The purpose of this thesis is to examine judicial impartiality in the light of social media.
The thesis initially contains a review of the relevant legislation regarding judicial impartiality in the Danish civil and criminal procedure. The thesis will firstly include a historical review of the legislation regarding judicial impartiality in The Administration of Justice Act through which the purpose of the legislation is deduced. The thesis moreover presents the legislation in the European Commission of Human Rights, which contributes to the interpretation of the legislation regarding judicial impartiality in a limited extent.
The thesis moreover contains a review of the legislation regarding judicial appointment, which is governed by The Administration of Justice Act part 4 regarding judges, assistant judges, etc.
Next, the thesis will include a thorough review of the relevant legislation regarding judicial impartiality, which is governed by The Administration of Justice Act part 5: Situations where the officers of the court must or may vacate their seat. Case law suggests that judicial impartiality as a result of a judge’s social media-interactions is governed by The Administration of Justice Act § 61. The thesis will therefore predominately focus on this section of The Administration of Justice Act.
In order to render the extent of § 61 in The Administration of Justice Act, the thesis will include a review of relevant case law as a complimentary interpretation of the extent of the section in general.
To examine the impact of social media-interactions on the assessment of judicial impartiality, the thesis includes a thorough analysis of relevant case law regarding judicial impartiality due to the judge’s interactions on social media. In this regard the thesis examines and analyses U 2016.149 H, U 2017.3544 Ø, U 2019.2824 Ø and U 2022.854 Ø.
In U 2016.149 H the Supreme Court stated that the lay judge was not impartial regardless of his social media activities, including a passive relation in terms of a Facebook- friendship with the aggrieved and active relation in terms of comments regarding the aggrieved in the criminal case.
In U 2019.2824 Ø the High Court follows up on the Supreme Court’s verdict, as the lay judge’s passive relation to the perpetrator in terms of a Facebook-friendship was not paramount in the verdict stating the lay judge’s impartiality.
In U 2017.3544 Ø the lay judge was not impartial regardless of her expressing her personal opinion on the case and the perpetrator. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lay judge had expressed reservations, as she emphasized having been bound by the boundaries of the law when passing the sentence in the case.
In U 2022.854 Ø the High Court passed a verdict stating judicial impartiality as a result of the district court judge’s social media-interactions in terms of likes and comments on Facebook. The High Court emphasized the likes and comments regarding the perpetrator and the perpetrators criminal case.
The thesis contains a discussion of relevant issues that may arise in the assessment of judicial impartiality as a result of a judge’s social media-interactions. The main issues being the difference between expressions of opinion on social media, the meaning of a like and the meaning of a Facebook-friendship.
The thesis concludes with reference to case law that the legislation regarding judicial impartiality in the Administration of Justice Act § 61 is sufficient to govern cases regarding social media and impartiality. Case law suggests that a passive interaction in terms of a Facebook-friendship is not in itself sufficient to state impartiality. Moreover, case law suggests that a judge’s active social media-interactions in terms of likes and comments after the circumstances can be sufficient to state judicial impartiality.