Abstract
The present paper introduces the problem of the European Unions Common Foreign and Security Policy in the uprising of the Libyan crisis. The main perspective is the lack of cooperation from the EU member states on a common foreign policy and common initiatives on how to deal with the developing violence in the area.
The timeframe is based on the critical period from the first demonstrations and runs until the United Nations Security Council approved a No-fly Zone over Libya. This period of time is very crucial for the EU to appear as a united institution which recently introduced a new and improved institutional basis for the Common Foreign Security Policy under the influence of a High Representative, Catherine Ashton. The main actors are four of the most powerful EU member states, Germany, France, UK and Italy. These member states play a central role during the case, as they have very different preferences and intentions when cooperating on the international level. How to deal with the Libyan crisis might have very different outcomes for the member states based on their national political situation which is why it becomes very difficult for the High Representative Catherine Ashton to coordinate the EU‘s common foreign policy.
Three main subjects will be examined as the reason for the lack of cooperation under the frame of the CFSP. These subjects are the Coherence between the member states, the Intentions of the member states and finally the possible Gains from international cooperation on a crisis like the one in Libya.
Two theories are used in the aim of explaining why the actors are motivated by the possible gains from international cooperation. Neo-realism focus on the power-related gains, such as an improved image in international relations and the relative increase in power compared to other actors together with the possibility for an increase in capabilities. The other theory, Liberal Institutionalism is more focused on the possible gains of political legitimacy and common policies such as the promotion of common norms and values, and finally the ability to ensure political and economic stability in the regional area.
The final conclusion shows that there are different opinions on how to deal with the Libyan crisis, and also under which international frame the cooperation should be based. During the analysis it becomes clear that the UN is preferred over the EU by several actors due to the initial intentions of the central actors. This has huge influence on the Ashton’s ability to form a common contribution under the CFSP.