With Denmark as its case, this thesis joins an already exciting conversation in the social sciences about the increasing challenges small states face in cyberspace. The thesis explores Denmark as a small state in relation to NATO and the EU. Collectively, the evidence gathered in this thesis explores the undefined role of small states in the realm of cyberspace and proves that cyberspace contains new security issues and dynamics in the international system. Small state issues are often not accounted for in conventional studies on cybersecurity. In an attempt to cover some of these issues, this thesis will explore Danish cybersecurity strategies paying special attention international cooperation on cybersecurity. The thesis discovers that Denmark in the globalized cybersecurity sphere has multiple options and challenges. Denmark has, however, been passive in defining a balance between NATO, the EU and domestic policies that have seen Denmark dismiss opportunities in both organizations. Though neither NATO nor the EU can guarantee Danish cybersecurity, NATO and especially the EU provide an array of initiatives through which Denmark can compensate for its relative weakness by cooperating on expertise and intelligence sharing, capacity development and emergency response entities to cyberattacks, but due to a high domestic political risk for the Danish government of backing referendums on lifting opt-outs on the ASFJ and Defence, Denmark has been reluctant to pursue the possibility of engaging in deep EU cooperation on cybersecurity.