Securitization of Immigrants in Denmark – A Diachronic Analysis

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Abstract

This thesis explores how immigrants have been securitized by politicians in Denmark over time. Using the Copenhagen School Framework, the focus is on the ‘speech acts’ and how immigrants are constructed discursively. The focal point is on security discourses: namely, those discourses that construct an issue (in this case immigration) as a threat towards a referent object (Denmark, ‘our’ collective identity and individual Danes) and allows the use of extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998). Whilst this Framework mostly focuses on ‘the moment’ (the speech act) when securitization occur, this thesis takes into consideration the historical context, events and “general discourse” facilitating security discourses over time (McDonald, 2008).

This thesis is structured around four chapters, representing four different government periods, to examine the development in discourse over time. In order to explore the (security) discourse, this thesis analyzes first readings and proposal speeches regarding changes in the Alien Act in the period from 1997-2017. Alongside with taking into consideration certain events affecting discourse, such as 9/11 and ‘the war on terror’, ‘The Muhammad Crisis’ and ‘the refugee crisis’, this thesis uses the Copenhagen School Framework to identify variables in the ‘speech acts’, determining when there is a process of securitization taking place and how this came about.

The findings from this research indicate that a securitization of immigrants has gradually been built up over time in Denmark. From primarily being performed by the far-rightwing parties, the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party, in the 90s, the tendency to portray immigrants in security terms has developed towards a broader accepted, dominating discourse, filling out most of the discursive domain regarding certain immigrants in Denmark. The Alien Act has been increasingly tightened with a risk of breaking with several conventions. In addition, a general tendency to portray immigrants in societal security terms, as a threat to ‘our’ identity, has gained ground over time. Lastly, a move away from discourse described as ‘humanitarian’ discourse (a compassion based discourse, expressing tolerance, refugee protection) can be witnessed, towards more hostile representations (as an in-tolerant and closed nation, focusing on stricter immigration policies).
Acronyms

DDF – The Danish Association (Den Danske Forening)
EASO – European Asylum Support Office
EU – European Union
FRONTEX - European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
JRS
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Political Parties:

ALT – The Alternative Party (Alternativet)
CD – Centre Democrats (Centrum Demokraterne)
DF – Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti)
EL – The Unitary List (Enhedslisten)
FP – The Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet)
FRI – Freedom 2000 (Frihed 2000)
KD – The Christian Democrats (Kristendemokraterne)
KF – The Conservative Party (Konservative Folkeparti)
KRF – The Christian People’s Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti)
LA – Liberal Alliance
NA - New Alliance (Ny Alliance)
RV – The Danish Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)
S - The Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiet)
SF – Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti)
V – The Liberal Party (Venstre)
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1. Introduction

Historically Denmark has been a pioneer country when it comes to refugee protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99) and has cultivated an image of internationalism and tolerance (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 402). Indeed, it was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and has been an important donor to the UNHCR (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99). However, in Denmark the Alien Act has become increasingly restrictive during the years (Wren, 2003, p. 59) and the perception of immigrants seems to have changed from being reasonably positive towards an emerging hostile discourse (Wren, 2001, p. 152).

During 2014 Europe (and Denmark) experienced an increase in immigration (EASO, 2015, p. 15-17). In media and by politicians this situation came to be termed a ‘crisis’ portrayed as threatening European countries to the level of breakdown. Meanwhile, The ‘crisis’ challenged the institution of EU and the willingness of its Member States to share the responsibility of treating asylum cases and protecting refugees (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2). This increasing influx to Europe could be characterized by a mixed flow of migration including refugees and economic migrants, among others (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 28, 29). Interestingly, during the ‘crisis’ a tendency emerged discursively where the difference between categories of immigration was somewhat erased and the word ‘immigrant’ was used to portray a homogenous group (Ruz, 2015). Whilst this term, according to Alexander Betts, used to have a neutral connotation, “(…) some people believe that the word has recently [been] used to mean “not a refugee”” (Betts in Ruz, 2015). In other words, such mixing up of categories has very real consequences: Thus, the use of the word ‘migrant’ can be a deliberate means to describe a person who has other (voluntary or economic) incentives to migrate and whose legal rights are not the same as those of a refugee.

This discourse was also replicated in Denmark by the Minister of Immigration Inger Støjberg, who for example uttered in 2017 that: “Right now the influx of immigrants crossing the Mediterranean continues. (…). These are primarily young men from countries such as Nigeria hoping for a better future in Europe.” (Støjberg, 2017). As stated by Betts, the above distinction is important because: “Refugees implies that we have an obligation to people [and] that we have to let them on to our territory and give them a chance to seek asylum.” (Betts in Ruz, 2015). From this understanding,

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1 Alexander Betts is the director of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University.
Støjberg’s utterance is not merely words but a discourse in which the speaker has an interest in portraying immigrants in a specific way. It is such a development in discourse about immigrants that forms the background for this thesis.

Whilst several actors have contributed to creating discourse regarding immigrants, this thesis aims at examining the discursive construction of immigrants by politicians in parliament. Using the framework of The Copenhagen School, the logic is that certain actors, in this case politicians, can label something as ‘security’ through a ‘speech act’, which in turn has real political effects (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998; Austin, 1975). This framework is used in this thesis to explore how certain issues (in this case immigration) are constructed as ‘above politics’, in security terms, legitimizing the use of extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998). As follows, the focus is moved away from the more objective aspects of security, which have traditionally been the primary focus in security studies, towards an interest in how an issue come to be constructed as a threat.

During the years, several events have affected the discourse about immigrants in Denmark, such as the terror attacks on the US 11th September 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, and in recent years, the ‘European refugee crisis’. This thesis aims at exploring how a discourse about immigrants has been built up following such historical events. From the perspective of the securitization framework there are certain ‘moments’ where such issues move into the area of security (Buzan et al., 1998; McDonald, 2008). However, as pointed out by McDonald (2008), securitization cannot be understood properly without a historical context and without a more general analysis of the legislation and discourse over time. Along these lines, though having its main focus on security utterances (the ‘speech act’), this thesis takes into consideration the more general discourse framing immigrants in ways characterized as hostile. This is done to examine different arguments making securitization possible.

Considering the vast amount of restrictions in the Alien Act over the years and the continuously political salience of the issue of immigration, it is indeed relevant to ask the following research question:

Have immigrants in Denmark been securitized by Danish politicians over time, and if so how?
1.2 Thesis Structure
Following the introduction, the thesis initiates with some of the methodological considerations, including the framework of The Copenhagen School and how it is applied in analysis. This is followed by a contextual chapter, which will shortly present the historical context in which the discourses about immigrants have been created in Denmark. The historical chapter is followed by the core analysis, chapter one – four, which analyses first readings from 1997 – 2017. Using the Copenhagen School Framework, these chapters aim at exploring the development in the (security) discourse over time. The analysis will go into depth with certain changes in the Alien Act and how immigrants are portrayed when introducing such changes. Here, the primary focus is on concrete utterances by politicians, whilst taking important historical events into consideration.

2. Methodology
In the following section, the methodology will be presented. Firstly, taking into consideration the terminological confusion which may exist when discussing immigration, it will be clarified how the notion of immigrant is understood in this thesis. Secondly, the framework of The Copenhagen School and its social constructivist aspect will be presented as well as an operationalization of the concepts used throughout the analysis. Lastly, the empirical data will shortly be presented.

2.1 Immigrants as Main Focus
This thesis focuses on the construction of security discourses regarding people who have migrated to Denmark for various reasons. There seems to be a significant terminological confusion regarding these people. This section will firstly present some of the different terminologies and how they can be understood and lastly introduce a single term used throughout the thesis to capture the relevant terminologies.

One of the groups of people explored in this thesis is refugees. A refugee is defined according to the 1951 Convention as a person who:

as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2011, p. 10).
Included in the definition is the 1967 Protocol which extends the 1951 Convention by leaving out the geographical limitation and includes people who have become refugees in and after 1 January 1951 (UNHCR, 2011, p. 5-6). An asylum seeker is entitled to receive refugee status, if he fulfills the above mentioned criteria and if the given country in which he applies for asylum has ratified the aforementioned Convention and Protocol (UNHCR, p. 1). According to the exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention individuals can, however, be excluded from refugee status. These persons fall into three groups where the group in Article 1 F is found most relevant in this thesis. This group is excluded because they: “are not considered to be deserving of international protection.” (UNHCR, 2011, p. 28). According to this, a person can be excluded if “he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity” (Ibid., p. 30). The Convention also permits a refugee’s expulsion if he has been convicted of a “particularly serious” common crime and “constitutes a danger to the community of his country of refuge” (Ibid.). Importantly however, even though (persecuted) individuals falling into the category of Article 1 F are excluded from refugee status, they cannot be deported without breaking with conventions. Instead, they can be put on ‘tolerated stay’ (tålt ophold) in Denmark (Institut for Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 2). These exclusion clauses are thus important in this thesis because they move in the area of security and may legitimate certain measure against some immigrants.

An asylum seeker is defined as someone who is applying for asylum but: “whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.” (UNHCR, 2017). In this thesis, the action of the authorities to grant refugee status, or reject, an asylum seeker can be understood as a performative utterance (Austin, 1975). The destiny of an asylum seeker is dependent on the refugee definition and whether the authorities utter that they believe an asylum seeker’s story. However, applying for asylum, hence saying the word ‘asylum’, is also a performative utterance because it invokes a specific legal order. Following this utterance, the authorities have to process the claim for asylum. Meanwhile, the

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2 A person can also be granted status as a mandate refugee if he meets the criteria of the UNHCR Statue as stated in paragraph 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the UNHCR Handbook (UNHCR, 2011, p. 7).
3 Denmark ratified the 1951 Convention the 4.12 1952 and the 1967 Protocol the 29.01 1968 (UNHCR, p. 2).
4 “The first group (Article 1 D) consists of persons already receiving United Nations protection or assistance; the second group (Article 1 E) deals with persons who are not considered to be in need of international protection; and the third group (Article 1 F) enumerates the categories of persons who are not considered to be deserving of international protection.” (UNHCR, 2011, p. 28).
5 Three groups of immigrants can be put on ‘tolerated stay’: immigrants who are rejected due to crime committed in Denmark, immigrants who are excluded from getting asylum due to the exclusion clauses in article 1 F in the Refugee Convention, and immigrants who are a threat to state security (Institut for Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 2).
asylum seeker has become part of the Danish asylum system and will be treated as the law prescribes\textsuperscript{6}. In general the perspective in this thesis is that to utter something, to use words in specific ways and combinations, have very real consequences for the people involved (Austin, 1975).

Another important terminology, migrant, captures a diverse group of people who have different incentives to cross borders (Castles & Miller, 2009, p. 28, 29), such as refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants. Whereas an economic migrant is defined by UNHCR as: “a person who, for reasons other than those contained in the definition, voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence elsewhere.” (UNHCR, 2011, p. 15), a refugee or asylum seeker is seen as an individual forced to cross borders\textsuperscript{7}. Though an economic migrant may find himself unable to survive due to lack of food or natural disaster, he is not entitled to refugee status in another country according to the definition above. Thus, it makes a huge difference whether the word migrant or refugee is used, because it portrays people in immensely different ways and attaches different rights.

These different terminologies are sometimes creating substantive terminological (intentional or unintentional) confusion, because they capture a diverse group of people possessing different rights. In some cases this terminological confusion may be used to construct a certain understanding of an entire group of people. This may be the case when economic migrants are suddenly mixed up in a debate regarding refugees or asylum seekers.

Throughout this thesis the term immigrant is used to capture the relevant terminologies. The aim is to use a neutral category regarding the people affected by concrete discourse, whilst being aware that politicians are using various terminologies, and sometimes aim at targeting specific people when arguing for, or against, certain changes in the Alien Act. The term is understood here as capturing: immigrants from “non-western” countries (i.e. Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and

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\textsuperscript{6} The exception for this is the ‘apparently unfounded procedure’ (åbenbart grundløs-proceduren). This describe how an application for asylum, according to the Alien Act § 53 b, pc. 1, can be accessed to be ‘unfounded’ by The Danish Immigration Service because, among other things, the identity one has pleaded is incorrect (Embedsmandsudvalget, 2012, p. 29-30).

\textsuperscript{7} A refugee is forced to cross borders due to e.g. persecution but refugees can generally be split up into three different categories: Firstly, those who flee because of e.g. persecution, secondly those who are deported, and lastly, people who are trafficked. As such, the first group has a greater level of agency due to their individual choice of fleeing in opposition to the latter groups.
ex-Yugoslavia\(^8\)), including refugees and asylum seekers (as defined above) and economic migrants\(^9\) (regular or irregular).

2.2 Politicians as Securitizing Actors

Various actors can affect the discourse about immigrants and engage in securitization, including pressure groups and defense intellectuals (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 55). However, this thesis focuses on the political elite as securitizing actors and how they shape the (security) discourse about immigrants. Due to considerations of space, the political elite is defined narrowly in thesis as those politicians in parliament discussing the changes in the Alien Act. These discourses are not created in a vacuum but shaped in a specific way in a specific time, affected by and affecting, the given norms in society (Hansen, 2012, p. 241). It is taken into consideration that politicians are trying to affect media. Or in other words, because politicians aim towards being quoted in media, which will affect the likelihood of people voting for them, the debates should be interpreted as a means to convince the Danish citizens of ways to respond and react to the presence of immigrants in Denmark.

As follows, the established media has pervasive power in creating and affecting discourse by setting the agenda and by using specific rhetoric regarding immigrants. They have extensive airtime, a broad audience, are (by most people) perceived as a reliable source and have direct contact with politicians and the general population which makes it easier to affect discourse. Additionally, the less established media may also affect discourse. Indeed, right-wing bloggers such as ‘Uriaposten’, ‘Den Korte Avis’ and ‘Snaphanen’, were among the most popular blogs in 2008 (Knudsen, 2008). Whilst these kinds of right-wing bloggers are gaining ground in Europe by means such as social media (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016) and may very likely affect discourse, they have considerable less power and airtime than politicians and the established media. Consequently, their chances of creating a dominant discourse are curbed.

Thus, whilst being aware that politicians are affected by media etc. and vice versa, the main focus in this thesis is on the ruling elite of the state. That is, Danish politicians in parliament who are seen as some of the most important actors when it comes to creating security arguments: among other things, because governing elites are the prime claimants of the legitimate use of force (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 49, 55). Moreover, they have the power to define how immigrants should be talked about

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\(^8\) The description of ex-Yugoslavia as “non-western” is questionable (from Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999).

\(^9\) Excluding Western economic migrants.
(which terminologies should be used in reports etc.) and which rights should be attached (Hansen, 2012, p. 241).

2.3 Securitization Theory – The Shaping of a Security Discourse

Traditionally, security studies have mainly focused on states and the study of war, threat and the use of military means (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 3). However, an intense debate about widening security studies, by also analyzing non-military sources of threat and conflict, grew as a result of the nuclear and military obsession during the Cold War (Ibid., p. 2). Whilst former studies had primarily focused on conflicts between states, the focus in the 1990s was, among others, on the intra-state conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia and Yugoslavia, which created new threats not only to states but also to people (Betts, 2009, p. 66).

This master thesis is inspired by the widening theorization, namely, Critical Security Studies, in the shape of "The Copenhagen School" established by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in the 1990s. This position to security studies takes a constructivist approach, focusing on the social construction of security discourses. This is done in an inter-subjective domain: meaningful to the people who created it, and are part of creating, what is ultimately established as common-sense knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 37). Securitization thus revolves around “(...) the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat.” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). Following Austin (1975), the perspective in this thesis is that the use of specific words can create and change what is perceived as reality, or in this case, a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). This is done through a performative utterance meaning that: “the uttering of the sentence [which is neither ‘true or false’], is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something.” (Austin, 1975, p. 4). Performing an utterance is to do something that has real effects: by e.g. changing how people, in this case immigrants, are referred to and perceived in society and by making concrete legislation (changes in the Alien Act). In the analysis of security discourses, this means that the focus is neither on the correctness of the utterances and what can be perceived as objective threats but rather on how actors create a reality through a ‘speech act’ (Austin, 1975; Buzan et al., 1998). Securitization thus describes how an issue, in this case immigration, “(...) is presented [in a speech act] as an existential threat, requiring emergency measure and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23-24).
Different steps are needed to achieve securitization, which can both be successful and unsuccessful. As follows, the first step in analysis is to identify a ‘securitization move’, describing how the securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). The framing of a security issue depends on the context, the norms in the given society and will vary over time and between countries (Pedersen, 2012, p. 188; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 35). According to Buzan et al. (1998), successful securitization is only achieved when it is accepted by the audience, which means that the claims of using extraordinary measures made in the speech act are accepted and perceived as legitimate in Danish society (p. 25). Such acceptance can be analyzed by examining opinion polls and variables relating to the Alien Act, e.g. opinions regarding regulation of migrants such as border control or integration issues. Whilst being aware that politicians are affected by the opinion of people, this thesis has left out the perspective of audience consent and instead focuses on the extensive material from the debates in parliament regarding the Alien Act.

In this thesis however, politicians in parliament are perceived as an audience evaluating whether a ‘securitization move’ should be accepted or rejected. Though the objective for a securitizing actor is indeed to get legitimacy from the audience to do security, by e.g. changing the law, this is not always successful (Ibid., p. 25). A political spokesman might present an issue as a threat but this is far from successful if all the other parties disagree with the utterance. While successful securitization is clearly achieved when extraordinary measures are used and the breaking with “normal” rules are perceived as legitimate, the perspective here is that emergency measures do not necessarily have to be adopted but there have to be enough resonance for a platform to be made where it is perceived as legitimate to make such statements (Ibid.).

To assess whether a securitization move has been successful, the analysis aims towards mapping the degree of unity revolving around such utterances in parliament. That is, whether there is a general agreement regarding perceptions of threat and means to counter it in parliament. Moreover, urgency of the enactment of bills and whether it is portrayed as a matter of emergency, requiring an immediate response to the threat, may also be an omen of a security discourse (Ibid., p. 24-25).

2.4 Operationalization

In order to identify whether an issue (of immigration) is securitized, it has to be established when and what can be perceived, and uttered, as an existential threat. According to Buzan et al. (1998) the securitized issue has to take absolute priority over other issues and does not revolve around “normal

10 Analysis of audience consent is left out due to the practical consideration of space.
politics”, such as redistributing policies or the like. Rather it should be seen as, “a special kind of politics or as above politics”. (p. 23). The logic is that, “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).” (Ibid., p. 24). Therefore, the security issue is often portrayed as one that needs to be handled urgently and can be identified by the use of extraordinary means and the break with: “the normal political rules of the game (E.g., in the form of secrecy (...), placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task).” (Ibid.). Since the focus of this thesis is on immigration, the extraordinary means will be related to suggestions in the discussion regarding the Alien Act about: breaking with conventions that Denmark has ratified, border control, confinement, deportation, or legislation more specifically related to values and culture such as initiatives against arranged marriages.

The concrete security utterances suggesting a securitization move depend on which security threat and referent object the securitizing actor is referring to. In the following section three different types of security areas will be presented, namely: national security, societal security and what can be termed human security, to clarify which patterns are searched for when identifying securitization moves.

2.4.1 National Security
Buzan et al. (1998) uses the notion of a military sector to analyze the use, and threats of use, of military means towards military and non-military threats to states existence (p. 22, 50). This thesis, however, uses the notion of national security which is understood as the constructed threats towards the Danish nation state. Such threats include threats to the Danish state and its citizen’s existence in the shape of influxes of immigrants which the state cannot control or which is perceived as challenging its capacity to a level of breakdown. In the light of the precautions introduced by states aFRer 9/11, it is also highly relevant to examine a possible construction of immigrants as terrorist constituting a security threat to the state and national order.

Indications of a securitization move will be identified as attempts at breaking with conventions, e.g., by deporting and/ or rejecting asylum seekers entitled to asylum in the name of security, and more generally, the introduction of bill’s where the security of the nation state is seen as imperative compared to the rights of immigrants in Denmark.
2.4.2 Societal Security
Societal security revolves around collectives and actions taken to defend their identity (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 20, 119). The organizing concept is *identity* and the self-conception of identity groups and individuals who identify themselves as members of a community (Ibid., p. 119). Though these identity groups can also be religious or racial, they are mainly national in Europe (Wæver, 1993, p. 120). When societal security is examined, the focus is on the nation as the referent object, understood in Benedict Anderson’s (2006) terms as a political ‘imagined community’ (p. 6). This means that whilst members of the nation may never meet or know each other, “in the minds of each [is] (...) the image of their communion.” (Ibid.). Indeed, by perceiving the nation as imagined, discourse is imperative in understanding how the mindset of the nation is created and what is shaped as a threat to the national unit ‘we Danes’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 120).

In the Danish context, societal security threats are those that threaten the collective identity of the national community in a way so that: “we will no longer be us” (p. 23). According to Buzan et. al (1998) one of the most commonly constructed rival, and possibly threatening, identities are immigrants, meaning that: “X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people [or] the X community will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population” (p. 121). In order to identify societal security issues it is necessary to determine certain patterns in the discourse, suggesting that identity is presented as threatened, such as references to national identity in terms of survival by e.g. perceived threats to language, behavioral customs or ethnic purity etc. (Ibid., p. 23). This could also include, multiculturalism (specifically emphasizing threats from ‘other’ cultures), religion (Muslims as a threat to values and customs) and attempts to regulate or assimilate behavior seen as threatening “our” identity. In other words, specific indicators are utterances of threats that are portrayed as corrupting the national unit (the “we”) and possibly making it less cohesive.

2.4.3 Human Security
Lastly, this thesis uses the notion of human security which is understood as the safety for people from both violent and non-violent constructed threats, in this case, from immigrants (Betts, 2009, p. 66). As such, this perspective takes the individual rather than the state or collectives as the referent

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11 In general, when analyzing the perceived threat from religion, the focus in this thesis is on utterances portraying specifically Muslims customs, values and Islam as a threat to our identity. This is from the perspective that the Danish discourse has presumably developed as an anti-Muslim discourse in Denmark (Rydgren, 2004; Wren, 2001; HedetoFR, 2006).
object (Ibid., p. 67). While The Securitization Framework by Buzan et al. (1998) does not use the notion of human security but focuses on collectives (p. 35), it is found relevant in this thesis from the perspective that immigrants may very likely be portrayed as a threat towards individual Danes. This is especially the case when referring to crime, threatening the security of Danish citizens (through violence/terrorism). Secondly, moving the focus away from identity, immigrants can be portrayed as a threat related to economic aspects, such as a financial burden possibly threatening the capacity of the welfare state, using resources and/ or taking ‘our’ jobs (Hedetoft, 2006).

A securitization move can encompass suggestions about deporting criminal immigrants, even if they have residence permit, to use confinement and/ or means breaking with conventions.

To sum up, the securitization framework is used as a processes tracing tool helping the analyst in determining when there is a process of securitization and/ or de-securitization and how this came about (Floyd, 2007, p. 42). The next section will go through the empirical data.

2.5 Empirical Data

In order to conduct a diachronic analysis of the discourse, the analysis takes its point of departure in the introduced bills regarding the Alien Act stretching from 1997\(^1\) to 2017\(^2\).

This thesis is based on proposal speeches\(^3\) made by the respective ministers when introducing changes in the Alien Act and first readings of bills\(^4\) in parliament regarding the Alien Act. These documents have been chosen because they give an insight in the immediate aims and goals regarding the Alien Act of the parties in parliament, hence, a considerable understanding of the discourses about immigrants in this period. It therefore allows for a comparative diachronic analysis with different perspectives on the Alien Act and an assessment whether the discourse has changed over time. In other words, the aim is to analyze when, how and in which ways the discourse has changed.

\(^{11}\) Documents before 1997 are not yet available at www.folketingstidende.dk and have been excluded from the analysis due to the practical consideration of time.

\(^{12}\) The selected bills have been dated the year they are proposed by the respective ministers.

\(^{13}\) Since the documents are only available in Danish, the selected quotes from all the first readings and proposal speeches have been translated in this thesis from Danish to English. The Danish versions can be found in this thesis as appendixes or via links in the bibliography.

\(^{14}\) Motions for resolutions (beslutningsforslag) have been left out due to the considerable amount of empirical material already at hand.
The focus in the analysis is on the portrayal of immigrants by politicians in parliament. Attempts at securitization are identified by certain variables, as mentioned in the previous section, which can indicate whether immigrants are perceived as a threat. These can vary from evident cases of securitization moves to more vague attempts. Though the analysis focuses on securitization, it does not only deal with concrete securitization moves. Indeed, to capture a possible change in the discourse, it is necessary to examine both securitization and the general discourses in the discussions. In this way it will also be possible to examine a move towards securitization, or the opposite, a welcoming and positive discourse towards immigrants.

The analysis has been split up according to right and left-wing government periods from the perspective that different governments will have diverging political agendas and introduced bills. As such, the government in office has more speaking time and also power in regards to the premise of suggested bills. Thus, the point of departure is that a change in government may signify an evident change in immigration policies and the discourse. This division does not take other changes in the compositions of the government into consideration since such changes, and their effect on the discourse, are estimated to have too little effect.

By analyzing the empirical material, it is evident that some topics have been appearing consistently. Themes across the bills were identified by taking into consideration: the recurrence of the topic, whether it securitizes immigrants (supported broadly or made by a single party), if it relates to the portrayal of immigrants (as a threat, a problem or in a more “positive” way as people needing protection or as contributing to society) and issues relating to conventions and legal rights of immigrants. To keep an overview of the considerable amount of empirical material, the analysis has been split up into themes to present a general picture of the respective periods.

3. A Historical Context – The Emergence of a Hostile Discourse

In order to analyze the (security) discourses regarding immigrants the scene has to be set. This chapter will shortly present the historical context in which the discourses about immigrants have been created in Denmark. The focus is not specifically on security discourses but on some of the circumstances prior to 1997 which have shaped the discourse.

According to Wren (2001) there was no significant non-white immigration to Denmark prior to the 1960s (p. 145) and Denmark could be described as an ethnically homogenous society without

16 In cases where the same government is reelected, it will be analyzed as one period.
political tradition for racism or xenophobia (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 3). In the late 1960s ‘guest workers’ started to emerge in Denmark. This was integral to the needs of the expanding Danish economy and the influx of immigrants did not become a politicized issue (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 3; Wren, 2001, p. 158). Bjørklund & Andersen (1999) ascribe this to the modest number of immigrants, low unemployment rates and the fact that the ‘guest workers’ occupied jobs that the ethnic Danes did not want (p. 3).

In the early 1970s political decisions were made to stop immigration from ‘guest workers’. The political right and left reached the same conclusion of averting this specific immigration, referring to social expenditures and an increase in unemployment. Though Bjørklund & Andersen (1999) argue that dispersed empirical evidence indicates that prejudices and intolerance towards immigrants was present already back then, immigration did not become a politicized issue at this time (p. 3).

In the 1980s a hostile discourse towards immigrants began to emerge. This can be seen as result of the dramatic increase of asylum seekers from 800 in 1983 to 9,300 in 1986 and thus also a change in immigration, from labor immigration to non-European refugee immigration. This made the immigration issue more salient in the debate and “attracts high, but short lived, attention.” (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 4; Rydgren, 2004, p. 492). In this period Denmark was experiencing a high degree of unemployment and economic crisis which reinforced the ‘negative’ attention towards especially refugees, who had replaced the ‘guest workers’ in the labor market (Wren, 2001, p. 152). Moreover, most of the asylum seekers arriving in this economically difficult period were from Muslim-majority countries. This affected the anti-immigration discourse which, according to Wren (2003), developed, “as specifically anti-Muslim and anti-refugee, where refugees [were] perceived as part of a specifically ‘Muslim Invasion’ which [was] portrayed as a threat to Danish culture” (p. 59). Additionally, a discourse was emerging where the number of asylum seekers was perceived to overstretch the capacity of system and the levels of refugee unemployment to threaten the viability of the welfare system (Ibid., p. 59-60). Hence, according to Wren:

It was commonly perceived that refugees were benefiting from Denmark’s generous welfare provision, while many Danes were suffering economically. Refugees and ethnic minorities generally became the scapegoats in an emerging racist discourse, being viewed not only as external to the needs of the Danish economy, but also as a financial and social burden (2001, p. 152).
Whilst Bjørklund & Andersen (1999) claim that the degree of hostility had not necessarily changed but that the issue became more salient (p. 4), Wren (2001) describes how Denmark faced a fundamental shift in attitude towards immigrants, from being reasonably positive towards an emerging discourse of cultural racism (p. 152). The cultural racist discourse focuses on history, instead of race and biology, to explain the ‘superiority’ of Europeans, who are seen as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ in opposition to ‘non-Europeans’, who are perceived as ‘backward’ and ‘traditional’ (Ibid., p. 143). Cultural racism thus functioned to create closed cultural groups while legitimizing the exclusion of ‘others’, whose cultural difference would inevitably lead to conflict (Ibid., p. 144). This hostile discourse was aggravated by the commencing influence of right-wing political associations, such as The Danish Association (Den Danske Forening) and the media who; “framed immigration to Denmark mainly as a problem.” (Wren, 2001, p. 155; Rydberg, 2004, p. 493). According to Wren (2001) ‘The Danish Association’, “managed to mobilize sufficient support and political influence to persuade the government to adopt a more restrictive refugee policy in 1986.” (p. 155). Thus, whilst Denmark previously had a relatively relaxed refugee legislation, a more restrictive policy resulted in a significant drop in the number of asylum seekers in late 1980s (Ibid., p. 152).

In the 1990s the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia created huge amounts of refugees. Hence, in line with UNHCR recommendations, asylum seekers were granted temporary stay in Denmark to avoid the time consuming process of undergoing individual status determination (Hathaway & Neve, 1997, p. 167). The growing immigration population and the increasing public attention towards e.g. language problems, unemployment and criminality put the issue permanently on the political agenda and by the 1990s immigration had indeed become a very salient issue (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 3). Though Denmark was benefitting from a prosperous economic environment, had low unemployment rates and was still one of the countries in the EU who had the smallest immigration population, the negative attention towards immigrants magnified (Andersen, 2003, p. 188; Rydgren, 2004, p. 492; Berggren, 2007, p. 380; Wren, 2003, p. 60). In 1991 the proportion of immigrants from “non-western” countries (i.e. Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia\(^\text{17}\)) was about 2.1 per cent and increased to 3 per cent by 1997/1998 (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 4). Hence, while Denmark did receive more asylum seekers in the 1990s the figures were not in themselves large enough to explain the high salience of the immigration issue in Danish politics. According to Andersen (2003), this might, “Rather, (…) be explained by the

\(^{17}\)The description of ex-Yugoslavia as “non-western” is somewhat questionable.
absence of other problems; by the fact that immigration has never been taboo in the Danish media; and by the presence of a right-wing populist party” (p. 188-189).

In the 1990s, immigration became the dominant issue in newspapers, public debate and political discourse, where it created strong political polarization (Rydgren, 2004, p. 493; Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 6). While The Danish Association played an important role in bringing the immigration issue into the public and political debate, the right-wing parties, the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party, additionally initiated a process in parliament of promoting an image of immigrants as a threat to Denmark and its culture (Rydgren, 2004, p. 493; Berggren, 2007, p. 372). The Progress Party was nourished by demands for law and order and the political response towards immigration in this period was one of tightening of refugee and immigration policies (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 24). Preconditions, such as the increasing influx of asylum seekers and high unemployment may indeed have been initiating a negative discourse but it was political factors that contributed to an increased hostile discourse in the 1990s (Berggren, 2007, p. 380). Indeed, this master thesis aims towards examining these ‘political factors’, contributing to a certain hostile (security) discourse.

The following analysis takes as its point of departure the government period from 1996-2001 with the incumbent Social Democratic government in office and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen as Prime Minister.

In this period attention was increasingly directed towards immigrants’ dependence on social security, unemployment and juvenile delinquency (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 3). In 1997 it was thus stated by the Minister of the Interior, Thorkild Simonsen, that: “The government is very aware that there (...) are sign of growing tumults and criminal acts are connected to young immigrants and refugees (...).” (Appendix 1, L 154, 1997, p. 5). Accordingly, going through the first readings in this period it is evident that there was a general perception in parliament regarding criminal immigrants as a problem. This was reflected in the suggestions for new bills which, among other things, introduced deportation of criminal asylum seekers (L 154, 1997 & L 59, 1998),

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18 Bills from 1996 and some bills from 1997 are leFR out due to lack of online documents.
19 Consisting of The Social Democrats and The Social Liberal Party.
confinement of criminal asylum seekers (L 191, 2001\textsuperscript{20}),\textsuperscript{21} initiatives to counter illegal work and the checking of cars to prevent illegal immigrants in Denmark (L 264, 2000\textsuperscript{22}).

Additionally, the government also introduced several restrictions in the Alien Act, specifically focusing on preventing arranged marriages and making restriction to ensure that immigrants did not exploit the system. These tightening’s should also be seen as a reaction to an increased voter support for the extreme right during 1997, which was growing steadily as a result of e.g. violent episodes involving immigrants and problems with reparation of Somali asylum seekers (Bjørklund & Andersen, 1999, p. 25).

According to Andersen (1999) the attitude towards immigrants in this period was, in large parts of the Danish population, one of insecurity and frustration towards immigrants (p. 17) and immigration was perceived by Danish voters as one of the most important issues across the spectrum of right and leFR-wing voters (Andersen, 2003, p. 188). In 1998 42 percent of the voters agreed that: “Immigration is a serious threat to our national identity\textsuperscript{23}”, whilst 50 percent stated that: “Refugees who have been given residence permit (…) should almost always be sent home as fast as possible.” (Andersen, 1999, p. 17). This signified a general discourse in society perceiving immigrants as a societal security issue. However, even though immigration had become a central issue in Danish politics and the policies became more restrictive in the late 1990s, it does not necessarily mean that immigrants in Denmark were securitized by politicians in parliament in this period.

4.1 The Social Democratic Response to Demands of Restrictions

Immigration had at this time become an issue of party competition where the right-wing parties generally demanded restrictions, the center-parties and the leFR-wing parties were against tightening’s and the Social Democrats could be seen as divided and ambivalent (Andersen, 2003, p. 188-189). Such ambivalence was reflected in the discourse. In the first reading of L 154 the Minister of the Interior, Simonsen (S), thus summarized the general government policy regarding immigrants in this period with these words:

\textsuperscript{20} See, Appendix 9 for first treatment.
\textsuperscript{21} The analysis of a criminalizing discourse can be found in Appendix 16 (confinement of asylum seekers) and Appendix 18 (a new border control).
\textsuperscript{22} See, Appendix 7 for first treatment.
\textsuperscript{23} Translated from: egenart.
We have to show humanity and consequence. Immigrants fleeing to Denmark (...) or immigrants who have a close family related connection, should be able to get residence here. Immigrants who do not have such a basis for residence but who only come here to exploit our welfare system, should not get residence permit. (...). We have to live up to our international duties and our legislation should respect fundamental principles regarding legal security. (A.24 1, L 154, 1997, p. 1).

Extensive parts of the government’s rhetoric emphasized “humanity”, hence the importance of protecting asylum seekers and refugees and abiding by conventions. Meanwhile, it also de-legitimized immigrants as people who “exploit our welfare system” and whom we have to treat with “consequence”. This quote can be seen as an example of a general tendency in this period, where the government was working from a humanitarian discourse as wanting to protect people in need whilst at the same time introducing (mostly symbolic) restrictions and de-legitimating immigrants. The consequence of the ambivalent discourse was however often the perception of “real” refugees in opposition to bogus refugees “exploiting our system”. The ambivalent rhetoric can be seen as a symptom of a divided party but also a development of a government’s perception of itself, the ‘we’ (the nation) and ‘others’ (immigrants). These utterances may symbolize a development from humanitarianism (a self-perception as a tolerant and liberal nation, emphasizing equality) (Wren, 2001, p. 142; Hedetoft, 2006, p. 402-403) towards nationalism (a more in-tolerant and closed nation constructing immigrants to be seen as a threat) (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 403). This discursive struggle is relevant for this thesis because moving away from a humanitarian discourse may signal a move towards securitization. The contradictory relation of humanity and de-legitimization was echoed throughout the government period and will be analyzed in the below sections.

4.2 De Facto Status – “Real” or Bogus Refugees
The de facto concept, and whether to keep this tool of protection in the Alien Act, was one of the main themes discussed in parliament during the period from 1996-2001. This part of the analysis mainly focuses on L 15425 (1997) and L 59 (1998) where de facto is covered extensively.

The de facto concept was included in the Danish Alien Act in 1983 as a result of the difficulty to accommodate the protection of asylum seekers who did not meet the requirements of the 1951

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24 A. will be used to term Appendix in the rest of the thesis.
25 L 154 was a massive bill which was rejected due to the little time to threat it. However, it was re-introduced, and adopted in 1998 as L 59.
Convention although having similar needs of protection\textsuperscript{26} (Kjær, 2003, p. 256). As Kjær (2003) notes: “Throughout the years, practice has developed so that the de facto status gained a broader scope of application” (p. 257). It is exactly this broadening of the scope and whether Denmark should keep the concept that was one of the main themes in L 154. As follows, the Minister of the Interior, Simonsen (S), made it clear that the government wanted the de facto concept to be specified “(...) so that, henceforward, there will be no doubt that only personally persecuted individuals will receive asylum” (A. 1, L 154, 1997, p. 1). He thus insinuated an awareness of the critique of the de facto concept. According to the government, restrictive policies had to be implemented to avoid that the asylum system was abused and to secure popular support:

(...) we have to talk about human obligation whilst securing that asylum seekers receiving asylum are actual refugees. If we are to receive popular support it is important that people who do not have such a basis for asylum (...) can be deported quickly. (A. 5, Bundsgaard (S), L 71, 1998, p. 1).

Hence, the Social Democratic Party appealed to humanity whilst insinuating that some people applying for asylum were deliberately cheating the system. This does not necessarily mean that the government was framing asylum seekers as a security threat but it can be argued that the constant de-legitimizing language may form the basis for more radical utterances and security logics. However, the government was accused by several parties for introducing symbolic policies, especially the right-wing parties, who demanded restrictions:

[The] de facto rule is more loosely interpreted in Denmark than in other countries and therefore Denmark is an especially attractive immigration destination (...). Yes, the legal entitlement (reetskraav) on de facto status should be abolished [for Denmark not to be] a magnet (A. 1, L 154, Møller (KF), 1997, p. 28).

The Conservative Party especially drew on the idea of Denmark as “a magnet” creating a perception that stricter rules would hinder immigrants from even applying for asylum in Denmark. In this also lay perceptions about asylum seekers as people who were not necessarily entitled to asylum, but rather immigrated to Denmark to have a more comfortable life. This was substantiated by Møller (KF) in 1998 when he uttered that: “(...) we do not think that the refugee problem can be solved in West Europe’s social service departments.” (A. 3, L 59, 1998, p. 11). Though he acknowledged that there was a “refugee problem”, hence people in need of protection, he de-

\textsuperscript{26} The de facto provisions had the following wording: “Upon application, a residence permit will also be issued to an alien who does not fall within the provisions of the Convention relating to the Statue of refugees (...) but who, for reasons similar to those listed in the Convention or for other weighty reasons resulting in a well-founded fear of persecution or similar outrages, ought not to be required to return to his country of origin” (Kjær, 2003, p. 257).
legitimized their claim. Additionally, Hornbech (V) claimed that: “(...) it must be because you mean that it is natural (...) that one can sit in the Third World and be persecuted and see in the TV how it is in Denmark and come here with an airplane.” (A. 1, L 154, 1997, p. 21). Though Hornbech (V) acknowledged that these people were persecuted, she still de-legitimized them by the construction of privileged immigrants having the possibility to choose the perfect destination. This rhetoric was supported by the far rightwing party, The Progress Party, who continuously referred to *de facto* refugees as: “(...) so called refugees who cannot get residence permit in other countries (...)” (A. 3, Behnke (FP), L 59, 1998 p. 31). From a strictly legal perspective, this discourse does not make sense since an asylum seeker will only obtain refugee status if he is accessed to need protection. Therefore, a refugee cannot be a ‘so called refugee’ but *only* a refugee in need of protection as a result of persecution. From a security perspective, the interesting part is why, particularly right-wing parties were so occupied with de-legitimizing refugees’ legit claim for asylum and whether this was related to security concerns. While it is evident that the other right-wing parties were skeptical towards the *de facto* concept, and the legal entitlement, the Progress Party simply wanted to abolish it.

De facto refugees are not refugees according to the Convention. (...) Now they have been here so long that the future generations can stay for the rest of their lives with enormous public cost as consequence. And at the same time we can’t even afford our own citizens and millions of real refugees do not get the help they need. (A. 1, Behnke (FP), 1997, p. 48).

Though Behnke (FP) did not use the word *security* there are elements of human security in this quote. Firstly, he de-legitimized *de facto* refugees by claiming that they could easily return to their country of origin. This was supported by arguing that *de facto* refugees hindered “real refugees” from receiving help. Thus, at the same time he made it clear that *de facto* refugees were people exploiting the system who were not entitled to stay in Denmark. Lastly, human security concerns were used by portraying immigrants as creating “enormous public costs”, and using the resources entitled “our own citizens”.

This securitization move by the Progress Party (to abolish the *de facto* concept) was, however, countered by all right- and leFR-wing parties. As an example, Møller (KF) stated that: “We can [abolish the *de facto* status], but then we would have to invent another concept and if we don’t do that we will behave completely inhuman and contradictory to conventions (...)” (A., L 154, 1997, p. 10). By portraying The Progress Party as being “inhumane” he de-legitimized the far-right parties
(FP and DF). This de-legitimizing discourse is continued throughout the Social Democratic government period\(^\text{27}\).

In conclusion, the discussion regarding the \textit{de facto} concept mainly revolved around restrictions and whether it was too easy to receive asylum in Denmark. Part of this discussion was a discourse constructing some immigrants as taking advantage of the Danish system and as people who did not need protection. This discourse is relevant because it may form the background for legitimizing the rejection of asylum seekers. While the Progress Party was attempting to securitize \textit{de facto} refugees by proposing to abolish this concept and framing them as someone “\textit{who could easily have returned to their home country}” and as a financial burden, this attempt was clearly rejected by the rest of parliament who saw this as “\textit{inhumane}”. Interestingly however, the \textit{de facto} concept was abolished in 2002 by the Liberal-Conservative government\(^\text{28}\).

4.3 Arranged Marriages – A Cultural Deviation

In 2000 the government put forward a new bill, L 208, supposedly with the main goal of contributing to a better integration of reunited families and to prevent ‘spouse reunification’ (ægtefællesammenføring) based on force. One of the concrete initiatives supporting the latter initiative was the abolishment of the ‘legal entitlement’ (retskrav) on spouse reunification for people younger than 25 years\(^\text{29}\) and the proposal of the ‘association demand’ (tilknytningskravet)\(^\text{30}\) (L 208, 2000, p. 1). These initiatives can be seen as restrictions curbing immigrant’s possibility to be reunited with their family members.

The relevant part for this thesis is whether the arguments supporting this restrictive bill are related to societal security. As a spokesman from the left-wing party The Socialist People’s Party critically noted, “(…) what one is doing now and trying to use as solution is some bureaucratic means towards a cultural phenomenon we cannot accept (…)” (A. 6, Hansen (SF), L 208, 2000, p. 5). Indeed, in this particular case the bill aims at making restrictions on “a set of ideas and practices”

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\(^\text{27}\) Despite specifically targeting the influx of immigrants as a problem The Liberal and The Conservative party were generally critical towards the harsh rhetorical means used by the far right-wing parties and dissociated themselves from these parties. For more analysis on this issue and The Danish People’s Party’s portrayal of a multicultural society as a societal threat, see Appendix 15.

\(^\text{28}\) Instead they introduced the new ‘Status B concept’. For an analysis of the discussion revolving abolishment of the concept, see Appendix 20.

\(^\text{29}\) Individuals aged 18-25 can still marry if it is assessed that the person is entering the marriage willingly (L 208, 2000, p. 1).

\(^\text{30}\) A person who is living in Denmark but who does not have Danish citizenship can only be reunited with his/her spouse if their overall connection to Denmark is at least on the same level as their connection to another country or if there are special personal circumstances (L 208, 2000, p. 1).
that contradicts the ones one ought to have to be part of the community (Wæver, 1993, p. 24). In the first reading it was thus argued that, “[This is] a result of political abnormal proposals originating in an exaggerated fear for new ethnic groups: that they constitute a threat against Danish society.” (A. 6, Hansen (SF), L 208, 2000, p. 20). From this perspective, the government was using societal security rhetoric and means towards people, who were framed as an existential threat towards the Danes by introducing norms deviating from Danish customs. Indeed, most of the left-wing parties were concerned about whether the government was introducing a bill that may break with ratified conventions. As stated by Hansen (SF):

The remarks say a great deal about the relation to human rights, the right to family life etc., and it says that in some cases the bill is on the edge and that the law has to be administered so that we do not get on the wrong side. (A. 6, L 208, 2000, p. 24).

However, these concerns regarding possible violations of conventions were countered by the Minister of the Interior stating that: “We agree that Denmark’s international duties should be abided by. We also agree that the unity of the family ought to be protected.” (A. 6, Jespersen (S), L 208, 2000, p. 1). Hence, according to this, the bill did not violate any conventions.

For this to be a concrete attempt of securitizing immigrants the bill would have to break with normal political procedures (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23-24). As the former quotes exemplifies, the parties did, however, not agree whether the bill was “abnormal” and breaking with conventions. It should also be noted that the left-wing referred to the bill as “on the edge”, and not necessarily breaking with conventions, though it leaves immigrants in a legal insecure situation when it is up to the individual to convince authorities whether they are marrying willingly.

Whilst it is less obvious whether the bill actually aimed at using extraordinary means to curb forced marriages, it is evident that the right-wing and the government used societal security rhetoric and also de-legitimized the claims made by the left-wing: “I think that the attitudes posed by The Socialist People’s Party and The Unitary List accidently, supports the underdeveloped, reactionary forces, suppressing young people in an authoritative manner and pressuring them towards entering marriages.” (A. 6, Jespersen (S), L 208, 2000, p. 41). By referring to the aforementioned “ethnic groups” as “underdeveloped, reactionary” and “suppressing”, Jespersen (S) drew on culturally racist rhetoric as it was implied that this group of people were culturally backward. According to Wren (2001), such discourse was built up around a contradictory relationship, relying on the
assumption that the ‘other’ should be understood in contrast to ‘us’: the culturally superior Europeans (p. 143). This discourse is supported by the right-wing. Hence, Hornbech utters that:

(...) in our modern Denmark we are witnessing how young people, born and raised in Denmark, (…) are, anyways, not allowed to enter marriage according to Danish norms, but according to age-old and antiquated norms originating in a distant past whom many Danes consider more or less barbaric. (A. 6, L 208, 2000, p. 11).

In this, she explicitly constructed an image of an antagonistic relation between “modern Denmark” and “age-old barbaric norms”. Hornbech (V) combined this with utterances emphasizing the problem of immigration influxes, when she claimed that: “Influxes to Denmark are still not controlled by Danish legislation but by the foreigners themselves (…)” (Ibid., p. 10). Hence, societal security arguments were built up by creating a perception of a loss of control. This was portrayed as a threat to the national identity because the ‘imagined community’ was invaded by un-regulated, ‘deviant’, cultural habits which may disturb the unity of the nation (Anderson, 2006; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 20, 120). Accordingly, at least some, immigrants are constructed as a threat towards the collective identity because “we will no longer be us” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23).

Interestingly, though the government and the right-wing did, in many cases, use the same rhetorical tools in this reading, they did not seem to agree about the object of the bill. While the aim of the right-wing was definitely to curb the influx of immigrants, by e.g. preventing family reunification, the government claimed that, “The aim of the bill is not to regulate family reunifications, but instead to protect young people against being pressured or forced into marriage (…)” (A. 6, Bennedsen (S), L 208, 2000, p. 3). However, it is difficult to argue that these initiatives did not curb immigration influxes at all. At least it is evident that immigration from culturally different groups was restrained. In this way the government was, yet again, in an ambivalent position of ‘discourse’ versus ‘policy’ which, as noted by Hedetoft (2006), covered up restrictive policies into humanitarian rhetoric (p. 412). From this perspective, the government was constructing an image of making policies to “protect young people” while at the same time making law that may have hindered those people in being reunited with their spouses and put them in a legally precarious situation.

4.4 Sub-conclusion
This government period displayed two main discourses struggling to gain prominence in the political arena: a humanitarian compassion-based discourse aiming at protecting immigrants and including them in Danish society and a more hostile discourse focusing increasingly on stricter
immigrating policies to curb the influx of the ‘other’. While the far right-wing parties (DF & FP) made several securitization moves these were not supported by the other parties. Rather, in this period, the rest of parliament countered the more radical claims made by these parties. However, it should be noted that there was an increasing tendency towards perceiving immigrants in societal security terms, especially, when related to the discussion regarding arranged marriages. The societal security discourse was based on concerns about increasing influxes of immigrants and a sense of “loss of control” of the ‘other’, who possessing a ‘backward’ culture, could possibly threat ‘our’ national identity. This also related to integration issues, where criminal immigrants were constructed as a threat to “national order” whilst the perception of bogus immigrants taking advantage of the system related to threats towards ‘our’ welfare system.

In most of the bills the result was a struggle between restrictive immigration policies, some of them introducing controversial initiatives such as detention with a risk of breaking with several conventions, and concerns about protecting immigrant’s legal rights. Though restrictive immigration policies do not necessarily mean securitization, it is noteworthy that many of the bills discuss whether conventions are abided by. Moreover, a move away from a humanitarian discourse may signify a move towards a more hostile discourse where immigrants are perceived increasingly as a threat.

Followed by a general election which primarily revolved around the issue of immigration the Liberal–Conservative government came into office in 2001 (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 408). This introduced a period where The Danish People’s Party had increased power as parliamentary backing for the government (Ibid.) and thus massive influence on reform packages vastly restricting the immigration policy (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 408; Rydgren, 2004, p. 496). The new government introduced an extensive amount of bills restricting the Alien Act which “dramatically lowered the number of permits granted to refugees and to family reunification.” (Andersen, 2007, p. 259).

One of the first initiatives by the new government was to create the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 409). Whilst this was previously handled by the Minister of the Interior, the introduction of a new Ministry showed an enhanced focus on

31 See appendix 17 for an analysis of the opposition against The Danish People’s Party and The Progress Party.
32 See appendix 16 for an analysis of the use of confinement in this government period.
33 The minister will be referred to as the Minister of Immigration.
immigration issues. Immigration had indeed become salient in Danish politics and in the 2001 general election “20 per cent of the voters mentioned ‘immigration’ when asked which problems of the day they considered to be most important.” in opposition to e.g. 1990 where only four percent mentioned the issue as a problem (Goul Andersen in Rydgren, 2004, p. 494).

The Liberal–Conservative government introduced a substantial amount of bills which only supported that the government had a great deal of attention to the immigration issue. The analysis will provide a general picture of the period and the selection of specific bills will rely on whether they introduce new perspectives, compared to the previous period, or if they are a clear expression of a tendency in this government period.

5.1 9/11 and Initiatives to Protect the Nation State
The new government came into office in a post 9/11 environment where a widespread Islamophobia dominated (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 408). According to Hedetoft (2006) this resulted in a macro-political global shift, moving from tolerance and interethnic harmony towards political absolutism supporting a cultural racist discourse and a “national self-assertiveness” that ‘our’ values were superior to ‘others’ (p. 412-413; Wren, 2001). This, Islamophobic, discourse could nothing but affect the government policies and the discourse in parliament. Hence, the discourse that followed supported concerns in society regarding Islamic fundamentalism and integration problems and it immediately created increased support for the right-wing populist parties (Andersen, 2003, p. 189). This part of the analysis will have the events surrounding 9/11 in mind and the consequences these had for the discourse about immigrants.

Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the newly elected government introduced a “Terror Package”. L 32 was part of this package and followed up on the UN Security Council resolution regarding combating terrorism. According to this resolution, states where obliged to deny sanctuary to people financing, planning or supporting terrorism. Importantly for this thesis, it was made clear that states should secure that the refugee status was not misused by individuals who had committed, organized or promoted actions of terror (L 32, Haarder, 2001). Hence, a connection between asylum seekers/ refugees and terrorism was made.

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34 As an example, the government implemented initiatives against foreign religious preachers (L 171, 2004) which are relevant because they portray an immigrant Muslim ‘other’ in security terms. See Appendix 19 for an analysis of this perspective.
In this bill, the government suggested collaboration between immigration authorities, the police intelligence agency and the defense intelligence agency to combat terrorism. This did in itself move the issue into the field of security. According to the so-called ‘Paris School’, security can be applied and constructed by certain practices enabling emergency measures (McDonald, 2008, p. 570). As an example, this bill moved into the area of securitization, not only through discourse, but also by using the police- and defense intelligence agency in the area of immigration. Hence, issues can become institutionalized as security issues: In this case through the incorporation of the issue of immigration within the area of security professionals such as the police and the military (Buzan et al., 1998). This should be viewed as pivotal to the construction of immigration as a security threat.

This bill introduced expanded possibilities to expel immigrants out of consideration to state-, society-, and citizen’s security (L 32, Haarder, 2001). Hence, security initiatives referring to the same security threat, the immigrant, were introduced. Several referent objects were constructed as being threatened: the nation state (national security), society (Islamic fundamentalism as a societal threat) and citizens’ security (concrete terror attacks as threatening individuals, human security) (Buzan et al., 1998). This combined reference to the same threat is relevant because it may indeed have reinforced the discourse about immigrants as a security problem.

In some ways, this bill spoke directly to the logic of securitization: an existential threat had been identified, the non-western ‘other’ who threatened Denmark and its people, and, on a more abstract macro-political level, democracy, freedom and the Western world (Crenshaw, 2013, p. 67). The perception of a new extraordinary threat resulted in new security means towards immigrants on the state level. Meanwhile, ‘the war on terror’ against the ‘axis of evil’ was initiated by the Bush Administration (Ibid., p. 79, 80). In this thesis, the use of words such as ‘war’ and ‘evil’ is understood as automatically moving discourse into the category of security, as ‘above normal politics’ where extraordinary measures are indeed necessary (Buzan et al., 1998). These phrases quickly became common vocabulary in this period and they did in themselves signal a move away from the area of ‘normal politics’ into the area of security.

Extraordinary means were, indeed, introduced by The Bush Administration through interventions in Iraq (which was illegal) and Afghanistan, covert operations and by introducing the controversial concept of “unlawful combatants” to justify holding suspects in military detention centers, and

35 Whilst acknowledging that such practices can affect and be part of securitization, this thesis will not go more into detail with Didier Bigo and the ‘Paris School’ but mostly focus on The Copenhagen School.
trying them in military instead of civilian courts (Crenshaw, 2013, p. 79). Though this thesis does not focus on the macro-level discourse, the domestic Danish discourse, and the legitimacy of introducing new means, has undoubtedly been affected by this dominating macro-level discourse. Along these lines, the political spokesman for The Social Democratic Party, Bødkov (S), initiated his speech in this reading with replicating the discourse following 9/11 in which he stated that:

(…) the 11th September was not only an attack on two skyscrapers in New York (…). It was, and is, an attack on all of us, an attack on the core of our society, that is the democracy and the openness. (…). The cynicism of the terrorist’s show that a neutral corner doesn’t exists anymore; the 11th September severely impacted previous ideas about security and defense. (A. 10, L 32, 2001, p. 1-2).

In this, it was seen that the national discourse by Danish politicians could not be separated from the “international discourse” initiated by the Bush Administration. Threats towards “democracy and openness” could be perceived as comprising a threat towards ideas on which western societies and identities are built, the Western identity, or more important in this case, a threat towards the Danish identity from an abstract and undefined ‘other’, the terrorist. By stating that “a neutral corner doesn’t exist anymore”, Bødkov (S) supported the discourse of ‘us versus them’ made by the Bush Administration in its ‘war against terror’ (Crenshaw, 2013, p. 79). This discourse did, to a large extent, simply the “conflict” between the West and the ‘terrorist other’ and aimed at legitimizing the use of extraordinary means towards it (Ibid., p. 79-80).

In L 32 new means were introduced and immigrants who had committed brutish crimes, including financing or planning terror, could be prohibited from gaining a residence permit in Denmark. Additionally, residence permits, including permanent resident permits, could to a greater extent be repossessed if one committed crimes outside Denmark (L 32, Haarder, 2001). The perception of threat was reflected in the first reading where it was stated by Hornbech (V) that: ”(…) with the trans boundary criminality of all kinds which is getting more and more organized, and not least terrorism, it is necessary that a country defends itself and keep an eye on who arrives in our country.” (A. 10, L 32, 2001, p. 1). Indeed, in this quote, Hornbech (V) supported the discourse of connecting terrorism with immigrants. In other words, this exemplified part of a securitization move where immigrants were portrayed as a security threat against “our country” and where we had to “defend” ourselves against this threat. By emphasizing that we needed to “keep an eye on who arrives”, the rhetoric also encompassed elements of suspicion towards the foreign ‘other’. While this suspicious discourse relates to the threat from immigrants as potential terrorists, it may have affected, and been part of, a general perception of immigrants in Denmark in this period. Hence,
according to Hedetoft (2006), the 9/11 terror attack strongly influenced the discourse about immigrants and this field became linked with, “security concerns and the need to monitor and control the flow of people - for reasons of high global politics.” (p. 413).

Similarly, the bill proposed an ongoing follow-up on the repatriation of immigrants who were denied asylum but who could not be repatriated due to risk of persecution\textsuperscript{36}. To enforce this, the government introduced the possibility for the police to put a ‘duty of notification’ (meldepligt) on rejected asylum seekers in order to repatriate them as soon as possible. Immigrants who did not comply could be confined if it was found necessary in order to assess whether he/she could be deported (L 32, Haarder, 2001). Here, it should also be noted that confinement, as discussed before\textsuperscript{37}, is a radical, though not necessarily illegal, measure and the ‘duty of notification’ (meldepligt) is also in risk of violating The European Human Right’s Convention regarding e.g. the right to freedom of movement and degrading treatment (Institut For Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 2). These means can, as discussed before, be linked directly to the area of security (Hailbronner, 2007). While the above initiatives were criticized by some of the leFR-wing parties, the response from the Minister of Immigration was that: “The world is not the same as it was before 11th September. This might be an answer for [those] asking how it might be that certain things are suggested differently than previously in parliament.” (A. 10, Haarder (V), L 32, 2001, p. 10). In other words, this is a concrete example of securitization where extraordinary means are portrayed as necessary in order to counter the threat because “the world is not the same” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21).

The UN’s perception of a risk of terrorists abusing the asylum system to commit terror was shared by most parties in the Danish parliament, though the left-wing parties (The Socialist People’s Party and The Unitary List) had another take on the new threat. Whilst they also wanted to secure that the refugee status was not abused by terrorists, their main focus was on the continued protection of refugees, instead of merely focusing on security. Bastrup (SF) thus stated that: “It is crucial that the citizens are not uncertain about the fact that a refugee is a person in need of protection and who is fleeing because of fear of persecution.” (A. 10, L 32, 2001, p. 7). What is relevant for this thesis is that the parties did not necessarily agree about the means and also that the left-wing replicated

\textsuperscript{36} According to the exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention individuals can be excluded from refugee status (UNHCR, 2011, p. 28). Read more on p. 4 in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{37} See appendix 16 for an analysis of the use of confinement in the 90s and the implications involved.
their previous discourse regarding concerns of legal rights and conventions. Even though it was made clear that, “(...) the government wants to comply with the conventions.” (A. 10, Haarder (V), L 32, 2001, p. 10), the rhetoric in L 32 exemplifies a general tendency in the post 9/11 environment, to see the world order as changed to a level where extraordinary means were needed and where the ‘normal’ rules do not necessarily apply anymore: state security was top priority above all (Buzan et al., 1998).

In conclusion, there seemed to be a broad agreement in parliament that there was a connection between terrorism and immigrants. Following recommendations from the UN Security Council, Denmark had to secure that the refugee status was not abused by potential terrorists. This bill, L 32, demonstrated a securitization move, emphasizing the threat towards different rejects object, which were portrayed as threatened by immigrants as potential terrorists, and where concrete measures were introduced to counter the threat. Such measures included, most importantly, expanded possibilities to expel immigrants out of consideration to state-, society-, and citizen’s security. Additionally, the ‘duty of notification’ for rejected asylum seekers was introduced and a perception about immigrants was built up relying on suspicion and hence the need to control and monitor their behavior (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 412). Lastly, even though the left-wing parties emphasized the legal rights of immigrants, there was resonance in Parliament regarding the perception of threat from people using the refugee status. Hence, in this case a securitization was taking place.

5.2 “A New Immigration Policy”
In 2002 the government introduced their proposal for what they called “A New Immigration Policy” relying on three fundamental criteria: the immigration policy should respect international responsibilities, the number of immigrants coming to Denmark should be reduced and the demand for self-reliance should increase (L 152, Haarder, 2002). L 152 was a massive bill and covered many of the same issues presented by the former government, however, with new perspectives and through a stricter Alien Act than the former government proposed.

5.2.1 Integration Issues & The Influx of ‘The Other’
During the 90s the right-wing parties worked towards curbing the influxes of immigrants and mainly portrayed them as a problem. In this first reading it was evident that the Liberal-Conservative government continued this discourse whilst including societal security concerns. As clarified by Hornbech (V), "We can’t keep the borders open forever if we want to continue being Denmark (...). "(A. 11, L 152, 2002, p. 3). This is an example of how the government increasingly
used societal security rhetoric to construct immigrants as a threat towards the Danish national identity in the 00s (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). The logical solution was to curb the admittance to Denmark if ‘we’ “want to continue being Denmark”. This sentence spoke to the logic of securitization and could be seen as describing a general rhetorical tendency in this government period.

In this bill, The Liberal Party clarified that their concerns about influxes was connected to the issue of integration: “(...) with this combination of demands in connection with the influx and a fare better integration policy (...) we think that we are offering the newcomers a favor (...).” (A. 11, Haarder (V), L 152, 2002, p. 42). In this government period there was a general tendency to focus on demands and consequences towards immigrants. The perception was that immigrants would be better integrated, and hence be part of society, if the government “put forward demands” and somewhat controlled the behavior of people (Ibid., p. 45). From a societal security perspective, immigrants are thus a threat and a burden to ‘us’, if we receive an amount that cannot be integrated to comply with Danish norms and take care of themselves.

The Danish People’s Party supported the discourse of connecting integration problems with mass influxes. However, as described by the Minister of Immigration, Haarder (V), the difference between the parties was that, “Ms. Kjærsgaard used the expression: The influx should be stopped. (...). The government can’t live up to this. We argue that the influx should be curbed.” (A. 11, L 152, 2002, p. 39). This perception of the influx of immigrants marked one of the main differences between The Danish People’s Party and The Liberal Party in this period. This was further elaborated when it was uttered by Haarder (V) that:

(...) I think there is too much suspicion. I think it is a hopeless situation if it should be made into a problem that more immigrants can make themselves useful and be an economic gain in Danish society instead of a burden. (A. 11, L 152, 2002, p. 49).

The difference was thus marked by a perception of “a burden” in contrast to a, possibly, “economic gain” in receiving immigrants. The perception by the Danish People’s Party of “a burden” was evident when Kjersgaard (DF) uttered that, “It’s the unfavorable we get. It is the un-educated, the illiterate, it is those from the third world.” (A. 11, L 152, 2002, p. 43). Though it

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38 In its new integration policy: “On the road to a new integration policy” the government also introduced means of demands and reward towards asylum seekers living in asylum centers, presented as “a break with the slackness on consequences”. See Appendix 22 for an analysis of the use of detention to “control” asylum seekers.

39 Immigrants are also a burden according to the Liberal Party if we get too many and it they do not follow the rules.
cannot be defined as securitization to frame immigrants as “unfavorable” this indicates a hostile, and culturally racist, discourse where the actors are moving into a discursive domain where it is more likely that security arguments are developed. Here, the logic is that a more “positive” discourse about gains regarding immigrants demonstrates a welcoming and open society, whilst a “negative” discourse relying on “suspicion” demonstrates a closed attitude where the “burden” of the immigrant is perceived to disrupt society. Importantly for the discourse, the right-wing parties understood and portrayed immigrants differently and there was not necessarily discursive agreement.

The Liberal Party also made arguments relating to the well-being of immigrants who should be integrated because they: “(...) should feel as good as possible and because we should benefit as much as possible from them while they are here. They should not be repatriated as destroyed, because they have been confined and haven’t been allowed to do anything.” (A. 11, Hornbech (V), L 152, 2002, p. 9). This utterance combined humanitarian arguments with the aforementioned arguments regarding utility. Hence, immigrants should “feel as good as possible” because “we should benefit” (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 411). While this utterance was part of the government’s prevailing discourse of self-reliance and duties, it somewhat stood in opposition to rhetoric about threat which is noteworthy in a discourse primarily revolving around curbing influxes.

The rhetoric of The Liberal Party seemed to be ambivalent, drawing on a societal security discourse about the possible undermining of national identity in the shape of integration problems, if ‘we’ receive too many immigrants, whilst simultaneously perceiving, some immigrants, as contributing to society. Whereas the societal security rhetoric by The Liberal Party mostly portrayed the numbers/ amount of immigrants as a problem, The Conservative Party substantiated the aspect of the “problem” with influxes by referring to the notion of ‘the alien’:

A large number of very alien people have arrived, people from a culture and with a family pattern and a view of humanity which is very different from ours, and different on a level where integration in Danish society is very difficult (...). (A. 11, Sørensen (KF), L 152, 2002, p. 26-27). It may produce problems when these two groups are going to live next to each other. (Ibid., p. 44).

Though Sørensen (KF) clarified that she wanted a decent immigration law (ibid., p. 26-27), she continuously use the notion of “very alien” and referred to cultural differences as the main problem. According to the above quote, the problem was that the “alien” people were too different to be integrated which might create conflict. Importantly, this rhetoric continues a cultural racist
discourse which was previously mostly performed by the far right-wing parties. Such language is generally echoed in nationalist discourses in a competitive, comparative field where ‘our’ nation is perceived as ‘the best’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 17). Hence, ‘our’ self-perception as a progressive country appears to legitimate this cultural racist discourse against immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating and adapting because of their ‘backward’ culture (Wren, 2001, p. 159). The above rhetoric was commented on by the Social Democratic spokesman Andersen (S), who questioned why “(…) someone is more alien than others. I have never heard this comparison (gradbøjning) of the word ‘alien’ before.” (A.11, L 152, 2002, p. 29). The response from Sørensen (KF) was that a Swedish immigrant was “better” to receive than ‘other’ immigrants who possess a markedly different culture and would be harder to integrate (ibid., p. 30). The notion of ‘alien’ is thus used to make a distinction, and a ranking, between different kinds of immigrants. Through this rhetoric, a perception of a homogenous nation is bolstered and it is clarified that the ‘others’ do not belong to what Anderson (2006) called the ‘imagined community’ (p. 7; Wren, 2001, p. 156).

In conclusion, the government was firstly, portraying influxes of immigrants as a problem related to integration which could be solved by curbing it. Secondly, from the perspective of the government, a decreased number of immigrants were easier to “control” and assimilate through means of demands which would turn the immigrants into an economic gain instead of a burden. Lastly, it was evident that the culturally racist discourse was gaining ground. This discourse portrayed the cultural difference between, primarily Muslim immigrants and Danes as creating conflict, and the ‘others’ as incapable of integrating.

5.3 Criminalization of Immigrants
The Liberal-Conservative government introduced a vast number of bills targeting criminal immigrants. L 128 (2006) contained several initiatives proposing to make it easier to expel criminal immigrants. These included a new sanction, ‘suspended expulsion’ (betinget udvisning), stating that immigrants who had committed crimes would be put on probation and could be expelled if they committed new crimes; the ‘step ladder model’ (trappestigemodellen) proving, among other

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40 Referring to the rhetoric of the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party in the former government period (1996-2001).
41 L 210 (2011) introduced restrictions towards criminal immigrants making it easier to expel them. This bill marked a change regarding the perspective on Denmark’s international duties and introduced the term “with certainty”: “(…) immigrants committing crimes and convicted to expulsion, should only have the opportunity to reside in this country if expulsion this is with certainty violating Denmark’s international duties.” (L 210, Pind V), 2011). The main focus could be perceived as being “expulsion” instead of abiding by conventions. For an analysis of the term see appendix 25.
things, that refugees who had resided in Denmark in less than eight years were equated with immigrants; expanded access to expulsion regarding certain kinds of serious crimes such as crimes towards state security, drug offences, slaughter and rape. The latter form of expanded expulsion possibilities also applied to refugees; considerations to generalized security and preventive considerations were stressed in the bill and the paragraph which stated that an immigrant “can” be expelled when committing gross crimes was changed to “shall” be expelled (L 128, Hvilshøj, 2006).

The predominant theme in L 128 was thus expulsion as a means to deal with criminal immigrants. These initiatives spoke somewhat for themselves by creating a correlation between immigrants and serious crime. They specifically connected asylum seekers and refugees to crime, portraying them as constituting a threat towards citizen’s security (from e.g. rape, etc.). Using elements of human security rhetoric the right-wing politician, Langballe (DF), claimed that “(...) radical politicians have been preoccupied by the assailter’s security (...) but there isn’t many who have been preoccupied with the security for the victims and the possible victims.” (L 128, FR, 2006, p. 12). Langballe (DF) thus rhetorically created a dichotomous relation between the “assailter” (the immigrant) and the “victim” (‘us’, The Danes) by the logic that some politicians, which he de-legitimized by referring to them as radical, found it more important to protect the immigrant (the security threat) than ‘our’ own citizens, “the victims”. The criminalizing discourse was continued by the The Liberal Party. As stated by Vesselbo (V):

(…) this bill should signal that we will simply not put up with people coming to Denmark to e.g. apply for asylum and get residence as refugees because they seek for protection in our country (…) and then commit crimes by possibly offending someone in Denmark by raping them or perpetrate robbery. (L 128, FR, 2006, p. 2).

In this utterance it became evident that refugees were perceived in this bill as a threat by the government because ‘they’ “commit crimes” “by raping” or through “robbery”. This utterance portrayed crime among immigrants as a general problem and one that the government “will simply not put up with”, implying a discourse where immigrants were somewhat portrayed as people needing to be deterred in order to follow the norms of society. If an immigrant did not follow the rules there would be definite consequences in the form of expulsion from Denmark. The solution towards the threat was thus to move it outside the borders of Denmark.

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42 Meaning that refugees could not receive the best protection until eight years had passed.
Moreover, there was a tendency of portraying, refugees especially, as ungrateful. Hence, according to Kjær (KF), “(...) it is necessary to send a signal that our hospitality should not be abused. One may wonder why people (...) commit gross crimes in the country which have helped them (...).” (L 128, FR, 2006, p. 12). This utterance could be seen as a way of legitimizing the means introduced towards refugees because ‘we’ “have helped them” and ‘they’ respond by abusing our “hospitality” it is legitimate “to send a signal”. In this bill, however, the “signal” received harsh critique from the opposition and several organizations. One of the arguments related to the violation of conventions:

This bill is criticized (...) by a number of organizations\textsuperscript{43} for possible being on the verge of violating the Geneva Convention, that is the refugee convention. (L 128, FR, Nielsen (RV), 2006, p. 14).

This critique signified a resistance towards a discourse increasingly moving towards securitizing immigrants. Moreover, the initiatives towards refugees were not perceived as legitimate because “(...) refugees have a special right to protection in opposition to other immigrants.” (Ibid., p. 3). Hence, the opposition stood together in advocating for the rights of refugees. However, this critique was dismissed by the government. Vesselbo (V) thus uttered that:

Every time we discuss immigration policy (...) it always revolves around the government violating some international conventions. When it is investigated it turns out that it is not true. And I don’t have any problem with some organizations (...) continuously stating that we are on the verge of violating conventions. What does “on the verge” means? As I see it, it means that we are not violating them. (L 128, FR, 2006, p. 4).

Hence, it clarified that being on the “verge” of conventions was not a problem to the government as long as “we are not violating them”. Moreover, stating that the accusations were “not true” was also a way of de-legitimizing organizations as unreliable and the government’s initiatives as necessary. This is a rather harsh rhetoric taking into consideration that these are acknowledged organizations specializing in human rights etc. Interestingly, it is also an utterance similar to The Danish People’s Party’s in 2000, which was countered by all the other parties\textsuperscript{44} and referred to as inhumane\textsuperscript{45} (A. 8, L 285, 2000, p. 6).

Even though the government did not necessarily violate conventions, the rhetoric in L 128 can be seen as a move towards perceiving immigrants as a threat towards Denmark and its citizens. The prime means proposed are expulsion of the threat, the immigrant, and probation as a means to deter.

\textsuperscript{43} Danish Red Cross, Amnesty International and The Human Rights Institute (L 128, FR, 2006, p. 3).
\textsuperscript{44} Except for The Progress Party.
\textsuperscript{45} See appendix 17 for an analysis of The Danish People’s Party’s de-legitimization of organization.
These were legitimized by portraying refugees as ungrateful and as necessary means to deter possible criminal immigrants and remove the ones who had committed gross crimes. Whether this was a securitization move also depended on whether it actually ended up violating conventions, which it may, according to the opposition and organizations, and will not according to the government who dismissed the accusations claiming that they were “not true”.

5.4 Restrictions on Family Reunification – a Means to Curb Influxes from ‘The Other’

Part of the new government’s immigration policy was restrictions on family reunification. According to Andersen (2007), the restrictions on family reunification in this period were: “tightened to the borderline of what is compatible with Denmark’s international obligations.” (p. 258). Here it should be noted that the unity of the family is protected under international law and covered by several conventions such as The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and under international humanitarian law (Jastram & Newland, 2003, p. 7). Obstructing, or simply preventing, family reunification can therefore be perceived as an extraordinary mean. Notwithstanding this, several initiatives were introduced in this area in L 152 (2002), such as the 24-year rule (24-årsreglen)\(^{46}\) and the abolishment of the legal entitlement on family reunification (A. 11, Hornbech (V), L 152, 2002, p. 3).

In this bill, family reunification was mostly portrayed by the government as a means to curb the influx of immigrants which would, combined with more demands, lead to a better integration. Hence, “(...) if you want integration you have to put forward stronger demands before you get family reunification: demands regarding self-reliance.” (A. 11, Haarder (V), L 152, 2002, p. 38). The assumption was thus that people would not integrate and become self-reliant unless the immigration law became more restrictive (Ibid., p. 38). Part of this discourse was that the ‘other’ became represented as a threat and a burden to the welfare state and ‘us’ if he/she would not comply with the demands put forward (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 412).

In 2003 the government proposed changes regarding the affiliation demand\(^{47}\) (tilknytningskrav) and the initiatives to counter forced marriages. Thus, a new ‘rule of assumption’ (formodningsregel) was introduced in L 6, prescribing that where marriages were formed between individuals who were closely related, it was considered doubtful that the marriage was formed willingly. As point of

\(^{46}\)According to the 24-year rule the age requirements for family reunification (ægtefællesammenføring) increases from 18 to 24 years (L 152, Haarder, 2002).

\(^{47}\)Spouse reunification should happen in the country where the unified affiliation is biggest (L 152, Haarder, 2002).
departure, such requests for family reunification were rejected and only accepted if the spouses could prove that the marriage was formed willingly (A. 13, Haarder (V), L 6 2003, p. 1).

The discussions during the first reading mainly revolved around the means introduced to counter forced marriages. Rhetorically, the perspective of the government was similar to the arguments made by the Social Democratic government in the late 90s. Thus, the Liberal-Conservative government emphasized their legislative role in protecting young people against forced marriages (A. 13, Simonsen (V), L 6, 2003, p. 1). The focus in this part will be on what was termed the government’s ‘cultural war’ and how this affected discourse.

According to the government, about half of the arranged marriages were based on force (A. 13, Simonsen (V), L 6, 2003, p. 5). From a security perspective, forced marriage can both be seen in relation to human security, as a threat to the individual whom the state needs to protect, and to societal security, as a cultural tendency potentially threatening ‘our’ identity and which the government needs to ensure is not scattered throughout the nation state. However, the political spokesman for the Christian People’s Party, Kornbek, countered such security perspectives when stating that:

(…) there isn’t any documentation about how big a part these forced marriages comprise. Miss Irene Simonsen48 says: If there is one it is too many. This is correct. Of course we want to disassociate ourselves from forced marriages. But this is a severe legislation if the problem is that small, because we don’t know the magnitude of it, and then we propose a bill which will target a large group of people. (A. 13, L 6, 2003, p. 6).

Rather than using the security discourse, this can be perceived as a de-securitizing discourse where the legislation is understood as an overreaction. Hence, the argument was that the bill was not based on evidence since “there isn’t any documentation” but instead on what she claims were assumptions and feelings (ibid., p. 5). Whereas the government portrayed the bill as protecting people from forced marriage whilst claiming that: "There isn’t the slightest bit of discrimination in this bill (...)” (A. 13, Simonsen (V), L 6, 2003, p. 2), the opposition portrayed it in ways relating to a societal security because “(...) the bill regards curbing immigration from specific population groups” (A. 13, Kornbek (KRF), L 6, 2003, p. 5). References to cultural racism can also be made when following the argument of The Danish Social-Liberal Party. Hence, according to Nielsen (RV):

48 From the Liberal Party.
This bill should be seen as a macabre proposal on the government’s true ‘cultural war’ (...). [This bill] regards advancing a specific way of life among people in Denmark. In this bill the citizens can read how to behave (...) if they want the blessing of the government of a marriage with an immigrant. (...). With this bill the government elevates a specific way of living (...) and norm into law. (A. 13, L 6, 2003, p. 25).

Whilst this utterance specifically portrayed the government as “elevating a specific”, European, “way of living” (Wren, 2001, p. 143, 159), such effort, to culturally change the ‘other’, also refers to the notion of ‘assimilation’: That is the employment of culturalist and Universalist/ Westerns discourse and a “claim for culture” that legitimates transgressing the public/private divide “wherever functional or morally called for.” (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 419). This discourse, which was also called a ‘cultural war’, thus legitimated the legislative intrusion into immigrant’s lives. From this perspective, the bill was not merely a tool of protection but a way to assimilate and push people into changing their cultural behavior into “the right one” in the shape of e.g. family reunification. This is highly relevant because it demonstrates a move towards a lack of tolerance towards ‘other’ cultures.

The supporting party, The Danish People’s Party, was more direct when specifically targeting Muslims: “[These] forced marriages are built on a non-Danish culture (...). What we meet in Islam, which is the ‘legislation religion tyranny’ (lovreligionens tyranny), is alien to Danish culture.” (A. 13, Krarup (DF), L 6, 2003, p. 14). This utterance specifically portrayed Muslims as a societal security threat by creating an antagonistic relation between “Islam” and “Danish culture”, and moreover, by making links between “Islam” and “tyranny”. This can be seen as a way of portraying Islam as a threat to Danish identity. According to Wren (2001), the Danish form of cultural racism is indeed distinctly anti-Muslim, relying on a portrayal of the imagined ‘other’ as ‘barbaric’, ‘tyrannical’ and ‘fundamentalist’ (p. 147-148). Contrary to their supporting party (The Danish People’s Party) the government did not specifically mention Muslims and Islam as a problem in this bill. Instead, they portrayed themselves as protecting young people against this ‘cultural tendency’. This does however not change the fact that the bill does, in itself, target specific people (Muslims) who have a tradition for arranged marriage as a problem to the Danish society.

In this government period there were, indeed, numerous restrictions on family reunification and the accusations of discrimination and violations of conventions were many though they were continuously countered by the government. These restrictions were linked to curbing the influx of immigrants, which would, according to government policies, improve the possibilities of integrating
people. This legislation did, however, target an ethnic minority group in Denmark and, according to the opposition it exemplified the government’s ‘cultural war’, dictating that certain groups of people were more welcome than others. From this perspective, restrictions were made out of societal security concerns: to hinder a dangerous culture from setting root in Denmark.

5.5 ‘The Muhammad Crisis’ & Denmark’s International Reputation

In 2005 the Danish newspaper *JyllandsPosten* published twelve cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. This resulted in worldwide protests from Muslims and had vast international consequences (Hansen, 2011, p. 62). What became known as ‘The Muhammad Crisis’ was defined by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller, as the biggest crisis since the German occupation during World War II (Ibid.). ‘The Muhammad Crisis’ is relevant for this thesis because it signified how an anti-Muslim discourse was becoming increasingly prevalent and established as common-sense knowledge in Denmark.49

At the beginning of the crisis, diplomats from 11 large Muslim populations requested a meeting with Prime Minster Anders Fogh to discuss the cartoons which he refused. According to the 11 diplomats, the images were part “of a wider campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam and Muslims.” (Ibid., p. 66). Hence, one of the main critiques was that the cartoons demonized Muslims (Ibid., p. 67). Interestingly, the Danish allies, the US and UK governments, declared the cartoons as offensive (Ibid., p. 62). The choice by the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh, to dismiss the critique could thus be perceived as rather radical, taking into consideration that two powerful Western States, who were also leading ‘the war against terror’, did not approve of the cartoons. However, in Denmark the perception was different and the protests against the depiction of the Prophet were mainly framed as one opposing Western values and ‘freedom of speech’.

As such, the violent protests, involving embassies that were set on fire, may have aggravated an existing hostile discourse towards Muslims in Denmark, thus underpinning an idea about Muslims as generally undermining an important Danish value: ‘the freedom of speech’. This discourse of a contradictory relationship between ‘the backward Muslims’ and ‘the West’ was indeed strengthened by *JyllandsPosten* who, in the main editorial ‘The threat from the dark’ by Flemming Rose (the cultural editor in chief at Jyllands-Posten), mobilized a clash of civilizations discourse, where ‘we’ were portrayed as threatened by: “Muslims who are unwilling to ‘put up with scorn, mockery, and

49 For more analysis of the anti-Muslim discourse, see Appendix 19 for an analysis of initiatives against foreign religious preachers in Denmark.
ridicule’, something which is said to be a key feature of modern democracy.” (Hansen, 2011, p. 65). Moreover, the violent episodes revolving around the crisis may have supported the cultural racist discourse of perceiving the ‘other’ Muslim as backward: as someone using violent means in opposition to Western sophisticated, democratic, means which would allegedly accept “ridicule” (Wren, 2001, p. 143, 156).

According to Hansen (2011), the fact that these images were even published by JyllandsPosten and that the Danish government refused to engage with this issue became established as a sign of Denmark as anti-Muslim (p. 67). From this perspective, the Danish government’s lack of response may have legitimized and strengthened a hostile discourse towards Muslim immigrants in Denmark. While a hostile discourse does not necessarily mean securitization, it can be perceived as a factor leading to the acceptance of more radical utterances and initiatives.

In 2008 the Danish Security and Intelligence Service reported a plotted murder on Kurt Westergaard, who made one of the cartoons for JyllandsPosten. During this year, Denmark entered what can be termed ‘the second Muhammad crisis’ (Hansen, 2011, p. 62). One of the suspects, who became known as ‘the Tunisian’, was a rejected asylum seeker on ‘tolerated stay’ who lived close to the home of Westergaard (L 69, Hornbech, 2008).

The government had already formed a group\(^{50}\) in 2008 working on the administrative deportation of immigrants who were assessed to be a threat to state security\(^{51}\) (L 209, Hornbech, 2009). However, the allegedly plotted murder prompted an immediate response from the government and resulted in the proposal of L 69 containing restrictive measures against immigrants on ‘tolerated stay’\(^{52}\). It was stated by the Minister of Immigration, Hornbech (V), that it was “(...) unsatisfactory that people, who we think are a threat towards the country, can just wander around and that there are victims here in Denmark feeling threatened.” (L 69, FR, 2008, p. 16). This heavily criticized bill, which was later known as ‘The Tunisian Bill’ (Tuneserloven), took away some of the basic legal rights for immigrants such as ‘court trial’ (domstolsprøvelse) for rejected asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’.


\(^{51}\) The working group suggested ‘diplomatic insurances’ as a means to deport immigrants who are considered a threat to state security. See appendix 23 for more analysis on this.

\(^{52}\) Three groups of immigrants can be put on ‘tolerated stay’: immigrants who are rejected due to crime committed in Denmark, immigrants who are excluded from getting asylum due to the exclusion clauses in article 1 F in the Refugee Convention (because they have e.g. committed crimes against humanity, war crimes etc. in their home country or another country), and immigrants who are a threat to state security (Institut for Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 2).
Moreover, it proposed increased control measures such as restrictions on ‘the duty of notification’ containing daily notification to the Police or stay in the Sandholm Center.\footnote{If an asylum seeker is ordered to stay in Center Sandholm, this means that he/she has to live in the center and sleep there every night. Previously, an asylum seeker on ‘tolerated stay’ and imposed ‘duty of notification’ only had to notify the policy once a week (L 69, FR, 2008, p. 18).}

The discourse in this bill revolved around criminal immigrants and national and human security as is exemplified in the below quote:

The necessity of this bill has been actualized by the case of the administrable expelled Tunisians who allegedly planned a murder on the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard but this bill applies to all immigrants on ‘tolerated stay’ and the concrete case has only demonstrated that the rules (…) are not good enough. (…) people are on ‘tolerated stay’ either because they are estimated to be a threat to state security or because of crimes (…). (L 69, FR, Ellemann (V), 2008, p. 19).

In this first reading, a discourse was built up by the government, and The Danish People’s Party, where asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’ were portrayed as a threat to state security. This signaled a move towards a discourse of increasingly securitizing immigrants as a national security threat. Since Westergaard, a cartoonist framed as an advocate for the ‘freedom of speech’, was almost murdered, this case demonstrated an existential threat to the state, its people and ‘our’ identity. Therefore it was portrayed as legit to introduce extraordinary restrictions. As exemplified by the above quote, an argument was built up drawing on the specific case regarding ‘the Tunisians’ and making the generalizing statement that all asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’ were a potential threat.

It was made clear by the government that it wanted: “(...) people on ‘tolerated stay’ to go home; they are unwanted in the country.” (Ibid., p. 23). However, in order for the government to abide by conventions\footnote{An immigrant on ‘tolerated stay’ cannot be deported due to risks of torture, degrading treatment or death penalty (Institut for Menneskeretigheder, 2016, p. 2).} it could not deport these people (Ibid., 18). The above discourse of securitizing all asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’ also related to ‘the principle of proportionality’\footnote{Discussions related to proportionality in relation to confinement is also discussed in appendix 16, “confinement of asylum seekers”.}. This was noticed by the political spokesman Kristensen (S) who questioned why the bill did not contain “(...) an individual assessment regarding whether immigrants are a threat to state security and that the measures of control are balanced in relation to the risk the immigrant constitute to state security.” (L 69, FR, 2008, p. 35). As generally emphasized by the opposition, proportionality is important in relation to an immigrant’s legal rights and it hardly makes sense that such restrictive means should...
apply to a person having received e.g. 40 days prison for having for instance a false passport (Ibid., p. 36).

It should also be noted that a daily ‘duty of notification’ is closely related to confinement since it involves some of the same loses of freedom and thus some of the same problems in relation to conventions\(^\text{56}\) (Institut for Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 5-6). This is interesting for this thesis because detention\(^\text{57}\) is usually connected to prevention of serious danger for the public order or punishment (Hailbronner, 2007, p. 159). In other words, the use of means related to detention linked asylum seekers to the area of security. Such means are in general a sensitive issue since it is a serious intrusion into asylum seekers fundamental rights and there are legal\(^\text{58}\) as well as humanitarian problems involved\(^\text{59}\) (Ibid.). This may also be one of the reasons why The Liberal Party found it: “important to emphasize that this is not confinement” (L 69, FR, Ellemann (V), 2008, p. 20). However, according to Østergaard (RV), “The lawyer council\(^\text{60}\) compares the combination in the bill of stay\(^\text{61}\) and ‘duty of notification’ with being in custody and there is a general agreement among lawyers in Denmark that tribunal control (domstolskontrol) should be secured.” (L 69, FR, 2008, p. 69). This comment should also be seen in the light of a ruling made by the Supreme Court stating that one of the Tunisians had been illegally imprisoned for eight and a half months, since The Danish Security and Intelligence Service did not have enough evidence against him (Maltesen, 2008). In an interview with Politiken, the Minister of Immigration, Hornbech (V), commented on the ruling of The Supreme Court stating that:

I have continuously been sorry about the amount of ‘police state’ in the current rules. (…) I am happy that the Minister of Justice, Brian Mikkelsen, now supports that there should be some form of judicial review (domstolsprøvelse) in cases of terror suspension. (…) it is not healthy not having an independent authority on the side of the convicted. (Hornbech as quoted in Politiken, 2008).

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\(^{56}\) Asylum seekers should not be confined, “for the sole reason that he/ she is an applicant for asylum” and, additionally, human rights law preventing interdiction against arbitrary detention (Hailbronner, 2007, p. 165). Article 7 of the Reception Directive provides that asylum seeker ought to able to move around freely in the territory of the host Member State (Hailbronner, 2007, p. 167).

\(^{57}\) For more analysis of the use of detention in the government period, see appendix 22.

\(^{58}\) It should be noted that The Reception Directive "gives states a right to confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance with their national law "when it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order” [or to] "protect national security” (Hailbronner (2007, p. 167-168).

\(^{59}\) “Consistent with international and regional human rights law, detention of asylum-seekers is exceptional and should only be resorted to where provided for by law and where necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose, proportionate to the objectives to be achieved and applied in a non-discriminatory manner, for a minimal period” (UNHCR in Hailbronner, 2007, p. 167).

\(^{60}\) Translated from: Advokatrådet.

\(^{61}\) In Center Sandholm.
This interview with *Politiken* was continuously commented on by the opposition in the first reading of L 69. Interestingly, referring to the present policies as “police state”, whilst emphasizing possible suspect’s legal rights, seems to be somewhat a critique of the politics lead by her own government following ‘the war on terror’. Such a statement may signify a discursive struggle within the government regarding the harsh means. Moreover, stating that some initiatives are “not healthy” de-legitimizes them and may thus affect the general discourse regarding the means introduced.

This comment by the Minister of Immigration, however, stood in opposition to the actual initiatives in the bill which was also noted by Schmidt-Nielsen (EL). In this reading she quoted the Prime Minister Anders Fogh in an interview he did with *Berlingske Tidende* in 2006 where he commented on the US initiative, the Guantánamo prison, in which he stated: “You can’t just contain people for years without them getting a judicial clarification with those guaranties there is in a constitutional state” (Fogh as quoted in L 69, FR, 2008, p. 70). This demonstrates how the government seemed to be split between its identity as a constitutional state, fighting for democracy and human rights, and on the other hand, a state using the harsh initiatives perceived as necessary to counter terrorism. Notwithstanding this, the end result was a bill which mostly framed some immigrants as a threat and took away some of their legal rights. Importantly for this thesis, treating all asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’ as a threat to state security has consequences for the security discourse, leading to an increasingly generalizing discourse about all asylum seekers, or immigrants, as a threat to state security.

L 69 can be seen as an example of a ‘securitization move’. Firstly, as a result of the plotted murder on the Muhammad cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, the threat was identified: asylum seekers on ‘tolerated stay’ who may be a national and human security threat. Secondly, extraordinary measures were introduced possibly violating conventions. Thirdly, these initiatives were introduced as a matter of urgency: as emergency measures which is of Ren part of securitization. This bill thus broke with basic principles of treating bills which was criticized heavily by the opposition. Lastly, this supported a prevailing discourse following the ‘war on terror’, legalizing means against the threat that did not necessarily match with the self-perception of Western states and ideals of legal and human rights.

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62 Translated from: retsstat.
63 For the discussion on urgency in this bill and the critique from the opposition, see Appendix 24.
5.6 Sub-conclusion
The Liberal-Conservative government came into office in a post-9/11 environment where an Islamophobic discourse dominated (Hedetoft, 2006). A perception of an extraordinary threat from the (Muslim) terrorist was created, where exceptional means breaking with the most fundamental legal rights and principles were legitimated in the name of security. Whilst a culturally racist discourse was already present in the discourse before 9/11, it seemed to be established as ‘commonsense-knowledge’ in this period as exemplified by e.g. ‘The Muhammad Crisis’.

As parliamentary backing for the government The Danish People’s Party had much greater influence on the discourse and the bills proposed in this period which affected the increasingly hostile discourse. For example, the government replicated a de-legitimizing discourse, previously mostly performed by the Danish People’s Party, regarding international organizations working to promote immigrants’. However, whilst the government introduced many restrictions in the Alien Act and was, in several cases, seen to make securitization moves towards immigrants, it should be noted that it opposed the more radical statements from The Danish People’s Party.

A rhetoric relying on punishment and reward was present in this period. This discourse dictated a much stricter immigration policy where means such as confinement, expulsion and ‘duty of notification’ were portrayed as necessary to control the behavior of the ‘other’. This was often done by reference to national order, hence security. In several of the readings, immigrants were portrayed as related to crime, as a threat towards Danish citizens and as a national security threat. Accordingly, their rights were curbed (as exemplified by e.g. ‘Tuneserloven’) often by removing basic rights. During this period the opposition primarily promoted a de-securitizing discourse of protecting immigrant’s right and worked against a generalizing discourse of perceiving an entire group of people as a threat.

Lastly, societal security concerns were used by linking immigration to problems with ‘social cohesion’. Hence, too many immigrants would create integration problems, conflict between “different cultural groups” and parallel societies. This discourse, which was termed a ‘cultural war’ by the opposition, was specifically built up around family reunification where it became evident that certain cultural groups of immigrants were not welcome.

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64 The Social Democratic Party was still ambivalent.
In 2012 the centre-left government came into office under the leadership of the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt. This government was based on a minority coalition consisting of The Social Democratic Party, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and The Socialist People’s Party. In 2012 the centre-left government came into office under the leadership of the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt. This government was based on a minority coalition consisting of The Social Democratic Party, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and The Socialist People’s Party. In 2012 the centre-left government came into office under the leadership of the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt. This government was based on a minority coalition consisting of The Social Democratic Party, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and The Socialist People’s Party. In 2012 the centre-left government came into office under the leadership of the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt. This government was based on a minority coalition consisting of The Social Democratic Party, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and The Socialist People’s Party.

In the 2011 election campaign 79 per cent of the voters indicated that economy was the most important issue which could be seen as a result of the escalating financial crisis. Thus, in opposition to former elections, this did not have immigration as the most salient issue (Hutcheson, 2012, p. 345; Kosiara-Pedersen, 2016, p. 874). The changed focus might have affected the discourse in this period.

The following analysis of this government period has been split up into material before and after a discourse began to emerge regarding ‘An European Refugee Crisis’. This is done from the perspective that the events surrounds the ‘crisis’ marked a radical change in discourse globally and nationally regarding immigrants.

6.1 Withdrawal of Restrictive Initiatives
Following the election of the new government a somewhat new take on the Alien Act could be witnessed where some initiatives from the former government were withdrawn. Whereas one of the main focuses of the Liberal-Conservative government had been to “break with the slackness on consequences.” (A. 12, Haarder (V), L 157, 2003, p. 11), and various means of control and demands had been introduced, the new government clarified that whilst they wanted to put forward demands these had to be fair (L 180, FR, Bjerregaard (S), 2012, p. 38). The underlying basis was that the previous government “(...) put forward unreachable demands giving people the feeling that they would never be able to belong to this country.” (L 180, FR, Stampe (RV), 2012, p. 43-44). According to this statement, the policies of the former government were ‘othering’ immigrants instead of integrating them. As follows, several initiatives introduced by the former government were abolished in 2012, such as: ‘The system of points’ (pointsystemet) dictating points to receive permanent residence status, ‘the citizenship test’ (medborgerskabsproven) (L 180, Bødskov, 2012),

65 From 3 February 2014, the Socialist People’s Party is no longer part of the government (Folketinget, p. 29).
66 The discourse of the Centre-LeFR Government generally seemed to portray immigrants in a more “positive” discourse where their well-being was increasingly emphasized, they were trusted to be part of society and less harsh means were suggested. As an example the government introduced L 130 in 2013 in which asylum seekers were allowed to work and live outside the asylum centers. See Appendix 25 for an analysis of this bill.
‘the system of points’ in relation to spouse reunification and ‘the 24-year rule’. ‘The affiliation demand’ (tilknytningskrav) was reversed into the form it had before ‘the system of points’ (L 104, Bødskov, 2012). It should be noted, however, that the withdrawal of these initiatives did not loosen up the Alien Act to how it was before the Liberal-Conservative government came into office. Denmark still had a tight immigration policy and it was emphasized by the government that it wanted to continue a strict immigration policy (L 178, FR, Bjerregaard (S), 2012, p. 29).

6.1.1 Quota Refugees – The Abolishment of the ‘Integration Potential’

In 2014 the Centre-Left government introduced L 141 which abolished the ‘integration potential’ as a selection criterion on receiving quota refugee. This selection criterion was introduced by the Liberal-Conservative government in 2005\(^{67}\) and was based on: “(...) individual’s chances of taking roots in Denmark and enjoy the residence based on linguistic requisites, education, network, motivation etc.” (L 79, Hvilshøj, 2005). The implementation of the ‘integration potential’ was heavily criticized by the opposition at that time and the UNHCR\(^ {68}\), who discouraged governments from adding it to the criteria for resettlement because: “Resettlement is a humanitarian response to the protection and solution needs of the most vulnerable refugees, the level of education and work experience, language ability, family size and composition (...) should not determine the acceptance of resettlement cases.” (UNHCR, 2014, p. 2). This is one of the reasons why the government chose to change the selection criteria for receiving quota refugees so that it instead “(...) takes as point of departure what the Danish society can offer refugees (...).” (L 141, Hækkerup, 2014). This criterion emphasized the capacity of the receiving community instead of the individual refugee’s ability to integrate in Denmark. This somewhat signified a move towards a humanitarian discourse emphasizing refugee protection. Substantiating this it was emphasized that:

“(...) it is central that Denmark plays a positive and strong role in the world society. We are a rich country and therefore we should take responsibility when it comes to tackling the challenges in the world’s hot spots. (...). The quota system is made to help someone. Not to help Denmark (...).” (L 141, FR, Reissmann (S), 2014, p. 16).

While this discourse displayed a more welcoming attitude towards refugees, it also stood in opposition to the discourse of the Liberal-Conservative government in the 00s which, to a large

\(^{67}\) For an analysis of the ‘Integration Potential’ implemented by the Liberal-Conservative government in L 79, 2005 see Appendix 21.

\(^{68}\) UNHCR has in general advised countries not to introduce additional and specific selection criteria, which can lead to the rejection of refugees whom UNHCR has identified as being in need of resettlement (UNHCR, 2014, p. 2).
extent, promoted as more national ‘self-oriented’ discourse primarily based on utility (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 411).

To sum up the first part of the government period, a more welcoming discourse which focused less on security aspects was performed. This manifested itself in the withdrawal of some of the very restrictive bills introduced by the former government and immigrants were to a greater extent allowed to be part of society. They were, in some cases, perceived as a benefit instead of merely a burden\textsuperscript{69}, Denmark’s international reputation as a humanitarian country was emphasized and there was a tendency towards respecting the advice from UNHCR. However, the right-wing parties continued their discourse of securitizing the influx of immigrants on several levels (human, societal and national security), and of the new policies (relaxations) as attracting more immigrants. This also demonstrated how the discourse can get affected by which parties are in office, meaning that the right-wing had not changed its discourse but had less influence on the discourse, and bills, when being out of office.

6.2 The European Refugee Crisis
During 2014 the discourse regarding immigrants faced a markedly change across Europe and in Denmark. The Syrian civil war, which entered its fourth year of crisis in 2014, was a major cause for the increase of forcible displaced people (UNHCR, 2015, p. 8). Hence, new crises had broken out in the Middle East and Africa and combined with unresolved conflicts in Afghanistan, DRC and Somalia, among others, this led to a vast increase in forced displacement. Since 2011 where the level of global forced displacement was 42.5 million, the number increased to 59.5 million\textsuperscript{70} in 2014. This was an increase of 40 percent within a span of just three years (Ibid., p. 5). In 2014, more than 660,000 third-country nationals applied for international protection in the EU, representing the highest number since the beginning of EU-level data collection in 2008 (EASO, 2015, p. 7).

The increase of asylum seekers and immigration to Europe marked the beginning of a ‘crisis rhetoric’ in the EU, supported and exacerbated by media and politicians where immigration was portrayed as a threat to EU and towards nation states in Europe. This was substantiated by The

\textsuperscript{69} See appendix 25 for an analysis of the integration of asylum seekers in to society.

\textsuperscript{70} “These included 19.5 million refugees: 14.4 million under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The global figure also included 38.2 million internally displaced persons and close to 1.8 million individuals whose asylum applications had not yet been adjudicated by the end of the reporting period.” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 5).
Minister of The Interior, Frederiksen (S), who stated that: “(...) the world is in an unusually difficult and extraordinary situation. Not since the time following world war two has so many people been fleeing.” (L 72, FR, 2014, p. 25). Hence, the ‘crisis’ discourse was also prevalent in Denmark and in 2014 the government took the first initiatives directly related to the perception of a ‘crisis’. This was done in the shape of control in border areas (L 95, 2014) and by implementing the notion of ‘temporary protection’ (L 72) in the Alien Act.

L 72 (2014) was portrayed by the government as a bill restricting the asylum legislation. It introduced the tool of ‘temporary protection’ which dictated that people could get temporary stay according to general conditions such as war and instability in their home country (L 72, FR, 2014, p. 25). The argument was that the need for protection for generally persecuted people was more temporary since the circumstances in their home country could change during short time (L 72, FR, Ravn (S), 2014, p. 36).

This bill could be seen a directly related to the aforementioned ‘crisis rhetoric’. It was thus presented: “As a result of the extraordinary situation where the Danish asylum system is undergoing tremendous pressure (...)” (L 72, Frederiksen (S), 2014). It is important to note that the government generally recognized: “(...) that we need to protect the people in need (...) on the other side we have to formulate a law (...) so that we can make things work in Denmark. And the number is not unimportant in consideration to our abilities to integrate.” (L 72, FR, Frederiksen (S), 2014, p. 25). This portrayed a government struggling in-between two discourses: On one hand, a discourse of “protecting the people in need” and abiding by their international duties. On the other hand, and portrayed in opposition, was the responsibility towards the nation state, because too many immigrants means that the government cannot “make things work”. The “number” of immigrants was thus seen as creating a “tremendous pressure” on the state and making it difficult “to integrate” immigrants. As part of this discourse The Liberal Party also referred to “(...) the limit to how many asylum seekers Denmark can accommodate economically (...)” (L 72, FR, Lauritzen (V), 2014, p. 30), thus combining a treat towards social cohesion in the shape of integration problems, as well as emphasizing the financial burden ‘they’ may constitute to the population.

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71 People who are granted temporary protection are initially granted residence for a period of one year only (GammeltoFR-Hansen, 2017, p. 105).

72 Persons who are individually persecuted can still get asylum according to the Refugee Convention (L 172, Frederiksen, 2014).
state. The Danish People’s Party drew more directly on societal security rhetoric by emphasizing that “(...) if this development continues it is going to change the Danish people’s character and Denmark crucially.” (L 72, FR, Henriksen (DF), 2014, p. 45). Using a societal security language ‘our’ national character was portrayed as threatened from the immigrant ‘other’. These different aspects lead to the same discourse: ‘we’ cannot handle the amount of immigrants. This was not a new discourse even though it had previously mainly been performed by the right-wing. What was new, however, was the wide support for this discourse. This seems to be a move towards establishing security rhetoric about the influx as commonsense-knowledge which is unquestionably a threat towards ‘our’ society in different ways. In this bill, it specifically legitimized ‘temporary protection’ which made it easier to return people to their ‘home country’ (L 72, Frederiksen, 2014). This, however, put asylum seekers in a more insecure situation.

6.3 Sub-conclusion
In conclusion, the Centre-Left government period initiated with a less hostile discourse and the withdrawal of some of the bills introduced by the former government in its latest years. The focus was somewhat moved away from the area of security.

This did, nonetheless, change with the genesis of the construction of ‘an European refugee crisis’ which initiated a security discourse broadly supported and wielded by most parties in parliament. The amount of asylum seekers coming to Denmark was portrayed in the language of security, in emergency terms as constitution “an extraordinary situation”, putting the system under “tremendous pressure”. Moreover, immigrants were portrayed in relation to integration problems (threatening social cohesion), as an economic burden (possibly taking ‘our’ share of the welfare) and in relation to matters of societal security (as a threat to ‘our’ identity). What distinguished the discourse in this period from previous ones was thus the broad agreement of an extraordinary situation which the state needed to control with new means such as ‘temporary protection’. The new government, however, still defended humanitarian ideals and its responsibility “to protect the people in need”. Notwithstanding, it was evident that the government parties were struggling between its responsibilities and duties according to Conventions and the principle of responsibility

73 In addition the Liberal Party and the Danish People’s Party used the notion of ‘refugees of convenience’ which largely replicated the discourse in the 90s regarding “so-called refugees”. This discourse de-legitimized immigrant’s claim for asylum. See Appendix 26 for an analysis of this perspective.

74 The Socialist People’s Party and The Unitary List are the only parties who do not support this discourse in this bill.
sharing, in opposition to the perceived security threat consisting of the increasing amount of immigrants.

7. Chapter four: The Liberal Government Period from 2015 to 2017

Following the 2015 general election The Liberal Party came into office as a minority government (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2016, p. 876). They had lost electoral support during the election which was the case for several of the larger parties in parliament. Interestingly, the support for The Danish People’s Party reached new heights as the party became the second largest in parliament (Ibid., p. 870).

In this period a tendency across Europe could be witnessed where smaller and more radical parties, advocating to curb immigration to Europe, were elected (Aisch, Pearce, & Rosseau, 2017). Whereas several factors could explain this development, one may be the aforementioned ‘crisis rhetoric’ which increasingly dominated in media and across the political debate and contained concerns about the influx of immigrants and the future of the EU. Hence, one of the reasons for the increase in support to smaller and more radical parties may have been the search for solutions to the ‘crisis’ where a party such as The Danish People’s Party offered a simply solution: Denmark had to defend itself towards the influx of immigrants which had to be curbed notwithstanding the means.

The Ministry for Immigration, Integration and Housing was reinstated under the leadership of Inger Støjberg signaling an increased focus on this area. This could also be witnessed by the extensive amount of bills proposed by the new government.

The main theme discussed in this chapter is the Danish government’s use of different forms of deterrence as means to curb immigration to Denmark. Deterrence is defined by Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017), as “policies intended to discourage or prevent migrants and refugees from either arriving in the territory of a prospective destination state or accessing its asylum system.” (p. 103). Whilst the use of deterrence by the Danish state is not a new phenomenon (Ibid., p. 100-103, 110), the discourse regarding the legitimacy of using deterrence reached new levels in this Liberal government period. The argument in this thesis thus is that the security and crisis discourse

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75 The Liberal government period continues into 2018 but this analysis is limited to 2017.
76 From 28. November 2016 the composition of the government changed and Liberal Alliance and The Conservative Party were included in the government (Folketinget, p. 31).
77 The Conservatives, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and the Socialist People’s Party all lost support.
78 The Minister of immigration, integration and housing will be referred to as The Minister of Immigration.
legitimated new means by Danish politicians to deter immigrants from coming to Denmark, such as an anti-refugee campaign in Arabic language newspapers in the summer 2015, warning refugees against seeking protection in Denmark (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99, 108).

7.1 Indirect Deterrence – Means to Make Denmark Less Attractive

In L 87 (2015), the ‘crisis rhetoric’ was continued, meaning that immigrants were not only a problem: they were constructed as a security threat towards Denmark. As stated by the Minister of Immigration, Støjberg (V):

I have a responsibility (…) to take care of Denmark and that both means taking care of the economy in Denmark but also the values and the basis on which we have built up our country. And because I believe that the number mean something, I have a duty to make sure that there isn’t coming any more asylum seekers or refugees to Denmark than we can integrate. (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 49).

This utterance combined several elements of security threat. Immigrants where portrayed as a societal security threat towards identity by linking to, “the values” in “our society” and in matters of integration relating to a threat towards social cohesion. In other words, when referring to the “numbers game” related to integration, the Liberal government continues the discourse of ‘othering’ immigrants, in which they are constructed as a threat to the homogenous composition of Denmark (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 409). In addition, they were also constructed as threatening “the economy in Denmark” and in other places in the bill as “(…) undermining the Danish welfare society (…)” (L 87, FR, Knuth (V), 2015, p. 37), thus using resources entitled to Danes. Such combining elements of security threat towards different referent objects only exacerbated and strengthened the construction of threat.

The above quote also related to the right-wing’s aforementioned endeavors of making Denmark less attractive for immigrants. Accordingly, the means to protect Denmark from the ‘refugee crisis’ (immigration) was to: “(…) restrict the conditions for asylum [which will make] it less attractive to come to Denmark.” (L 87, Støjberg, 2015). In L 87, the means to make Denmark “less attractive” for immigrants were means such as: ‘the jewelry law’ (smykkeloven) which granted the police the authority to seize assets from asylum seekers to cover the cost of their stay in Denmark.

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79 The Danish campaign “warn about the difficulties in obtaining legal asylum and family reunification, as well as the plights that asylum-seekers and refugees will have to endure in those two countries.” (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 109).

80 Valuables worth more than 10.000 could be confiscated by the authorities (L 87, Støjberg, 2015).
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 105; L 87, Støjberg, 2015). Initiatives cutting down on the financial support for asylum seekers, such as ‘the social benefit’81 (integrationsydelse) for refugees was introduced. Lastly, access to family reunification was removed during the first three years of residence restrictions for those granted ‘temporary protection status’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 105; L 87, Støjberg, 2015). Referring to the latter, it was specifically emphasized that: “(...) those means we can use to reduce the amount of people attempting to come to an attractive country as Denmark are rules regarding family reunification.” (L 87, FR, 2015, Knuth (V), p. 34-35).

The above means can be categorized as controversial. Whereas the ‘jewelry law’ resulted in heated debate82 and worldwide headlines in newspapers (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99, 109-110), the restrictions on family reunification arguably violated the right to family life according to general human rights law83 (Ibid., p. 107). Referring to this possible violation of conventions, the bill distinguished from most other bills by the fact that it was acknowledged by the Minister of Immigration that there was a process risk (process risiko) that the European Human Rights Court might find that the Danish government was violating the human rights convention (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 36). Referring to this it was thus stated that: “This is not something we are doing because we want to. It is because we are experiencing a historically massive asylum pressure.” (L 87, FR, 2015, Knuth (V), p. 34). As such, it was acknowledged that these means were controversial but, according to this discursive construction, necessary.

The above means could arguably be seen as elements in a discursive ‘indirect deterrence’ which, according to Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017), describes measures to discourage asylum seekers from applying asylum or “divert them to other countries by making conditions for asylum-seekers and recognized refugees less attractive.” (p. 105). In addition, detention of asylum seekers can be perceived as a means to indirectly deter immigrants from applying for asylum in Denmark (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 106; Hailbronner, 2007, p. 160). Though this chapter will not go into detail with the restrictions targeting criminal immigrants, it should be noted that the government continued its ‘criminalizing discourse’ of immigrants. This was specifically the case with

81 The social benefit implemented a decrease in social benefits for refugees, which was cut by 10% (L 87, 2015, Støjberg).
82 Following heavy critique, it was eventually clarified by the government that immigrant’s valuables with sentimental values should not be confiscated (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 26).
83 Year-long waiting periods arguably violate the right to family life as established in general human rights law (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 107). According to, among others, the lawyer council (Advokatrådet), Amnesty International, Dignity, Safe the Children, Danish Refugee Council and The legal Political Union (Retspolitisk Forening), the initiatives in L 87 on family reunification are against conventions (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 27).
Immigrants on ‘tolerated stay’, whose stay the Minister of Immigration allegedly wanted to make “as unbearable as possible” (Institut For Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 13). Hence, in this period, the government implemented more restrictions against criminal immigrants such as an increased ‘duty of notification’ (meldedpligt) and ‘residence duty’ (opholdspligt) (L 51) taking place in the departure center Kærshovedgård (Institut For Menneskerettigheder, 2016, p. 3). These restrictions might have resulted in violations of conventions related to e.g. confinement, degrading treatment and issues of proportionality (Ibid., p. 1).

Indirect deterrence, such as detention, restrictions in family reunification, and cuts in financial benefits etc., can thus be seen as directly related to the discourse of making Denmark “less attractive”. By making the protection system and asylum system appear as unattractive as possible Denmark will receive fewer immigrants and possibly achieve what Gammeltoft-Hansen (2017) has called a ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ effect where the ‘unattractiveness’ will push asylum seekers towards other countries (p. 100). Such means can be characterized as “deliberate ‘negative nation branding’” (Ibid.). Referring to such ‘negative nation branding’, Schmidt-Nielsen (EL) argued in L 87 that: “I wonder whether the primary goal with this bill is to send a signal worldwide that it isn’t pleasant to reside in Denmark if you are a refugee.” (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 36). As stated before, this is not a new discourse, neither is means of deterrence (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 110). What is new, however, is the legitimacy of using such means. An increase in the use of measures of deterrence and a broader discursive support was taking place. As an example, the Social Democratic Party began to replicate this discourse by stating that “If one has a markedly more gentle immigration policy than those countries surrounding you (…) you will become a magnet.” (L 87, FR, 2015, Jørgensen (S), p. 26). Drawing on the worst case scenario of Sweden, these means were portrayed as necessary by Jørgensen (S), because: “(...) it is our responsibility that our welfare society is secured and our social cohesion endures.” (Ibid.). This replication of the rhetoric, primarily used by the right-wing parties since the late 90s, signaled a discursive move in parliament towards increasingly legitimizing and using means of deterrence towards immigrants as security threats. This does not mean that total unity in parliament existed regarding these means. However, it is significant that one of the larger parties in parliament moved towards increasingly accepting and actively promoting the premise of securitizing immigrants.

84 Schmidt-Nielsen (EL) is referring directly to ‘the jewelry law’ (L 87, FR, 2015, p. 36).
85 Here Jørgensen (S) stated that: “we risk that Denmark ends up like Sweden” (L 87, FR, 2015, Jørgensen (S), p. 26).
7.2 Direct Deterrence – ‘The Emergency Break’ & A New Quota System

As analyzed in the above section, a securitization manifested by several means of indirect deterrence used to discourage asylum seekers from applying for asylum in Denmark (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 105). However, means of direct deterrence were also launched to curb immigration, such as a temporary border control (Ibid., p. 104-105) and the cooperation in the EU to curb immigration at the EU border via private actors such as Frontex\textsuperscript{86} (Ibid., p. 104). This chapter will, however, focus on the introduction of ‘the emergency break’ (L 153, 2017), describing how asylum seekers could be rejected at the border in a situation of crisis, and the temporary pause in receiving quota refugees\textsuperscript{87} (L 80, 2017),

L 80 (quota refugees) and L 153 (‘emergency break’) were both seen as means for the state to protect itself against another ‘emergency situation’ as had been exemplified by the ‘refugee crisis’. Indeed, using the notion of an ‘emergency break’ immediately moved this means into the area of security: as ‘above politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). It was emphasized that: “[the bill] gives the police the possibility to reject asylum seekers at the border (...) if a situation of crisis emerges where the Dublin Regulation formally apply but where the cooperation (...) in reality has ceased to function.” (L 153, Støjberg, 2017). The ‘emergency break’ was portrayed as a means useful in situations of larger influxes such as during fall 2015 (Ibid.). Whereas the tool of an ‘emergency break’ was not intended to be used immediately but in a new crisis, the pause in receiving quota refugee was already launched before the first reading of L 80 (L 80, FR, 2017, p. 21). Most parties perceived the quota system as the most favorable way to receive refugees\textsuperscript{88} but the perception from the right-wing (and The Social Democratic Party) was that the system should be paused because Denmark had “(...) received an extraordinary amount of spontaneous asylum seekers (...).” (L 80, FR, Tesfaye (S), 2017, p. 2). Since these had not been integrated in society yet: “(...) we don’t have the capacity to receive the most vulnerable.” (L 80, FR, Lindahl (LA), 2017, p. 22). These bills were thus portrayed as means for the Danish state to re-gain control in situations of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency situation’, or on other words, in situations revolving around security.

\textsuperscript{86} Denmark has contributed to joint operations regarding EU’s border agency, Frontex, since 2006 (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 104).

\textsuperscript{87} In addition the ‘integration potential’ was reintroduced in L 87 (L 87, Støjberg, 2015).

\textsuperscript{88} L 80, FR, Knuth (V), 2017, p. 14; Khader (KF), p. 34; Schmidt-Nielsen (EL), p. 21; Lindahl (LA), p. 22; Nielsen (SF), p. 32.
These bills relied on the same perception of threat from integration problems as discussed in the previous chapter because “(...) we should not receive so many refugees that it begins to threaten the social cohesion in our country.” (L 80, Støjberg, 2017). And as stated by Tesfaye (S): “We have to be able to keep up to avoid additional clashes of cultures, vulnerable residential areas, and larger economic challenges.” (L 80, FR, 2017, p. 2). The Social Democratic Party continued its support of a securitizing discourse. These bills are thus elements in an increasingly dominating securitization of immigrants, portraying these people as a societal threat, because “we” have received “an amount of spontaneous asylum seekers” impossible to integrate and because this creates “clashes of cultures” (identity conflict), and human security threat in the shape of “vulnerable residential areas” (parallel societies, crime, curbing cohesion) and economic problems (threats towards ‘our’ welfare society). Whilst the discourse of crisis has been firmly established, the discourse of immigrants threatening ‘social cohesion’, changing ‘us’ and ‘our’ society so that “‘we’ will no longer be what we used to be” (Buzan et al.) has indeed become established in parliament as a dominating discourse at this point.

7.3 Responsibility Sharing in The EU - A Lack of Solidarity
‘The emergency break’ and the new ‘quota agreement’ (kvoteordning) are bills demonstrating a new era regarding refugee protection which rather emphasize deterrence than principles of solidarity and responsibility sharing. For example, the discussions surrounding the ‘emergency break’ had its focus on the possible breakdown of The Dublin Regulation in a situation of crisis and the importance of the legal concept of ‘first country of arrival’ as a means to prevent asylum seekers from travelling through various European countries and applying for asylum in Denmark (L 80, Støjberg, 2017). Moreover, the ‘emergency break’ implemented the possibility to reject asylum seekers at the border and return them to ‘safe third countries’ in situations of crisis (L 153, Støjberg, 2017). Meanwhile, one of the main problems with the Dublin Regulation during the crisis (and even to this date) was that it supported an unfair distribution of asylum seekers (Carrera & Guild, 2015, p. 9-10). This meant that countries, such as Greece and Italy bordering up to the sea,

89 The only parties that do not refer to a threat towards ‘social cohesion’ is The Unitary List and The Alternative.
90 According to The Dublin Regulation, states part of the Regulation cannot reject asylum seekers at the border if the person in question applies for asylum. According to the regulation Denmark is obliged to give the person in question access to Denmark whilst The Danish Immigration Service assess which country, according to The Dublin Regulation, is responsible for treating the asylum application. However, this bill implements that asylum seekers can be rejected in situations of crisis (L 153, Støjberg, 2017).
91 Article 3 (5) of the Dublin Convention allows for removal by the responsible State of the asylum seeker to a third country, part of the Dublin Regulation as long as the principle of non-refoulement is respected (UNHCR, 1998, p. 2).
was obliged to receive and treat the cases of more asylum seekers than the rest of the EU. Indeed, the EU worked towards reinstating responsibility sharing and cooperation amongst its Member States. Consequently, the EU temporary relocation (quota) system was proposed in 2015, to relocate 120,000\(^{92}\) asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU Member States\(^{93}\) (Ibid., p. 2). In relation to the relocation (quota) system, Denmark has an opt-out but initially agreed to take 1000 asylum seeker (European Commission, 2015). However, the Danish government did not honor their promise and by 2017 has not received a single relocated asylum seeker (Vormsby, 2017). Due to different factors, such as Member States lack of cooperation, the temporary relocation system largely failed (European Commission, 2015). Whilst the EU Commission has discussed to change the Dublin regulation and make a more permanent system for the relocation of asylum seekers, Denmark has rejected to be part of such a re-distribution (Vormsby, 2017; Berlingske, 2017) and thus continued its anti-solidary course.

Another element signaling the Danish states lack of solidarity and responsibility sharing was the fact that Denmark in 2016, as the only country in Europe, simply paused the reception of quota refugees (L 80, FR, 2017, p. 21). This was a decision criticized by the UNHCR (2017, a), referring to “the humanitarian nature of resettlement” and the fact that “global solidarity is currently needed to a greater extent than in a long time.” (p. 4). In general, it was urged by the UNHCR for EU Member States to demonstrate the principles of international solidarity and responsibility sharing and to focus on the fair distribution of asylum seekers instead of merely curbing the influx to one’s own country (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2). As discussed, in the case of Denmark, however, the solution to the perception of threat had primarily been to deter immigrants directly and indirectly (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017), notwithstanding the means and the consequences. The Danish governments discourse and numerous of the introduced bills are, arguably, an expression of securitization of immigrants. Meanwhile, according to UNHCR (2016),

The signal Denmark’s introduction of restrictions sends to other countries in the world (…) is worrisome and could fuel fear, xenophobia and similar restrictions that would reduce – rather than expand - the asylum space globally and put refugees in need at life threatening risks. (p. 2).

\(^{92}\) Initially, 40,000 asylum seekers were proposed relocated. 120,000 were added, making the total number of proposed relocated 160,000 asylum seekers (European Commission, 2015).

\(^{93}\) This system did, however, not move far beyond the scope of the Dublin system and should be seen as a ‘temporary derogation’ of the Dublin principle regarding ‘first country of arrival’. As such, the ‘first country of arrival’ is still responsible for treating the asylum claims (Carrera & Guild, 2015, p. 4).
From this perspective, the securitization of immigrants currently performed by the Danish government may affect the discourse across Europe regarding immigrants whilst inspiring similar discourse and initiatives in other countries\(^{94}\). Accordingly, it is also remarked by Schmidt-Nielsen (EL), that: “This bill\(^{95}\) sends a wrong signal (…) that Denmark (…), which was previously known as a pioneer country in regards of human rights and development aid, won’t take responsibility (…).” (L 153, FR, 2017, p. 32). At this point, it can be argued that the discourse of ‘negative nation branding’ is indeed gaining ground over the previously discussed ‘humanitarian discourse’, promoting Denmark as a ‘humanitarian country’ and as a liberal frontrunner of refugee protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99-100). Moreover, actively aiming towards pushing asylum seekers towards other countries (‘beggar-thy-neighbor’), works directly against the principle of solidarity and responsibility sharing. From this perspective, the above examined bills and related initiatives are an expression of a Denmark progressively moving away from the humanitarian discourse and principles of solidarity and towards means of deterrence to protect the Danish nation.

### 7.4 Sub-conclusion

To conclude, the argument in this chapter is that the security and crisis discourse legitimated new means by Danish politicians to deter immigrants from coming to Denmark. Discursively, Denmark was constructed as being in a constant state of security crisis from the influx of immigrants. The continued repetition by media and politicians of this ‘crisis’ discourse manifested as a securitization where the extraordinary means to keep out immigrants to a lesser degree needed to be argued for. In other words, it had become established as a dominating discourse.

Instead of supporting the EU’s and UNHCR’s repeatedly call for solidarity and responsibility sharing, the Danish government continued its ‘negative nation branding’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017) and used various means of deterrence to curb immigration to Denmark. This was portrayed as necessary to protect the Danish welfare society, and importantly, ‘our’ identity. Accordingly, Denmark needed to be protected against more spontaneous immigrants whom, if they did not get integrated, could disrupt the social cohesion in Denmark, create parallel societies, crime and economic problems. These restrictions to curb immigration may have fuelled xenophobia across Europe and inspired other countries to lead similar policies.

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\(^{94}\) It is acknowledged that this is an inter-subjective process and Denmark is also affected by others countries and the general European discourse.

\(^{95}\) Regarding the ‘emergency break’.
8. Conclusion

This thesis aimed towards addressing the research question: Have immigrants in Denmark been securitized by Danish politicians over time, and if so how? In exploring this research question, first readings and proposal speeches regarding changes in the Alien Act have been examined. Using the Copenhagen School Framework, the focus has been on how the political elite through ‘speech acts’ have constructed immigrants discursively over time. In this thesis, the focal point has been on security discourses: namely, those discourses that construct an issue (in this case immigration) as a threat towards a referent object (Denmark, ‘our’ collective identity and individual Danes) and allows the use of extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998). Whilst this Framework mostly focuses on ‘the moment’ (the speech act) when securitization occur, this thesis has taken into consideration the historical context, events and “general discourse” facilitating security discourses over time (McDonald, 2008). These different elements are pivotal in understanding how the discourse has developed diachronically.

In the first analytical chapter, taking its departure in the Social Democratic government period from 1996-2001, this thesis argued that the extreme right wing parties, The Progress Party and The Danish People’s Party, played a significant role in primarily constructing immigrants in societal security terms: as a threat towards the Danish national culture and identity. Even though the more radical claims and securitization moves were rejected and de-legitimized by the rest of parliament, these parties established a discourse that became increasingly dominating in the following years.

It was argued that this government period displayed two main discourses struggling to gain prominence in the discursive domain regarding immigrants: A discourse described as ‘humanitarian’ (a compassion based discourse, expressing tolerance, refugee protection) which stood in opposition to more hostile representations (as an in-tolerant and closed nation, focusing on stricter immigration policies). This discourse manifested especially in relation to arranged marriages, where restrictions were portrayed as protecting immigrants though simultaneously using culturally racist language (Wren, 2001). Hence, bureaucratic means were adopted to hamper cultural behavior contradicting ‘our’ identity. A hostile, but subtle, societal security discourse was built up and this period. This discourse was based on concerns about increasing influxes of immigrants and a sense of loss of control of the ‘other’, who, possessing a ‘backward’ culture, could possibly threat ‘our’ national identity. Another element affecting discourse was criminalizing portrayals of immigrants as inherently connected to crime.
In the second analytical chapter, taking its departure in the Liberal-Conservative government period from 2001-2011, this thesis argued that a major turning point in the overall discourse towards securitization was taking place. This can be ascribed to the influence of the Danish People’s Party who, as parliamentary backing for the government, had extensive influence on reform packages and interlinked discourse. Additionally, the new government came into office in a post 9/11 environment where connections were made between Muslims and terrorists (Hedetoft, 2006; Rydgren, 2004; Berggren, 2007). This aggravated the ‘islamophobic’ discourse which had already been promoted by extreme-rightwing parties in the previous years.

Following 9/11 the general tendency to see the world order as changed legitimized the use of extraordinary means. This included expanded possibilities to expel immigrants out of consideration to state-, society-, and citizen’s security. The macro-level security discourse somewhat aggravated the domestic hostile discourse about, Muslim, immigrants. As exemplified by the ‘Muhammad crisis’, which was framed in Denmark as an attack on ‘the freedom of speech’, it is argued, that this anti-Muslim discourse was somewhat established as ‘commonsense-knowledge’

This thesis argued that this culturally racist language, relying on the ‘superiority’ of Europeans and a national self-assertiveness on ‘our’ values as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ in opposition to the ‘backward’ and ‘traditional’ ‘other’ (Wren, 2001; Hedetoft, 2006), legitimated what could be called a ‘cultural war’. Here ‘punishment and reward’ were constructed as useful means to control and change (assimilate) the behavior of the immigrant ‘other’. This discourse was manifested by introducing restrictions in the area of immigration which often referred to national order and to societal security, by constructing the influx and influence of immigrants as threatening our national identity. The societal security discourse also linked immigration to problems with ‘social cohesion’ describing: integration problems, conflict between “different cultural groups” and parallel societies. This discourse thus dictated a much stricter immigration policy where means such as confinement, expulsion and ‘duty of notification’ were portrayed as necessary. Additionally, it legitimated stricter policies regarding e.g. family reunification which was tightened to the borderline of what is compatible with international duties. Lastly, the ‘humanitarian discourse’ was losing ground and replaced by a more national self-oriented discourse (Hedetoft, 2006) where the threat from the immigrant ‘other’ was emphasized compared to promoting Denmark’s international reputation as an advocate for refugee protection.
In the third chapter, taking its point of departure in the Centre-Left government period from 2011-2015, this thesis argued that the issue of immigration was less salient in discourse and the focus was somewhat moved away from the area of security. This government period initiated with a less hostile discourse and the withdrawal of some of the more restrictive bills introduced by the former government in its latest years.

The discourse, however, changed markedly with the genesis of ‘an European refugee crisis’ which constructed the influx of immigrants as an extraordinary (security) problem putting ‘our’ system under enormous pressure and threatening the social cohesion in Denmark in matters of integration, economic and-welfare concerns. This discourse was quickly established as a hegemonic discourse, broadly supported and wielded by most parties in parliament and across Europe. One of the results of this discourse was new means such as ‘temporary protection’ for refugees limiting their rights markedly. It was argued that the repeatedly use of ‘crisis rhetoric’ came to link immigration to security per se. The government, however, still defended humanitarian ideals and its responsibility to protect refugees.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, taking its point of departure in the Liberal government period from 2015-2017, this thesis argued that Denmark was constructed as being in a constant state of security crisis from the influx of immigrants. This manifested as a securitization and legitimated the increased use of extraordinary means to curb influxes of immigrants. These were primarily expressed in the shape of direct-and indirect deterrence to decrease the attractiveness of Denmark as a destination for asylum seekers and refugees. Such means, as for example restrictions on family reunification for refugees on ‘temporary protection status’ may violate conventions. This was portrayed as necessary to protect the Danish welfare society and ‘our’ identity. Hence, instead of supporting a discourse of international refugee protection and solidarity, the government primarily emphasized means of deterrence to hinder immigrants from seeking protection in Denmark.

Thus, the securitization of immigrants in Denmark has been built up over time, from primarily being performed by the far-right parties, The Danish People’s Party and The Progress Party, towards representing a broader accepted discourse, filling out most of the discursive domain regarding certain immigrants in Denmark. This thesis has analyzed how certain events have affected discourse and legislation, whilst a general and more subtle tendency to portray immigrants in societal security terms, as a threat to ‘our’ identity, has gained ground over time. These developments have created a context in which securitization of immigrants has become possible.
Moreover, immigrants have been portrayed as security threats incrementally which was a process beginning well before the dramatic events and securitizing language of 9/11 and ‘the refugee crisis’.

In conclusion, securitization of immigrants in Denmark has indeed become a fact in parliament.
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