Alleviation of precarious access to electricity through decentralised electricity market design
Authors
Aliana Guardia, Arnau ; Torne I Diaz De Heredia, Alexandre
Term
4. Term
Publication year
2021
Submitted on
2021-06-03
Pages
101
Abstract
Mange husholdninger i EU har stadig usikker eller for dyr adgang til elektricitet (energifattigdom). Samtidig er decentraliserede elmarkeder på vej frem. Det giver en mulighed for at designe markederne, så omkostningerne ved at sikre en overkommelig, grundlæggende elforsyning til sårbare husholdninger bliver indregnet. Vi foreslår en metode til at beregne, for forskellige husholdningstyper, et minimum anstændigt elforbrug og en pris, de kan betale. Vi præsenterer derefter to måder at indregne udgiften ved at garantere overkommelig elektricitet: (1) en energifattigdomstarif, betalt af de aktører, der står stærkere i markedet, og (2) en prisintervention, hvor prisen på handler mellem store producenter og lavindkomsthusholdninger fastsættes. En casestudie viser, at selv om resultaterne afhænger af markedets arkitektur og deltagerne i analysen, kan den nødvendige støtte finansieres inden for markedet uden en urimelig påvirkning af de øvrige aktørers velfærd. Fordelingen af omkostninger bør tilpasses de konkrete forhold.
Many households in the EU still face unreliable or unaffordable access to electricity (energy poverty). At the same time, decentralised electricity markets are emerging. This creates a chance to design these markets so they include the cost of ensuring an affordable, basic electricity supply for vulnerable households. We propose a method to estimate, for different household types, a minimum decent electricity consumption and a price level they can afford. We then present two ways to internalise the cost of guaranteeing affordable electricity: (1) an Energy Poverty tariff paid by better‑positioned market participants, and (2) a Price Intervention in which the price of trades between large producers and low‑income households is fixed. A case study shows that, although outcomes depend on the market architecture and the sample of agents, the required support can be funded within the market without an excessive impact on other agents’ welfare. How costs are shared should be tailored to each specific context.
[This summary has been rewritten with the help of AI based on the project's original abstract]
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