Clientelism, legitimacy, and do voters have a choice in Mexico?

The return of the PRI

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Abstract

During the years under the monopoly rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which lasted for 71 years, Mexico suffered authoritarianism, violence and economic crisis as witnessed in the 1968 student repression in connection with protests during the Olympic Games and the economic crisis beginning with the Latin American Economic Crisis in 1982 and culminating in 1994 with the devaluation of the Mexican Peso. At this time, there was a sentiment of governmental misrepresentation among the Mexican population. These actions highlight some of the important reasons why the PRI party was generally not seen as legitimate.

The culmination of these events and the general public discontent it entailed resulted in the 2000 election win for the candidate for the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) Vicente Fox Quesada, the former president of Coca Cola Mexico, backed by public slogans such as "¡Que se vayan!" (Get them out) – referring to the PRI.

The 2000 elections were celebrated as a regime change from a one-party monopoly of political power to political pluralism and much progress was predicted in public opinion polls, because the main obstacle to this change– the hegemony of the PRI – had been removed. Signs were emerging that Mexico was on the right track to becoming a real democracy through a legitimately elected government.

After only twelve years of PAN presidency, in 2012 Mexico again had a PRI president: Enrique Peña Nieto, elected with a 38.15% of the popular vote. The elections were followed by massive protests and questions concerning legality and corruption.

Using the framework of clientelism, legitimacy and social choice, this thesis provides the means to answer the following research question:

What are the underlying reasons for the PRI to have regained the presidency in Mexico in 2012, despite past legitimacy issues?

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2 Introduction

Mexico is a country with a rich history of shifts in power - even in the pre-Columbian era, when the area was dominated by several indigenous tribes. When the Spanish conquistadores came ashore in 1519 they took advantage of this fact, and with the help of enemy tribes they were able to overthrow the dominating Aztec empire.

Throughout the past 500 years the country has undergone a series of transformational changes. First the conquest in 1521 by Hernán Cortes and his troops that led to the establishment of what the Spanish King named "New Spain". Then in 1810 Mexico found its independence when "El Grito de Dolores" (the cry at Dolores) initiated the independence war that would last a decade. Later the country was invaded by the French, and for a brief period had an emperor, who was executed in 1867. Eventually, this series of events led to the Mexican Revolution that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century.

From the end of the Mexican Revolution, and for the following seventy-one years, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI – the Party of Institutional Revolutionaries), established in 1929, was the only ruling party. In discussing why the PRI was in power for so long, and the way in which they led, the historian Ai Camp describes that 300 years of being a colony left a political vacuum by the time Mexico gained its independence. Further, the violent process of forming political structures caused the army to be the main upholder of order during most of the nineteenth century. (Ai Camp 2000: 52)

This country that inherited a paternalist political structure, and that continued this structure after the revolution, does not have a tradition of party politics and the concept of party politics is a distorted one compared to that of the rest of the world. This sentiment is well captured by a phrase in a volume titled *Mexico Faces the 21st Century:*

> *"In democracies, parties are established to obtain political power. In Mexico, in contrast,* ***the*** *party was established to retain (not acquire) political power."* (Shulz & Williams ed. 1995: 30)

This is important because it raises issues of legitimacy because in this construct all other political parties are by definition "the opposition" which is inappropriate to the function of democratic elections. (Shulz & Williams ed. 1995: 30) Opponents of the government learned to play by the unique set of rules particular to Mexico, and influence decision making in other ways, such as through important positioning in the private

sector, as well as through negotiation with the PRI. (Ai Camp 2000: 232) This fact is also important, challenging legitimacy by circumventing democratic procedures and distorting the political reality.

Since the sixties the government has promoted electoral reform and emphasized the importance of democracy, while at the same time oppressing the opposition. This is important to have in mind, as it emulates democracy only in certain aspects, but without reforming the underlying processes. The government legitimizes itself only on the surface most visible in the public eye. In the international context of the eighties, which saw increasing attention placed on democracy and legitimacy, enhancing the opposition made sense in order to legitimize the PRIs own political position towards the exterior. Large parts of the PRI believed that the party would prevail in fair elections by merit, but the sentiment was tempered by the precaution of rigging elections for PRI wins, just in case, thereby again undermining democratic process and political legitimacy. Not until 1988 is some party competition observed, when the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN – Party for National Action) party won the Governors elections in two states (although this was more due to local politics than a national tendency), and a coalition of opposing parties formed to support a common candidate, which was quite unexpected by the PRI government. (Shulz & Williams ed. 1995: 30-31)

Then, in 1988 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former PRI member who had abandoned the party and had come to be the oppositions' candidate for presidency over Carlos Salinas de Gotari (the PRI president at that time) gained a large number of votes without the support from the PRI or the usual election rigging. This fact strengthened the belief that the PRI party could also win on its own merits, (rather than by rigging the outcomes of elections) as it seemed possible that with the right policies, the party would have enough popular support. (Shulz & Williams ed. 1995: 30-31) This is important because it gave way for more open and democratic elections by Mexican standards. By changing their policies the PRI party seemed to gain more popular support resulting in a sweeping win for the PRI in 1994 elections.

But the legitimacy of the government was undermined later that same year when a severe economic crisis hit Mexico, and popular support of PAN (Party of National Action) increased, which was reflected in governor elections in several states after the crisis hit. Other factors that could have set the stage for a change was the Zapatista Movement (The revolutionary leftist group formed in the nineties) uprising in the state of Chiapas (Shulz & Williams ed. 1995: 40-41) and the assassination of the presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in the 1994 elections, which was popularly believed (but never proven in court) to be ordered by the president in office at the time, Carlos Salinas (PRI). (La Jornada, 23 March 1997)

During the years under PRI rule Mexico suffered authoritarianism, violence and economic crisis as witnessed in the 1968 student repression in connection with protests during the Olympic Games, still

remembered every year on October 2nd, and the economic crisis beginning with the Latin American Economic Crisis in 1982 and culminating in 1994 with the devaluation of the Mexican Peso. At this time, there was a sentiment of governmental misrepresentation among the Mexican population. These actions highlight some of the important reasons why the PRI party was generally not seen as legitimate.

The culmination of these events and the general public discontent it entailed resulted in the 2000 election win for the PAN candidate Vicente Fox Quesada, the former president of Coca Cola Mexico, backed by public slogans such as "¡Que se vayan!" (Get them out) – referring to the PRI. The 2000 elections were celebrated as a regime change from a one-party monopoly of political power to political pluralism and much progress was predicted in public opinion polls, because the main obstacle to this change– the hegemony of the PRI – had been removed. (La Jornada, 10 July 2012) Signs were emerging that Mexico was on the right track to becoming a real democracy through a legitimately elected government.

Vicente Fox (PAN) started his time in office with plans for strengthening the collaboration with the United States with regards to a migratory reform and intentions to improve the infrastructure in the country by building a new airport in Mexico City, both of which failed. The first due to the 9/11 attacks and the increased distrust of foreigners in the United States (coupled with the lack of support from Mexico of the war in Iraq), and second due to resistance from the peasants from whom the land would be expropriated (Proceso 16 August 2002 and Proceso 3 July 2013). Other failed promises were the very ambitious goals of 7% economic growth and the creation 1,300,000 new jobs. (Proceso, 11 June 2002) However, Fox's government did achieve a greater freedom of expression by (insert reference). Fox's government also introduced programs such as Popular Housing, which gave credits for home buying for poor families, and the Popular Health Insurance, which would introduce health care for those without private insurance and who were not covered by the social security system (which is only available to employees in formal jobs, excluding the large informal economy) (Proceso, 13 May 2003).

In 2006 PAN candidate Felipe Calderón won the presidential elections and instated the Popular Health Insurance, started by his predecessor. Calderón's plans were mainly focused on the issue of security and his term was largely marked by his declared war on drug cartels. Mexico was the primary route from South America to smuggle drugs into the United States, and due to little or no interference from the authorities and widespread corruption, illegal activity was very high. (Aristegui Noticias, 22 May 2012). However, Calderón's military action against the drug cartels caused a general rise in violence and during his 6 year term, from 2006 to 2012 an estimated 60.000 were killed in the war on drugs. In many regions, especially the north and on the Pacific and Gulf coasts, Mexicans felt unsafe. This situation overshadowed all other issues during these six years, even the fairly efficient averting of the worldwide economic crisis in 2008 that did not affect

Mexico nearly as much as it did Europe and the United States. The issue of increased insecurity prompted large peace demonstrations all over the country and challenged the legitimacy of the PAN government. (CNN Online, 5 May 2011)

Another party that is important to mention along with the PRI and PAN parties is the Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD - Party of Democratic Renewal). Although never gaining presidency, this party has challenged the legitimacy of the PRI and PAN parties in Mexico. For example, the win of Felipe Calderón was challenged by his opponent, PRD candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (PRD), the former (and successful) leftist mayor of Mexico City. Lopez Obrador (PRD) chose to challenge the win with massive protests in the center of Mexico City, rather than through the courts, as he felt that a formal complaint would not receive a fair treatment by officials. The presence of this party is important for legitimacy because it not only challenges the presence of other prominent parties, but it contests the legitimacy of governmental process and increases the choices available to the Mexican public for democratic election.

After only twelve years of PAN presidency, in 2012 Mexico again had a PRI president: Enrique Peña Nieto, elected with a 38.15% of the popular vote (IFE PREP Website 2012). As in 2006, the elections were followed by massive protests and questions concerning legality and corruption.

2.1 Problem formulation

Based on these historical developments in the party politics, electoral tendencies, and especially considering the strengthened opposition, the ascent of the PAN party and its success in the 2000 elections, I pose the following question:

- **What are the underlying reasons for the PRI to have regained the presidency in Mexico in 2012, despite past legitimacy issues?**

To investigate this situation thoroughly, I will take into account the following sub-questions;

1. To what extent has a patron dependent relationship affected voter behavior?
2. How did the legitimacy of PRI and PAN governments - or lack thereof – play into the return of the PRI?
3. What has motivated voters to vote for one party or the other over time?
4. How is the legitimacy affected when an election is won by small margins?

3 Methodology

In order for the reader to get from the problem formulation to the conclusion in the manner it was intended it is pertinent to outline the thought process that lies behind, and what considerations must be taken into account when reading the thesis. This chapter will define reasoning behind the thesis: how I will attempt to answer the research question and subsequent sub questions through the selected theories; the types of data collected to analyze the subject of Mexican politics; what its advantages and shortcomings of these data collection processes are, and finally; determine the delimitations to the topic of Mexican politics, in order to avoid a discussion that is too broad and unfocused.

The research of this thesis begins from the point of an inductive reasoning and with the assumption that from observation we detect a pattern, making a generalization based on what we observe. In this type of reasoning we test the pattern against a theoretical framework (Pontzer Ehrhardt 2011: 33). During the past 12 years I have lived in Mexico, observing the political events which have unfolded from 2001 to the present, as an unintentional case study. During the presidential election campaign in 2012 I witnessed large concern at different social levels that the PRI would return to the presidency and continue its style of government of the past, thus setting the country back in time. However, when the PRI eventually *did* win in 2012 I wondered why this had happened, and what the factors were that enabled such a result.

Epistemologically the main approach is that, as Alvesson argues: "Knowledge and theory in social science are never about presenting the absolute truth or an objective picture in any abstract or neutral way. We always proceed from our pre-understanding, based on conscious and unconscious assumptions and expectations." (Alvesson 2004: 236). Because of this, it is important to use in depth and detailed information when analyzing the issue.

3.1 Types of Data

As Mikkelsen states (205: 161) "Development studies rest on empirical data – data about the social world. There has been some reluctance to use the concept 'data' in the social sciences, since it provides associations with the natural and technical sciences." As specified in this quote, information accrued in social sciences is not to be compared to the data one compiles in other sciences. There is no final truth that one can reach through specific calculations. In social sciences we can only observe phenomena, events, situations etc. and try to find some connection and explanation for them, and through these develop a pattern in order to predict future events.

In this thesis I do this through secondary empirical evidence consisting mostly of qualitative data, which is a form of data that characterizes but does not measure. It is collected through various types of text, as opposed

to qualitative data, which is most often statistical data that can be summarized in tables, graphs and numbers to be analyzed in a mathematical way. The advantage of qualitative data is the "depth, openness and detail… [in an] attempt to understand the categories of information that emerge from the data" (Blanche et. al. eds. 2006: 47). This is especially important when analyzing the *how* and *why* of an issue, as it identifies the context and setting of the phenomenon. In other words, qualitative data identifies relevant relationships and maps the public opinion, tendencies and actions. Social sciences are always based on a subjective understanding of the workings of society, and therefore the in depth and detailed advantages of qualitative data are important, as certain issues cannot be detected from quantitative investigation (Mikkelsen 2005: 144).

It also is important to point out that there are weaknesses to conducting research through qualitative data, as it is not statistically accurate and therefore one must be careful not to generalize. For this reason and to the extent possible, I will supplement the qualitative data with secondary quantitative data, for example opinion polls and electoral statistics, as this is the most accurate way to measure electoral behavior. However, when doing this it is important to consider context, and this information should certainly be seen in the light of whether or not validity can be trusted and potential shortcomings of who conducts these polls and elaborate the statistics. This is also particularly important because of the issue of historical electoral fraud in Mexico.

3.2 Theoretical choice and use

With the use of inductive reasoning it was particularly important to approach the political situation in Mexico from an academic standpoint and led to a number of theories that presented themselves as possible alternatives, because they made sense for explaining facts that can be observed over time. After a review, clientelism, legitimacy theory and electoral behavior theory were selected as the primary theories, based on their ability to most thoroughly explain the political events in Mexico as they have unfolded over time.

Clientelism was selected because it explains a dominant culturally based practice in Mexico, in different forms. As Edgar Hernández Muñoz argues, it is a concept that is ever present in Mexico, it is flexible and adapts to different conditions over time. It is also a practice that actors have sought to eliminate, however they have failed to do so, because the symptoms were attacked, not the causes. (Hernández Muñoz 2006: 137) Legitimacy theory was selected because it was a natural continuation of clientelism, as clientelism is used to seek legitimacy of an entity, in this case the government and the political party PRI. Legitimacy is important to gain voter support and for a political party to gain or stay in power, and lack of legitimacy undermines the authority of a government. Finally, Electoral behavior theory, specifically social theory was selected in order to detect general electoral patterns in Mexico, in relation to its citizens and their

motivations, because it deals with the issues that arise when there are three or more candidates in an election and questions about the interpretation of majority and legitimacy arise.

3.3 Sources

For a more in depth historical, political and theoretical perspective I will use a combination of academic literature and journal articles. However, given the nature of the of the research at hand, which refers to very recent events, but with deep roots in history and culture, it is important to combine consolidated literature with news media because it is the newest information available about the issue. This more recent information will be held up against historical research, for example that which looks at the changes in policies and public behavior. New empirical evidence (such as interviews) has not been collected due to the vast availability of information surrounding the elections, both before and after the 2012 National elections in Mexico. However, first hand observations have been made due to the fact that the author of this thesis was in Mexico both before, during and after the elections.

Before, during and after the 2012 national elections there has been a massive flow of information in the form of articles, editorials, blogs, and observations in social media. I will base my media information on articles published in the dominant newspapers in Mexico; Reforma and El Universal, whose political views are varied but more to the right of the leftist newspaper La Jornada. ADNPolitico.com is another source used for this thesis, which is an online newspaper created by the CNN Group, and Revista Proceso is a weekly magazine created by journalists that were expelled from the newspaper Excelsior in 1976 - both are reliable online sources. I will also use international media such as BBC World, New York Times and CNN, where Carmen Arístegui, one of Mexico´s most respected critical journalists and political commentators, reports in depth on Mexican politics. Carmen Arístegui also has her own news site, which will be quoted as well. Another media source that has published important investigative journalism about the 2012 elections is The Guardian, who came to play a central role in some issues that will be discussed in later chapters.

3.4 Critique and use of sources

Mexico is a highly polarized country, and any source, be it websites and publications of interest groups, government or the supposedly objective press, are inevitably subjective according to the political views of these entities. However, according to Mikkelsen (2005: 193) the way to assure the quality of quantitative data comes down to three factors: public accountability, confidence and relevance. If the source has a) a role in society that holds them accountable for the information and opinion expressed, b) is considered a trusted source, and c) is relevant in the society that is being studied and can be considered a valid source (Mikkelsen

2005: 193). I have attempted to adhere to these criteria when selecting sources, selecting the most trusted media, from both sides of the political spectrum.

Despite the quality of the data it is always important to keep in mind the biases of the author, remembering that qualitative data can never be completely objective. As Mikkelsen argues:

> *"…reliability (repeated observations using the same instrument under identical conditions produce similar results) and validity (what is measured is accurate and reflect the 'truth' or 'reality'), are not symmetrical. Measures… may be reliable in the sense of replicable measures. The validity of the measure touches people's subjective experience…"* (Mikkelsen 2005: 195)

The quote illustrates that the experience of an individual creates their own subjective reality, and they interpret this as 'the truth'. Furthermore, "biases are accentuated by different cultural norms and interpretation, filtering of information etc." (Mikkelsen 2005: 195) and I am aware that findings may be influenced by both my own idiosyncrasies as well as those of the sources.

Another factor to take into consideration when analyzing political climate in Mexico is that among the public, political views are commonly associated with personalities and tradition more than political ideology. This is also important to take into consideration in the use of sources, especially that of social media, editorials and journalistic articles.

Also, I would like to emphasize that what goes on behind the scenes is not possible to map out in a complete fashion and so it is obviously impossible to find one certain and universally true answer to the research question, as there are too many factors that cannot be verified. It is, however, possible to get a general idea of the reasons for the electoral behavior.

Many of the sources used in this thesis are in Spanish. Most non-literary sources are not translated into English, and the more recent and rapidly changing nature of news and editorials is not permanent enough to be translated. However, there is a lot of valuable information to be found in these sources, and they provide a more detailed impression of a given situation, whereas the information in the international media gives a more complete overview to anyone not immersed in Mexican culture.

3.5 Censorship and media influence

Given that this thesis is conducted through qualitative research of sources that include media, it is important to bring to the reader's attention the issue of censorship. In Mexico, though the country has experienced

increased freedom of expression, censorship still exists. The censorship takes place with different motivations and is carried out by several actors.

Media ownership plays a significant role in the way information is portrayed in newspapers and on television. For example, the market of "open" television (free television channels available to the entire population) is divided between Televia and TV Azteca, and thus these two media groups are responsible for 95% of broadcast television in Mexico. (The Guardian, July 9, 2012)

Another form of censorship is self-censorship. In an article dated May 2013, The Committee to Protect Journalists, a worldwide organization, ranked Mexico as number 7 of the most dangerous countries for journalists. This is very significant, because it causes self-censorship among reporters who are afraid for their own security. Drug cartels have been known to threaten and kill journalists that write critically about drug related crime. Also, censorship due to political pressure is known to happen.

3.6 Delimitation and limitation

Finally, the analysis will be limited to explain the research question through the aspects defined in the sub questions and selected theories. A broad investigation of aspects such as deeper issues of corruption and geopolitical factors will not be included, as these aspects of Mexican politics are areas extensive enough for separate theses on their own. I will exclusively analyze the relationship with regards to voters' choice, tendencies and cultural influence between parties, government and the public.

3.7 Approach

Before proceeding, the approach to the remainder of this thesis will be outlined in order to give the reader an overview of what can be expected.

Chapter two outlines the methodology of this thesis. First, a justification for chosen theories will be given, based on their relevance for explaining political events in Mexico. *Clientelism* was chosen because of the paternalist nature of Mexican politics, *political legitimacy* due to the shift in the approval of certain presidents as a result of events during their presidency, and *voting theory* to explain the PRI win in contrast to social mobilization against the party. Next, an explanation will be given for the way in which data was collected and used in the empirical analysis. This is followed by a critique of the sources and outlines any problems there might be in the analysis of the issues at hand. It also specifies the limitations to this thesis, as well as the scope and delimitations.

Chapter three discusses the three main theories introduced in chapter two, which were chosen due to their relevance for explaining the political development in Mexico. First, clientelism is a theoretical concept that describes the exchange of goods and services for political support. It describes a relationship that provides the patron with political legitimacy through this type of an agreement, instead of through the acceptance of his or her accomplishments and fulfilling of electoral promises. The final purpose of the practice of *Clientelism* (Schröder 2012, Clapham 1982, Eisenstadt 1981) is to consolidate the legitimacy of the patron through the support of the client, or the voters. And this leads to the next theory; *Political Legitimacy Theory* (Connolly 1984, Rogowsky 1974). Legitimacy is the justification of the authority in the mind of the 'dominated party' in the relationship, or the citizen. Legitimacy is that balance point where a citizen considers that the authority of elected officials is justified, based on several internal and external factors, such as voting, economic progress, development, ethics etc. In order to hold the first two theories, which are largely subjective, up against a scientifically objective theory and thus consider to what extent election outcomes are predictable according to existing models, I will finish the theoretical chapter looking at voting theory. One aspect of voting theory is particularly relevant in this case: *Social Choice Theory* (Gaertner 2009, Elster 1986, Kelly 1987), which is an analysis of collective decision making that "starts out from the articulated opinions or values of the members of a given community or the citizens of a given society and attempts to derive a collective verdict or statement" (Gaertner 2009: 1).

Then, chapter four will present the empirical analysis, linking the theories presented in chapter three to actual political developments and events that have happened in Mexico. First, clientelism will be used primarily to describe the period between 1929 and 2000, during which the PRI was in power, as well as the clientelist practices that may have influenced the 2012 presidential election. Next, Political *Legitimacy Theory* will be used to explain the dividing gaps in the public opinion, reflected in public protests and the overwhelming percentage of votes for other parties. To have political legitimacy is crucial for political leaders in order to stay in office. This aspect will be compared to both the PRI and PAN governments. Through Social Choice Theory, I will analyze the election outcomes, the behavior of the Mexican voters and how legitimacy is affected when elections are decided by relatively small margins. In this regard I will also take into account the common critiques of this theory, and examine if these apply in this case.

Based on the connections presented in chapter four, chapter five will respond to the main research question and each sub-question respectively. This chapter will also present ways in which this research could be extended in the future.

4 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I will present the theories that were chosen to analyze the research question. I will provide a definition of each theory and I will outline the origin and characteristics. Finally I will describe how each of these theories will be applied in chapter four, the empirical analysis.

4.1 Clientelism

There are many definitions of clientelism, some simple and some more elaborate and detailed. The specific form of distribution which constitutes clientelism has deep cultural roots and is a characteristic of the traditional feudal societies, such as Mexico. The distributive aspect of clientelism is important, because resources, in some cases public resources, are used to obtain political support. This means that resources are allocated in a subjective manner, not according to a transparent public distributive policy. However, as Roninger & Gunes-Ayata express in the following quote, the concept has transferred from feudal societies to democracy, where the patron becomes the politician and the client becomes the voter:

> *"From a unilinear developmentalist perspective, the existence and perpetuation of clientelistic relations in modern or developing societies came as a surprise to many scholars. In general the expectation was that patron-client relations of all types would be replaced by modern forms of participation"* (Roninger & Günes-Ayata eds. 1994: 19)

Barbara Schröter further elaborates on the concept of clientelism in her article in The Mexican Journal of Sociology, in which she comments on the varying definitions, and outlines the following characteristics she considers basic to the concept, as experienced in the feudal societies. (Schröter 2010: 145)

- *Social asymmetry* of the parties involved in the clientelist relationship. That is, the actors are not equal in the hierarchy. The patron has the power and the access to resources, which are exchanged for support.
- *Reciprocal exchange*. Both actors give something and both benefit in some way from the relationship.
- *Mutual interdependence*. The patron needs the public support of the client, and the client needs the protection, opportunities or economical support of the patron.
- *Personal.* The benefit of the patron/client must benefit one person, or one group of persons, selected solely based on the support they give to the patron. The relationship does not benefit the general public within a setting.
- *Informal*. The relationship is not of a public nature and not open to public criteria.

- *To some extent voluntary*. The client must not be forced or coerced through physical or psychological violence. This aspect is what distinguishes clientelism from servitude or slavery.
- *Mutual confidence*. The support of the voter and the protection/support of the patron are usually not executed at the same time, and so the relationship must be based on a mutual trust that the other party will comply.
- *Loyalty*. The objective of a clientelist relationship is to create loyalty in the client towards the patron.

Schröter also points out that the relationship between patron and client can be rooted in a notion of charity. The patron wants to take care of the client, and the client wants to be taken care of. This patron-client relationship can take place on several levels, not necessarily just between the lowest economic layers in society but also between one patron, and a patron on a higher level, and so the patron of one client, can be the client of another patron, and so on. Furthermore, although the clientelist relationship is between two actors, it exists within the wider context of society, and it is competitive – clients seek advantage over others on the same hierarchy as themselves. Various patrons on the same level of this hierarchy are in competition with each other for the clients, and the clients subscribe to the patron that most adequately offers them what they need. Often there is an intermediary between the patron and the client that functions as a gate-keeper or a filter of petitions to the patron, and who also benefits from the exchange. (Schröter 2010: 144-145)

Complementary to the ideas of Schröter, Clapham (1982: 7) determines that there are four conditions that necessarily must appear in order for a clientelist system to exist:

- The patron controls critical resources and the client lacks access to these resources, which increases the client's vulnerability or it decreases its security.
- The patron should require or desire the services provided by the client to the extent that it motivates the allocation of resources in exchange for services/support.
- The client group cannot obtain access to the controlled resources through cooperative strategies to confront the patron group.
- No effective ethic of public allocation or system to allocate resources with public criteria, only private and personalist systems of allocation. Absence of accountability of the patron.

Stokes et. al. (2003: 7) have developed a model that makes the distinction between programmatic (where benefits for beneficiaries *are* part of the official election platform) versus non-programmatic distributive politics (where benefits for beneficiaries *are not* part of the official election platform), which enables us to

determine if a practice is clientelist or not through questions that determine the nature of the system in which the practice takes place:



Source: Conceptual Scheme of Distributive Politics (Stokes et. al. 2013:7)

Stokes et. al. thus equates clientelism with vote buying and patronage, non-programmatic and dependent on the individual's political support. These are practices that are illegal in Mexico, as well as in all other democracies, but which can be hard to detect, due to their non-public nature. The authors emphasize that most strategies can have both legal and illegal connotations, depending on the specific case or presentation of the issue, and that the determining factor is usually whether or not the strategy is public and open to public scrutiny. (Stokes et. al. 2013: 8)

Contrary to what one might think at first glance, clientelism is a system that is not only present in developing countries. Stokes et. al. argue that clientelism is present to a certain extent in different forms, as is evident in case studies carried out in different parts of the world, such as Australia, Argentina, Sweden and the US. For example the development of a certain geographical sector or a sector of the population, like the poor, the agricultural sector etc. Stokes et. al. (2013: 9) argue there is also a grey area, because certain programmatic distribution may seem public, but have not undergone the same objective evaluative process as such programs normally would, with regards to necessities and priority.

In this thesis, clientelism is defined as social science theory that describes the relationship between a patron and a beneficiary in a political setting. Simply stated, it is the exchange of services or economic benefits for votes or political support. It is important to note that this exchange takes place between groups or persons,

in a relationship where one party is considered superior to the other, most often between politicians and public officials and citizens. (Schröter 2010: 143) Clientelism is therefore a theory included in the concept of distributive politics, the way in which resources are allocated from politicians to citizens in various forms. I will focus on this relationship in the modern political setting where the patron is the politician or political party, and the client is the citizen or voter. However, the feudal relationship between patron and client will serve as a backdrop for the current system, as it explains the cultural and historical roots of this behavior.

The critique of clientelism as a concept and a concept is that it is flawed as an analytical tool, as it takes harmony for granted, not considering possible disputes, which in the end distorts reality (Eisenstadt ed. 1983: 9). As we will see in Chapter Four disputes about clientelist practices do occur, and one of the difficulties with the concept is that it is elusive and at times difficult to pinpoint as a political rather than cultural practice. Eisenstadt (1983: 10) argues that the key to compensating for this flaw, is "to distinguish between social praxis and social values, between the 'structural' and 'ideological' dimensions of clientelism" by separating discourse from reality. A second point of critique is what Eisenstadt calls "The Reductionist Trap"; the tendency to reduce all social phenomena to fit into the same category without considering the deeper aspects of the phenomenon (Is it a case of class oppression or a type of social organization? Is it equilibrium or domination?). The third and most pressing critique is that of macro-level application. Eisenstadt asks "how far above the micro-level can the concept be stretched if it is to retain its analytical value?" This critique is based on the observation that the starting point for clientelism was at micro-level, and would describe the relationship between local caciques (ie. native chiefs) and the people in villages. This was especially true because centuries ago, when access to information and communication between local communities and centralized government was scarce, it created a situation where centralized authorities could not easily access the local population. The solution, he argues, is to magnify the concept, incorporating the local level patron-client personal relationship into institutions and apply the logic of "more or less" rather than "either-or" and accurately defining the levels that are being analyzed. (Eisenstadt ed. 1983: 13-14) That is, in analysis it is important to consider to what extent clientelism occurs, not if it exists or not. He continues to specify that

> *"The analogy is not meant to suggest that parties , bureaucracies, multinationals, or states are to be treated as faithful replicas of concrete clientelistic structures; the point rather , is that as 'analytic structures'… they reveal some of the traits and relationships derived from the behavior of individual patrons and clients"* (Eisenstadt ed. 1983:14)

4.2 Political Legitimacy

From Clientelism, we now move to the issue of political legitimacy. After defining and describing legitimacy, individual and governmental practice will be discussed in terms of legitimacy.

The concept of legitimacy is a subject that is widely studied, and for which one can find several definitions. Several disciplines such as sociology, political science, law, philosophy and political anthropology all include the concept in their research and the definitions may vary according to the focus of each discipline, but in each discipline the essential meaning of legitimacy is the right to govern. (Coicaud 2002: 10) It is difficult to discuss the concept of legitimacy without taking a starting point, as most academic literature does, in the theories of Max Weber, who has been named the father of sociology. Weber defined legitimacy as the authority with which a governing body has been bestowed to uphold the law, and divided *legitimate authority* into three categories (Chalcraft et. al. 2008: 225):

> *1. Rational Authority is based on the belief in the legality of 'patterns of normative rules and the right of those elected to authority under such rules to issue commands'. Authority is based on procedures and formal rationality.*
>
> *2. Traditional Authority rests on '… an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them'.*
>
> *3. Charismatic Authority is opposed to both rational and traditional authority, and rests 'on the devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him'. Charismatic leadership appeals to substantive rationality and affective social action as defined by Weber.*

A further development of Webers ideas include the concept of inner justification, which will be the focus in this thesis. This more encompassing approach to the definition can be illustrated by the questions posed in the following quote:

> *"Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?" (Connolly ed. 1984:33)*

Schaar describes how Weber's theories laid the building blocks for legitimacy theory, explaining that scholars have mapped how charismatic authority transforms into traditional authority and later into rational authority. Meanwhile wholly different issues of legitimacy have become significant, as groups of populations increasingly feel that authorities fail to protect them and their interests as citizens. Schaar therefore argues that this rational-legal authority is in decline in the modern state, as legitimacy is no longer a result of principle or reason, but *habit*, *expediency* or *necessity*. (Connolly ed. 1984: 105-106)

Here we see a differentiation of legitimacy according to law and something being considered legitimate according to an individual or group. In other words, as Rogowski very concisely puts it, legitimacy is "how people choose to accept or not to accept particular governments". He further elaborates that the question is usually answered with the assumption that the political decisions of an individual are rational. However, what the individual considers a rational decision is usually determined by ethnicity, occupation etc. The individual's rationality is subjective according to the values and situation of that person (Rogowski 1974: 3).

However, the assumptions that the choice of an individual is rational, are made based on the existence of a perfect democracy. When this reality is distorted, the legitimacy of a government in the eye of the citizens is at best fragile. (Chalcraft et. al. 2008: 225) This is a very important observation, and is certainly relevant in new democracies with flawed systems and authorities, and in which large groups of the population do not feel represented by the elected government. When individuals or groups within society do not feel represented by the government, they tend to not respect the authority of this government. As Shaar points out: "Many people are seeking ways to live in the system without belonging to it: their hearts are elsewhere… Others… are acting politically to transform the system." (Connolly ed. 1984: 106)

Suchman (1995: 572) further develops these observations when arguing that researchers focus on different aspects of legitimacy: "(a) legitimacy grounded in pragmatic assessments of stakeholder relations, (b) legitimacy grounded in normative evaluations of moral propriety, and (c) legitimacy grounded in cognitive definitions of appropriateness and interpretability." In Table 1 we can see the strategies of gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy of each of these approaches to legitimacy. Shaar and Suchman attribute characteristics to the concept of legitimacy that are much less rooted in law and much more variable according to the interpretation of morals and situations by stakeholders, individuals as well as groups.

Furthermore, Suchman argues that legitimacy can be divided into two groups according to a (a) strategic or (b) institutional focus, often operating with some degree of each, as purposes overlap. (Suchman 1995: 572) Strategic legitimacy includes the use of carefully designed communication with symbols (such as slogans or posters) that will generate support in the target group. This type of legitimacy is often sought by

single organizations to legitimize a certain agenda. Institutional legitimacy rests upon structure as the main justification of authority and "transcends any single organization's purposive control" (Suchman 1995: 572). That is, we can distinguish on single case legitimacy for a specific program, policy or individual, and the legitimacy of a system, or a political party and a government as a whole.

Taking into account the findings of Schaar, Suchman, Connolly and Chalcraft, when looking at the case of Mexico it is particularly important to look at these distinctions that differ from Max Weber's original theory, because, as Griffin et. al. argue;

> *"…legitimacy remains a problematic concept since conformity to the law does not directly confer legitimacy, but is the product of one's ability to shape the legal rules. Nonetheless, when one chooses the rules that will govern behavior, one, in turn, learns to identify with these rules." (Griffin et. al. 2002: 187)*

Coicaud points out that the key to understanding issues involved in legitimacy is the justifying political power and obedience simultaneously, and he outlines three factors that are essential for the existence of legitimacy; *rights, norms* and *law*. We have already touched upon the concepts of the norms and law, so let me draw out the ideas on the concept of *rights* as seen by Coicaud. Coicaud argues that legitimacy is a question of 'right', the right to practice authority by an individual or group. It is also understood by Coicaud that the concept of right only exists in contrast to the right of another, and thus it only exists in a community. So, the concept implies the competition as well as the coexistence of two actors. (Coicaud 2002: 10-11) This is further illustrated by Kalyvas who writes:

> *"Politics may also be a struggle among competing groups for the influence and control of culture, the radical transformation of subjective orientations, representation and attitudes, the dissemination of a new world view, the construction of political identities, and the generation of values and meanings upon which legitimate political authority rests."* (Kalyvas 2008: 36)

In this coexistence a network between stakeholders is created, and "such a network allows exchanges to unfold within a fixed framework and under the form of reciprocity, that is to say, in a tangling together of rights and duties. For, to each right corresponds a duty." (Coicaud 2002: 11) This balance of rights and duties are essentially the backbone of a democracy and this principal applies both to the citizen and the government. In the preceding section we talked about reciprocity with regards to clientelism, and this is a concept also essential to legitimacy. Coicaud argues that reciprocity implies consent - "a right whose validity is recognized by no one does not possess, properly speaking, the character of a right." (Coicaud 2002:11). This further underlines the fact that legitimacy only by law or tradition is not properly legitimate without the

reciprocity of recognition and support from the citizens or voters, and that the actions of government by winning an election is not automatically legitimized throughout the term, but constant evaluation will result in different levels of legitimacy according to the policies carried out. Coicaud argues that "it is logical that the role [authorities] play in coordinating and conducting collective affairs will have the character of law only to the extent that they have the accord of the population." (Coicaud 2002: 11) Coicaud emphasizes that it is important to distinguish authority from the common use of 'authoritarian' as the latter implies force. Legitimate political authority is based of reciprocity and the acceptance of the right of the government to make decisions on behalf of the population, whereas the word 'authoritarian' implies the use of force.

Particularly these aspects of popular support of the actions of government, beyond the legal aspect of legitimacy, is what is important to discuss in the case of the Mexican presidential election.

4.3 Electoral Behavior - Social Choice Theory

Social Choice Theory can be used to analyze the structure of the collective decision that is the election of a president, as well as the inherent problems with the way the majority vote is determined in the specific context of this election. With regard to collective decision making, Social Choice Theory also refers to an inherent part of Democracy. The theory will be used to detect general electoral patterns in Mexico, in relation to its citizens and their motivations, as well as the issues that arise when there are three or more candidates in an election.

In his 1987 book, Kelly starts out with a very simple definition of social choice theory: "Social Choice Theory is the study of systems and institutions for making collective choices, choices that affect a group of people." (Kelly 1987: 1) Taking a more practical approach, Hylland further explains what Social Choice Theory can be used for:

> *"Perhaps the theory can be used to evaluate systems for decision making; perhaps it can give insight into the inherent properties of concepts like 'collective decisions' or 'social welfare'; or perhaps, in a more practical spirit, it can aid us in designing political institutions and constructing actual decision procedures." (Elster & Hylland 1986: 45)*

There are many aspects to Social Choice Theory, most of which are closely linked. Social Choice Theory is based on mathematical calculations and proofs with demonstrable truths, also called theorems., such as Condorcet's Winner, Impossibility Theorem, Managing Ordering, the Copeland Rule and Plurality Voting. It is not possible to examine all of these theorems in this thesis, and although plurality voting, a concept that defines the candidate with the highest percentage of the vote the winner of an election, could seem relevant to this thesis at first glance. However, I chose to analyze the problems that arise when the margin

between the winner and the runner up is minimal. For this reason, I will focus on the first two theorems, Condorcet's Winner and the Impossibility Theorem, which are relevant and important for analyzing the research question posed in chapter one.

Furthermore, the theorems within this social choice theory are based on mathematical models, which I will not elaborate on here. Rather, what is relevant for this thesis, from a social science perspective, are the findings that scholars have deduced from these models, or, how these mathematical findings can be applied to explain problems with electoral practices. A key concept in Social Choice Theory is how to determine the majority vote of a specific candidate. This is a fairly easy task when the choice is between two candidates. However, it gets more complicated when there are three or more candidates, as is the case of the presidential election in Mexico in 2012, which had 4 candidates. In the realm of this thesis it is relevant to look at the problem with simple majority in a context with more than two candidates, and how this affects the outcomes of an election, in which the margins are small and the disapproval of each candidate is high among the population at large. Simple majority does not measure how much you prefer one candidate over another, whether you actually like any of them, whether you are indifferent or if you are choosing "the lesser evil". It doesn't provide us with the *why* of a specific choice, the degree of like or dislike, and it does not help us understand what influenced the voter to choose the candidate that he or she did. (Kelly 1987: 4-5)

Kelly argues that there are four characteristics of majority voting and the theorem is that if all four conditions are met, the consequential social choice would be majority voting. (Kelly 1987: 7-10)

Universal Domain

"Simple majority voting is in this sense defined over a large domain, the largest possible; that is, simple majority voting satisfies the property of universal domain"

Anonymity

"A social choice rule will satisfy this property if it doesn't make any difference who votes in which way as long as the numbers of each type are the same"

Neutrality

If, whenever everyone reverses their preference between x and y, then the result is reversed (and if there was a tie, there still is)"

Positive responsiveness

"If X and Y were tied and now X rises in the voters order then this is enough to break the tie in X's favor"

Let us now look at the practical implications of each of these characteristics. First, with regard to domain it is important that the public that vote on a candidate or an issue is the largest possible in the context. That is, if the vote decides an issue or a candidate for a country, it is important that the whole country is able to vote, note only certain areas. Next, with regard to anonymity, this characteristic implies that votes by all individuals are equally weighted. In other words, it would not matter if the individual were a doctor, lawyer, dish washer, or a parliamentarian, it would count as one vote regardless. Kelly calls this *one-to-one correspondence*. Looking at the third characteristic of neutrality, it refers to each option or candidate are treated equally. And lastly, positive responsiveness describes that if a voter changes opinion about preferences, for example for candidate x in relation to y and z, then the 'distance' in preference between x and the other two candidates is either reduced, or surpassed. This is to say that a change in opinion about a candidate only affects the opinion of this specific candidate. These characteristics are important to take into account when considering the validity of the majority vote in an election setting because otherwise the election results could lack legitimacy.

The concept of majority voting is central to representative democracies, which is based on collective decision making and the election of representatives through which these decisions are carried out. It is also related to legitimacy, as discussed in the previous section, because the majority vote provides legitimacy according to law. The legitimacy of a government, both legally and in public perception, depend on the fact that there is no question about the majority vote. In cases where doubts about the accuracy of the majority vote arise, legitimacy of the winning candidate is often challenged.

These characteristics for majority voting, particularly *universal domain* and *positive responsiveness* become hard to determine in a setting with two or more candidates. If there are four candidates and one achieves a 33.33% vote, you could still argue that 66.66% of the voters that did not vote for the winning candidate voted against him or her. Also, when two of three candidates are tied, it is difficult to determine which of the candidates have more support among the voters that voted for the third or fourth candidate. In other words, if the voters that supported the losing candidate could choose between the tied candidates, which candidate would then have greater support?

These are just some of the questions that arise regarding majority in a setting with three or more candidates. This paradox of how to accurately determine the majority vote in a context of more than two candidates is referred to as the Voting Paradox, or Condorcet's Paradox, as coined by Nicolas de Condorcet, a 18th century French philosopher. (Gehrlein & Lepelly 2011: vii) Condorcet determined that different and contradicting interpretations of an election occurred in a scenario with three or more candidates.

The concept of "Condorcet's winner" as Kelly describes it occurs if between alternatives X, Y and Z are paired up in all possible pairs (X/Y, X/Z and Y/Z) one candidate is tie or winner in each combination. The voting paradox arises when all candidates win in one constellation. Let us consider that Y wins between Y and Z, Z wins between X and Z and X wins between Y/X, and in this case "X loses to Z which loses to Y who in turn loses to X" (Kelly 1987: 16) the degree of approval of each candidate with each voter is not measured, therefore in any combination of:

1 – XYZ 2 – YZX 3 – ZXY

will produce a Condorcet's winner, even if the degree varies, as in the example in figure following figure (Kelly 1987: 25:



The preferences in the figure depict single-peaked[1] preferences; that is to say, no two preferences have the same value to the voter, as opposed to preferences that are not single-peaked; the voter prefers several choices to the same degree. This is important to the concept of majority rule, because it determines and 'individual end result' so to say, and the median of a collection of individual end results will determine the final outcome of an election. In order for there to be a Condorcet's Winner it requires single-peaked preferences. Kelly points out that the microeconomic origin of Social Choice Theory causes the assumption that individual decision making always follows an "internal consistency" of the individual, that "if one alternative is preferred to a second while the second is preferred to a third, then the first is preferred to the third." (Kelly 1987: 16) In an election setting this entails that the total degree of preference for each candidate is *virtually impossible to detect*. For this same reason it is difficult to determine how many historical situations have failed to have a Condorcet's Winner because of the lack of full preference information. This can be described as the unknown factor of the second preference. (Kelly 1987: 50)

Another of the most important theorems in Social Choice is the impossibility theorem, set forth by the father of Social Choice Theory, Kenneth Arrow. This theorem determines that "given a list of criteria that we would like a social choice procedure to satisfy, it isn't possible for any social choice rule to satisfy all of them." (Kelly

[1] Single-peaked performance means that the voter has an ideal choice, or one candidate or option that is preferred to all others.

1987: 2) Arrow proved that when meeting a list of fairness criteria, it is impossible to reach a completely fair result of an election. These fairness criteria include (U) Unrestricted Domain (all possible combinations of individuals), (P) Weak Pareto Principle (if the preference of each individual is a certain option, this is transferable to society as a whole – everybody wins), (I) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (no irrelevant alternatives affect the preference between X and Y), (D) Non-Dictatorship (preference is of multiple voters, not one single voter). (Gaertner 2009: 20) The theorem concluded and proved that: "For a finite number of individuals and at least three distinct social alternatives, there is no social welfare function *f* satisfying conditions U, P, I and D" (Gaertner 2009: 21) This theorem can seem a bit mathematical and abstract, but what Arrow argued was that all elections operate under conditions that are to some extent affected by external factors. For example, the condition of unrestricted domain supposes that all types of communities participate in elections that decide policies or representatives that concern them. Also, in order for there to be "no irrelevant alternatives" it would mean that the voter would never prefer to vote for someone that is not running. Another example is there to be a satisfying condition of The Weak Pareto Principle, if one policy can improve the condition of one voter and the conditions of all other voters remain the same, this policy is to be preferred. And finally, non-dictatorship implies that one single person is not deciding for a community as a whole, assuming to know their preferences (or not considering them).

We will return to these two theorems central to Social Choice Theory in chapter four, when I will discuss these paradoxes in regards to the 2012 presidential election which had very close margins, and I will explain how a candidate with a considerable degree of disapproval among the public could win the election, and the significance of these theorems in the setting of a flawed democracy.

5 Empirical Analysis

This chapter will discuss the way in which Clientelism has formed processes and norms that are relevant in an election setting in Mexico. The way that issues of legitimacy have been handled by the PRI and PAN governments will also be discussed, including how this legitimacy has been justified and questioned, and how this general environment has impacted the 2012 presidential election. To conclude, Social Theory theorems will also be analyzed with relation to the 2012 Mexican election, to determine whether and how they may be able to shed light on the election results.

5.1 The cultural remnants of a feudalist society (clientelism and legitimacy)

A history of feudalism has permeated Mexico's political culture. Even today when the country is a democracy, remnants of the feudalist system, in which the local ruler gave permission for use of the land in exchange for

services from the peasants, are evident in some political and daily practices. This system is also evident in the formation of Mexican political ideals which started taking place after gaining independence and throughout the nineteenth century.

Mexico was a colony under the Spanish crown for nearly 300 years, from the time of 1521 when Hernán Cortez landed in Veracruz. This rule came to an end with the Independence War which lasted from 1810 to 1821, at which point Mexico was free and needed to build its own political system. However, this was by no means a smooth process. From Agustín de Iturbide, who became Emperor of Mexico for a short time directly following Mexico's new found independence, and until the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, which ended with the Revolution in 1910, there was a constant struggle for power between two camps: The liberals and the conservatives. (Hamnett 1999: 144)

The liberals rejected the traditional Spanish colonial authoritarianism and were influenced both by the French Age of Reason and the American values of liberty and sovereignty that promoted strong legislative power and classic economic liberalism. (Ai Camp 2000: 54) The conservatives were generally the former supporters of the Spanish colonial power and believed in governing with a strong executive power as a natural extension of the former colonial rule, so as to avoid disorder that could develop into a void similar to the one left after colonization during the previous centuries. (Ai Camp 2000: 55)

After Mexico obtained independence, the states enjoyed relative independence, however this was replaced by a stronger federal government and centralized administration with the Constitution of 1835. This happened after the collapse of the finances of the then liberal government, and the strong federal structure that was created is still in place today. Furthermore, in 1843 the Organic Law changed the congressional structure of the 1847 constitution and established the division of federal government affairs in departments with governors elected by the president, also a structure that is still in place today. (Hamnett 1999: 147). This structure allows the President to virtually control the management of these public institutions. The liberals finally won the ideological battle and Benito Juarez achieved a functioning liberal government which was established in 1858 and existed until his death in 1872. However, after Benito Juárez's death, Mexico was again left in a political void, with no logical successor, much to the benefit of Porfirio Díaz, a military man with a belief that Mexico needed stability and order, above liberty and progress. (Ai Camp 2000: 57 and Pansters 2011: 54)

Historians argue that the attempts of a liberal and democratic government during the last part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century failed to take proper form because of the internal disagreements of the Liberals. No strong alternative to the paternalist leaders and the strong central government were found. The most successful of the liberal attempts of forming a democratic government

was that of Benito Juárez, who was the president under which the Constitution of 1857 was signed, and who carried out some of the most significant reforms in Mexican history; for example educational reforms that made education mandatory for all, and the ecclesiastical reform that subordinated the church to the state and civil law. But even Benito Juárez had not achieved uniting the liberals in one camp, and because of this no consolidated liberal wing could naturally take over after his death. (Hamnett 1999: 160-162)

The *Porfiriato*, as the period of time when Porfirio Díaz was in power is popularly called, used the force of the state to maintain order and forced the sale of indigenous land, much of which fell into the hands of foreigners or the already wealthy. The Porfiriato was a step back when it came to constitutional guarantees for the Mexicans, and the attempts of establishing a constitutional democracy that had begun a century before were extinguished. (Hamnett 1999: 194-195) Ultimately, this and a troubled Mexican economy led to popular unrest and finally the Mexican Revolution in 1910, which started as a protest of the Liberals against the dictatorship, and which had the purpose of forming a democratic government. The success of the revolution led to the exile of Díaz and the election of Francisco Madero as democratic president. However, after the murder of Francisco Madero in 1913, the Revolutionary War broke out – a war that would last for several years. (Hamnett 1999: 209). The revolutionaries wanted social justice, and the government formed after the revolution was formed on the basis of these ideals. However, in the words of Roderic Ai Camp:

> *"In my opinion, the Revolution introduced significant changes, but it did not change the social structures in a way that can be expected of a great social revolution, such as the Soviet or Chinese revolutions." (2000:64)*

The post-revolutionary structure of government was built upon the already existing structure from the *Porfiriato*. (Ai Camp 2000: 69 and Hamnett 1999: 147) In fact, Hamnett argues that despite the many positive results such as the reestablishment of community land ownership (Hamnett 1999: 20) and the promotion labor organization (Hamnett 1999: 179), the revolution "increased authoritarianism, centralism, and one-party rule." (Hamnett 1999: 235) Subsequently, there are three factors which characterize this one party rule, all of make a poor foundation for a government that enjoys legitimacy within the public opinion:

The first of these factors is *the vacuum that was left by colonialism*. Mexico had never had an independent political system, and as the Spanish left Mexico, they took with them all structure that had once existed. The Mexican people needed to build a political system from scratch and with no previous experience, a void, or vacuum was created. As Hamnett puts it, the first establishment of an independent government suffered for the fact that "the source of the problem was that Mexico was trying to transform Spanish colonial structures into ones suitable for an independent state without an indigenous tradition of national representation." (Hamnett 1999: 144)

After the colonial era, the challenge of the new, Mexican post-independence government was to balance regional institutionalization with federal government, but the states were reluctant of too much federal power as a result of Spanish colonialism and the rule of Emperor Iturbide. This succession of events demonstrates that throughout post-independence Mexican history, it has been difficult to establish lasting governmental systems that do not emphasize a strong central power. Obviously this is not interchangeable with the centralized power of the Spanish colonial rule, but parallels can be drawn. For example, this need to centralize the power and exercise this power with force of the post-revolution government, is comparable to the ways of enforcing Spanish Colonial Law, only through congress and the president, again creating fertile grounds for benefits and protection to be distributed according personal relations, only in this case instead of the exchange occurring between patron and subordinate, it occurs between voters and politicians, and internally among different levels of politicians (For example state and federal officials). As mentioned in the previous chapter in new and flawed democracies such as this newly founded Mexican republic, in which the population was divided between the liberals and the conservatives, but also in social and ethnical classes, this paternalist structure lacked popular legitimacy, and this was expressed in the many different constitutions that were drafted during the last half of the nineteenth century, and the several failed governments.

Another deciding factor for the one-party rule was the legacy of *Authoritarianism* - The legacy left by the Spanish was authoritarian, and this was the only system that had been tried locally. The liberal ideas stemming from Europe and the US were set in very different environments, and not necessarily comparable to the Mexican reality, which made it difficult to see them as a strong alternative to authoritarianism. Hamnett states that "in positive terms, it can be argued that the origins of contemporary Mexico lie in the Reform era with the attempt to define citizens' rights and lay the foundations for representative government." (Hamnett 1999: 196) However, this legacy includes the negative aspects of "strong centralizing tendencies (within a federal system), untrammelled executive supremacy, the seemingly perpetual re-election of the monopoly party, the frequent abuse of citizens' rights, the failure to develop a political culture of effective participation, and the prevalence of private deals and personal patronage." In other words, the failure to reach consensus among the liberals caused a missed opportunity to create a structure government in which the population felt protected enough to not recur to personal patronage to protect their interests, and thereby creating legitimacy that did not only rest in the justification by law, but also in the opinion and support of the citizens.

The third defining factor is the *Paternal State*. The political culture that was left after the military leadership during the *Porfiriato*, bled into the culture established after the revolution, with a strong state at the center, paternalist in nature. This was also a practice inherited from the Spanish colonial rule, in which special

privileges were given to the church, the military and the population of Spanish origin. Secondary to these were the Criollo or Mestizo population (part indigenous and part Spanish descent) and lowest in the hierarchy was the indigenous population (Ai Camp 41-45) In the Porfiriato paternalism was executed for example by dividing important positions between friends of the president, negative public opinion was met with force and loyalty was rewarded with protection and societal position. This history of difficulty of implementing a democratic government is fertile ground for the practice of clientelism, because when lacking a system that protects the interests of the population as a whole, each individual is forced to seek his or her own protection. Of course, the nature of the clientelist exchanges in modern day Mexico are not the same as during the Porfiriato. Instead it has adapted according to conditions as Mexico has become more open to the outside world and subsequently attempted to gradually democratize the country.

Today the Constitution itself is applied in what can be argued to be a paternalist manner. During the 19th century with the different governments, Mexico forged what is the basis of the constitution which is in place today; the Constitution of 1917. Williams describes the paternalist character of the Constitution in the following manner: “In the official post-revolutionary discourse of Mexican modernity, then, popular will was deposited in the Constitution and from there passed into the state thereby implying that the will of the state was and is the de facto will of the people and vice versa.” (Williams 2011: 12) The Mexican presidential power is superior to the Congress, and usually legislation passed down from the President is approved in both chambers (from 80-95% of the proposals are passed in Congress). This is an example off seeking legitimacy through law; the constitution. This is also evident the paternalist nature of the use of the Constitution is Article 29 which allows the president and council of ministers, when approved by congress, to use force to uphold peace and eliminate disturbance during a limited time only. In other words; Article 29 by law legitimizes use of force, which is very exceptional for a Constitution. (Williams 2011: 26) However, again this legitimization does not consider the legitimacy in public opinion, and is a de facto means to silence voices of discord, which was further evident in 1941 with the ratification of the penal code to include “social dissolution” as a punishable federal crime. (Williams 2011: 27).

Williams argues that this strengthening of presidential power in relation to congress and the population, discourages and to an extent penalizes opposition. Adding to the penal code that “those who meet with a group of three or more individuals to discuss ideas or programs that tend to disturb public order or affect Mexican sovereignty with from two to twelve years in prison” (Williams 2011: 28) made presidential power virtually synonymous with the Mexican Political System, which is essentially identical to the constitution before the revolution.

The revolutionaries had set up a system similar to that of the government they revolted against, a system lacking (perceived) legitimacy, and favoring those who supported their position, through protection – most certainly a clientelist practice. This is clearly illustrated by Williams who argues that in Mexico "the law not only legitimates the state, it breaks down all barriers that obstruct the state's practice" (Williams 2011: 11) and that governmental reason in Mexico is not characterized by self-limitation and the quest for collective well-being, but rather "a postcolonial quest for a police state capable of creating the good order and sovereign mastery that would allow for the implantation and extension of bourgeois rule." (Williams 2001: 11)

This was the setting in which the post-revolution Mexico took its starting point, and which influenced the development of Mexican politics from the Revolution until today.

5.2 The formation and performance of PRI Governments (clientelism and legitimacy)

The current Mexican political system is based on the Constitution of 1917. The constitution is based on a representative democracy of popular sovereignty and was one of the first constitutions in the world to include issues of social justice, such as land allocation and education. The constitution divides powers in legislative, executive and judicial branches, with a centralized federal government and state governments. However, these divisions only work in theory, as Mahler argues, because the Mexican executive power (the president) also has the power to introduce legal proposals (legislative power), issue executive decrees and appoint and remove judges (judicial power). (Mahler 2013: 394) The president is by all means "the single most powerful individual in Mexican politics" (Mahler 2013: 396) and this makes Mexico in practice a "presidential dictatorship", which enables the president to operate in a paternalist manner. Again, the legitimacy of a government that is permitted to permeate into all branches of government may have legitimacy according to law, however legitimacy in public opinion may not follow when arbitrary decisions of the executive power are executed with the 'cover' of lawfulness.

This is the foundation on which the PRI was established. At the time of formation in 1929, the name of the political party of the revolutionaries, that would later become the PRI, was Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR – National Revolutionary Party).

As a reaction to the Porfiriato, in which Díaz proclaimed successive reelection, the constitution includes the clause that no Mexican president must be reelected, and therefore each president can only be in office for six years. This is very significant, because it has shaped the way the PRI leaders have appointed and prepared their successors. Throughout the PRI rule, the president in term has, in practice, chosen the president that

was to follow him. This was possible because first of all because of the power that the president in Mexico traditionally possesses (as mentioned above), and also because for the best part of the twentieth century, there were no opponents neither from within the party, nor other political parties that the appointed candidate would have to compete. Until the end of the eighties there was no real dissidence within the PRI that it would be enough to produce another candidate than the one chosen by the leaving president. (Mahler 2013: 398)

Mahler, in his 2013 work, sets up a list of stages in the process of the selection of the presidential successor within the PRI:

1. *President consults with advisors and colleagues as to acceptability of possible nominees.*
2. *The President announces his choice.*
3. *Power-seekers and political leaders in the PRI praise the candidate-designate.*
4. *Candidate is officially nominated at the PRI Rally.*
5. *The Campaign takes place.*
6. *The Election takes place.*
7. *The winning candidate officially accepts the election results.*
8. *The new president selects his advisors.*
9. *The new president selects an advantageous time to announce his appointments.*

(Mahler 2013: 397)

The candidate would then proceed to do extensive and intensive campaigning all over the country, even in relatively small towns. One might ask why this was necessary if there was no real competition for the presidency, but Mahler argues:

> *"There were at least two reasons why the national campaign was useful, even if it contained no surprises. First, the act of campaigning itself helped to create support for the regime, and thereby afforded the government greater legitimacy than it might otherwise have had. Second, the presidential campaign could make a significant difference to candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies who were running for office, either on the same side as the presidential candidate or an opposition ticket."* (Mahler 2013: 398)

As Mahler points out, campaigning and creating a relation to the voters locally increased the otherwise questionable legitimacy of a candidate with no real opponent. This local campaigning was also a way to create and use clientelist networks. (Holzner 2010: 5) Often clientelist networks would be local networks, led by individuals that can mobilize large groups of people. The political parties would then include these leaders

into their clientelist network. (Holzner 2010:143) A New York Times article describes a typical example of a clientelist setup by the PRI in the northern border city of Tijuana:

> *"Under a scheme that the party began to perfect in the 1970's, the PRI turned to men like Don Agustin, as he likes to be called, to gain control over the vast squatter settlements that had sprung up on publicly owned land. With the blessing of local officials, Don Agustin would sell small plots for $500 or $1,000, from which party and Government officials would take a cut. Little if any paper changed hands. In return for Government tolerance and the occasional attentions of public works officials, Don Agustin would do his best to assure that his colonia voted solidly for the PRI."* (New York Times, 21 August 1994)

It is important to point out that clientelist behavior is not limited to the PRI. Many PAN and PRD politicians were, and are, former members of the PRI. They would be able to take advantage of already existing clientelist networks. Furthermore, Holzner argues that clientelist practices have not decreased with increased party competition; in fact the contrary seems to be the case. However, with increased party competition, the PRI no longer has the monopoly of clientelist favors and the fight to win over the clientelist networks has become more expensive. (Holzner 2010:143) The local clientelist networks will simply support the party that offers what most adequately meets their needs, as mentioned in chapter 3 with regard to competition between patrons.

The 71 year PRI rule was marked by several events that would erode the legitimacy rooted in the constitution and the revolutionary past. As Williams argues:

> *"Modernity in Mexico has been predicted on the permanent application of state power in the construction of social order, rather than on the self-limitation of state power via a legal system guaranteeing individual rights and limiting public power"* (Williams 2011:11)

The rule of what has begun as a political party of revolutionaries that fought for social justice and civil rights little by little lost its revolutionary glow, and by the sixties the government's application of force to uphold order caused a decrease in support among the population. This can be illustrated by the first event that marked the beginning of the social unrest that led to end of the PRI era by the end of the century. In 1968, as a reaction to the army occupation of the National Preparatory School, thousands of students and professors from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM - National Autonomous University) and headed by the university's rector, marched towards the Zócalo (the main square of Mexico City) to protest against the violation of civil liberties and the use of force of the government of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (PRI). The protesters stayed in the Zócalo for weeks and by August a crowd of 100,000 citizens were gathered,

which was unprecedented in Mexico. The government responded with arrests and occupation of the university, claiming the protests were with the intent of creating another revolution with the aim to overturn the government. The tension came to a climax on October 2 in Tlatelolco, when the protesters were met with force by the Mexican Army. (Hamnett 1999: 269) The number of deaths is to date not certain. The government said 26 people had died. The Guardian published that 500 had died. However, many, including Mexican writer Octavio Paz, consider that the correct number is around 325 casualties. (Aristegui Noticias, 1 October 2013). Nobody was held responsible for "The massacre of Tlatelolco", as it came to be known, which sparked criticism in the intellectual middle class and became the beginning of the decline of the PRI and its perceived legitimacy among the population. (Hamnett 1999: 271)

The 1988 presidential election became significant to the opening up to more democratic multi-party elections. The PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gotari officially took 50% of the vote between the three running parties. However, the electoral computers conveniently broke down during the counting process. Some argue that even the official numbers showed a 25% of votes for the PRI before the breakdown, and there were a number accusations of fraud and rigged counting processes. (Hamnett 1999: 284) It was the first time in which the win of the PRI was in doubt. This was largely due to the emergence of a strong enough opposition which offered an alternative to the "Dinosaur" as the PRI is popularly called. The rigged counting of votes secured a PRI win but it was the beginning of the road that would lead the PRI to lose the election in 2000 and later not only lose, but come in *third* in the 2006 elections after the PAN and the PRD, as we will see in a later section. (Mahler 2013: 396) As Hamnettt argues "the fraud issue of 1988 ensured that the government remained virtually obliged to acknowledge opposition victories" (Hamnett 1999: 284) in order to preserve some perceived legitimacy in public opinion.

1994 was another significant and eventful year, which eventually became decisive for the perceived legitimacy of the PRI. It began with rebellion in the southernmost state of Chiapas and a general rise in violence in Mexico, as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN – Zapatista National Liberation Army) captures four cities in Chiapas. As Shulz and Williams describe it, this army "unlike traditional guerrillas, … did not seek to destroy the state, but rather to shift the balance of forces in favor of popular and democratic movements, thereby isolating and ultimately defeating anti-democratic tendencies within the PRI, the state and the rest of society" (Schulz & Williams 1995: 165). This is a good example of a part of the population which did not feel represented or protected by the government. The government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population in Chiapas, that wanted the government to be accountable, and that caused some of them to form the movement and start the rebellion. As mentioned in Chapter Three, A right whose validity is recognized by no one is by definition not a right. This socialist movement even rejected the political left that was the PRD, and later on the EZLN leader, Subcommander Marcos, would lead the "Other

Campaign" parallel to the 2006 presidential campaigns, to create conscience among the leftist part of the population that the proposals of both the left, center and right political parties were insufficient to create social justice. (New York Times, 31 August 2005)

In March that same year, leading up to the presidential election in July of 1994, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the successor hand-picked by president Raul Salinas de Gotari, was assassinated during a campaign visit in Tijuana. Although a supposed culprit was convicted, to this day many are convinced that conservative PRI members and even Salinas himself may have been involved in the assassination. However, this was never proved in the inadequate investigation carried out by the special investigator assigned to the case. (New York Times, 21 August 1994) The same month Colosio's campaign manager Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon was nominated for presidential candidate in replacement of Colosio. This came to become very significant, because one of Zedillo's goals was to open up the Mexican political system and allowing the participation of other political parties. (Mahler 2013: 399) Ultimately this prepared the terrain for the election of the PAN candidate Vicente Fox in 2000.

In December 1994, only a few months into the term of Ernesto Zedillo (PRI), the external debt became so bad that Mexico had to ask for the assistance of the United States (Mahler 2013: 408) The Mexican peso devaluated and many Mexicans lost their savings and homes almost overnight. The economic crisis of 1994, was the culmination of the less serious economic crisis that took place in 1982, which was a result of an overgrown public sector (Hamnett 1999: 273-274). The stability that the PRI had originally provided, had diminished since the seventies. Not only through the violation of civil rights during the repression of social protest in 1968, the exclusion of social groups as what happened in Chiapas but now the economic situation of the general middle class was affected.

All of these events from the 1968 repression of student protesters and over the next years up until 1994 arguably represent the signs of the decline of the legitimacy inherited from the revolution. Social disintegration and political disillusionment stood in stark contrast to the idealism and good intentions that were prevalent after the revolution. Perhaps the idealistic glow was enhanced because of the long period of dictatorship, as it tends to happen in the cases regime changes as a result of public discontent. All of this in spite of the increased openness, economic and political reforms and the emergence of other political parties able to compete with the PRI. Some scholars argue that the collective memory of the revolution faded over time, and the fear of the violence that took place before and during the revolution was a factor that deterred the population that still remembered those times from going against the system. (Ai Camp 2000: 97)

During the six year term of Zedillo (PRI) that led up to the end of the millennium, history seemed to catch up with the PRI. In spite of the fact that Zedillo was a president that was determined to reform the reputation

of the PRI, by carrying out an electoral reform that made PRI less influential, the accusations of fraud during PRI government and the demand for democratic accountability intensified. Amnesty International and several ONGs presented complaints about corruption and violations of human rights (Hamnett 1999: 293) Furthermore, Mexico experienced increased international attention with NAFTA in 1994 and a trade agreement with the European Union in 1997. The unresolved issue of Chiapas and the EZLN was highly criticized by foreign observers, and represented a sore spot for Zedillo's government. Mahler argues that "Zedillo's reforms have been effective; ever since they were enacted, in fact, opposition to the PRI has increased, and the PRI has moved from being the dominant party in the nation to being an *also-ran*" (Mahler 2013: 405) The population's trust in the government, and thus the popular legitimacy had steadily decreased. In fact, a study conducted in 1995 showed that 1 of every 3 Mexicans thought the government was to be trusted, and in another survey two thirds of the Mexicans expressed that they thought that government officials were more concerned about their own gain and interests than serving the public (Ai Camp 2000: 82 & 86)

Zedillo, who had been appointed as candidate at the last moment when Colosio was assassinated was likely considered a puppet of Salinas, and even though this sentiment was reduced when Raul Salinas, Carlos Salinas' brother was convicted of murder (and supposedly proved that Zedillo did not protect his predecessor) he was not able to correct the image of the PRI, perhaps because of his relative anonymity in the public eye. (Ai Camp 2000: 85) Mahler strikingly describes the significance of the PRI:

> *"The PRI was the major party in Mexico from the 1920s through the 2000 election. It was so well entrenched and central to the operation of the government that through the end of the 1990sit had been seen as serving 'as a subordinate extension of the presidency and central government bureaucracy'"* (Mahler 2013: 404)

Because of this, it is notable that for the 2000 presidential election, Zedillo did not select a successor, and the candidature was open to those who would put forward a bid for the presidency. (Hamnett 1999: 303) Arguably this internal disorganization, the lack of legitimacy in the public eye (who were tired of economic crises), the lack of proper representation, and the use of force to control social movements provided fertile soil for the political parties that had developed enough to pose a real threat to the political monopoly of the PRI to stand a real chance in the elections. The entrenched perception of PRI as synonymous with 'the government' was now able to be dismantled, provided a proper organization of the opposition.

5.3 2000-2012 PAN Governments (clientelism, legitimacy and social choice)

Ai Camp observes that political ideology has little to do with the way Mexicans place their vote (Ai Camp 2000: 101) and although PAN is considered neo-liberal and the PRI left-center "the major difference between the PAN and the PRI included the PAN's greater criticism of the United States, and the PAN's desire to support the Catholic Church." (Mahler 2013: 405) When Mexicans voted in July of 2000, rather than political ideology, they voted for change. The reforms carried out by Zedillo (PRI), the strengthened organization of the PAN and the growing discontent of the Mexican population culminated with the election of Vicente Fox Quesada (PAN). The PRD candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas did not have the popular backing that Fox did and opinion polls showed a close race between Fox and the PRI candidate Francisco Labastida. (ADN Político, 8 February 2012). The transition after Fox' win was peaceful and occurred with no interventions from the PRI, who accepted the defeat.

Fox' campaign promises included a very ambitious 7 percent economic growth after 3 years and to create 1.4 million jobs a year. (New York Times, 21 July 2000) He promised a Mexico where no one was above the law (BBC, 3 July 2000) He conducted himself with charisma and compared Mexico to South Africa under apartheid and to Germany divided by the Berlin Wall. Meanwhile his opponent campaigned that Fox' and PANs inexperience could lead to chaos. (New York Times, 26 April 2000) The ambitious economic goals that Fox (PAN) posed in his campaign were never achieved. According to Banxico, the National Bank of Mexico, the growth rate between 2000 and 2008 was a total of 1.8%, about the same growth rate as the rest of Latin America in that time period, (Banxico, November 2009) and instead of more jobs being created, unemployment increased. (La Jornada, 18 November 2006) Other problems that emerged during Fox' term were corruption accusations against his wife, general inefficiency, and increased violence of drug cartels. All of these events were contributing factors that made the strong initial perceived legitimacy fade quickly. As mentioned in Chapter Three, winning an election is not enough maintain perceived legitimacy throughout the whole term. The election winner is constantly evaluated, and support varies according to performance.

However, most noticeable is that Fox' attempt to clearly separate his government from the PRI past also failed. After his 2000 Fox (PAN) announced the "Special Prosecutor for Social and Political Movements of the Past" (Femospp) seeking to prosecute the responsible parties for events such as the killing of students in the '68 student revolt (Williams 2011: 30) However, the way that the Femospp was set up meant that the state was in reality scrutinizing itself, a attempt of legitimization doomed to fail. The former President Echevarria and several other PRI leaders from earlier governments stood trial with the special prosecutor, but none were ever convicted due to statute of limitation and political exceptionality. The Femosspp was dissolved by the end of Fox' term and no other instance would take over the functions of investigating the past violations

of the PRI. (Williams 2011: 33) It was also known that Fox included in his cabinet several officials that had been loyal to Zedillo (PRI), and it came to public attention that Fox had met with several PRI members and prominent businessmen, such as Carlos Slim (the richest man in the world according to Forbes) at Salinas' home in 2003 to discuss "the pragmatics of consensus" as Slim would later confirm in an interview. (Williams 2011: 33) Perhaps the most significant of all this was not the fact that Fox was seeking consensus, as this is arguably important for a democracy to work, but rather that again democratic accountability was absent. Fox could have established his perceived legitimacy in spite of the unfulfilled promises of economic growth, if the Mexicans had felt that the new government was a real change from the 71 years with the PRI. However, the perception was that those who influenced the policies of the government and the decisions of the president were essentially the same during the PRI rule.

It is known that all political parties in Mexico make use of clientelism as a tool for obtaining government support, and the government of Fox, in that aspect, proved to be no different. The program *Progresa* that was initiated by the PRI government, was a program run by the SEDESOL (Ministry of Social Development) that gave benefits in terms of education, nutrition and income subsidies to poor families in rural areas as a (Hevia de la Jara 2009: 69) Although the program was renamed *Oportunidades* and several reforms were made to the program, for example to include urban areas, the PAN did not rid the program for political influence that the PRI had been known for, and although several mechanisms were incorporated to maintain the democratic structure of the program, by 2006 thirteen of seventeen program coordinators were militant PAN representatives, against only four representatives of civic society. (Hevia de la Jara 2009: 70) This is an example of how a program that is intended to fight poverty can be an important factor in positioning a political party, and The State Secretary for Social Development, Josefina Vázquez Mota, would later run for president as a candidate for the PAN party in the 2012 election.

When Fox's term came to an end the new PAN candidate for presidency was Felipe Calderón. However, whereas in 2000 the top contenders were PRI and PAN in the 2006 campaign the strongest candidates were Felipe Calderón of the PAN and for the PRD Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD), former Mexico City mayor and with a large popular backing, the new hope of the Mexican left. The PRD had consolidated during the PAN government and was now a real alternative to the neo-liberal government, whose policies for growth failed. The PRI candidate, Roberto Madrazo was not a prominent character in the campaign nor in the elections, and all attention was on the PAN and PRD candidates.

The margin was very close between the two candidates, and until around 8pm on the day of the election the preliminary count showed an advantage for Lopez Obrador (PRD). However as the election night progressed, Calderón caught up to him and finally when all the votes were counted, Calderón (PAN) had won with a 1.04% advantage. The margin was so small that López Obrador (PRD) protested the results and demanded a recount of the votes. IFE issued a recount but came to the same result, although with a slightly smaller margin. Lopez Obrador (PRD) did not accept the decision and claimed that the recount had not been carried out in a way that would give representative results, and the evidence of fraud should be enough to justify a complete recount. He mobilized the PRD supporters in the Zócalo and Avenida Reforma (the main avenue of Mexico City) and protested by carrying out 3 months sit-in, and in November before all of the supporters, he declared himself the "Legitimate President of Mexico". (El Universal, 27 November 2006) The general perception of the protests of Lopez Obrador (PRD) was that he took them too far. Many inhabitants in Mexico City were annoyed by the taking over of their public spaces, and saw the whole campaign as a personal quest for power. (La Jornada, 8 August 2007) Comparisons to Venezuela's president Chavez were made and the PRD's perceived legitimacy eroded. Lopez Obrador (PRD) remained active on the political scene during the term of Calderón as the leader of the PRD in preparation for the 2012 elections.

Results
Presidential Election 2006

Felipe Calderón (PAN)	*36.38%*
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD)	*35.34%*
Roberto Madrazo (PRI)	*21.57%*
Other Candidates	*6.66%*

Source: IFE PREP results 2006

As Felipe Calderón took office he declared war on drugs by establishing a plan that would have the marine and the army combat drug cartels operating in Mexico. With this war declaration, the violence that had already started to escalate during the term of Fox, became much worse. There are different calculations as to how many people were killed as a result of the war on drugs. The official number from the Department of Justice is around 40,000 whereas ONGs estimate more than 60,000 deaths and 20,000 missing, (CNN Mexico 31 August 2012). When the son of a famous poet Javier Sicilia was kidnapped and murdered by members of organized crime, he took to the streets and organized large demonstrations for peace, and against the strategies of Calderón (PAN). (New York Times, 9 May 2011) Another issue that has taken protesters to the street against the Calderón government was the death of 40 small children in a fire in a nursery run by the government, for which no one was held responsible. The population was tired of dealing with violence and insecurity, and tired of no one being held responsible. After the six year war on the drug cartels, violence has

not decreased. Whenever a drug lord is put in jail, the cartels engage in a turf war to fill the void and insert a new drug lord to cover the area.

Leading up to the 2012 elections, the perceived legitimacy of the PAN had severely diminished, because not only did the government not maintain status quo, as the PRI had done for many years despite many questionable policies and actions, the situation for the Mexicans became increasingly worse. Many of the problems that Mexico suffered during the PAN government were arguably a residue of former PRI governments, but the policies of the PAN government were essentially not that different from those their predecessors in terms of reforms, privatization of government companies and reluctance to seek accountability. The economy had not improved, the growth promised that Fox (PAN) had promised had not happened, and the individual Mexican could perceive this through inflation of gas and staple foods while at the same time increase in wages was stagnant (CNN Expansión, 23 May 2013), even though Mexico had weathered the world economic crisis of 2008 relatively well.

5.4 2012 Presidential Elections

When the time came for the positioning of candidates for the 2012 presidential election, the PRI was prepared with a very well-crafted campaign, announcing “The new PRI”. The image of the PRI candidate in the last presidential election, Roberto Madrazo, was poor during the elections, and an illustrative example of his image was how he was caught cheating in the Berlin Marathon – his actions became a metaphor for the corrupt PRI politician who cheats to get ahead. (The Independent, 6 October 2007)

The candidate for the PRI was Enrique Peña Nieto, former governor of Mexico State. Peña Nieto is young, fresh-faced and is married to an actress that used to be a soap opera star, a perfect picture for the media. Furthermore, Peña Nieto (PRI) has the ability to speak with certain security that stood out in the televised debates, in which his opponents seemed unfocused and unprepared. (New York Ties, 11 June 2012) Peña Nieto’s image corresponded with his promise of a “New PRI” that was no longer controlled by the Dinosaurs of the past, but who still had the experience and structure that the country needed regain stability. This was especially resonant with the Mexican voters after all the drug violence and insecurity they experienced during the term of Felipe Calderón (PAN).

During his campaign Peña Nieto (PRI) put forward a long list of reforms and actions that his government would implement - 266 to be exact. Among these reforms was permission for private and foreign companies to extract oil from Mexican subsoil oil deposits, a fiscal reform to reduce subsidies and increase tax collection and an educational reform that would increase monitoring and control over students’ educational level. (ADN Político Promesómetro, 15 December 2013)

5.4.1 Irregularities – Clientelism and Legitimacy during the Presidential Campaign

During the campaign that lasted for 90 days, several accusations of irregularities emerged. In June before the 2012 election, the British newspaper The Guardian leaked a media plan that allegedly outlined how Mexico's largest TV network Televisa would promote the candidate, which, in case it were true, was a violation of Mexican electoral law that prescribes equal media time for all candidates. (The Guardian, 7 June 2012) Televisa responded to the article denying the allegations claiming the leaked documents had no official letterhead or signatures. (The Guardian, 8 June 2012) However, an analysis carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS – Center for Research and Superior Studies in Social Anthropology) showed a clear imbalance favoring the PRI in the mentions of the candidates in the media, in both Televisa and TV Azteca, during the campaign. The analysis concluded that TV stations favored Peña Nieto (PRI) in coverage and positive mention, whereas Lopez Obrador (PRD) received less and more negative mention in the media. (Aristegui Noticias, 26 June 2013) A formal complaint about Televisa and the PRI was presented to the electoral courts, but was dismissed because of a lack of evidence (La Jornada, 6 February 2013) It is important to clarify that 95% of broadcast TV belongs to Televisa and TV Azteca, and TV is the preferred source of information, news and current events in Mexico, which means that the impact of coverage is significant. It is commonly known that these media corporations are opposed to the political left (The Guardian, July 9, 2012) The claims of The Guardian were later backed by WikiLeaks, who published documents with internal communications of the United States government, expressing concerns over the practice of Mexican officials buying air-time under the table. (The Guardian, June 11, 2012) This violation of electoral law undermines the legitimacy of the PRI, both legally and perceived.

In addition to the complaint of uneven media coverage, Lopez Obrador (PRD) also claimed electoral fraud in the form of 'bought' polling stations and voters. Particularly significant was the accusations against the financial services company Monex, that had issued pre-paid giftcards to polling station officials and some voters (the amounts distributed accordingly). However, although witnesses that had received the gift cards testified, the formal complaint was dismissed concluding insufficient evidence (La Jornada, 24 October 2012) and that although the existence and use of the cards were verified, and the issue and validity dates corresponded to those of the election, the link between the issuing company and the PRI could not be documented. (Aristegui Noticias, 25 January 2013) This is an example, and the most notorious of many cases during the election, of how clientelism is applied in practice. The politician or political party pays a bonus or benefit to gather voters or commit fraud at the polling station, or directly to the voter promising benefits for a proven vote (for example by taking a picture with a camera phone in the polling booth, or by lending the personal voter ID to individuals who would then cast the vote in their place).

Even though all of these claims were dismissed by the courts, we can see from posterior analysis that preference of Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) in the media did occur, and to a great extent were effective. A media campaign to enhance legitimacy, combined with large scale clientelist actions would prove to be efficient to gain sufficient votes to bring the PRI back in government. All of these actions to improve the image of the PRI in the media was an attempt affect to the perceived legitimacy of the party in general, and in particular of the candidate.

The monetary gifts to polling station officials, key groups of voters and community influencers rallied voters to vote in exchange for short term benefits, and thus clearly displaying clientelistic behavior. The monetary gifts that were given to polling station officials could for example be used to ensure that ballots were lost or added, were 'unintelligible' and generally did not count in the tally. The media had beforehand urged the citizens to take pictures of the results posted on their local election sites and compare them to the computed results on the IFE web page, to avoid fraud in the transfer of information. Social media buzzed with complaints that many votes were not counted due to being 'illegible', even when in their pictures the numbers were perfectly readable. The Electoral Institute launched a campaign to make voters report electoral fraud (See Figure 4) Reports of this kind of fraud were not only against the PRD, but against all candidates, and experts report that clientelist practices have augmented, especially on a state level, since 2007. (El País, 21 June 2012) It is noticeable that clientelist practices and coercion to gain votes can be very hard to detect and prove, and when several have been detected, although not proven in court, we can suppose that a vast number of cases go unnoticed. In a country with such significant levels of poverty, it is to be expected that individuals that can barely feed their family are not reluctant to take a monetary gift in exchange for a vote, especially when the individual does not see much difference in his or her personal situation under one government or the other.

On July 2nd 2012 Peña Nieto (PRI) won the elections with 38.15% of the votes. The popular left candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD) again became runner up in the elections with a 31.64%. (IFE PREP Results 2012) Whereas in 2006 the PRD staged protests that paralyzed Mexico City for weeks, in 2012 they proceeded with formal claims of fraud with the election authorities instead.

According to the newspaper La Jornada, even electoral observers from the European Union noted irregularities in their official report to the IFE after the election, particularly the practice of buying votes

Results Presidential Election 2012	
Enrique Peña Nietto (PRI)	*38.15%*
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD)	*31.64%*
Josefina Vázquez Mota (PAN)	*25.40%*
Other Candidates	*4.78%*

Source: IFE PREP results 2012

through gift cards and other incentives, but these reports were disputed by the electoral institute, who maintained that the evidence was not presented in a standardized and measurable fashion, and therefore it was impossible to take into account. The observers also commented on equal opportunity in the media, the use of propaganda, the opening hours and waiting time at the voting places etc. (La Jornada, 24 October 2012) The observations of the commission furthermore shows a lack of formal legitimacy by law, as the government institute that evaluates itself rejects the observations of a neutral outside actor.

5.4.2 Public Opinion and legitimacy of the government

Another auto-evaluation of the government is the survey that the Mexican Secretary of State carries out every few years in order to map the national political culture. The survey in 2012 is of particular interest, as it was carried out in two rounds; one before the elections (April-May) and one after the elections (July-August), which gives a snapshot of public opinion on a number of political/citizenship questions. This is interesting to the questions of this thesis, because it gives us a practical and matter of fact idea as to how the issues of particularly legitimacy of the government, but also clientelism and electoral behavior, have had an effect on the outcomes of the 2012 presidential elections.

54.28% percent of the Mexican citizens surveyed in the 2012 National Survey on Political Culture and Practices of Citizenship Survey (ENCUP), believed that the Government was more authoritarian than democratic. (ENCUP Survey 2012) According to the same survey, half of the surveyed Mexicans preferred economic development to democracy, and 64% answered that they did not think the country is on the right track in general. 21% said that in certain circumstances they would prefer an authoritarian government over a democratic one. This confirms the cultural legacy that is authoritarianism. Democracy and the transition from authoritarianism can be messy and even painful, and in the chaos of violence and economic uncertainty, the safety of the familiar paternalist control may seem more appealing. Through the results of this survey we can deduce that even though the PAN government aimed to become more open and democratic, the effect on the voters was minimal, especially in a setting with a slow economy. The large parts of the population that live in poverty, and to a certain extent also the middle class, are likely to consider economic benefits more

important than democracy, and this opens the door for clientelist practices, which is why questionable campaign practices such as the distribution of gift cards have been successful.

In an earlier ENCUP Survey carried out by the Mexican Government in 2008, 62% of the Mexicans asked expressed that they did not believe elections in their country to be clean. (Muddle and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 89). Sixty-two is a very high percent for distrust in the democratic process. This question was not included in the 2012 survey, but from the reactions to the 2012 presidential election it is clear to see that this percentage has most likely not diminished. Especially not when seen in the light of the fact that in 2006 the protesters largely belonged to the political left, while in 2012 we would see protests of students from well off families in a private university, generally with a more neo-liberal profile, meaning that legitimacy of this process is highly questionable in the public eye.

An example of this was the protests that arose from the events that followed the visit paid by Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) to the Universidad Iberoamericana (The Iberoamerican University) on May 11, 2012. The Iberoamericana is a large private university with middle and upper class students. He was to give a speech in which, on a side note, he defended his role in the San Salvador Atenco incident, which took place in 2006 when Peña Nieto was governor of Mexico State, where Atenco is located. During this incident armed federal and state troops attacked unarmed peasant protesters, a confrontation that ended in bloodshed and the death of two young boys, 200 arrests and widespread vandalism at the hand of the troops. Several accusations of rape of arrested women was brought before the Human Rights Commission. Peña Nieto (PRI) was met with protests from many of the students, some wearing masks of Salinas de Gotari as a symbol of the corrupt past PRI, some yelling disqualifying words, Peña Nieto took refuge in a bathroom on campus. Later on the PRI accused the protesting students of being persons from the opposition posing as students in order to discredit the presidential candidate in a smearing campaign. The 131 students identified themselves on social networks, with their names and student IDs, to prove that they were, in effect, real students and not actors. This inspired a social movement called #YoSoy132 (I am 132) that started as an act of solidarity, but ended as a movement for social change. (YoSoy132 Website) The movement is formed with a student base, but includes all individuals concerned with defending citizen rights according to the human rights declaration and the first article of the Mexican Constitution, in an attempt to hold the government responsible for its actions. These social movements show the lack of perceived legitimacy of the PRI among those who did not vote for the party, and it is a testimony to the strong contrast between the PRI support and opposition, although the opposition is divided.

5.4.3 Majority vote and the 2012 Elections

Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) took office on December 2nd 2012 for the PRI, surrounded with massive security measures and organized protests. (La Jornada, 2 December 2012) One might wonder why so much protesting took place after the elections when we have established that great part of the reason for Peña Nieto being elected was the lack of an opposing contender strong enough and with enough perceived legitimacy to be preferred by the rest of the public.

In this case it is important to look at the social choice of the Mexican voters, particularly in relation to the perceived legitimacy of the elected PRI president, in order to explain the extent of social disapproval of Peña Nieto's government. As mentioned, the PAN government had lost public support, and the candidate, Vazquez Mota, did not have a very strong platform. Her campaign slogan was 'Josefina, Different' which was probably a poor choice of slogan for the candidate of the party in office, she distanced herself from the existing policies, but did not say in what way she was different, and did not provide any alternatives to the issues of violence and insecurity that was the main critique of the PAN government. Rather, her campaign emphasized the fact that she would be the first female president of Mexico, and given the situation at the time, there were more pressing issues than gender equality. Vazquez Mota (PAN) never posed a real threat to Peña Nieto (PRI) nor to Lopez Obrador (PRD), and in fact she was the first to recognize Peña Nieto as president a only couple of hours after the polling places closed of the votes were counted, which caused suspicion that there might be an agreement between the PAN and the PRI (El Universal, 2 July 2012).

Lopez Obrador (PRD) had lost legitimacy with the mainstream population, while maintaining the popularity with the left wing intellectuals and the politically oriented poor. It is important to take into account that the protesters against the PRI government were necessarily supporters either of the PAN or the PRD. However, the voters of the PAN and PRD camps were so divided that although they were vehemently against the return of the PRI, and thereby the majority of the voters were against the PRI, the political divisions between the two would benefit the PRI.

As we established earlier, majority vote is an essential concept to democracies, such as the one Mexican government have aimed to become. It is however complicated when there are more than two candidates, and the winner and runner up are only separated by a close margin. First of all because in a flawed democracy such as Mexico, the conditions of universal domain, anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness are questionable. In particular there is one condition that is not met in the context of the Mexican presidential election; Neutrality. Neutrality determines that each candidate must be treated equally, as it is also established in the Mexican election law. However, as seen in the Section 4.4.1, even though it was disputed in court, media analysis showed a clear disparity in media reputation, both regarding how much time each

candidate was mentioned, but also with regards to positive or negative mention. This is consistent with Arrow's impossibility theorem that no social welfare function satisfies the conditions necessary to reach a fair result of an election.

As mentioned in chapter three, the issue of Condorcet's winner becomes relevant when we consider that if a voter prefers PRD over PAN and PAN over PRI, another voter prefers PRI over PAN and PAN over PRD, and a third voter prefers PAN over PRI and PRI over PRD, we have no way of determining if the voters that voted for PAN prefer the PRI to the PRD, or where would their preference lie if the election was reduced to two candidates. The legitimacy of Peña Nieto (PRI) was discussed in the Mexican media and among different spheres of the population in relation to this unknown factor of second preferences of the voters. Again the issue of voting 'for your candidate' or 'against the PRI' was discussed, and the debate leading up to the elections included suggestions of voting coalitions against the PRI in spite of the ideological differences between the contending parties. It is impossible to know whether the PAN and PRD voters would have chosen the PRI candidate or not, had they not been able to vote for their own candidate. But the protests before and in the wake of elections and during the first year of Peña Nieto's presidency could indicate that a large part of the population would not have voted him into office. In the light of this, Peña Nieto (PRI) might have had the highest percentage of votes of all the candidates, but this does not change the fact that the majority of the population voted *against him.* This, in its essence explains the contradictory situation of an official majority vote met with large amounts of protests.

In an article about the 2012 Mexican Presidential Election in the Spanish Newspaper El País, the electoral analyst Mauricio Merino commented on the clientelist practices in Mexican politics and described the problem of the election in a nutshell: "No electoral system resists the disloyalty of the political parties that compete in an election. While the parties toy with the disloyalty towards the institutions that they themselves created, there is no way to trust an electoral system" (El Pais, 21 June 2012) This observation is important, because it also applicable to issues of social choice, due to the lack of neutrality in majority voting and the concept of impossibility, as well as perceived legitimacy which is expressed in the lack of confidence the Mexican population has in politicians and the institutions they represent.

6 Conclusions and extensions

This chapter has two main purposes. First, I will answer the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis; *"What are the underlying reasons for the PRI to have regained the presidency in Mexico in 2012, despite past legitimacy issues?"* I will answer through the four sub-questions that are the guide to through

the issues that can explain the most important aspects of the answer to the main research questions. Second, I will outline what is likely to happen in the future, when extending the theory applied in this thesis.

The first sub-question posed in Chapter One was “To what extent has a patron dependent relationship affected voter behavior?” As we can deduct from the political history of Mexico, clientelism is a practice that is deeply imbedded in Mexican culture, that has been maintained throughout the rule of the PRI and the networks were continued through the 12 years of PAN government and came to play a central role in the 2012 presidential election. These practices were not denied, but a documented connection to the PRI could not be proved according to the electoral court. It is noticeable that of all the claims of fraud presented both by the PRD, citizens and the European Observer Committee were dismissed in court, and this can be interpreted either as a sign of incapacity and lack of legal groundwork, or as an indication of corruption. Furthermore, in a country with high levels of poverty and with a general lack of confidence in public institutions and promises of change, voters are more likely to seek a personal benefit from giving his or her vote to a specific candidate, and clientelism thus becomes a self-reinforcing cycle of benefits. Thus, we can conclude that the patron dependent relationship affected voter behavior significantly.

The second question was “How did the legitimacy of PRI and PAN governments - or lack thereof – play into the return of the PRI?” After analyzing the performance, actions and perceived legitimacy during the PAN government in 2000-2012, which characterized by unfulfilled campaign promises and a rise in violence as a result on the war on drugs, as well as that of the PRD candidate Lopez Obrador after his insistent protesting and claims of being the “legitimate president of Mexico”, my conclusion is that these factors were most likely the main reason for the PRI win in the 2012 presidential election. Between the three strongest candidates, there was no one candidate that could unite the population in opposition to the PRI, who was more visible during the campaign due to large investments in media coverage.

The third sub-question “What has motivated voters to vote for one party or the other over time?” can essentially be answered with one word: Stability. Voters have generally been seeking stability in the form of personal and economical security as well as the reduction of violence. Political instability was an issue in the nineteenth century when Mexico was trying to establish itself as a nation. The desire for stability in a country where half of the population lives in poverty is greater than the desire for democracy. Also the middle class, who traditionally would be liberal and democracy seeking to a greater extent, were affected by the violence issue during the years leading up to the presidential election, even though Peña Nieto did not promise a substantial change in the policies on the war on drugs.

The fourth and final question posed in the beginning of this thesis was “How is the legitimacy affected when an election is won by small margins?”, and from the controversy over the small margins, as well as the large

parts of the Mexican population that protested against the PRI claiming dishonest practices in the campaign we can detect a sharp contrast between supporters and non-supporters. Two thirds of the population do not feel represented by the elected government and the small margins that separated the two leading candidates, when adding the clientelist acquisition of votes, caused a perception of unjust achievement of power, and thus a lack of perceived legitimacy of the PRI government.

6.1 Extensions

For the next five years, it will be interesting to see how the reforms that Peña Nieto (PRI) promised in his campaign, most of which he is introducing and completing according to plan. The educational and fiscal reforms were approved in congress and the energy reform is currently being approved in state congresses to be passed on to the federal government.

Not much seems to have changed for the average Mexican in the year EPN has been in office. The violence is still recurrent, as EPN has followed the same policy as Calderón (PAN) did in the war on drugs. Gas prices undergo planned price increases each month, just as they did during the last term of Calderón. (Pemex Pricelist) It remains to be seen what the consequences of the reforms will be. The left is still protesting, particularly against the energy reform that will privatize the supply of electricity and gas, as well as the extraction of oil in the Mexican gulf, and open up to foreign investors. The concern expressed by many economists, including Joseph Stieglitz is that the Mexican government may not have the structure or knowledge to properly manage the environmental monitoring and the revenue collection from the large oil companies, who have better experts and lawyers than the Mexican government does (El País, 27 August 2013).

Peña Nieto seems to be on track to complete the reforms he promised in his campaigns. In order for the PRI to gain perceived legitimacy with the Mexican voters, it is crucial that the reforms do not just look good on paper, but in practice do not work, as it has been seen before. In the past the PRI has promoted ideas in a way that made them seem beneficial to the public, when in reality the benefits have been few or none. If the Mexicans do not see an improvement with the reforms set in motion, social movements are likely to strengthen and become more influential, as they learn how to organize, mobilize and influence the right actors. This may cause a shift to the left, and if the PRD can create a public image that appeals increasingly to the broad population and find a charismatic candidate, the party could be a real contender for the 2018 presidential election. The media has speculated that Marcelo Ebrard, also a popular former Mexico City mayor, will be the candidate in 2018. Lopez Obrador has separated himself from the PRD and established the Morena movement, with the intention to turn it into a political party.

Clientelist practices are not likely to disappear, unless Mexico achieves to create a more transparent and democratic structure. These practices are too embedded in the culture to disappear without a dramatic reduction in poverty, a much more transparent government and electoral system, and above all without electoral monitoring in which violations actually generate sanctions, and it will likely take decades for Mexico to improve these issues. However, with increased transparency and accountability controls, clientelism can be reduced gradually to a more acceptable level.

7 Figures/Tables

7.1 Figure 1 – Legitimation Strategies

Legitimation Strategies

	Gain	Maintain	Repair
General	Conform to environment	Perceive change	Normalize
	Select environment	Protect accomplishments -Police operations -Communicate subtly -Stockpile legitimacy	Restructure
	Manipulate environment		Don't panic
Pragmatic	Conform to demands -Respond to needs -Co-opt constituents -Build reputation	Monitor tastes -Consult opinion leaders	Deny
	Select markets -Locate friendly audiences -Recruit friendly co-optees	Protect exchanges -Police reliability -Communicate honestly -Stockpile trust	Create monitors
	Advertise -Advertise product -Advertise image		
Moral	Conform to ideals -Produce proper outcomes -Embed in institutions -Offer symbolic displays	Monitor ethics -Consult professions	Excuse/Justify
	Select domain -Define goals	Protect propriety -Police responsibility -Communicate authoritatively -Stockpile esteem	Disassociate -Replace personnel -Revise practices -Reconfigure
	Persuade -Demonstrate success -Proselytize		
Cognitive	Conform to models -Mimic standards -Formalize operations -Professionalize operations	Monitor outlooks -Consult doubters	Explain
	Select labels -Seek certification	Protect assumptions -Police simplicity -Speak matter-of-factly -Stockpile interconnections	
	Institutionalize -Persist -Popularize new models -Standardize new models		

7.2 Figure 2 – IFE PREP 2006 Election Results

President / Presidente / *Président*

	PAN	PRI	PRD PT	Nueva Alianza	Alternativa	Candidatos NO Registrados	Votos Nulos	Actas Procesadas	Total de Actas	Participación Ciudadana
Total Nacional	14,027,214	8,318,886	13,624,506	384,317	1,085,966	281,145	827,317	128,771	130,788	58.90%
Porcentaje	36.38%	21.57%	35.34%	00.99%	02.81%	00.72%	02.14%	98.45%		

Source: IFE PREP 2012 Election Results

7.3 Figure 3 – IFE PREP 2012 Election Results



Source: Mexican Federal Electoral Institute: https://prep2012.ife.org.mx/prep/NACIONAL/PresidenteNacionalVPC.html

7.4 Figure 4


LOS
delitos ELECTORALES
deben ser Denunciados
FEPADE
FISCALÍA ESPECIALIZADA PARA LA ATENCIÓN DE DELITOS ELECTORALES
1
2
3
Votar o pretender votar con una CREDENCIAL
4
CONDICIONAR programas sociales a cambio de tu VOTO
ES UN DELITO ELECTORAL
5
OBSTRUIR el desarrollo normal de la votación
ES UN DELITO ELECTORAL
6
7
UTILIZAR recursos públicos para apoyar a un partido político o candidato
ES UN DELITO ELECTORAL
8
VOTAR
9
RECOGER
*
LLAMADA SIN COSTO
0
DENUNCIA EN LA FEPADE los delitos electorales
#
COMUNÍCATE a FEPADETEL
FEPADETEL
24 hrs
365 días del año
Conéctate con la Legalidad
01 800 833 72 33
Si lo prefieres, puedes acudir a la FEPADE en Boulevard Adolfo López Mateos Núm. 2836, Colonia Tizapán San Ángel, Delegación Álvaro Obregón, C.P. 01090, México, D.F.
PGR

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