



The French Leadership towards the Intervention In Libya



Isabelle Fischer
Master Thesis, European Studies
Supervisor Wolfgang Zank
Aalborg University
September 2011

Abstract

On the 19th of March the United Nations Security Council voted on favour of resolution 1973 (2011), authorizing the International Community to take the necessary means and protect the civil population in Libya. A Franco British leadership, headed the initiative for concrete measures on Gaddafi's regime, which had been violating Human Rights after protests began on the 16th of February, 2011 in Benghazi.

This thesis aims to examine French policy, between the period in which the protests began in Libya and the day the UN resolution 1973 was approved, to analyze the steps taken towards the military intervention. It looks into the theory chosen to understand the French Leadership justifications for pressuring the International Community towards the military intervention. The main concerns analyzed are the security arguments that French Leadership used to raise the situation to a level of security.

The thesis uses as framework for analysis, the Copenhagen School Theory. It aims to help the understanding of the process engaged in by those actors who claim and approve security issues.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mother
Special thanks for their support to Laura Reininger and Lars Hørlyck

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	II
DEDICATION	III
1. INTRODUCTION	2
2. METHODOLOGY	4
2.1. THE CASE STUDY	4
2.2. HYPOTHESES	4
2.3. THE SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION	5
2.4. THE OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT	6
2.5. THE THEORY	6
2.6. THE ANALYSIS	7
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	10
3.1 WHAT IS SECURITY - A SECTOR DILEMMA IN ‘SECURITY STUDIES’?	10
3.2 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL THEORY	13
3.2.1. THE SECTORS APPROACH	14
3.2.2. SECURITIZATION – “A PROCESS”	17
3.2.3. MACROSECURITIZATION	22
3.2.4. THE REGIONAL LEVEL	22
3.3. STATE-CENTRISM AND THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIZING ACTOR AND AUDIENCE	25
3.4. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL	28
3.5 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY	29
4. CASE STUDY – THE STEPS TOWARDS THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA	31
4.1 CHRONOGRAM – GENERAL OVERVIEW	32
4.2. THE OFFICIAL FRENCH POSITION	37
4.2.1. THE FIRST REACTIONS – MILITARY INTERVENTION, NOT AN OPTION.	37
4.2.2. RECOGNITION OF THE NTS – LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	40
4.2.3. THE IDEA OF A NO-FLY ZONE “IS IN THE AIR”	42
4.2.4. THE FINAL PUSH TOWARDS UN RESOLUTION 1973 (2011)	46
5. ANALYSIS	51
5.1. A THREAT TO STABILITY	51
5.2. A THREAT TO HUMANITARIAN ISSUES	55
5.3. WAS THIS A CASE OF SECURITIZATION?	57
6. CONCLUSIONS	64
BIBLIOGRAPHY	66

<u>APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</u>	<u>75</u>
<u>APPENDIX B - TOTAL OIL IMPORTED TO FRANCE IN PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>76</u>
<u>APPENDIX C – WORKING TABLE 1 “CHRONOGRAM”</u>	<u>77</u>
<u>APPENDIX D - WORKING TABLE 2 “THE FRENCH POSITION”</u>	<u>80</u>

1. Introduction

On the 17th of March 2011, the United Nations Security Council, UNSC hereafter, adopted resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the conflict in Libya. This resolution, drafted in part by France, imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, and “authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians” (UNSC, 2011)

In this thesis I would like to shed some light and understand the French position, or more specifically the French leadership actions in the context of the intervention in Libya in 2011. **I would like to explore French policy in the crisis in Libya and understand why did France pressure the international community to intervene? And, was this a case of securitization?** By intervention it is understood that “intervention should attempt to influence the authority structures, whether it is to overthrow the ruling elite or to support the status quo” (Rosenau in Reagan, 2010: 458). Securitization, which will be explained in detail later, is defined as an act of speech, aimed at securing urgently a threat to a referent object after obtaining consent from an audience.

In the beginning of the crisis in Libya, France paved the way for the international community in adopting concrete measures towards Gaddafi’s Regime. The aims of this thesis is shedding some light and understand how and why did France took the initiative for the international community to intervene in Libya.

For this analysis I would like to present the following hypotheses:

1. France saw a threat to the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood. If Libya faced a long-standing civil war, it could become a failed state and have negative consequences for France, like mass migration, instability of gas and oil supply and organized crime.
2. France saw that the principle of Human Rights was being threatened, and the intervention was pure humanitarian issue.

In the following chapters a methodology, theoretical framework, overview and analysis will be provided, following by conclusions. The theory used is a theoretical framework for analysis on security, based on The Copenhagen School Theory. The methodological steps will also be provided in order to understand the process of research and analysis. The overview follows, and it encompasses the political steps toward the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which would be taken from the period of the first protests in Libya ending on the day when the resolution was implemented. Because the aim of this thesis is to explore France's leadership the overview will be mainly around French decisions and steps. The first part of the overview is a general brief chronogram of the international community and the measures taken over the issue in Libya. The second part is a detailed chronogram of the French position.

These chapters will be followed by the analysis, which will use the theory on securitization and the overview to finally come with conclusions in the last chapter.

2. Methodology

In this chapter I would like to describe the steps taken throughout my research and analysis. The thesis is a research project to help understand what interests affected French government to lead the way resulting in the intervention in Libya in 2011. The other concern is whether or not this was a case of securitization? The dependent variable is the intervention in the conflict. The intervention was defined by the UN Resolution 1973 and was a consequence of a political process during mid February 2011 and March 19th.

2.1. The Case Study

The case study that will be analyzed rests in Conflict in Libya 2011, previous to the military intervention. I intend to frame it by creating a time boundary to be precise in exploring the process that lead to the intervention. It is during this period that is important regarding the steps taken by the international community resulting in the implementation of the UN Resolution 1973. The timeframe is between February 15th and the 19th of March. The first date marks the beginning of the protests in Libya, and the final date marks the day in which French Rafale Jets bombed Gaddafi's military tanks in Libya, under NATO.

The body of the case study is made up of a chronological overview emphasizing on the French government's steps during this period of time. France shared with Great Britain leadership during the process that led to the intervention. Nevertheless for the purpose of this thesis what interests me is only the position of France. The choice is in order to keep the research manageable and does not undermine the fact that Great Britain also had an important role in determining the path to the resolution 1973.

2.2. Hypotheses

There have been speculations on what is the real motive for France intervention in the conflict, so I have chosen three independent security variables that could explain the situation, and within the threats to referent objects, which are:

3. A failed state resulting in instability of the region would pose security issues to the EU and thus to France
4. Gaddafi's regime and violence posed a threat to Human Rights

The hypotheses that I will address come from the following security concerns:

1. France saw an opportunity to securitize the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Region, by bringing down Gaddafi's government and controlling the flows of immigration and supply of oil and gas.
2. There was a genuine humanitarian moral duty that needed to be protected.

2.3. The Sources and limitations on information

For the theoretical aspect the sources are books and journals on Security Studies. The theory chosen is The Copenhagen School Theory by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, which will be explained and discussed in detail further on.

The sources for the overview are restricted because the conflict in Libya is recent and therefore poses a restriction regarding the availability of material from scholars. The alternatives are therefore official documents and articles from the media as supplementary information. The official documents and information chosen are publications from the French Government, the European Union, the United Nations and other governmental and International Organisations. These sources include resolutions, official press releases and conferences, discourses, letters and videos from speeches and information in their websites. All of this information is available to the public. The information retrieved from these sources also pose a restriction since there is a question of whether there is more information in the archives of these institutions, so unfortunately this is a limitation for the thesis because I do not have access to those archives. A good option could have been to interview officials from the French government, United Nations and the European Union, but this option was not feasible.

The supplementary information from the media is provided from newspapers, magazine and other media sources that have followed the conflict in Libya. These documents are basically articles and interviews regarding the issue in Libya. All

documents have been collected in a table, in chronological form to aid in the reconstruction of the overview. Because the information provided by media sources is so wide I have chosen to focus on reliable Media sources, such as the New York Times, Le Figaro, Reuters, among others. In order to organize the information it was useful to use a chronological research table for comparing the information in the official documents and that provided by the media. C.r.77

Another table was created to separate in chronological order the official French documents related to Libya in the period of time. This was useful in extracting the security arguments found in speeches, press conferences, declarations and another official documents. C.r.80

This fact-finding assignment is presented in the overview in two parts: a Chronogram with the General Overview and the Official French Position.

2.4. The outline of the project

After the introduction and methodology the overview is provided. The first part of the overview is dedicated to a summarized chronogram with the steps taken by the international community during the period between the 15th of February and the 19th of March 2011. The second part of the overview presents a more detail description of the steps taken by the French leadership during that same period of time bringing to light arguments on security issues.

The information of the facts surrounding the event may not be a precise reflection of 'the truth', as previously mentioned I do not have access to governmental archives. I will collect information from reliable sources, but bearing in mind that the event is recent, ongoing, and probably the information might not be as deep and available.

2.5. The Theory

The theory chosen will be of help in analyzing the case. The theory used, The Copenhagen School Theory, is of interest because it allows the analysis to include

other sectors apart from the military within the study of security issues. It also includes the concept of securitization, which provides the tool that helps us identify an issue as a “security issue”. Lastly The Copenhagen School’s third component is the Regional Security Complex Theory, which basically allows us to see that security concerns will tend to intensify at a regional level. The choice of my theory is not coincidental but more of a decision based process made on the importance that this theory gives to these three components.

It has been necessary to first research the meaning of security through several schools of thought, in order to capture the concept and have a better perception of how it is used in the Copenhagen School Theory. Because Security Studies is a broad subject it in this thesis the particular area of Strategic Studies is left aside. It is not intended to bring knowledge on the material capability and strategic actions of the conflict itself.

One of my desired approaches was to interview Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, and know his opinion and perspective on the conflict in Libya through the lens of ‘securitization’. Unfortunately the interview did not take place, which has lead me to research and through my own perception learn The Copenhagen School Theory point of view on the this event.

As compliment I look briefly at two other theories, Constructivism and Rational Choice. Constructivism is important because the CPH theory is based on it, through the constructed processes that actors engage in to determine security issues. Furthermore I also look briefly at Rational Choice Theory, since the CPH does not provide the tools to understand the actor’s interests that motivate him/her to act upon the perception that X is a threat.

2.6. The analysis

In the analysis each hypothesis will be analyzed using the theoretical framework and the data from the overview.

To analyse the steps by France it is necessary to make a distinction between actors and bring forward those relevant that made up the French position in this case. For this I chose the securitization definition of actors, which provides three types of actors:

“1) Referent objects, things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival; Securitizing actors: actors who securitize issues by declaring something existentially threatened; 3) Functional actors: actors who affect the dynamics of a sector” (Buzan et al, 1998: 36).

Thus, the actors chosen will be those representing the government of France, who spoke on behalf of France in relation to the conflict in Libya, e.g., French President Nicolas Sarkozy, French Minister of EU and Foreign Relations Alain Juppé, French Representative at the United Nations Gérard Araud among others.

Secondly, each hypothesis will be analysed using the discourses available. This is not done through a linguistic technique but focusing on the securitization framework which tells us to “Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined here as security” (Buzan et al 1998:177) Thus, the arguments presented by the actors that do not fall in the category of what the framework tells us that is security will not be dealt with. The hypotheses will also be dealt with by referring to official documents from the European Union concerning security, such as the European Security Strategy 2003 and the Implementation Report of the Security Strategy.

Finally it should be analyzed whether or not this was a case of securitization. According to Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen School Theory “Security” is the result of a move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as above normal politics” (Wæver, 2004: 8). This can only be analysed through looking carefully at the interactions by the relevant actors in the case study and “understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). The dynamic process is analyzed and also the three step process to a successful securitization:

1. An existential threat is labelled and presented
2. Required emergency measures
3. Justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures

What I will not do in this thesis is analyze in detail the historical background of Libya or their democratic process throughout the Arab World, nor will I analyze the detailed position and policy of other actors other than France.

3. Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the current events in Libya and the actions of the United Kingdom and France through the Copenhagen School Theory, it is essential to understand the origin and main characteristics of the theory. To do this it is essential to provide a map of Security Studies, in which this theory lies. Therefore, the concept of Security will be briefly described, as it is relevant to know how it came about and how classic approaches on security differ from other recent ones. Further on The Copenhagen School Theory, will be described in order to understand the tools provided for the analysis in the coming chapters. Because constructivism is constantly present it will be described, without deeply bringing upfront all the concepts it embraces but just does that relate to the characteristics of this theory. Finally a brief look to Rational Choice Theory will be given, a side angle compliment.

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen (COPRI) developed the theory chosen, The Copenhagen School Theory. The aim of The Copenhagen School Theory is to provide a framework for security studies using the concepts of securitization, sectors and a regional approach.

3.1 What is Security - A Sector dilemma in ‘Security Studies’?

It is understood that Security has been one of the main, if not the main concern within International Relations. Both Theo Farrell and Allan Collins argue that “IR originated in the study of war, specifically, the study of the causes of war in the immediate period following the First World War” (Farrell 2010; 1). “It is the study of security that lies at the heart of International Relations” (Collins 2010; 2). Security Studies is not only the study of war, but covers much more, as there are several concepts of security and not only relates to war or strategy. Strategic Studies understands and analyzes “threat and use of force to achieve political objectives” (Collins 2010:173). The scope of Security Studies covers this area among others and is a broad concept.

It also seems that major events shape and define security, e.g. World War 2 (Wæver, 1995; Ullman, 1983), The Cold War (Walt, 1991), the war in the Persian Gulf (Walt) or 9/11 (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). These are just examples of events that had a major effect on how scholars, politicians and the common civilian perceive the field and the concept of Security.

To date, the concept is presented in a shade of definitions between the narrow and the traditional approach. Collins claims that, the interest of security studies lies in the knowledge on how survival is ensured after a referent object is threatened and how has this threat come upon it. But the definition is not so simple as many scholars and policy makers define and construct different definitions of the term. In his latest book on *International Security Studies*, Barry Buzan describes how the concept evolves and is shaped by the interplay of five forces. In his view these forces not only influence but also provide a lens for the analyst. He argues that that the forces are: Great power politics; the technological imperative; Events; and the internal dynamics of academic debates; Institutionalism (Buzan et al: 2009).

Furthermore, there has been a long debate on how broad or deep the study of security should be. Several lines of thought have emerged over time trying to provide explanations and approaches to the main concern of the study on security. The main two approaches vary in how they view the scope of security. On one end, Traditional Security emphasizes on the military sector. On the other end, the Wide approach does not limit itself to the military sector. Further on, the two different approaches will be examined.

To some, the military sector remains the main area of interest, defining security in geopolitical terms, encompassing aspects such as deterrence, power balancing and military strategy, “the state... is the exclusive focus of study” (Collins, 2010: 500). This line of thought is known as the ‘Traditional’ or ‘Narrow’ approach. It is a dominating approach in the USA and although inside this line of thought it is acknowledgeable that other sectors apart from the military exist, they still consider that war is the main subject and nucleus of security studies (Walt, 1991). For

traditionalists threats appear in the form of military capabilities and therefore dealt with in the same way. A critical military approach does acknowledge that the “military security threat facing a population... is not the armed forces of neighbouring states, but those of the state itself” (Collins, 2010: 171) This area of military security could actually be considered to be more of a societal security issue, which will be mentioned further on.

Contrary to the Narrow perspective, a more recent approach has emerged, mostly in Europe, one in which relevance is given to other sectors apart from the military. This approach is called the ‘wide approach.’ It represents a line of thought in security studies where environment, society, economy, and politics become relevant. These sectors are considered part of the field of study and can include the referent object within security.

Traditionalists argue that widening the concept of security “would destroy its intellectual coherence” (Walt, 1991: 213). On the other side, the wide approach argues that security has a broader reach beyond the military aspect and as Ullman claims “defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality” (Ullman in Hugues 2011: 11). We can see that other sectors pose important threats to the survival of humanity/nations/countries; issues such as immigration, environmental disasters, economic meltdowns, financial crisis, are all part of the sectors included in the wide approach. A financial crisis as we saw happening in Asia and lately in Europe threatened the economic growth and progress of nations, the liberty to engage in economic activities threatened the well being of people. Failed states provoke economic uncertainty and poverty causing immigration, drug, arms and human trafficking, among others. All of these issues could pose a challenge and threat to neighbouring countries and their socioeconomic system. The environment is not left outside the wide approach, as nature is unpredictable and can cause disasters threatening human lives and economic activities and progress.

Within the schools that include a wide approach lies The Copenhagen School Theory, which provides a framework that intends to bridge the gap between the two

approaches. The inclusion of sectors within this theory are essential for the purpose of this thesis, in order to include the presented hypotheses into the analysis of *security studies*. This theory will be further on described.

3.2 The Copenhagen School Theory

The Copenhagen School Theory offers a framework to help understand security just as other schools of thought offer their own approach. It aims to provide a solution between the narrow and widening approach, incorporating the military sector while at the same time allowing a substitute widening approach. As Buzan et al argue, security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form (Buzan et al 1998: 27). Security issues according to this framework become security when they are labelled as such.

This theory supports the view that other sectors should be included in the study of security i.e. environmental, societal, economical and political sectors. It argues that security issues within these sectors play an important role alongside the military. In this thesis it is relevant to include the wide approach, to bring forward security arguments in other sectors than the military. The importance to consider all sectors relevant in issues of security is described by Buzan's claim that "sectors are not ontological separate realms"(Buzan et al, 1998: 168). All sectors are in reality not independent from one another, but connected, and important for policy making and taking decisions.

Wæver claims that the main component that differentiates this approach to other widening approaches is the idea of 'urgency', which is "the specific quality characterizing security problems" (Wæver in Hugues et al, 1995: 94). Therefore, all sectors become relevant within security but not everything becomes an issue of security. Threats can emerge causing a state of urgency that needs to be securitized 'now'. The Copenhagen School Theory also provides us with a parameter, because not everything that is urgent is a matter of security. The actor who claims that the issue is urgent must have the approval of an audience in order to react and securitize the issue. We must acknowledge that the actor who will declare that something is a

threat will have the power to change the status quo and raise the issue from a political level to a security level, but only once has the actor the approval of the audience does the securitization take place. By actor it must be understood that not only individuals fall in the category, but also “the collectivities for which individuals are designated authoritative representatives” (Buzan et al, 1998:41) In view to this thesis, we can then argue that French President Sarkozy can be a securitizing actor as an individual or as the representative of the French Government, in which case other representatives with the same rhetoric on security arguments also constitute the securitizing actor as the French Government or Leadership.

The Copenhagen School Theory Framework has three main concepts: sectors, securitization and the regional security Complex (RSC hereafter). The first concept allows us as previously argued to find threats that arise in other sectors apart from the military. Secondly the concept of securitization involves a process on how and why an issue becomes securitized. Their approach provides the necessary tools to understand how certain issues are raised from the political level to the security level. The other concept, RSC, provides relevance to the regional level, mapping the world in mutual exclusive regions, with security as the main criteria or component to trace the regions. These regions will be discussed later and are useful in providing a lens that allows us to see how security issues are more relevant and intense within proximity.

3.2.1. The Sectors Approach

As mentioned for purposes of this thesis it is important to include the sectoral approach, as this will help in analyzing the hypotheses, which include other sectors than the military. The theory acknowledges and emphasizes that the idea of making the divisions in sectors is to provide an analytical tool, but that the definition of the security concerns is constructed in the unit or securitizing actor. Thus sectors are interconnected, but the approach allows us to study the concept of security towards sectors that are important for political approaches. “Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors” (Buzan et al 1998:27). In this thesis this means that the

analysis can include threats and referent objects in a intersectoral approach, which is needed to analyse the given hypotheses.

3.2.1.1. The Military Sector

As previously mentioned military activities are not always security issues, and in many cases remain political. The military sector is focused on the state and on how to deal with military threats from other states. Additionally the theory acknowledges that referent objects and actors can be other than the state and statesmen. In this sector sovereignty and territory of the state are important but not the only important factors. As mentioned before the referent objects can appear as “balance of power, international society, non-proliferation of some type of weapons... and international laws... such as human rights, collective security or international stability” (Buzan et al 1998: 55). Furthermore in the military sector military capability and dynamics between units are important to determine the threat, but the process of securitization will be determined by “geography, history and politics” (Buzan, 1998:59).

3.2.1.2. The Political Sector

According to the securitization theory, security in this sector is about the balance of social order and in general it is closely related to all the other sectors. Although the referent object is usually sovereignty and the state, in this sector there are also systemic referent objects and threats to the international order. These are characterized as those essential, “pillars for the general international order” (Buzan et al, 1998: 149). The theory proposes that the principles of the United Nations Charter, such as human rights belong to this category. Lately, Buzan and Wæver have brought into the Copenhagen School Theory, the concept of macro-securitization, which will be explained later. This concept will also include security issues, at a system level, that include principles of the UN charter.

The theory also provides that, “ If the UN Security Council acts under chapter 7 of the Charter, it has some far-reaching competences. It is able to break the otherwise inviolable sovereignty of member states by pronouncing the words “this is a threat to international peace and security.”” (Buzan, 1998: 149). When the speech-act has the approval, its members are legitimized from an intervention, which they would

probably not engage in without the support of the UNSC. On the other hand, from the intervened country's point of view, this could mean a threat to its territorial integrity; the principle of non-interference and sovereignty, thus creating on its side a securitization issue that must be dealt with. As previously mentioned this type of securitizations could also fall in the category of a larger system level, and thus be part of a macro-securitization.

3.2.1.3. The Societal Sector

The societal sector is determined by an identity, "self-conception of communities and of individuals" (Buzan et al 1998: 119) and a threat to the survival of this identity will be perceived as a security issues. Within this sector the referent object, which can be seen as threat, can be "tribes, clans, nations..." (Buzan et al 1998: 123) The understanding is that it belongs to a concept of common identity. The threats perceived will be those that threatened the survival of this identity. "Different societies have different vulnerabilities depending upon how their identity is constructed" (Buzan et al 1998: 124). Thus, the threat is left for the securitizing to be conceptualised or defined. According to the Copenhagen School migration can be a threat to the societal sector: "Migration – x people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what is used to be because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population" (Buzan et al 1998: 121).

The theory does point out that Migration, Horizontal Competition and Vertical competition, are considered as threats to the societal referent object. The theory defines these three as follows:

"Migration: X people being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X community will not be what is used to be, because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population. Horizontal competition: although it is still X people living here, they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural linguistic influence from neighbouring culture. Vertical competition: people will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an integrating project or

secessionist –“regionalist” project that pulls them toward either wider or narrow identities” (Buzan et al 1998: 212)

Regardless of the source, within the theory the threat is the result of a constructed perceived threat.

3.2.1.4. The Economic Sector

On the one hand the societal sector can be seen as a major referent object threatened by the conflict in Libya. On the other hand the economical sector can also be the referent object of interest that France perceived threatened. As in the other sectors, the stability of the national economy can be seen threatened but again it will be determined from the perspective of the securitizing actor what is the threat that puts in risk the survival of a referent object. In summary the Economic Sector is wide and can thus have variety of referent objects, and like the other sectors it depends on the process of securitization whether or not an issue is considered as security.

3.2.2. Securitization – “A process”

The second important component of this framework is the process of securitization. Barry Buzan provides a clear definition of securitization, “the social processes by which groups of people construct something as a threat” (Buzan, 2009: 37). The Copenhagen School emphasizes that security deals with a perceived threat to a referent object, explaining that through a three-step process, securitization is successfully achieved. This means that first there is a possible or eminent threat to a referent object. Next, through an act of speech or manifestation, a securitizing actor reacts to that threat, seeking consent from an audience. And thirdly with the approval of the target audience, there is a reaction in order to securitize the threat. Before further explanation is must be noted that in this framework the analyst should make a distinction between the referent object, the securitizing actor and other functional actors. In the conflict in Libya we will further see that the securitizing actor is the French Government and depending on which hypothesis is being analyzed a different referent object will be perceived as threatened through arguments that are label as security issues.

Security issues, under this framework, are those being considered differently from those of normal politics. “It’s an attempt to take things out of the realm of normal politics and attach to them an emergency type of priority” (Buzan B., 2010 “Professor Barry Buzan discusses the concept of security”, LSE) As Barry Buzan explains military force does not always imply an act of securitization. In an interview he provided an example of military strategy that was a pure act of politics: When Denmark sent troops to Bosnia it was not an act of security. “My sense of a security issue is that it goes along with a certain kind of formula, that there has to be an existential threat, a big threat to something - a referent object which is highly valued by a group of people - and that combination of things leads to call for extreme measures, or emergency measures of some sort.” (Buzan B., 2010 “Professor Barry Buzan discusses the concept of security”, LSE). The reasoning behind Buzan’s clarification that Denmark sending troops to Bosnia as not an act of securitization comes from their meaning of ‘security.’ What was happening in Bosnia did not represent any imminent threat that needed an urgent resolution; the strategy behind mobilizing troops was a political action from the Danish government. Denmark was supporting NATO with military capability but was not elevating the issue above politics. In this situation, strategic/military actions were implemented but it was not an act of securitization. In his argument Buzan explains what is not the definition of security by explaining that threats, which arise in every sector, are not always an issue of security and remain in a political level. In regards to the intervention in Libya the previous example and in the explanation in the following paragraph will help to analyse whether or not this was an act of securitization or a pure act of politics. The theory explains that referent objects are vulnerable to threats in all sectors, but the difference between an issue that remains at the political level and that that is raised to the security level, lays in the following explanation:

A perceived threat to a referent object cause a reaction by a relevant decision making actor, who will have the capacity to mobilize or generate a reaction aiming at ‘securitizing’ the initial threat after receiving approval of an audience. Thus, unless there exists approval from an audience, the actor will not be securing the threat, but will just be engaging in a ‘securitizing move.’ “A successful securitization thus has

three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan 1998:26).

The idea of breaking free of rules and “panic politics” can be confusing at some point, since it could be assumed that securitization occurs only when there is breaking free of normal rules and procedures. Thus, in the European Union of today, the meaning of this could be seen in different perspectives on what are the normal procedures and if they have been broken or not in the conflict with Libya and toward which threats. Ole Wæver claims that what is important is raising the issue out of the political level. So, what should be highlighted when analysing security arguments and processes, is the way in which the actors share the same urgency to deal with the problem in a ‘Now’ mode. It can also be arguable that these procedures or ‘social rules’ will depend on the context. Buzan claimed in an interview:

“...That combination of things leads to call for extreme measures, or emergency measures of some sort...In other words, it’s an attempt to take things out of the realm of normal politics and attach to them an emergency type of priority, saying “we have to do something about this, and we have to do it now and quickly because if we don’t, something we value, maybe us, is going to disappear or be seriously damaged in some way”” (Buzan B., 2010 “Professor Barry Buzan discusses the concept of security”, LSE).

The political discourses that capture this form of rhetoric with the approval of an audience can then be labelled security issues, although it can be seen also that some issues of security become politicised without being dealt with in an emergency or urgent way. The difference between dealing with issues that are of security concern and those that remain in a political level is in this explanation of the difference between politicised issues and securitization issues:

“to politicised (‘the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance’) to securitization (in which case the issue is no longer debated as a political question, but dealt with at an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules)” (Buzan et al 2009: 214).

It is important to point out that this theory will not focus in the concepts of a threat as a threat and in that respect the theory is weak. The theory does not point out to the reasons of why the securitizing actor declares something as a threat. Threats are constructed; the securitizing actor plays a vital role within this theory. He or she decides what is a threat and through an act of speech declares that this must be given priority above other things, and that an action must be taken in order to ‘securitize’ this issue in immediately, but the theory will not claim any ethical definitions on threats.

In order to have a successful securitization the theory assumes that the actor must receive consent from an audience, “For security speech to be successful, they also need to convince their relevant audiences.”(Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 34). Thus the theory assumes that the audience must be needed to securitize the issue. The speech act will determine how the audience reacts to the securitizing actor, emphasizing on the “intersubjective security” (Buzan et al, 1998:31), which is the dynamic process between the actors and the outcome of this interaction. The theory does not provide the specification on who the audience is, the audience is not given within this framework and will depend on a case basis.

In order not to fall into a closed dilemma of whether the word ‘security’ must be in context during the act of securitization, it is important to point out that the Copenhagen School does not define the speech act by this, “what is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (Buzan et al 1998: 27). Some critics have emphasized broadly on whether or not body language is a also considered part of the speech act and how others forms of communication should be or not considered, to avoid a void in the framework (Hansen, 2000). Austin, who is the main proponent of speech act theory considered them to be linguistic acts with some social dimension used in ‘saying something’. “The successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech” (Buzan et al, 1998:32), providing a clear understanding of this by claiming that the speech-act has an internal and external

aspect. The internal is relevant as the securitizing actor manages to express security in his speech, referring to the threat, referent object and actions to be taken. The external is defined by the “positions of authority of the securitizing actor” (Buzan et al, 1998:33). This means the image and position of the actor in relation to the audience and “finally of the alleged threats” (Buzan et al, 1998,33). The speech act is also a tool for the actor to persuade its audience in accepting and constructing together a threat, using both internal and external aspect e.g., the authority. In the case in Libya French President Sarkozy speaks security, and through his speech-act he not only brings the security arguments, but also his position and authority.

To understand better the speech act Geis provides a new approach arguing that speech acts are a social action, and “what is important about an utterance is what it contributes to the work of the interaction in which it occurs, not what action is performed in uttering it” (Geis, 1998: 32) Both Austin and Geis agree that in a speech act the speaker does something while saying it and can have effects on the audience, “making a promise or offer, or an apology, etc” (Geis, 1998:3)

“Saying something will often, or even normally produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them (Austin in Geis, 1998:3)

It is understood that the importance of the speech act in securitization lies in the effect that the securitizing actor has on the audience. In the actor’s speech act a promise or persuasive utterance that indirectly or directly indicates a request to the audience is made.

In conclusion, this framework offers an analysis that helps understand how an issue is raised from the political level to that of security in urgency by labelling as a security issue. A securitizing actor perceiving a threat to a referent object defines the process. This actor then gains consent from a targeted audience after a speech-act, in order to react to that threat in an urgent manner. The next section will define the third important concept of the Copenhagen School Theory, the Regional Security Complex.

3.2.3. Macrosecuritization

In 2009 Buzan and Wæver introduced the new concept of macrosecuritization to the Copenhagen School Theory. Their aim was to provide a tool to see securitization at a system level. Global security issues like international terrorism, with 9/11, have marked a tendency for security studies to bring attention at a global level. Hence, Buzan and Wæver, bring forward this new concept, which uses securitizations at a larger global scale, in this sense macrosecritizations both concepts share the same characteristics, can emerge in all sectors and are defined by the same steps. But macrosecritizations are “launched as candidates for top-rank threats (though they may not make it: for example, geo-economics, terrorism, nuclear proliferation)” (Buzan et al, 2009: 259). Like securitization, macrosecritization can also include principles of Human Rights as referent object when these are treated as “referent objects higher than those at the middle level... and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations” (Buzan et al, 2009: 257).

The concept also implies that there is an existing hierarchy of security issues, where those that fall as issues of macrosecritization are those found at system level. The best example provided by Buzan is the Anti Nuclear Movement, which is found in this level. It should be noted that securitisation of superpowers could be confused with macrosecritizations. Buzan claims that macrosecritization can be vulnerable to breakdowns “when the higher level becomes blurred with the middle-level securitisation of a leading great or superpower” (Buzan et al, 2009: 257). In this sense it is noticed that many levels and sectors are at interplay in the dynamic security issues that emerge in the world. What is of relevance is not only to see this interplay of actors within levels and sectors but also to understand the process between the units.

3.2.4. The Regional Level

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) comes upfront as an important concept within The Copenhagen School, claiming that ‘regional perspectives’ or regional territories play a strong role in security. Territory, according to Buzan is a “defining feature of many (in)security dynamics” (Buzan et al, 2003: 30), it is proximity between units that will engage them in similar or the same security issue

and the fact that “most types of threat travel easier over short distance” (Buzan et al 2003:461). Having said this it is relevant to point out that Buzan’s idea can be interpreted as follows: threats will tend to be similar among units that have physical proximity.

Firstly, it is relevant to understand that Buzan points out that a Region is a substructure that is ‘mutually exclusive’ and that it does not fall in others’ definitions of regions. Buzan’s definition of what makes up a RSC is based on certain criteria that allows us to find common ground among the units and provides the mapping of the world into mutually exclusive regions that are themselves substructures of the whole international system. This is found in common security issues that glue the actors together in a pattern of enmity and amity and power relations, creating an RSC. Buzan argues that it is extremely relevant to focus on territory, as many issues of great importance will tend to be similar at a regional level. In view of the research in this thesis, it is of extreme importance to point out this relevance that exists due to proximity as the EU being in the Western European Security Complex finds its southern Mediterranean neighbours (The Maghreb region) of high importance.

The RSC framework for analysis intends to provide an approach between the analysis of global and local security. Security issues shared by neighbouring actors/units are important but the domestic, global and interregional levels are still considered in the analysis of this framework.

3.2.3.1. Characteristics of RSCT

Although it is not the objective to describe thoroughly the RSCT because it is not intended to map the world according to this theory, it is important to provide some of the basic characteristics, concepts and elements that make up the framework as tools for understanding the RSCs and the dynamics between units.

Firstly, it as Barry Buzan argues, it is indispensable to know how the world is divided according to this theory, and what is the status that each unit (state) occupies in it. The units are divided in Superpowers, Great Powers and Regional Powers. In his conference lecture at London School of Economics he declares:

” Superpowers are as the name implies big and system dominating. In other words superpowers have both the material capability and the social standing to operate globally and to influence in a major way things that happen all over the planet. Great powers are, first of all not superpowers, they are big powers that have influence in more than one region, think for example at the moment China or the EU come to that if you think of that as qualifying as a great power and then the next phase down is Regional Powers where you might want to think about countries like South Africa, Brazil or India whose power is mainly exercised within the region” (Barry Buzan, 2011, “A world without Superpowers: de-centered globalism”, Sheikh Zayed Theatre, New Academic Building LSE)

Having noted this previous argument Buzan maps the world into several RSCs, with one Superpower, The United States, several Great Powers and many regional powers. This European RSC (EU & other European countries) acts as a whole Great Power and Regional Power, with France as one of the old Great Powers. North Africa on the other hand belongs to the Middle East RSC, which has three subcomplex regions, the Gulf Subcomplex, the Levant Subcomplex and the Maghreb subcomplex. The Maghreb subcomplex includes Libya and other North African countries with important proximity to Europe, defining it as extremely relevant for the EU-Europe RSC.

Buzan argues that the EU-Europe RSC is most distinguished by the integration process, and a pattern of cooperation between the Members. Nevertheless each EU Member still maintains its own identity and view on security and global issues, whether they can attempt to influence the system or not as individual nations depends their ability to interact with other units.

Finally, it is important to point out two aspects regarding the RSCT. First, that it is a characteristic of superpowers to have the global capacity to reach and “transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships” (Buzan, 2003: 36). This means that superpowers stand out of the regional definition and include global security issues in their agenda, a characteristic that is not given to small units that tend

to focus on security issues at a regional level. A “...great power will typically penetrate several adjacent regions, and superpowers will range over the whole planet” (Buzan et al, 2003: 46). This is a description of our present situation in which the sole superpower has the means for dealing with security issues at a system level.

Secondly, The RSCT explains that security concerns are drawn up in constellations that map the world. Buzan and Wæver have recently brought deepness to the concept of constellations, by adding the macrosecuritization concept, arguing that, “a regional security complex, while its essential structure is defined by relations among units at the regional level and by the complexes external boundary – always exists within and as the core of a wider constellation” (Buzan et al, 2009: 237). These wider constellations are brought about with the concept of macro-securitizations. This allows the theory to include a global perspective towards security issues that usually concerns superpowers and great powers.

There are some components from The Copenhagen School theory, which are vital for the analysis of the study case and will therefore be discussed in this section. These components are: sectors, state-centrism, the securitizing actor, the all-present constructivism in the theory, the need for more thorough definitions of some concepts and the speech-act itself. First, State-centrism will be discussed as the theory relies on the state to securitize the threatened referent object. This will be followed by the role of the securitizing actor, constructivism and lastly some concepts on speech act. The speech act is important, as it is one of the main components of the securitizing theory.

3.3. State-centrism and the role of the securitizing actor and audience

Buzan amends the theory in 1998 by redefining the meaning of RSCs. In the new definition he mentions units instead of ‘nations’ or ‘states’, aiming at rephrasing their theory in accordance to the wider agenda and loose some state-centrism. Nevertheless, state-centrism still plays an important role in both the RSCT and securitization theory. The RSCs are basically formed by nations, even though they are called units. When securitization theory is used as tool for mapping the RSCs, it

can be seen that the security issues are drawn from a state-centric point of view. Furthermore, the securitization theory accepts the wider agenda, as to what constitutes or where a threat emerges, but still, the state and elite remains the main actor with the power to securitize the issues. It may not be intentional but it is reasonable that state-centrism plays a decisive role in a theory about security.

The role that the securitizing actor and audience have in this theory are quite important, as the actor is a defining component in what is a threat and the audience in the decision making process of securitization and thus in mapping the RSCs. These two actors decide which threats will be securitized. Matt McDonald argues that a weakness in the securitization framework comes afloat as the theory entitles the act of defining security to political actors. The particular actors have the power to change the status of a given situation and usually are the elites in the government. Thus, the theory “encourages a focus only on the discursive interventions of those voices deemed institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of particular collective” (McDonald, 2008:2). The power to raise an issue out of politics into the realm of urgency and security is in the hands of the statesman or those who have power to change the status quo.

The interests of the securitizing actor may or may not be perceived as real and important to the civil society/referent object or others. As previously mentioned, this is a gap in the theory, since we do not know how is it that an actor decides why something is a threat. This opens the door for the question of whether or not the security argument is real or if political interests and motives move the actors to sell a perceived threat for personal interests.

The securitizing actor's and audience perception to threats has consequences on the civil society. It is assumed that an audience has to approve the securitizing move, but this does not mean consent of the majority, the audience might still represent only a small fraction of the whole society affected by the decision and be the ‘elite’ e.g., high-ranking officials or government representatives. Although the case in Libya does not encompass the period after intervention, it could be interesting to see how in the French constitution the parliament vote four months after the military intervention is

decided by government, thus a politicised dynamic that is in a sense more democratic, but once an intervention has been done. The securitizing action may not represent the needs and values of the majority/civil society or referent object. It can be assumed that either the decision makers democratically represent the rest or that they are a minority who do not represent the values of the rest, but the theory does not point in this direction.

As Lene Hansen argues, this theory risks to fall victim of ‘security as silence’ “a situation where the potential subject of security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking its security problem” (Hansen in Farrell 2010: 397) Hansen’s main arguments emerged from gender based security issues. The securitizing actor and audience’s perceptions and values can also not represent or consider the needs of some. Thus, a relevant aspect to consider within this theory is the values and beliefs and how the decision-making actors perceive threats in all sectors. It is in some way not a democratic process, unless the audience represents the civil society (parliament), but the theory does not provide who the audience is. The theory does not shed light into how threats become threats to some and not to others, thus it should be highlighted that because the securitizing actor and audience, might not always represent the values of the referent object, some threats might not be securitized at all. Threats that not being dealt with as threats, in this framework, are therefore not threats. In semi-failed states where violence and homicides are part of everyday life, it is seen that the act of securitizing the civil society’s safety is not always pursued, “Security is a quality actors inject in to issues by securitizing them” (Buzan et al, 1998: 204) If the civil society is the referent object and perceives a threat, but the threat is not declared as such, then according to this theory, this threat would not be a security issue. Thus, the securitization theory only leaves ‘security’ to be defined according to those who have the power to speak security.

In another scenario, it can be argued that The Copenhagen School theory can only be related to democracies, as it assumes that the main securitizing actor together with the audience have been provided the legal, constitutional and institutional tools to represent the civil society. As previously mentioned, in countries on the verge to becoming a failed state, the civil society might find itself forced to join the organized

crime network. In these situations the ‘securitizing actor’ could be argued that is no longer someone who has the legal and constitutional means of control to securitize a referent object but one who holds power through illegal and unconstitutional means, e.g. leaders of drug cartels and organized crime.

3.4. Constructivism in The Copenhagen School

Considering what Buzan et al argue in ‘Regions and Power’ the theory is rooted in constructivism and it can be argued that a common cultural and historical background define an RSC. It is through culture and history that values are perceived in individuals, values that will define within this context, what is considered as a threat, “the operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actor” (Buzan et al 2003: 40). These patterns between the units can easily be culturally and historically trace. Unfriendly relationships between units could be the result of historical conflict and vice versa. What is relevant is the social construction of the security arguments that the units have and their dynamic toward the issues and threats.

According to Christine Agius “Constructivism puts into context the actions, beliefs, and interests of actors and understands that the world they inhabit has been created by them and impacts them” (Agius in Collins, 2010: 51), providing three important positions, i.e., normative and ideational structures, identity and how agents and structures shape and influence each other. Thus it is the perception of an actor and how this actor relates to an audience, through their own perceptions that securitization is achieved. Threats are not self-defining in this theory but a construction of the securitizing actor. “The senses of threat, vulnerability, and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent” (Buzan et al, 1998: 27). As previously mentioned the theory does not engage in trying to define why is a threat a threat, but it does support itself in constructivism, which is translated in relation to the securitizing actor and audience’s construction of a perceived threat. Interests in constructivism are also constructed.

It is understood that culture plays an important role and it is therefore necessary to include a constructivist approach to understand the relevance that the agent has in the process of securitization. How does the actor in power perceive and decide that an issue is in fact an imminent threat? Through what processes or values does he/she achieve the information that makes him/her decide and declare something as a threat? Is this information real? Are there any underlying interests that motivate the actor in speaking security? The theory does not point out answers in this direction, although it clearly argues that ‘securitization’ is rooted in constructivism.

Although it is not intended in this thesis to include an ethical/moral dilemma in the theory and pose the question of why should a threat be a threat, it would be appropriate to include the Rational Choice Theory briefly. This theory could show a different angle, and explain what the securitization theory cannot provide, the

3.5 Rational Choice theory

This theory could provide complementary approach to find the motives behind the political actors. The theory “focus is primarily on individuals, the factors that lead them to choose preferred courses of action, and how strategic interaction generates uncertainty (Collins, 2008: 23). This theory could help finding underlying interests for the intervention in Libya to answer whether or not the French leadership wanted to show strength and gain political image in the eyes of the French public. The theory “contains three essential elements: (1) methodological individualism, (2) goal-seeking or utility-maximization and (3) the existence of various institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice” (Pollack, 2006: 2)

Rational Choice points out to self-interests in individual behaviour, in which we aim to maximize the results of our actions by choosing under constrained circumstances, “Rational choice focuses on strategic interactions in which agents participate on the basis of their given identities and interests and try to realize their preference through strategic behaviour” (Risse, 2000: 3) Thus actors chose a path of action attempting to achieve a desired objective.

The hypotheses posed in the introduction will be analyzed further after a detailed overview, which makes up the case study, is provided in the next chapter.

4. Case Study – The steps towards the intervention in Libya

In this chapter I would like to introduce the empirical data. This will be done in two sections. In the first section, a chronological reconstruction of the events will be provided for an overview of the dates. This will be followed by the second section, which encompasses a detailed overview of the French position in the conflict.

In the first section the chronological overview is reconstructed with the political events surrounding the conflict that emerged in Libya. This chronogram starts in February 15th 2011, when the protests began in Libya. It ends on March 19th 2011, with French jets leading the military strike in Libya. The idea of the chronogram is to create a boundary for the study case; the reason why it ends on the first air strike is because the process behind the final decision to intervene is a point of interest in this research. It is within this process that we can determine if this was a case of securitization or not. This can only be done looking closely at the steps leading up to the military intervention. The chronogram is necessary in order to provide a boundary and frame that encompasses the study case. It is important to note that during this period other events related to the conflict were happening in Libya such as the detailed conflict between the National Transitional Council and the government. For purposes of this research the focus is not on these events but instead on the political dynamics of French leadership that led to intervention.

Further on, in the second section, a detailed overview of the official French Position within the conflict will be provided. This will help explain what the justification was that French leadership used in order to push the international community for an intervention.

These two sections, the chronological overview and the detailed French position, will afterwards be analyzed using the theory in the following chapter.

4.1 Chronogram – General Overview

On the 16th of February 2011, ordinary men and women in Libya took to the streets of Benghazi demanding basic democratic rights, liberty and the end of tyranny. These events were triggered after Fethi Tarbel, a human rights campaigner, was arrested. Although the demonstrations were initiated in the city of Benghazi, they soon spread to other cities in Libya, including Tripoli (Cutler and Golovnina, 2011).

The movement in Libya was part of the crying out for democracy and human rights seen in other Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East. This movement, known as the Arab Spring, started in Tunisia on December 2010 and rapidly spread throughout other Arab countries. Protests and clashes between the civil society and the government ranged with a different level of intensity, from non-violent protests and strikes in Morocco and other countries, to revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and a civil war in the case of Libya.

Unfortunately, the people protesting in Libya were met with a formidable show of force and state brutality by Gaddafi's government. This soon included aircraft attacks towards civilians. Libyan diplomats and high-ranking officials decided to resign and condemn the actions of Gaddafi, pressuring the International Community to take special notice of the events. Political leaders all over the world condemned the situation asking for political dialogue and peaceful negotiation. Regardless of this, Gaddafi did not concede to the wishes of the international community and continued the attacks on the protesters. At this point the international community was hesitant to take a clear stand towards Gaddafi and his regime.

Five days after the revolt began in Benghazi, and on the 22nd the EU Council issued a press release, declaring its concern on the situation and condemning the violence and force against the civil populations. The EU also offered support to their southern Mediterranean neighbours on the path towards their democratic process and that special focus should be taken on the issue of humanitarian aid and on the possible immigration and displacement (Council of the European Union, 2011). By then speculation on oil prices had hit the headline news. The French Minister of Industry and Energy Eric Besson declared that despite the escalating violence and conflict

there was no threat in this regards (Aphatie, J.M., 2011). Nevertheless a publication on Business week showed that the share prices on European oil companies in Libya began fluctuating harshly within days of the beginning of the conflict. But oil was not the only commodity affected by the conflict. Gas supply through the Greenstream Mediterranean pipeline was suspended on the 22nd of February (Migliaccio, 2011); The New York times published that this affected the whole of Europe but particularly Italy (Donado, 2011). The situation was turning problematic and the international community was still in hope of political and diplomatic dialogue. The Arab League had issued a statement, presented to the UN Security Council, whose council President Maria Luiza Ribeiro welcomed urging Gaddafi to stop the violence, expressing concern about the safety of people and asking the authorities to protect the population (Ribeiro, 2011).

Due to the violence towards the Libyan people, the Libyan minister of justice resigned declining to participate in the brutality towards the civil society. The headlines around the world reported how some soldiers were brutally killed after not following orders to attack protesters, and how two Libyan air force pilots defected their jets from the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force. The pilots landed in Malta, in refusal of following orders to attack the civilians (Scicluna, 2011). A week after the protests begin, Gaddafi had aired a dramatic video. Now, the world learned that Gaddafi was willing to crush down the civil population without remorse in order to bring down those who defied his government.

In view of the escalating situation on the 23rd of February, President Nicolas Sarkozy spoke out at the French Parliament. He demanded the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, at that time Michèle Alliot-Marie, to engage in dialogue with their counterparts from members of the EU in order for concrete measure to be taken toward Libya. Later that same day, at the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels, by initiative of France, the EU Member States agreed to the existing needs in applying measures to Libya (French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2011). The EU High Representative Catherine Ashton condemned the situation urging Libya to stop the violence, expressing specific concern and offering support over the human rights issues. She also announced threateningly "The EU has decided

to suspend negotiations with Libya on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement and is ready to take further measures” (HR Catherine Ashton 2011). The claim that the EU was breaking relations to some point was a stand aimed at provoking Gaddafi to reconsider his position and retreat to a peaceful negotiation with the population of Libya.

Regardless of the attempted requests made by the international community, Gaddafi’s government did not do anything to amend the violence and retract its armed forces from assaulting the civil population. In view of Gaddafi’s position, the Human Rights Council held a meeting on the 25th of February addressing the issues on human rights in Libya. The main issue discussed was removing Libya from the Human Rights Council as a consequence of Gaddafi’s actions. One of the concerns pointed out, was the effect of the conflict on migration towards Libyan neighbouring countries, since refugees fleeing the conflict zone could seek humanitarian aid (UN News Centre, 2011). That same day, the Libyan representative for the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Abdurrahman Shalgham, gave a straightforward speech at the UN Security Council in New York. He spoke on behalf of the Libyan people, condemning Gaddafi and asking for concrete support from members of the UN Security Council (H.E. Mr. Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, 2011). France, supported by Great Britain, pushed in adopting a concrete measure towards Gaddafi. Back in Libya the anti-Gaddafi movement was shaping into what is now known as the National Transitional Council (NTC), headed by Mustafa Abdeljelee.

On the 26th of February the Security Council of the United Nations decided upon UN resolution 1970 (2011) to implement an arms embargo on Libya and prevent the further supply of armament. Furthermore, they requested a travel ban on Gaddafi’s family and government representatives, as well as a financial asset freeze to his family (UN resolution 1970 (2011)). Meanwhile in Libya the conflict persisted, but the NTC remained strong trying to gain terrain by fighting back against forces and troops loyal to Gaddafi. Facing the uncertainty on Gaddafi’s decision to stop the violence, France closed its embassy in Tripoli on the 27th of February 2011.

In the first week of March the conflict continued between the two sides, the National Transitional Council and forces Loyal to Gaddafi. Many civilians were caught in the

conflict. The United Nations General Assembly upon UN resolution 65/265 also suspended Libya as a member of the UN Human Rights Council on the 1st of March, the same day in which British Prime Minister declares that he had asked the (British) Ministry of Defence to work with “our allies” on plans for a military intervention” (Macdonald, 2011). It seemed as if Gaddafi was running out of options and refused to change his course of action, although some media, including the Spanish newspaper, *El Pais*, published that he accepted the proposal from Venezuela to act as mediator between the international community and him (Primera, 2011).

On the 10th of March the media showed that France became the first country to recognize the National Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan People (Maria Golovnina Reuters). Meanwhile, other nations and international organizations condemned Gaddafi’s decisions, but did not take the same stand on the recognition of the NTC. Anders Fogh Rasmussen on behalf of NATO declared on this day, their presence in the Mediterranean was increasing but highlighted that any military action would need “three key principles. Firstly, there has to be demonstrable need for NATO action. Secondly, there has to be a clear legal base. And thirdly, there has to be a firm regional support” (Rasmussen, 2011). Although the tension in Libya was growing and NATO was preparing itself for possible military action, there was a clear prerequisite for military intervention and this required the support from several actors.

On French and British initiative, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting in Brussels on the 11th of March. After the meeting the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, express the urgency of the situation by declaring that an extraordinary need for the twenty-seven members to gather was accountable only for urgent matters, and this had happened only three times. This introductory statement to the press conference in Brussels, expressed the importance of this matter for the EU. At the press conference he also declared, “The EU welcomes and encourages the interim National Transitional Council based in Benghazi” (Van Rompuy 2011). A day before, other EU member states were puzzled to see how France had recognized the National Transitional Council, and nevertheless on that day the EU council followed France and Great Britain’s steps. It seemed that these two

countries were leading the way in the conflict with Libya. A day later the Arab League met in Cairo where they agreed that a no-fly zone should be implemented in Libya. Consequently they sent, on the 14th of March a letter to the UN Security Council in hopes of bringing to an end the air strikes to civilians by Gaddafi's forces (Freeman, 2011). The document on behalf of the Arab League read "To call upon the Security Council, in view of the deterioration in the situation in Libya, to shoulder its responsibilities and take the measure necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft" (UNSC, 2011).

The measures taken up to that date by the international community did not bring enough attention to Gaddafi, whose armed forces continued with the violent attacks on the Libyan people according to the media. The Gaddafi regime had already taken possession of two oil towns by the 13th of March, Ras Lanuf and Brega. By then, the Zuetina Oil facility was one of the many to have sustained damages due to the conflict (Abbas, 2011).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy sent a letter to the members of the UN Security Council urging them to support the Arab League on a proposed no-fly zone and take responsibility by responding accordingly (Élysée, 2011). Consequently of the Arab's League agreement and the French-British pledge, on the 17th of March the UN Security Council met again with the agenda on Libya. In this meeting the members finally voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by France, which backed up the no-fly zone in Libya, among the implementation of other measures. This resolution resulted in NATO's support to the military intervention in Libya starting on the 19th of March 2011.

The intervention has been classified in the media by resulting in the consecutive leadership by France. In the next part of the overview, the French position through out the period that ranges from the 15th up to the 19th of February, will be describe in detail. The information gathered is the result of the research in official documents and the media; unfortunately some information is not available to the public and thus cannot be included.

4.2. The Official French Position

This overview aims at laying out the careful political steps taken by France in pushing the International Community to intervene in Libya. Many of the actions were initiated by France, which played a pivotal role in the political dynamics previous to the intervention. What follows will be presented in chronological order, following the path that lead the International Community to adopt UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011). Thus, a detailed overview of the French position is presented in the following section beginning from the first official declaration regarding the issue in Libya and ending on the 19th of March, date in which the implementation of the no-fly began.

It is important to note that this was a delicate period for all French political parties, as French Cantonal elections were programmed for the 20th and 27th of March. Additionally, the presidential elections of 2012 could also influence the parties' positions, as the conflict would present an opportunity for them to show their ability to make decisions and take leadership. It is important to mention this as some of the criticism comes from the opposition of the ruling party.

4.2.1. The First Reactions – Military Intervention, not an Option.

As a consequence of the aggressive reaction by Gaddafi's regime towards the Libyan people, the French media and the world became outraged; seeking answers from powerful nations. The Élysée Palace on the 21st of March made its first announcement regarding the conflict in Libya. In this brief statement, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy condemned the use of force towards the people of Libya and demanded a political dialogue without violence.

In view of the escalating violence, two days later Sarkozy addressed himself to the Council of Ministers of France, where he asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at that time Michele Alliot-Marie, "to propose ... EU partners ...adopt concrete sanctions" (Sarkozy, 2011). He specifically emphasized that what was happening in Libya was a humanitarian issue, "The international community cannot stand idly by in the face of these massive human rights violations" (Sarkozy, 2011). With this demand

he was clearly taking a step towards the need for dialogue and coalition between other Member States of the European Union. He also proposed, as means to stop Gaddafi, the prohibition of access to EU territory, the monitoring of financial flows and considered suspending economic and trade relations with Libya (Sarkozy, 2011).

Consequently by French initiative, the EU agreed for the need of specific sanctions and the UN Human Rights Council held a meeting to reach a conclusion regarding the suspension of Libya as member of the council.

France did not leave the issue aside, and days later, Gérard Araud, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations in New York, gave a press conference on the 25th of February at the United Nations in New York. Here he claimed that the current situation in Libya was a ‘humanitarian issue’. When he responded to questions by the press, he said that at the time being a military operation was not an option, this excluded the possibility of a no-fly zone. Arnaud clearly mentioned that they were aiming to apply sanctions on Gaddafi, his family and other Libyan individuals; as well as an arms embargo and reference to the International Criminal Court. His speech emphasized the human rights violation, stating that the international community could not stand still without taking any action, “we follow this with horror and compassion...”(Araud, 2011). Arnaud also reaffirmed that this was an urgent matter by asking the General Assembly to vote on the suspension of Libya as part of the Human Rights Council, “It must go now” (Araud, 2011). When he expresses this sentence he referred to the voting of Libya’s suspension as a member of the HR Council.

French leadership did not only seek coalition partners within Europe, but also with other head of states. On the 24th of February, Nicolas Sarkozy engaged in a telephone conference with President of the United States Barack Obama, regarding the issue in Libya. He relayed France’s position and claimed that France was ready to request another urgent meeting with the Security Council of the United Nations on this issue. He also exposed that by French initiative, the EU was analyzing concrete measures towards Libya. Again he repeated that humanitarian aid should be activated, as well as the sanctions so far proposed (Élysée Palace, 2011). Sarkozy also had a

programmed visit on the 25th of February to Turkey as president of the G20. He took the opportunity to strengthen France's position on Libya during the joint press conference with Turkish President Abdallah Gül. In a determined tone he said that their position was that Gaddafi "must go... the violence toward the people is unacceptable and should be punished" (Sarkozy, 2011). He pointed out that he and President Obama, on request, had spoken about this issue and about demanding a meeting with the UN Security Council. The French president also agreed with his counterpart Abdallah Gül, on the importance of the humanitarian issue. He emphasized that a massive flow of people fleeing from Libya toward neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, "contains the seeds of risk of destabilization" (Sarkozy, 2011). At this point, Sarkozy said that France was cautious to take any military action and that their position was determined although reasonable, but that both the UN Security Council and the EU Council should meet to discuss possible actions and measures to be taken. He finished his speech by saying "...fear is not a strategy" (Sarkozy, 2011).

The 27th of February marked an important day with relevant events that influenced the path of France's direction in the Libyan issue. Firstly, a non-governmental figure appeared on the scene, with a key move on the further developments in France's steps towards the Libyan issue. Secondly, that Sunday night, Sarkozy announced a change and replacement of key governmental positions within his cabinet.

In a more or less expected move, the French public was presented with President Sarkozy's decision to make changes in his cabinet. Sarkozy addressed the French people on radio and television broadcasting late on Sunday night to share his decision of reshuffling his cabinet as a response to the current situation. He announced that the French minister of Foreign Affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie, was to be replaced by Alain Juppé. Alliot-Marie had provoked criticism with the way she had handled the crisis in Tunisia months earlier. She had raised concerns regarding her own personal interests in the relationship with the former president of Tunisia. It was said that she had a close relationship with him and a close friend of his who had flown her in his private jet during her holidays in Tunisia (Erlenger, 2011). Now, with Juppé on board, the French media recognized that Sarkozy aimed at repairing the French image and bringing strength to French diplomacy (Bremer, 2011). Alain Juppé was not only at

that time the Minister of Defense, but had also been a former Prime Minister during the Chirac era. Because of these two factors, his position was strong among the French people. A public survey conducted by *Harris Interactive* on the 28th of February showed that 55% of the French people said they could trust Juppé as Minister of Foreign and European Affairs; the survey also showed that this was welcomed mostly by the right wing.

Sarkozy also announced in that night's speech that the change in cabinet included a new Minister of Interior and Immigration, Claude Gueant, who would replace Brice Hortefeux. Guent was known to the French public as the person who managed the crisis of the Islamic attacks in 1995 with verifiable experience on terrorism (Dusseauix, 2011).

That Sunday evening, Sarkozy began his speech by explaining the current situation faced by France, argument used as a justification for his decision to make changes in the cabinet. He claimed that his duty was not only to communicate and explain the "challenges" but also "... to protect the present of the French"(Sarkozy, 2011). Sarkozy explicitly pointed out that the historic movement toward democracy should be supported. Thus, the situation in Libya was one that needed support from those who cherished democracy, and by not reacting that current situation could escalate and bring a worse dictatorship. He said that if the situation deteriorated in Libya, consequences could result in "flows of uncontrollable migration and terrorism" (Sarkozy, 2011); furthermore Sarkozy stated that the position taken should be in the middle between interference and indifference. At this point military intervention was not mentioned in his speech but he does say that they should do everything in their hands to support the people in search of Democracy.

4.2.2. Recognition of the NTS – Leading the International Community

It is on the 27th of February that a non-governmental figure brings attention to the scene, Bernard-Henry Lévy, the French philosopher born in Algeria, with a long public history in conflict countries. Lévy, commonly known in the media as BHL, offered to arrange a meeting between the representatives of the National Transitional

Council and President Sarkozy. The French President agreed to have this meeting, motivating BHL to fly to Egypt on the 3rd of March on a rented airplane (Erlanger, 2011). BHL then crossed the Libyan border and got a lift on a truck towards Benghazi. Once in Benghazi, BHL managed to drive and meet, in person, with members of the National Transitional Council, specifically the former Libyan Minister of Justice, Moustapha Abdeljalil (Girard, 2011). It is in this meeting that BHL arranged for the representatives of the NTC to hold a meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris as soon as possible. Two days later, on the 5th of March, the NTC announced to the world that it was the only legitimate power in Libya. France responded to this, greeting their formation in a press release. The New York Times quoted BHL, who said that the greeting by France was a good gesture expected from the NTC representatives, in order to proceed and meet with the French President in Paris (Erlanger, 2011). Again, in the press release France condemned the violence toward the people in Libya by Gaddafi's regime and "...calls for the full respect of UNSCR 1970 "(<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/>).

The meeting between the representatives of the NTC and Nicolas Sarkozy finally took place on the 10th of March 2011 at the Élysée Palace in Paris. In the meeting with the French president, BHL, Mahmoud Jibril and Ali Essaoui were present, but the details of what was spoken during the meeting are not offered in any official or unofficial source to the public. The meeting was finalized outside the Élysée Palace where Sarkozy shook hands with the representatives of the NTC, a recorded moment that made headlines all over the world. It is outside the Élysée Palace that Mr. Jibril announced to the press that the French authorities had decided to recognize the National Transitional Council as Libya's legitimate representative of the Libyan People. Furthermore, an official statement on the recognition of the NTC, on the French Government's website, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, supported his testimony. This action resulted in Libya's Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled Kaima announcement: Libya was breaking diplomatic relations with France (Golovnina, 2011). The decision by France made the headlines, with speculations of whether the EU would follow the steps and if this was a unilateral decision.

By now, the French leadership was receiving some criticism by the opposition regarding the situation in Libya. On the one hand, from the Front National Party and on the other the Socialist Party, both parties with whom the ruling party competes for the presidential election of 2012. The Front National Party, a right wing nationalist party headed by Marine Le Pen, had issued a press communication on the 3rd of March, urging Sarkozy's government to close the borders, suspending the freedom of movement and asking for deportation to all illegal immigrants. Their concern was due to the migratory flow received by France from Tunisia earlier in February. Furthermore, Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of The Front National openly criticized Sarkozy's decision to recognize the NTC, reminding the French public of the events that occurred on the Ivory Coast with their president and how Sarkozy's threat meant nothing at the end on that occasion (Le Pen, 2011). Contrary to their position, the other political party with a strong grip on the French public, the Socialist Party, was in favour of the interference in Libya and openly criticized Sarkozy for not taking more initiative, emphasizing the human rights issues and individual freedom (The Socialist Party, 2011) The Socialist Party, contrary to the position of the National Front, urged for more EU intervention and supported the idea of a no-fly zone.

4.2.3. The idea of a No-Fly Zone "is in the air"

A day before the meeting in Paris with members of the NTC, Sarkozy, again supported by Prime Minister David Cameron, had jointly written a letter to the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. According to the Élysée Palace's official website, on the 28th of February, Sarkozy and Great Britain's Prime Minister, David Cameron, engaged in a telephone conference in which they agreed on the urgency of the EU action, as it reads in French *urgence*. It was in their telephone conference of the 28th that they had concluded to approach the European Council demanding the extraordinary meeting for concrete actions to be taken (Élysée Palace, 2011).

In this letter both heads of state welcomed the formation of the National Transitional Council in Benghazi. They addressed themselves, not only to the EU but also to their allies and friends in Africa and the Arab countries in order to unite and follow seven concrete measures they had drafted. They pointed out that the situation was an urgent

matter that had to be dealt with now, using the French word for *today*, “Today’s priority is to cope with the political and security situation” (Sarkozy and Cameron 2011). They claimed that the steps to be taken were justified by the lack of efforts on behalf of Gaddafi to stop the violence regardless of UN resolution 1970, which was adopted earlier by the international community.

The suggested steps not only aimed at ending the violent attacks on civilians, but also to put an end to the regime of Gaddafi, stating that him and his “gang must go” (Sarkozy et Cameron, 2011). They concretely communicated that they supported the NTC and that this Council should be regarded as a valid interlocutor; they also brought up the idea of the no-fly zone as a measure to be taken in order to protect the Libyan people from Gaddafi’s attacks. They communicated that both France and Great Britain were drafting a resolution to be presented at the UN Security Council, proposing specific steps to be taken on this behalf. Furthermore, they also raised concerns regarding humanitarian aid and the displacement of people who would flee the conflict area, stating that they were willing to provide all types of support in this area, but making it clear that the humanitarian issues should be dealt by the United Nations.

It should be noted that several Heads of State and the EU Council President, on the 7th, 8th and 10th of March, met with Nicolas Sarkozy at the Élysée Palace. The agenda that reads in the official website of the palace describes that the meetings were devoted for discussing the meetings to be held in the EU Council concerning Libya and the Euro Region. The Prime Minister of Slovenia, Borut Pahor met on the 7th, followed by Von Rompuy, the president of the EU Council, who met with Sarkozy on the 8th. Finally the Greek Prime Minister, Georges Papandreou, met with Sarkozy on Thursday the 10th of March. Furthermore, a reunion on Wednesday the 9th with his Council of Ministers is shown but unfortunately no information is provided on the details of the meeting. (Élysée Palace, 2011). During the same days, the new Foreign Minister Alain Juppé was on his first official travel. His travel was to Egypt where he gave a press conference and repeated what Sarkozy and Gerard had stated, that Gaddafi had to leave. When asked his position regarding a military operation, Juppé said that this was not France’s desire, but that they should be ready to react if the situation got worse. He stated that France accepted the idea of the no-fly zone

provided the UN would decree a mandate and with the support of both the African Union and the Arab League (Juppé, 2011) In his visit he also repeats what Sarkozy had stated to the French Council of Ministers, in Paris, “The message being passed is non interference nor indifference” (Juppé in Salaün, 2011).

On the 11th of March before noon, Van Rompuy had gathered the Member States of the European Union on an extraordinary meeting regarding the situation in Libya. After reaching conclusive remarks and measures, Sarkozy among others, offered a press conference. He expressed how France had desired this extraordinary meeting to take place in order for the EU to act up to the level of the historical circumstances that were shaking the southern Mediterranean countries. He emphasized firstly on the democratic values that were being raised in the Arab countries and also on their physical proximity in the Mediterranean.

The second part of his speech is dedicated to summarizing the conclusive decisions made by the EU Council meeting. Firstly he said that the EU Council agreed that Gaddafi should leave, as he was no longer seen as a political interlocutor because the EU Council had decided to recognize the NTC as the only political interlocutor. He pointed out that although they recognized the NTC, it was up to the people of Libya to decide whether or not the NTC would evolve to be the future ruling institution. The idea of recognizing the NTC came specifically, as this would avoid the risk of a “somalisation”.

Thirdly, Sarkozy pointed out that the EU Council was already addressing the humanitarian issue, regarding the displacement of thousands of people who would flee the conflict areas. In order to address the question of migration he explained that the EU Council had decided to convene the Ministers of Interior on the migration policy, reinforcing border security and engaging in dialogue with their counterparts of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood. He stated that this was an issue that should be spoken of, as it was probable that the people fleeing the conflict areas would try to cross the Mediterranean if they found no support, which made it a good reason for humanitarian aid to be in action in North Africa. Sarkozy clearly expressed his desire for this issue to be taken care of, as he exposed how it was known that by that time 200,000 persons were displaced and that migration policy should evolve and

react to this situation. He said “nobody wanted the replica of Lampedusa, nobody” (Sarkozy, 2011). Lampedusa is the Italian island known for receiving a high percentage of immigration from North African countries; island which had since February 19th been the objective of Frontex’s operation Hermes. This operation was launched after the island had received approximately 6000 immigrants mostly Tunisians after the Arab Spring had started.

Furthermore, and important, in this press conference, Sarkozy mentioned that the EU in view of air attacks toward the civil population, would take other considerations and possible actions. This, he said, was in order to protect the people and after a UN mandate and the support of the Arab League (Sarkozy, 2011). It was this way that Sarkozy addressed the military issue, although later in his speech he pointed out that France was in favour of a diplomatic solution and political dialogue and a ground military intervention had never been an option, but the no-fly zone could still be considered. He mentioned that together with David Cameron they had discussed whether they should just observe how Gaddafi massacred the civil population with air artillery; therefore he and Alain Juppé had already discussed possible strategic options aiming at targeting Gaddafi’s military infrastructure. In Sarkozy’s views the Libyan people were victims of acts of war (Sarkozy, 2011).

On that same Friday evening, the French Socialist Party criticized the EU, releasing a press communication in which they argued that they expected more concrete measures to be taken. They supported a no-fly zone, the recognition of the National Transitional Council, and a more united EU front. They argued that the EU should take a more stronger and united position and criticized Sarkozy for not having a stronger leadership and paved the EU into these measures (The Socialist Party, 2011)

The Brazilian magazine *Veja*, published an interview to Sarkozy, a day after the meeting in Brussels. In this interview he stated the international community should aim at stopping Gaddafi from perpetrating more violence, and that this was to be done through sanctions and economical measures. He also stated that the European Council had met and was already dealing with the issue on migration and helping Libyans to build a democracy. He pointed out the importance to have support from International

Organizations and other countries, such as Brazil, in order to proceed with further steps (Élysée, 2011).

On this weekend of the 12th of March, in Cairo, The Arab League was gathering in a meeting, and agreeing to propose and support a no-fly zone over Libya, to which France rapidly on the 13th issued an official statement by Alain Juppé. The statement read that France welcomed the solution adopted by the Arab League, indicative of the desire to protect the Libyan civil population against violence and abuse. It also stated that France would put all efforts in pursuing this objective with all counterparts, i.e. EU, UNSC, Arab League and NTC (Juppé, 2011). According to a Reuters reporter James Regan, France was aiming to lead the way and persuade all counterparts to apply a no-fly zone over Libya.

4.2.4. The final push towards UN Resolution 1973 (2011)

On the 14th of March, back in New York at the United Nations Security Council, two letters were being received and analyzed. The first would be a document on behalf of the European Union on their concluding remarks from their meeting of the 11th of March. The other document came on behalf of the Arab League, communicating their decision of the 12th of March, regarding the issue in Libya. Furthermore, the UNSC received a draft resolution presented by Lebanon, which had been jointly drafted together with France and Great Britain (France at the United Nations, 2011). The draft resolution's topic was the issue in Libya and the implementation of concrete measures, including a no-fly zone. Consequently, on the 15th and 16th of March, the UNSC held a meeting regarding the draft resolution. On the 15th, Mr. Gerard Araud made the following comments to the press before the first meeting: "Now that there is this Arab League statement, we do hope that it's a game changer for the other members of the council" (Abbas, 2011).

France's period to hold the G8 presidency 2011 presented an opportunity bring the no-fly zone issue during the programmed meetings to be held in March 14 and 15th. By the 15th of March regardless of the well-documented violence, the G8 ministers did not manage to take a clear stand on the situation towards Gaddafi, other than welcoming the so far actions by the United Nations and the Criminal Court and

offering further humanitarian support (G8 Chairman's Summary, 2011). After the G8 meeting, Alain Juppé declared to the press, regretting the situation and claiming that a no-fly zone would have prevented more violence in Libya; an idea that was backed up by his British counterpart but blocked by Germany and Russia. (Irish et al, 2011). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that one of the governmental figures who attended such meetings, was U.S.A Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in whose agenda a bilateral meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy and Alain Juppé was to take place on the 14th at 5pm. The details of what was spoken between the three figures is not available, nonetheless Clinton provided an interview on the 16th in Cairo with Shahira Amin of Nile TV. In this interview she said "The Arab League statement on Saturday was an extraordinary commitment... there is a sense of urgency... so we want to see the Security Council act as soon as possible" (Clinton, 2011). She also said that the international community had been reluctant before the Arab's League position on a no-fly zone and that the British and French's proposed resolution was being revised at the UNSC (Clinton, 2011). France next move was to persuade the international community on a harder united front to implement the no-fly zone, and this was going to be done in New York at the UN Security Council.

A letter from Nicolas Sarkozy was published in the official website of the Élysée Palace. The letter was addressed to members of the UNSC and referred to the petition by the Arab League concerning the measure to be taken in view of the human rights violations. In his letter he said "France calls on all members solemnly Security Council to take full responsibility and to support this initiative." (Sarkozy, 2011). He urge them to support the Arab League and the draft resolution presented by Lebanon a day before.

A day later, Alain Juppé flies to New York where he attended the UN Security Council meeting held on the 17th of March; the agenda proposed was the voting on the new draft resolution presented two days before. At the UN Security Council meeting, Alain Juppé spoke out, honouring the Arab League and African Union for their approach on the no-fly zone and reminding them of the violations of human rights by Gaddafi. He mentioned that although steps had been taken, there still were

no results and that it was time to react. Juppé ended his speech with the following emotive statement:

“France solemnly calls on all the members of the Security Council to support this initiative and to adopt this resolution. If this mandate is passed, France is ready to act, with the member States, including Arab ones, who want to. We are running out of time. It is a matter of days, maybe a matter of hours. With every day, every hour that passes, the forces of repression are clamping down on civilian populations in quest of freedom, in particular the population of Benghazi. Every day, every hour that passes increases the weight of responsibility that weighs on our shoulders. Let us not be too late! “. (Juppé, A. 2011)

On that day UN Resolution 1973 (2011) was approved.

Back in France, the National Front Party, who was heading the 2012 elections race by then, publicly criticized the decisions by the French government in leading the intervention in Libya. They issued a declaration in which they demonstrated their rejection by stating, “this was a violation of the principle of sovereignty that underpins international law”. They also claimed that Sarkozy had once more acted by impulse and that the bringing down Gaddafi would be bring negative consequences to France, such as migration and “somalisation” of Libya (The National Front, 2011). Contrary to the National Front and a few other political parties against the intervention, the Socialist Party, and third in the race for elections 2012, re-emphasized that the intervention had been their initial position, and thus criticized Sarkozy for not taking a stronger initiative earlier. Like the Socialist Party, the majority of the political elite approved and welcomed the French government initiative towards the issue in Libya (Cori, 2011). The question on hand as the Economist publishes it, was whether fighting this war for electoral purposes (The Economist, 2011). France, as mentioned previously was running the Cantonal elections and in a tight race for 2012 elections, which was headed by Marine Le Pen, from the National Front, with a 23% according to the election polls by *Harris Interactive* earlier in March, and bringing on board tight migration policies.

Following the approval of UNSC resolution 1973, Gaddafi got a clear message. France, the United Kingdom, the United States with the support of Arab countries issued a statement addressed to Gaddafi. In this, they asked Gaddafi for a halt in the violence, and ceasefire, the matter was not negotiable in which they asked for the ceasefire, or “the international community will make him suffer the consequences and the implementation of the resolution will be imposed by military means” (Élysée, 2011). The message was clear and Gaddafi was being warned to either comply or accept the military intervention for which the international community was preparing. Gaddafi responded to a willing ceasefire on the 18th of March, but there is not enough evidence that this was really the case.

The French president’s agenda in the following 24 hours was devoted for the summit in Paris, where heads of states and official figures attended, the matter in concern: UNSCR 1973. The summit took place on the 19th of March 2011, where Sarkozy pronounced a powerful speech, and representatives of members of the EU, the United States of America, The Arab League and Canada were present. He greeted the decision on UN resolution 1973 in the view that the international community could take all necessary measures if Gaddafi did not cease fire. He referred again to the International Criminal Court for the crimes against humanity committed in Libya. Additionally, mentioned the sanctions in UNSC 1973, imposed on Gaddafi and for the first time he mentioned the asset freeze on the National Oil Company of Libya (Sarkozy, 2011). Representatives of Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Canada, Qatar, and the Netherlands were supportive to France on this matter. This way France took the leadership of what Reuters calls the “biggest international military intervention in the Arab world since 2003” (Golovnina, 2011). French Rafale jets launched the first air strike to Libya’s armed forces near Benghazi followed by the US and Great Britain. This day marked the beginning of the French military participation Harmattan in Libya (other counterparts have other names for their participation in this intervention).

Throughout the writing of this thesis, the events of the conflict constantly developed. At some point after the military intervention began, Colonel Gaddafi is missing and as of September 2011 there are still no signs of him. To date the National Transitional Council has managed to occupy most of the territory in Libya, although there is still

sporadic fighting between the two sides and pockets of resistance against the NTC still persist. Furthermore, efforts from the International Community, in supporting Libya paved its democracy are in process.

For purposes of this thesis the 19th of March marks the end date of the timeframe that is relevant for the further analysis. The chronogram intends to capture the relevant decisions and interaction by the international community towards Libya and specifically the French leadership.

The next section will use the previous overviews together with the theory for an analysis. This analysis is aimed at exploring the hypotheses presented in the introduction.

5. Analysis

In this chapter I use the theories and hypotheses and begin by exploring to what extent the hypotheses are valid (or not) by analyzing each one by one. Afterwards, I have a look at the theoretical framework in light of the empirical material and ask how useful this theory is for my problem. In the last part I will also use the theoretical framework to find out if there was a process of securitization or not, through analyzing the process.

The hypotheses used are:

1. France saw a threat to the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood. If Libya faced a long-standing civil war, it could become a failed state and have negative consequences for France, like mass migration, instability of gas and oil supply and organized crime.
2. It was a humanitarian intervention; France wanted to protect the principle of “Human Rights” being violated by Gaddafi’s regime.

5.1. A Threat to stability

The first hypothesis: France saw a threat to the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood. If Libya faced a long-standing civil war, it could become a failed state and have negative consequences for France, like mass immigration, instability of gas and oil supply and organized crime.

There is documentation that already provides supporting evidence to this hypothesis. This way of back thinking is provided in both the European Security Strategy 2003, (ESS hereafter), and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS. All EU members including France approve both documents and they represent the standard way of thinking among EU members. Nevertheless, this does not imply that they dictate how to react to concrete crisis.

For this hypothesis it is important to capture the territorial aspect; The Copenhagen School emphasizes that it is within closeness that security concerns will be of higher importance. In the case of Libya it is seen that the concerns grew more intense for countries in proximity, including the members of the Arab League and those EU members north of the Mediterranean. In this sense it must be highlighted that not all the members of the European Regional Complex shared the same sense of urgency as France and the UK and in this case the UK is fairly separated (geographically and by not being part of the Shengen area). It is seen in the ESS that the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood stands out as a geographic hot zone, from where issues can be easily translated into threats due to its proximity with Europe. This is evident in the ESS which claims the following: “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its border all pose problems for Europe” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 7). Related to the Libyan Crisis, French President Sarkozy expressed repeatedly the concern of proximity with Libya. He expressed this, both at a press conference in Ankara and at the European Council extraordinary meeting. On the 11th of March at this meeting in Brussels, Sarkozy made reference to the territorial proximity, by saying that the positioning of Europe was “at first rank” (Sarkozy, 2011) from the impact of the Libyan crisis. In this sense he referred to the EU’s society as a referent object that was directly threatened as a consequence of the crisis in Libya. The Security arguments used during his answers were related to the threats posed by the instability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhoods to the EU’s society.

Considering the attention France gave to the crisis in Libya, it can be argued that the problems in North Africa may represent a series of threats to European societies. The security dynamics of the Mediterranean region are in a way dominating in the agenda of France and the EU. This is the reason why the stability of the region is already considered as a key challenge in the ESS, and why it is pursued through EU policies of cooperation. Related to the crisis, if Libya were perceived as being on the verge of becoming a failed state, it would have been perceived as a problem for the French people. This could bring possible immigration, increased crime, and drug traffic among others. The ESS already argued, back in 2003, “State failure is an alarming

phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds regional instability” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 4). The strategy behind Sarkozy welcoming the NTC had a clear objective, as his argument was that they needed to have a political interlocutor in Libya in order to avoid the country falling into a “somalisation.” In this way he connected the conflict to the possibility of Libyan falling into a failed state, which would bring about worse security issues. In the letter sent by France and Great Britain to Von Rompuy, it is seen that the proposed measures aimed at stabilizing the region and that one of the security concerns also was the flow of massive immigration to Europe.

In fact, immigration was one of the repeating security arguments by the French Leadership. Sarkozy claimed that if the displacement took place massively, the North African region would find itself with a problem and become instable. In his security arguments he was addressing his audience by bringing forward one of the major key threats that is given in the ESS. It is important to note that during the first days of the crisis in Libya, the displacement of Tunisians to Lampedusa was a source of speculation on the possible immigration that the crisis in Libya would bring to the EU.

During the public broadcast to the French people, Sarkozy provided a more precise definition of whom the referent object threatened by this crisis. He mentioned that if the Libyan people were not supported in their effort to change their political system, the situation could deteriorate and bring negative consequences like the “massive flow of uncontrollable migration and terrorism” (Sarkozy, 2011). In this broadcast he claimed to be the one responsible for the protection of the French people; therefore identifying them (French people) as the threatened referent object and to himself as the securitizing actor. In his speech-act he communicated that the situation required resolved changes in the cabinet.

By arguing that people fleeing the conflict zones in Libya could find it “tempting to cross the Mediterranean” (Sarkozy, 2011), Sarkozy was relating the security of the European society’s identity with that the conflict in Libya. The immigration could take place if the displaced people faced a situation without humanitarian solutions (in

the neighbouring countries) in North Africa. The actions needed to avoid this, he argued, were to be urgently addressed in order to securitize migration. Otherwise, immigration was going to threaten the European societal identity. In this sense, the stability of Libya had become a shared security concern for the EU. It can be seen how the EU initially assigned, for the displacement of Libyans, three million euros, an amount that was raised to ten million and then to thirty million euros by the first week of March 2011, only three weeks after the initial protests in Libya.

With the support of France, Italy's initiative on border control was urgently implemented, through Frontex, by allocating twenty five million Euros for Operation Hermes in the first weeks of the crisis. Sarkozy emphasized that "Nobody wanted a multiplication of Lampedusa, nobody!" (Sarkozy, 2011). As previously mentioned Frontex had kick-started an emergency operation to protect the borders, specifically in Lampedusa, where around 6000 Tunisians had migrated due to the conflicts in North Africa. This is the same rhetoric heard from French Minister of European Affairs Laurent Wauquiez in a radio interview expression his opinion that it was "irresponsible" (Wauquiez, 2011) not to act in the light of the recent Arab Spring, speculating massive immigration to Europe. Both Sarkozy and Wauquiez argued that the humanitarian actions needed were to be implemented in North Africa, where the displacement of around 200.000 Libyans was expected in the neighbouring countries. Wauquiez claimed, "We must defend our borders" (Wauquiez, 2011) arguing that Libya was a channel for illegal migration, "it is a real risk..." (Wauquiez, 2011).

In the period previous of the intervention, the French leadership did not provide security arguments specifying the securitization of oil and gas supply; whereas the media did not hesitate in speculate that this was one of the underlying interests behind France's actions. The ESS and the Implementation Report on ESS relate the stability of Northern African countries with the security issue of energy and the challenges faced by the EU regarding oil and gas. These energy sources are not officially presented within the security arguments of French Leadership in the material, but it can be argued that it is not an irrelevant factor since Libya is an important exporter of oil and gas to Europe and several European energy companies have operations in the country. France imports of oil from Libya constituted 16% of its total oil import in

2010 (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies INSEE). Furthermore, because France imports high quantities of natural gas from Algeria and Egypt, both neighbours to Libya, the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood is important to France. To date there are fingers pointing to France for possible promises of oil made by the NTC as a thankful gesture for their support. Nevertheless if this was the case, there should be a cost analysis to determine if the cost of this intervention was worth the “supposed” promise of oil.

In the light of the material it can be seen that France wanted to securitize the stability of the South Mediterranean Neighbourhood and avoid Libya from becoming a failed state. This is shown throughout their speech-act in which security arguments point to migration and organised crime as threats from an unstable Libya. Perhaps this could be seen as an attempt for Sarkozy to demonstrate his leadership and resolution in regional conflicts. It is seen that he was a main actor towards the resolution in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia.

5.2. A Threat to Humanitarian issues

This second hypothesis: France wanted to securitize the “human rights principles” being violated in Libya by Gaddafi’s regime.

Both the political and the military sector in the Copenhagen School Theory define, international principles such as Human Rights as part of possible threatened referent objects. As in the previous hypothesis, there is also evidence from the ESS and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS that sheds light onto the principles of International Stability and Human Rights. Both documents claim that the EU commits itself to be a global player in protecting global security and state that the EU should be an anchor of stability, contributing to security worldwide.

The material in this thesis also presents recurring humanitarian security arguments used by the French Leadership, mainly defending the principle of Human Rights and the right of the Libyan people to choose their political path. In their joint letter to Von Rompuy, British Prime Minister and Sarkozy claimed that the violations perpetrated

by Gaddafi were not acceptable. It is seen repeatedly that the arguments call for the immediate protection of Human Rights, “The international community cannot stand idly by in the face of these massive human rights violations” (Sarkozy, 2011). This is a clear speech-act of “security.”

French Leadership also argued it was their responsibility to support the Libyan people in seeking their own democratic path and in choosing their own destiny freely. Persuasively the French representative of the UN would then argue that this was a moment in which France should support Libya because “A wind of Liberty has arisen south of the Mediterranean” (Araud, 2011). The argument is presented to persuade the audience in supporting the opportunity to make the Libyan people change the course of their political situation in Libya. This is an argument also used by Sarkozy when he addressed the French Public to justify his change in cabinet. Here he referred to the “historical movement” that was taking place in the Arab countries, where the people were seeking to live under the same “cherished values” (Sarkozy, 2011) as the Europeans, e.g., democracy and human rights. He declared that it was their duty to support them (civil society in Arab countries) in this path towards democracy.

According to my material, the French Leadership used these security arguments throughout the period previous of the intervention, but also claimed that this was a shared responsibility with its partners. Going back to the ESS, the shared security concerns towards genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity is evident showing that “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security in the building a better world (Council of Europe, 2003: 1).

Sharing the responsibility in this sense, called for members of the EU to engage among each other and with their counterparts, nations and international organisations to protect the threatened principle. In the world of today, countries rarely engage alone towards an intervention. Kosovo did prove to be different in the sense that the United States (superpower) ventured without support or approval from the UNSC. Nevertheless it would be the norm for a country such as France, which claims to have the UN, the EU and NATO “in the heart of the national strategy” (Delegation aux

Affaires Stratégiques, 2011) to seek approval and share responsibility in this type of situation.

This way, Sarkozy proposed, in his letter to the members of the UNSC, to share the responsibility by complying with the Arab League's petition of the no-fly zone. The material shows that the speech-act brought the humanitarian argument as an issue of security and urgency. Regardless of this, there is not an answer to whether the humanitarian issue was genuine on behalf of the French Leadership. The interests that lay underneath the French government's official position cannot be determined, and it is not possible to say whether or not there was a moral duty to protect the principle of Human Rights. Before this crisis it was well known that Gaddafi's government did not always respect Human Rights, but this had not been a motive to stop the French Government from engaging in good diplomatic relations with him. In fact, negotiations with the EU towards a Framework Agreement had begun in 2008 and were only suspended earlier this year. The humanitarian issue could have been used by Sarkozy to sell a political image needed for the 2012 elections, but this can only be a conjecture that is not materialized in the collected documents.

5.3. Was this a case of securitization?

The basic idea is that securitization is a social process. In order to analyze whether or not this was a case of securitization there are steps that will be analyzed. To analyze the process, first the definition of the referent object and relevant actors should be pointed out. This is to find out who was designated something as a security issue, and who was the approving audience. The next step is to go through the material collected and find the speech-acts with security arguments that entitled the threat to be an urgent matter of priority.

According to the hypotheses the French leadership perceived that several referent objects were by the crisis in Libya. It is useful to remind that a referent object is that which X is threatening and has the right for survival. The referent objects are those given in the analysis of each hypothesis.

Hypotheses	Referent Objects:
Hypothesis one	The French/EU societal identity The French Economy
Hypothesis two	The principle of Human Rights

Having the referent object we should define the securitizing actor, who according to this theoretical framework, is that who labels something as security through a speech-act. In this case, the securitizing actor is the French Government through its representatives, mainly: Nicolas Sarkozy, Alain Juppé, Gérard Araud, Laurent Wauquiez, Eric Besson, and at the beginning Michèle Marie-Alliot. They all acted and spoke with the same logic and rhetoric through their discourse. It should be highlighted that the British leadership was also a securitizing actor, and importantly shared the same security arguments as the French.

Throughout the period in this case study, the French Leadership showed various security arguments in their speech-act by labelling the crisis in Libya as a matter of security and high priority. Within days of the beginning of the protests, European citizens were evacuated from Libya and security concerns were raised. Sarkozy urgently demanded the French European and Foreign Minister to prioritize the crisis in Libya, by agreeing with other EU partners on concrete measures towards the unacceptable situation.

The urgency factor in the Copenhagen School Theory helps define what is an issue of security. Within the context of Libya it relates to the urgency status of the conflict, given by the French leadership. The phrase: “Gaddafi must go!” (Sarkozy, 2011; Juppé, 2011), becomes a symbolic phrase that would reappear in several occasions, to the point that other actors within this period of time would use the same phrase in addressing the issue e.g, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, US President Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Denmark Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

Their arguments were not only in regards to Gaddafi stepping down, but also to the security issue that needed to be stabilized urgently, and immediately, “Today’s

priority is to cope with the political and security situation” (Sarkozy and Cameron 2011). It is also seen in Sarkozy’s letter to the members of the UNSC when he used security arguments by pointing out that the situation should be dealt with immediately, by saying that it was a matter of days and hours that could make a difference in stopping the violence towards the civil population in Libya. Alain Juppé emphasized with the same urgency, using the same rhetoric at the UNSC meeting:

“... The situation in Libya is now more alarming than ever ... We cannot allow these warmongers to go on... France solemnly calls on all the members of the UNSC to support this initiative and to adopt this resolution... France is ready to act... We are running out of time... maybe a matter of hours... Let us not be too late!” (Juppé, 2011)

Hence, the French Leadership, with support of Great Britain, brought the speech-act labelling the crisis as one that should be dealt above normal politics. They represent the securitizing actor in this situation.

After defining the possible referent objects (Human Rights, French and EU societal identity, French economy, etc) and securitizing actor (French Leadership) it is important to define the audience. The audience in this case is a series of actors, but primarily those from whom approval was needed to securitize the crisis in Libya. The primary audience were those actors, who made the UN resolution 1973 a reality. Additionally there are political actors from whom approval was needed from a political point of view. These are The French Parliament and French Public.

It is relevant to understand that the French Parliament could not formally veto the French Government’s decision to participate under NATO in the intervention in Libya. Nevertheless it is considered to be part of the approving audience. It needs to be pointed out that according to the article 35 of the French Constitution:

“The Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote. Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall

submit the extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the final decision”. (Constitution of October 4, 1958)

This means the Parliament can only vote against the continuity of the intervention four months after it has began. The peculiar change in article 35 was part of a series of changes made in 2008 on initiative of President Sarkozy, which aimed at empowering the parliament. Additionally, it is the French President, in quality of chief of arms, who presently decides military participation on treaties. In a way, if this intervention hindered political campaign motives, it had to be in Sarkozy’s interest to have the support of Parliament and the French Public before the intervention. It is in this way that the Parliament and French Public are unofficial audiences, those whose approval was not required but was sought. It was seen that the French Public considered that Juppé was the right person for the new position and already supported this shift in cabinet, which aimed at dealing with the events in the Arab World.

The political opposition on the other hand was divided. For instance, The National Front opposed vehemently. Marine Le Pen’s political party, well known for hard immigration and anti-islamist policies, was dominating the 2012 election polls at that moment. It can be conjectured that if Sarkozy was looking to gain support from Le Pen’s voters, he put a stronger emphasis on the security concerns regarding immigration. Not having the approval of the French Public and Parliament would have been political suicide considering that Sarkozy will run for re-election to the presidency in 2012.

Having defined why it is important to consider the two previous actors as part of the audience, the formal audience should be defined. This is made up of those actors that made possible the UNSC Resolution 1973, the document that was required by NATO to implement the military operation on the intervention. Hence, the actors that represent the audience are the members of the UNSC (through their representatives) who engaged in the dynamic process regarding the crisis in Libya, such as the United States of America, represented by President Obama and Hillary Clinton among others. In the same way other actors that comprise the audience are other actors, outside the UNSC, whose support was required for the resolution to be voted in favour of. These are the members of the Arab League, whose support was a requirement for the

intervention. The EU and its members were also important key holders to the approval of the steps taken. French leadership needed the support of these actors, as “the EU, NATO and the UN... are in the heart of the national strategy” (Delegation aux Affaires Stratégiques, 2011).

Germany, Russia, and the other countries that did not vote in favour of the resolution, are part of the audience. The voting was not unanimous, but nevertheless the result within the UNSC was favourable towards the resolution.

Having in mind the defined actors, now it should be analyzed whether or not the securitization process was successfully achieved. This is done by looking closely at the process to determine if this issue was raised above politics with the approval of the audience.

Through the dynamic between the audience and the securitizing actor we can analyze how the audience’s security arguments came in line with those of French Leadership. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the successful securitization is achieved after an audience accepts the existing threat, “on coercion as well as on consent” (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). The speech-act by French Leadership was elaborated upon in a woven series of steps using security arguments that reached certain approval from a targeted audience, and moved towards reaching approval from another audience.

A few days after the beginning of the conflict in Libya, Sarkozy held conversations with Obama and David Cameron regarding the crisis. With David Cameron, the security arguments were easily aligned in a Franco-British united front. Both countries held the leading position in arguing security issues and concerns that emerged as a consequence of the crisis in Libya. There is no doubt that the British Leadership also played a vital role through their speech-act, hand in hand with that of France.

On the other hand having dialogue and support from the United States meant that the “superpower” shared a common security concern, towards the crisis in Libya. In Sarkozy’s press conference in Ankara, he referred to his conversation with President

Obama on the issue in Libya, perhaps in an attempt to reveal his allies. Hillary Clinton's meeting with Sarkozy and Juppé, followed by her declarations in Cairo, also pointed at the similar reasoning between both governments.

The approval of other members of the EU also was on Sarkozy's agenda. The request by France for an extraordinary meeting with the EU Council, probed to be a milestone in constructing shared threats and creating an urgency adjective to the situation. Part of the objective was the welcoming of the NTC by the EU, which marked step in the direction towards the intervention. By France refusing to recognize Gaddafi as a political interlocutor, the French government revoked the status of head of state from Gaddafi. At that point France stopped having an equal-to-equal diplomatic relationship; and although to date the NTC is not globally recognized by all nations, in the context of the intervention in Libya, this was a strategic move by France because other countries followed by either recognizing or welcoming the NTC as a political interlocutor. France's argument was the need to avoid the "somalisation" of Libya through having a diplomatic relationship with a valid political interlocutor.

At the G8 meeting in Paris, there was a debate on the implementation of the no-fly zone among its members. Although the French leadership was not successful in finding consent for a no-fly zone at this meeting, the direction needed for its approval was provided. This was the regional support from the Arab's League. By then the AL had already made a public announcement requesting a no-fly zone, but the G8 members wanted a clear indication of its support before they would consider the no-fly zone. As a consequence the UNSC received the letter from the AL, which opened the door for the vote on the UN resolution 1973. A representative of Lebanon, a member of the AL, symbolically brought the draft resolution that was presented to the UNSC. The gesture could be seen as both an indication of the AL's genuine support and approval of an intervention. This was also indicative of French leadership in the intervention since France and the UK had jointly written the draft. Finally the members of the UNSC voted in approval of resolution 1973, resulting in the no-fly zone. Through speaking and constructing a shared perception on security the securitizing actors succeeded in lifting the situation to a level of security.

In this intervention, it can be argued that there was a breaking free of normal rules if the UN Chapter 1 Article 2 paragraph 4 is contemplated. This states that “All members shall refrain.... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” (UN security Charter). Instead “both resolutions 1970 and 1973 state that they are being adopted under Chapter VII... (and) enables the Security Council in the event of any threat of the peace... to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Doebbler 2011). Under the UN rules the no-fly zone is a legitimate action. Nevertheless, the normal rules among nations, of non-interference territorial integrity and sovereignty, were broken. This is a question of international law, which is not part of the scope of this thesis. The material shows that the issue was indeed an urgent matter that required unprecedented proceedings that resulted in the no-fly zone.

The securitizing process in this case is very complicated and cannot be isolated to include only one single referent object. In this dynamic process, threats to the stability of Libya posed important security concerns for France. Humanitarian issues were also security issues, whether or not they were a genuine motive for French Leadership to act, they were labelled as such.

The Copenhagen School Theory cannot provide us with the tools needed to go beneath the surface to understand the real motives and interests behind the actor's actions. Hence, it is not possible to determine the real motives behind French leadership in pressuring the international community to the intervention Libya. It does however provide us with the understanding of a constructed process through which issues are raised from the political level to a security level as in the case of Libya.

6. Conclusions

The conflict in Libya is recent and there is still a lack of information for deeper understanding of the main interests and motives that moved French Leadership to pressure the international community towards bringing down Gaddafi through the military intervention in Libya. It could be determined that both the stability of the Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood and the Human Rights issues were part of the security arguments throughout the process. Nevertheless it cannot be determined to what extent these motives were real or which were the underlying interests, if any other, that moved Sarkozy to push for the intervention. It could be speculated that oil is an important issue, although this should be analyzed in detail with more information available. It can also be speculated that Sarkozy was trying to gain political image aiming at his re-election in 2012. On this regards there should also be an analysis of the French people's opinion on the intervention and Sarkozy's role.

It is obvious that Libya and its neighbours play an important role in France's agenda. The security dynamics of the region have a high impact in French policies. It is evident that France will aim at strong relations with countries in this region in order to address the possible challenges. It still remains to be seen what the prospect is for French-Libyan relations once the country finds stability.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the European member states may not be in agreement when dealing with security issues outside its borders. This could pose a challenge to the EU institutions in finding consensus over future security challenges. It is evident that France still desires to hold a leading power position among other countries and achieves to do this to some extent. France has a historical background as a Great Power whose reach has been both global and regional. Additionally, by being a member of the G8 and the UNSC, France also has power and influence in global decisions of security, nature through the power that these memberships infer. On this behalf it is worth pointing out that these international institutions play a decisive role in security matters at all levels. Not less important is the role that Nicolas Sarkozy has played by demonstrating again his reach and attempt in resolving

conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood. How his leadership in the Libyan crisis, will unfold towards the 2012 presidential elections is yet to be seen.

Bibliography

Books and articles in books

Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2009) *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003) *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Buzan, B. et al. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Collins, A. (2010) *Contemporary Security Studies*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

Farrell, T. ed. (2010) *Security Studies: Critical Concepts in International Relations*. Volume 1. Oxon: Routledge

Hansen, L. (2000) The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School In Farrell, T. ed. (2010) *Security Studies: Critical Concepts in International Relations*. Volume 1. Oxon: Routledge pp.390-411

Geis, M.L. (1995) *Speech acts and Conversational Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Hugues, C.W. and Meng, L.Y. eds. (2011) *Security Studies A Reader*. Oxon: Routledge

Lake, D.A. and Morgan, P.M. eds. (1997) *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press

Journals

McDonald, M., (2008) Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations* [e-journals] (14:4), 563-587. Available through Aalborg University Library [Accessed 11 of September 2011]

Buzan, Barry and Wæver, Ole (2009) Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitization theory. *Review of international studies* [e-journals] (35:2), 253-276. ISSN 1469-9044

Regan, P. M., (2010) Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas. *Civil Wars*, [e-journals] (12:4), 456-476. Available through Aalborg University Library [Accessed 11 of September 2011]

Taureck, R. (2006) Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, [e-journals] (2006) (9), 53-61 [Accessed 4 of September 2011]

Walt, S.M., (1991) The Renaissance of Security Studies in International. *Studies Quarterly*, [e-journals] (35/2), 211-239 [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Papers in Conferences or not published

Pollack, M.A., (2006) Rational Choice and EU Politics (October 2006). *ARENA Working Paper No. 12*. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011326> [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Wæver, O. (2004) Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery. In: *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*. Montreal, Canada 17-20 March 2004. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen.

Online Media – Newspapers, Magazines and Radios

Abbas, M. (2011) WRAPUP 9 Libyan forces fight for town in west, rebels in east. *Reuters* [online] 4 March. Available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/us-libya-protests-idUSTRE71G0A620110304>> [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Abbas, M. (2011) Libya jets bomb rebels, French press for no-fly zone. *Reuters* [online] 14 March. Available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/14/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110314>> [Accessed 17 of September 2011]

Abdallah, D., (2011). Two Libyan fighter pilots defect, fly to Malta. *Reuters*, [online] 21 Feb. Available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/us-libya-protests-malta-idUSTRE71K52R20110221>> [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Aphatie, J.M., (2011). Le prix du gaz va-t-il augmenter de 5% le 1er avril? *RTL*, [online] 22 Feb. Available at <<http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/politique/article/eric-besson-je-ne-confirme-pas-l-augmentation-des-prix-du-gaz-7662399795>> [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Bremer, C., (2011). Sarkozy tasks Juppe with repairing French image. *Reuters*, [online] 28 February. Available at: <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/28/uk-france-reshuffle-idUKLNE71R00920110228?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11708>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].

Buzan, B., 2010. *Barry Buzan discusses the concept of Security* [online interview] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, [online] 23 March 2010, 13:37. Available at <<http://lseinternationalrelations.wordpress.com/2010/03/23/professor-barry-buzan-discusses-the-concept-of-security/>> [Accessed 9 May 2011]

- Chittenden, M., Rogers, L. and Smith, D., 2003. Focus: 'Targetitis ails NHS. *Times Online*, [online] 1 June. Available at: <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article1138006.ece>> [Accessed 17 March 2005].
- Cori, N., (2011) *En France, la classe politique serre les rangs. Libération*. [online] 19 March. Available at: <<http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012326447-en-france-la-classe-politique-serre-les-rangs>> [Accessed 19 September 2011].
- Cutler, D., (2011) Timeline: Libya's uprising against Muammar Gaddafi. *Reuters*, [online] 22 August. Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-libya-events-idUSTRE77K2QH20110822>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
- Doebbler, C. (2011) The Use of Force Against Libya: Another Illegal Use of Force. *Jurist Legal News & Research*, [online] 20 March. Available at: <<http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-use-of-force.php>> [Accessed 24 September 2011].
- Donado, R., (2011) Italian Energy Company Suspends Gas Pipeline to Libya. *The New York Times*, [online] 22 February. Available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/europe/23italy.html>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
- Dusseauix, A., (2011) Pourquoi Claude Guéant va à l'Interieur. *LeJDD*, [online] 27 February. Available at <<http://www.lejdd.fr/Election-presidentielle-2012/Actualite/Pourquoi-Claude-Gueant-va-a-l-Interieur-275479/>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
- Erlanger, S., (2011). Sarkozy is Criticized on a Visit to Turkey. *The New York Times*, [online] 25 February. Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/europe/26turkey.html?scp=2&sq=alliot+marie+juppe+sarkozy&st=nyt>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
- Erlanger, S., (2011). By His Own Reckoning, One Man Made Libya a French Cause. *The New York Times*, [online] 1 April. Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/africa/02levy.html?pagewanted=all>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
- Freeman, C., Meo, N. and Hennesy, P., (2011) Libya: Arab League calls for United Nations no-fly zone. *The Telegraph*, [online] 12 March. Available at: <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8378392/Libya-Arab-League-calls-for-United-Nations-no-fly-zone.html>> [Accessed 17 September 2011].
- Girard, R., (2011). La campagne libyenne de Berard-Henri Lévy. *Le Figaro*, [online] 18 March. Available at: <<http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/03/18/01003-20110318ARTFIG00671-la-campagne-libyenne-de-bernard-henri-levy.php>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].

Golvinina, M., ed Woodward, R., (2011) Libya may cut diplomatic ties with Western nations. *Reuters*, [online] 10 March. Available at:
<<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/10/libya-diplomatic-idUSLDE7292PC20110310>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].

Golvinina, M., and Georgi, M, (2011) Western warplanes, missiles hit Libyan targets. *Reuters*, [online] 19 March. Available at:
<<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110319>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Irish, J. and Hephher, T. (2011) France fails to get G8 accord on Libya no-fly zone. *Reuters*, [online] 15 March. Available at:
<<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/15/us-g8-libya-idUSTRE72E0BX20110315>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

McDonald, A., (2011) Cameron Doesn't Rule out Military Force for Libya. *The Wall Street Journal*, [online] 1 March. Available at:
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704615504576172383796304482.html?mod=googlenews_wsj> [Accessed 25 September 2011].

Migliaccio, A., (2011) Oil Driller Eni at Risk in Libya as Political Unrest Spreads. *Businessweek* [online] 22 February. Available at
<<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-22/oil-driller-eni-at-risk-in-libya-as-political-unrest-spreads.html>> [Accessed 15 of September 2011]

Primera, M., (2011) Gadafi acepta a Chávez como mediador internacional. *El País* [online] 3 March. Available at
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gadafi/acepta/Chavez/mediador/internacional/elpepuint/20110303elpepuint_23/Tes> [Accessed 15 of September 2011]

Regan, J. (2011) France steps up Libya no-fly zone efforts. *Reuters* [online] 13 March. Available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13/us-libya-france-idUSTRE72C2UG20110313>> [Accessed 15 of September 2011]

Risse, T., 2000. Let ' s Argue !'': Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54(1), p.1-39. Available at:
<http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818300440932>. [Accessed 27 of September 2011]

Salaün, T., (2011) Alain Juppé fait profil bas en Egypt. *Le Figaro*, [online] 6 March. Available at: <<http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/03/06/01003-20110306ARTFIG00219-juppe-profil-bas-en-egypte.php>> [Accessed 9 September 2011].

Scicluna, C., ed. Abdallah, D., (2011) Two Libyan fighter pilots defect, fly to Malta, *Reuters* [online] 21 Feb. Available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/21/us-libya-protests-malta-idUSTRE71K52R20110221>> [Accessed 9 of September 2011]

Wauquiez, L., 2011. *Libye: La diplomatie francaise á l'avant-garde* Interview by Mathilde Munos [radio] France Radio, [online] 2 March 5 2011, 08:31. Available at

<<http://www.france-info.com/chroniques-les-invites-de-france-info-2011-03-02-libye-la-diplomatie-francaise-et-europeenne-a-l-avant-garde-laurent-518912-81-188.html>> [Accessed 25 of September 2011]

Official Documents – Governmental and International Institutions

Assemblée Nationale, *Constitution of October 4, 1958*, [online] Available at: <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#V>> [accessed 24 September 2011]

Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy 2003 (ESS)*, 12 December 2003, [online] S407 / 08, Available at: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy.aspx?lang=en>> [accessed 21 September 2011]

Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World*, 11 December 2008, [online] Available at: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy.aspx?lang=en>> [accessed 21 September 2011]

UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) [on expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians]*, 26 February 2011, [online] S/RES/1970 (2011), Available at: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4486094.html> [accessed 9 September 2011]

UN Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011)]*, 17 March 2011, [online], S/RES/1973 (2011), Available at: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2235724.html> [accessed 9 September 2011]

UN General Assembly, *General Assembly resolution 65/265 [Suspension of the rights of membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council]*, 3 March 2011, A/RES/65/26, Available at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/125963.9.html> [accessed 9 September 2011]

UN Security Council, *Security Council: Agenda in New York: Peace and Security in Africa*, 6490 Meeting, (26 February 2011) [online] UNDP, 2011 (SC/10200) Available at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/482492.6.html>, [accessed 9 September 2011]

UN Security Council, *Security Council: Agenda in New York: The Situation on Libya*, 6498 Meeting, (17 March 2011) [online] UNDP, 2011 (SC/10200) Available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10200.doc.htm>, [accessed 9 September 2011]

UN Security Council, *Security Council Letters [Letter dated 14 March 2011 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council]*, 14 March, [online] UNDP, 2011 (S/2011/137)

Available <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.6623189/>,
[accessed 17 September 2011]

Press Releases and Press Conferences

INTERPOL, 2011. *Red Notice for arrest of Muammar Gaddafi at request of International Criminal Court*. [issuance], 22 February 2011, Available at:
<<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10180.doc.htm> > [Accessed 11 September 2011]

France Diplomatie, 2011. *Remarks to the press by Mr. Alain Juppé, Ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs*. [remarks to the press], 17 March 2011, Available at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/libya_283/remarks-to-the-press-by-mr.-alain-juppe-ministre-etat-minister-of-foreign-and-european-affairs_15237.html> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

FRONTEX, 2011. *Hermes 2011 starts tomorrow in Lampedusa*. [press release], 22 February 2011, Available at:
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/hermes_2011_extended/news_releases/> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

NATO, 2011. *Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels*. [speeches and transcripts], 10 March 2011, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_71398.htm> [Accessed 1 September 2011]

The United Nations Security Council, 2011. *Security Council Press Statement on Libya*. [press release], 22 February 2011, Available at:
<<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10180.doc.htm> > [Accessed 11 September 2011]

The United Nations in New York, 2011. *Libya - Remarks to the press by Mr. Gerard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nation* [remarks to the press], 25 February 2011, Available at:
<<http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5407>> [Accessed 10 September 2011]

The United Nations in New York, 2011. *Libya- by H.E. Mr. Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham, Libyan Permanent Representative to the United Nations* [media stakeout], 25 February 2011, Available at:
<<http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/02/h-e-mr-abdurrahman-mohamed-shalgham-libyan-permanent-representative-security-council-media-stakeout.html>> [Accessed 9 September 2011]

The United Nations in New York, 2011. *Libya/ Adoption of Resolution 1970 - Remarks to the press by Mr. Gerard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations* [remarks to the press], 26 February 2011, Available at:
<<http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5412>> [Accessed 10 September 2011]

The Élysée Palace, 2011. *Radio television address on the International Situation on behalf of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy* [official media release], 27 February

2011, Available at:

<<http://www.elysee.fr/president/mediatheque/videos/2011/fevrier/allocution-radiotelevisee-du-president-de-la.10755.html?search=&xtmc=&xcr=&offset=0&context=null>> [Accessed 2 September 2011]

The Élysée Palace, 2011. *Point de presse conjoint de M. Le Président de la République Française et de M. Abdallah GÜL Président de la République de Turquie*. [press conference] (Ankara, 25 February 2011). Available at <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2011/point-de-presse-conjoint-du-president-de-la.10754.html?search=TURQUIE&xtmc=&xcr=>>> [Accessed 2 September 2011]

Council of the European Union, 2011. *3069th Council meeting on Foreign Affairs* [press release], 21 February, Available at: <http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10689_en.htm> [Accessed 2 September 2011]

Council of the European Union, 2011. *Extraordinary European Council on the situation in Libya and the Mediterranean on behalf of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy* [official press conference], 11 March 2011, Available at: <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/mediatheque/videos/2011/mars/conseil-europeen-extraordinaire-consacre-a-la.10879.html?search=&xtmc=&xcr=&offset=0&context=null>> [Accessed 1 September 2011]

The European Council, 2011. *Paris Summit for support for the Libyan people behalf of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy* [official press conference], 19 March 2011, Available at: <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/mediatheque/videos/2011/mars/declaration-lors-du-sommet-de-paris-pour-le.10950.html?search=&xtmc=&xcr=&offset=0&context=null>> [Accessed 1 September 2011]

Sarkozy, N. et Cameron, D., 2011. *Lettre conjointe de MM. Nicolas SARKOZY et David CAMERON adressée à M. Herman VAN ROMPUY*. [letter] (communication, 28 February 2011). Available at <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/communiqués-de-presse/2011/entretien-telephonique-avec-m-david-cameron-au.10760.html?search=CAMERON&xtmc=&xcr=>>> [Accessed 1 September 2011]

The National Front, (2011). *Déclaration de Guerre à la Libye*. [press release], 18 March 2011, Available at: <<http://www.frontnational.com/?p=6639>> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

The National Front, (2011). *Flux de clandestins: il y a maintenant urgence!* [press release], 3 March 2011, Available at: <<http://www.frontnational.com/?p=6537>> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

The National Front, (2011). *La politique étrangère de Nicolas Sarkozy: Un bateau ivre* by Jean-Marie Le Pen. [press release], 10 March 2011, Available at: <<http://www.frontnational.com/?p=6592>> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2011). Conférence de presse d'Alain Juppé (Le Caire, 6 mars 2011) [press release], 6 March 2011, Available at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/egypte_414/france-egypte_1136/visites_8493/conference-presse-alain-juppe-caire-6-mars-2011_90357.html> [Accessed 11 September 2011]

Websites

Anglia Ruskin University, 2011. *Harvard System of Referencing Guide*. (referencing guide) [online] (updated 12 May 2011) Available at: <<http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.htm>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

CIA, 2011. *Libya*. (country template) [online] (updated 1 September 2011) Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_ly.html> [Accessed 25 September 2011].

Delegation aux Affaires Stratégiques, 2011. *La France et L'Otan*. [online] (14 march 2011) Available at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/das/rerelations-internationales/l-otan/node_79310/la-france-et-l-otan/%28language%29/fre-FR> [Accessed 25 September 2011].

Élysée Palace, 2011. *Agenda de M. le Président de la République du lundi 7 au vendredi 11 mars 2011* [online] (4 march 2011) Available at: <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/agenda/2011/agenda-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique-du.10799.html>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Élysée Palace, 2011. *Entretien de M. le Président de la République avec l'hebdomadaire brésilien VEJA*. (Interview) [online] (12 march 2011) Available at: <<http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/interviews/2011/entretien-de-m-le-president-de-la-republique.10884.html?search=veja&xtmc=veja&xcr=1>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Energy Delta Institute, 2011. *Country gas profile – France* (country gas profile) [online] (12 march 2011) Available at: <http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-france#reference-dbsource_1> [Accessed 27 September 2011].

France at the United Nations, 2011. *Remarks to the Press by Mr. Gerard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United nations* (remarks to the press) [online] (15 March 2011) Available at: <<http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article5434>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

G8, 2011. *G8 Meeting of Foreign Ministers*. (Chair's Summary) [online] (15 March 2011) Available at: <<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/formin110315-en.html>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Harris Interactive, 2011. *La reaction des Française au remaniement*. (poll article) [online] (28 February 2011) Available at: <<http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2011/01032011b.asp>> [Accessed 11 September 2011].

Harris Interactive, 2011. *Intention de vote présidentielle premier tour: Marine Le Pen recueille 24% des intentions de vote, Sondage pour Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui-en-France*. (poll article) [online] (6 March 2011) Available at: <<http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2011/08032011.asp>> [Accessed 11 September 2011].

Institute National de la statistique et des etudes économiques, 2011. *Provenances du pétrole brut importé en France*. [online] (6 March 2011) Available at: <http://insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATTEF11348> [Accessed 27 September 2011].

Le Parti Socialiste, 2011. *Sommet européen sur la Libye*. (declaration) [online] (11 march 2011 20:46) Available at: <<http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/communiqués/sommet-europeen-sur-la-libye>> [Accessed 10 September 2011].

Le Parti Socialiste, 2011. *Rassemblement de soutien au peuple libyen Samedi 5 mars 15h Place Bellecour*. ([online] (4 march 2011) Available at: <<http://www.partisocialisterhone.fr/2011/03/04/rassemblement-de-soutien-au-peuple-libyen/>> [Accessed 10 September 2011].

TV Newsroom European council – Council of the EU, 2011. *Extraordinary European Council . March 2011*. [online] (11 March 2011) Available at: <<http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/extraordinary-european-council-march-2011/national-briefing-france-part-1-9/>> [Accessed 1 September 2011].

UN News Centre, 2011. UN refugee agency ‘very concerned’ civilians being prevented from fleeing Libya. [online] (4 march) Available at: <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37684&Cr=Libya&Cr1=&Kw1=migration&Kw2=libya&Kw3=>>> [Accessed 5 September 2011].

U.S. Department of State, 2011. *Interview with Shahira Amin of Nile TV to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton*. [online] (16 march Cairo) Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158445.htm#>> [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Appendix A - Acronyms and Abbreviations

AL	Arab League
AU	African Union
COPRI	Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen
CPS	Copenhagen School
EC	European Commission
ESS	European Security Strategy 2003
EU	European Union
FN	Front National
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTC	National Transitional Council
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Appendix B - Total Oil imported to France in percentage

Provenances du pétrole brut importé en France

Provenances	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (r)	2010
Afrique	19,5	22,5	20,8	22,4	29,3	32,5	32,1
<i>dont Libye</i>	4,8	5,3	5,1	6,4	8,4	8,9	16,0
Ex-URSS	22,6	23,2	24,4	29,3	27,9	32,9	32,8
Proche-Orient	27,2	26,4	27,7	25,2	22,2	17,0	17,4
<i>dont Arabie Saoudite</i>	14,7	12,2	10,6	8,5	9,1	7,8	9,3
Mer du Nord	30,1	26,7	24,8	21,8	19,6	17,6	16,6
Autres pays	0,7	1,1	2,2	1,2	1,1	0,1	1,1
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Importations totales (en millions de tonnes) (1)	85,1	84,6	82,1	81,2	83,6	71,7	64,1

r : données révisées.

Champ : y compris condensats et autres produits à distiller.

Source : SOeS.

Appendix C – Working Table 1

“Chronogram”

Institution	Presidency (www.elysee.fr)	The French Government (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr)	The EU/UN	The Media
Dates				
20/02/11			EU Declaration by HR Ashton on events in Libya	
21/02/11				Gadafi saca los bombarderos para reprimir la revuelta
21/02/11			EU Council conclusions on developments in the Southern Neighbourhood	Two Libyan fighter pilots defect, fly to Malta
22/02/11				Oil Driller Eni at Risk in Libya as Political Unrest Spreads
22/02/11				February 22 La Libye dérègle le marché pétrolier
23/02/11	French President Sarkozy at council Ministers demands measures	Marie-A publicly ask EU partners	EU Parliament President Buzek on Libya: "this is the point of no return"	
23/02/11			Statement by EU Commission President Barroso following his meeting with Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	
24/02/11	President Obama holds conference call with Sarkozzy		Situation in Libya (February 24, 2011)	
24/02/11			France to pressure UN Human Rights Council	
25/02/11	Press Conference in Ankara	Situation en Libye - Conseil des Droits de l'Homme - Déclaration de Michèle Alliot-Marie (25 février 2011)	EU Parliament President Buzek on Libya: "this is the point of no return"	UN rights council recommends suspending Libya, orders inquiry into abuses
25/02/11			Remarks by EU HR Ashton on Libya in the margins of the Informal Defense Ministerial Meeting	

26/02/11			Libya: EU HR Ashton Statement on UNSC resolution and latest developments	
26/02/11		26 February 2011 - Libya / Adoption of resolution 1970- Remarks to the press by Mr. Gérard	UNSC Adopt resolution 1970 (meeting and resolution)	
27/02/11				Nicolas Sarkozy tente de redonner un cap à la diplomatie française
28/02/11	Joint letter with David Cameron to EU council		Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions	Sarkozy tasks Juppe with repairing French image
01/03/11			UNHR suspends Gaddafi from UNHR Council	
03/03/11		Humanitarian crisis in Libya - Summary of France's actions (March 3, 2011)		
06/03/11		Press conference of Alain Juppe (Cairo, March 6, 2011)		Le Figaro / Alain Juppe a low profile in Egypt
06/03/11		Creation of the National Libyan Council (March 6, 2011)		BBC / Libya unrest: Gaddafi claims to retake towns disputed
07/03/11	Interview with Borut Pahor, Prime Minister of Slovenia			
09/03/11			Update on French humanitarian assistance (March 9, 2011)	
10/03/11	Von Rumpoy visit to the Elysee Palace			Libya may cut diplomatic ties with Western nations
10/03/11				NATO speech/Rasmussen
11/03/11	Conseil européen extraordinaire sur la situation en Libye et en Méditerranée - retrouvez la conférence de presse du Président/ Transcription & Video		Extraordinary EU council meeting	Paris et Londres appellent l'UE à reconnaître le Conseil national de transition

11/03/11			Remarks by President Herman VAN ROMPUY at the press conference following the extraordinary European Council on EU Southern Neighbourhood and Libya	Nicolas Sarkozy calls for air strikes on Libya if Gaddafi attacks civilians
12/03/11	Interview of the President of the Republic with the weekly Brazilian VEJA			The Telegraph/ Libya: Arab League calls for United Nations no-fly zone
13/03/11		Libye – Résolution de la Ligue des Etats arabes - Déclaration d'Alain Juppé, ministre d'Etat, ministre des Affaires étrangères et européennes - 13 mars 2011		Force justified if Gaddafi uses chemical weapons or launch
14/03/11		G8 Meeting at Paris / Remarks by Juppé		Reuters / Libya jets bomb rebels, French press for no-fly zone
15/03/11	Sarkozy, Juppé and Hillary Clinton meet at the Elysee Palace	Gerard Araud press remarks		
16/03/11	Lettre du Président adressée à Mmes et MM. les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement des Etats membres du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies		Déclarations Officielles de politique étrangère	
17/03/11		Visit by Mr. Alain Juppé, Ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, to the UN (March 17, 2011)	Déclarations Officielles de politique étrangère Bulletin d'actualité du 15.03.2011	
17/03/11		Statement by Mr Alain Juppé, ministre d'Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs before the UN Security Council	UNSC Resolution 1973 is approved	
18/03/11		Message to Colonel Gaddafi jointly by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of Arab countries		La campagne libyenne de Bernard-Henri Lévy. Le Figaro
19/03/11	Sarkozy speech at the Paris Summit		Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 (March 19, 2011)	The National Front Party criticises Sarkozy

19/03/11				Reuters /Western warplanes, missiles hit Libyan targets
----------	--	--	--	---------------------------------------------------------------