KLIMAFORANDRINGER OG ANSVARSFORDELING
Oversat titel
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Forfatter
Jensen, Lau Mary
Semester
4. semester
Uddannelse
Udgivelsesår
2020
Antal sider
78
Resumé
Specialet argumenterer for, at man kun kan holdes ansvarlig for en forkert handling, hvis man havde en rimelig mulighed for at undgå den. Samtidig kan man have pligt til at tage ansvar for en skadelig situation, selv hvis man ikke selv har forårsaget den, når problemet ligger inden for rækkevidden af ens handlekraft (det man med rimelighed kan påvirke). Dette gælder for nogle nuværende aktører i forbindelse med klimaforandringer: Tidligere individers og staters handlinger har skabt lidelse for nuværende og fremtidige generationer. Nuværende aktører har ikke begået disse tidligere handlinger, men de er heller ikke så fjernt fra dem, at de slet ikke bør tage ansvar. Specialet viser, at fremtidige mennesker kan skades af klimaforandringer, selvom non-identitetsproblemet gør dette tilsyneladende vanskeligt. Problemet kan adresseres via Wide Principle og idéen om eksistentielle goder, så det bliver meningsfuldt at sige, at fremtidige mennesker kan blive skadet. På den baggrund må en tilstrækkelig teori for, hvordan ansvar fordeles i en ikke-ideel verden, gøre rede for, hvad de mennesker, der skades nu og senere, har ret til at gøre for at sikre deres rettigheder og krav. Teorien må derfor omfatte overvejelser om Skadeundgåelsesretfærdighed og Byrdefordelingsretfærdighed samt en teori om, hvornår det er berettiget at bruge sin Ret til modstand mod global uretfærdighed (RRGI). Specialet konkluderer, at ingen af de ofte diskuterede fordelingsprincipper (PPP, BPP, APP)—fx forurener-betaler, beneficiary pays og ability to pay—hver for sig eller i de gennemgåede kombinationer kan løse en tilstrækkelig del af klimarelaterede problemer uden at skabe nye. Den foretrukne mulighed er derfor en hybridtilgang med (P)APP og (Q)BPP (varianter af APP og BPP), fordi denne kombination medfører færrest problemer og løser det bredeste spektrum af problemer vedrørende klimaforandringer.
This thesis argues that people can be held responsible for wrongdoing only if they had a fair chance to avoid it. At the same time, even if someone did not cause a harmful situation, they may still have a duty to take responsibility when the issue falls within the reach of their agency (what they can reasonably influence). This applies to some current actors in climate change: past actions by individuals and states have created suffering for current and future generations. Today’s actors did not commit those past actions, but they are not distant enough to avoid all responsibility. The thesis shows that future people can be harmed by climate change, despite the Non-identity problem. This puzzle can be addressed using the Wide Principle and the idea of existential goods, making it coherent to say that future people are harmed. Given this, an adequate theory for distributing responsibility in a non-ideal world must explain what people harmed by climate change—now and later—are entitled to do to secure their rights. The theory must therefore include considerations of Harm Avoidance Justice and Burden Sharing Justice, as well as a view on when it is justified to exercise the Right of Resistance to Global Injustice (RRGI). The thesis finds that none of the commonly discussed distribution principles (PPP, BPP, APP)—such as polluter pays, beneficiary pays, and ability to pay—alone or in the reviewed combinations resolves enough climate-related problems without creating new ones. It therefore recommends a hybrid approach using (P)APP and (Q)BPP (variations of APP and BPP), because this combination involves the fewest drawbacks while addressing the widest range of climate change problems.
[Dette resumé er omskrevet med hjælp fra AI baseret på projektets originale resumé]