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The influence of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on migration in the Mediterranean region

HANNA-MAIJA SAARINEN
Master Thesis, European Studies
Supervisor: Per Lunde
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AALBORG UNIVERSITY
May 2008

Keywords: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Union, migration, Morocco
Statement of authenticity

This paper represents my original work. All sources used to prepare this paper are properly cited, and I have not submitted this paper or significant elements thereof at an earlier occasion.

Frederiksberg, 2 May 2008

Hanna-Maija Saarinen
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab-Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CARIM</td>
<td>The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategic Paper</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EuroMeSCo</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
<td>European Police Office (European Union law enforcement organisation)</td>
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<td>Eurostat</td>
<td>Statistical Office of the European Communities</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership</td>
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<td>Frontex</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Moroccan dirham</td>
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<td>MEDA</td>
<td>Mesures d’Ajustement</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MPC</td>
<td>Mediterranean partner country</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-sized Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia</td>
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<td>TEMPUS</td>
<td>Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed major changes in the geo-political environment in the world and the end of the Cold War resulted in political restructuring in the areas surrounding the European Union. At the same time, attention was directed away from the Cold War and to new possible security risks. In this context, the attention of especially the South European countries was focused on the Southern borders of the European Union, where the rise of Islamic militancy and the civil war in Algeria were increasing the fears of the South Europeans of what was called “the apparent threat of massive ‘south-north’ migration into Western Europe from the Third World, particularly from the Maghreb\(^1\), with sensationalist newspaper headlines warning of an impending ‘migrant invasion’”.\(^2\)

The end of the Cold War had directed the external relations orientation of the European Union strongly eastwards, especially under the pressure of the newly unified Germany. This eastwards balance resulted in concerns from the part of the southern Member States, who felt that the attention of the EU should be directed to the South, and especially to Maghreb, because of “fears of immigration from the South, and of xenophobia in the North, perceived security threats arising from the South, such as terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, and anxiety arising from the growth of Islamic Fundamentalism.”\(^3\) Migration turned out to be not only one of the threats, but a useful bargaining tool for the Southern EU Member States to convince Germany and the other Member States that did not share the immediate interests and concerns of the South, about the need to concentrate more attention on the security and stability in the Mediterranean. The message from the South was that increased activities were needed to improve growth prospects in the Maghreb, because without further action, all the Member States would experience an increase in the levels of immigration.\(^4\)

This new way of seeing migration from a security-point of view was connected to the change in the security paradigm at the end of the Cold War, where security was beginning to be seen not

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\(^1\) Referring to the regional grouping of Maghreb is rather common in the literature on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Maghreb has traditionally referred to the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, but since the creation of the Arab-Maghreb Union in 1989, the concept of Maghreb usually also includes Libya and Mauritania. Source: Maghreb. Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia.


\(^3\) Adler 2001. Emanuel Adler is known for adapting Karl Deutsch’s theory on Security Communities, through which he has been attached to the constructivist theory of international relations. He is Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto.


7
only as a state of being safe from military threats, but more comprehensively from threats against economy, culture, identity and environment. For example, Barry Buzan has divided security into five different sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. The threat perceived by the EU Member States to be coming from the South was not connected to military security, but more in an all-encompassing way to the broader socio-economic issues in the Mediterranean countries, giving rise to the possible “invasion of migrants”. Why was it that the EU Member States saw “an invasion of migrants” as a threat to their security? How and why did migration become a security issue?

It seems that the Southern EU member states were successful in their attempts to bring the issues related to the Mediterranean neighbours into the attention of the rest of the Member States by “playing the security-card”. In 1994, the Corfu European Council gave the Council and the Commission the task of evaluating the then EU’s Mediterranean policy by “jointly examining political, economic and social problems”. As a result of this evaluation, the Commission proposed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was due to the multiple areas of interdependence between the North and the South to be multidimensional in its nature. The EMP, also known as the Barcelona Process, was launched at the Barcelona Conference on 27-28 November 1995 by the Foreign Ministers of the then fifteen Member States of the European Union and twelve Mediterranean partner countries (MPC). The objective of the EMP is to create of the Mediterranean an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. The EMP follows in its design the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was created as the institutional part of the 1975 Helsinki Model, facilitating “conciliation between East and West regarding issues of security, economic cooperation and humanitarian issues”. In a similar way,

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5 See: Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 7. Barry Buzan is an international relations scholar, working as Professor of International Relations at London School of Economics.


7 Biscop 2003, pp. 31-33. Sven Biscop is Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB). Since 2007-8, he is a visiting professor for European security at the College of Europe in Bruges.

8 The Mediterranean signatories of the Barcelona declaration are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya has had an observer status in EMP since 1999. The non-EU members of the EMP will hereinafter be referred to as the Mediterranean partner countries. See: Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27-28/11/95 (hereinafter called the Barcelona declaration); and European Commission: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Cyprus and Malta joined the European Union in 2004, leaving the number of Mediterranean partner countries to 10. As a very recent event it deserves to be mentioned that the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, organised in Lisbon, 5-6 November 2007, welcomed Mauritania and Albania to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

9 Barcelona declaration.

10 Pardo & Zemer 2005, pp. 41-42. Sharon Pardo is Director of the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Lior Zemer is law lecturer at the Radzyner School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.
the EMP is constructed of three different areas of cooperation: the political and security partnership, establishing a common area of peace and stability; the economic and financial partnership, creating an area of shared prosperity; and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs, developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.\footnote{Barcelona declaration.}

The Barcelona declaration, summarising the results of the Barcelona Conference, includes however a limited number of actions that deal directly with causes or consequences of migration. The participants acknowledged the importance of migration in the relationships between the partners and proposed to strengthen the cooperation in order to reduce migratory pressures for example through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. Furthermore, it was agreed to guarantee the protection of all the rights of the legal migrants. When it comes to illegal migration, it was only agreed to establish a closer cooperation in the field.\footnote{Ibid.} The work programme of the Barcelona declaration, however, gives a clear indication of the direction that the cooperation in this field was taking, by encouraging meetings between the partners a) in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures, and b) to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. An interesting comment with this regard is that it is suggested that a differentiated approach has to be applied taking into consideration the diversity of the situation in each country.\footnote{Ibid, Annex: Work programme.} Taking into account the limited number of actions included in the Barcelona declaration presented above, what were then the underlying causes and consequences of the migratory flows towards the EU that the Southern EU Member States wanted to manage through the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Furthermore, how has the EMP dealt with these causes and consequences since 1995?

It appears nevertheless that despite the fact that the Barcelona Declaration was signed more than 12 years ago, migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU is on the rise. This is the case for example in Morocco, which is together with Egypt one of the main countries of emigration in the Mediterranean region. The CARIM Mediterranean Migration Report 2006-2007 presents latest figures for migration from Morocco, which show that the number of Moroccans registered by the Moroccan consulates to be living abroad has doubled between the
past 12 years from 1.545 million in 1993 to 3.185 million in 2005. Furthermore, the emigration has not only continued, but it has rather accelerated in pace, which is shown by the same data from the Moroccan consulates, recording an increase in Moroccan population living abroad of 5.4% in 1993-1997, 5.9% in 1997-2002 and 7.0% in 2002-2005.\textsuperscript{14}

Simultaneously with the growth of legal migration from Maghreb towards the EU, also the illegal immigration has shown signs of sharp increase since the mid-1990s. As an indication of this, we can use the numbers of vessels intercepted and undocumented persons detained in Spanish waters between 1996 and 2003 (Table 1). Whereas the number of vessels intercepted almost tripled from 339 vessels in 1996 to 942 in 2003, the number of undocumented immigrants increased by more than tenfold from 1,573 in 1996 to 18,420 in 2003.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Vessels intercepted & 339 & 399 & 557 & 475 & 780 & 997 & n.a. & 942 \\
\hline
Persons detained & 1573 & 887 & 2995 & 3569 & 14,893 & 17,697 & 16,670 & 18,420 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Interceptions of vessels and undocumented immigrants in Spanish waters, 1996-2003}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{15} Lutterbeck 2006, p. 63. Derek Lutterbeck was a programme coordinator at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and has since 2006 worked as Deputy Director at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies on Malta.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

The increase in the number of illegal immigrants is not only considered a security problem for the receiving country, but it is also an increasing humanitarian problem on the level of personal security due to the high number of immigrants who die while attempting to make it to the European Union.\textsuperscript{16}

The increase in both legal and illegal migration has happened at the same time as the European Union has began to implement the Schengen Agreements turning the EU gradually into an area without internal borders (with the exception of UK and Ireland, as well as Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania). The possibility for free movement of people inside the EU has consequently led to a strengthened control of the external borders of the area. The incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Treaty of Amsterdam brought about common rules regarding conditions of entry...
and visa policy, crossing of external borders, freedom of movement and return policy. The nationals of all the Mediterranean partner countries are required to have a visa to enter the European Union.\textsuperscript{17} It seems that these unilateral, restricting actions are in contradiction with the goal of the EMP to manage migration in a more comprehensive way. Are the interests of the European Union with regard to migration in coherence with the goals and activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and with the interests of the Mediterranean partner countries?

On the basis of the above illustration, we have decided to base the research in this paper upon the following twofold problem formulation:

\textbf{To what extent has the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership influenced migration in the Mediterranean region, and why?}

2 METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, we go deeper into the research methods that will be used in this paper by firstly narrowing our problem formulation down into three different working hypotheses that will indicate the main direction for our research. Moreover, we will present the framework for our research by first explaining the aim of this study and subsequently by describing the different chapters of the thesis, beginning from the theoretical framework and continuing through the empirical parts of the study and the case study on Morocco. Finally, we will conceptualise some of the main terms that will be submitted to analysis in this paper, such as migration, in order to create more overall coherence to the thesis and to give an idea of how we define the different concepts.

2.1 Hypotheses

The above considerations about the increasing migratory flows from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, especially from the Maghreb countries, suggest together with the growing concerns about illegal migration that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is in its current form not able to deal comprehensively with the causes and consequences of migration in the Mediterranean. Hence, our hypotheses are based on the presumption that the EMP has been unsuccessful in its attempts to influence migration in the Mediterranean. Thus, rather than only discussing “to what extent” the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced the migratory developments in the Mediterranean region, we also go deeper into discussing “why” the extent of this influence has been such as it is. Below we will try to identify different hypotheses that could provide us with an answer to these considerations.

Firstly, as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to a large extent a cooperation modelled by the European Commission and the partners from the EU, it is possible that the underlying causes of migration in the countries of origin are not fully understood by the “architects” of the partnership. Furthermore, it is possible that the EU does not have a comprehensive understanding of the consequences (both positive and negative) that migration has on the countries of origin. This would indicate that the measures introduced for dealing with causes and consequences of migration within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are irrelevant and ineffective.
Secondly, we turn to the differing interests of the EU Member States and the Mediterranean Partners, when it comes to migration management. According to this hypothesis, the partners are indeed aware of the causes and consequences of migration in the area, and know, what should be done in order to deal with them. However, the interests of the EU Member States in relation to migration, on the one hand, are directed by their perception of migration as a security threat and the main goal for them is to restrict migration in order to diminish this threat. The Mediterranean partner countries, on the other hand, do not necessarily see migration as a negative phenomenon. It is thus possible that the policy makers in the Mediterranean partner countries do not cooperate fully with the EU partners in their attempt to diminish migration. For example the important share of remittances in the Maghreb-countries’ GDP can in fact make the governments of those countries wish for their nationals to migrate. Furthermore, emigration is expected to have a positive effect on the real wages and unemployment in the country of origin.\textsuperscript{18} Hence, it seems that the Euro-Mediterranean Partners have not succeeded in applying the differentiated approach to migration management, taking into consideration the diversity of the situation in each country, which was encouraged in the Barcelona declaration (see above).\textsuperscript{19} This hypothesis suggests thus that the contradicting interests of the different stakeholders (i.e. countries of origin and countries of destination) have made it difficult to deal with the causes and consequences of migration in a comprehensive manner within the multilateral framework of EMP.

Finally, it is possible that the causes and consequences of migration are well understood by the Euro-Mediterranean Partners, and decisions have been taken within the framework of the EMP that can influence migration in the Mediterranean, but that the implementation of these measures has not been carried out effectively. This could be caused by many different reasons such as lack of resources, lack of capacity, lack of skills or even lack of will from different stakeholders. This would suggest that we will find a number of activities within the EMP which have been decided upon, and which should address migration, but which do not show any results.

In short, the three different hypotheses that our research will be based on are:

a) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in the Mediterranean due to the lack of ability to comprehensively understand the causes and consequences of migration in the region, and thus tackling them with irrelevant and ineffective measures;

\textsuperscript{18} Testas 2001, p. 72. Abdelaziz Testas was at the time of article publication a lecturer in Economics at the Shandong Finance Institute, Jinan, China. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Leeds in 1997.

\textsuperscript{19} Barcelona declaration, Annex: Work programme.
b) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in the Mediterranean due to the inability to develop a comprehensive, common strategy, taking into account the complex variety of interests of the Mediterranean partner countries and the European Union;

c) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in the Mediterranean due to the lack of ability to effectively implement the decisions taken within the framework of EMP.

2.2 The framework for research

The aim of this thesis is to define, substantiate and explain the possible influence that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may have on migration in the Mediterranean. With migration we mainly mean migratory flows in the Mediterranean, and thus, whether the activities within EMP have influenced the migratory flows in one way or another. This is however not the only aspect presented in this thesis, because it is not only the migratory flows, but also the migration policies that develop and are influenced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The investigation of the influence of EMP on migration will be done by providing a critical assessment of the EMP, concentrating on the abilities of the EMP to deal with the causes and consequences of migration, both in the countries of origin and in the countries of destination, and on the interests of the countries of origin (Mediterranean partner countries) and the countries of destination (EU) with regard to migration. The thesis is structured as follows:

We will begin by presenting the theoretical considerations behind security and its connection to migration. Our theoretical part will concentrate on the exploration of the notion of security and the way in which it has come to be connected to migration. We will look at the way in which the concept of security has changed and how a new security paradigm emerged at the end of the Cold War, widening and deepening the security studies to cover multiple referent objects, apart from the traditional “state”, and different areas of security, apart from the military security.

Our main theoretical framework is based on the direction of security studies spoken for by the Copenhagen school, and especially by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. We will
present their concept of comprehensive security as a way to explain the widening of the security
paradigm. Furthermore, the concept of securitisation is examined in order to provide one way of
understanding why migration has become a security concern. Finally, we will examine the notion
of societal security, which suggests that migration has become a security threat because the
societies in the EU perceive it as a threat in identity terms. This means that the immigrants, who
arrive in the EU with their languages, cultures and religions, pose a threat to the society and its
identity. The ideas of the Copenhagen school will be balanced by the contradicting views of
different theorists, who for example argue that securitisation can turn out to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy, and issues that do not pose a security threat can become security threats when they are
presented as such. In the context of this study, this kind of an argument would thus suggest that
migration has only become a security issue, because the Southern EU Member States presented it
as such to the other Member States. Furthermore, the Copenhagen school’s argument of societal
security is questioned, because the traditionalist conception of society is rarely present in the
European Union; most Western European countries are already characterised by a certain level
of multiculturalism.21

The use of theories in this paper differs somewhat from a traditional theoretical analysis, in
which theories are used as a rather rigid support structure for the overall framework for the
research. In this paper, the main discussion concerning the relevance of the theories in our
context is already carried out in the chapter including the theoretical considerations on security.
We will however refer to the findings of this chapter when discussing the differing interests of
the EU Member States and the Mediterranean partner countries to managing migration, where
securitising migration is provided as an explanation to the interest of the EU Member States to
restrict migration from the MPC. A more open deliberation of the theoretical considerations is
thus used as an explanatory power to determining the usefulness of our hypotheses.

The core of this paper will be on a study of the impacts of migration to the countries of origin
and the countries of destination. The aim of this study is to identify the causes of migration in the
countries of origin and the consequences that migration has both to the countries of origin and
the countries of destination. This study aims to identify both advantages and disadvantages of
migration, whether in form of economic gains or losses or of demographic changes. This is done
in order to provide background data for examining what kind of measures the Euro-

21 See for example Huysmans 2000, p. 762. The contradictory views of Copenhagen school and, for example social-
constructivists are well presented in the discussion articles of McSweeney (1996 and 1998), Buzan and Wæver
Mediterraen Partnership should theoretically undergo in order to manage migration in a way that is satisfactory to all parties, but also to see whether the perception of migration as a threat to the countries of destination holds true when it comes to other aspects than societal identity.

We will then place the findings of this study in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and investigate in which ways the EMP aims at dealing with the identified causes and consequences of migratory flows in the Mediterranean. This will be done by presenting activities in the three different baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership relating to the causes and consequences of migration and by assessing whether they deal with the issues in a comprehensive way. This part of our paper moves the attention from the migratory flows towards the migration policies and to how the migratory policies within the EMP have developed, partly as a result of changes in the internal policies of the EU within this field.

To put the findings of this comparative study into practical context, we will conduct a small case study on the migration policies and migratory flows in Morocco. The goal of this case study is to present the changes in the patterns of migration from Morocco to the EU in the light of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In our case study on Morocco, we will study the developments in the field of migration with the help of a number of indicators, which mean “[observations] that we choose to consider as a reflection of a variable we wish to study”. These indicators will include: number of immigrants (both legal and illegal) from Morocco to the EU; demographic growth; remittances sent to Morocco by migrants; unemployment rate and poverty in Morocco; and finally economic growth, measured in GDP and GDP per capita. We will also present more specific programmes and projects that have been undertaken in Morocco within the framework of the EMP in order to directly or indirectly influence migration. The description of the projects will together with the indicators help us to see how well the EMP activities correspond to the causes and consequences of migration, and whether any development can be detected.

The empirical part will be followed by an analysis, which will place our findings in the context of our hypotheses in order to determine which one of them gives the most suitable explanation to our problem formulation. The analysis will be divided into two different parts, following the twofold construction of our problem formulation between “to what extent” the EMP has influenced migration, and “why”. The structure of the thesis is illustrated in the figure below:

22 Babbie 2007, p. 125.
2.3 Sources and limitations

The main sources used in this thesis will firstly be the basic documents related to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, such as the Barcelona declaration, the declarations from the subsequent ministerial meetings organised within the framework of the EMP and the Association Agreements signed with the Mediterranean partner countries. Special emphasis will be put on the documents describing the activities in the field of migration or having an effect on the issues relating to migration.

Statistics describing a number of indicators related to migration and the development of migratory flows will be used throughout the thesis. The main sources for these statistics are the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) and the Medstat-programme. There are a number of comments that it is important to make concerning these sources.

The Medstat-programme has as its goal to harmonise the statistical methods of the Mediterranean partner countries in line with European and international norms and standards.
Furthermore, the programme aims at improving compatibility of data in the MPC and the comparability of the data with the data from the EU and EFTA-countries. This is why the statistics collected within the framework of this programme are very relevant for this paper and provide a solid statistical background for investigating the indicators concerning migration. The statistics from the Medstat-programme will especially be used as indicators for economic development and demographic changes.

The main block of statistics in this paper concerns migration and migratory movements. CARIM has as one of its main tasks to collect statistics especially in this field, which is why these statistics form the core of our statistical data concerning migration. Thanks to their extensive database in the field of migration in the Mediterranean, we have also chosen not to collect any data through interviews or surveys about the implementation of the EMP in the field of migration. This database provides us with statistics that are up to date and reliable, and the studies conducted especially in Morocco cover a broad range of questions related to the causes and consequences of migration.

Statistics from OECD have in many occasions been included in order to supplement the data collected from Eurostat, Medstat or CARIM. Using the data from OECD presents us however with certain problems, especially due to the fact that not all Member States of the EU are members of OECD. This is why the data from OECD is only used in order to provide indications of trends and developments, but cannot as such be used when analysing the development of migratory flows in the Mediterranean. In addition to the statistics from OECD, a number of tables have been borrowed from academic literature, usually collected by the authors from various sources.

Furthermore, we have chosen to attempt to direct the research away from the main security issue in the Eastern parts of the Mediterranean, the conflict in the Middle East, even though we understand the importance of this conflict to the developments in the Mediterranean, especially when it comes to security. The conflict does affect the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, mostly by leading into difficulties when attempting to agree upon a common declaration on an issue or on measures to be taken. It is possible that the conflict in the Middle East has had an effect on the policies related to migration as well and we will keep this in mind when studying the available data.

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It is however our understanding that many aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, especially in the case of the third basket, are developing well despite of the conflict and we will try to evaluate the EMP keeping this in mind. This is why we have chosen to concentrate the study of the development of migration to the Western parts of the Mediterranean, and especially to Morocco. Morocco is furthermore chosen as the country for our case study because it is together with Egypt one of the main countries of immigration in the Mediterranean. What we have to consider, is that Morocco shares very close ties with France due to their colonial history and that Morocco is the only one of the Mediterranean partner countries to have applied for EU membership. This could indicate that its interests in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are not representative to the interests of the other Mediterranean partner countries. It would however be difficult to find another country that would better represent the interest of all the MPC due to the fact that the area is rather heterogeneous. Furthermore, due to the close relations of Morocco to the EU, we can presume that the developments seen in the field of migration with respect to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are most pronounced in Morocco and that the possible lack of developments in Morocco could indicate that the developments in the other MPC are even slower in character. Comparing two different MPC would have brought an interesting point of view to this paper, but taking into consideration the broadness of the topic, we chose to limit the scope of the paper rather by leaving one case study out.

2.4 Definitions

When it comes to definitions, it is often possible to recognise many differing views and ways of using different terms in the academic and specialised literature. This is why we present our understanding of the main definitions used in this paper below.

2.4.1 Migration

Migrants can according to CARIM be defined on the basis of two different criteria: their country of nationality and their country of birth. The country of nationality-criteria considers migrants to be resident foreigners and the country of birth-criteria sees migrants as residents born abroad. The two definitions differ concerning the place of birth (born abroad but having taken the nationality of the country of residence) or nationality (foreign residents who were born in the
country of residence but have not taken its nationality). Instead of defining our own understanding of who can be counted as migrants, we have decided to use the definitions that the sources used in this paper have chosen and to take this into account when analysing the data. Qualifying data for this research only based on one definition of a migrant would make the acquisition of data close to impossible.

2.4.1.1 Legal

The European Commission divides the legal migrants into four different categories: asylum seekers, family members joining migrants already legally settled in an EU Member State, registered labour migrants and business migrants. It is important, especially in the framework of this thesis, to distinguish between economic migrants and persons in need of protection (asylum seekers). States have no obligation to let economic migrants enter their territory, whereas asylum is a human right that has its foundations for example in the 1951 Geneva Convention. The people in need of protection are therefore not included in the definition of migrants in this thesis.

It is easier to study the developments in the legal migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, than that of illegal migration especially due to the fact that reliable statistics exist on the number and “types” of legal migrants. This is not the case for the illegal migrants, the conceptualisation of which is presented below.

2.4.1.2 Illegal

Illegal or irregular migration is defined for example by the International Organization for Migration as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.” The definition also depends on whether the migrant is seen from the perspective of the destination or the sending country, the country of destination seeing irregular migration as consisting of illegal entry, stay or work in the country, whereas for the sending country the irregularity can for example be seen as the crossing of an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document. IOM also mentions that there is a “tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking.

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24 Fargues 2007, p. xiii.
26 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 34.
Europol comments on the necessity of migration to the development of the sending and receiving countries and defines illegal migration as follows:

“Migration itself is not illegal; it is in fact necessary for the development of both source and destination countries. Migration, however, becomes illegal when individuals themselves or with the assistance of others attempt to enter countries clandestinely due to the fact that they may not enter or stay in a country legitimately.”

Our definition of illegal migration follows the one used by Europol, which covers the two different definitions identified by the IOM. Illegal migrants are thus seen as individuals who attempt to enter countries clandestinely either themselves or with the assistance of others. When collecting indicators for illegal migration, it is however essential to identify the conceptualisation used by the collectors of the original data.

2.4.2 Mediterranean partner countries

In the course of this paper, many different definitions will be used of the non-EU members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Concerning the time before the signing of the Barcelona declaration, the Mediterranean non-EU countries will be called the Mediterranean non-Member States. Concerning the time after the signing of the Barcelona declaration, our definition of Mediterranean partner countries follows, unless otherwise indicated, the list of signatories: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. It is important to specify that until their accession in the European Union in 2004, Cyprus and Malta were also Mediterranean non-Member States (before 1994) and Mediterranean partner countries (from 1994 to 2004). It is also important not to forget the role of Libya and Mauritania. They are both members of AMU and long-term observers of the Barcelona Process. During the process of writing this thesis, an important development was seen, as the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, organised in Lisbon, 5-6 November 2007, welcomed Mauritania and Albania to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Despite this, these two countries will as a rule not be included in the definition of Mediterranean partner countries, as the changes in their relation towards the EMP have until now been limited.

27 International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 35.
29 In a number of official documents, the Palestinian Authority is replaced by “West Bank & Gaza strip”. For the sake of being consequent, we have however chosen to use the name Palestinian Authority throughout this paper.
2.4.3 Country of origin and country of destination

Academic literature includes several different ways of naming the country where the migrant emigrates from and the country where he or she immigrates. We have chosen to use the definitions “country of origin” and “country of destination”, which are also the definitions used by the International Organization for Migration, whose Glossary on migration defines the country of origin as “the country that is a source of migratory flows (legal or illegal)”.\textsuperscript{30} Country of destination is defined as “the country that is a destination for migratory flows (legal or illegal)”.\textsuperscript{31} Definitions used elsewhere include for example “sending country”, “source country” and “recipient country”. Furthermore, a definition that will occur in this paper is that of “country of transit”. According to the above-mentioned IOM Glossary on migration, a country of transit is “the country through which migratory flows (legal or illegal) move”.\textsuperscript{32} This definition is relevant in the context of this thesis because an important part of the migration (mostly illegal) from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU does not originate from those countries, but the MPC are rather used as countries of transit.

\textsuperscript{30} International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 15. This definition does not, however, suggest that the migrant has to be a national in the country of origin, which is the case with the definition “state of origin”. International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{31} International Organization for Migration 2004, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
3 MIGRATION AND SECURITY – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As has been indicated above, presenting increasing migration flows from the Mediterranean countries to the European Union as a security threat was an important part of the strategy of the Southern EU Member States in directing the attention of the EU Southwards and in initiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Why did the EU Member States see migration as a threat to their security? Is migration a threat to the EU as an international community, to the states individually or to the local communities? It is thus not only the case of describing how migration can cause conflicts or threats in and between the countries of origin and destination that is important, but the main underlying question is also why migration became a part of the security framework. It cannot be denied that migration and security share a connection and that security has become during the past decade increasingly used as a way to study the different indicators of migration. One of the earlier scholars to suggest this approach to migration was Myron Weiner, former director of Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT), who suggested that a number of features in the international population movements, such as:

“a growth propelled by economic differentials, internal political disorder, […] the political as well as economic constraints on the admission of migrants […] suggest the need for a security/stability framework for the study of international migration that focuses on state policies toward emigration and immigration as shaped by concerns over internal stability and international security”.

Hence, the aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of such a security/stability framework for the study of migration by presenting differing theoretical considerations as to why and how migration has become to be considered as a security issue. These considerations will be developed further in the following chapter of this paper, in which we discuss the causes of migration and its consequences to both the country of origin and the country of destination. We will begin by presenting the changes in the direction of security studies, and subsequently in the security paradigm, which were witnessed at the end of the Cold War.

33 Weiner 1992-1993, pp. 94-95.
3.1 Developments in the security paradigm

The end of the Cold War not only brought about many changes in the geo-political map of the world, but it also contributed to changes in the international relations theories, especially in the field of security studies. This change is aptly commented by Steve Smith, Professor of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, who explains that the change in the security paradigm brought about an important change at the actor level, where the role of the state as a source of security, but also as a source of insecurity for populations became more widely accepted.34 The transfer in the security paradigm also led to a change in the traditional understanding of what or who it is that needs to be secured. The old paradigm concerning national security was characterised by state-centrism, whereas the “new security issues” can refer to the security of for example societies or individuals.35 Smith continues by saying that it is not only military concerns that are central to the debates about security, but that many different aspects of human activity have entered the discussion fora as security issues. In other words, the concept of security has both widened and deepened.36 Widening the concept of security describes the extension of the understanding of security to cover a wider range of potential threats apart from the military one. Deepening the security agenda describes “moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points”.37 The biggest change, according to Smith, is however that security is not only seen as a question of dealing with constant, unchanging and unchallenged security issues, but that the debate now deals with the starting point of security, namely what counts as security and what counts as a security issue.38

An important role in the “widening” of the concept of security has been played by Barry Buzan, whose 1983 book People, States and Fear presented a broadened agenda for the security studies by adding four new sectors to it. Thus, according to Buzan, the five main sectors of security are military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security.39 In this work, Buzan still saw the state as the main referent object in all the five sectors, and he was criticised for this for example by Ken Booth and Steve Smith, who argued for the centrality of the individual as the

34 Smith 1999, p. 74.
35 Ibid, pp. 83-84. This is however not uncontested, the question of individuals as referent objects is discussed further down.
36 Ibid, p. 74.
37 Krause & Williams 1996, p. 230. Instead of “widening”, Krause and Williams use the name “broadening”. At the time of publishing of this article, Keith Krause was affiliated with the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and Michael C. Williams to the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Maine.
38 Smith 1999, p. 74.
referent that needed to be secured. Buzan modified his state-centric statement later on, because “[i]f a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state had to be allowed into the picture”.41

Buzan’s *People, States and Fear* was also one of the first publications to discuss the connection between security and migration. Even though Buzan discussed the threats of migration from a state-centric point of view, his example was preceding the way in which the end of the Cold War made it possible to direct the view of the security studies towards “diffuse and hard-to-grasp security threats that do not emanate from sovereign states but from non-state actors, involving issues such as crime, drugs, migration”.42 At the same time, Buzan developed together with Ole Wæver the concept of societal security, which marked the separation from the state-centric line of thinking. Whereas state-centric security thinking saw sovereignty as the main value to be protected, societal security sees identity as the main target of protection. This identity is represented in a society’s ability to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. Moreover, the identity is about the sustainability of the society’s language, culture, religion, national identity and customs.43 At least at the first sight, the concept of societal security seems to suit well for considering migration through the security framework. However, before we move on to discuss further the different referent objects that migration can be considered to threaten, it is important to present another concept developed especially by Wæver, namely securitisation. We believe that the theory of securitisation will provide us with an understanding of how migration became a security issue.

### 3.2 Securitisation

According to the Copenhagen school, security issues do not exist as such, but issues that are presented by actors as threats that require measures and actions outside the normal political procedure are ‘securitised’. Securitising an issue (having transformed an issue into a security issue) includes thus discussing an issue in a way that breaks the normal rules of conduct, but also that this rule-breaking receives public acceptance. The acceptance can be gained through the assumption that if the problem is not tackled, everything else will become irrelevant. Security

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40 Smith 1999, p. 84. Ken Booth is EH Carr Professor and Head of the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth.


42 Faist 2004, p. 1. Thomas Faist is Professor of Transstate Relations and Sociology of Development at the Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University, and Director of the Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development.

43 Wæver et al. 1993, p. 23.
issues are thus not necessarily formed by real existing threats, but by people, who present issues as existential threats. These people are according to Wæver called the securitising actors, who construct security issues by “speech acts”. Wæver continues by saying that “In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)”.45

According to the theory, security deals with threats to survival that mobilise extreme countermeasures. This means that security does not only concern military issues or national sovereignty, but that the concept of security should be understood by securitisation, which Buzan and Wæver describe as “the discursive processes through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”46 This means that all the aspects that a political community sees as threatening to something valuable can be considered as security threats.

How can securitisation then be studied for example in the case of migration? Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde explain that it should be studied by looking at discourse and political constellations – securitisation does not need indicators. Instead, one should ask questions such as when does an argument achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If the securitising actor has been able to gain the acceptance of the audience to violate rules or procedures that are normally meant to be followed, one is witnessing a case of securitisation.47

A number of scholars have questioned the thinking of the Copenhagen school for example by posing the following questions: Who are the audience and how do we know when public acceptance has been gained? And who are the people that can be considered as “securitising actors” – who are the ones that have sufficient authority to gain public acceptance?48 The Copenhagen school replies:

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46 Buzan & Wæver 2003, p. 491.
48 See for example McSweeney 1996, p. 84 and Léonard 2004, p. 16. McSweeney asks how it is possible to know when the society is actively backing up the securitising actor. Sarah Léonard was during the time of writing this article affiliated to the Department of Political Science, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.
“We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity”.49

Furthermore, who speaks about security is not as important as the existence of an existential threat that requires emergency action or special measures, and the acceptance by a significant audience to undertake the action.50 There are thus no specified criteria on who can be considered as securitising actor. Common players, who are however more likely to be accepted as securitising actors, are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups.51 Interestingly, the Copenhagen school does not only speak for securitisation, but assesses it to be a rather conservative and defensive concept. Protecting a referent object through securitisation means that it is wished to continue to exist in its current form. Nevertheless, there are cases in which extensive securitisation can lead to stifling the economy, creating an intrusive and coercive state and eventually crippling the economy. Thus, it is considered sociologically, politically and economically important to avoid excessive and irrational securitisation.52

3.2.1 Securitising migration

What are thus the variables that define whether migration will be securitised or not? Why is migration in some cases considered a security threat, whereas in other cases it is accepted? Christopher Rudolph proposes four different variables that he sees as the most significant ones to the perception of migration as a threat in the Western states: cultural proximity, visibility, entry channel and the unintended or latent effects of prior policies.53 Cultural proximity refers to the perception of difference between the migrants and the locals in the country of destination in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion and culture.54 This variable implies that the closer the migrants are to the locals in the country of destination in terms of “culture”, the smaller the chances are that migration is seen as a security threat. Visibility refers to the concentration of migratory flows both in space and in time. Rudolph points out that migration is often

50 Ibid, p. 27.
52 Ibid, p. 208. Soviet Union, North Korea and Iran are mentioned as an example.
53 Rudolph 2002, p. 8. Christopher Rudolph works at the Department for International Politics at the School of International Service, Washington D.C. During the time of writing he was visiting Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.
concentrated in one geographical area and in a specific period of time. When migration is more visible, it is easier pushed to the foreground as a security threat.\textsuperscript{55} This statement is verified by our Euro-Mediterranean context, where there are a small number of main entry points to the European Union for the migrants from the Mediterranean partner countries. Furthermore, a sudden increase in the migratory flows at a specific geographical location (for example the Canary Islands) brings attention to the issue and supports the cause of securitisation.

With entry channel, Rudolph means the way in which the migrants enter the country of destination – through legal means with a working visa etc, or through illegal means.\textsuperscript{56} This variable is connected to securitisation, because the debate on the ways of entry creates “a spiral of insecurity”, which helps the securitising actors, such as politicians or media, to connect the immigration and the means of entry to terrorism, illegality and crime.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, Rudolph suggests that the effect of earlier migration policy affects the securitisation of migration in the current society. This is for example because earlier migration facilitates future migration by creating migratory channels, but also by sustaining migratory networks, through which contact is kept with the “people back home”. If a society has positive experiences of earlier migrations and the migrants have settled in the society, perhaps contributing to the culture, it is easier for the country of destination to accept migrants of the same background in the future.\textsuperscript{58}

When we consider the question of securitising migration from the point of view of the European Union, we have to take a short look at the history of migration to the EU. This aspect will however be discussed at length later on in this paper. What is important to understand, is that migration to Western European countries was originally based on the increased need for cheap and flexible work force in the 1950s and 1960s. As Huysmans argues, the status of immigrants for example in France was at that time not politically sensitive.\textsuperscript{59} This changed however in the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, when the need for guest workers diminished and there was a growing need to protect the domestic workforce and their social and economic rights. This led to a change from a more permissive immigration policy towards a control-oriented, restrictive policy. Here we can identify the first signs of securitisation in relation to migration in Western Europe. The immigrant population kept growing due to the right for family reunion, despite the

\textsuperscript{55} Rudolph 2002, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{57} O’Neill 2006, pp. 327-328. P.E. O’Neill is a Wing Commander at the UK Royal Air Force and has written this paper within the framework of the Advanced Command and Staff Course No. 9 JSCSC, Shrivenham.
\textsuperscript{58} Rudolph 2002, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{59} Huysmans 2000, pp. 753-754.
diminishing need for labour immigrants. Subsequently, the public rhetoric began to link migration to the destabilisation of public order and the public awareness of migration and immigrant population in the European countries increased.\(^\text{60}\) When the migrants were not needed as labour force anymore, the Europeans began to question their presence in the continent. Moving on to the 1980s, migration was already increasingly a subject in the political debates concerning the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability, but also of the welfare state and the cultural composition of the European nations – migration had become a security issue, threatening the domestic society.\(^\text{61}\) As a sign of the acceptance of the audience, that is required for an issue to be securitised, we can mention the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.\(^\text{62}\) The Convention makes a connection between immigration and asylum on the one hand, and terrorism, transnational crime and border control on the other hand, locating thus “the regulation of migration in an institutional framework that deals with the protection of internal security”.\(^\text{63}\) Making this connection, and being ratified by the Member States, the Convention is a good example of how migration has come to be securitised in the European Union.

Theorising about the connection of security and migration cannot however be made without questioning the connection in the first place. On the basis of the above theoretical considerations on securitisation in general, we claim that migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the European Union has been securitised inside the EU. The idea of migration as an existential threat has been proposed to the European audience by the securitising actors (in this case originally the South European EU Member States, but they have been joined for example by extreme right-wing parties in a number of Member States), and an important part of the European audience has accepted the threat as existing. This is supported by the developments in the EU cooperation in the field of migration, where the intergovernmental cooperation has spilled over to cover areas of Justice and Home Affairs through the Treaty of Amsterdam, and where the Schengen Agreements and the Dublin Convention indicate that the EU as a whole is now cooperating with migration questions.

Nevertheless, the act of securitising migration has been harshly criticised by a number of scholars. For example Jef Huysmans, Senior Lecturer of Politics and International Studies at the

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\(^{60}\) Huysmans 2000, p. 754.
\(^{61}\) Ibid, p. 756.
\(^{62}\) Schengen Acquis.
\(^{63}\) Huysmans 2000, pp. 756-757.
Open University, UK, argues that connecting migration and security together supports the nationalist agendas of extreme right-wing groups and provides a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the migrant, who has been turned into a security problem, becomes “the other who has entered (or who desires to enter) a harmonious world and just by having entered it, has disturbed the harmony”\(^6^4\). According to Huysmans, it is only natural that security studies – a research field that sees itself as problem-solving – does not neglect migration, which is a field that is by many considered as a basic security problem. By researching the problem, the scholars however reinforce the connection between migration and security, which can be seen neither as neutral nor innocent. Huysmans suggests that connecting security and migration is not something that necessarily has to be done, but if it is in fact done, it changes the meaning of migratory flows by making them a “security drama”.\(^6^5\) Huysmans is supported by Sarah Collinson, who says that presenting or discussing migration in terms of security can function as a legitimizing or encouraging act for xenophobic and racist sentiments. This is why it is important rather to discuss the specific, instead of the general problems related to migration whenever possible, and thus to ask what specific types of security problems migration might pose, in order to make it clear that it is necessarily not migration in general, that is bad.\(^6^6\)

Not denying the fact that securitisation is not always the right way to go, Wæver argues that having taken the path of securitising migration once, it is very difficult to go back – that is, to desecuritise. Desecuritisation is however considered by the Copenhagen school as the ideal option in the long-term, since it means moving threats out into the public sphere, away from the threat-defence sequence. The claim of the Copenhagen school is that in specific situations securitisation can be chosen, but it should never be seen as “an innocent reflection of the issue being a security threat”. Securitising or accepting securitisation by the securitising actors is always a political choice.\(^6^7\)

3.3 Migration – a threat to what and whom?

The examination of how the movement of persons in form of migration affects security can be done from two main points of view – that of the threat and that of the referent object. One thus has to ask the questions:

\(^{6^4}\) Huysmans 1995, p. 65.
\(^{6^5}\) Ibid, p. 54.
\(^{6^6}\) Collinson 2000, pp. 317-318.
\(^{6^7}\) Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, p. 29.
What is the threat? What is it that scares the actors, what do they desire to be freed from? What is it that is threatened? As will be discussed below, the referent object can be for example the state, the society, the individual – all depending on from which point of view the threat is looked at.\textsuperscript{68}

Below, we present a number of points of view concerning what migration is threatening, not only in the countries of destination, but also in the countries of origin.

3.3.1 Societal security

As mentioned above, the traditional thinking in security studies locates the state as the main referent object for security threats, that is, the target of the threat, \textit{what is threatened}. The change in security paradigm brought about a change also in this context, when the security studies “deepened” and began to consider other referent objects both on the higher end of the vertical scale, such as international organisations, and the lower end of the scale, moving from the state level to societies and individuals. In the context of our thesis, the most important change was seen in the views of the Copenhagen school, which broadened the state-centric views presented earlier by Buzan to include the possibility of threats towards the society, by introducing the concept of societal security.

One of the Copenhagen school’s first contributions to the discussion on the widening of the security studies was Buzan’s presentation of the five different security sectors (military, political, societal, economic and environmental) in his book \textit{People, States and Fear}. He defined the concept of societal security as “[t]he sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom”.\textsuperscript{69}

Moving further away from the idea that only the state can be a referent object when considering security threats, society is presented as a referent object of its own in the 1993 book from the Copenhagen school, \textit{Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe}.\textsuperscript{70} Security is seen to have two different referent objects – state, that has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and society, which is concerned about the identity and how it can be preserved. More precisely, “A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears

\textsuperscript{68} This division to threat and referent object is based on Huysmans 1995, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{70} Wæver et al. 1993.
that it will no longer be able to live as itself". Societal security should however not replace the focus on state security, but rather be more at the centre of the analysis.

What is then this society that can be threatened? Wæver et al. explain that society concerns identity and “the self conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community”. Furthermore, the Copenhagen school is of the opinion that societies encompass, to some degree, more than just the sum of its parts, meaning that a “society” cannot be reduced to individuals. This is why individuals and social groups should not be targeted as the object of security studies. The Copenhagen school follows thus the Durkheimian conception of society being a sui generis phenomenon, one of a kind.

The connection to our context is revealed when we look at the main threats to society and societal security, as they are seen by the Copenhagen school. In Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, the main threats are presented as competing identities and migration – and in the more recent work Security. A New Framework for Analysis the most common issues that have been viewed as threats to societal security are outlined as migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition. These three threats are explained as follows:

1. **Migration** – X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population […]
2. **Horizontal competition** – although it is still X people living here, they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighbouring culture Y […]
3. **Vertical competition** – people will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an integrating project […] or a secessionist-“regionalist” project […] that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities. […]

How may these issues threat societies and societal security? Societies differ as to what kind of vulnerabilities they have, depending on “how their identity is constructed”. It is suggested that the background of the national or societal identity affects to what extent for example migration is considered to be a threat to the society – as an example Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde mention
Finland, which has an identity based on separateness and being remote, where even a small number of foreigners can be considered as problematic. Furthermore, it is proposed that in societies where language is central to national identity, as is in France, an influx of migrants speaking for example English, can be considered as threatening to the society’s identity. This reasoning is valid also in the current times, where religion is playing an important role and the Christian societies of Western Europe are feeling threatened by the increasing influence of Islam in their daily lives, brought to the societies by the immigrants.

Whether migration becomes a threat also depends on how well a society absorbs migrant populations and can adapt to them; societies are very different in this sense. The threat posed by the differing culture or ethnicity of the immigrants is especially amplified when the immigrants attempt to maintain their identity in the country of destination. The same amount of migrants can have a very different effect depending on whether they aim to integrate in the country of destination, or whether they bring with them all their habits, whether these are related to religion, food or language. This is in accordance with Rudolph’s “visibility” variable, according to which a bigger concentration of migrants in space and time will enhance the chances of migration being noticed by the local population and thus becoming an issue that is seen as disturbing or altogether threatening. Moreover, European integration is said to weaken the territorial state and its principle of sovereignty, leading to groups within societies feeling threatened and feeling their identities being endangered by for example immigration. Wæver suggests that in these cases cultures defend themselves by strengthening the existing identities and thus making culture a part of security policy. When it is no longer possible to get support from the territorial state in a threatening situation, support is being looked for in the culture and society. In case of a “threat” of changes in the culture and society, people feel threatened for their identity.

Theorizing about societal security and securitisation can however not be done without encountering problems. In the same way as securitisation was criticised for “becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy” and legitimizing anti-immigrant sentiments, Wæver admits that securitising the societal sector in an unsophisticated way may result in legitimised arguments for defining immigrants and refugees as a security problem. Further questions arise for example from the identification of the society – how does a society speak, as it does not have formal institutions similar to those of a state? Wæver explains that it is never the society as such that speaks, but

80 Wæver 1995, pp. 67-68.
that society is spoken for, and as societies are full of hierarchies and institutions, there are some people that are better placed than others to speak on behalf of “their” societies.82

The notion of societal security, or the security of a culture, is also present in Jef Huysmans’ interpretation of the connection between security and migration. In a way that is not very distant from the concept of securitisation, he describes the “security drama” that migration is placed in and where the migrants create disharmony by taking the jobs, emptying the public purse and bringing with them Islamic fundamentalism and criminality. This disharmony indicates that an undesired disturbance has been experienced in the way of life, that the people in a society were accustomed to, and that this disharmony would not exist were it not for the migrants. Migration is thus seen as an existential threat, which threatens the survival of the self-identity of the society. This leads to the “natives” trying to distance themselves from the migrants83 in the same way that Wæver suggested for societies to strengthen their identity towards the threats posed by migration.

In the post-Cold War Europe, the continuing immigration is thus seen as a threat to the continuation of the cultural identity of the “natives”. Migrants are however not only understood as a threat to cultural identity, but more widely to the political or economic system or to an individual’s security. With this statement Huysmans moves further away from the concept of societal security, where the Copenhagen school denies that a society could be divided into individuals. Huysmans continues by describing the migrant as the “cultural other”, a construction that is created by securitising migration and thus setting “the migrant apart from the natives mainly in terms of culture”.84 In a later work, Huysmans takes up the problématique of societal security, and of the assumption that the migrants threaten the cultural identity of the society in the country of destination, by suggesting that most European countries are already multicultural, at least to some extent.85 This shows us that the cultural identity is in fact not constant, but that it varies. On the one hand, this comment supports the assumption that migration is feared because it threatens the cultural identity; this comment shows that the cultural identity has as a matter of fact been modified in the European countries. On the other hand, this comment indicates that changes in cultural identity should not be seen as threatening, they are a fact and they happen because cultural identity is not static.

82 Wæver 1995, p. 70.
84 Ibid, p. 61.
85 Huysmans 2000, p. 762.
The same way of thinking is present in Reinhard Lohrmann’s account of societal security. He argues against the Copenhagen school’s statement that societal security is about sustainability of language, culture and religious identity, among others, by suggesting that “most Western European countries already have elements of multicultural societies”.86 Following McSweeney’s way of seeing identity as a social construct (presented below), Lohrmann concludes that it is not the fact that immigrants have different cultural backgrounds that presents problems to the countries of destination; “it is the political exploitation of these cultural differences that confers a security dimension to immigration”.87

Apart from Huysmans’ departure from the societal security towards seeing the individual as a possible referent object to security threats, the work of the Copenhagen school has also been heavily criticised by a field of social constructivism, and especially by Bill McSweeney. He presents three main criticisms towards the concept of societal security, concerning the objectivism of the concept of identity, the misunderstanding of methodological individualism and the impact of the Copenhagen school’s identity “theses” on “Buzan’s distinctions between strong and weak states and mature and immature anarchies”.88 The debate between the Copenhagen school and McSweeney is however not between constructivist and non-constructivist views, because both parties identify their positions as being constructivist. The dispute considers rather the different views of the two on identity construction89 and the question of methodological individualism.

McSweeney begins by admitting that focusing on societal identity as the core value that is vulnerable to threats and that is in need of security, makes the theorisation of the Copenhagen school appealing and influencing. A more traditional sociological formula would see society as a system of interrelationships, which connects together the individuals who share a common culture. Wæver et al., for their part, describe society as “a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity”.90 According to McSweeney, the concept of society loses however all touch with fluidity and process throughout Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, resulting in a near-positivist conception of identity. Instead, the society

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86 Lohrmann 2000, p. 8. Reinhard Lohrmann is a staff member at the International Organization for Migration in Geneva.
87 Ibid.
should be considered as a process that is constituted by social practices. McSweeney claims that this misunderstanding of the society leads to the misunderstanding of “identity”. He suggests that the Copenhagen school’s view of identity as a social fact is false, and identity should rather be seen as a process and negotiation – we are who we want to be, instead of “we are who we are”.91 McSweeney discusses the possibility of moving down to the individualistic level of analysis by claiming that Buzan and Wæver have misunderstood the concept of methodological individualism. McSweeney claims that Buzan and Wæver are mistaken when they say that methodological individualism has to be avoided by treating society as a reality of its own and not reducing it to the individual level. Instead, McSweeney states that the characteristics of collective concepts are in fact not more than the sum of its individual parts because the individual parts exist separately from them. As McSweeney puts it, “a collectivity is not a social fact in the sense of a thing existing independently of the individuals who comprise it. A collective concept focuses on the structural properties of action which are inherent in every instance of individual interaction”.92

This discussion is further commented by Buzan and Wæver, who warn that such a move to an individualistic level would have severe consequences. The possibility of taking an individualist view on security is acknowledged, but this could, according to Buzan and Wæver, lead to all security being individual security, where the state security would have to be seen from the point of view of how it influences the aggregate security of the individuals. Buzan and Wæver explain that “In the securitisation perspective, however, identity is not a value, it is an intersubjectively constituted social factor”.93 The view of Buzan and Wæver is strengthened by the fact that there are only few commentators who see the individual as the only referent for security and there is an ongoing debate concerning the role of the individuals in the broader security system.94

3.3.2 Further considerations on migration and threat

Reinhard Lohrmann from the IOM identifies different levels at which migration affects security in international relations. According to him, it is possible to divide the ways in which migration affects international security into three different levels: (1) on the national level in the countries of transit and destination, which can see immigration as a threat for example to the economic

91 McSweeney 1996, p. 90.
92 McSweeney 1998, p. 139.
93 Buzan & Wæver 1997, p. 245.
94 Collyer 2006, p. 260. Michael Collyer is Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, at the University of Sussex.
well-being, political stability, social order, culture, religion and identity; (2) on the bilateral level, where migratory movements have a tendency to create tensions between the countries of origin and destination and thus have an impact on regional and international stability; and (3) on the level of the individual migrants, especially in case of irregular migration, which can have implications on the individual security and dignity of the migrants and thus make them unpredictable actors in international relations. According to Lohrmann, the three above-mentioned levels interact, which makes it “difficult for researchers to assess the role of specific factors”.\footnote{Lohrmann 2000, p. 4.} These three levels are also affected by the triangular interaction of migration, which includes the migrant’s relationship to both the country of destination/transit and the country of origin, but also the relationship between the country of origin and the country of transit/destination, as presented by Lohrmann.

**Figure 2: Triangular interaction of migration**

![Figure 2: Triangular interaction of migration](image)

It is interesting to see that the individual emerges as a referent object – migration is threatening the security of an individual, however not of individuals in the country of destination, but of the individual migrant. In our opinion, Lohrmann leaves out an important level of reference for migration; namely the national level in the country of origin. This level is however taken into account in the theorisation of Myron Weiner. Weiner, who sees migration from an international perspective, explains that migration can become a security threat for both the country of origin and the country of destination. To him, security is a social construction that has different meanings in different societies. This means that an issue that may be perceived by some as an important security risk is by others regarded as an important part of the society. From his point of view, in which the concept of migrants also includes refugees, Weiner presents five different situations where migration can be seen as a threat either to the country of origin, the country of...
destination or to their bilateral relations. The first situation can arise, when the migrants are considered to be a threat to the bilateral relations of the country of origin and the country of destination, mostly in cases where the migrants are opposing the regime in their country of origin. The second possible threat scenario can arise when the migrants are seen as a threat to the political regime in their country of destination. The third situation may arise when the migrants are perceived as a threat to the culture or cultural identity in their country of destination, for example when they come from a culture or religion very different to that in the country of destination. In the fourth scenario, the migrants may be regarded as a social and/or economic problem in the country of origin, and the fifth situation can arise if the migrants are used by the country of destination as an instrument of threat against the country of origin.  

Weiner’s presentation is however not unproblematic. As Léonard points out in her criticism of Weiner’s article, Weiner falls short of explaining the factors, which influence the fulfilment of the necessary conditions in which the migrants may be perceived as a security threat. Weiner does nevertheless make an interesting point in explaining that the economic absorptive capacity of the country of destination or the volume of immigration it receives, do not play an important role, but rather it is the “cultural affinity”, or the lack of it, that “critically influences the willingness of states or citizens to welcome or reject migrants”. This is an interesting comment in relation to the theories presented above, where it was suggested that different countries have different capacities for absorbing migrants, that is, absorptive capacity does play a role, but it differs from one country to another.

Applying his categorisation into the case of the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries does however reveal its usefulness, as at least the four first categories represent situations, in which the migrants arriving from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU can be considered as a threat. The first situation, where the migrants are opposing the regime in their home country, is however more rare, and in the case of EU, the problems between the country of origin and the country of destination may rather arise due to the unwillingness of the country of origin to regulate emigration. The second situation, where the migrants are a threat to the political regime in the country of destination has become increasingly possible due to the recent developments in the spread of Islamic fundamentalism among the immigrants from the MPC, living in the European Union. The third situation, concerning the threat that migration poses to the cultural identity of the country of destination, fits well with the theory on societal security, which was

96 Weiner 1992-1993, pp. 105-120.
97 Léonard 2004, p. 4.
presented above, and can in our opinion be considered as one of the main threats from migration. The fourth scenario, where migrants can be perceived as social or economic problems in the country of destination, is widely present in the EU. The rising anti-migratory movements and the increasing support to the right-wing parties are clear signs of the perception of threat from the part of the citizens in many European countries. The fifth example, however, is not seen in the European Union and it seems to be better suited for the analysis of the situation in the developing countries dealing with refugee flows.

3.3.3 Conclusion

Above we have attempted to give a number of answers to questions such as “why did the EU Member States see migration as a threat to their security?” and “is migration a threat to the EU as an international community, to the states or to the local communities?”. The theories presented above suggest that migration has come to be seen as a threat due to the act of securitisation, that is, the public rhetoric of the securitising actors (politicians, media etc.) has presented migration as an existential threat and this has been accepted by the people. Furthermore, migration is seen to present a threat to the state, the society and/or the individuals.

Above considerations only suggest certain answers to these questions and seen from the different theoretical points of view, these questions might have altogether different answers. For example Faist argues that it is not possible to understand the development of the security framework for migration only by looking at the actual threats to the state and human security; instead, it is important to understand the “political psychological mechanisms of threat construction”.98 According to Faist, studies conducted on the phenomenon of threat construction show that external threats often increase in-group solidarity, lead to vilification of the source of threat and limit any government actions that could help the members of the threatening group in any way. Moreover, external threats lead to the support of aggressive solutions directed at the threatening individuals or groups.99

Another problem with this regard is presented by Léonard, who points out that the increasing amount of studies in this field has brought with it the problem of indeterminacy due to the lacking definition of the concept “security” by many scholars. Security is however a concept that does not offer a universally agreed-upon conceptualisation, which is why connecting security to

99 Ibid.
migration should always be followed by an understanding of the way(s) in which security is identified in each case.\textsuperscript{100}

An interesting way to conclude this chapter is to underline that the connection between migration and security is not universal. As an example of this, Collyer mentions the reactions to terrorist attacks around the world. Whereas migration was not provided as an explanation in the attacks in for example Morocco, Algeria or Jordan, the bombings in Madrid and London were rapidly associated with migrants. According to Collyer, it is mostly the wealthier parts of the world that associate terrorism (and thus security threats) to migration.\textsuperscript{101} This is why we will now turn to look at the case of European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries in order to identify the causes of migration in the countries of origin, the consequences of migration in both the countries of origin and destination, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of migration.

\textsuperscript{100} Léonard 2004, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{101} Collyer 2006, p. 256.
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

In order to be able to assess to what extent the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced the migratory developments in the Mediterranean region, we are in need of a broader understanding of these migratory developments. This will be done through a small presentation of the historical developments in the migratory movements in the Mediterranean. The statistics concerning the developments in migratory trends presented in this chapter are however limited and a more thorough examination of the developments will be conducted in the case study on Morocco. Moreover, we will try to gain an understanding about migration itself, that is, why people migrate and how that affects the different actors involved. We are deviating from the trend of the recent years where most concerns have been directed to the disadvantages and advantages of migration in the countries of destination. Instead of only looking at how migration poses problems to the Western world for example due to rapid population growth, poverty and conflict in the countries of origin, we will try to identify what migration means to the country of origin, both in positive and negative terms.

When structuring this chapter, we are following the methodology of Danièle Joly, who suggests that in order to gain an understanding of the consequences of migration in the countries of origin and destination, it is first useful to identify the causes of migration, and then relate these causes to its consequences. Joly follows in her methodology a Durkheimian way of conducting research, according to which finding out the causes of a phenomenon will often help in finding out the consequences. When conducting this kind of research, we have to bear in mind that looking at the migratory flows from different angles, such as political or economic, can offer different kinds of explanations to the causes of migration. Weiner mentions as an example that seen from a narrowly economic angle, the migratory flows from poorer countries to the richer ones can seem to be mutually advantageous due to remittances received by the country of origin and the labour force acquired by the country of destination. However, when seen through a security/stability framework, migration can be seen as a threat to the ethnic composition in the country of destination. Furthermore, the effects of international migration have to be assessed on a case by case basis, because of their varying impact from one country to another. This is why this paper includes a case study on the causes and consequences of migration in Morocco. With this chapter we are already trying to focus the discussion about migration to the context of our study,

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103 Joly 2000, pp. 25-26. Danièle Joly is Director of the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick, UK.
and thus to mainly consider migration from developing countries to Europe, discussing as much as possible the migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU.

4.1 History of Mediterranean migration

The Mediterranean has always been a crossroads between different peoples and civilizations, which is why it has also played a big part in the development of migratory flows between the three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. Until the later half of the 20th century, the migratory flows in the Mediterranean were in the North–South–direction, emphasising the European peoples’ tendency for emigration. A new era of migration can be identified to have begun in the 1960s, when people from the East and South shores of the Mediterranean started travelling North to fill the gaps in the boosting labour market of the European countries, which emerged while the economies of the OECD countries grew on average by 5% per year. Especially France, Germany and the UK were running short of labour. The nature of this immigration was originally temporary, as the immigrants were considered as “guest workers”. It is nevertheless necessary to point out that the migratory flows in the 1960s were not only from Asia and Africa towards Europe, but similar flows can be identified from the South and East European countries towards Western Europe. Between the early 1950s and 1973 the net immigration to West Europe reached around 10 million. The flow of guest workers was however slowed down by the economic crisis in the 1970s, following the oil crisis that hit the European economies in 1973.105

Reaching the 1990s it is possible to see a multiplication in the number of immigrants arriving in Europe from the Mediterranean partner countries. According to Khachani “[f]rom 1992 to 1999 the number of migrants multiplied by 3.5%. In the case of Moroccans it more than quadrupled”.106 At the same time, however, the migratory flows changed in nature, as the Schengen Accord signed by five EU Member States (at that time still called the European Communities) on 14 June 1985 began to take its effect setting up visas, making border controls stricter and introducing more selective systems for issuing work permits.107 This development boosted the phenomenon of illegal migration.

105 Khachani 2006, pp. 3-6 and Stalker 2002, p. 153. Mohamed Khachani is Professor at the Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences, Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco.
107 The first states to sign the Schengen Accord were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. An implementation convention to the Schengen Accord was adopted in 1990 and the Schengen Convention entered into force on 26 March 1995. See: Europa.eu. The Schengen acquis and its integration into the Union and Hix 2005, pp. 348-349.
When analysing illegal immigration, one has to take into consideration that due to the nature of this phenomenon, it is difficult to measure. Even if one can at times find information and statistics about the number of illegal immigrants who have been arrested or regulated, it is easy to make faulty assessments, depending on the source of the information. This is why it is also difficult to estimate the number of immigrants (both legal and illegal) from the Mediterranean partner countries entering the European Union every year. According to Khachani, the approximate number of immigrants from MPC in the EU in 2006 was six million. Of these six million, over 90% were Turkish (50.3%) and North Africans (41%). The North African immigrants included in this figure are Moroccans (22%), Algerians (around 13%) and Tunisians (5.8%).

The above statistics are supported by those from the European Commission, according to which the most numerous groups of third-country nationals in the EU come from Turkey (2.3 million), Morocco (1.7 million), Albania (0.8 million) and Algeria (0.6 million). The statistics differ however depending on whether the source is the country of origin or the country of destination. There are also differences depending on whether the nationals of the country of destination are categorised as migrants or not. This is for example not the case in the data from the European Commission, which is why it is stated that “the number of foreign-born citizens in some Member States, like France, Sweden, The Netherlands and UK, is higher than the number of third-country nationals as many immigrants acquired the citizenship of the host country.” Moreover, the typology of entry to the EU differs widely between the Member States. Some Member States witness higher numbers of migrants who enter as a result of family reunification (Austria, France and Sweden), while for example Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the UK have a high percentage of work-related immigration.

4.1.1 Legal migration

Measuring the migration into the EU is done by calculating the difference between immigration into and emigration from the area during a certain year. Most countries do not however provide accurate figures on immigration and emigration or they have no figures at all. Eurostat estimates net migration on the basis of the difference between population change and natural increase

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110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
between two dates. The statistics on net migration are therefore affected by all the statistical inaccuracies in the two components of this equation, especially population change.\footnote{Eurostat 2008.} Below we present statistics on net migration to the EU between 1996 and 2007 (estimate).

Table 2: Net migration to the EU 27, including corrections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU27</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>588,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>430,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>528,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>981,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>723,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>600,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,851,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,035,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,874,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,654,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,607,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,647,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2008. A map presenting net migration to the EU, including corrections, can be found in Annex 1.

These statistics tell however nothing about the migration to the European Union from the Mediterranean partner countries, which is why statistics from OECD have been included. This data cannot however be used as a comprehensive indicator for developments in the migratory flows from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, but should only be seen as data indicating trends in migratory flows from one year to another.

Table 3: Inflows of population from selected Mediterranean partner countries to selected EU Member States, in thousands, 1996-2005

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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain
B: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden
C: France
D: France, Italy

Source: OECD 2007, B.1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality. For details, see Annex 2.\footnote{OECD 2007, B.1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality. For details, see Annex 2.}
When examining the above tables as data indicating trends in migratory flows from one year to another, certain trends can indeed be identified. Looking at the inflow of immigrants to the European Union in general, we can see that the inflow peaked between 2001 and 2002, but has since then showed some signs of calming down. A similar pattern can be identified in the statistics concerning Turkish and Tunisian nationals entering the EU. The rising trend between 2001 and 2002 can also be identified in the numbers of immigrants entering the EU from Algeria and Morocco, but instead of showing signs of decrease, the numbers of immigrants have rather shown signs of decline, followed by a new increase.

4.1.2 Illegal migration

According to Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, the EU Member States noted a decreasing trend of illegal entries to the Schengen area in 2006. However, detections and apprehensions increased both at the Spanish external borders and in Greece. Interestingly to the context of this paper, Moroccans form the core of the illegal immigrants at the southern EU maritime borders, representing approximately 70% of all detections at the Italian sea borders. They are followed by Sub-Saharan nationals, who mainly migrate to the Canary Islands, and Eritrean nationals and Egyptians, who mainly migrate to Italy and Malta.\textsuperscript{114} The following table, put together from data collected by Thomas Spijkerboer, gives an impression of the numbers of illegal immigrants intercepted at the EU borders in the recent years.

\textsuperscript{113} The data is collected from the OECD International Migration Outlook – edition 2007, which is why data is only available for those Member States of the European Union who are members of OECD and a number of selected non-member economies. See: OECD 2007. OECD defines permanent or permanent-type migrants to be “persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence upon entry, persons admitted with a permit of limited duration that is more or less indefinitely renewable plus some entering persons with the right of free movement (such as EU citizens within the European Union).” See: Lemaitre et al. 2007, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{114} Frontex 2006, p. 7.
Table 4: Interceptions of illegal immigrants in Malta, Spain and Italy 1993-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Malta</th>
<th>Straits of Gibraltar</th>
<th>Canary Islands</th>
<th>Apulia</th>
<th>Sicily</th>
<th>Calabria</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4952</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4189</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>5287</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>5287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7741</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7348</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7031</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>39,065</td>
<td>8828</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>55,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>7178</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>46,481</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>58,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>16,885</td>
<td>2387</td>
<td>18,990</td>
<td>2782</td>
<td>5045</td>
<td>46,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>4112</td>
<td>8546</td>
<td>5504</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>33,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1686</td>
<td>11,807</td>
<td>9875</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>18,225</td>
<td>2122</td>
<td>47,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>9794</td>
<td>9382</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>33,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>7425</td>
<td>8426</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>13,594</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>30,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>7066</td>
<td>4715</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>13,603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spijkerboer 2007, pp. 128-129.

The Spanish authorities have furthermore indicated that the number of illegal immigrants attempting to cross into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla has decreased significantly from 55,000 in 2004 to 12,000 in 2005. The numbers concerning the interceptions of illegal immigrants in the Canary Islands in 2006 are somewhat unclear. In May 2006, large influxes of illegal immigrants were reported to have landed on the shores of the Canary Islands, and by the end of May, a total of 8,000 illegal immigrants had reached the Islands. In late July, it was reported that all in all 11,000 had entered the Canary Islands, in comparison to the 4715 reported in 2005. Even though the data in the above table cannot as such be used to identify exact trends in illegal migration to the EU from the Mediterranean partner countries, it gives us an idea of the volumes of illegal migration that the EU is dealing with. Furthermore, we can see that illegal migration concentrates on certain points of entry at certain points in time. Whereas in Italy, illegal migration has moved from Apulia towards the more accessible shores of Sicily, in Spain the migratory movements have moved from the Straits of Gibraltar towards the Canary Islands.

4.2 Causes of migration in the country of origin

When conducting research on the causes of international migration in general, one is presented with a number of (mostly economic) theoretical explanations that conventionally understand

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115 Spijkerboer 2007, p. 129. Thomas Spijkerboer is Professor of Migration Law at the Free University of Amsterdam.
international migration to occur “as a consequence of imbalances in development between sending and receiving societies”. This comes from the assumption that when demographic growth exceeds the speed of growth in material resources, migration pressures from the potential migration producing countries towards the more developed countries increases. The causes of migration are often divided into different categories, such as in the classical theory, which sees migration as being generated by the “push” and “pull”-factors. The push and pull factors are the factors from the point of view of the country of origin (push factors, such as marginalisation and destabilisation) and the country of destination (pull factors, such as economic concentration and wealth).

Another way of looking at the causes of migration is to investigate them from the “recruitment” point of view. Recruitment is according to Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen understood as related to the conditions producing migration. These conditions are twofold and include on the one hand migration motivation (why people migrate) and on the other hand facilitating factors/agents (what/who makes movement possible). A similar division is used by Khachani, who calls the factors describing migration motivation the generating factors and the facilitating factors/agents the spurring factors. Both of these can be seen as conditions producing migration in the country of origin. When it comes to international migration in general, migration is often seen to be caused by the following push and pull factors:

**Push factors** (these factors are often the result of inadequate or deficient domestic policies or the absence of reforms in the countries of origin):
- Negative or low economic growth combined with unequal income distribution;
- Overpopulation, high population growth;
- High underemployment and unemployment rates, including as a result of major economic restructuring;
- High pressure on land and urban environments;
- Armed conflict, ethnic cleansing;
- Human rights abuses, discrimination, persecution;
- Natural catastrophes, ecological degradation; and
- Poor governance.

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116 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 11. Ninna Nyberg-Sørensen, Nicholas Van Hear & Poul Engberg-Pedersen worked at the time of publishing this article at the Centre for Development Research in Copenhagen.
117 Ibid.
119 Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 11.
120 Khachani 2006.
Pull factors:
Main pull factors are safety and socio-economic improvement stemming from labour demand in the countries of destination.\textsuperscript{122}

Instead of going meticulously into the different theories explaining international migration, we will concentrate on our context of the Mediterranean region, and thus limit our consideration to the causes of migration in the Mediterranean partner countries.\textsuperscript{123} In our account, we use the division of migration producing conditions into generating factors and spurring factors.

4.2.1 Generating factors

Despite improving macroeconomic indicators, such as decreasing inflation, the economic situation in the Mediterranean partner countries has not shown the expected signs of development, especially due to population growth. Whereas the recorded population growth in the EU will over the next 25 years be only 3.5\%, the Mediterranean “hot spot”-countries, Turkey and Egypt, will overtake Germany as the country with highest population in the Euro-Mediterranean region, whereas Morocco will reach Spain’s population of 40 million.\textsuperscript{124} This results subsequently in an increase in labour force, which is estimated to grow on average at a rate of above 3\% yearly until 2010. Unless the economic growth in the Mediterranean partner countries accelerates, the economies will not be able to absorb the new labour force that would need approximately five million new jobs yearly. This increases emigration from the Mediterranean partner countries and can be expected to add to the migratory pressure towards the European Union.\textsuperscript{125}

The sustaining economic and political problems in the Mediterranean region are hindering the large development disparity between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean from diminishing, which has direct consequences to the stability and security of the region, not

\textsuperscript{122} European Commission. COM (2002) 703, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{123} Such theories include for example: the theory that sees migration as caused by supply and demand of labour, related to wage differentials; dual market theory and labour market segmentation, according to which migration is primarily due to pull factors in receiving country; World system theory, where international migration is attributed to the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral non-capitalist societies, and its disruptive consequences which create a mobile population prone to migrate; and New economies of migration, according to which migration decisions are made by larger units than the individual, such as households or extended families in order to maximise and diversify the sources of income as an insurance against a variety of risks. This theory also includes the concept of a “migration hump”, according to which successful development policies may, in the short term, lead to an increase in migration. See: Massey et al. 1993; and Olesen 2002, p. 140 onwards.
\textsuperscript{124} Khachani 2006, pp. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{125} Nadal 2002, pp. 21-23.
least due to migration. According to Gallina, the various socioeconomic causes (demographic, social, political and economic) have been largely discussed and the broad consensus of the scholars has been that migration would by the turn of the 21st century be an explosive issue for the Mediterranean region and that we are facing the consequences of this today. The reasons for this lie in the “economic marginalisation of the peripheral areas and the political destabilisation of countries and regions at large”.\footnote{Gallina 2006, p. 17. Andrea Gallina is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, and Director of the Federico Caffè Centre of Studies, Roskilde University.} Put shortly, the Mediterranean partner countries’ economies are not able to digest the growing labour force that is created by the fast population growth, which is subsequently leading to increasing migration towards the EU.

Khachani argues that the first set of factors leading to immigration from the MPC consist of the so-called generating factors, which are mainly connected to economic reasons. This is why immigration often stresses the economic inequality between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean. The per capita income in the MPC is at least 10% lower (2002) than the European per capita income, which can be seen as a great generating factor for migratory flows from the South to the North.\footnote{Khachani 2006, p. 12.} For example in 2006, the EU27 average GDP per capita (appr. € 22,000) was almost 16 times that of Syria (€ 1382) and almost 13 times that of Morocco (€ 1708).\footnote{Eurostat 2007, p. 36.} At the same time, the distribution of income in many MPCs is often distorted between different social groups and different geographical regions of the country, creating large welfare gaps between the different groups of the population.\footnote{Khachani 2006, p. 13.} Another generating factor can be identified in the fact that the majority of the Mediterranean economies suffer from great instability. The economic growth is based mainly on the primary sector, which means that climatic hazards affecting agriculture also affect the economic growth of the countries. The up-and-down effect of the economy causes instabilities in the labour market. When this is combined with a fast population growth, the Mediterranean partner countries are left with a great labour force surplus and high unemployment rate. Nevertheless, the migratory flows are not always generated by the unemployed, but also people who are already employed in an MPC often decide to emigrate in hopes of better salaries in the EU.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 13-14.}
4.2.2 Spurring factors

According to Khachani, the economic reasons might be seen as the background for emigration, but often a different kind of incentive is needed for taking the final decision to emigrate.\textsuperscript{131} This is supported by Fargues, who argues that it would not be right to consider emigration simply as a solution to a problem, since emigration can also be considered as a way to exercise freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{132} One can mention at least three different spurring factors: the social image of returning emigrants; easier access to audiovisual information about the other countries; and geographical proximity. Firstly, the emigrants returning home for example on holidays, give an example of the “better life out there”, adding to the image of better income and job situation. Secondly, the developed audiovisual technical equipment gives the people in MPC the chance to see how the life is in the European Union. An image of the possible receiving country decreases the elements of uncertainty and cuts down the threshold for emigrating. Thirdly, the geographical proximity of the EU can also function as a spurring factor. From many Mediterranean countries, Europe seems only one step away. The shortness of the distance to the receiving country can give the emigrant an image of an easy access to the European Union, thus giving an incentive to emigrate.\textsuperscript{133} These spurring factors can be complemented with “mediating factors”, such as social networks that have been created by the migrants that have already immigrated into another country; and by improved communication and transportation linkages, which together with the audiovisual technical equipment and the geographical proximity of the EU mentioned above, provide an easy way to “connect” with the country of destination.\textsuperscript{134}

Finally, Khachani expresses harsh criticism towards the migration policy of the European Union by presenting appealing factors in the receiving countries (pull factors) that will make the people from the MPC try to emigrate to the EU, even illegally. He calls the dream of emigrating a taboo, where the costs of emigration have become very high compared to the gain. Nevertheless, once the decision of emigration has been taken, it is not possible for the migrant to return home empty-handed anymore, showing the failure to family and friends. The economic appeal put together with the strengthened visa rules have created a phenomenon at the Mediterranean, which Khachani calls “illusion trade”. This business of selling transport and working documents to the European labour market has become a big business, where the emigrant is in a lose-lose

\textsuperscript{131} Khachani 2006, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{132} Fargues 2007, p. xv.
\textsuperscript{133} Khachani 2006, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{134} Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 10.
situation, often paying for non-existent documents and being stranded in Europe, where the only possibility to work is illegally. This means that the EU is, by tightening the control of its borders, indirectly encouraging illegal immigration and the trafficking business. The EU cannot be accused for deliberately attracting migrants by “being appealing”, but as it has chosen (at least for now) to manage migratory flows by closing its borders, migration has changed from legal to illegal. This is an interesting point of view, which we will return to later on in this paper.

4.3 Consequences of migration in the country of origin

How does migration then affect the country of origin? Taking into account that migration means that countries with (usually) high unemployment rates are sending some of the extra labour force abroad, one could imagine that the effects of migration are positive. A reduction in the labour force surplus leaves fewer people out of job and has a positive effect on the competitive position in the country. The picture is however not that simple. The people who take the decision to migrate are usually those, who are the most productive household members. This leads subsequently to a lowering of the local labour intensity. When the young people migrate, the old people stay at home and create a demographic imbalance in the village or city of origin. Furthermore, the fact that many EU Member States are especially looking for skilled workers, the countries of origin are experiencing a considerable “brain-drain” as the educated labour force is emigrating. These kinds of problems have also been seen in the political field, where the local political leaders have in some cases been the first ones to emigrate. This has led to a brain-drain in form of social and political capital in some regions.

It is nevertheless important to understand that migration is not only considered to be a negative phenomenon to the country of origin. There are multiple ways in which the migrants contribute to the development and well-being of their country of origin even when they are no longer living there, or in many cases, not planning to go back. It is nowadays understood that migrants do not always move to another country in order to start a life there, but rather to improve their current life in their country of origin. The most obvious and well-known, albeit heavily debated way of contribution are the remittances that migrants send to their country of origin.

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The European Commission describes remittances as private money used first and foremost for improving the living conditions of the family of the sender. The use of remittances can be divided into three stages: a first stage, where the money is usually spent on debt repayment and family maintenance; a second stage, where the money can be used for improvements in housing, consumer durables or education; and a third stage, where the remittances “appear to be invested in productive activities and the purchase of land or small businesses”.140 This is supported by Gallina, who lists the main uses of remittances as follows:

“Remittances are used for the most part on food, clothing and health care as well as housing construction, buying land and cattle, and consumer goods and sometimes on conspicuous purchasing – such as gold and precious stones. Generally, only a small percentage of remittances are invested in productive activities, even though increased housing activities can have significant spillover effects on the local production system”.141

Gallina also mentions that remittances form the most stable financial flow in the Middle East and North Africa.142 This is verified by the data in the table below, which shows that the amount of remittances to the MENA countries has exceeded the amount of public development aid as a rule at least since 1990. It can be seen that the foreign direct investment (FDI) has shown some signs of growth compared to the beginning of the 1990s, but this growth has been rather marginal, taking into account that the FDI in the MENA countries is concentrated in only a few countries (Algeria, Libya and Morocco receive more than 50% of the FDI in the region), and a limited number of sectors, such as oil and privatisation of public enterprises in strategic sectors. In 2002, for example, the Mediterranean partner countries received, as a part of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, an amount of FDI equivalent to 2.8% of the total FDI of the European Union for third countries.143

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142 Ibid, pp. 18-19. It must however be added that in addition to the MEDA support, the Mediterranean partner countries receive loans from the European Investment Bank.
143 Ibid, p. 20.
Table 5: Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment and Public Development Aid during 1990-2004 (billions of dollars constant 2000)\textsuperscript{144}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Foreign Direct Investment</th>
<th>Public development aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>76,2</td>
<td>19,9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>78,8</td>
<td>20,7</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>84,4</td>
<td>24,2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>87,2</td>
<td>21,3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>92,6</td>
<td>20,0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>94,1</td>
<td>15,9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>96,3</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>110,8</td>
<td>16,6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>117,1</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>123,0</td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>131,6</td>
<td>16,2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>147,9</td>
<td>17,4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>161,8</td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>180,2</td>
<td>16,9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>186,8</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1990-2004</td>
<td>117,9</td>
<td>18,1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite of being an important source of income to the countries of origin, there is a lively debate concerning the impact of remittances in the country of origin. A rather strong consensus exists on the use of remittances, as indicated above when discussing the three stages of their use. Some negative developments related to remittances have however also been witnessed. In some countries of origin, the remittances have resulted in inflation of real estate prices, concentration of land tenure to the families who are connected to migration, and even increased unemployment.\textsuperscript{145} It is argued that this is because the remittances are rather spent on debt maintenance, everyday expenses, consumer durables, housing, retirement, health care and education, instead of being used for productive purposes, which in turn creates inflationary pressures on the local economy. Furthermore, remittances are said to increase inequality, encourage consumption of imports as well as creating dependency. Criticism has also been

\textsuperscript{144} MENA, which is in general used as an acronym for Middle East and North Africa, is in this context used to describe the group of countries consisting of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Turkey.

\textsuperscript{145} Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 21.
expressed about the inefficiency of remittances, as up to 20% of their value is said to disappear, for example because of high transfer fees and poor exchange rates.\footnote{Newland 2003. Kathleen Newland is Director of Migrants, Migration, and Development and Refugee Protection Programs, and Member of the Board of Trustees at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington D.C.}

The above shows that there is no doubt that remittances have a significant impact on the standard of living for the households receiving them, but the question of how remittances can help the development of bigger communities is not unambiguous. Positive effects have for example been seen in cases, where the migrants have formed so-called hometown associations (HTAs), which can serve as “platforms and vehicles for matching-funds schemes that pool remittances with government funds and expertise. This has often resulted in significant improvements in local health, education, and sanitation conditions, for the migrant and non-migrant households alike”.\footnote{Smith, M.P. Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization. Cited in Gallina 2006, p. 22.}

A new transnationalist way of seeing migrants as a connection between the country of origin and the country of destination reveals more ways in which the migrants have become important to the country of origin. They are no longer only seen as a source of remittances, investments and political contributions, “but also as potential “ambassadors” or \textit{lobbyists} in defence of national interests abroad”.\footnote{Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen 2002, p. 15.} It is thus recognised by many countries of origin that the migrants, even the ones that are unlikely to return, hold the potential to advocate for the interests of the country of origin, especially by organising strong lobbies. In return, the migrants may be provided with for example protection or special rights in order to secure their support in the long run.\footnote{Ibid.}

4.4 Consequences of migration in the country of destination

Having identified a number of factors causing migration, and some advantages and disadvantages that migration has on the country of origin, we will now move on to discuss the other end of the migratory movement, the country of destination. In the previous chapter discussing theoretical considerations about migration and security, a thorough review was conducted of the different aspects connecting migration to security, and the reasons for which the countries of destination may see migration as a threat. The goal of this chapter is to see how well these fears match with reality, by looking at how migration affects the countries of destination. The consequences of migration in general are multi-faceted and extend for example to economic
(welfare, labour market etc.), social, cultural, security (criminality etc.), demographic and political aspects.

There is however a certain *problematique* connected with this chapter. Migration can have very different consequences on the country of destination depending for example on the type of migration (family reunion, economic migration of highly skilled professionals, migration of people with low skills, or illegal migration) and the country of destination (a relatively closed ethnic society with limited experience on immigration, such as Finland; or a multi-ethnic society with a high number of migrants, such as France). Differences in consequences can also be detected between countries that have for many years been countries of immigration, and those countries that have recently changes from having been countries of emigration to becoming countries of immigration. Furthermore, migration can have a number of indirect consequences, which can, in addition to the above-mentioned factors, depend for example on the duration of the stay in the country of destination. As an exhaustive account is not possible neither within the limits of this thesis, nor due to the fact that the answers are not unambiguous, once more, a more specific investigation will be conducted in the case study on Morocco.

We begin our account by discussing the most clearly identifiable consequence of migration to the countries of destination: demographic changes. Cleon Tsimbos explains that migration has a two-fold demographic impact on the local population:

“In the short term, migration has a direct demographic effect on the growth and age-gender composition of the host population through the influx of persons entering the country; in the long term, immigration has indirect effects on the vital rates of the population of the receiving country via changes in the levels and patterns of fertility and mortality; the magnitude of the direct demographic effects depends mainly on the relative volume of immigration and the composition of immigrants (age distribution, family structure, etc.).”

According to the Global Commission on International Migration, international migration accounted for 56% of the population growth in the developed world between 1990 and 2000. At the same time, immigration accounted for 89% of population growth in Europe; and between 1995 and 2000, the population of Europe would have declined by 4.4 million, were it not for

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150 Tsimbos 2006, p. 233. Cleon Tsimbos is Associate Professor at the Department of Statistics and Insurance Science, University of Piraeus, Greece.
immigration. The demographic changes are directly connected to the changes in the labour market. The Eurostat population projections from 2004 estimate that the population of the EU will continue to increase until 2025, but only due to immigration. At the same time, the working age population in EU25 is expected to decrease by 52 million by 2050, which means a decrease from 67.2% to 56.7% of the population. A decrease in the number of working age people leads to a decrease in the amount of money that the European states can collect in form of income tax, which is traditionally used for example to cover a number of social security benefits, such as elder care and pension. When at the same time the demographic profile changes in such a way that the number of pensioners increases, the EU Member States are faced with a situation where the social security expenses are increasing at the same time as funds in form of income tax are decreasing. This leads to a situation where drastic structural changes are needed in the EU Member States and the EU is faced with an increased need to import labour in a similar way as it did until 1973. It seems that it is especially the countries that are based on high taxation and a broad social security scheme that will face such problems, but the need for extra labour force is most likely to be common to most EU Member States.

When discussing the consequences of migration to the economy of the country of destination, it is necessary to understand that a cost or loss experienced by a person, business, industry or region, may as well be a gain of another one. According to Collinson, this is why it is very difficult to reach any conclusions on whether migration is a disadvantage or an advantage to the economy in the country of destination, especially when it comes to our context of the European Union. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the consequences of migratory movements are highly dependent on the context – the situation, the countries and the type of migration that is in question.

On its special reportage on migration in January 2008, The Economist concluded that the rich economies do in fact gain from the high levels of migration, but that these gains are very unevenly spread among countries. Many Europeans are however not convinced of these economic benefits, as a poll conducted in November 2007 showed that whereas 55% of Spaniards consider migrants to be an advantage to the Spanish economy, the equivalent number was 42% in the UK and Germany, and only 30% in France. Immigration often has a strong

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152 Global Commission on International Migration 2005, p. 84.
155 The Economist, 5.1.2008, p. 3.
link to the “underground economy” in the countries of destination. Especially the illegal, and sometimes also the legal immigrants, are cheap and flexible labour force and they often take up jobs that are not wanted by the local workers. In most cases, the immigrants are not competing with the local population for their place in the job market, due to the strong segmentation of the market, but there are also cases where the locals feel that the immigrants threaten their jobs. This is often true especially for the low-skilled local workers and the people working in the construction sector. Collinson concludes that there seems to be little evidence to support the fear that undocumented economic immigration would be likely to have an important impact on the economies of the countries of destination, especially in the way that their economic stability would be threatened.

According to The Economist, if the migrants are at work, they benefit the economy of the country of destination as a whole. This is derived from the assumption that an expanding workforce permits faster growth and that many migrants, being young adults, are very productive. Migrants are also often more flexible when it comes to moving after jobs; they can release the local population to the job market, for example by providing childcare and thus freeing parents to go back to work; and migrants are consumers, who rent accommodation and buy goods and services. It is however difficult to calculate to what extent all of this brings economic advantage to the country of destination. It has been reported that migration has helped lift the growth rate of the UK above its long-term trend, and that immigration into Greece has led to an increase of 1.5-2% to the Greek GDP every year.

The question concerning the relation of migration and the welfare of the country of destination can be examined from various directions. The concerns of the locals can be, in addition to jobs, related for example to social benefits and costs related to health care or schooling. These are especially important in the cases where migration happens through family reunification. Concerns are not totally unfounded. OECD has found that immigrants tend to be somewhat overrepresented at the highest and lowest levels of education. In some OECD countries, nearly 50% of all immigrants between 25 and 64 years of age have not attended upper secondary school. This is the case in France, for example, as well as in Italy, Portugal and Belgium. This can subsequently lead to difficulties in finding employment in the country of destination, which

is the case in most OECD countries. This is shown for example by the fact that the employment rate of the immigrants is well below that of the native-born. For example in France, even if the educational level was comparable to that of the native-born, over 60% of the employment gap would still exist. There are however countries, such as Ireland, the UK and Denmark, where the proportion of immigrants with low education is significantly smaller, and that of higher-educated immigrants generally exceeds 33%. The overall conclusion of OECD is nevertheless that the results suggest that it is difficult for migrants to “make effective use of their human capital in the labour market”.\textsuperscript{159} For example Kicinger states that there is a risk attached to international migration with regard to social security systems and welfare state philosophy. It is possible that people may not want to pay high taxes “if they do not feel that the other do the same and share the same values, which is true in case of economically inactive immigrants and asylum seekers living on social benefits”.\textsuperscript{160} This indicates that there are differences between the EU Member States concerning the extent of the consequences of migration, and whether migration is seen as a threat, depending on the degree of their social security systems. This can also lead to differing levels of interest towards dealing with the issues of migration within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. We can assume that the Member States with a low social security coverage on the one hand, and greater geographical distance to the countries of origin on the other hand, are more reluctant to see the causes and consequences of migration to the countries of origin and the EU Member States, which are struggling for example with the problem of illegal migration. The consequences of migration in these countries are not as drastic as they may be in the countries that are built on a strong social security system that can be burdened by the support needed to deal with for example unemployed migrants, and that are geographically closer to the countries of origin. On the other hand the countries with a strong social security system will also be more in need of the migrants to fill the gaps in the labour market and to support the economy in order to keep the welfare system running also when the number of people in retirement increases and more money is needed in order to cover the increasing social security benefits.

Much of the disadvantages of migration to the country of destination are experienced through illegal migration. Illegal migration is often the only kind of migration that receives a significant amount of media attention and it can thus undermine public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of a state’s migration and/or asylum policy. Furthermore, illegal migration is often connected to corruption, organised crime and trafficking, and can thus be considered as a threat

\textsuperscript{159} OECD. International Migration Outlook, 2007 edition, pp. 132-133.
\textsuperscript{160} Kicinger 2004, p. 2. Anna Kicinger is research at the Central European Forum for Migration Research in Warsaw.
to the public security. It is however the estimate of some researchers that the impact of immigration on the crime rate tends to be overestimated. Nevertheless, one cannot look aside the fact that for example in Italy many of the illegal immigrants are employed by the local groups of organised crime. Also, even though the impact of immigrants on the criminality rate is more limited in Spain, the locals see interconnectedness between immigration and crime. Moreover, in cases where the illegal immigrants are in fact competing with the locals for their place in the job market, migration can lead to xenophobia. This problem is however not only connected to the illegal migrants, but can easily spread to include all the different types of migrants in the region in question creating a negative attitude towards all immigrants.  

A natural consequence of migration can also be seen in the “place” that the migrants take to themselves in the society of the country of origin. Coming to a new country and new culture, and especially when coming in bigger groups at one time, migrants have the tendency of reconstituting entire communities with their institutions, associations, kinship networks, religious organisations and political groups. The connections of the migrants are still stronger with the culture and religion of the country of origin, as well as with social networks there. This is however not only a negative aspect, because where there is demand, there is also supply. As a result, ethnic press, banks and businesses are flourishing in many areas that have a high density of migrants. An interesting piece of evidence on the political impact of migration in the country of destination is presented by Thomas Faist, who uses the case of Algerian migrants in France. Faist claims that the Algerian communities and organisations in France seem to have had a moderating effect on the political situation in Algeria, thus avoiding a spill-over of the conflict to the country of destination; France. Another example is the case where Arab-background immigrants helped the French police in dismantling the Armed Islamic Group in 1995.

As a way of conclusion, we can state that the evidence presented in this section has only briefly touched upon the questions of migration and security presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. It seems that there are differing opinions on the consequences of migration to the country of destination, especially depending on the type of migration. Whereas migration to the EU is seen to be increasingly necessary, especially in light of the demographic changes in the EU, especially the low-skilled immigrants continue to have a low employment level, burdening thus the social security systems in the European countries. Illegal migration is often associated with criminality,

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161 Global Commission on International Migration 2005, pp. 33-34; and Tsardanidis & Guerra 2000, p. 331.
162 Joly 2000, p. 33.
163 Faist 2004, pp. 6-7.
but at the same time the illegal migrants are together with other low-skilled migrants helping the EU Member States to keep their industries active, especially when it comes to seasonal industries such as agriculture. As this section did not provide us with explicit answers to whether the fears of the European populations concerning threats posed by migration are well founded, or what kind of activities the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should include in order to manage migration effectively, we are hoping to shed more light on these issues in the case study on Morocco. Now we will however move on to discussing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the ways in which it is aiming to deal with migration.
5 MIGRATION AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

The aim of this chapter is to present the various ways in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership aims at influencing migration and migratory flows in the Mediterranean either directly or indirectly. Directly, by introducing specific actions that are explicitly related to migration, and indirectly, by introducing other measures that can have an impact on for example the root causes of migration, without them being specifically directed at the migratory flows. This chapter is structured as follows: we will begin by introducing the structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in order to gain an understanding of the framework within which it is possible for EMP to influence migration. This is followed by the main part of the chapter, which is dedicated to an overview of the direct and indirect measures that have been introduced within the framework of EMP for influencing migration.

5.1 Barcelona declaration

After numerous attempts to initiate a cooperation between the countries on the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership experienced a boost in 1994, when the Corfu European Council gave the Council and the Commission the task of evaluating the then EU’s Mediterranean policy. This should according to the European Council be done “jointly examining political, economic and social problems”. As mentioned above, the change in the global security scenario after the end of the Cold War changed drastically from East-West axis to a much wider geographical area, bringing the Mediterranean non-member states and their security issues closer to the European Union. We have argued that this was one of the main reasons for the Southern EU Member States to be able to convince the Northern Member States of the necessity of a closer cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, aiming at securing peace to the South of the EU.164

The increased support among the Member States led the Commission to propose the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was due to the multiple areas of interdependence between the North and the South to be multidimensional in its nature. The European Council in Essen supported the Commission’s proposal and the Spanish Presidency during the second half of 1995 was chosen as the host of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference. With regard to the participants of the Conference, it was decided that the participation should be

164 This is also the view of Sven Biscop. See Biscop 2003, pp. 31-32.
limited to the EU Member States and the 11 Mediterranean countries that had signed agreements with the EU, joined by the Palestinian Authority. Further observers, such as Mauritania, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council were admitted to the Conference. There were also discussions about the inclusion of Libya as an observer due to the proposal from AMU, but this was not approved by the EU Member States because of the sanctions against the country.\footnote{Libya was accepted as observer in 1999.}

Despite of the fear that some Arab countries might be reluctant to participate, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995 saw all the countries invited being present.\footnote{Biscop 2003, pp. 32-33.}

The main result of the Barcelona Conference was the Barcelona declaration, which is a document agreeing the broader framework for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on the one hand and more exact measures for the implementation of the declaration in the form of a work programme in its annex on the other hand. The declaration is divided into three different parts, or “baskets”: a political and security partnership establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership creating an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.\footnote{Barcelona declaration.} Below, we give a short presentation of all the three baskets and the organisational aspects of the cooperation.

5.1.1 Political and Security Partnership

The political and security partnership-section of the Barcelona declaration includes many ambitious wordings about developing the rule of law and democracy, as well as respecting human rights and freedoms, while respecting self-determination and territorial integrity of the signatories. Furthermore, the signatories agreed for example to promote confidence and security building measures, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to refrain from developing military capacity.\footnote{Ibid.} However, when it comes to the realisation of the aims in the Barcelona declaration through its work programme, the goals ended up being much more modest than the ambitious goals of establishing a common area of peace and stability. The two main activities that were introduced by the work programme were the establishment of a senior officials’ meeting to conduct a political dialogue and to prepare the Euro-Mediterranean...
conferences, and the recommendation for the foreign policy institutes in the region to establish a network for more intensive cooperation. The senior officials have indeed met at least four times a year since 1995 in order to conduct a dialogue on political and security cooperation. Further measures that have been adopted so far are:

- Cooperation in matters of justice, police and migration;
- Training and information seminars for diplomats;
- A network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo);
- A register of bilateral agreements; and
- Exchange of information on international conventions on human rights, disarmament and humanitarian rights.

An important part of the cooperation in this field has been the discussion concerning an instrument that would be used in order to implement the Barcelona declaration’s commitment to create an area of peace and stability. With this regard, the adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability has been negotiated with the participants. The first ideas on what this charter would consist of were seen at the Third Euro-Mediterranean conference of ministers for foreign affairs in Stuttgart in April 1999. According to the chairman’s conclusions from the meeting, the Charter would especially provide for “an enhanced political dialogue as well as the evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good-neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy”. The Charter is to be a politically and not legally binding document where the rule of consensus would be applicable to all decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. Furthermore, the Charter should recognise the indivisibility of security in the area and acknowledge the concept of comprehensive security. Since 2001, due to tensions in the Middle East, the pace of negotiations on the Charter has slowed down. The ministers have however reaffirmed their dedication to the aim of adopting the Charter when the political situation allows it.

When discussing the political cooperation in the Mediterranean, it is inevitable to mention the question of the Middle East peace process. As mentioned above, the matters relating to the peace
process are not directly connected to the EMP, but it is important to understand that the progress in political and security cooperation within the partnership is greatly limited by the absence of proper, long-term and comprehensive settlements between the countries in the Middle East.

5.1.2 Economic and Financial Partnership

The second basket on economic and financial partnership presents the ways in which the EMP aims to create of the Mediterranean an area of shared prosperity. According to the Barcelona Declaration, the long-term objectives of the partnership are the acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions in the Mediterranean countries while increasing the employment level and reducing the development gap in the region; and the encouragement of regional cooperation and integration. The partnership is based on three main goals: the progressive establishment of a free-trade area; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas; and a substantial increase in the EU’s financial assistance to the Mediterranean partner countries.\textsuperscript{174} The plan is to progressively establish the free-trade area by year 2010 both through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and free-trade agreements between the Mediterranean partner countries. When it comes to the Association Agreements, the free-trade area seems to be on track, but the regional and sub-regional cooperation in the MPC is behind schedule.\textsuperscript{175}

As we saw in the previous chapter, the level of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mediterranean partner countries is continuously lagging behind the amount of remittances. The importance of FDI as the basis for economic development is however even acknowledged in the Barcelona Declaration, but the main goal of the economic and financial partnership, the establishment of the free-trade area, attaches more weight to intra-regional \textit{trade} liberalisation than to FDI. According to Testas, opening up to free trade without paying attention to intra-regional \textit{investment} liberalisation, could end up increasing import to the Mediterranean partner countries. This would consequently lead to deteriorated trade balances and require additional efforts to limit public spending. Testas further demonstrates that such activities would result in a short-term decline in the real GDP growth rates and living standard, further increasing the unemployment rates and possibly also the migratory flows.\textsuperscript{176} Vasconcelos and Joffé support

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Barcelona declaration.
\item Calleya 2005, pp. 85-86.
\item Testas 2001, p. 76.
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these claims by saying that the creation of an integrated free-trade area has been slowed down especially due to the lack of South-South cooperation, meaning economic cooperation between the Mediterranean partner countries. The result has been that the creation of a free-trade area has been limited to the bilateral Association Agreements. Furthermore, they criticise the EMP for not taking sufficiently into account the social consequence of trade liberalisation, which is without substantive support measures unlikely to be positive. The South Mediterranean is undergoing extensive economic restructurings but not attracting enough FDI that would help further transition and restructuring.177

This claim is related to the idea that increased economic development could be used as a way to decrease emigration from the Mediterranean partner countries. The rather simple thought behind this idea is that economic development in the MPC leads to expanding economies and job creation, which in turn lead to a rise in the living standards and subsequent political stability. This would furthermore encourage the local politicians to cease to see migration as a source of income, and would decrease the incentives for the locals to emigrate. One of the basic features of this economic development would be Foreign Direct Investment, because “it is the arrival of foreign capital and the relocation of European enterprises that will be able to generate sustained economic growth and, consequently, provide elements allowing for alternatives to emigration, not targeted co-operation measures or trade liberalisation on their own”.178 The activities in the second basket of the EMP are thus very important when discussing the measures that the EMP has taken to manage migration indirectly.

5.1.3 Social, Cultural and Human Affairs Partnership

When it comes to the third basket of the EMP concerning social, cultural and human affairs, the words in the Barcelona declaration seemed to be very grand. Recognising the role of traditions of culture, civilisation and religion in the Mediterranean region, and seeing them and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level as an essential factor in bringing the peoples in the region closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other, the signatories of the declaration acknowledged the need for a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. The activities included in the work programme ranged from

177 Vasconcelos & Joffé 2000, pp. 3-6. Álvaro Vasconcelos is Director at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and George Joffé is a research fellow at the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University.
development in human resources, dialogue between cultures and civilisations and exchanges between civil societies to activities related to media, youth, health and migration.\textsuperscript{179}

During the early years of the partnership, some criticism was expressed concerning the uneven development of the three different baskets. Whereas the second basket on economic and financial partnership was given great attention and numerous senior officials’ meeting were organised within the framework of the first basket, the social, cultural and human affairs partnership was pursued only half-heartedly. In the recent years, the third basket has however seen an increase in the level of activity, not least because of the widening of the partnership to the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The JHA questions are however also present in the first basket, and the main activities in the third basket also include those related to cultural dialogue.\textsuperscript{180} The views on this are somewhat split, according to some this is positive, whereas according to others, the attention given to the third basket mostly because of terrorism and organised crime as well as controlling and regulating migration is rather a short-term policy and was provoked by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{181}

It seems nevertheless that the cooperation in the field of social, cultural and human affairs has been increasing also outside the context of JHA. The importance of cultural dialogue in the region has been stressed at multiple occasions and this has led for example to the foundation of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures in 2005. Furthermore, the Euro-Med Civil Forums play an important role in supporting the role of cultural dialogue in the partnership, bringing together an important number of NGOs, trade unions and regional groups around the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{182}

With regard to migration, we can point out at least two different ways in which the activities in the third basket can influence migration. Firstly, concentrating on exchanges between people and cultures, it is possible that the activities taken within this framework will enable the people in the European Union to see migration less as a threat and more as a possibility and cultural richness. Moreover, mediating knowledge to the people in the Mediterranean Partner Countries may also give the possibility to inform them more about the problems related to migration and

\textsuperscript{179} Barcelona declaration.
\textsuperscript{180} Gillespie 2003, pp. 21-22. Richard Gillespie is Professor at the School of politics and communication studies at the University of Liverpool.
\textsuperscript{181} Melasuo 2002, pp. 125-126. Tuomo Melasuo is Senior Research Fellow at the Tampere Peace Research Institute.
\textsuperscript{182} EuroMed Info Centre. Cultural, Social and Human Partnership.
especially to illegal migration, thus helping them to make rational choices concerning their migration decision.

5.1.4 Organisation and funding

From the three different areas of cooperation described above emerge also the multi-level organisational structure of the Barcelona process. The cooperation functions basically on three levels: multilateral level which covers the new, multilateral institutions such as the ministerial meetings and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly; the bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements; and the unilateral MEDA (Mesures d’Ajustement) funding mechanism.\textsuperscript{183} The first phase, MEDA I, lasted from 1995 to 1999 and the second phase, MEDA II, lasted from 2000 to 2006 with a budget of € 5,3 billion. The MEDA programmes were giving bilateral and regional aid firstly through the European Commission’s DGs Relex and Aideo, and later on through the EuropeAid Office. Furthermore, the Mediterranean partner countries have access to funding via the European Investment Bank (EIB), which provides loans, investment capital and grant aid to the MPC. The operations in the Mediterranean region have been grouped under the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which funds the development of SMEs, improves infrastructures, supports training and economic development and promotes environmental protection schemes. The loans reach some € 2 billion per year.\textsuperscript{184} The reason for which MEDA is here described as a unilateral level of partnership is that the decisions and administration of the programme were left in their entirety to the EU. The allocation of funds was decided upon in Brussels through the four-year Country Strategy Papers, two-year National Indicative Programmes and Annual Financial Plans. The Mediterranean partners were in fact consulted in the drafting process, but their opinions were not binding.\textsuperscript{185}

The MEDA programme ceased to exist in 2007 when it was replaced by the financial instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which all the Mediterranean partner countries are also participating in. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was created especially as a means to improve the capabilities of the European Union to support cross-border

\textsuperscript{183} See Annex 3: Three organisational levels of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
\textsuperscript{184} EuroMed Info Centre: About MEDA programme.
\textsuperscript{185} Bicchi & Martin 2006, p. 198. Federica Bicchi works at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science and Mary Martin works at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
cooperation along its borders and to help the EU in avoiding the creation of new dividing lines between the EU and its neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{186}

5.2 Migration and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

What are then the different activities that have been introduced within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that can influence migration at the Mediterranean, or have already done so? Below we provide a presentation of the policy developments with regard to migration in the framework of the EMP and thus collect further evidence for our analysis of the effects of the EMP on migration in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{187} The main emphasis will be put on the actions that are meant to influence migration directly, but actions that can have an indirect impact on migration will also be dealt with to some extent.

Despite the statements that increasing migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the European Union played an important part in the initiation of the Barcelona process, migration itself is not strongly present in the Barcelona declaration. The specific references to migration in the Barcelona declaration and work programme are divided into legal and illegal migration, including more general comments such as acknowledging the importance of migration in the relationships and guaranteeing the protection of all the rights, and somewhat more specific recommendations to organise periodical meetings in the field of illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{188}

It would take some more years before migration entered the EMP agenda more extensively. This happened as a result of the widening EU competencies in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, especially in the aftermath of the Tampere European Council in 1999. It has been argued that the uneven development of the three baskets was a result of the EU’s inexperience in dealing with JHA matters, and the increasing importance of the migration agenda experienced in the recent years results directly from the expansion of the EU’s own JHA agenda since Tampere.\textsuperscript{189} As a result of the Tampere European Council, the JHA matters covered an important part of the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean\textsuperscript{190} adopted by the European Union in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000. A whole section of this strategy was devoted to JHA questions. The specific references to migration emphasised the need to develop effective cooperation mechanisms in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{186} European Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy. The Policy: Frequently Asked Questions.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} A comprehensive list can be found in Annex 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} Barcelona declaration.
  \item \textsuperscript{189} Gillespie 2003, p. 22 and Papagianni 2006, p. 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{190} Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region.
\end{itemize}
field of fighting illegal immigration networks. This could be done through the establishment of readmission agreements. Furthermore, the causes of migration should be dealt with by combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights. More specifically, information and statistics on migration flows should be exchanged between the partners. This Common strategy, even though it was unilateral in nature, indicates the direction that the migration management within EMP has taken. Firstly, it is important to deal with the causes of migration. Secondly, illegal migration should be fought.

The first Euro-Mediterranean Conference reaching any real results when it comes to Justice and Home Affairs, including migration, was the fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference organised in Valencia in April 2002. The migration (and especially illegal migration) agenda had been pushed forth in particular in the name of new security concerns, which directly leads the question into the first basket of the partnership, but the wish of the EU to collaborate with the Mediterranean partner countries in regulating migratory flows pushed the agenda towards the third basket. The MPC tended to take up the issues of xenophobia and racism towards their nationals who had migrated to the EU while continuously calling for “greater human mobility across frontiers to be achieved through the Partnership”. This means that the security questions from the first basket were continuously blended together by the Mediterranean partner countries with the human rights questions from the third basket. Gillespie explains that in order to gain a more positive response from the Southern partners and to “legitimise” the idea of security cooperation within the field, the EU countries finally favoured the placing of the JHA matters in the third basket.

The Valencia Conference adopted an action plan, which did in fact open the door to the discussion of enhanced cooperation in the field of JHA, but did not provide any guarantee of such cooperation ensuing in the long run. When it comes to migration, the idea of organising a Ministerial conference on migration and social integration of emigrants was welcomed in 2003. More specifically, the Conference endorsed the Framework Document concerning a Regional Cooperation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people, which had been prepared by the senior officials,

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192 Gillespie 2003, p. 23.
193 Ibid.
and the Commission was asked to adopt it with the Mediterranean partner countries.\textsuperscript{194} This Framework Document was the first document listing a number of activities to be taken both in the field of legal and illegal migration, including for example the investigation of the possibilities to simplify and accelerate visa-issues, as well as reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family reunion.\textsuperscript{195}

The Framework Document led to the creation of the regional programme “MEDA Justice, Freedom and Security Programme”, the implementation of which started in 2004. As a part of this programme, a MEDA migration project was launched in January 2004. The main goal of the project is to assist the different bodies in the Mediterranean to design and implement their own migration policies. The specific tasks of the project are to establish and systematically update a database containing existing statistical input, to prepare and follow-up targeted training in order to build a Euro-Mediterranean expertise in international migration, to produce monographic, comparative and other types of migration-related studies and research work, and to implement initiatives for the dissemination of results, such as publications, brochures and a website.\textsuperscript{196} In practice, the project has created the Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM). Since February 2007, and the end of MEDA funding, CARIM has been funded as part of the AENEAS programme for technical and financial assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum.\textsuperscript{197}

Actions dealing with migration have also been included in some of the Association Agreements between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries. Whereas the agreements with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia include specific provisions in the area of migration, the agreements with Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority only include very limited, or no provisions in the area of migration.\textsuperscript{198} When looking at our focus country, Morocco, we can see that the main migratory provisions have been included in Art. 71 of the Association Agreement, according to which it is one of the priorities of the partnership to reduce migratory pressure, in particular by improving living conditions, creating jobs and developing training in

\textsuperscript{195} Regional Cooperation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people - Framework Document, pp. 7-9.
\textsuperscript{196} Regional and Bilateral MEDA Co-operation in the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security. An overview of MEDA / JHA co-operation activities, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{197} The Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration – CARIM.
\textsuperscript{198} Magliveras 2004, p. 464.
the areas where the migrants come from. Furthermore, it is important to resettle those who have been repatriated because of their illegal status.199

Since the Valencia Conference, all subsequent Euro-Mediterranean meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs have discussed the issue of migration, usually underlining the need to strengthen the cooperation in the field and recognising the activities that have been undertaken within the regional cooperation programme.200 The first set of comprehensive recommendations in the field of migration since Valencia were presented in the Five Year Work Programme, which was introduced at the Summit organised to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 2005.201 This document, which forms the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation until 2010, when the free-trade area is meant to become operational, includes two overall objectives in the field of migration. Firstly, legal migration opportunities should be promoted, and the legal movement of individuals should be facilitated, as these movements “constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a means to improve links between countries, fair treatment and integration policies for legal migrants, and facilitate the flow of remittance transfers and address ‘brain drain’”. Secondly, the level of illegal migration and trafficking in human beings should be significantly reduced.202 More specifically the Euro-Mediterranean partners will:

- Hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss all issues pertinent to migration […];
- Develop mechanisms for practical co-operation and sharing experience on managing migration flows humanely, deepen dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore options for providing assistance for countries of origin and transit;
- Promote schemes for safer, easier, less expensive channels for the efficient transfer of migrants’ remittances, encourage active contacts with expatriate communities to maintain their participation in the development process in their country of origin;
- Develop ways to assist capacity building for those national institutions in partner countries dealing with expatriates;
- Promote legal migration opportunities and integration of migrants; and
- Enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration. This cooperation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation of different kinds of readmission agreements, the fight against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, and capacity building in border management and migration.203

Considering that this document was approved by the participants of the Summit in Barcelona, some interesting issues can be pointed out. Firstly, a ministerial meeting in migration is

199 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part. Art. 71.
200 See Annex 4.
203 Ibid, p. 11.
encouraged, showing that the issue of migration has become one of the priority issues within the EMP. Secondly, the question of illegal migration flows is also influencing the recommendations that are necessarily not only directed towards fighting illegal immigration. As an example, it is proposed to deepen the dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore the options for providing assistance to them. These recommendations seem especially relevant in the case of illegal migration, particularly from outside the Mediterranean region to the partner countries. Moreover, the recommendation of promoting legal migration opportunities is not supported by any specific means for doing so. However, including this recommendation in the work programme suggests that migration, as long as it is legal, is seen to be a necessary phenomenon by all parties, including countries of origin and countries of destination within the Euro-Mediterranean region. Together with the recommendation on promoting safer and easier channels for the migrants’ transmittances to the country of origin, it seems that the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is not to diminish migration, but rather to manage it, to mould it in such a way that it fits the needs of the partners.

Most likely the main development in the field of migration until the date has been the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, which was organised during the Portuguese Presidency on 18 and 19 November 2007. The conclusions from this meeting include issues relating to legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration. The conclusions confirm the above assumption of EMP wanting to manage migration in such a way that it fits the needs of the different stakeholders: “[…] well-managed migration can contribute to optimise the economic and social benefits of migration, for countries of origin, transit and destination […]”204. Migration is explicitly connected to the development of the countries of origin, and for the first time it is indicated what kind of measures should be taken to deal with the causes of migration. Firstly, poverty, unemployment and the development gap should be addressed through encouraging result-oriented partnership projects, in order to create a momentum for sustainable development. Secondly, FDI should be encouraged and promoted to generate employment and to thus reduce migration outflow. Finally, mechanisms, services and effective financial products should be set up in order to facilitate the transfer of remittances and micro credit opportunities. This could be done by the encouragement on using financial services for example by increasing migrants’ awareness of and access to the formal banking system, and by

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constructing a website gathering together information on remittances and transfer procedures, promoting thus competition among financial institutions and decreasing the transfer costs.\textsuperscript{205}

The facilitation of legal migration continued as the main theme also in this document, which also acknowledged “the globally positive effect of legal migration in terms of development”.\textsuperscript{206} The migration of workers in demand should be facilitated, but at the same time, the consequences of brain drain should be taken into account. This means that on the one side, there are the labour markets in the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, which have specific needs for migration, and on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean are the countries that see migration both as a tool for development, but also as a problem, especially when it is the migration of the skilled people, who would perhaps find employment in the country of origin in any case. The recommendations in this field are very much directed to the facilitation of legal migration, and ranging from studies of the labour situation and labour market needs for migrants, training courses in countries of origin, professional training and language courses and information campaigns directed to potential migrants, to the creation of centres providing information on and manage job-seeking and employment in the Euro-Mediterranean region.\textsuperscript{207}

The provisions on illegal migration touch closely upon the operational area of the European borders agency, Frontex, and range from promotion of better security standards in national travel documents and training courses for the countries of transit to information campaigns covering all aspects of illegal migration.\textsuperscript{208} It seems that even though illegal migration is still playing an important role in the relations between the Mediterranean partners, the importance of legal migration as well as migration and development are emerging to the foreground of the partnership. One reason for this can be that the issues of illegal migration belong to a large extent to the area of expertise of Frontex, which became operational in 2005, and thus the operational cooperation in that field has been moved from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership towards the multilateral cooperation coordinated by Frontex. However, even though Frontex cooperates actively with the MPC on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, the main parties taking part in its projects and activities are the EU and the Schengen Associated Countries, leaving thus MPC outside of the decision-making. Legal migration, however, is an issue that can to some extent be dealt with within the framework of EMP, because an important part of the financing

\textsuperscript{205} First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, Algarve 18 and 19 November 2007. Agreed Ministerial Conclusions, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. p. 4.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid, pp. 6-7.
used for dealing with the causes of migration comes from the financial support allocated to the Mediterranean partner countries.

As a form of an introduction to the analysis, we will here recapitulate the main causes of migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU, and try to identify in which ways the EMP is, in addition to the direct references and actions presented above, indirectly influencing migration. Above, we presented the following main causes of migration from the MPC to the European Union (generating, spurring and mediating factors):

- Economic inequality between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean
- Growing labour force in the Mediterranean partner countries, due to demographic growth
- Political destabilisation in some MPC
- Instable economies, that are dependent on the agricultural sector
- People who migrated earlier spread news of the good life “out there”
- Audiovisual communication, transport linkages and other communication technology has brought the European Union closer to the MPC
- The shortness of the geographical distance makes the thought of emigration easier

The influence that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership may have on these causes is in our opinion two-fold. On the one hand, three of the “generating factors”, concerning economic and demographic issues, are to some extent dealt with especially within the second basket of the EMP. The measures with this regard are aiming to improve the situation in the countries of origin and thus to limit migratory flows. These measures include for example the financial aid provided to the MPC through ENPI, which is used for example for private sector development, support to small and medium-sized enterprises, and for developing the local infrastructure.\textsuperscript{209} The four spurring and mediating factors, on the other hand, are more related to the cooperation in the third basket, which in fact includes measures that would increase the effect of these factors. For example the cooperation in the field of media will only bring the EU closer to the Mediterranean partner countries, as will the TEMPUS programme that is meant to increase student exchange between the MPC and the EU. While not aiming to decrease migration from the MPC to the EU, these activities are rather directed to increasing the understanding between the cultures and societies on both shores of the Mediterranean. They can, however, also function as a spurring factor for migration towards the EU.

\textsuperscript{209} EuroMed Info Centre. Economic and Financial Partnership.
As a concluding remark we can say, that “activation” can be identified in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of migration. More specific measures are being identified and agreed upon, and the ministerial meeting on migration indicates that an air of agreement concerning the migratory policies is beginning to emerge. It seems thus that the concrete actions taken within the framework of EMP in the field of migration have been agreed upon too recently for them to have taken any effect until now. We will return to this question in the analysis. Before we will however apply the findings to the case of Morocco, in order to find out whether we can see any patterns of changes in the migration policies and migratory flows that correspond to the equivalent provisions in the EMP.
6 CASE STUDY: MOROCCO

The goal of this chapter is to introduce a number of indicators that will present us with evidence concerning the development of the migration policies, migratory flows, their causes and consequences in Morocco, especially during the time the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has existed. We have chosen a number of different indicators that will be presented: number of immigrants from Morocco to Europe (both legal and illegal); demographic growth; the amount of remittances sent to Morocco by migrants; unemployment rate and poverty in Morocco; and finally economic growth, measured in GDP, its annual growth rate and GDP per capita. Instead of analysing these indicators or their development in relation to the EMP in this chapter, we have chosen to leave this to the following chapter, which is entirely dedicated to a thorough analysis of the evidence present throughout this paper. With this regard, the evidence presented here will be used in order to determine to what extent the EMP has had an impact on migration in the Mediterranean. Before moving on to the indicators, the chapter will begin with a general description of the activities and projects undertaken in Morocco within the framework of the EMP.

As explained in our methodology, we understand that discussing the impacts of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on migratory flows from all the Mediterranean partner countries cannot be done comprehensively by looking at one country only. It is however our understanding that considering the scope of this paper, one Mediterranean partner country will be sufficient to give us an indication of the extent of the influence of EMP in questions of migration. Considering that Morocco is the country in the region with the largest number of nationals living in the European Union, showing an interest in cooperation with the EU (as shown for example by the Moroccan application for membership in the EU in 1987), and that Morocco has been the largest beneficiary of financial aid through the MEDA programme, we presume that the influence that the EMP may have had on migration would be the most pronounced in the case of Morocco.

6.1 Morocco and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Concerning the impact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has had in Morocco in general, a number of actions deserve to be mentioned here. The EU-Morocco Association Agreement has been in force since 1 March 2000, and it is implemented through Country Strategic Papers (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP). The assistance allocated to Morocco has focused on
a number of sectoral interventions: support to economic reforms, business upgrading, infrastructure projects, and support for the implementation of the Association Agreement. MEDA has invested especially on five different priority areas, including institutional support and reform of the public administration; a trade facilitation programme with projects to support the restructuring of private enterprises, the liberalisation of the transport sector, and the implementation of the Association Agreement; human resource development with the focus on vocational training and higher education; and projects in the area of migration with programmes to improve the socio-economic development of the poorer regions of the country, to channel legal immigration, and to contribute to a more effective control of illegal immigration.210 Between 1995 and 2006, Morocco received more than € 1.6 billion in funding through MEDA, which makes Morocco the biggest beneficiary among the Mediterranean partner countries.211

More specifically the projects funded through MEDA in Morocco have concentrated for example on tax reforms (with the view of increasing the number of taxpayers and the ratio of tax revenue to GDP), improving living conditions in slums and clearing slums by means of measures targeting shanty towns, under-equipped and substandard districts and decayed housing, as well as waste management and water sanitation (NIP 2005-2006).212 The latter actions are essential in the attempt to reduce poverty in Morocco. The National Indicative Programme for 2007-2010 includes projects such as support for reducing the illiteracy rate, increasing the enrolment rate of children in schools, public administration reform for example through completing and implementing a new system of pay, recruitment and mobility, assessment, and promotion, and finally to strengthen the competitiveness of the Moroccan industry and improve the environment for business in Morocco. This is done in the context of the trade liberalisation belonging to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. The funding accorded to different sectors within the framework of the NIP 2007-2010 is presented in Annex 5.213

Morocco has also received funding from the EIB’s FEMIP-programme. For example in 2006, the EIB accorded € 290 Million to Morocco, concentrating on the renovation and modernisation of the infrastructures in health sector and hospitals (€ 70 Million), construction of a waste water treatment facility (€ 40 Million), bringing electricity to rural areas (€ 170 Million) and participation in the development of an investment fund for the financing of projects in the

211 EuropeAid: Morocco.
212 Euro-Med Partnership.
213 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.
infrastructural sector (€ 10 Million). On a more general level, the EIB concentrates its funding in areas such as energy, transport and telecommunications, water and environment, support for SMEs, infrastructures and technical assistance.214

With regard to migration, the 2002-2004 NIP proposed support to three specific areas: a programme of institutional support for creating a national structure responsible for channelling legal migration to the areas with demand; a programme of institutional support for fighting illegal migration through support to the Moroccan government to strengthen the control of its external borders; and a strategy for developing the Northern provinces of Morocco, which are the source of app. 40% of all the Moroccan migration towards the EU.215 The support is thus both in form of technical and economic aid. All in all, migration management, including border control management, institutional support for the movement of persons and the development of the Northern provinces received €87 million in funding during 2002-2004.216 The 2007-2010 NIP includes an important sector of vocational training which aims to cut down youth unemployment and at the same time provide training for potential legal migrants through an investment of € 50 million.

On the basis of this short presentation of activities undertaken in Morocco within the framework of EMP we can see that intentions for developing the country are there and that on paper it seems that if all these projects are carried out successfully, the situation in Morocco should be improved. In order to find out whether this is so, we will turn to the five different indicators.

6.2 Number of immigrants

The below table presents the development of migration from Morocco to the top nine receiving countries, to Europe and to all receiving countries combined between 1993 and 2005. This period of time is interesting with regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as it covers the first ten years of EMP and could thus show indications of its effects on the migratory flows. We can see that the number of Moroccan migrants has continuously been increasing, but that the migration speed has recently began to slow down.

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216 Euro-Med Partnership, p. 3.
Table 6: Moroccan emigrants: top nine receiving countries 1993-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>678,917</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>1,024,766</td>
<td>1,113,176</td>
<td>1,036,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>65,847</td>
<td>119,422</td>
<td>222,948</td>
<td>423,933</td>
<td>503,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>145,363</td>
<td>199,647</td>
<td>214,859</td>
<td>293,097</td>
<td>354,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>91,699</td>
<td>146,460</td>
<td>287,000</td>
<td>298,949</td>
<td>345,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>164,546</td>
<td>274,641</td>
<td>276,655</td>
<td>300,332</td>
<td>324,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>85,156</td>
<td>104,051</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>108,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>77,713</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>120,413</td>
<td>112,026</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>78,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,275,567</td>
<td>1,609,373</td>
<td>2,185,894</td>
<td>2,616,871</td>
<td>2,740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All receiving</td>
<td>1,545,036</td>
<td>1,917,217</td>
<td>2,582,069</td>
<td>3,089,090</td>
<td>3,185,386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fargues 2007, Annex p. 401.217

From the calculations done on the basis of the above table, we are able to see that the average number of migrants per year was at a strong rise until 2004. The biggest yearly increase can be seen between 2002 and 2004, but between 2004 and 2005, the number of migrants per year had already dropped from almost 254,000 to less than 100,000.

Table 7: Average number of migrants per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average growth</td>
<td>93,045</td>
<td>253,510</td>
<td>96,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average growth</td>
<td>132,970</td>
<td>96,296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on Table 6.

Even though our data only indicates a decreasing trend in the recent years and we do not know whether it has continued since 2005, we can make a preliminary assumption that the migratory trend (at least when it comes to legal migration, which is registered by the consulates) is beginning to show signs of slowing down. This is interesting especially with regard to the recent developments within the EMP, which encourage the promotion of legal migration.

Extracting data concerning illegal migrants from Morocco to the EU is however more difficult. To get a picture of the developments in the illegal migratory flows, we present here two different tables describing the number of interceptions by Moroccan officials at the Moroccan borders (2000-2005) and the number of detentions of Moroccan nationals in Spain (1996-2000).
Table 8: Detention of Moroccan nationals in Spain 1996-2000 (number and % of total detentions)

Table 9: Interceptions by Moroccan officials 2000-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6701</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5911</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5724</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5819</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12,858</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9850</td>
<td>14,395</td>
<td>24,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13,002</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>28,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>31,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>23,851</td>
<td>36,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9353</td>
<td>17,252</td>
<td>26,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We can see that whereas there was a steep increase in the number of illegal Moroccan migrants until 2002, the number has been in decline since then. The total number of interceptions by Moroccan officials has also come down since 2003. This is confirmed by Sadiqi, according to whom there was a 65% drop in the detention of illegal migrants at the Moroccan borders between 2005 and the first four months in 2006.218

6.3 Demographic growth

One aspect that has played an important part in the Moroccan migratory flows to the EU is population growth. In Morocco, the population growth peaked in 1965 and has kept on declining since then, which is mainly the cause of the strong decrease in fertility rates from 6.89 in 1972 to 2.75 in 2002. In the case of Morocco, a more significant factor than fertility rate is however the fact that the growth of the working age population increased clearly in the 1970s and 1980s. It is pointed out by Hein de Haas from the International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford that even though this demographic transition coincides well with the start of the international migration boom from Morocco and its peak in 1972, this should not mean that rapid population growth is always connected with more migration. This is because population growth only represents a part in a complex chain of processes leading to migration. De Haas explains that it is especially the growth in working age population combined with a shrinking demand for labour that first lead to high unemployment, and further possibly to migration. Furthermore, the migratory boom from Morocco between 1963 and 1972 was not only caused by growth in working age population, but is also closely related to political and economic trends of the time. The tendency to migrate thus always interacts with external political and economic factors, and

218 Sadiqi 2007b, p. 181.
the interplay between these and, for example growth in working age population, can lead to increased migration.\footnote{De Haas 2007, pp. 58-59.}

The statistics concerning population growth in Morocco that we have been able to collect originate from the Haut Commissariat au Plan (High Commission for Planning) of the Kingdom of Morocco in 2004. This number includes all the people residing in the Moroccan territory, including descendants of foreign nationals, but excludes Moroccans living abroad. The growth percentage describes the average yearly population growth rate.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Population & Growth \\
\hline
1960 & 11,626,470 & n/a \\
1971 & 15,379,259 & 2.58 \\
1982 & 20,419,555 & 2.61 \\
1994 & 26,073,717 & 2.06 \\
2004 & 29,891,708 & 1.38 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Population of the Kingdom of Morocco 1960-2004 with growth rate}
\end{table}


The population of Morocco is continuously growing, but the growth has clearly slowed down since the beginning of 1980s. According to the Haut Commissariat au Plan, the reason for this is the decrease in fertility since 1970s, which has further continued to decrease from 2.75 in 2002 to 2.5 children in 2004.\footnote{Royaume du Maroc 2004, p. 13.} The reductions in fertility will begin to reduce the number of working age population from 2010 onwards, and will reach its full momentum in 2015-2020. This means that the generation entering the labour market around this time should theoretically be faced with smaller labour market competition and a very light demographic burden, compared both with previous and upcoming generations. This may subsequently lead to a decrease in international migration.\footnote{De Haas 2007, pp. 61-62.}

\subsection*{6.4 Amount of remittances}

Even though remittances are earlier in this paper categorised under the consequences of migration to the country of origin, we have here chosen to present the developments in the amount of remittances as one of the main indicators from which we can see signs of changes in the migratory flows and in the nature of migration from Morocco to the EU. The amount of
remittances from Moroccan migrants to Morocco has been increasing remarkably since the 1970s. As we can see from table 9, only in the period 1997-2005, the amount of remittances more than doubled from MAD 18 billion to almost MAD 41 billion, which is approximately € 3.5 billion.

Table 11: Distribution of fund transfers originating from Moroccans residing abroad, according to the country of provenance, 1997-2005, millions of Moroccan dirhams (1 EUR = app. 11.5 MAD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4312</td>
<td>5290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>2258</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,036</td>
<td>10,373</td>
<td>10,206</td>
<td>10,386</td>
<td>14,974</td>
<td>14,462</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15,934</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1524</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>2044</td>
<td>2994</td>
<td>5864</td>
<td>3698</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4308</td>
<td>5037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>1639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium-Luxembourg</td>
<td>1366</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2073</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>2207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,033</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,311</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,002</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,962</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,858</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,708</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td><strong>37,401</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,738</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Fatima Sadiqi, who is Professor at the University of Fes in Morocco, the main reasons for the increase are the rise in European salaries during this period and the actions taken by the Moroccan government to facilitate the transfer of money and investments in Morocco. Whereas Sadiqi states that the Moroccan government has always shown an interest in the Moroccan community abroad, and especially the ways in which the flow of remittances could be increased, de Haas states that the active policies only emerged in the 1990s as a result of “an ominous stagnation in remittances”. It is undisputed that the Moroccan government has actively stimulated emigration throughout the post-independence time, but it was not before 1990 that for example the ministry for Moroccans residing abroad was created. Morocco has been able to direct remittances through official channels rather successfully especially through the effectiveness of fiscal policies, the development of an efficient banking system and also the return of macro-economic stability. The government has also opened banks in European

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222 Sadiqi 2007a, pp. 11-12; and de Haas 2007, p. 56.
countries that have a strong Moroccan community.\textsuperscript{223} Nothing is mentioned here of any possible actions supported by the EMP to simplify the transfer of remittances. Another important reason for the growth of remittances is the growth of the Moroccan migrant population abroad as presented in chapter 6.1. The growth in the number of migrants has however not been as strong as the growth in remittances; whereas the number of migrants increased 1.6 fold, the amount of remittances more than doubled.

There is no doubt about the fact that remittances account for an important part of the Moroccan economy; for example in 2003, remittances accounted for 9.7\% of the Moroccan GDP.\textsuperscript{224} It is also said that more than 1.2 million people in Morocco have escaped poverty because of the remittances from the Moroccan migrants. As presented in chapter 4.3, remittances often tend to be used for fulfilling the basic needs of the family members in Morocco, instead of being used in investments or reconstruction of the society. According to Andrea Gallina, an important amount of money is under-utilised, especially outside the housing sector, due to the risk of losing the savings or the lack of market opportunities and proper infrastructure, as well as “limited interest in the local development institutions”.\textsuperscript{225} Also in the case of Morocco, the remittances raise the standard of living of the families receiving money from abroad, and by becoming prosperous as a result of migration, remittances are encouraging more people to migrate. This means that remittances have both a positive and negative effect for Morocco. Remittances do not guarantee economic growth, but they can be very useful when turned into investments. In Morocco, the role of the remittances is according to Sadiqi still hindered by a number of obstacles, and the productive use of the money transfers and their capacity to improve local development should be stimulated. 80\% of the business projects of the Moroccan migrants in Morocco are in the building sector, and especially the smaller cities are very much dependent on remittances.\textsuperscript{226} This is why it is essential that the cooperation between Morocco and the EU increases measures not only to help facilitate the transfer of remittances, but also to direct these remittances to the areas of economy in Morocco which can improve labour productivity and increase economic growth. The inflow of remittances becomes even more important when considering that the flow of FDI to the Mediterranean partner countries is limited. As mentioned previously, FDI in the Mediterranean region is concentrated in Algeria, Libya and Morocco, which receive more than 50\% of the FDI, and in the oil sector, as well as the privatisation of public enterprises in strategic

\textsuperscript{223} De Haas 2007, p. 56; and Sadiqi 2007a, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{224} Sadiqi 2007a, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{225} Gallina 2006, p. 31.
sectors. The return for FDI in the region is the lowest in the world, which has led to the North African countries becoming net exporters of capital.227

6.5 Unemployment rate and poverty

Unemployment rate is another factor that has a direct connection to the development of migratory flows, but it can also show us results of structural changes that may have happened in the Moroccan economy for example as a result of the financial aid directed to Morocco through EMP. The below table presents the development of the unemployment rate in Morocco in 2000-2006. As a comparison, we have chosen to show how the development has been in two other countries, Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, and Algeria, which has a relatively similar relationship to the EU as Morocco. The choice of these countries may seem somewhat random, but they were chosen especially to bring some additional depth to the tables of indicators, and to show the developments in two other countries as a comparison to the developments in Morocco, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the extent of changes for example in the unemployment rate. Romania was chosen because of its level of GDP which responds almost perfectly to that of Morocco in the beginning of our comparison, 2000. Comparing Romania and Morocco can thus show us the difference between a country that gets the full support from the EU as an accession country, and later on a Member State of the European Union; and a country that has a status of a neighbouring country to the EU and of a Mediterranean partner country. Algeria was added to this comparison in order to show the development in another MPC during the same time span. We have however not studied the context of these developments in Algeria to any extent, which is why some caution is encouraged while comparing the developments in especially the unemployment rate between Morocco and Algeria.

From the table below, we can see that the unemployment rate in Morocco seems to have been declining modestly since 2000, whereas in the neighbouring Algeria the unemployment rate has crashed down from almost 30% to 12.3%. In Romania, no important changes can be indicated, even during the years preceding its accession in the EU.

Table 12: Unemployment rate (15-64) (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 92

According to Sadiqi, the unemployment in Morocco has not decreased strongly partly due to the fact that the state has drastically reduced public administration jobs and the recruitment of people to the public sector. This is on the other hand a direct consequence from the liberalisation of the economy, which has led the Moroccan state to decrease public investments and employment.}\textsuperscript{228}

This presents us with a direct connection to the goal of the EMP to create a free-trade area in the region by 2010. This goal is related to the liberalisation of the economy and shows us that more support is needed to the private sector in order to provide a positive balancing power towards the diminishing employment in the public sector.

More than the general unemployment rate in the country as a whole, it is the unemployment rate in cities and among young people that function as a generating factor to migration. In comparison to the 10.8% unemployment in the country as a whole in 2004, the unemployment was 18.4% in towns and 30% among young people, including graduates and non-graduates.}\textsuperscript{229}

The high unemployment rate in the towns is caused by poverty in the rural areas, which follows from the instability of the agricultural sector, presented above. The agricultural sector is not only dependent on the climate, but it is also meeting an important pressure from the liberalisation efforts, related for example to the creation of a free-trade area in the region.}\textsuperscript{230}

In addition to the unemployment rate, also the poverty rate tells a lot about the development in a country. Unfortunately the official sources only present the poverty rate for Morocco until 2001, which makes it difficult for us to see an influence from the EMP. An important aspect of this table is that it shows us that poverty is an important phenomenon especially in the rural Morocco. This means that any means for fighting poverty in Morocco, should be directed to the development of the rural communities.

\textsuperscript{228} Sadiqi 2007a, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{229} European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{230} Parténariat Euro-Med, p. 15.
Table 13: Relative poverty rate according to area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.6 Economic growth

A strong economic growth is an important factor in creating jobs, and thus also in reducing migration from a country. This is why economic growth has been chosen as the fifth indicator presenting us with evidence on possible influence that EMP has had on Moroccan migration. We have chosen to compare the Moroccan GDP, GDP growth and GDP per capita with those of Romania and Algeria, especially because in the first year included in our comparison, the Romanian GDP was almost exactly at the same level as that of Morocco, and Algeria was the MPC with closest GDP to that of Morocco. What the below table shows us is that in terms of current prices growth of GDP, the growth of Morocco has been clearly slower than that in both Romania and Algeria. Compared to Romania, which increased its GDP 2.4 fold, and Algeria, which increased its GDP 1.6 fold, Morocco was only able to increase its GDP 1.3 fold.

Table 14: GDP at current prices (millions of €)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>40,236</td>
<td>41,719</td>
<td>42,930</td>
<td>44,108</td>
<td>45,375</td>
<td>47,419</td>
<td>52,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>40,346</td>
<td>44,904</td>
<td>48,442</td>
<td>52,613</td>
<td>60,842</td>
<td>79,551</td>
<td>97,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>59,378</td>
<td>61,082</td>
<td>60,049</td>
<td>60,020</td>
<td>68,466</td>
<td>82,608</td>
<td>92,745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 34

The picture changes however when looking at the growth of GDP at constant prices. Here the differences between the three countries become less pronounced, but the most significant aspect to notice is that whereas the growth in Romania and Algeria is relatively balanced, it fluctuates strongly in Morocco, between 1.8% in 2000 and 8.0% in 2006. One reason for this was presented in chapter 4.2.1 concerning the generating factors for migration. The economies in this region are characterised by the up and down effect, resulting from the dependency on agriculture and thus on the weather conditions.
Table 15: Annual growth rate of GDP at constant prices (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 35.

The GDP and GDP per capita have constantly been growing in Morocco, whereas in Algeria, a decrease in GDP was seen both in 2002 and 2003. The growth in Morocco is nevertheless “too modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Moroccan labour market”.231

Table 16: GDP per capita at current market prices (€)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>1447</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>1708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>3700</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>2770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat 2007, p. 36.

The GDP per capita comparison between Morocco and Romania show us an interesting point when discussing the income differentials between the countries of origin and countries of destination. Despite the fact that Romania is not an important receiving country of Moroccan migrants in the European Union, it is nevertheless a Member State of the EU and thus adding to the GDP per capita of the EU as a whole. What the comparison between Morocco and Romania shows us, is that as the Romanian GDP per capita is increasing significantly faster than the GDP per capita in Morocco, we can presume that the income gap between Morocco and the EU is not diminishing either. This would furthermore mean that when taking the income gap as one of the main causes of migration, we can assume that a decrease in migration towards the EU is not in sight.

6.7 Concluding remarks

The above presentation of indicators supports the explanation of de Haas, according to whom Morocco is a “labour frontier country”, which is characterised by “upper-lower and lower-middle income levels, sharply falling birth rates, rather high, but decreasing population growth,

231 De Haas 2007, p. 60.
and a steep increase in the number of young adults entering the labour market”. It is said that the modest social, economic, and infrastructural development in these labour frontier countries motivates and enables people to emigrate in large numbers.

For example Sadiqi has studied the migration intentions of Moroccans towards the European Union. She found that almost one fifth of the Moroccan population is interested in migrating to Europe. Migration intentions are especially high in the North of Morocco, where the living conditions are characterised by insecurity, particularly due to the lack of resources and investments, but also because of the proximity of Spain. Sadiqi’s study also indicates that the mass media and especially the national television channels in Morocco are indirectly encouraging migration by giving an idealistic image of Europe. As an example she mentions the programme “Noujoum al hijra”, or “the stars of migration”, which shows examples of Moroccan migrants that have succeeded in their countries of destination. The hard conditions often experienced by especially the illegal migrants are not presented in the national television. This supports the theory of Khachani concerning the spurring factors that facilitate migration from the MPC towards the EU, presented in chapter 4.2.2.

After having presented a number of indicators related to migration and development, we will now move on to analysing the evidence that has been presented throughout this paper in order to test the hypotheses presented in the beginning of the paper.

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232 De Haas 2007, p. 58.
233 Ibid.
235 Ibid, p. 6
7 ANALYSIS

Each of the previous chapters included in this paper have served a specific purpose in relation to the analytical part of the paper, which will be presented in this chapter. We have chosen to divide this analysis into two parts according to our two-fold problem formulation. In the first part of the analysis, we will discuss the findings in this paper with the view of answering “to what extent” the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced migration in the Mediterranean. We will refer to our hypotheses and try to determine which hypothesis holds true. In this part we will draw heavily on chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis, where we have presented the ways in which migration affects the countries of origin and destination, the ways in which the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership deals with migration and how migration has developed in Morocco. By comparing the developments in the EMP, both in general and with regard to activities introduced in Morocco, to those in migration policies and the migratory flows from Morocco towards Europe, we will try to identify patterns that would tell us more about the influence of the EMP.

The second part of the analysis will be dedicated to a discussion concerning “why” the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has influenced migration to the extent determined in the first part of the analysis. We will recapitulate the three different hypotheses and try to determine their explanatory power drawing on chapter 3, where we present theoretical considerations concerning the perception of migration as a security threat by the European Union, chapters 4 and 6, which present the interests of the countries of origin and destination in relation to the consequences of migration, and the interests of Morocco with regard to migration; and chapter 5, which presents the policy changes and measures taken within the framework of the EMP to address migration. By doing this, we aim to find an explanation (or multiple explanations) to the level of influence of the EMP on migration.

7.1 The extent of influence on migration

Based on the information concerning the increase in migration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU presented in the introduction to this thesis, we formulated our hypotheses following the presumption that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been unsuccessful in influencing migration in the Mediterranean. Multiple pieces of evidence concerning this
hypothesis have been presented throughout the thesis and our aim here is to recapitulate the main evidence and form the final conclusions on this basis.

In the text boxes below, we summarise the main causes of international immigration on the one hand and the main causes of immigration from the Mediterranean partner countries to the EU on the other hand. Many of the more general causes for international immigration are also valid in the Mediterranean context, and play a role as the fundamental reasons for the development of the more specific causes of migration from the MPC to the European Union. For example the negative or low economic growth, which is combined with unequal income distribution, transforms in our context to the economic inequality between the MPC and the European Union. Furthermore, the high underemployment and unemployment are in the MPC closely related to the strong demographic growth, but also to the economic restructuring that is expected from the MPC in order to fulfil the requirements concerning the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. One cause that comes through in the context of our case study on Morocco, but is not directly included in the lists below, is poverty. For example in 1998-1999, approximately 19% (or 5.3 million people) of the Moroccan population were living in poverty, in comparison to 3.4 million people in 1990-1991. Poverty is high especially in the rural areas, and it is increasingly spreading to the urban areas, contributing to the increased unemployment, and functions thus as a generating factor to migratory flows from Morocco towards the EU.\textsuperscript{236} We can thus expect that the EMP activities include the aim of reducing poverty in the Mediterranean partner countries in order to influence migration.

\textsuperscript{236} Euro-Med Partnership, p. 15.
Furthermore, we presented a number of consequences that migration has both in the countries of origin and in the countries of destination. It has become evident that the consequences of migration are neither exclusively positive nor negative and for example the demographic changes have very different impacts in the country of origin (increase in average age due to the emigration of the younger people) and country of destination (a regained balance in the demographic profile, where immigration serves as a way of filling gaps in the labour market and in keeping the balance between the working age population and the people in pension).
To deal with the above-mentioned causes and consequences of migration, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has since its establishment introduced a number of direct and indirect measures. Below we have listed the most important actions as indicated in the Association Agreements, work programmes, actions plans and ministerial conclusions.

**Dealing with the causes of migration:**
- poverty, unemployment and the development gap should be addressed through encouraging result-oriented partnership projects, in order to gain momentum for sustainable development
- FDI should be encouraged and promoted in order to generate employment and to thus reduce migration outflows

**Dealing with the consequences of migration:**
- developing effective cooperation mechanisms in the field of fighting illegal immigration
- establishment of readmission agreements
- investigate the possibility to accelerate and simplify issuing of visas
- reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family reunion
- develop training in the areas where the migrants come from
- resettling those who have been repatriated because of their illegal status
- legal migration opportunities should be promoted and facilitated
Mechanisms, services and effective financial products should be set up in order to facilitate the transfer of remittances and micro credit opportunities. Increasing migrants’ awareness of and access to the formal banking system. Information campaigns (also on illegal migration) in the countries of origin.

Other measures related to migration

- exchange statistics and information on migratory flows, and establish a systematically updated database
- prepare and follow-up on targeted training in order to build a Euro-Mediterranean expertise in international migration
- produce monographic, comparative and other types migration related studies and research work
- implement initiatives for the dissemination of results, such as publications, brochures and a website

Compared to the actual causes and consequences of migration, we can identify a number of connections. The measures to deal with the causes of migration in the country of origin take into account three main points listed as causes of migration from the MPC to the EU. On the one hand, concentrating on sustainable development through addressing poverty, unemployment and the development gap by encouraging result-oriented projects, suggests a way of dealing with economic inequality between the MPC and the EU, as well as a growing labour force in the MPC. Furthermore, as presented above, poverty is one of the main causes of migration from our case country, Morocco, and the recommendation acknowledges this fact. On the other hand, encouraging and promoting FDI would help to stabilise the economies in the MPC, create more jobs and support the growing independence from the agricultural sector. This is important, because for example in the beginning of this decade, three consecutive years of drought caused an increase in poverty in the rural areas of Morocco\textsuperscript{237}, showing that dependence on the agricultural sector can contribute to worsening living standards and subsequently to increased migratory flows towards the European Union. However, looking at the development of FDI in the MENA countries (table 5 in chapter 4.3) we can see that whereas the amount of FDI was growing strongly until 2000, it crashed to half in 2001 and was further diminishing until 2004. This indicates that until now, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has not been able to encourage the flow of FDI to the Mediterranean partner countries. This finding is furthermore supported by our case study, where we found that the National Indicative Programmes including activities and projects funded in Morocco do not include activities to support the inflow of FDI to Morocco.

This is an important finding because FDI is considered as a means “to achieve economic development in its own right, with expected positive spillovers over and above those associated

\textsuperscript{237} Euro-Med Partnership, p. 4.
with domestically financed investments”. Krogstrup & Matar explain that the impact of FDI is dependent on multiple factors, which determine whether the host country can absorb FDI and further benefit from it. When these factors are in place, FDI can contribute to the development of the country through four main channels: the crowding channel, the linkages channel, the human capital channel and the market-opening channel. Firstly, the crowding channel describes the impact where FDI triggers an additional need for financing, which can be sought in the domestic markets as a way to complement the initial FDI. Secondly, the linkages channel explains how FDI can result in transferring new technology to the host country’s economy. This can subsequently lead to growth and higher productivity. Thirdly, the human capital channel describes how FDI can influence the human capital development in the host country positively, “through the training and transfer of skills, managerial know-how and expertise to local employees and staff of upstream suppliers”. Finally, the market-opening channel presents the way in which the multinational corporations can help the host economies in accessing new markets through their existing trade relations. Such an exposure to global markets can support increased efficiency and competitiveness among the exporting industries of the host economy.

It seems thus that supporting FDI is in fact an important measure in influencing migration and that the EMP has not managed to do this.

When looking at the consequences of migration and the measures to help deal with them, there are a number of actions that deserve mentioning. The primary observation is that the actions aim at supporting the consequences of migration that are considered to be positive to the countries of origin and destination, and finding solutions to the negative consequences. For example the importance of remittances is acknowledged both in the recommendation to set up mechanisms, services and effective financial products to help the transfer of remittances, and in the recommendation to increase the awareness of and access to the formal banking system. However, no actions are included concerning the channelling of the remittances to specific fields of investment, which is problematic due to the low impact on economic growth of remittances that are only channelled to the primary needs of the families. The negative aspects of illegal immigration are taken into consideration as the need for further cooperation in the area and

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238 Krogstrup & Matar 2005, p. 2. Signe Krogstrup is Lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and Linda Matar is affiliated at the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Beirut. 
239 Krogstrup & Matar 2005, p. 2. The factors are for example the level of technology used in the domestic production of the home country, level of education, level of financial sector and the level of institutional development. 
240 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
242 Ibid.
readmission agreements is listed. Furthermore, information campaigns are supported. The problematic situation of unemployed migrants and the financial and social consequences of this to the country of destination are taken into consideration by supporting training and vocational education in the countries of origin. Finally, legal migration, which contributes positively to the economies in the countries of destination, is encouraged and measures to facilitate it are supported. The question of dealing with brain drain in the countries of origin is however not dealt with extensively. This seems to indicate that the areas where both the countries of origin and the countries of destination share the same interests (for example supporting the economic development in the countries of origin) are included in the list of actions, whereas the potential problems caused by certain actions in the countries of origin are not dealt with comprehensively. We will return to this problem later on in this paper.

These measures listed in the action plans etc. do not however tell us anything concrete about the actions that have been realised and not only planned. In order to go more deeply into the actual projects, we will return to our case study on Morocco and try to identify specific actions that may have influenced migration in the Mediterranean. Due to the vastness of activities, we have chosen a number of specific activities that are targeted in the areas of cooperation, aiming to influence migration. The problem with this method is however that the long-term impacts expected (that is, the changes in the indicators presented in the previous chapter, such as lower unemployment) are very distant from the short-term objectives of the projects that have been planned and realised. The objectives on a more general level (such as increasing cooperation in the field of illegal immigration) are more directly related to our indicators, but are for their part difficult to measure. The data presented is from the NIP 2002-2004, as the projects realised within the framework of the programme should show signs of improvement by now. In addition to the indicators presented in the previous chapter, we have included the poverty rate as an additional indicator.

7.1.1 Analysing the concrete effects of the EMP

The National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Morocco concentrated on the second and third baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, dividing the funds equally between the two. We have chosen to present the activities within the NIP that deal most closely with migration, either directly or indirectly. Possible effect will be evaluated by a comparison with the developments in the indicators, on the one hand, and by investigating subsequent NIPs, on the other hand.
The main activity within the framework of the economic and financial partnership concerns the reform of public administration in Morocco. The main goals of this priority have been to concentrate the role of the state to specific priority tasks, and to reduce and rationalise public spending by redirecting funds from the salaries to priority sectors such as health, education and infrastructure. The support for this reform adds up to €810 million. Concerning the impact of this reform on migration in the Mediterranean, we can refer to the development of the unemployment rate in Morocco in the recent years, which shows (especially compared to the decrease in the unemployment rate in Algeria) a rather modest decrease from 13.4% to 9.7%. As mentioned above, the main reason for this is exactly the public administration reform, which has led the state to drastically cut jobs in public administration. This reduction has however not been met with a sufficient increase in the number of jobs in the private sector, partly caused by the lack of FDI. As the increased unemployment is one of the main causes of migration, it seems that the support to the reform of public administration has in fact rather increased the incentives to emigrate, than reduced them. This is however only the case in the short term and rendering the public administration more efficient will be an asset in the long term.

Within the framework of the social, cultural and human affairs partnership, the 2002-2004 NIP includes a priority to deal with emigration. This priority consists of three specific support programmes, with a combined budget of more than €115 million. The first project has as its aim to create a governmental institution responsible for channelling legal emigration according to demand especially by using a quota system. The long-term goals of this institution will be to diminish illegal emigration and to make legal migration more effective. Though we have not been able to find evidence concerning this institution and its establishment, for example Sadiqi refers to the ongoing plans for creating a Direction de la Migration et du Contrôle des Frontières (Migratory and border control authority) and of an Observatoire de la Migration (migration observatory). It seems thus that the plans are still waiting to be finalised and thus no effect can be measured. Instead, we can look at the figures for illegal migration from Morocco to the EU in order to see whether there have been any changes in the illegal migratory trends. It does in fact seem that the number of (Moroccan) illegal immigrants has decreased in the recent years, with 16,100 migrants intercepted by the Moroccan officials in 2002, in comparison with 8000 in

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244 Ibid, pp. 44-45.
245 Sadiqi 2007b, p. 181.
2005. We cannot connect these changes directly to the support from the EU, but we can see that there is development in the right direction on the way.

Also the following support programme concentrates on diminishing illegal migration, but it does it more through crime fighting mechanisms by centring on cross border crime, such as trafficking and smuggling human beings.\(^{246}\) The programme aims to do so for example through the establishment of a duly equipped and trained border police and a “gradual installation of technical means at border crossing points allowing for a rapid an effective control”.\(^{247}\) Once again we can look at the indicators for illegal migration and see that the goal may be reached when it comes to illegal Moroccan migrants. In addition, even if our statistics tell us that the number of other illegal migrants intercepted at the Moroccan borders has not diminished significantly, we have the statement from Sadiqi that the first months of 2006 witnessed a 65% decline in the number of illegal migrants intercepted in Morocco. Furthermore, 120 networks for illegal migration were dismantled in Morocco and new border control policies have been adopted together with “reinforces policies and measures to stop clandestine migration”.\(^{248}\) Once again, we can see development towards the goals of the EMP support programmes, but the development cannot be attributed to the EMP only.

Finally, the NIP 2002-2004 includes a strategy for the development of the northern provinces of Morocco. This programme aims to prevent further emigration from the poor rural areas in the northern Morocco to both the bigger cities and the European Union by creating jobs and by strengthening the role of these provinces in the overall economy of the country. The infrastructural and rural development projects financed by MEDA were meant to create at least 15,000 jobs connected to the execution of the programme. A similar programme had already run 1996-2000 without significant influence.\(^{249}\) The success of the project should be seen for example in the development of the poverty rate in Morocco, but also as a decline in the number of immigrants. Unfortunately, the data concerning the poverty date presented above only show us the development until 2001, which is why we cannot make any direct conclusions from that basis. The data supports however the statement that the 1996-2000 programme did not result in comprehensive development. The overall number of Moroccan immigrants has not diminished

\(^{246}\) Parténariat Euro-Med, p. 45.  
\(^{247}\) Ibid, p. 46.  
\(^{248}\) Sadiqi 2007b, p. 181.  
either, which leads us to conclude that the development reached through this programme have been a) modest or b) regional in nature and cannot thus be detected in the general indicators.

On the basis of the above, rather limited analysis concerning the influence that the EMP may have had on migration from Morocco to the EU the main conclusion can be that if and when the EMP has had an influence on migration, this has either been on the root level or the influence cannot be detected yet. Many activities concerning the development of Morocco are present in the National Indicative Programmes and especially the activities presented in the conclusions from the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on migration in 2007 include a list of direct measures to deal with migration. It is however too soon to tell in which ways these activities will be implemented and what their effect will be. Even though migration was already present in the Barcelona declaration, it seems to us that it has become a priority area of cooperation only recently, which is why impacts are not yet visible. The conclusion of this chapter is thus that the first parts of our hypotheses seem to hold. However, instead of stating that the EMP has been unsuccessful in influencing migration on the Mediterranean, we consider it to be more correct to state that the influence that the EMP has had on migration in the Mediterranean has, until now, been modest.

7.2 The reasons behind the extent of influence on migration

Having established that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has, until now, only had modest influence on migration in the Mediterranean region leads us to the question of why it is so. We know that migration and the threat that the southern EU Member States felt that it poses were one of the main reasons behind the creation of the EMP. It would thus seem reasonable that after more than 12 years of the Barcelona conference, more impacts could be seen. In the methodological chapter of this paper, we presented a number of hypotheses that could explain the lack of activities in this area of cooperation. Below we deal with each hypothesis one by one in order to see how our evidence supports or opposes it.

Based on the information that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to an important extent modelled by the European counterparts, we assumed that the “architects” of the partnership may not be fully aware of the causes and consequences of migration in the countries of origin. If the measures taken within the EMP to influence migration were found to be irrelevant and ineffective, we could find the reason for why the influence on migration has only been modest.
The analysis conducted in the previous parts of this chapter shows us that the activities within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership match relatively well with the causes and consequences of migration in the Mediterranean partner countries, and especially in Morocco. We have established that Morocco suffers from both low economic growth and high population growth, which is however drastically slowing down and thus showing signs of improvement. Furthermore, migration is generated by poverty, especially in the northern and other rural regions, by the increasing development gap between Morocco and the EU and the economic instability, caused partly by the dependence on agriculture, but also by the lack of FDI. The general actions of the EMP, stated for example in the ministerial conclusions and action plans, take into consideration poverty, the development gap and the need for economic stability, and these are also dealt with within the framework of the more specific National indicative programmes.\(^{250}\) It appears to us that the ability to understand the causes and consequences of migration in the region is there and that the measures introduced within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are targeting the right causes and consequences.

Considering that our first hypothesis has been falsified, and that the EMP seems to be tackling the relevant issues, it appears that the problems lie rather in the way that these issues are tackled. This leads us to turn to the two remaining hypotheses, according to which the EMP has not been able to influence migration either because of the inability of the partners to develop a comprehensive, common strategy, which takes into account the differing interests of the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries, or because of the lack of ability to efficiently implement the decisions taken within the framework of the EMP. The reason for dealing with these two hypotheses together is that they are by no means exclusive, and that our final conclusion may very well be based on an explanation that draws partly to both hypotheses.

The first of these two hypotheses is based on the differing interests of the European Union, on the one hand, and the Mediterranean partner countries, on the other hand, seen in the consequences of migration to both parties. Many of the consequences of migration can be positive to one party and negative to the other, and they can also be ambiguous in their impacts, forming partly an advantage and partly a disadvantage to both parties. Such is for example the case of the integration of the migrants to the country of destination. Earlier in this paper, we have argued that migration has become to be seen as a security issue in the EU, especially because of

\(^{250}\) We have however only studied the NIPs of Morocco.
its threat to the societal security in the Member States. Due to the process of securitisation, migration has been brought to the forefront of the political debate and it has been accepted by the European peoples as a security issue especially after migration has been associated in the public to a number of terrorist attacks in the Western world. At the same time for example the cultural, religious and linguistic differences of the migrants have come to be seen as a threat to the identity of the society, that is, to the ability of the society to keep its essential character also under changing conditions or threats, which might be both possible and actual. The society’s identity is connected to the ability of the society to sustain its language, culture, religion, national identity and customs. Immigrants entering a society bring with them language, culture, religion, national identity and customs of their own country or region and take thus a “place” in the society. Whereas it is in the interest of the immigrants to rather adapt into the society in such a way that there is also a place for their “societal identity”, it is often the interest of the host society to integrate the immigrants into the society as well as possible. Herein lays the conflict of interest between the countries of origin and the countries of destination. As a more practical example, we can mention the goals of the Delegated Ministry in Charge of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad:

1. To consolidate the rights and the assets of the Moroccan community residing abroad and to protect this community from all forms of discrimination, racism and violence.
2. To promote a global approach of migration and to update migration policies through awareness campaigns.
3. To encourage integration in the host countries while preserving the Moroccan identity, with its Muslim, Arabic and Berber dimensions.
4. To organise the Moroccan community abroad as a powerful Diaspora and a lobbying force that will play an important role in the development of various strategies at both the national and the international level.
5. To encourage the Moroccan community abroad to defend national interests and to create the conditions required to facilitate its participation in the public life.
6. To intensify co-operation with the host countries in order to set rational policies and adopt a global approach to legal migration.
7. To involve the Moroccan community abroad in the process of decision-making.251

We can see that while integration is encouraged, it should be done by preserving the Moroccan identity. Furthermore, the Moroccan community is encouraged to defend the national interests of Morocco in the countries of destination. Close ties are encouraged in order to take full advantage

251 Sadiqi 2004, p. 4.
of the Moroccan Diaspora and of the economic possibilities that the remittances and other financial aid from this Diaspora can mean to Morocco. Meanwhile, in the countries of destination the threat felt to the societal identity is in many cases leading to racism and xenophobia.

An especially important area of cooperation where the conflict of interests is posing difficulties concerns the legal migration and its management. Legal migration can basically be considered to be an asset both to the country of origin (for example in form of reduction of labour force surplus and the financial aid that the country of origin receives from the working migrants abroad) and to the country of destination (recovering balance in the demographic structure, filling gaps in the labour market). The interests are however becoming all the more diverged, as the countries of destination are in need of more skilled and specialised labour, whereas the countries of origin need the educated people to stay at home in order to improve the situation there. As seen in chapter 5.2, promoting legal migration has recently become one of the main issues within the cooperation between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries. For example the conclusions from the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on migration in November 2007 dedicate a whole chapter for the facilitation of the legal movement. The main problem in relation to brain drain is that it can be complicated for the Mediterranean partner countries to make a rational choice between the benefits of migration and the disadvantages of brain drain, because migration can lead to direct economic benefits to the country through remittances, whereas the problems related to brain drain are rather seen in the long run. Whereas the above-mentioned conclusions state that legal migration has a globally positive effect in terms of development, the negative consequences of legal migration are also mentioned, as it is said that the needs of the countries of origin with regard to transferring competences and alleviating the consequences of brain drain have to be taken into account.252

How can the equation of encouraged legal migration versus balanced supply of skilled labour function? As for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the solution includes studies concerning the labour situation and the labour market needs for migrants, possibilities for labour matching, introduction of training courses in order to help the migrants enhance their skills (which can then be used when the migrant returns to its country of origin) and exploring possibilities to establish job-seeking centres in the Euro-Mediterranean region.253 Hence, the solution seems to be that the needs of the labour markets in the European Union (but also elsewhere in the Mediterranean

252 Ministerial Conclusions, First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, p. 4.
253 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
region) are fulfilled by managing the migratory flows in such a way that only people who fulfil the requirements of filling specific gaps in the labour market are given the permission to migrate. In these cases, however, migration will be largely facilitated and speeded up. Furthermore, the potential migrants in the countries of origin are educated and trained in the specialty areas where additional labour force is needed in the European Union. The migrants acquire an important skill-set while working abroad and can then take a use of these acquired skills when returning home. This solution leads to a number of questions. In which ways will it be made sure that the countries of origin have a sufficient supply of highly skilled workers, specialised in the areas where the country of origin is in need of labour force? Furthermore, is it a fair conclusion to expect the migrants to return to their countries of origin after having acquired increased skills in the country of destination?

One recurring issue concerning the interests of the countries of origin and the countries of destination is that the developments in the migration cooperation within the EMP seem to have a direct connection to the needs and interests of the EU and the development of its migration policy. Migration has been on the agenda of the EMP from the beginning, but it was only after the European Union gained widened competences in the field of Justice and Home Affairs that migration became a central issue in the cooperation. When the migratory flows, and especially the flows of illegal immigrants, to the EU grew drastically around year 2000, migration was dealt with more in connection with judicial cooperation, crime and terrorism, whereas facilitating legal immigration has become more pronounced during the recent years, when the EU Member States have began struggling with a shortage of labour force in specific fields. This can be caused by another level of differing interests, that is, differing interests among the EU Member States. Whereas illegal immigration is a problem with limited effect on for example the northern EU Member States, the labour force shortage is a phenomenon that strikes all the Member States. It seems that the EU’s interests towards the Mediterranean partner countries are only as strong as the average interests of the Member States. This would explain why the actions to promote legal immigration have recently become a more multilateral interest than the fight against illegal immigration, which the EU has mostly dealt with unilaterally.

An important concern related to the change in the migratory policies according to the needs of the EU Member States is that these policy changes are in our opinion showing rather short-term than long-term interests. When immigration became to be seen as a security threat, the EU strengthened its migratory policies and restricted the access to its territory. Now that there is a
need for additional labour force in the EU Member States, legal migration is supported and encouraged. The increasing interest towards legal migration could at the same time indicate that a process of desecuritisation with regard to migration is underway. Whereas illegal migration is still seen as a security threat, legal migration is now spoken for by a wide range of politicians in the EU, showing signs of desecuritisation from the part of the “securitising actors”. Whether this desecuritising speech is accepted by the general public is however less probable.

Furthermore, broadening the scope of analysis in this thesis would bring us to discuss how the internal policies within the EU, apart from migration policy, affect the interests of the EU Member States towards the EMP. For example the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) plays an all the more important role with regard to the Mediterranean partner countries and especially the success of the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. Now that the world is struggling with an increasing food crisis, especially the agricultural producing Member States will be interested in limiting the support to the agricultural sectors in the MPC. The same is relevant for example with regard to the common commercial policy. We wanted to mention this in order to show that the EU’s interest towards the EMP are in fact dependent on a number of factors and that bringing up the analysis to another level could have provided us with a number of different answers. This was however not the aim of this thesis, which is why the attention has been concentrated on migration.

This leads us to conclude that even though the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does take into consideration the causes and consequences of migration, it seems that the cooperation is to a large extent modelled by the EU partners. The interests of the Mediterranean partner countries are taken into account, but left to the background, whereas the areas of cooperation of direct interest to the EU are supported more extensively. This has for example led to the fact that pushing legal migration forth has only happened during the recent years. Instead, the EU partners have been more concerned in dealing with the consequences of migration unilaterally, strengthening migration laws and making it more difficult for migrants to enter the European Union. The Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration shows however that the balance is now turning more towards the Mediterranean partner countries, but this is in our opinion only happening because of a change in the interests of the EU partners. We can thus say that Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s influence on migration in the Mediterranean has been modest because of the inability of the partners to draw a common strategy that would
comprehensively take into account the interests of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination.

We have however shown that the activities within the framework of the National Indicative Programme for Morocco are taking into account the interests of the Mediterranean partner countries, as the support actions are very much concentrated on infrastructural developments and support in fighting poverty, areas which first and foremost benefit Morocco and only provide an indirect benefit to the European Union. The benefit is however expected in the long run, and diminishing poverty and unemployment by improving living conditions, health, education and sanitation is meant to tackle the issue of immigration from Morocco towards the EU. This approach supports the conclusion of Khachani, according to whom all the actions that try to tackle immigration, be it legal or illegal, should be dealt with by touching upon the underlying causes that create and support immigration.  

This brings us to our last hypothesis, according to which the EMP has only had a modest influence on migration in the Mediterranean because the implementation of the activities has not been carried out effectively. We postulated that this could be caused by lack of resources, lack of capacity, lack of skills or even lack of will from different stakeholders. What we find is that despite the ambitious wordings in the ministerial conclusions throughout the years, the National Indicative Programmes for Morocco have concentrated on a limited number of support areas on a relatively low level. Low, meaning specific, rather than lacking ambition. The projects are, to an important extent, taking place and implemented, but considering that their impact is not seen directly in migratory flows, but rather as more modest developmental steps, it is easy to consider their implementation to be ineffective. Rather, the results of the implementation will be seen in the long run, and due to the fact that many of these projects have not been running for very long yet, the influence on migration can not be detected yet. This connects our conclusion concerning the third hypothesis to our second hypothesis. We found that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership follows too much the lines of interest of the EU partners, and that increasing interest in managing the migratory flows in a way adequate to the European Union has brought migration to the foreground of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The measures taken within the EMP are relevant and effective, but due to the fact that dealing with migration, and especially legal migration, has been on the top of the agenda for a limited time only because of the interests of the European Union, the influence that the EMP has had on migration on the Mediterranean has been modest.

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254 Khachani 2006, pp. 16-17.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

The changing geo-political environment, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, brought with it the realisation of the existence of a widening and broadening scope of security issues. Security was no longer only connected to military threats, but became associated with the political, economic, societal and environmental sectors as well. To the southern EU Member States, this brought about the increasing threat of a massive migratory flow from North Africa as a result of political instability in for example Algeria. Migration became to be seen as a threat to the societal security in the European countries and we have argued that migration went through a process of securitisation, where the perception of migration as a security issue became accepted by the public. Subsequently, the attention of the European Union was directed towards the Mediterranean, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established, with a view of creating an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity. The aim of this thesis was to answer the twofold question: To what extent has the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership influenced migration in the Mediterranean region, and why?

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has since its beginning included indirect and direct actions for influencing migration in the Mediterranean. In this paper, we have been able to conclude that the influence that the EMP has had on migration until now, has been modest. In many cases the influence can either be detected on the root level, or the actions have taken place too recently for any impact to be detected. The cooperation has however resulted in changes in migratory policies, especially within the cooperation itself. It can be said that increased cooperation within the economic and financial basket of the partnership requires a more efficiently managed cooperation in the field of migration, which is why the EMP has in fact had an impact on migratory policies.

Having investigated the different measures taken within the EMP to influence migration especially in Morocco, we could conclude that the measures introduced within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are targeting the right causes and consequences of migration. Instead, the problems in influencing migration seem rather to be related to both the differing interests between the Mediterranean partner countries and the European Union, as well as to the differing interests among the EU Member States. These differing interests are manifesting themselves particularly in the earlier reluctance of the Mediterranean partner countries to limit (illegal) migration due to the financial benefits it brings to the country of origin in form of remittances,
and in the relatively recent change in the EU’s attitude towards legal migration from the Mediterranean partner countries. When the interest towards limiting illegal migration from the MPC towards the European Union was only closely touching the southern Member States of the EU, the measures to deal with the problem were mainly unilateral and concentrated on restricting access to the EU. Now that encouraging well-managed legal migration in order to balance the labour shortage experienced by most EU Member States has become a common interest in the EU, multilateral cooperation within the framework of the EMP is supported more widely.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in general is however affected by a much broader policy framework than that of the multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. Especially the Mediterranean free-trade area, envisaged for implementation in 2010, is due to its nature closely connected to international trade agreements within the framework of World Trade Organisation. The EU is not the only international organisation with an interest in the Mediterranean region, and despite the common commercial policy of the EU, the interests of individual EU Member States are not always unitary with the public common interests of the EU. We mention this in order to show that much of the cooperation within the EMP can actually be managed by an even more complicated network of policies and interests than those presented in the thesis. Taking this network of interests into consideration would however require an important amount of extra research.

Similarly, the role of Morocco has in this thesis only been discussed from the point of view of Morocco being a country of origin for migration. The illegal migration originating from Morocco is however slowing down and Morocco’s role is now primarily that of a transit country for migration from more southern countries. Considering that the migratory flows in the Mediterranean are increasingly formed by nationals of sub-Saharan Africa, the task of understanding the overall causes and consequences of migration, and the ways to influence them, becomes even more complicated. At the same time, the field of research moves from European studies and international relations towards the field of development aid, which is not the aim of this thesis. What becomes evident is that the networks of influence and dependence are all the more global in nature and a complete understanding of an issue such as migration in the Mediterranean, has become to require a global, rather than regional perspective.
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ANNEX 1: Net migration to the European Union, including corrections.

ANNEX 2: Inflows from selected MPC to selected EU Member States, thousands

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<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD 2007, B.1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
ANNEX 3: The three organisational dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION:
THE EMP INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

THE BILATERAL DIMENSION:
THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS

THE UNILATERAL DIMENSION:
MEDA PROGRAMME

Explanations:
EU = European Union (usually represented by Presidency)
MS = EU Member States
MP = Mediterranean partner country/Countries
DG = Directorate General

Source: Modified from Philippart 2003, p. 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>References to migration (legal, illegal)</th>
<th>Actions to be taken</th>
<th>Expected impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona declaration</td>
<td>Acknowledge the importance migration plays in the relationships</td>
<td>Strengthen the cooperation to reduce migratory pressures for example through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance of job creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>Guarantee the protection of all the rights recognised under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in the territories of the signatories</td>
<td>Adopting relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Programme</td>
<td>Establish closer cooperation in the field of illegal immigration</td>
<td>Meetings taking into account acquired experience, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the EU. Periodical meetings of officials to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. The meetings have to take into account the need for a differentiated approach considering the diversity of the situation in each country.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia</td>
<td>Encourages meetings in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Keeping the MPC nationals in their home countries by offering them what they expect to find in the host countries of the Community, namely a better standard of living and an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resettling those, who have been repatriated on account of their illegal status</td>
<td>Improved employment environment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving social protection system and enhancing the health cover system</td>
<td>Developing more appealing work environment in the MPC and thus reducing migratory pressures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon</td>
<td>Social dialogue shall focus on problems related to migrant communities' living and working conditions (the movement of workers, illegal migration, repatriation of illegal immigrants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority areas: reduction of migratory pressure, promotion of the role of women and improvement of the social security and health care systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Restrictive social dialogue, no migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Presidency conclusions from ministerial meetings**

<p>| Malta 1997 | The signatories underline their common wish to intensify the dialogue and cooperation on the Euro-Mediterranean level on migration issues and human exchanges and in the field of illegal immigration |
| Stuttgart 1999 | It was noted that activities in the third chapter of the Barcelona Process mainly cover good governance and human rights, education, youth, health, women's participation, migration and human exchanges, culture, dialogue between cultures and civilisations, dialogue between civil societies, fighting international crime, particularly drugs and terrorism, and the fight against racism and xenophobia. Ministers referred to the results of the Valencia conference and urged that the various activities in this chapter be further concentrated on priority areas, notably through the updated Regional Indicative Programme. Ministers welcomed the meeting on migration and human exchanges held in The Hague on 1-2 March 1999 which provided an opportunity for a frank discussion on this important and delicate issue. | Work should be pursued, which could lead to the holding of a high-level meeting. |
| <strong>Marseille 2000</strong> | The ministers reaffirmed the necessity, even if the Charter is not adopted, to reinforce the political dialogue. The Senior Officials were given the mandate to do this, especially in the fields of terrorism, migration and human exchanges. There should be no more taboo topics whereas a topic is of common interest. The importance of the human dimension in the partnership was stressed. They expressed their interest to deepen the dialogue in this area, giving emphasis to a global and balanced approached, and supporting the co-development policies and the integration of migrants from third countries, residing legally in the territories of the Member States. |
| <strong>(Brussels 2001 - extraordinary)</strong> | Migration was here presented as a part of the political partnership and not as a part of the third basket. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the holding, on 22 October, of a further meeting of Senior Officials on migration and human exchanges preceded by two meetings of experts on 13 June. They instructed the Senior Officials to continue and deepen the dialogue on this sensitive topic which should, moreover, also form an integral part of a regional programme in the third chapter to be agreed by the 27 partners. The Ministers took note of a Presidency report on the progress of discussions by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee on migration, judicial co-operation and the fight against organised crime and terrorism. They stressed the importance of launching a regional programme on common problems, the resolution of which is so important in developing the fundamental values on which the Partnership is based. They considered that these discussions were encouraging since they enabled some progress to be made. The Ministers requested the Euro-Mediterranean Committee to already reach agreement in a spirit of Partnership and within a global approach on a framework document, if possible for the Barcelona V meeting. The Ministers stressed the input of civil society into all aspects of the Partnership. In particular, they noted the conclusions of the Civil Forum that took place on 19 and 20 October in Brussels where three topics were discussed: peace and conflict prevention, migration and movement of people and cultural exchanges. The Ministers urged the protagonists in civil society to organise themselves to respond better to the terms of reference of the regional programmes. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valencia 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welcomed the idea for a Ministerial Conference on Migration and Social integration of emigrants to be held in the second half of 2003, which should include aspects such as: co-operation with the countries of origin, social integration of its migrant workers and management of migratory flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conference reiterated the importance of the third Chapter of the Declaration of Barcelona and mandated the Euromed Committee to study ways and means to develop further its contents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission should implement the framework document with the partners through a regional cooperation programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Cooperation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people - Framework Document 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social integration of migrants, migration and movements of people are of vital importance to the Partnership. A large proportion of migrants legally resident in the European Union are from the Mediterranean Partner countries. The harmonious development of the Partnership will be facilitated by measures aimed at promoting their social integration by combating racism and xenophobia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family reunion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- strengthen human rights and step up the fight against racism and xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- promotion of partnerships between countries of origin and host countries in order to make the most of migrants’ contribution to the regional or local development of their country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- promote and improve exchanges of information and statistics on migration flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- investigate the possibilities of simplifying and accelerating visa-issue procedures in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Promote assistance, cooperation and training relating to increasing the capacities of institutions in the processing of asylum applications and in refugee protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furthermore, the promotion of partnerships between countries of origin and host countries in order to make the most of migrants’ contribution to the regional or local development of their countries of origin will stimulate trade and investment in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Partner countries. The geographical proximity and the gap in prosperity between the European Union and its Partners have led to illegal migration flows and trafficking in human beings, with very adverse consequences in social and human terms.

All the Partners are aware of their common interest in combating these phenomena.

Furthermore, the implementation of procedures governing the issue of visas to nationals of the Mediterranean Partners has often been placed on the agenda for our Euro-Mediterranean meetings. All these issues should be approached in a spirit of cooperation and with a view to identifying mutually acceptable solutions.

- combat illegal immigration by developing mechanisms for combating networks involved in smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings; provide appropriate assistance to the victims of such crimes;
- promote bilateral readmission agreements
- examine the causes of migration flows in order to take appropriate development measures
- strengthen solidarity and exchanges of information between countries of origin, transit and destination
- set up modern and effective systems to control and monitor borders
- encourage accession to and real application of relevant existing international instruments.

**Naples 2003**

The Ministers expressed strong support for all present and future initiatives aiming at integration at a sub-regional level such as the AMU or Agadir, on issues such as trade, infrastructure networks, and migration policies. They supported the implementation of policies of sub-regional integration in both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with the three central Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). The latter could constitute a "pilot experiment" in that respect aimed at being extended, to other partner countries.

The Ministers took note of the progress made in the implementation of the regional programme covering the justice, police and migration sectors which for the first time in the framework of the partnership allowed experts and practitioners from the Euro-Mediterranean countries to work together in judicial co-operation, in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime and in a joint approach to migration. The Ministers gave full support for this first experience of concrete teamwork, on training of judges, training of police forces and the development of a common tool of observation and analysis of the migratory flows in the Mediterranean and look forward to the further development of this co-operation. Migration and movement of people.

Partners should agree upon readmission agreements including illegal migration. Conducting a study on the relationship between illegal and legal immigration.
The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and express the view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region. They ensured that the dialogue and co-operation on migration which has started with some Mediterranean Partners is extended to all and covers the root causes of migration, the possibilities to promote legal migration and to combat illegal migration through readmission agreements covering illegal immigration, to be agreed upon with Partners most directly involved. In this respect, they confirmed the need to adopt a global approach balancing security concerns and the management of migratory flows, on the one hand, with the facilitation of legal movement of persons and social integration of migrants, on the other. The Ministers also took note of the Commission's intention to initiate a study into the relationship between legal and illegal migration.

Luxembourg 2005

Migration and social integration of migrants is a central issue of the Euromed Partnership. Partners should agree on a strategic approach that aims to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners. Such an approach would include intensified cooperation aimed at encouraging cooperation programmes with countries of origin of potential migrants. Ministers examined the possibility to hold specific Ministerial meetings prepared in advance by relevant Senior Officials meetings. Association Agreements and Neighbourhood Action Plans will help in promoting joint management of the movement of people as well as the integration of migrants. Efforts need to continue to foster integration within the host country, including through intensifying the fight against discrimination and social exclusion. The new ENPI can be used to promote a comprehensive approach including cross-border cooperation among the partners and between them and the countries of origin. All aspects should be taken into account, including the fight against racism and xenophobia as well as a study of the labour markets in the EU and in partner countries. Ministers agreed that a regional strategy against racism, xenophobia and intolerance should be designed in the framework of the partnership instruments, including the Anna Lindh Foundation.

Designing a regional strategy against racism, xenophobia and intolerance.
In light of the common problem of illegal migration to the EU, characterised by human suffering and tragedy, there is a need for intensified co-operation that addresses root causes as well as negative effects of illegal migration, including transit migration. This co-operation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation of re-admission agreements, the fight against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, border management and migration related capacity building.

At the bilateral level, the Association Agreements progressively started including provisions on Justice, Liberty and Security, reflected in the implementation of ENP action plans concluded so far, which contain sections referring to legal systems, corruption, asylum, migration, the movement of people, readmission, border controls, the fight against organised crime including human trafficking, drugs, money laundering and the financing of terrorism, as well as policing and legal co-operation. At the regional level, the Euromed Justice programme covering the justice, police and migration sectors continued its activities aiming at allowing experts and trainers from the Euromed countries to work together in judicial co-operation, civil and penal matters, fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime and in a joint approach to migration.

Those activities have involved the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht, the European Police College (CEPOL) and the European University Institute-Robert Schumann Centre in Florence. Thus:
- the second part of the Euromed Justice Programme was launched on 20 December 2004, in Brussels, aiming at creating an inter-professional community of magistrates, lawyers and legal practitioners in the framework of an open and modern justice service, strengthening the rule of law and the effective implementation of human rights.
- The 5th Training Seminar on EU Basics for Mediterranean Civil Servants took place from 14 to 18 March 2005, in Brussels, as part of the "Training of Public Administrations" Regional Programme.
| **Tampere 2006** | Ministers underline the need to strengthen the management of migratory flows in a comprehensive and balanced manner beneficial to the peoples in the whole Mediterranean region while respecting migrants’ rights, and to intensify co-operation on all aspects of migration between all parties concerned, including the fight against trafficking in human beings and negotiations of different kinds of readmission agreements. In a spirit of partnership and on the basis of the Barcelona 5-year Work Programme the Ministers stress the need to increase cooperation in the fields of legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration. The Ministers take note of the work of the FRONTEX agency. Ministers welcome Euromed Partners’ contribution to the preparatory work of the Euromed Ministerial meeting on migration due to take place in 2007 in coordination with the Commission, aiming at agreeing on a series of further measures to promote co-operation on all issues pertinent to migration. In this context, an overview of existing bilateral and Community funded projects in the areas of migration and development, legal and illegal migration have been compiled on the basis of information provided by all Partners. Ministers also take note of the contributions from other international initiatives such as the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting on Migration and Development held in Tripoli on 22-23 November, as well as the Rabat Euro-African Ministerial meeting on migration. Expressing their renewed commitment to implement the 5-year work programme adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2005, Ministers commit to work towards the objectives contained in these Ministerial conclusions. | Working towards the objectives of the 5-year work programme |
| **Lisbon 2007** | In relation to the upcoming ministerial meeting on migration, the ministers stressed the opportunity to underline the added value of the regional cooperation framework, stressing the need for continued progress by all Partners to achieve the strategic goal of optimising the social and economic benefits of migration for countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as continued cooperation in efficiently tackling illegal immigration. In this context Ministers stress the importance of the contributions and follow-up from other international initiatives such as the Rabat Euro-African ministerial meeting on migration and development, held on 10-11 July 2006, as well as the EU-Africa ministerial meeting on migration and development held in | Ministers mandated the senior officials to undertake a reflection on ways and means to increase the added value of regional cooperation in the fields of Justice and Security in accordance with the Five Year Work programme. |
Tripoli on 22-23 November 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other important documents contributing to migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building on the acquis of the Barcelona Process and further to the conclusions of the European Council in Tampere, the EU will: develop effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks, including trafficking in human beings, inter alia, through the establishment of readmission arrangements relating to own and third country nationals as well as persons without nationality, — work with Mediterranean partners to address the question of migration, taking into full consideration the economic, social and cultural realities faced by partner countries. Such an approach would require combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, exchange information and statistics with the Mediterranean partners on migration flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developing effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- establishment of readmission arrangements,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- exchange information and statistics on migration flows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 2004 |
| The EU aims to promote a comprehensive approach towards migration and the social integration of legally residing migrants and extend to all partners the dialogue and cooperation on migration which has already started with some Mediterranean partners. |
| Continue to provide technical assistance and cooperation for improved joint management of migration flows, including border control, and institutional capacity building; Seek the conclusion of readmission agreements with our partners; Strengthen the safeguards with respect to international obligations to provide protection for refugees alongside fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally in the EU. |
Five Year Work Programme to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledging that Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security are issues of common interest in the Partnership, and should be addressed through a comprehensive and integrated approach, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will enhance co-operation in these fields to:</th>
<th>With a view to contributing to the above objectives Euro-Mediterranean partners will:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Promote legal migration opportunities, work towards the facilitation of the legal movement of individuals, recognising that these constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a mean of improving links between countries, fair treatment and integration policies for legal immigrants, and facilitate the flow of remittance transfers and address ‘brain drain’;</td>
<td>(a) Hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss all issues pertinent to migration. And hold an expert senior officials meeting to prepare the Ministerial and discuss other issues of relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and loss of life through hazardous sea and border crossings;</td>
<td>(b) Develop mechanisms for practical co-operation and sharing experience on managing migration flows humanely, deepen dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore options for providing assistance for countries of origin and transit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Continue to pursue the modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice and facilitate access to justice by citizens,</td>
<td>(c) Promote schemes for safer, easier, less expensive channels for the efficient transfer of migrants’ remittances, encourage active contacts with expatriate communities to maintain their participation in the development process in their country of origin,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Reinforce judicial co-operation, including on cross border issues;</td>
<td>(d) Develop ways to assist capacity building for those national institutions in partner countries dealing with expatriates;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Facilitate solutions to problems arising from mixed marriage disputes and child custody cases and encourage cooperation in accordance with the principle of the UN Convention of 1989 on the Rights of the Child and national legislation.</td>
<td>(e) Promote legal migration opportunities and integration of migrants;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Promote the ratification and further implementation of the relevant UN conventions on combating organised crime and drugs, and improve co-operation by law enforcement agencies.</td>
<td>(f) Enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration. This cooperation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation of different kinds of readmission agreements, the fight against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, and capacity building in border management and migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Develop contacts, training and technical assistance for judicial and legal professionals, building on the Euromed Justice Programme, the ENP Action Plans and other agreed multilateral and bilateral instruments, with the participation of the concerned Mediterranean partners in the design and implementation process;</td>
<td>(h) Develop contacts, training and technical assistance for police and law enforcement officers, building on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Conclusions: First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, November 2007</td>
<td>Well-managed migration can contribute to optimise the economic and social benefits of migration and represents a bridge for the enhancement of mutual understanding between cultures and civilizations. - Joint management of migratory flows - facilitation of people-to-people exchanges, promote faster issuance of visa and look at specific procedures, taking into account the needs of the labour market - migration constitutes a factor that contributes to economic and social development - further promote capacity building in the institutional framework and management of migrants flows, to develop and intensify mutual cooperation and vocational training projects - define measures to avoid brain drain and skills shortages - facilitate the secure transfer of remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Strategy paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2013</td>
<td>Presents the objective of creating a common area of justice, security and migration cooperation. Migration questions will be dealt with at national, regional and global level, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>- help to set up mechanisms and services and effective financial products</td>
<td>- A seminar on transfer of funds and micro-credit opportunities, - construction of Euro-Mediterranean website which will gather all the available information on remittances and respective transfer procedures, - study the possibility to supporting legal migrants financially</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 5: Projects and programmes financed in Morocco 2007-2010 within the framework of the National Indicative Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007-2010 (In millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and literacy campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to health insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance and human rights sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional support sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Programme to the Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Rocade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening up isolated zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FODEP (Industrial De-pollution Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EuropeAid: Morocco.