying Washington*

Morocco understands the importance of gaining US support for its autonomy measures in the Southern provinces. The US is seen as a key logistical player in the Western Sahara conflict, one reason being that it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore has the authority to veto any resolution that is put forward. In this position, the US is also in the position to put forward and support measures that would be in the Moroccan interests. Morocco is allied to the US and any hard power tactics would be considered to be diplomatic suicide. Instead, Morocco turns to the soft power of persuasion; through heavy lobbying Morocco aims to attract the US to its position and thus to providing political support as well as military support in the context of Western Sahara. Lobbying is a political science all on its own. However, here we can examine the areas in which Morocco is lobbying, the resources that it is putting into lobbying, and the outcomes that have resulted from this persistent lobbying.

Morocco directs its lobbying efforts through a number of firms in the US, the most prolific being the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). Others include the Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center (MATIC) and the Moroccan American Cultural Center (MACC). All are stated as being initiatives of HM King Mohammed VI and seek to promote Moroccan interests in America (Morocco on the Move, n.d.). Morocco has, however, paid more to MACP than any other organisation, with $13.8 million recorded as paid by Morocco to them since 2007 (Barclay & Chick, 2014). The role of these institutes is to promote the Moroccan narrative and autonomy initiative to journalists, congressmen and government officials.

All organisations supported by foreign interests are required to register with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) which records topics that are being funded through lobbying firms. The primary topics are currently US-Morocco Bilateral relations, but Western Sahara is consistently registered as a topic of communication (FARA, n.d.). An article by Barclay and Chick states that the MACP argued through email that the Tindouf camps filled with Western Sahara citizens are becoming recruiting grounds for al-Qaeda and groups associated with them (Barclay & Chick, 2014) and that this should require diplomatic action from the US. These lobbying groups are actively utilizing not only the identity-politics established in the earlier discourse analysis but also framing the narrative in a manner to make the “rescue” scenario appeal to US audiences. By “rescuing” the Western Sahara citizens from recruitment into terrorism, Morocco is both protecting its citizens and also providing a narrative that is sympathetic to the needs of the USA.

In the battle of the narratives, in this case Morocco wins on sheer spending and resource commitment alone. Compared to the $20m that Morocco provides to lobbying firms, Algeria commits merely $2.4 million between 2007 and 2013 (Elalamy, 2013) and the Polisario has only paid $42,433 to the Independent Diplomat since 2009. These groups are also almost entirely concentrated on lobbying the Western Sahara issue (Elalamy, 2013). A narrative can win by being most persuasive, but it can also win by becoming hegemonic; in this case it seems that in the Capitol is attracted to the loudest voice in the room. The US Congress recently passed the 2014 Appropriations bill, which allocated foreign aid to Western Sahara through Morocco. It also iterated Congressional support of the autonomy initiative by advocating for a resolution of the dispute “based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty” (House of Representatives, 2014) and with the intention to include “efforts to address durable humanitarian solutions to the protracted refugee crisis in the camps near Tindouf, Algeria” (House of Representatives, 2014). The direct lobbying of members of Congress could be seen to have resulted in Moroccan human rights discourse making its way into official US policy.

#### *US-Morocco Talks*

Morocco’s ties with the US were further bolstered in November 2013. The start of the year marked a cooling of the “special” relationship between the two states due to the US supporting a UN mandate for human rights monitoring in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Annual military exercises and war games between the two states were cancelled in April of 2013 due to this US support of monitoring in Morocco. Minister of Communication Mustapha Khalfi sated in response that the USA position was “An attack on the national sovereignty of Morocco and will have negative consequences on the stability of the whole region” (Al Arabiya, 2013). An official state visit in November 2013 sought to repair the relationship. The US-Moroccan official state visit brought HM King Muhammed VI and President Barack Obama together to discuss future cooperation between the two countries. However, in the lead up to the meeting, tensions flared up between Morocco and Algeria. Morocco recalled its ambassador in Algeria over Algeria’s President Abdelaziz Boutelflika commenting that human rights monitoring in Western Sahara was needed “more than ever” (Al Arabiya, 2013). Pro-government Moroccan press also attacked Algeria with a claim that a number of Algerian settlements were in fact Morrocan and were occupied by Algeria, “50 ans après son indépendance, l'Algérie n'a toujours pas rétrocédé les territoires marocains qu'elle occupe” [translation by author: 50 years after its independence, Algeria has not surrendered Moroccan territory it occupies] (Maroc Hebdo, 2013). Mustapha Naimi, a former member of Morocco's Royal Advisory Council of Saharan Affairs, suggests that this confrontation with Algeria was engineered to discredit Algeria before the King’s visit to the US (Schemm, 2013). On this theme, it can be seen that elements of the ‘self defence’ scenario are employed in official discourse here (including state action such as removal of the ambassador). The newspaper article in a publication with strong ties to the state accuses Algeria of wanting to dominate the region, and of ‘stealing’ territory from morocco. It is an attempt to use the national narrative to discredit Algeria before the US meeting. Strategically, the narrative then moves to promote the solution.

Thus, by the time the official meeting occurred, the narrative strategically positioned to be utilised. In the joint statement released after the meeting,

“The two leaders affirmed their shared commitment to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara and agreed to work together to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory”

With regards to the autonomy plan, the US repeated the phrasing that was used in previous discourse by Moroccan officials:

“The United States has made clear that Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible” (The White House, 2013)

This example uses the language from the Moroccan discourse:

“a realistic, negotiated political solution” (MAP, 2012b)

“bold and realistic initiative” (MAP, 2011d)

“based on serious negotiations and on a spirit of consensus and realism” (MAP, 2011b)

This dissipation of discourse from Morocco to other international actors demonstrates the pervasiveness of the Moroccan narrative in the US policy realm. While this is a carefully crafted official statement, and therefore does not contain any radical policy shifts, it does present an occasion where the US accepted the Moroccan version of events, and thus accepted their narrative. In this case, the narrative has ‘won’ by being repeated by another powerful actor. Dissenting voices persist, so the narrative cannot claim hegemonic dominance. However, in the repetition by the US of meanings critical to identity construction and the Moroccan narrative, the US has provided legitimacy and support for the autonomy plan. This is the outcome that Morocco required; and it can be argued that the strategic narrative applied proved persuasive and thus effective.

### Europe and the EU

The relationship that ties Morocco to Europe is historic and linked directly to their colonial past. The foreign policy strategy therefore is focussed on individual countries within the EU as well as with the institution of the EU itself. The concerns are twofold: the trade links and economic reliance on the EU; and the legitimacy and support for the Western Sahara solution.

The EU is a crucial trade partner for morocco. It is the first trading partner of the Kingdom, and total trade in 2012 was worth approximately €24 billion (European Commission, n.d.). Framework currently in place for trade relations is an Association Agreement which provides a Free Trade Area between Morocco and the EU. In 2013, this looked to be expanded through an establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), with negotiations taking place in April 2013 in Rabat (European Commission, n.d.). This enhanced agreement will extent the current free trade agreement and will include:

“Trade in services, government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights, investment protection and the gradual integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU single market, for example in areas like industrial standards and technical regulations or sanitary and phytosanitary measures.” (European Commission, n.d.)

If the DCFTA becomes a reality, the Moroccan economy will be modelled upon the EU standard, and will be held to this same accord. Indeed, from this, Morocco’s main concern with EU trade is that it is a highly asymmetrical affair. In contrast to the amount that Morocco depends on the EU for trade, its trade with the EU makes up less than one percent of the EU’s total trade (Willis & Messari, 2003). This one-sided dependency gives Morocco little room for manoeuvre in negotiations of trade treaties. However, “the EU is too important for Morocco to neglect, but it is too powerful to be dealt with on a one-to-fifteen basis” (Willis & Messari, 2003, p. 170) and so Morocco looks to its special relationship with France to gain influence, as well as utilise its connections with the US.

#### *The Special relationship with France*

France and Morocco have always enjoyed a strong diplomatic relationship. France is seen as Morocco’s anchor in Europe and the EU. France has had a constant supportive position on the Western Sahara conflict, recognising Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed region. However, in the time of this study period, 2011-2014, there have been a number of diplomatic incidences between France and Morocco which directly reflect the ongoing situation in Western Sahara.

The 2013 presidential meeting between President Hollande and HM Mohammed VI marked a renewal of the close diplomatic ties that define the Morocco-France relationship after the perceived slight with the president of France visiting Algeria in 2012 before visiting Morocco. This visit to Algeria provoked anger from Morocco as tensions between the two regional powers had been high and Morocco defines Algeria as its ‘villain’. With France having diplomatic relations with Algeria, it complicated Morocco’s dependence on France to be its voice in Europe. France moved away from Morocco’s narrative of Algeria as the villain in the dispute, and even went so far as to sign the Algiers Declaration on friendship and cooperation between France and Algeria (Embassy of France in London, 2012). On the topic of Western Sahara, France moved away from its constant position of support for autonomy in the region with ultimate sovereignty resting with Morocco. Instead, Hollande expressed that “The French position is the following: the UN, nothing but the UN and all the United Nations resolutions, and we won’t change it.” (Embassy of France in London, 2012). Indeed, France provided Algeria with defence equipment and support, although Hollande made clear that it was not “war material” (Embassy of France in London, 2012).

The meetings four months later in Morocco presented an arena in which France could be persuaded to join paths with the Moroccan narrative again, and the Kingdom utilised these meetings to strengthen the ties between the two states through talks attended by French foreign minister Laurent Fabius, diplomatic advisor to the president of the republic, Paul Jean-Ortiz, General Benoit Puga, special chief of staff of the president of the republic, and Charles Fries, ambassador of France to Morocco, alongside the Moroccan foreign minister Saad Dine El Otmani. The talks appear to have had the desired effect, with President Hollande stating during a speech that “The plan presented by Morocco in 2007 is a serious and credible basis for a negotiated solution” (MACP, 2013). The President also praised Moroccan reforms, going so far as to state that “Every day, your country takes decisive steps towards democracy” (MACP, 2013). As part of Morocco’s narrative structure, this articulates Morocco’s claims of being a forward moving state that holds a serious claim to the lands of Western Sahara. In actuality, the nexus between France and Morocco cements Morocco’s status in EU concerns, which is deemed essential as “Morocco constantly seeks diplomatic support as it faces its regional competitor Algeria and a potential escalation of violence with Polisario. [...] The EU secures Morocco’s financial, military and energy needs” (Sater, 2010). Therefore, to have the official discourse of the French leadership echo that of the Moroccan position utilises the power that France holds in the EU as well as building a legitimate support structure for the state.

Recent diplomatic incidences have moved France to reiterate its support for Morocco. In April 2014 arrests were made of Moroccan citizens accused of torture in Paris. Following this, comments were made by a French Minister stating that “Morocco was a mistress with whom we sleep every night even if we aren't especially in love with her, but that we must defend. In other words, we turn a blind eye.” (Schemm, 2013). Morocco seeks recognition of legitimacy from France. It also has aspirations of being accepted as international equals of France, although with one-sided dependency currently the situation, Morocco has more need of France than France does of Morocco. It is historical obligations rather than necessity that keeps France close to Morocco, and it is the aspirations of Morocco that keeps it tied to France. As stated, “Moroccans look at themselves in the mirror of Europe, and try/hope to imitate Europe” (Willis & Messari, 2003, p. 154).

#### *Influencing European Union policy*

Morocco does not just need to persuade states to accept its narrative of the Western Sahara issue in order to physically retain the land territory. It also needs to convince outside actors that its cause is legitimate in order to utilise the gains that the southern provinces provide it with.

Morocco and the Western Sahara are coastal states; they have control over large areas of highly fruitful ocean that is fished largely by Spanish boats. The EU and Morocco had a long lasting fisheries agreement that was however suspended in December 2011. The reason for the suspension was worries about the cost-effectiveness of the deal, along with a growing dissent among EU countries of the human rights violations in Western Sahara and concerns over the international legality of the agreement (EUbusiness, 2013). As the territory is disputed, it is argued that Morocco does not possess the rights to sell resources that come with the territory. This hiatus also drew attention to concerns that the agreement did not benefit the population of Western Sahara sufficiently (European Parliament, 2013).

By 2013, the fisheries accord was back on the table, with the explanation that it was now more cost-effective for the EU (European Parliament, 2013). This agreement thus ensured “Fishing vessels from 11 EU countries will be allowed to fish in the waters of the Kingdom of Morocco in return for an annual EU payment of €30 million” (European Parliament, 2013). It also added that Morocco will have to invest to the benefit of the Sahrawi people as part of the agreement. It does not, however, address the issue of international legality, and opponents of the accord stated "it does not respect international law provisions, as it does not exclude the waters of the Western Sahara coast" (European Parliament, 2013). This did not stop the bill from passing. The outcome reflects an implicit judgement and acceptance from the EU that the territory is Morocco’s, and an acceptance of Morocco’s self-defined borders including Western Sahara. This can be seen as a victory for proponents of Morocco’s territorial integrity discourse and the narrative structures which underline the importance of the integrity of the entire state, including the southern provinces, as part of the Kingdom of Morocco. This gives Morocco legitimacy in its efforts to process the abundant resources in Western Sahara.

# Chapter 6: Assessment and Conclusion

This paper has presented evidence that supports the claim that a soft power application of narratives ensures that a stat can shape which direction it wants the story to take, and in the process favour some “facts” over others.

The established basic discourses provide the orator for the state with a collection of meanings that can be drawn from to resonate with the audience. In constructing the Self as good, progressive and ethical, and the Other as evil, regressive (or static) an unethical, the state can use these meanings to structure a narrative that amplifies and orders these binaries. The intention with this is to create meanings that resonate but also attract the audience. For example, we have seen that Morocco constructs itself as a human rights champion, and Algeria and the Polisario as human rights violators, despite Morocco having a poor international human rights record. This exemplifies the ability of narratives to hide elements of the story from the audience and only present what is essential for the state to publicise.

Morocco uses narratives to effect in lobbying and diplomacy efforts. While not all foreign policy encounters articulate the entire narrative, or follow the script exactly, they all draw from the bank of meanings and the narrative structure that is the focus of the foreign policy mission. In fact, the narrative identified in this analysis is built through many texts and articulations of identity and events. However, depending on context, the narrative is manipulated and altered to fit the audience, showing that narrative formation is a dynamic process that the orator controls.

This paper had the intention of understanding *why* Morocco employs narratives in its foreign policy interaction. The answer to this is simply to persuade other actors that Morocco’s claim on Western Sahara is legitimate and viable. Morocco’s foreign policy is centred on two main actors: the US and the EU. These are heavily one-sided relationships, with Morocco reliant on them for trade and military assistance. While Morocco has natural resources, it lacks the oil of other regional neighbours, and as such the power that comes with oil. Therefore, Morocco turns to the EU and US to fulfil the needs it cannot provide for itself. However, in doing so, Morocco is seeking support for the Western Sahara issue in return. In cultivating relationships such as with Israel, Morocco actively utilises its narrative and constructed identity to attract the US to its cause. In Europe, France is an active ally (despite recent troubles) and can turn around issues such as the fisheries agreement to support Morocco. The outcomes of these actions are not only economic gain, but recognition of Moroccan claims to Western Sahara. The US have reverted to a support of the autonomy plan and have receded their requirement for human rights monitoring, while the EU has recognised that Western Saharan waters are Moroccan territory to be managed under Moroccan sovereignty. It is the outcomes that are important in a narrative battle, and Morocco has made significant progress over opposition claims in achieving the desired outcomes.

What is interesting in this case is that Morocco often downplays its religious status in its interactions with Western actors, or in statements likely to have a Western audience. Despite being a large source of national identity, religious identity is less frequently articulated in foreign policy discourse, and overlooked in favour of universalistic concepts such as human rights and territorial sovereignty. It could be noted that religion would resonate less with the largely Christian states such as the US, and as such is not such an attractive and persuasive tool to utilise in discourse. However, this is largely conjecture and further study on the topic would provide more illumination.

# Bibliography

Al Arabiya, 2013. *Morocco recalls ambassador from Algeria over Western Sahara.* [Online]   
Available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/30/Morocco-recalls-ambassador-from-Algeria-over-Western-Sahara.html  
[Accessed 7 March 2014].

AOAV, n.d. *Western Sahara.* [Online]   
Available at: http://aoav.org.uk/on-the-ground/western-sahara/  
[Accessed 2 February 2014].

Barclay, E. & Chick, K., 2014. *The $20 Million Case for Morocco.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/25/the\_20\_million\_case\_for\_morocco\_lobbying  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Basement Geographer, 2011. *Moroccan Wall: The Berm of Western Sahara.* [Online]   
Available at: http://basementgeographer.com/moroccan-wall-the-berm-of-western-sahara/  
[Accessed 2 April 2014].

BBC News, 2014. *Morocco Profile.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14123260  
[Accessed 13 February 2014].

Bottici, C., 2010. Narrative. *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, pp. 920-921.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J., 1998. *Security: A new framework for analysis.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campbell, D., 2013. Poststructuralism. In: T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith, eds. *International Relations Theories.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 223-247.

Connolly, W., 1991. *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davies, M., 2008-. *The Corpus of Contemporary American English: 450 million words, 1990-present.* [Online]   
Available at: http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/  
[Accessed 1 April 2014].

Elalamy, M. H., 2013. *Why Morocco Matters to the US.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/11/21/why-morocco-matters-to-the-u-s/  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Embassy of France in London, 2012. *François Hollande pays state visit to Algeria.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Francois-Hollande-s-press,22091  
[Accessed 21 March 2014].

EUbusiness, 2013. *Morocco-EU fishing accord signed after 18-month hiatus.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/morocco-trade.q0t  
[Accessed 23 April 2014].

European Commission, n.d. *Trade - Morocco.* [Online]   
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/morocco/  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

European Parliament, 2013. *MEPs approve renewed EU-Morocco Fisheries agreement.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20131206IPR30021/html/MEPs-approve-renewed-EU-Morocco-Fisheries-agreement  
[Accessed 24 April 2014].

FARA, n.d. *FARA document search.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.fara.gov/search.html  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Ferris, J., 2010. Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare. In: J. Baylis, J. J. Wirtz & C. S. Gray, eds. *Strategy in the Contemporary World.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 248-265.

Haarstad, H. & Fløysand, A., 2007. Globalization and the power of rescaled narratives: A case of opposition to mining in Tambogrande, Peru. *Political Geography,* Volume 26, pp. 289-308.

Hansen, L., 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War.* Abingdon: Routledge.

HM King Mohammed VI, 2012a. *Full text of the Royal speech to the nation on 37th anniversary of Green March.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/full-text-royal-speech-nation-37th-anniversary-green-march  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

HM King Mohammed VI, 2012b. *HM The King Urges MPs To Show Determination And Courage Required By The Quality Of Parliamentary Practice.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/hm-king-urges-mps-show-determination-and-courage-required-quality-parlia  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

HM King Mohammed VI, 2012c. *Morocco: HM the King Delivers Speech to Nation On Throne Day.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201207310463.html  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

HM King Mohammed VI, 2012d. *Morocco: HM the King Reaffirms Morocco's Willingness to Advance Settlement of Sahara Issue.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201211070391.html  
[Accessed 11 March 2014].

HM King Mohammed VI, 2013a. *Full Text Of HM The King's Speech At Opening Of First Session Of Third Legislative Year Of Ninth Legislature.* [Online]   
Available at: https://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/full-text-hm-kings-speech-opening-first-session-third-legislative-year-ninth  
[Accessed 13 March 2014].

HM King Mohammed VI, 2013b. *Morocco: Speech of Hm King Mohammed VI During Official Dinner Offered in Honor of French Pres..* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201304040322.html?viewall=1  
[Accessed 21 March 2014].

House of Representatives, 2014. *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill.* [Online]   
Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr185&dbname=113&  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Human Rights Watch, 2006. *Morocco: Prosecution of Independent Newsweeklies.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/morocco0506/1.htm#\_Toc133829251  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

International Court of Justice, 1975. *Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&p3=5  
[Accessed 12 February 2014].

Jensen, E., 2012. *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate?.* 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R. & Krasner, S., 1998. International Organisation and the Study of WOrld Politics. *International Organisation,* 4(52), pp. 645-685.

Lakoff, G., 1991. *Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML\_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff\_Gulf\_Metaphor\_1.html

Lakoff, G., 2006. *Thinking Points: Communicating our American values and vision.* Kindle edition ed. New York: Farra, Straus and Giroux.

Lantis, J. S. & Howlett, D., 2009. Strategic Culture. In: *Strategy in the Contemporary World.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MACP, 2013. *Morocco: Hollande - Nation Is a Leader for Peace and Reform, Backs Autonomy On Western Sahara.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201304090715.html  
[Accessed 7 March 2014].

MAP, 2011a. *Morocco: Group of Youths Protest Against Abuses in Tindouf.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109290992.html  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

MAP, 2011b. *Morocco: The Country Will Continue to Defend its Sovereignty And Territorial Integrity- HM the King Says.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201108021289.html  
[Accessed 11 March 2014].

MAP, 2011c. *Morocco: UNHCR Urged to Intervene to Set Free the Population Held in Tindouf.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109240017.html  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

MAP, 2011d. *North Africa: Sahara - Morocco Renews Full Commitment to Pursue Negotiations for Political Solution.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109270089.html  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

MAP, 2011e. *North Africa: Sahara Issue - Morocco Foreign Minister Deplores Other Parties' Rigid Position.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109270104.html  
[Accessed 11 March 2014].

MAP, 2011f. *Morocco: Former Polisario Official Exposes Before UNHRC Human Rights Abuses in Tindouf Camps.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109161123.html  
[Accessed 1 April 2014].

MAP, 2011g. *Morocco: International Democratic Centre Draws HRC Attention to Non-Respect for Freedom of Expression in Polisario Camps.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109161122.html  
[Accessed 1 April 2014].

MAP, 2011h. *Morocco: Country's Autonomy Initiative, Sole Solution to Sahara Dispute - Conference in Geneva.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109230154.html  
[Accessed 1 April 2014].

MAP, 2011i. *Morocco: Algeria Badly Positioned to Talk of Human Rights - Moroccan Delegation.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201109231261.html  
[Accessed 20 March 2014].

MAP, 2012b. *Morocco: Sahara - HM the King Reaffirms Country's Commitment to Negotiate On the Basis of the Principles Set By UN Security Council and Autonomy Initiative.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201209290630.html  
[Accessed 12 March 2014].

MAP, 2013a. *Morocco: HM the King Gives Important Speech Before Parliament Members.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201310141011.html?viewall=1  
[Accessed 11 March 2014].

MAP, 2013b. *Morocco: Hm the King Sends Message to Participants in High Level Meeting of UN-ESCWA.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201302051040.html  
[Accessed 20 March 2014].

MAP, 2013c. *Morocco: Hm the King - Morocco Will Pursue the Dynamic Process Initiated At the Domestic Level in the Sahara Issue.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201307310631.html  
[Accessed 12 March 2014].

MAP, 2013d. *Morocco: HM the King Holds Talks With French President.* [Online]   
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201304040258.html  
[Accessed 14 March 2014].

MAP, 2014a. *Tindouf Camps: Moroccan flags brandished, Autonomy supported.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.lemag.ma/english/Tindouf-Camps-Moroccan-flags-brandished-Autonomy-supported\_a7290.html  
[Accessed 15 April 2014].

Maroc Hebdo, 2013. *La Bombe À Retardement: Tindouf, Colomb-Béchar, Hassi Beida, Gara Jbilat, Kenadsa, Touat... sont marocaines.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.maroc-hebdo.press.ma/Site-Maroc-hebdo/archive/Archives\_1045/pdf\_1045/mhi\_1045.pdf  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

McGrew, A., 2008. Globalization and Global Politics. In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-33.

Merriam-Webster.com, n.d.. *Separate.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/separate  
[Accessed 1 March 2014].

Moroccan American Center for Policy, n.d. *The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara.* [Online]   
Available at: http://moroccanamericanpolicy.com/MoroccanCompromiseSolution041107.pdf  
[Accessed 17 March 2014].

Morocco on the Move, n.d. *About Us.* [Online]   
Available at: http://moroccoonthemove.com/about-us/#sthash.f8XqpcPt.dpbs  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Mr. Y, 2011. *A National Strategic Narrative.* s.l.:Woodrow Wilson Center.

Müller, M., 2008. Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice. *Political Geography,* Issue 27, pp. 322-338.

Nye, J. S., 2004. *Soft Power: the means to succeed in world politics.* New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, J. S., 2011. *The Future of Power.* New York: Public Affairs.

O'Neill, P., 1996. *Fictions of Discourse: Reading Narrative Theory.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Parlement Chambre des Représentants, 2013. *Laenser: 150 éléments des forces de l'ordre blessés lors des derniers événements survenus dans les provinces du sud.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.parlement.ma/fe/\_travaux12.php?filename=201305151505140  
[Accessed 13 March 2014].

Reuters, 2008. *Timeline: Western Sahara, a 50-year-old dispute.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/04/us-sahara-polisario-idUSL2163728820080104  
[Accessed 13 February 2014].

Rosen, S., 1995. Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters. *International Security,* Volume 1914, pp. 5-31.

Royal Speeches, 2013a. *HM The King Delivers Speech On Occasion Of 38 Anniversary Of Green March.* [Online]   
Available at: https://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/hm-king-delivers-speech-occasion-38-anniversary-green-march  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

Royal Speeches, 2013b. *Argana café blast: HM the King reiterates unrelenting commitment to pursue efforts to root out all forms of terrorism.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/argana-caf%C3%A9-blast-hm-king-reiterates-unrelenting-commitment-pursue-efforts-root-out  
[Accessed 01 March 2014].

Sater, J. N., 2010. *Morocco: Challenges to traditionand modernity.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Schemm, P., 2013. *Bitter Morocco-Algeria row before king’s U.S. trip.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/12/bitter-morocco-algeria-row-kings-us-trip/?page=all  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Slaughter, A.-M., 2011. Preface. In: *A National Strategic Narrative.* s.l.:Woodrow Wilson Center, pp. 2-4.

Smith, S. & Owens, P., 2008. Alternative approaches to international theory. In: J. Baylis, S. Smith & P. Owens, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 174-192.

The White House, 2013. *Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco.* [Online]   
Available at: http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/22/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-kingdom-morocco  
[Accessed 12 May 2014].

Toolan, M., 1988. *Narrative: A critical linguistic introduction.* London: Routldege.

Touchard, L., 2013. Stratégie militaire: Algérie et Maroc, les frères ennemis. *Jeune Afrique,* 19 March.

United Nations, 1960. *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml

UPI, 2013. *Algeria's military goes on an arms spree.* [Online]   
Available at: http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2013/03/11/Algerias-military-goes-on-an-arms-spree/UPI-89581363031700/  
[Accessed 17 March 2014].

Watts, S., 1991. The Idiocy of American Studies: Poststructuralism, Language and Politics in the Age of Self-fulfiment. *American Quarterly,* pp. 625-660.

White, S. K., 1988. Poststructuralism and Political Reflection. *Political Theory,* pp. 186-208.

Willis, M. & Messari, N., 2003. Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe. *The Review of International Affairs,* 3(2), pp. 152-172.

Willis, M. & Messari, N., 2003. Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Poliicy and Relations with Europe. *The Review of International Affairs,* 3(2), pp. 152-172.

Zunes, S. & Mundy, J., 2010. *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.