


Social capital as a poverty reduction strategy ?

- a case study of Spitzkoppe community, Namibia



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ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the concept of social capital in relation to poverty reduction in terms of economic development, whether social capital is an efficient poverty reduction strategy and whether social capital is relevant to poverty reduction. The aim is to establish a more realistic picture of social capital as a poverty reduction strategy, where the issues of context and power are included. The case study of Spitzkoppe community, a small poor rural community in Namibia, used in the project shows how difficult it is for a poor community to make use of its social capital in terms of its social relationships, networks, memberships of organisations and associations to move out of poverty, when these are neither particularly strong nor extensive. The main reason for the Spitzkoppe community's lack of social capital is its entire social network's low social location in the Namibian society, which is extremely differentiated and where especially the poor groups/communities do not have the same access to the same resources, resulting in an uneven distribution of social capital as well as an uneven access to it. Namibia still suffers from its colonial inheritance of Germany military rule and the apartheid rule in terms of discrimination, inequality, and exclusion of the civil society in political matters as the ruling party SWAPO has reinforced these. SWAPO is in every clan with its clan and patronage politics wanting to keep all power to the party, which has increased during the 19 years of ruling Namibia and in that process also has prevented development in rural areas of Namibia to avoid the decentralisation of the government. Then, in the case of Spitzkoppe community the existence of; (1) widespread, increasing and legitimised ethnic inequalities; (2) entrenched poverty; (3) chronic unemployment; (4) weak, unjust, flaunted uniform law; (5) dominant and subordinated groups who have little shared stake in common outcomes and (6) minorities who are overtly discriminated against in the society makes it extremely difficult for the community to make use of its social capital to move out of poverty. Then, as illustrated in case of the Spitzkoppe community social capital as a poverty reduction strategy social capital may not be the most efficient or relevant strategy compared to basic redistribution measures, investments in health and education and the extensions of citizen rights.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades there has been an explosion of scholarly and politically interest in the concept of ‘social capital’, which has made the concept one of the most popular exports from sociology to other social sciences, and into everyday language (Fields 2003:1; Farr 2003:1; Halpern 2005:1). Despite its current popularity, social capital does not embody any really new idea to sociologists. That social relationships themselves constitute resources or assets is a staple notion, dating back to the work of Marx, who placed great emphasis on the resource that was created by the organisation of large number of people giving them the means to change the social relations of production (Marx [1894] 1967; Marx and Engels [1848] 1947), and to Durkheim, who noticed how the productivity of industrial society rested on a complex division of labour in which relationships of complementarity bonding people together (Durkheim [1893] 1984). This way the concept of social capital simply recaptures an insight present since the very beginnings of social theory.

In 2001 the World Bank had adopted the concept of social capital and linked it to poverty reduction in its influential publication “*World Development Report 2000/2001 - Attacking Poverty*”. Advocating that social relationships, networks, organisations and associations constitute a unique, vitally important resource that poor people can use to move out of poverty, because they along with the trust and norms that hold them together connect people to each other, and thereby enable people to act collectively and mobilise greater resources to achieve common goals. This way social capital also provided a social glue or social cohesion facilitating norms, trust and cooperation crucial to poverty reduction in terms of ‘economic development’¹, which was the main attack against poverty in the Third World. Suddenly, social capital was being heavily promoted as a major poverty reduction strategy by the World Bank and was seen as a part of the solution to ending poverty (Fine 2001; Harriss 2001).

This project discusses the concept of social capital in relation to poverty reduction, whether social capital is an efficient poverty reduction strategy, and whether social capital is relevant to poverty reduction. The problem statement is about, how and why social capital got linked to poverty reduction, and how the World Bank has conceptualised and

¹ Economic development in this project is defined as “*the process whereby the real per capita income of a country increases over a long period of time – subject to the stipulations that the number of people below an ‘absolute poverty line’ does not increase, and that the distribution of income does not become more unequal* (Meier 1989:6)”.

operationalised social capital, which leads to the specific problem formulation of this project.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

THE WORLD BANK IN CRISIS

The World Bank had since its foundation in 1945 been the most influential development agency to set the development agenda politically as well as academically and lead on new development discourses that was believed to facilitate economic development in Third World countries. However, in the early 1990s the World Bank was facing its perhaps worse crisis ever (Beddington et al. 2006:11). Towards the end of the 1980s, the difficulties of creating market institutions in transitional most prosperous economies, financial crisis in Mexico, Russia and Brazil, the enduring scourge of poverty in the most prosperous economies together with the East Asian miracles led to mounting criticisms of the World Bank's structural adjustment policies². In particular; the need to take account of adjustment with a human face; how to account for the East Asian miracles; and the apparent failings of adjustment policies to deliver significant difference in economic performance let alone development (Fine 2001:139).

The strong criticism based on these geopolitical factors rocked the otherwise powerful 'Washington consensus' that had dominated the development agenda throughout the 1980s. The Washington consensus was a set of ideas and policies that had emerged rapidly in the early 1980s among institutions in Washington that included the World Bank and IMF³ and was a severe reaction against the rationale for extensive state interventionism in the 1970s (Fine 2001:132). According to the Washington consensus, "[...] *the markets work well if left to themselves, and where they do not work well, there is no guarantee that allowing or encouraging the state to intervene will lead to an improvement* (Fine 2001:134)". However, not only had it been proved that the markets had failed in any possible way to facilitate economic development, but it had also been proved that state interventions had led to economic development in East Asian newly industrialised countries (Fine 2001:137). The World Bank was therefore forced to react and reconsider its development policies.

² Structural adjustment policies were meant to assist and prepare poor countries to adjust their economies in terms of opening their markets to further trade, while correcting imbalances between national income and spending, and thereby increase their economic growth (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996:4; Brown 1955:69; Commins 1988:62).

³ The International Monetary Fund was also founded in 1945 together with the World Bank to address more short-term macro economic issues and fiscal stabilisation, whereas the World Bank has the responsibility for more micro projects designed to foster long-term development (Beddington et al. 2006).

MAKING THE POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

It took nearly a decade before the World Bank had digested these facts and showed some willingness to present itself as more state-friendly and people-friendly in its policies, and at a more academic level to accommodate social theory (Fine 2001:139). Faced with a choice between making incremental or rapid reform, the most influential voices within the World Bank stressed that the virtues of “shock therapy” invoked aphorism such as “you can only jump a canyon in a single bound” to make their case (Adams and Brick 1993). In early 1998, Joe Stiglitz, Senior Vice President and Chief economic to the World Bank explicitly launched the manifesto of the new consensus by first distances himself from the old consensus stating that (Stiglitz 1998:1):

“[...] policies advanced by the Washington consensus are hardly complete and sometimes misguided. Making market work requires more than just low inflation, it requires sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology, to name some fundamental issues neglected by the Washington consensus.”

He then returned to the new consensus (Stiglitz 1998:25):

“The state has an important role to play in appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection and welfare. But the choice is not whether the state should or should not be involved. Instead, it is often a matter of how it gets involved. More importantly, we should not see the state and then market as substitutes...the government should be seen itself as complement to markets, understanding those actions that make markets fulfil their functions better”

The ‘post-Washington consensus’ differed in four ways. First, it sought an alternative in which the state intervention was greater in depth and breath. Second, it rejected the analytical agenda of the state versus the market, arguing that the two complemented each other. Third, it proposed an alternative agenda for development economics and policy debate seeking to establish the appropriate role of the state in the view of market imperfections. Fourth, it also brought the social back into the analysis as means of addressing, and potentially correcting, market imperfections – rather than creating them.

However, the post-Washington consensus was still firmly based on methodological individualism by which is meant an understanding of society from the perspective of aggregating over the behaviour of individuals (Fine 2001:143). The new consensus had

reduced the problems of development to those of dealing with market imperfections, and how to handle these (Fine 2001:131). The state and its institutions then were added to the analytical framework, and the World Bank was able to manoeuvre its way through the mounting criticisms, without giving up its economic perspective.

THE ITALIAN CASE

Around the same time as the World Bank was facing its worse crisis ever, the American professor in political science Robert Putnam had just published his book “*Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*” about the performance of regional governments, asking – why has the north of Italy’s record of development proved superior to that of the south of Italy? His answer was straightforward – because it had enjoyed superior levels of social capital. More specifically, social capital was identified with the formation of association within civil society, in the interstices between government and the economy. Such civic, so-called horizontal, associations had prospered, along with democracy and growth, in the north as oppose to the south. In other words, social capital made the government, and hence the economy, work better (Putnam 1993).

All this, because these civic, so-called horizontal, associations fostered ‘norms of reciprocity’⁴ and ‘social trust’⁵ that improved the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions to pursue shared objectives, which helped to overcome ‘the dilemmas of collective actions’⁶, and that way created the right conditions for institutions to work (Putnam 1993:167-74). Putnam stressed that the success of the democratic government weighed heavily of social capital in two ways. On the demand side, social capital promoted civic engagement that allowed citizens to express their interests and demands on the government and (in part through their own efforts), they got it. They demanded more effective public services, and they were prepared to act collectively to achieve their

⁴ Norms of reciprocity or norms of generalised reciprocity “[...] characterised by a combination of what one might call short-term altruism and long-term self-interest: I help you out now in the (possible vague, uncertain and uncalculating) expectation that you will help me out in the future. Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts each of which is short-run altruistic (benefiting others at a cost to the altruist) but which together typically make every participant better off” (Taylor 1982: 28 and 29).

⁵ Social trust occurs when social norms transfer the right to control an action from the actor to others, because the action has consequences for others. For instance, raking leaves so they do not end up on other people’s yards, because the norm is keeping lawns leave-free, which is mentioned to all newcomers when they move in (Putnam 1993:171).

⁶ Dilemmas of collective action occur when rational behaviour in the context of distrust leads to the worst-case scenario. The best-known dilemma is the prisoner dilemma (Marysse 1998:4).

shared goals. On the supply side, the performance of representative government was facilitated by the social infrastructure civic communities and by the democratic values of both officials and citizens – the social ability to collaborate for shared interests (Putnam 1993:182). As for the economic growth and development, social capital primarily improved the functioning of markets by facilitating communication, flow of information, coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefits of the members of the associations (Putman 1993:173-74).

In the end of the book, Putman took the liberty of extending the lessons from the Italian case to the development problems of the Third World among others. Stating that “*where norms and network of civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for collective action disappear bleak*”, and just like that the development problems of the Third World was being identified and reduced to ‘the lack of social capital’ (Putnam 1993:183).

THE WORLD BANK AND SOCIAL CAPITAL – A PERFECT MATCH!

The World Bank immediately saw the qualities of social capital as a source of democracy, and not least as a source of economic development, seeing how perfectly Putnam’s social capital theory fitted into the new consensus – politically and analytically (Fine 2001: 132; Harriss 2001: 9 and 114; Øyen 2002a:12).

Politically, the World Bank had for a long time advocated a diminishing role for the state and a decrease in public expenditures. Strengthening civil society through the promotion of social capital fitted right into this agenda, because the state would be reduced as the space of civil society expanded, plus the funding would be channelled to and through NGO’s rather than the state and its local institutions (Harriss 2001:121 and 9). Furthermore, the World Bank also had a strong interest in de-politicising development, the problems of poverty and social justice, because the last thing the World Bank needed was another round of “ugly politics” (Harriss 2000:2). The World Bank therefore preferred to solve poverty reduction in harmony, where government policies were directed at encouraging and increasing the involvement and participation in civic associations that would underpin political and economic activity, than redistributing social and economic resources more equally (Øyen 2002b:5; Harriss 2001:28). Analytically, the way Putnam had associated the civil society with political and economic performance could not have fitted better into the post-Washington consensus. Social features such as trust, norms and networks within the civil society facilitated cooperation that helped overcome dilemmas of collection actions, which made government and

economy work better. This way social capital became the means of addressing, and potentially correcting, market imperfections.

Then, due to the crisis in the early 1990s the World Bank had to come up with the post-Washington consensus in order to justify its business of making loans, and in that process, the concept of social capital just happened to fit right into the new development discourse lead by the World Bank.

SOCIAL CAPITAL – A POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY?

The World Bank has since been devoted a good deal of energy promoting the concept of social capital as a major poverty reduction strategy (Harriss 2001:96). Demonstrating how membership in groups or voluntary associations is good for people's and communities' well-being only focussing on the positive consequences of associational activities, namely the resources made available to the members of the group or voluntary association (Grootaert 1999; Grootaert 2001; Narayan and Pritchett 1997; Krishna and Uphoff 1999; Knack and Keefer 1997). Based on the assumption that social relations, networks, organisations, and associations constitute a unique, vitally important resource that poor people and poor communities can use to move out of poverty, because they along with trust and norms that hold them together connect people, and thereby enable people to act collectively and mobilise greater resources to achieve common goals (World Bank 2000/2001). The crucial question is then:

“How does social capital work as a poverty reduction strategy in terms of poor people/communities being able to make use of their social relations, networks, memberships in organisations and associations to move out of poverty?”

The reason for questioning the above assumption, is that, it appears as if the World Bank's main reason for adopting the concept of social capital and linking it to poverty reduction has more to do with the political and analytical value of social capital, rather than its actually ability to provide economic development in Third World countries.

Several of social scientists have criticised the World Bank and its specialists, mostly economists, for downplaying and ignoring the less attractive sides of social capital in the above assumption about social capital and poverty reduction. Forgetting that, “*sociability cuts both ways*” (Portes 1998:18). First of all, the costs of networking sometimes greatly

outweigh the benefits with noneconomic claims in on the members' sense of obligations and commitment, with negative economic consequences (Woolcock and Narayan 2000:229 and 231). Secondly, just as social capital enables people to gain access to resources, it can also prevent people from gaining access to resources. In the sense, that it is the same strong social ties that bring benefits to members of a group or community that also enables the group or community to bar others from accessing these benefits (Portes 1998:15). Thirdly, social capital can equally counterbalance social inequality as well as reinforce it, which is related to the previous feature of social capital. It is true that social capital provides individuals access to crucial resources that they otherwise would not be available to them, but then again, the access to social capital also depends on "*the social location of the specific individuals or groups attempting to appropriate it...*" (Edwards and Foley 1997:677)". This way social capital is also an asset that in its own right is unequally distributed, which can promote further inequality, if powerful groups try to limit or undermine the social capital of those who are less powerful (Field 2003:74-5). In other words, the World Bank has evaded the issues of context and power in its assumption about social capital and poverty reduction, and according to the sociologist Alejandro Portes, there is little reason to believe that social capital will provide a ready remedy for major social problems, because social capital has not been accompanied so far by any persuasive explanation of how to bring about the desired stock of social capital (Portes 1998:21).

The overall aim of this project is therefore to study the concept of social capital in relation to poverty reduction in terms of economic development, where the issues of context and power will be included to establish a more realistic picture of social capital as a poverty reduction strategy. A small poor rural community living in Spitzkoppe in Erongo region in Namibia will be used as a case to illustrate, how social capital as a poverty reduction strategy works in terms of making resources available for a poor community to move out of poverty. In the following method chapter the approach, the theoretical framework and the case study that will be used to understand and explain how social capital works as a poverty reduction strategy in Third World countries will be presented and accounted for.

METHOD CHAPTER 1

This method chapter is the first out of two. The first chapter is about the approach, the theoretical framework and the single case study that will be used in the project to study the question above. The second one is about the specific design of the case study and the data involved that will follow after the theory chapter.

THE APPROACH TO SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION

THE NETWORK APPROACH

As implied in the problem statement it is the sociological approach, or more precisely, the network approach that will be used in this project to understand and explain the concept of social capital and its relation to poverty reduction in terms of economic development. The concept of social capital is embedded in social relations and structures among and between individuals. It is only in and through these social relations and structures that social capital or 'social-structural resources' are made available to individuals, groups or communities (Coleman 1990:302; Foley and Edwards 1999:144). Social capital is not borne by individuals wherever they might go, as oppose to what political scientists and economists believe, when they identify social capital with norms of reciprocity and tolerance and attitudes such as social trust, and look for effects of associational life on individual attitudes and behaviour (Foley and Edwards 1999: 154). Their presumption is that a vibrant civic life in terms of associations enhances the democratic and economic performance through their impact on individual norms and attitudes, which in turn have an impact on society through individual behaviour. This way norms and attitudes are featured alongside social relations and social structures as ingredients enabling a society to undertake collective action (Foley and Edwards 1999:142). To sociologists, subjective attributes such as norms and attitudes are endogenous to specific social relations and developed in an iterative process within social relations (Coleman 1990:302). They may become social capital for an individual, in fact, they do so only by the virtue of social relations or social structures in which they are embedded. Social capital is therefore identified with social relations and structures such as social networks that enable individuals, groups or communities to gain *access to resources* (Bourdieu 1986) that they otherwise could not achieve, or could only achieve with great difficulties (Coleman 1990). Sociologists then have a structural interpretation of the concept of social capital, and as implied, social capital is a *context-specific* concept where nature and extent of

social capital, the amount of access an individual, group or community gains from its social network, depends on a) the structures within the social network itself in terms of the willingness and ability of the members to draw nurturing social ties that constitutes social capital within the network, also referred to as ‘embeddedness’, and b) social location of the entire social network within the broader socio-economic context that shapes the ways that specific social network can and cannot link its members to resources outside the social network, also referred to as ‘autonomy’, rather than a set of norms and attitudes of individuals, groups or communities being present in a society (Bourdieu 1986:249; Foley and Edwards 1999:165).

The reason for adopting the sociological understanding of social capital in the project is that, unlike political scientists and economists, sociologists treat social capital as a context-specific concept that depends on the structures within and around the social network, which influence the access gains of an individual’s, group’s or community’s. Political scientists and economists in their approach, identifying social capital mainly as trust and norms, tend not to take further notice of the fact that all societies in one or another way are differentiated, and that not all individuals, groups or communities within these have the same access to the same resources (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000; Knack and Keefer 1997; Grootaert 2001; Cohen et al. 1997; Kawachi et al. 1999). Instead, they assume that there is a synergy from the collective action that goes beyond counting the numbers of people who take part in any form of the activity and where the more people interact with each other, the more likely people are to cooperate with each other and sensing a greater responsibility for collective endeavours (Uslaner and Dekker 2001; Putnam 1993:90), defining social capital more as a *public* good. Forgetting, as argued earlier, that just as social capital enables individual, groups or communities to gain access to resources, it can also prevent these from gaining access to resources, and thereby reinforce or even promote further social inequality, if powerful groups try to limit or undermine the social capital of those who are less powerful, which also associate social capital with power. This way, the concept of social capital has acquired a high normative charge among political scientists and economists and political scientists.

Then, if the study of social capital and its relation to poverty reduction in the Third World should have any meaning, social capital must first of all be identified as social networks that enable poor people and poor communities in the Third World to gain access to resources. Secondly, the social structure within the social network as well as the social location of the entire social network within the socio-economic context must be included

in the theoretical framework and the analysis. Thirdly, the element of power must also be included to account for the many ways in which social resources are created and made available to individuals, groups or communities.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION

THE REASON FOR CHOOSING WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The theoretical understanding of a poor community's prospects of using its social capital to move out of poverty comes from the sociologist Michael Woolcock⁷ and his framework about social capital and economic development in which he explores the conditions under which social capital both *helps* and *hinders* economic development (Woolcock 1998:154).

The main reason for using Woolcock's framework is that he studies the nature and extent of a poor community's social capital in a socio-political context, incorporating social capital into economic development theory and policy, at both the micro and the macro level (Woolcock 1998). Social capital is, as argued above, a context specific concept, which also includes the wider socio-political context in which it is created and fostered. The type of state and state-society relations (the state's top-down development/the macro level) therefore matters when it comes to a poor community's prospect of developing useful networks for increasing its own social capital to move out poverty (the community's bottom-up development/the micro level) (Woolcock 1998:176 and 78; Woolcock and Narayan 2000:238).

This view is quite the opposite of the one of political scientists, economists and the World Bank, who see social capital as a independent concept creating the conditions for the institutions to work, and depending on what side one is on, one can always argue for either the top-down development or the bottom-up development to be the determining factor to make the other work better. The relation between the two will always be a somewhat dialectical relationship, however, in the case of a poor community's economic development, I believe that the influence of the top-down development has a larger impact on the bottom-up development, than the other way around. Due to the issues of

⁷ Michael Woolcock is a social scientist with the World Bank's Development Research Group and an adjunct lecturer in public policy at Harvard University.

context and power, where not all communities in the society have the same access to the same resource, which is why the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital will be studied in a socio-political context in the project.

EXTENDING WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT THE MICRO LEVEL

In the framework the poor community's social capital is described as the nature and extent of its *personal* and *institutional* relationships, which amount to four levels or dimensions of social capital, namely: 'social integration' and 'linkage' at the micro level concerning the community's bottom-up development (which refer to the community's embeddedness and autonomy) and 'organisational integrity' and 'synergy' at macro level concerning the state's top-down development (which refer to the state's autonomy and embeddedness) (Woolcock 1998: 168). Woolcock is very interested in examining how different combinations of these four distinct, but complementary forms of social capital can either weaken or support the social capital outcome⁸, but he tends to 'over-network' and only indirectly associates social capital with the issues of context and power in his framework (Woolcock 1998:182 and 187). I have therefore extended Woolcock's framework at the micro level to include the issues of context and power, due to the earlier arguments about social capital and context and power, in order to account for the many ways in which social resources are created, and made available to individuals, groups or communities.

At the micro level this means that a community's access to resources does not only depend on the right combination of social integration and linkage. It also depends on the social location of the community's entire network within the broader socio-economic context, indicating that the amount and type of resources within a community's are not insignificant when it comes to linking the community's network to others with more extensive social resources. Furthermore, it also depends on whether or not those other local communities and groups with more extensive social resources and connections to civil society are willing to give access to their resources and connections. Then, for instance, entrenched poverty; chronic underemployment; widespread class, sex and ethnic inequality; and overtly discrimination of minorities makes it difficult for the community to linked itself to other external communities or groups with extensive social resources due to the lack of resources, social position in existing power structures.

⁸ The four social capital forms and how they complement each other will be further elaborated in the theory chapter.

EXTENDING WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AT THE MACRO LEVEL

Another critique of Woolcock and his framework of social capital and economic development is that he states that the nature and extent of a community's social capital i.e. the combinations of the different social capital forms present is in turn depended on a) the structure of the state, b) the nature and extent of its involvement in civic life, and c) the organisation of the society, which are influenced by existing social, cultural, political and economic features within society that have emerged historically, without elaborating or conceptualised how these features have influenced the state, the state-society relations and the social structure or organisation within and outside the community (Woolcock 1998:182 and 187). Then, in order to understand and explain the reasons for the nature and the extent for a community's social capital, I have added an extension of the wider context, in which the community's social capital is fostered and created, to the framework at the macro level.

The extension at the macro level is an elaboration of Woolcock's weak state typology (the one closest to the Namibia state), which he uses briefly to describe the connection between the type of state and the state's organisational integrity and synergy in his framework (Woolcock 1998: 177-78). The elaboration of the weak state is the 'African state', which I have deduced from the foremost common features of the African states⁹ identified by Goran Hyden¹⁰ in his book "*No Shortcuts to Progress – African Development Management in Perspective*" to make a general conceptualisation of the typical African state, where social, cultural, economic and political features such as a clan phenomenon, 'economic of affection' and patronage and client relationships existing within the African society are described, and the way they influence the African state's organisational integrity and synergy as well as the social organisation of the society. This is described within a specific historical setting and it is within this historical setting that the social capital of the small poor rural community living at Spitzkoppe is situated.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PROJECT

Woolcock's framework in terms of the way the four forms of social capital relate to each other together with the two important extensions the one at the micro level and the other at macro level then constitute the theoretical framework, which will be used respectively

⁹ In this project African states refer to sub-Saharan African states.

¹⁰ Göran Hyden is a well-known professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, who is a specialist in governance and management in Africa.

at the micro level (bottom-up development) and at the macro level (top-down development) to understand and explain Spitzkoppe community's prospects of affecting its economic development using its social capital.

This makes Woolcock the main contributor to the theoretical understanding of the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital. This is because Woolcock has incorporated social capital into economic development theory at *both* micro and macro level and linked these together in his framework, which not only captures the dynamic, but also the complexity of social capital, making his framework the most comprehensive and cohesive framework of social capital and economic development compared to the ones of Narayan, Evans, Portes and Sensenbrenner, and Edwards and Foley. Furthermore, Woolcock's framework of social capital is designed to explore, how social capital from a poor community's perspective can be used to enhance its economic development and with the extensions added to the framework, I have not found a more qualified framework or theory to understand and explain Spitzkoppe community's prospects of using its social capital to move out of poverty. As I have already argued for choosing the sociological approach over the political and economic approach, there is no need to include contesting or competing theories, which is also why Woolcock is going to be the main theoretical contributor.

THE SINGLE CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY

REDUCTION

As mentioned earlier in the problem statement, a case study of the small poor rural community living in Spitzkoppe in Erongo region in Namibia will be made to illustrate, how social capital as a poverty reduction strategy works in terms of making resources available for a poor community to move out of poverty. The strength of the case study method, whether single or multiple, is its ability to examine in depth, a contemporary social phenomenon within its 'real life' context, where the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context not are unambiguous, and the use of multiple sources is needed to illustrate or explain the phenomenon (Yin 1989:23). As already implied in this method chapter, social capital is a context-specific concept, which cannot be understood or explained detached from the structures within the social network and the structures in which the social network is located. The case study method therefore seems to be a rather naturally choice, when it comes to understanding and explaining the nature and extent of poor community's personal and institutional relationships that constitute its social capital.

Nonetheless, there are divergent views as to the extent of possibilities and limits of using the case study method. Case studies are often criticised for being insufficient in terms of reliability and validity, though most of the critique is related to the possibilities for generalisation (Kristensen 1996:15). However, if one speaks of ‘analytical generalisation’, the case study is fully suitable to generalise, not to populations or universes, but to *theoretical prepositions* (Yin 1991:21). Meaning that, an assumption, theory or an abstract phenomenon can be generalised to other concrete cases, if the context or preposition of the case is the same. In other words, one deduces the general from a concrete case, and in that way, the case study as a method is equally generalisable as other methods.

In relation to the project this means, that the single case study of Spitzkoppe, a poor rural community’s possibilities for using its personal and institutional relations to gain access to resources in Erongo region in Namibia, is an example of how a typical poor community’s social capital is shaped in a typical African context knowing that local, regional and national differences do exist. It does not represent the general picture of social capital as a poverty reduction strategy in the Third World, but it illustrates some of the difficulties in using social capital as a poverty reduction strategy.

This is how the concept of social capital in relation poverty reduction in the Third World will be understood, explained and studied in the project.

THEORY CHAPTER

WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The concept of social capital has been studied since the late 1970s, but the most extensive empirical research and coherent theoretical advances have come in the late 1980s and 1990s from the network approach (ethnic entrepreneurs studies), which studies social capital at the micro level, and the institutional approach (comparative institutionalist studies), which studies social capital at the macro level (Woolcock 1998:161-62). Seeing on one hand, how the network approach neglects to incorporate institutions at the societal level and their capacity to both shape and be shaped by the local communities and ignores the enormous potential of positive state-society relations in particular, and seeing on the other hand, how the institutional approach lacks a microeconomic component, authors like Evans, Narayan and Woolcock have tried to combine the two into one approach, which they refer to as the synergy approach (Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

THE TWO KEY FORMS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: EMBEDDEDNESS AND AUTONOMY

Woolcock's framework of social capital and economic development is an attempt to make a synthesis or a combination of the network approach and the institutional approach, which rests on the centrality of two key forms of social capital shared by the two approaches both referring to two distinct but complementary forms of social capital, namely 'embeddedness' and 'autonomy' (Woolcock 1998:162). The idea of embeddedness originates from Karl Polanyi¹¹, but was introduced to contemporary sociologists by Granovetter, who argued that all economic action was inherently enmeshed in social relations of one configuration or another, and that, development essentially brought about a change in the kind, not degree, of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985:493). This was a critique of the pure market approach to economic action, and to

¹¹ Karl Polanyi argued that as a result of the structural transformation, "*the noncontractual organisations of kinship, neighbourhood, professions and creed were... liquidated since they claimed the allegiance of the individual and thus restrained his [economic] freedom* (Polanyi [1944] 1957:163)."

Granovetter, whether it was the performance of firms, shaping labour-market outcomes or economic development of poor communities¹², it was all about the structures of personal relations and networks of relations between and within, respectively, firms, labour-market and communities (Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1985, Granovetter 1995).

The idea of embeddedness has since been incorporated substantive research on economic development, and according to Woolcock, there exist three common assumptions of embeddedness. The first is that all forms of exchange are inherently embedded in social relationships. The second is that embeddedness itself can take several of forms: social ties, cultural practices and political contexts, which all have powerful effect on shaping the types of opportunities and constraints individuals face as they seek economic development. The third – and perhaps the most significant – is that the costs of networking sometimes greatly outweigh the benefits with noneconomic claims in on the members' sense of obligations and commitment, with negative economic consequences. The calculus of these cost and benefits appears to change markedly as development proceeds and can in fact impose considerable constraints on successful members as they attempt to make the transitions to membership in larger, more extensive, and sophisticated exchange networks coordinated by formal institutions and the rule of law. This transition is highly problematic since it also entails gaining knowledge of how to participate in, construct, and maintain new institutional forms. Similarly, difficult is the transition the other way, especially those social ties that transcend the public realm preventing the institutions from becoming vehicles for corruption, nepotism or exploitation, since it is the same social mechanisms that protect the social ties among powerful institutional actors (Woolcock 1998:163).

In order to establish whether the cost or benefits of embeddedness prevails in any given situation, scholars begin to suggest that the presence or absence of a complementary set of *autonomous* social ties need to be incorporated into the analysis of embeddedness and economic development. At the micro level, this means focussing on the extent to which community members also has access to a range of non-community members; at the macro level, it entails examining the extent to which senior policy makers are not just connected to key industry leaders, but are themselves simultaneously governed by a professional ethos committing them to negotiating and pursuing collective goals, and recruiting and rewarding colleagues on the basis of merits. In other words, to overcome numerous of

¹² See Woolcock, Michael and Narayan, Deepa: "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy" in *The World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2000.

organisational problems that entail coordinating developmental (as opposed to predatory, rent seeking, or other inefficient) outcomes, actors – and the groups or which they are members – have to be able to draw on both embedded and autonomous social ties (Woolcock 1998:164), which illustrated looks like this:




Figure 1. Top-down and bottom-up development and the forms of social capital.s

Then, just as there are different forms of embeddedness, so too are there distinct but corresponding forms of autonomy. However, the way embeddedness and autonomy is deployed at the micro and macro level differs; embeddedness at the micro level refers to intra-community ties, whereas at the macro level it refers to state-society relations; autonomy at the micro level refers to extra-community ties, while at the macro level it refers to institutional capacity and credibility (Woolcock 1998:164). This is how the four distinct, but complementary forms of social capital are being identified and defined by the two approaches, which Woolcock's framework rests on.

THE DESIGN OF THE FRAMEWORK

The framework of social capital and economic development is about examining the concept of social capital as a potentially useful component of economic development theory and policy. If social capital is to have any meaning as development concept, it must not only be a resource that helps groups overcome essentially *static* organisational dilemmas in terms of costs outweighing benefits at networking, it must also encompass a range of societal dimensions and display certain key attributes that can be called upon in the course of resolving *dynamic* organisational dilemmas in terms of easing the transition both ways around (Woolcock 1998:168). According to Woolcock, the importance of conceiving social capital at different levels of society can be seen most clearly by examining the organisational dilemmas of development in poor communities (Woolcock

1998:167). The unit of analysis is therefore poor communities. His understanding of social capital is dynamic, seeing that a) the nature and extent of social relationships vary within and among different institutional sectors, b) the tasks performed by these relationships necessarily change as economic exchange becomes more sophisticated and c) that both “too little” and “too much” social capital at any given institutional level can impede economic performance (Woolcock 1998:168). He therefore refers to social capital as [...] *the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively*”, which is a simple definition that accommodates the different dimensions of social capital (Woolcock and Narayan 2000:236-37). Furthermore, Woolcock finds necessary to label the four forms of social capital more precisely to explore the different levels, dimensions and combinations of social capital having both a contemporary and a classic referent. At the micro level, embeddedness becomes ‘integration’ and autonomy becomes ‘linkage’, and at the macro level, embeddedness becomes ‘synergy’ and autonomy becomes ‘organisational integrity’ (Woolcock 1998:168), which inserted in previous figure look like this:




Figure 2. Top-down and bottom-up development with new labels.

The idea of social integration is derived initially from Durkheim’s familiar notions of mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim [1893] 1984), whereas the idea of linkages comes from Simmel, who early on recognised that poor communities needed to generate social ties extending beyond their primordial groups, if long-term developmental outcomes were to be achieved (Simmel [1908] 1971). The idea of organisational integrity has its origins in Weber, who argued that economic development was intimately associated with the emergence of formal bureaucracies and the universal rule of law – what he called collectively “the routines of administration” – which provided the secure

and predictable basis on which individual rests and abilities could be channelled into the attainment of larger collective enterprises (Weber [1922] 1968; Weber [1923] 1981). In time, as the growth and formalisation of state bureaucracies was mirrored in political parties and private business, they needed to find ways and means of ensuring their organisation's continuity, power and status. Weber therefore noticed that after having attained a certain measure of size and stature, large bureaucracies would essentially become "iron cages", unable and unwilling to change and to meet new circumstances (Collins 1980:925-42). Comparative institutionalists then extended the Weberian thesis and developed the idea of synergy, which they defined as the ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public-private divide, or more generally, the social relations between representatives of formal organisations (Evans 1996:1120).

According to Woolcock, the different combinations of these four dimensions of social capital account for a range of development outcomes, from 'anarchic individualism' (the absence of all four dimensions) at one extreme to 'beneficent autonomy' (the presence of all four dimension) at the other. The same dimension of social capital can serve very different developmental purposes when combined with other forms, which make social networks a unique, vitally important, but nonetheless highly problematic resource in terms of affecting positive development outcomes, and are thus the basis of major theoretical and policy dilemmas (Woolcock 1998:170). To clarify the basis of these dilemmas Woolcock distinguishes between *bottom-up* and *top-down* dilemmas of development and examines specific evidence relevant to each of the dimensions and combinations of social capital.

THE BOTTOM-UP DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT

Bottom-up development initiatives are those that emerge or take place at the local or grassroots level. This type of development typically functions in and through social relations among people with common neighbourhood, ethnic religions or familial ties i.e. those with high endowments of social integration. These social networks constitute an important asset that can be called upon in crisis i.e. risk management, enjoyed for its own sake and leveraged for material gain (Woolcock and Narayan 2000:226). The more intensive the social networks and social trust within a given community, the higher its endowments of social integration (Woolcock 1998:171). The typical bottom-up dilemmas of development occur when here exists too high endowments of social integration in a community given that "more is not necessarily better". For instance, communities that are built on fierce ethnic loyalties and family attachment can discourage its members from

advancing economically, which Woolcock refers to as ‘amoral familism’, where social integration is present and linkage is absent and the costs outweigh the benefits of networking (Woolcock 1998:171). The difficulties of development in social environments characterised by amoral familism raises the questions of privatising as a developmental objective, since the efforts to sell off collectively owned goods under these conditions may not only intensify existing social problems, but actually create new ones (Toye 1987; Colclough 1991). ‘Amoral individualism’, on the other hand, exists where there is neither familiar nor social trust, where narrow self interest literally permeates all social and economic activity, and where members are isolated – either by circumstances or discriminations – from all forms of cohesive social networks. Also characterised by the absence of both integration and linkage, which is rarely found empirically (Woolcock 1998:172). A third case, classically associated with urban setting and modernisation, is that of anomie, where individuals have newly-found freedom and opportunity to participate in a wide range of activities, but lack the stable community to provide guidance, support and identity. In other words, they have linkage but no integration. Then, with too much freedom and not enough community small-scaled business will fail to get started (Woolcock 1998:173-74).




Figure 3. Integration and linkage in bottom-up dilemmas of development.

Woolcock therefore argue that (Woolcock 1998:175):

"[...] for development to proceed in poor communities, the initial benefits of intensive intra-community integration, such as they are, must give way over time to extensive extra-community linkage: too much or too little of either dimension at any given moment undermines economic advancement."

Meaning that a community's stock of social capital in form of social integration can be the basis for launching development initiatives, but is must be complemented over time by construction of new forms of social capital i.e. linkage to non-community members, hence the dynamic understanding of social capital.

THE TOP-DOWN DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT

To Woolcock, the internal dynamics and development of economic groups in poor communities does not occur in isolation, but rather in the context of a particular history and regulatory framework that can itself strengthen or undermine the capacity of independent groups in civil society to organise in their own collective interests. Such groups can also play an important role in shaping government policies and performance. The developmental effectiveness of state-society relations therefore turns on the articulation of the interests, needs and resources of both parties (Woolcock 1998:176). A range of developmental outcomes is therefore also depending on the prevailing combinations of the state's organisational integrity and its engagement with and responsiveness to civil society.

		ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY (Corporate coherence and capacity)	
		<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
SYNERGY (State-society relations)	<i>Low</i>	Anarchy (Collapsed states)	Inefficiency, ineffectiveness (Weak states)
	<i>High</i>	Predation, corruption (Rogue states)	Cooperation, accountability, flexibility (Developmental states)

Figure 4. Organisational integrity and synergy in top-down dilemmas of development.

The so-called 'collapsed' states such as Somalia represent one extreme, where a nightmarish anarchy reigns and there are no sign of organisational integrity or synergy (Woolcock 1998:176). Collapsed states are closely related to 'predatory' or 'rouge' states, which are characterised by the absence of competent and coherent government bureaucracies. Featuring ruthless non-accountable military state dictators, and regimes staffed by mercenaries or cronies, which lead to rampant corruption, the destruction or commandeering of private (and common) property and the wilful violation of basic human right (Rosenberg 1991). However, the predatory or rouge states are effective in the sense that they are able to carry out their narrow agendas due to their monopoly of violence rather than organisational integrity. These states are characterised by low organisational integrity, but have a modest degree of synergy (Woolcock 1998:177). 'Weak' states, on the other hand, are characterised by high organisational integrity, but with low synergy. Here government may be committed in principle to upholding common law and may refrain from actively plundering the common weal, but practice misappropriates scarce resource, is largely indifferent to the plight of vulnerable groups such as women, the elderly, poor and disabled, produces shoddy goods and responds

slowly at all to citizen demands (Woolcock 1998: 177-78). The ‘developmental’ states, where Japan, South Korea and Singapore are prime examples represent the other extreme. Here state-relations, those between government ministries and major business groups, are characterised by embedded autonomy in which a coherent, connected and cohesive development framework emerges as a result of “*a concrete set of social ties which bind the state to society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies* (Evans 1992:164)”. Organisational integrity is high and so is the synergy. Woolcock therefore argues that in the cases of collapsed, rought and weak states, it is the state that is the problem rather than the solution. Furthermore, what is true of state-society relations holds more generally for all forms of top-down development. Any institution with a developmental agenda must be at once engaged with the communities it seeks to serve and capable of maintaining its own credibility and effectiveness (Woolcock 1998:178).

CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

After having established the different dilemmas of development Woolcock finds that the prospects of local-level development efforts very much turn on the extent to which both bottom-up and top-down dilemmas are resolved. In the line with Uphoff he argues that (Uphoff 1992: 273):

“Paradoxical though it may seem, “top-down” effects are needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalise “bottom-up” development. We are commonly constrained to think in “either-or” terms – the more of one the less of the other – when both are needed in a positive-sum way to achieve our purposes.”

Forging and sustaining social relations connecting top-down resources and bottom-up capacity building is not easily done. For instance, in places where bottom-up dilemmas are especially acute, the direct intervention by top-down agencies itself becomes more problematic since it tends to change the very condition that made intervention necessary in the first place. Furthermore, with strengthening subordinated groups or weakening previously dominant groups comes along fresh claims on the resources of both the state and other social groups (Woolcock 1998:179-80). Then, for sustaining economic development, the interaction between the top-down and bottom-up must be a dynamic one, where in the case of bottom-up development; intensive intra-community ties (social integrations) must begin to coexist with more extensive albeit weaker extra-community network (linkage); while at the same top-down combinations of state-society relations

(synergy) must coexist with cohesive corporate ties (integrity)(Woolcock 1998:180). This aspect makes social capital a vital unique, but also a problematic resource to use.

A SUMMARY OF WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK

Then, development outcomes are shaped by the extent to which basic social dilemmas at the micro and macro level are resolved and positive outcomes are attained to the extent that both embedded and autonomous social ties prevail at *both* levels, which happens when people are willing and able to draw on nurturing social ties (i) within their local communities; (ii) between local communities and groups with external and more extensive social connections to civil society; (iii) between civil society and macro-level institutions and (iv) within corporate sector institutions (Woolcock 1998:186). All four dimensions of social capital must be present for optimal development outcomes within and between bottom-up and top-down development initiatives, which becomes an ongoing process that entails *getting the social relations right* (Woolcock 1998:187). If the social relations are “wrong” – i.e. one or more of the four dimensions listed above is absent – the development outcomes will be sub-optimal.

In relation to this, he mentions that a number of social, cultural, political and economic conditions that have emerged historically in the society such as entrenched poverty; widespread class, sex and ethnic inequality; overtly discrimination of minorities; chronic underemployment; and uniformed weak, unjust and flaunted laws will highly reduce a community's prospects for effecting economic development (Woolcock 1998:182 and 187). This way Woolcock indirectly associates social capital with the issues of context and power in his framework, but he does not examine these important issues further, which invites to an extension or an elaboration of Woolcock's framework, due to the earlier arguments under the network approach in the method chapter.

WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK EXTENDED AT THE MICRO LEVEL

At the micro level this means that a community's access to resources outside the network (linkage) does not only depend on the right combination of social integration and linkage – strong intra-community ties and weak extra-community ties, which are influenced by the social organisation within the community in terms of amoral familism, amoral individual and anomie. It also depends the social location of the community's entire network within the broader socio-economic context (Bourdieu 1986:249; Edwards and Foley 1999:165). The access or the ways that the specific social network can and cannot

link its members to resources outside the social network varies due to a number of constraints (Edwards and Foley 1997:672). First of all, the amount and types of resources within a community's network are important, when it comes to linking the community's members to others with more extensive social resources. Secondly, geographic and social isolation constrains the structural availability of the community, but also how the network itself is embedded in broader social patterns of inequality constrains the possibilities of the community to develop useful network to increase their social capital, which depends on whether or not those other local communities and groups with more extensive social resources and connections to civil society are willing to give access to their resources and connections. Then, entrenched poverty; widespread class, sex and ethnic inequality; and overtly discrimination of minorities makes it difficult for the community via its network to linked itself to other external communities or groups with extensive social resources due to the lack of resources, social position in existing power structures in the society. These issues of context and power must therefore the incorporate at the micro level to fully understand and explain, how social capital works in relation to poverty reduction.

WOOLCOCK'S FRAMEWORK EXTENDED AT THE MACRO LEVEL – THE AFRICAN STATE

At the macro level this means that an extension of Woolcock's weak state typology (the one closest to the Namibian state) must be made to conceptualise how existing social, cultural, economic and political features within the society that have emerged historically, have influenced the state, the state-society relations and the social structure or organisation within and outside the community. The extension of the weak state is the African state¹³, which will be described in the following next pages.

THE AFRICAN STATE AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE

After the independence in 1950s and 1960s, the African state took form as a 'socialist state' associated with a central planning bureaucracy, known for its political interventions in all sectors of the society, especially in the economic sphere (Hyden 1983: 51-52). There were various reasons for choosing bureaucracy over market. To begin with the African countries were left with a sizeable bureaucracy after their independence, a legacy

¹³ The African state, as earlier mentioned in the method chapter, is deduced from the foremost common features of the African states, or more precisely, the sub-Saharan African states identified by Goran Hyden a professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, which is used to make a general conceptualisation of a typical African state and the prevailing features of the African society and how these have influenced the functioning of the state.

of the colonial powers. Secondly, after having witnessed what politics could accomplish, namely political independence, there existed a strong belief among the African leaders that politics also would lead to social welfare and economic growth (Hyden 1983:49). Bureaucracy was therefore seen as a necessary political instrument to reallocate resources and income in the society as well as control the economy, and in that way dismantle the colonial legacy (Hyden 1983:50). Thirdly, the first generations of African leaders were all products of a pre-capitalist environment and believed firmly that the market was the greatest threat to the very foundation of their society, due to the capitalism that had been imposed on the African countries by the colonial powers (Hyden 1983:1 and 51). The bureaucratisation of the African society was based on a socialist conviction among the national leaders and their pre-capitalist attitude, and maybe more on the latter. Despite of some attempts during the 1980s to minimise the state's influence on the economy and depoliticise other sectors (Hyden 1983:3), and the 1990's implementation of 'decentralisation'¹⁴ policies, the African state can still be characterised as a central planning bureaucracy (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983; Mawhood 1983).

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AFRICAN STATE

The political culture that prevails in African countries comes from some existing cultural and social features in the African societies, which influence the way of doing politics in Africa. For one, a single rule party without any opposition rules in most African countries today, often with a charismatic leader in front (Hyden 1983:33). In this one party system there is a high concentration of power, which of course belongs to the party. The political affiliation to the party is demographic, meaning that a certain tribes or clans located in a part or parts of the country belong to the party (Hyden 1983:37). The different clans have great influence in African societies, since there is no ruling class. These clans represent a geographic area, a tribe, an ethnic group, a kingdom or a religious movement and attend to only their geographic kingdom, affairs. A clan can, according to Donald B. Cruise O'Brien, be described as (O'Brien 1975:149):

“[...] a political faction, operating within the institutions of the state and the government party: it exists above all to promote the interests of its members through political competition, and its first unifying principle is the prospect of the material

¹⁴ Decentralisation is defined as “[...] a transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisation, local government, or NGOs (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983:18).”

rewards of political success. Political office and the spoils of office are the every definition of success: Loot is the clan's totem.“

This cultural and social phenomenon exists in various degrees throughout Africa where the general aim for the clan leaders in Africa is to benefit from the political office and allocate resources and income to its own members. This set of rationale behind the political activities has an impact on the kind of politics that is being led in Africa, which has influenced the state's organisational integrity and the extent and nature of its involvement in civic life in a particular way.

THE AFRICAN STATE'S ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRITY

The strong existence of clans in African society has made it necessary for the African leaders to incorporate clan leaders and their clan politics in the government. The most common way of incorporating clan leaders has been to create a loose alliance of these leaders, who, through participation in the ruling party and the government, were given the opportunity to secure benefits for their respective constituencies (Hyden 1983:41). Though this participation of clan leaders has been legitimate, it has never been a part of the official government structure. The result of this arrangement has been a diversion of public resources to the different clans and their constituencies, despite the cost of the national economy, which only is acceptable because of the political stability it creates. Hence, dissatisfaction or imbalance among the clan leaders could become a threat to the President in office (Hyden 1983:42). The motive for engaging in any political activity in African state is therefore highly associated with the prospect of the material rewards of political success, where the political office and the spoils of office are the very definition of success. Due to the particular rationale in the African state for doing politics, there exist two public realms with different link to the private realm. At one level there is the public realm, in which primordial groupings, ties and sentiments influence and determine the public behaviour of individuals, which is coherent with the private realm. At another level there is a civic public realm, which is historically associated with colonial rule such as the civil services, the judiciary, the police and the military created back in those days, which has no moral link to the private realm. The civic public realm is a place from which actors seeks to gain, if possible in order to benefit the primordial public realm (Hyden 1983:39).

This way, the strong presence of clans and clan politics causes a very high level of organisational integrity within the African state, because African politics is all about finding ways and means of ensuring the government i.e. the clans' continuity, power and status, which are enforced by strong powerful social ties both within the government and in the surrounding society.

THE AFRICAN STATE'S SYNERGY

Due to the African state's high level of organisational integrity and the prevailing practises of civic public realm, there has been a tendency to "[...] *raise the walls surrounding the political arena and make the access to it more difficult* (Hyden 1983:48)", regardless of the form of state structure, which has limited the state-society relations. The incorporation of the clans and clan politics in the state's organisation combined with the single-party rule has made the need for organisation and mobilisation of the civil society in political and economic matters unnecessarily, since the clans attend their members' needs (Hyden 1983:35). The unions and other interest groups are therefore more or less invisible in the political arena, where the clans and individuals set the agenda. This minimum engagement in the civic life has also something to do with the colonisation that most of the African countries have experience in which the indigenous people were not included in any political and economic matters. It is therefore not surprisingly that in most of these African states, the engagement in civic life has not yet been fully institutionalised (Hyden 1983:35). The African state's synergy is therefore rather low.

The above description of the African political culture in terms of clan politics and its influence on the state's organisational integrity and synergy is reinforced by a peculiar type of economy, namely 'economic of affection', which has affected the economic and the social organisation in Africa, including the African state (Hyden 1983:37).

ECONOMY OF AFFECTION

This type of economy is especially prevalent in the rural communities, though an integrated part of the society and the political life (Hyden 1983:9). Economy of affection is characterised by a person's or household unit's exchange of goods to another person to thereby secure the physical and social maintenance of the person or household, whereby a patron-client relation occurs. Economy of affection is (Hyden 1983:82):

“[...] a network of support groups, communications and interactions among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities for example religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units which in other regards may be autonomous.”

This network is often ad hoc and informal rather than regular and formalised. This type of economy, or rather network, complements the operation of the clan and visa versa, and is probably the main reason for the prevailing clan politics. The tradition in African politics is to make use of the public resources in order to “cut a deal” is a result of the use of patronage politics to secure, insure and protect certain interests for instance a clan’s through their use of economy of affection.

Politics in the African state therefore are much more based on *personal* network and power than *institutionalised* processes, in which the different stakeholders including the civil society are represented. Personal power then becomes a crucial element in the African state, especially given that the different clans/groups in the African society are rather independent from each other and therefore competitive when it comes to gaining power (Hyden 1983:72). The African state is known for having a little but powerful political elite, with strong reference to their clans, who is conducting the decision-making. The

NUMBNESS OF THE AFRICAN STATE

The political culture of the African state involving clan politics, patronage politics and economy of affection and patronage politics in a way also undermines the function of a state. First of all, the existing political culture is hollowing out the state power, the power to rule and steer the country in the wished direction. The power is spread all over, and it is not clear how and in what way the different alliances or networks between the parties or government and the clan member’s work (Hyden 1983:59). The exercise of state power is, as implied earlier, very much dependent on personal network, which makes the state weak and inconsistent. Secondly, the political culture, in particular economy of affection, undermines the need for a state to allocate the public resources within a society, as the allocation is happening in the form of economy of affection without the interference of the state. The term “[...] *African countries are societies without a state* (Hyden 1983:79)” is very striking in this context. Usually, the state reflects the will and

interests of society or more precisely the people who own the means of production. This independence of the state reinforces the weakness and the frailty of the state. Thirdly, the myriad non-transparent and invisible networks between the different groups in society, which characterise patronage politics and economy of affection, undermine any form of institutionalised political and administrative processes. Fourthly, clan politics and the amoral civil public realm extend to the government's field organisation. The state bureaucracy is used to accommodating competing clan's interests, and is often portrayed as a 'soft state', due to its sensitivity towards the clan pressures that occur from the use of economy of affection (Hyden 1983:69). The African state is therefore considered in every way to be numbness; because of the prevailing political culture the state is not able to fully function let alone introducing, sustaining and institutionalising top-down development. In stead the weak state is responsible for creating entrenched poverty; widespread class, sex and ethnic inequality; overtly discrimination of minorities; chronic underemployment; and uniformed weak, unjust and flaunted laws (Woolcock 1998:177-78).

The above conceptualisation of the African state is based on some empirical studies of African countries and their development after independence, which have been generalised. It is a general picture of how the states in Africa are organised, as well as function. The degree of the clan phenomenon, patronage politics and economies of affection varies from state to state, and it is therefore not all African states that are as burden as described above. The numbness of the African has different levels. One can argue that the Namibian state is not identical with the African state, but in order to get an overview of such a somewhat complex organisation as the state, a conceptualisation has been necessary.

THE THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION

According to Woolcock's framework of social capital and economic development all four dimensions of social capital must be present for the small poor rural community living in Spitzkoppe to make use of its social capital to move out of poverty. Meaning that both social integration and linkage must present at the micro level (the community's embeddedness and autonomy) as well as both organisational integrity and synergy must present at the macro level (the state's embeddedness and autonomy). This happens when people are willing and able to draw on nurturing social ties (i) within their local

communities; (ii) between local communities and groups with external and more extensive social connections to civil society; (iii) between civil society and macro-level institutions and (iv) within corporate sector institutions (see figure 2).

This is because, the four dimensions of social capital are distinct, but complementary in the way that both embedded and autonomous social ties must be present at both levels for a community to develop. Meaning that it is difficult for a community to develop if it is limited to the resources within the community as well as it is difficult for a community to develop with mainly resources from the outside without the community to foster and nurture these resources. Similarly, difficult is it for a state to assist a community's development if the corporation only exists within the state and not between the state and society as well as it difficult for a state to assist a community's development with only the corporation between the two without any form of state capacity to introduce, sustain and institutionalise development initiatives that promote the community's economic development. Then, both "too little" and "too much" social capital at any given institutional level can impede the economic development of the small poor rural community living at Spitzkoppe. The most optimal combination of the four forms of social capital is therefore, when at the bottom-up development intensive extra-community ties (social integration) coexist with more extensive albeit "weaker" extra-community networks (linkage), while at the same time at the top-down development state-society relations (synergy) coexist with cohesive corporate ties (integrity). However, though all four forms are equally complementary, the top-down development is usually needed to introduce, sustain and institutionalise the bottom-up development. Meaning that Spitzkoppe community's prospects of making use of its social capital to move out of poverty depends on the African state to make some top-down development initiatives.

The Spitzkoppe community's prospects of making use of its social capital to move out of poverty, then depends on the nature and extent of its social capital i.e. the combination of the different social capital forms that are being present, which in turn depends on a) the structure of the African state, b) the nature and extent of its involvement in civic life, and c) the organisation of the African society, which are influenced by existing social, cultural, political and economic features within African society that have emerged historically, which constitute the broader context in which Spitzkoppe community's social capital is fostered and created, illustrated below.




Figure 5. The African state in a historical setting

At the micro level this means more specifically that the historical suppression and discrimination of indigenous people, inequality, clans and their use of patronage and client relationships and economic affection have affected the organisation of the African societies making these very differentiated, where widespread ethnic inequalities and overtly discrimination of minorities exists, which also may be reflected in the social integration within the Spitzkoppe community depending on the constellation of the different groups living in the community, which would make it difficult to at times draw on nurturing social ties within the community. Furthermore, people's lack of experience of organise themselves can also affect the social integration within the Spitzkoppe community in terms of low organisation. As earlier stated the Spitzkoppe community's access to resources outside the network (linkage) does not only depend on the right combination of social integration and linkage – strong intra-community ties and weak extra-community ties, which are influenced by the social organisation within the

community. It also depends the social location of the community's entire network within the broader socio-economic context. The access or the ways that the specific social network can and cannot link its members to resources outside the social network varies due to a number of constraints. First of all, the amount and types of resources within a community's network are important, when it comes to linking the community's members to others with more extensive social resources. Secondly, geographic and social isolation constrains the structural availability of the community, but also how the network itself is embedded in broader social patterns of inequality constrains the possibilities of the community to develop useful network to increase their social capital, which depends on whether or not those other local communities and groups with more extensive social resources and connections to civil society are willing to give access to their resources and connections. Then, depending on the degree of widespread ethnic inequality and overtly discrimination of minorities in the Namibian society this may become difficult for the small poor rural community living at Spitzkoppe to via its network link itself to other external communities or groups with extensive social resources due to the lack of resources within the community and its social position in the existing power structures within the African society.

At the macro level this means more specifically that the existence of the clans and their use of patronage and client relationships and economic of affection as well as the well-established state bureaucracy after the colonisation have affected the structure of the state in terms of a central planning, single rule party, strong closed elite, clan and patronage politics, power-oriented politics and a prevailing civic public realm, which have resulted in a very high organisational integrity within the African state, where politics is all about finding ways and means of ensuring the government i.e. the clans' continuity, power and status, which are enforced by strong powerful social ties both within the government and in the surrounding society. Due to this political setting there has been no room or need for the state to get involved in civic life, which equally reflected in African state's low synergy, its state-society relations. Then, depending on the degree of the existence of these features in the Namibian state, its top-down development can be therefore invisible, which affects the community's bottom-up development in a negative way.

This is the theoretical understanding of Spitzkoppe community's prospects for making use of its social capital to move out of poverty.

METHOD CHAPTER II

CASE DESIGN

The purpose of making a single case study in this project is to explain the how social capital works as poverty reduction strategy in terms of poor people/communities being able to make use of their social relations, networks, memberships in organisations and associations to move out of poverty by studying one of these many poor communities to illustrate some of the difficulties poor communities have, when it comes to using their social capital to move out of poverty. The single case study can according to Yin three types of investigations be characterised as both typical and critical.

The reason for choosing Spitzkoppe community in Erongo region, Namibia, is first of all, because I had my internship at the Erongo Regional Council back in 2000. So, I knew a little bit about Spitzkoppe community, region and the country. Secondly, because Spitzkoppe is a typical poor community with all what means in terms of housing and infrastructure, facilities, resources, organisation, livelihoods and livelihoods opportunities and diverse social problems such a poverty and unemployment. However, this does not mean that Spitzkoppe represents all poor people and poor communities in the Third World, but it just illustrates some of these difficulties that poor people and poor communities have using their social capital to move out of poverty, which used to question the efficiency and relevance of social capital as a major poverty reduction strategy.

THE PERIOD OF THE CASE

As the case is about Spitzkoppe community's prospect of making use of its social capital to move out of poverty, and not a process, the case period concerns the current situation of its personal and intuitional relations (using the latest data from 2007-2008).

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CASE

The case study is about the Spitzkoppe community's social capital – the nature and the extent of the Spitzkoppe community's personal and institutional relationships that constitute its social capital. The case study will start an introduction of Namibia and Erongo region followed by a description of the community's social capital formation in terms of social integration and linkage referring to the community's bottom-up

development and the state's synergy and organisational integrity referring to the state's top-down development, where the two levels will be analysed separately and then together to establish the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital formation to find out what the prospects are for the community to make use of its social capital to move out of poverty. Then, a description of the existing social, cultural, political and economic features within the Namibian society that have emerged historically will follow, and hereafter an analysis of how these have influenced the structure of the state, its involvement in civic life and the organisation of the society, and thereby the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital.

THE USE OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To understand how the four forms of social capital are interrelated to each other, Woolcock's framework of social capital and economic development will be used, whereas the extensions of Woolcock's framework, the one at the micro level and the other at the macro level will be used respectively at the micro level (bottom-up development) and at the macro level (top-down development) to analyse Spitzkoppe community's prospects of affecting its economic development using its social capital.

THE CHOICE OF DATA AND THE GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE DATA

Because Spitzkoppe community and Erongo regional development planning is relatively unknown outside of Namibia, or even the region it has been very difficult to find data and data that were up to date, especially to the latter. However, I have been able to collect some articles, reports and newspaper articles on the Internet, which were quite new. The only "old" data that has been necessary to use are regarding the current Erongo regional planning, however, a report and an article confirmed that the decentralisation process had not much changed since my stay. The description of Spitzkoppe community is based on one major report made by UraMin in Namibia regarding a mining project due to the lack of date, but it had all the information that was needed and it is relatively new. Then, this was the best I could do from a distance.

EMPIRICAL CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

Namibia, formerly South West Africa, lies in southwestern Africa bordering the Atlantic Ocean on the west, Angola to the north, Zambia to the northeast, South Africa to the south and southeast and Botswana to the east (Minahan 1998:193). The total area of the Namibia is 825.418 square kilometres with a population of approximately 2.087.000 (cia.gov/library/publications/.../wa.html), where most of the population still resides in the rural areas in the northwest and northeast Namibia (Töttemeyer 1998:1). 55% of the urbanised population is domiciled in the capital, Windhoek. There exist 15 national groups in Namibia, the largest group of which are the Ovambo, which make up 50% of the population. The other major national groups Kavango, Herero, Damara, Afrikaaner, German, English, Coloured, Nama, Caprivian, San and Baster represent about 48,5% of the population. The last 1,5% of the population is the small tribes such as the Topnaars people (cia.gov/library/publications/.../wa.html).

Most of Namibia consists of high plateaus and deserts, which makes it one of the driest countries on earth (Minahan 1998:194). She has little fertile land on which to grow crops and the main economy is heavily based on mining, fishing, livestock as well as tourism (UraMin Namibia 2008:195). Namibia is listed as a “middle income” country in terms of income per capita and ranked at position 125 out of 177 countries in United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development report (UNDP 2005), which places her in the category of medium development countries. However, due to the extremely skewed wealth distribution in Namibia, where an estimated 55% of national income accrues to only 10% of the population, underdevelopment is a significant problem in the rural areas of Namibia (UraMin Namibia 2008:196).

Namibia is divided into 13 regions. Erongo region is Namibia’s sixth largest region, named after the Erongo Mountains, extending 63.720 square kilometres and borders the Atlantic Ocean. Almost 50% of the region is completely unpopulated, because of the world’s oldest desert – the Namib. The main centres in the region are Swakopmund and Walvis Bay and the smaller are Henties Bay, Usakos, Karibib and Omaruru. The region has the second highest income per capita in the country after Khomas Region, which is derived from fishing, mining, tourism and livestock farming, especially game farming (UraMin Namibia 2008:193 and 198; Töttemeyer et al. 1996/97:77). Compared to other

regions, Erongo is quite well-developed in terms of schools, hospitals and clinics, supply of electricity and telecommunication service function well (UraMin Namibia 2008:197; Töttemeyer et al. 1996/97:78). Though, in the remote rural areas of Erongo underdevelopment is still a significant problem as in the rest of Namibia (UraMin Namibia 2008:197).

THE SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

THE ORIGINS OF THE SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

The Spitzkoppe community is situated at the foot of the 1,900 metre the Spitzkoppe granite dome (also referred to as the “Matterhorn of Namibia”) located between Usakos and Swakopmund in the Namib desert (UraMin Namibia 2008:217). The community is neither traditional nor long-established resident. Some forty years ago there was no community resident in the area around the Spitzkoppe. After the San people died out or left the area, the area remained uninhabited until the late 1960’s, where a small group of Damara people was resettled under the policies of the former South African apartheid government (Odendaal Commission) and moved there. The community was established on the south of the mountain, and is referred to locally as ‘Spitzkoppe Skool’ (UraMin Namibia 2008:217).

THE HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE OF SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

The number of people living in the community is approximately 1.600 and most of these are Damara. They are scattered over a fairly large area, with most formal dwellings concentrated in Spitzkoppe Skool, but also a number of informal dwellings are found there. The numbers of such dwellings have increased recently due to the drought. Some parents can no longer afford to pay the fees for the school hostel, and therefore live in iron shacks, so that their children can live with them and still attend the local school. The number of people living in informal dwellings is considerable, but no figures were available (UraMin Namibia 2008:218).

The community is rather isolated with regard to communication. There is no regular bus or train and very few members of the community have cars. There are only 5-10 members that have telephones (mobile or fixed line). One phone serves as a message centre/answering service, and faxes have to be sent to, and collected at, Nampost on Usakos 40 km away (UraMin Namibia 2008:220).

THE FACILITIES IN SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

Social services are housed in a school and a hostel, a church and a small multi-purpose community centre, which also serve as a clinic (irregular and infrequent visits of a doctor). There is a small play-centre for children in the grounds of the community centre, which was erected with donor funding (UraMin Namibia 2008:219). There are no banking facilities, postal office, police station, refuse removal service or recreational facilities other than soccer and netball fields (UraMin Namibia 2008:218).

THE EDUCATION IN SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

There are 260 pupils at the local school, and five teachers, including the principal. Pupils can complete grade 7 at the school, but afterwards they have to go on and complete secondary schooling in Usakos or Swakopmund (70 km away). The number of pupils who do not complete their schooling is in excess of 50%. The literacy rate in the community appears considerably lower than the regional average of 92.3% with no more than 50% (UraMin Namibia 2008:220).

THE LIVELIHOODS AND LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES OF SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

The community is poor and the assumed total income for the community of between US\$ 90,000 and US\$ 180,000 (i.e. US\$ 150 – US\$ 300 per person) per annum (UraMin Namibia 2008:220). It lives far from any employment opportunities and travel to potential centres for employment, such as Swakopmund, is erratic. The infrastructure is inadequate, the area is too remote for establishment of any formal commercial or industrial activities, and it is far from markets and sources of supply. The unemployment rate is 75%+, which refers to formal employment, and is therefore extremely high (UraMin Namibia 2008:220-21).

The community members make a living from a few goats and cattle, but grazing/browsing capacity is very limited. The area is not suitable for permanent pasture and the lack of rain means that there is very little growth in some years. Domestic livestock further degrades the grasslands. The lack of water also means that the cultivation of crops is not possible and the Department of Water Affairs discourages the use of groundwater for crops due to the low value-adding activity (UraMin Namibia 2008:221).

One of two main economic activities in the area is a small-scale mining for semi-precious stones. No beneficiation is done. The stones are sold at low price to passing tourists, but a current multi-stakeholder initiative is to develop a formal craft market at the intersection of Windhoek/Swakopmund and the Henties Bay roads, to promote and formalise the small-scale mining sector (UraMin Namibia 2008:221).

The other main economic activity is the Spitzkoppe Park and campsite with very few facilities, which is run by the Spitzkoppe Community Development Association (SCDA)¹⁵, which provides work for 16 people, where the community also sells firewood and water to the campers. The economic benefits to the community amount to approximately N\$ 214,000 a year, however, this income is not sufficient to manage the camp adequately or protect the cultural heritage of the San rock art. Each of the 25 campsites is namely situated on an archaeological site (UraMin Namibia 2008: 203 and 221).

The Spitzkoppe community is a member of the //Gaingu Conservancy registered in 2004, which covers an area of 7,677 square kilometres, making it one of the largest conservancies in Namibia. Together with 750 registered members and 2,000 other rural people, which live within its area, they have the right to conditional ownership and use of the game, including tropical hunting, local consumption and cropping for meat sales or capture for live sales. The opportunities to establish community based tourism enterprises and entering into joint ventures agreement with the private sector enterprises exist, but so far the Conservancy has not generated any form of income or created employment in the community (UraMin Namibia 2008:203 and 222).

Tourist efforts therefore seem to be the greatest potential for people to improve their income and living conditions.

THE FORMAL, LOCAL AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY

The Spitzkoppe community is formally represented by its Traditional Leaders, who are recognised as legal entities (The Traditional Authorities Act no. 25 of 2000), who are supposed to promote peace and welfare amongst the community members, supervise and ensure the observance of the customary law by its members. The Traditional Leaders also have to ensure that natural resources are used on a sustainable basis in a manner that conserves the environment and maintains the ecosystem and assist the Government,

¹⁵ The association will be mentioned and elaborated on later in this description of Spitzkoppe community.

Regional Councils and Local Authority Councils in the execution of their policies (UraMin Namibia 2008:216). However, in the case of Spitzkoppe it is difficult for the Traditional Leaders due to the remote location of the community, which is scattered over large area to fulfil their responsibilities in terms of representing the community and assisting the other authorities (UraMin Namibia 2008:223). The Traditional Leaders also have limited resources and lack the skills to conduct these different tasks. For instance, at the Spitzkoppe campsite some of the designated campsites were in rock shelters that contain San rock art or archaeological deposits, resulted in the damage to the rock art (UraMin Namibia 2008:221).

The only association within the community is the above-mentioned SCDA, which operates within a thirty-kilometre radius of Spitzkoppe, where the benefits from the activities accrue to members, who, in 2006 numbered 600. Besides from running the campsite the association also conducts a revolving livestock project and provides low interests loans to small-scale miners to buy equipment with three-year payment period (UraMin Namibia 2008:202). However, last year (2007) it was revealed that the campsite had been plagued by infighting, political agendas, mismanagement, and not to mention, the poor environmental practise (UraMin Namibia 2008:vii). The Spitzkoppe Development Committee had received almost half a million Namibian dollars donated by the '10 000 BC' film project, which had been transferred to the account of the Spitzkoppe Community campsite without informing the community, where the money was spent unaccounted on maintenance of the campsite (Maletsky 2007c). Both the local headman and the camp manager denied the knowledge of this event to Damara Chief, who threaten with the possibility of handing the case over to the police and the Anti-Corruption Commission, if they could not account for the missing money (Maletsky 2007c). A large herd of springboks left by the film company was also rabidly poached under the Development Committee supervision. These events made sections of the community approach the founder of the campsite to return to the project, which they felt was deteriorated. He therefore afterwards invited to a meeting with the purpose of discussing future of the community project, but the deputy chairman of the Development Committee and the local headman, who questioned the former founders authority to call the meeting thereafter would not participate, and sabotaged the meeting (Maletsky 2007a; Maletsky 2007:7b).

The social groups/networks within the community does only amount to a youth group, a women's group and a choir (UraMin Namibia 2008:220).

The Spitzkoppe community, besides having these tensions between different community members also deals with alcohol abuse, drug abuse, child abuse, commercial sex, vandalism and HIV/AIDS (UraMin Namibia 2008:218).

SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY'S COOPERATION WITH OTHER GROUPS AND ORGANISATIONS

The SCDA is a member of the Namibia Community Based Tourist Association (NACOBTA), which have assisted and helped the Spitzkoppe community in raising the funding for its park and campsite. The association is currently involve in another project of SCDA, namely the establishment of a cultural village, which at the moment is put on hold, due to practical circumstances (UraMin Namibia 2008:221). The NACOBTA was established in 1995 and operates at both the micro and macro level. At the micro level, it works with individual enterprises by providing advices, loans, training and promoting services, but also acts as a network and a "voice" for the community based tourism enterprises. At the macro level, it is active in lobbyism and assisting the Government to develop its tourism (Nicanor 2001:8). The association is largely depended on donors (Sweden, UK and EU), and its main challenge is to meet the standards expected by the private sector to enter joint ventures, which has low regards for communities as business people (Nicanor 2001:11 and 23). It also faces the challenge of working between three cultures: the traditional and community which are sometimes slow and prolonged; the corporate culture with little time and strike deals quickly (Nicanor 2001:23). The main weakness of NACOBTA is it lack of business, tourism and financial expertise to corporate with the private sector.

The community is also a member of the earlier mentioned the//Gaingu Conservancy, which has its own Constitution and a democratically elected committee. The objectives are 1) to enable its members to gain the right to manage and utilise the wildlife and to retain the income derived from these activities, 2) to gain the exclusive right develop tourism accommodation and operate guided tours within the Conservancy and 3) access rural development for local communities. However, four years after the management plan framework and the natural resource monitoring system are still not in place, though poaching is a major problem in the Conservancy. This is simply because the necessary resources to control this activity are not available (UraMin Namibia 2008:222).

This is the current situation of Spitzkoppe community, regarding its housing and infrastructure, facilities, education, livelihoods and livelihoods opportunities, formal, local and social organisation, and cooperation with other groups and organisations, which constitute the foundation for its bottom-up development, which depends on the nature and extent of its social integration, linkage as well as resources.

THE SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY'S BOTTOM-UP DEVELOPMENT

THE SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL INTEGRATION

The Spitzkoppe Skool community is a relative small community scattered over a fairly large area with relative little and not particular strong formal, local or social organisation. Starting with the formal organisation, which is the Traditional Authority personified in the Traditional Leaders of the Spitzkoppe community, who at the moment are not able to fulfil their responsibilities in terms of representing the community at the regional level; ensure that natural resources are used on a sustainable basis in a manner that conserve the environment and maintains the ecosystem; and assisting other authorities with the execution of their policies. Without the establishment of a Settlement Committee, the Traditional Leaders are left alone to carry out these different tasks, which are quite difficult without any form of organisation. In other words, there is no formal organisation in the Spitzkoppe community. The only local organisation in Spitzkoppe community is the community based organisation SCDA, counting 600 members, has been plagued with infighting and political agendas, due to the serious mismanagement in form of corruption regarding the Spitzkoppe Park and campsite. This has resulted in tensions between sections of the community and an overt mistrust towards the Development Committee and the management at Spitzkoppe Park and campsite. Lastly, there is the social organisation within the community, which does not amount to much, when it comes to social networks or activities, where people living in the community can be social, enjoy themselves and create relations. There exists a youth group, a women's group and a choir, which make up for the entire social life of the community.

The problem is therefore not the people living in the community willingness to draw on nurturing social ties within their community to gain access to the different existing resources within the community, but rather the ability to do so, due the lack of strong formal, local and social organisations. First of all, it is rather difficult for the people living in the community to draw on nurturing social ties within the formal organisation of the community, when no organisation exists in which relations are developed other than the

sporadic contact to the Traditional Leaders, who's only capacity is advisory at the regional level, which so far has not resulted in further development of the community. Instead, there has grown mistrust between some members of the community and the Traditional leaders. Secondly, it is also rather difficult for the people living in the community to draw on nurturing social ties within the only local organisation, the SCDA, which has been corrupted and not only is lacking resources, but also trust between its members and the leading members of the organisation. Thirdly, it is generally difficult for the people living within the community to draw on nurturing social ties, when there exist so few social networks/groups, where people can engage with each other and create social ties within the community.

Then, after having reviewed the formal, local and social organisation of Spitzkoppe community, the general picture of the community's social integration is that it is relative low. Instead, there exist tensions and mistrust between members of the community, especially to the ones representing the community i.e. Traditional Leaders and leading members of the SCDA. A certain degree of amoral individualism exists among the leading members in the SCDA, where narrow self-interest has at some point permeated the social and economic activity in the community.

THE SPITZKOPP COMMUNITY'S LINKAGE

The Spitzkoppe Skool community has a very limited network with other groups and organisation with external and more extensive social connections to civil society. The community cooperates with the NACOBTA and the//Gaingu Conservancy, which both have limited resource within them of which the community can benefit from. The reason for the small and somewhat resource limited network of Spitzkoppe community is not because the community has "too much" social integration, which can make it difficult or even prevent the community to establish linkage to other groups and organisations' resource outside of the community, but rather to do with its social location within the broader socio-economic context in terms of its amount and type of resources, its geographical and social isolation and the broader social patterns in which it is embedded.

Starting with resources of Spitzkoppe community, which is clearly lacking resources in every possible way. First of all, there exists a minimum of facilities within the community, which means there are no banking facilities, postal office, police station or removal service. Secondly, there exists a minimum of human skills due to poor schooling facilities, but also poverty. Parents cannot afford to send their children to live at the hostel

and go to school, so 50% of the pupils do not complete their education. Thirdly, there exists a minimum of economic activities due to its geographical location and the lack of natural resource to have any significant livestock or crops. The few current livelihoods that exist i.e. a few livestock, a small-scale mining business and the Spitzkoppe Park and campsite, are far from generating enough income to even maintain these activities, which means that any extension of these rely entirely on external assistance such as funding, training of management skills and environmental practises. Fourthly, the most promising resource of the community, namely the conditional ownership of the//Gaingu Conservancy, which gives the community the right to use the game, including tropical hunting and local consumption as well as cropping for meat sales or capture for live sales, but most important of all, the opportunities to establish community based tourism enterprises and entering into joint ventures agreement with the private sector enterprises, is yet to be exploited. Then, with the little amount of resources in terms of physical, human and financial resources and the most promising resource being unexploited, it becomes rather difficult for the community to link itself to other networks and groups with more extensive resources and connections to the civil society.

The geographical location of Spitzkoppe community is not making it easier for the small poor rural community to link itself to resources outside of the community, which is situated at the foot of Spitzkoppe in the Namib desert, where the nearest town is 40 km away. There is no regular transportation going to this remote area and only few members have cars, which makes the community not only geographical, but also social isolated from the rest of the society. Furthermore, due to the minimum of resources within the community the isolation is reinforced by the lack of telecommunication, which all make the Spitzkoppe community at some point unavailable to the rest of the society.

The lack of resources together with the geographical and social isolation of the Spitzkoppe community make it extremely difficult for the community to gain access to important and more extensive resources outside of the community within the broader socio-economic context, where the distribution of wealth and resources are extremely skewed. Though, the opportunities exist for entering into joint ventures agreements with the private sector enterprises, which have the business, tourism and financial expertise, but lack the natural resources in forms of land and game, it is rather unlikely, seeing that private sector have low regards for communities as business people. It is therefore not surprisingly that the Spitzkoppe community only is able to link itself to other larger, but similarly organisations such as the NACOBTA and the//Gaingu Conservancy, in the

sense of being community based organisations and having also limited resources to serves its members, in this case Spitzkoppe community with the necessary funding, management skills in terms of business, tourism and financial expertise. The linkage of Spitzkoppe then can therefore be characterised as very weak with limited resources available within the community's network.

A SUMMERARY OF THE SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY'S BOTTOM-UP DEVELOPMENT

After having described and analysed the Spitzkoppe community's social integration and linkage one can conclude that neither its social integration nor its linkage are particularly high or strong.

The main reason for the community's low social integration is the lack of strong formal, local and social organisation within the community that reduces the people's ability to draw on social nurturing ties within their community. The lack of strong formal, local and social organisation has also led to tensions and mistrust within the community, which makes it difficult to nurture the few existing resources within the community, and moreover create new ones. Whereas, the main reasons for the community's weak linkage is the community's lack of physical, human and financial resources and the community's geographical and social isolation, which puts the community in a rather low position within the broader socio-economic context, making it extremely difficult for the community to link itself to more extensive resources outside of the community.

The low degree of both forms of social capital can be related to the underdevelopment that marks the settlement area of Spitzkoppe, which makes it extremely difficult for the community to make use of its social capital to move out poverty. Meaning that it is not easy for Spitzkoppe community to develop based only on the few resources within the community, especially when these are not being nurtured and the prospects of fostering new ones within the community are minimal. Investments therefore need to be made in the community's housing and infrastructure, facilities and education along with a strengthening of the community's organisational capacity, assistance with the training of management skills and environmental practises, but also assistance with the extension of the community's linkage in order to enable the community to create nurturing social ties within and outside of the community. Put in another way, the Spitzkoppe community is depending entirely on private donors and not least the Namibian state to ensure its bottom-up development, which leads us to the description of the Namibian state's state-

society relations i.e. the relation between Erongo Regional Council and Spitzkoppe community and the Namibian state.

THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS

THE ERONGO REGIONAL COUNCIL

Namibia, as mentioned earlier, is divided into 13 regions, which each has a Regional Council. The Erongo Regional Council consists of 7 elected Councillors (one for each constituency in the region)¹⁶ with the overall aim to view and coordinate the different development programmes and plans within the region coming from the National Planning Commission (NPC), Line Ministries (sector ministries and field directorates), Local Authorities, Traditional Leaders, Regional Council itself and its own regional office, which is placed in Swakopmund (Töttemeyer 1997:7). Apart from this the Erongo Regional Council, due to the "Decentralisation Policy", is to undertake a range of functions from Line Ministries as well as assist the Local Authority in the exercise of its duties and functions (Regional Council Act 1992:37). The Council is also responsible for the areas in the region, which are situated outside the Local Authority's areas, and left without such. In these areas provisions should be made for the management, control and regulation of matters regarding the health and welfare of the people living in these areas (Regional Council Act 1992:41). It is the Council's responsibility to establish a local council/government in these areas and proclaim them as formal settlement areas, and if the development is progressing, upgrade these areas to towns and thereafter municipalities (Regional Council Act 1992:42).

At the moment Erongo Regional Council is responsible for the development and administration of following settlements/communities: Otjimbingwe, Okombahe, Omatjete, Tubusis, including Spitzkoppe.

THE REGIONAL PLANNING

The "Decentralisation Policy" which was launched on the 30th of March 1998 introduced the idea of the regional planning. The general thought concerning Regional Councils and regional planning was to have a political body setting the national standards and implementing national policies at the regional and local level, but at the same time accommodating regional priorities and local ideas (MRLGH 1997:44). In order to

¹⁶ Erongo region comprises 6 constituencies, but because Walvis Bay is divided into rural and urban, 7 Councillors have been elected.

accommodate these inputs in the regional planning, a range of committees were established to include the participation of the people living in the municipalities, towns (townships) and settlement areas.

Regional planning from the bottoms starts with the Settlement Committee (SC), the lowest political level in Namibia. The SC consists of the officer in charge of the settlement, the Traditional Leaders, representatives of each Line Ministries (from the sector ministry) and five members of the community (MRLGH 1998:53). The Councillor guides the SC and the general purpose of the committee is to ensure effective coordination of the administration and development of the settlement. The SC has several functions formulated by the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing (MRLGH):

- a) To draw the attention of the Councillor or the Executive Regional Officer¹⁷ to any matter that rouses their concern or interest or relating to the management and administration of the settlement/community.
- b) To facilitate the establishment of a community – based management information system in the area.
- c) To resolve problems identified at that level.
- d) Identify, assess and evaluate community need/problems to be considered for development plans by the Regional Council.
- e) Initiate, encourage, support and participate in community self-help projects and mobilise people, material, financial and technical assistance in relation thereto.
- f) To assist in the maintenance of law, order and security.
- g) To serve as a communication channel between the regional constituency and the people in the area.
- h) To generally monitor the delivery of services within its area and report to regional constituency (the Constituency Development Committee (CDC)).
- i) To carry out any function that may be assigned to it by the regional constituency.
- j) To carry out any other function which law or incidental to above may impose.

¹⁷ The Executive Regional Officer is elected and is the Officer in charge of the Regional Office, which works for the Regional Council.

It is in these SCs that the people living in the communities in the settlement areas have the opportunity to participate in the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of development projects, and thereby influence their own destiny. The SC is to report to the CDC, which is the level above. The CDC is responsible for the effective coordination of the planning and development of the region at the constituency level. The committee consists of the chairman, the Councillor, two recognised Traditional Leaders, representations of NGOs, CBOs, government services (head of the sector ministries), two members representing the youth and 2-3 members of the SC (MRLGH 1998:47).

The functions of CDC do not differ much from the SC's, it just operates at the constituency level (MRLGH 1998:46-48). The CDC is to identify and assess community needs/problems, but in relations to the constituency development plans and capital projects. The CDC is supposed to prioritise and prepare the inputs of the SCs in relation to the regional planning and submit these to the Regional Council. The CDC is also functioning as the main communication channel between the Regional council and the people in the constituencies, where the people living in the settlement areas are represented, partly through the Councillor and the 2-3 members of the SC.

The next political level is the Regional Council, where the Councillors meet monthly to discuss the current situation in their constituencies and present different needs/problems in the region. Follow the implementation and evaluation of different development projects is also on the agenda at these meetings. However, it is the Regional Development Coordinating Committee (RDCC), which task is to coordinate the overall regional development planning and coordination. The RDCC consists of the Executive Regional Officer, who is the chairman of the committee, heads of the Line Ministries departments in the region, one designated member of each local authority in the region, one representative of NGOs and CBOs operating in the region and for the annual planning two members from each recognised authority in the region (MRLGH 1998:45).

The RDCC consults the National Planning Commission (NPC)¹⁸, Line Ministries, Regional office and Local Authorities when drafting the regional plan, which is to be approved by the Regional Council. In the process of making this draft the different community groups, private sector, NGO's, CBOs and Traditional Leaders will be advisory. The functions of the RDCC are similar to the SC and the CDC, but operating at the regional level. The RDCC can be considered as a secretariat for the Regional Council,

¹⁸ The National Planning Commission is responsible for national planning and funding.

which purpose is among other things to prepare and evaluate development projects and plans for the region for the Regional Council, coordinate the development planning and integrate all the development projects from the CDCs in the regional planning. Furthermore, supervise/oversee the implementation of the already approved development plans by the central government or the Regional Council (MRLGH 1998:46). The regional planning is illustrated underneath.




Figure 6. Regional development planning.

The local communities are therefore first and foremost represented in the SCs, where five members of the community and the Traditional Leaders among others constitute the committee. It is in this forum that the local people, through their members of community and the Traditional Leader, have the opportunity to view their opinions or draw attention to matters concerning the daily management and administration of the community

More importantly, the local community can in this committee identify, assess and evaluate community needs/problems to be considered for development plans by the Regional Council, and thereby the participate and to some extent influence their future development. The suggestions for development plans are then reported to the CDC, where 2-3 members of the SC are presented along with the two recognised Traditional Leaders to advocate for the people. Together with all the other inputs, the Councillor reports these suggestions to the monthly council meeting, as well as the current situation in the constituency. At this level the Councillor is the spokesperson for the people in the

settlements, however he/she is also advocating for the whole constituency, but also the Regional Council represents the settlement since it has the legal responsibility for these.

This way the people living in the settlements areas have several of possibilities or channels by which they can participate in the regional planning such as the SCs, Traditional Leaders (who are represented in all regional levels), Councillors, the Regional Council and its office.

THE CURRENT SITUATION OF ERONGO REGIONAL PLANNING

The establishment of the SCs in the rural settlement areas, with few exceptions, is far from complete due to nomadic lifestyle and tribal conflicts (Interview with the Councillor of Walvis Bay Rural constituency 2000:1; Interview with the Councillor of Karibi constituency 2000:2). In the case of Spitzkoppe, the SC has not been established the way that the MRGLH have lined out above, which means that there is no official or regular forum, where the Spitzkoppe community can participate in the development planning of their community (Interview with the Councillor of Daures constituency 2000:1). None of the above listed functions of the SC are therefore carried out in the Spitzkoppe community. The Spitzkoppe community is still being represented, at the regional constituency level and at the Regional Council level, through their Traditional Leaders and Councillor. However, a number of members are of the opinion that the community is not being very well represented in the Erongo Regional Council (UraMin Namibia 2008:223).

The lack of establishment of the SCs also influences the work and meaning of the CDCs, which compared to the SCs are rather well-established (Interview with the Chief Clerk of Settlement Areas 2000:3). It is difficult for the CDCs to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the development plans, when the SCs are not reporting back to the CDCs, which equally makes it difficult to prepare and evaluate development plans and projects for the constituency to submit to the Erongo Regional Council. Furthermore, the task of coordinating and monitoring projects and activities undertaken by the government, government agencies, Regional Councils, Local Authorities, NGOs and CBOs in the area is also considered rather difficult, as the sector ministries and the Local Authorities not always are as formative as wished (Interview with the Chief Clerk of Settlement Areas 2000:2). The CDCs are therefore far from attending all the functions intended by the MRLGH, including being the main communication channel between the local communities such as Spitzkoppe and the Erongo Regional Council.

The situation of the SCs and the CDCs also affects the function of the RDCC, which main job of coordinating the development planning – integrating all development proposals from the different parties: CDCs, Regional Council and office, Traditional Leaders, Line Ministries (sector ministries and field directorates) and the Local Authorities – is not taking place (Interview with the Erongo Regional Executive Officer 2000:1). The official structure of the RDCC as illustrated earlier it not working, instead, two or three different informal structures have generated, which is not only confusing, but also difficult to operate within. The blurred structure of the RDCC is due to the lack of communication, especially between the units of the government, namely the Line Ministries, Regional Office and the Local Authorities. The Line Ministries have their own procedures, and they do not often include or inform the Regional Office in their planning. They are still to some extent serving under the government and believe that they are not responsible to the Regional Councils (Hopwood 2005:12). The same goes for the Local Authorities, meaning that it often happens that the Line Ministries and Local Authorities have their future plans, as well as the means in terms of personnel and financial resources to realise these plans, which makes it difficult to split these well-established structure and incorporate them into the regional planning (Interview with the Councillors of Walvis Bay Rural constituency 2000:5).

The current structure of the RDCC therefore makes rather it impossible to integrate any development proposals coming from the SCs, CDCs and the Traditional Leaders, as well as those from the Regional Council and Regional Office, in the general planning. Most of the general planning is at some point is still being conducted by the, Line Ministries and the Local authorities, where the planning of the non-urban areas is left to the Regional Council, which compared to the other government units has little personnel and financial resources to left such a task (Hopwood 2005).

As a result of the current situation of Erongo regional planning, there exist no concrete plans for the future development of the Spitzkoppe community. The community has received no direct funding since the independence back in the late 1980s, neither from the Regional Council nor the government (UraMin Namibia 2008:223).

THE NAMIBIAN STATE

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT

The government of Namibia consists of three tiers. The first tier consists of the President (and his Cabinet) and the bicameral parliament, which consists of the National Assembly and the National Council. The 13 Regional and the Local Authorities respectively constitute the second and the third tier of the government structure (MRLGH 1997:34-36). The intention was to have cooperative governance thus sharing governance at all levels (Töttemeyer 2007:9). However, despite of this government structure, the Namibian government structure can still be characterised as central planning (Hopwood 2005; Töttemeyer 2007).

The Regional Council Act was passed back in 1992 and 13 Regional Councils were established, but during these last fifteen years Regional Councils have gained very little meaningful power in terms of political, personnel and financial powers (Hopwood 2005:2). Though, the Act states that the Regional Councils are responsible for planning the development of the regions, they have only been given advisory powers so far (Hopwood 2007:173). The successful implementation of RDCCs, CDCs and SCs has therefore been rather sporadic although much groundwork has been done by the MRLGH, the ministry responsible for the decentralisation, with the launch of the “Decentralisation Policy” in 1998, which have been given legal force through a series of new laws introduced in 2000, most notably the Decentralisation Enabling Act (Hopwood 2005:2 and 13). The Act entails a clear division of responsibilities and procedures between the government units, and not least the transfer of financial powers to the Regional Councils, which so far have depended entirely on the national development budget (Drake and Mukwena 2000:35). The Regional Councils looked forward to this Act and anticipated that the process of decentralisation would speed up, but nothing has really changed. The staff structure of the Regional Councils has been expanded and they have their own tax income, but many Line Ministries have yet to submit their Development Action Plans (Hopwood 2007:181).

The overall planning therefore still comes from the central government, namely its Line Ministries, which from the beginning of the decentralisation process have been against transferring (their) powers to the Regional Councils. The result is that no ministry has decentralised in terms of the legal framework set down (Hopwood 2005:10). This view

has also been shared by leading politicians, who consider Regional Councils as a 'political' experiment, which one day will be abolished (Hopwood 2005:1).

THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL OBJECTIVES

The lack of decentralisation has resulted in many of the political and developmental objectives of the Namibian government have not been achieved as planned. First of all, the political objective of enhancing and guaranteeing democratic participation of the people at the lower/grass root level to achieve sustainable democratic development is far from being realised. Secondly, different developmental objectives formulated in the National Development Plan 2 by the NPC¹⁹ such as create employment; reduce inequalities in income distribution; reduce poverty; reduce regional development inequalities; promote gender equality and equity; and promote economic empowerment in Namibia are far from being accomplished, when parts of the government units are not functioning, which are responsible for the most disadvantaged people living in Namibia. The existence of entrenched poverty, chronic unemployment and widespread inequalities are proofs of the lack of institutional capacity at the regional level as well as most of the local level²⁰ (NDP 2, 2002-2006).

Then, regarding the specific developmental objectives for Erongo region stated in the National Development Plan 2, which are listed underneath as:

- diversify economic activity through value-adding to fisheries, mining and agricultural outputs,
- support self-empowerment in the secondary and tertiary sectors, maintain and improve the physical infrastructure of the region, especially in and to outlying areas, and
- develop, initiate and implement empowerment programmes for women and marginalised groups,

none of these development objectives have been fulfilled within their timeframe (2002-2006), due to the limited institutional capacity of Erongo Regional Council in terms of lack of funds, skills, infrastructure and coordination (UraMin Namibia 2008:194). It is

¹⁹ The NPC is responsible for planning the national priorities and directing the course of national development in Namibia.

²⁰ The local level is mostly lacking of intuitional capacity with a few exceptions like the Local Authority in Swakopmund and Windhoek.

therefore also rather questionable whether these developmental objectives will be achieved in the near future.

THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLITICS

The Namibian government is not only facing problems with fulfilling its own political and developmental objectives. Though, the Namibian government is all for (Office of the President 2004:174-5)

“[...] a functioning social-democratic framework, underpinned by a robust and sustainable system of equitable social provisioning for the basic needs of all citizens, in terms of, among others, education, health, housing, water sanitation, land etc.”

Corruption has time after time been revealed within the Namibian government and its intuitions, where government officials use their positions within the system to enrich themselves, which also serve as a protection of these officials (Staby 2007:13). Most of the corruption occurs, when there are more resources available and the where control are the weakest. According to the Namibian Institute of Democracy (NID), there have been 467 reported cases of corruption during the period of 1990-2004, but it is only major cases are being passed to the Anti-corrupt Commission by the Parliament, and there are still some reports of corruption that have never been released (Staby 2007:12-3). Annual expenditures – which year after year refer to circumstances of fraud, unauthorised expenditures, and plain theft – is approved by the Parliament (Staby 2007:14). Furthermore, it is no secret that there exists a high concentration of political power in the legislature, the personal powers of the President and the manner of patronage linkages that seems to primarily determine the appointments of persons in government, parastatals and other key institutions (Keulder 2007:18). Namibia recently was ranked as 55 out of 163 countries in the Corruption Perception Index of 2006, conducted by the Transparency International, with a score of 4.1 out of 10 points, which indicates that the Namibian government and its institutions have a corruption problem (Keulder 2007:18).

The problems of corruption do not only exist within the central government. Reports of corruption and maladministration have also been associated with the Local Authorities. The Regional Councils have likewise had their difficulties accounting for their expenditures in the years 1999-2003, which leaves a gap of 4-5 years (Hopwood2005:11). This also goes for the rest of the Namibian society, where a large part of the corruption reported implicates business people paying bribes to corrupt government officials

(Shaanika 2007:43). The way of doing politics and business in Namibia has deteriorated into a practice without much protest, which has infested the entire Namibia society (Staby 2007: 13 and 15).

This is how the Namibian state works in terms of its government structure, its steering and governing of political and developmental objectives and its ways of doing politics, which together with its regional planning constitute the foundation for its top-down development, where the state's ability to initiate top-down development depends on the extent and nature of its synergy and organisational integrity.

THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S TOP DOWN DEVELOPMENT

THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S SYNERGY

The Namibian state has rather limited state-society relations, especially the state's relation to the most disadvantaged people living in the rural communities. The main reason for the limited state-society relations is the lack of regional planning in the different regions. The government has launched the "Decentralisation Programme for Namibia" with the intention of bringing the government closer to the people and including them in the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of development projects, and thereby influences their own destiny. But also with the intention of having a political body that would set the national standards and implement national policies, including those concerning the development of the regions. Unfortunately, the successful implementation the regional structure in terms of establishing the different committees and the functioning of these is sporadic. In most of the regions in Namibia the regional planning is at a minimum, meaning first of all that the people not often are being included in the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of the different development projects in their communities. Secondly, the communities' opportunities to draw attention to their needs or problems that need to be considered in relation to future development plans are limited. Thirdly, there exist few government resources in terms of the regional offices, the different sector ministries and the field directorates, which the communities can draw on to initiate, encourage, support and participate in self-help projects and mobilise people, material, financial and technical assistance in relation thereto. The relation between the Namibian state and Namibian society is therefore far from strong. In other words, the Namibian state's synergy is low.

Especially weak is the relation between the state and the most disadvantaged people living in the rural settlement areas since they have no other authority than the Regional Council and its office to initiate, encourage and support their development as well as represent them, which means that when the regional planning not functioning the way it is suppose to, they are the ones with the least contacts to the different governments units. This is indeed the case of the Spitzkoppe community, where limited regional planning is taking place.

The Namibian state's low synergy is first and foremost caused by the lack of decentralisation, the transfer of political, personnel and finance powers from the central government to the lower government units, which has made the task of regional planning almost impossible for the Regional Councils to undertake and is unquestionably linked with the state's degree of organisational integrity.

THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRITY

The Namibian state has a very strong central government, the President (and his Cabinet), the National Assembly and the Line Ministries, who successfully have succeeded in stalling the decentralisation process for more than fifteen years, and thereby preventing the lower tiers of the government units from gaining any meaningful power, although legal provisions were made back in 2000 with the Decentralisation Enabling Act. No Line Ministry has yet decentralised in terms of the legal framework set down, and leading politicians within the Namibian central government are of the opinion that the Regional Councils are "political experiment", which some day will be abolished. This is not because the Namibian state initially does not believe in the vision of sustainable democratic development, but because decentralisation more than any thing means power sharing, which conflicts with the way of doing politics within the Namibian state.

It is not unusual that government officials use their positions within the government and its institutions for personal gains. This practice has been accepted by the Parliament (National Assembly, which has is the highest legislature of the two, other being the National Council), which year after year approves annual expenditures that refer to circumstances of fraud, unauthorised expenditure and plan theft. In fact, there exists a strong closed political elite that operates within the Namibian government close to the President (and his Cabinet), who determines the appointments of persons in government, parastatals and other key institutions, which are used for personal gains. This is the main for the strong reluctance towards the decentralisation of the Namibian government, which

the political elite due to its the strong ties within the central government has been able to prevent so far. The organisational integrity of the Namibian state can therefore be characterised as very high with a strong closed political elite that rules and steers the country in the wished direction, regardless of the official government's politics.

A SUMMARY OF THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S TOP DOWN DEVELOPMENT

After having described and analysed the Namibian state's synergy and organisational integrity one can conclude that the state has very low synergy, whereas its organisational integrity is very high.

The main reason for the Namibian state's very low synergy is the lack of the regional planning in most of its regions, where the establishment and functioning of the different committees are at a minimum, which makes it rather difficult for the people and their communities to influence participate in their own future development as well as draw on the different government resources to initiate, encourage and support their further development. Especially, the people and communities living the rural settlement are vulnerable since their development is left to the Regional Councils. The lack of regional planning comes from the lack of decentralisation, which is directly a consequence of the Namibian state's very high organisational integrity caused by a strong and closed political elite within the central government, whose interests is to keep the power and uses its social ties/powers to prevent any further form of decentralisation other than a symbolic one. Then, both the Namibian state's very low synergy and very high organisational integrity can be related to the strong and closed political elite within the central government, who so far has been able to rule and steer around the governments official policies. This of course weakens the Namibian state and its ability to achieve political as well as developmental objectives.

It is therefore extremely difficult for the Namibian state to initiate, sustain and institutional any top-down development, when the strong closed political elite, referring to the Namibian states too high organisational integrity, at the same time prevents the decentralisation of the Namibian government in terms of a well-functioning regional planning, referring to the state's very low synergy, which is necessary for achieving the different developmental objectives. In other words, to ensure the communities bottom-up development.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SPITZKOPPE COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL CAPITAL

After having described and analysed the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital in terms of the four capital forms, where social integration and linkage concern the community's bottom-up development, and where organisational integrity and synergy concern state's top-down development one can conclude that the community's prospects of making use of its social capital to move out of poverty are minimal.

This is first of all because the Spitzkoppe community is not capable to make use of its social capital to move out of poverty. The community's social integration is low and its linkage to other groups or organisations with resources also low. Meaning that the Spitzkoppe community has to base its economic development on the few existing resources within the community, which is rather difficult when these are not being nurtured and the prospects of fostering new ones within the community are limited. Secondly, because the Namibian state is not able to initiate, sustain and institutionalise development at the community level. The state's too high organisational integrity prevents the state from having the high degree of synergy that is necessary to ensure development at the community level. Meaning that Namibian state has a strong closed political elite within its government, who uses its social ties/powers to prevent the state from decentralising and having a well-functioning regional planning, which makes it impossible to initiate any development at the community level. Then, without the Namibian state to initiate, sustain and institutionalise the development in Spitzkoppe, the community's prospects for making use of its social capital to move out of poverty are highly reduced. This combination of the four forms of social capital is quite unfortunately, where there is hardly any linkage or synergy between the community and the state to connect the two. The development of Spitzkoppe community is left entirely to the community itself and the state is allowed to lead rent-seeking policies instead of developmental policies.

The Spitzkoppe community's limited personal and intuitional relations, the lack of social capital, are directly linked with the structure of the Namibian state, the nature and extent of its involvement with the civic life and the organisation of the Namibian society, which has been influenced by the existing social, cultural, economic and political features within the Namibian society that emerged historically (see figure 6. The historical setting of Namibia). These are the main reasons for Spitzkoppe community's lack of social capital,

which leads to a description of the historical setting of Namibia followed by an analysis of how these different features have influenced the nature and extent of Spitzkoppe community's social capital.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF NAMIBIA

THE COLONISATION OF NAMIBIA

In 1884 Germany occupied Namibia (at that time known as South West Africa), which ruled the country with its military, where parts of the indigenous people was forced to out of their traditional areas in the process of seizing farmland, most notorious during the 1904-07 war against the Herero and the Nama/Damara people (Hopwood 2005:3). The German colonial rule ended rather suddenly with alliance military defeat in 1915 in World War I. South Africa, which represented the allied forces, took over the territory and continued practice of forcing and restricting the indigenous people to native reserves. In 1962 South Africa established the Odendaal Commission, which recommended dividing Namibia along racial and ethnic lines into so-called homelands or Bantustans due to the apartheid thinking of the time (Pisani 1986:53). Namibia was afterwards divided into eleven homelands, partly through forced removal of communities, which was more or less central governed by the South African government, though being entitled to limited selected power. An administrator, who had the sole authority to rule the homeland with the assistance of the Advisory Council, administered these homelands. These were all of course white people, and the white minority dominated the Local Authorities and alone benefited from these institutions (Töttemeyer 2000:95).

The country and its indigenous people have had a rather painful history of military colonial rule followed by a period of racism and apartheid, which lasted all up till 1988 (Hopwood 2005:5). Making Namibia the last African country to gain its independence.

SWAPO AND THE INDEPENDENCE

It was during the South African rule in 1960 that the liberation movement, South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), was formed. In 1966 the movement launched an armed struggle for the independence of Namibia. Throughout the years SWAPO consistently campaigned for Namibia to become an independent unitary state and opposed the policy of setting up homelands through the popular slogan "One Namibia, One Nation" (Hopwood 2005:3). It took a century of colonial occupation and a 23 year

liberation war before Namibia could claim its independence in 1988, when South Africa withdrew from Namibia and allowed a United Nations peace plan to be implemented (Hopwood 2005:4). After the independence SWAPO transformed in to political party and won the first democratic election in 1989. Though, SWAPO started out as a liberation movement the political affiliation to SWAPO was demographical counting most of the Oshivambo-speaking population in the northern regions Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto supported the party, which made up a little over 50% of the total population in Namibia favoring the party (Töttemeyer 2000:105). SWAPO soon turned out not to differ from the others single rule parties in Africa wanting to keep the power within the members. During the draft of the Constitution of Namibia members of SWAPO were in favor of promoting their own interests in terms of political power and material rewards (Töttemeyer 2005:100). In fact, many in the ruling party stated that democratic rights should be defined accordingly to the interests of the ruling party. However, SWAPO did not win the two-thirds majority that would have enabled the party to write the Constitution on its own (Hopwood 2005:4). The opposition, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which earlier dominated the legislative assemblies of the homelands authorities, was of course against this and a provision was made for the insitutionalisation and implementation of the decentralisation (Hopwood 2005:4). The institution of regions and Regional Councils was therefore a compromise between DTA and SWAPO, which most of all feared that Namibia would become a federation, where self-governing regions were operating under a central government, and where the governing powers of the regions were usually constitutionally entrenched, which could not easily be overridden by the central government. Whereas a unitary state was run by a centralised, national government and any decentralised powers, responsibilities and functions could be revoked by the central government (Hopwood 2005:4)

SWAPO AND THE TIME AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE

SWAPO has dominated every election – at local, regional and national levels – since independence, and since 1994 the party has held a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, giving it the power to change the Constitution (Hopwood 2005:4). This was done in 2000, when the President Sam Nujoma was obliged to leave the office after a maximum of two legislative periods of five years each. The National Assembly provided the exception to rule and entitled the President to rule a third period not by the virtue of his being elected by the Namibian voters, but through an election of by the members of the Constitutional Assembly (Melber 2006:98)

After the independence members of SWAPO still believed in all power to the party, where government had to be based on clan politics, party patronage and economic of affection, which during the years have increased as the party has become more powerful, but also due to the growing public service, an abundance of natural resources (and the possibility of misuse through the allocation of rights and concessions, high tax burdens and a administration system that is becoming more discretionary, and the prospect of several very large public sector investments projects (Staby 2007:18). Making SWAPO the very definition of the clan phenomenon.

These above described features are all somehow reflected in the structure of the Namibian state, the nature and extent of Namibian state's involvement in civic life and the organisation of Namibian society, which have influenced these in a certain way, which will analysed below.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NAMIBIAN STATE

The strong centralised structure of the Namibian state is first of all due to the colonisation of Namibia followed by the apartheid rule of South Africa, which divided Namibia into eleven homelands based on racial and ethnic lines that functioned as local governments, but of course was central governed. So, when the liberating movement became ruling party after the independence it did everything to avoid decentralisation, because it reminded the liberating movement/party of the apartheid rule. SWAPO not surprisingly won the first election after the independence and with SWAPO as the ruling party, a clan ruled Namibia with its clan and patronage politics wanting all power to the party. SWAPO dominance in the Namibian government has resulted in a strong centralised structure, where a strong closed political elite of SWAPO party members placed in the highest positions uses their social ties/powers for personal gains, which has been able to rule and steer around the official government policies.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE NAMIBIAN STATE'S INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIC LIFE

The Namibian state's involvement in the civic life is also strong related to the colonisation and not least the single rule party SWAPO. After a century of colonial occupation with a centralised government that suppressed and discriminated the indigenous people, the new government did have any experience with democracy and SWAPO being the liberating force of the country was only interested in rewarding its members after 23 years of fighting for independence. Furthermore, as the party associated

the decentralisation of the government with the apartheid rule, SWAPO has done everything in its power since the independence to stall the process of decentralisation. This means that Namibia's political institutions that have the potential to be the closest to the people and ensure improvements at the community level are not functioning affecting the nature and the extent of the Namibian state's involvement in civic life greatly.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE NAMIBIAN SOCIETY

There is no doubt that Namibia's colonial past have heavily influenced the organisation of the Namibian society, where indigenous people for a century were suppression, discrimination and inequality has been practiced and even divided into racial and ethnic lines that makes Namibia a very differentiated society in very way, which has been reinforced by SWAPO and its clan and patronage politics. Today, Namibian has a extremely skewed wealth distribution, where an estimated 55% of national income accrues to only 10% of the population and where underdevelopment is a significant problem of rural areas of Namibia in form of housing and infrastructure, schools, clinics, post offices, supply of electricity, telecommunications and banking facilities lacking. This means that not all groups/communities have the same access to the same resources, resulting in an uneven distribution of social capital as well as an uneven access to it. These aspects of social capital are increased, as the poor people are often not nearly as organised as the non-poor people. Lastly, there is the prevailing patronage practice within the Namibian state, which have been legitimised by the ruling party SWAPO is also reflected in the Namibia society, where a large part of the corruption reported implicates business people paying bribes to corrupt government officials.

Then, the two main reasons for the Spitzkoppe community's limited personal and intuitional relations, its lack of social capital, are the colonisation of Namibia and the ruling party SWAPO and all that they have brought with them.

CONCLUSION

In 2001 the World Bank adopted the concept of social capital and linked it to poverty reduction in the Third World. The World Bank launched social capital as a major poverty reduction strategy based on the assumption that social relationships, networks, organisations and associations constitute a unique, vitally important resource that poor people/poor communities can make use of to move out of poverty, because they along with the trust and norms that hold them together connect people to each other, and thereby enable people to act collectively and mobilise greater resources to achieve common goals.

In the case of the small poor rural community in living in Spitzkoppe in Erongo region, Namibia, this has not been the case. Instead, the case of Spitzkoppe community illustrates, how difficult it is for a poor community to make use of its social capital in terms of its social relationships, networks, memberships of organisations and associations to move out of poverty, when these are neither particular strong nor extensive. In fact, there exists only one community based association the SCDA in Spitzkoppe community, which have been plagued by infighting, political agendas, mismanagement and poor environmental practice and does not generate any profit. The social groups/networks within the community amount to a youth group, a women's group and a choir. There is no formal organisation in the community form of a Settlement Committee, only in form of the Traditional leaders. The Spitzkoppe community is a member in the NACOBTA and the//Gaingu Conservancy, but both have limited resources within them of which the community can benefit from and at the moment Spitzkoppe community has no concrete projects with neither of these. The two organisations make up for the community's entire social network outside of the community. This means that Spitzkoppe community has to base its economic development on the few existing resources within the community with no prospects of fostering new ones within the community. The prospects for using its social capital to move out of poverty are therefore minimal.

The main reason for the Spitzkoppe community's lack of social capital is its entire social network's low social location in the Namibian society, which is extremely differentiated and where especially the poor groups/communities do not have the same access to the same resources, resulting in an uneven distribution of social capital as well as an uneven access to it. Namibia still suffers from its colonial inheritance of Germany military rule and the apartheid rule in terms of discrimination, inequality, and exclusion of the civil

society in political matters as the ruling party SWAPO has reinforced these. SWAPO is in every a clan with its clan and patronage politics wanting to keep all power to the party, which has increased during the 19 years of ruling Namibia and in that process also has prevented development in rural areas of Namibian to avoid the decentralisation of the government.

Then, in the case of Spitzkoppe community the existence of; (1) widespread, increasing and legitimised ethnic inequalities; (2) entrenched poverty; (3) chronic unemployment; (4) weak, unjust, flaunted uniform law; (5) dominant and subordinated groups who have little shared stake in common outcomes and (6) minorities who are overtly discriminated against in the society makes it extremely difficult for the community to make use of its social capital to move out of poverty.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION

The case of Spitzkoppe community's leads us to the questions about whether social capital is an efficient poverty reduction strategy, and whether social capital is relevant to poverty reduction. Starting with the efficiency of social capital as a poverty reduction strategy, which as illustrate in the case of Spitzkoppe community depends on so many different factors ranging from the community's geographical placement to weak, unjust, flaunted uniformed laws making it very difficult to steer and control the outcome of such a strategy. Making social relations and networks a highly problematic resource to use in terms of poverty reduction i.e. economic development. Furthermore, if social capital were to be an efficient poverty reduction strategy some of the prevailing social, cultural, political and economic features constituting the main reasons that indirectly have affected Spitzkoppe community's lack of social capital would in principle have to altered. This could take some time seeing that these are deeply rooted in the society making social rather inefficient considering the much more efficient redistribution policies.

The relevance of social capital as a poverty reduction strategy depends on the whether the poor people/communities are able to make use of their social capital to move out of poverty in the sense that they can link themselves to other groups of organisations that have more extensive resource and connections that becomes available to the poor people/communities to use. However, this depends on their social location within the society in terms of first and foremost their resources as they are expected to contribute with some kind of resource, whether it be material or non-material. By the definition the poor people/communities may not have much to offer in the way of material resources to

any non-poor network, and their non-material resources may not be much appreciated by the non-poor, which makes it rather difficult to make that link as in the case of Spitzkoppe community. Then, for the poor people/communities such as Spitzkoppe to use their social capital to move out of poverty, they need to have a certain type and amount of resource valuable to non-poor, which makes social capital as a poverty reduction strategy less relevant. Meaning that it is highly unlikely that poor people/communities can use their social capital, as an instrument to achieve economic development given that they have to have resources in order to gain more. Then, as illustrated in case of the Spitzkoppe community social capital as a poverty reduction strategy social capital may not be the most efficient or relevant strategy compared to basic redistribution measures, investments in health and education and the extensions of citizen rights.

However, that does not mean that efforts to increase the social capital of the poor should not be intensified, but for different other purposes. It is necessary to mobilise the poor people if any changes in their living conditions are to occur. It is necessary to make the poor people part of the political life for their voices to be heard and for democracy to develop. It is necessary to open up and let poor people into civil society if they are to become part of society at large. It is necessary to increase the social capital is civil conflicts are to be avoided. For all these reasons, it is vital for poor people that their social capital is increased and over time, and in conjunction with a whole set of other strategies, such as the redistribution of major resources, social capital may lead to poverty reduction.

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