Since the 1980s the Danish politicians have shifted their focus from welfare to workfare in the Danish labour market policy. This shift has among other things entailed that demand after working capacity among social security receivers has increased – especially for married couples. In 2005 the so called “300 hours rule” was introduced. The law states that recipients of welfare benefits who are married will loose the right to welfare payments if they work less than 300 hours during a two year period. The aim with this project is to examine how the 300 hours rule is implemented in two Danish municipalities and why only few couples have lost their welfare payment in these municipalities. The analysis is based on an analytical model by Bo Rothsteins. The model focuses and combines process and substance in the following three areas: the policy’s design, organization, and legitimacy. The analysis shows that the two municipalities, Aalborg and Svendborg, have decided to focus very hard on making sure that no one falls for the 300 hours rule and this project shows that Aalborg and Svendborg have done so with success. These municipalities success is a compost of different factors who combined are the main reason for their success. The factors are a weakening of the municipalities’ autonomy in labour market policies. This development in the autonomy has caused an even larger reluctance against the government´s use of power and in this case, against the implementation of the 300 hours rule. This weakening combined with the shift to workfare has created a politicisation in the two municipalities which stretches through out both municipalities. The politicisation is both a consequence and a result of the disagreement of the rules political intentions and methods. The low effect of the rule in Aalborg and Svendborg is a combination of the conditions as stated above and is mainly due to the street level bureaucrats’ effort, their additional focus on the target group and their softening of the 300 hours rule.