Traditional and Local Knowledge in the Arctic

A comparison of traditional and local knowledge recognition among the Arctic States and in the Arctic Council

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Abstract

In recent years, the Arctic has become ´hot´ not only in meteorological terms, but also in a political discourse. The Arctic is inhabited by approximately 400,000 Indigenous Peoples, who through the centuries have developed knowledge and mastered the skills for survival in the harsh Arctic environment. This set of knowledge and skills including a wide range of areas like hunting, weather forecasts, culture, medicine, food, and crafts, and passed on through generations, is commonly referred as traditional knowledge or Indigenous knowledge. Its multi-dimensional and long-standing character may cast light into the climatic, environmental, and social changes taking place in the Arctic. Since several scholars have proved the benefits of applying traditional knowledge in the Arctic context, this thesis is analysing how is this knowledge concept communicated by eight Arctic States, as the main regional actors, and by the Arctic Council, as a still young and developing intergovernmental forum for the Arctic cooperation.

The thematic analysis is applied to reveal the main communication themes in which traditional and local knowledge (TLK) is communicated in the Arctic States´ national strategies towards the High North, and in the Arctic documents. To provide an analytical guidance, three hypotheses were formulated on a basis of realism, liberalism, and agenda-setting theory.

The findings revealed that the liberal or realist nature of the national Arctic strategy does not influence whether TLK is included in the strategy or not. Instead, it is argued that the factor of framing and representation is more important. TLK has been in the national Arctic strategies communicated predominantly under the theme of science and research enhancement. On the Arctic Council´s agenda, the concept of TLK has continuously developed from being included in only one working group, to the general recognition in all working groups. Its predominant use by the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) has been explained by its institutional venues and framing factor.

Despite of the promotion of TLK on the Arctic Council´s agenda, Indigenous Peoples´ representatives still perceive this process as challenging, mainly due to inconsistent naming and definition of TLK. This, together with the other factors, contribute to the contested character of TLK.

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The List of Abbreviations

ACAP – Arctic Contaminants Action Program

AEPS – Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

AHDR – Arctic Human Development Report

AMAP – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

CAFF – Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna

CBM – Community based monitoring

CBMP – Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program

CLEO – Circumpolar Local Environmental Observer

DoD – Department of Defence

EPPR – Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response

EU – European Union

IMO – International Maritime Organization

IPY – International Polar Year

LEO – Local Environmental Observer

MPA – Marine Protected Areas

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs – Non-governmental organizations

PAME – Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment

PPs – Permanent Participants

SAO – Senior Arctic Officials

SDWG – Sustainable Development Working Group

TEK – Traditional environmental knowledge

The U.S. – the United States

TK – Traditional knowledge

TLK – Traditional and local knowledge

UN – United Nations

UNEP- United Nations Environmental Programme

WG – Working group

WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization

WTO – World Trade Organization

1 Introduction

For centuries, the Arctic has been perceived as a cold, dark, inhospitable region under the rule of polar bears and aurora borealis. *Terra incognita*, as it used to be referred to, was not considered as an area important neither for human activities nor governmental concerns. (Nord 2016b) Changes have always been present in the Arctic, in a sense of unpredictable weather and seasonal landscape transformation. However, in the recent years, these challenges have been accompanied by other changes happening due to external factors, i.e. climate change, discoveries of new energy resources, tourism, transportation needs, globalization, and re-emerging potential for great power rivalry. (Arctic Council 2016) Thus, Nord (2016b) argues that the Arctic is becoming *hot,* not only in meteorological terms, but also in public discourse. (Nord 2016b, p.1)

According to the Arctic Human Development Report, there were 4,053,055 people living in the Arctic in 2013. (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015, p.53) Indigenous Peoples represent approximately 10% of the total population living in the Arctic. However, this number is not precise due to various definitions of indigenousness. (Arctic Centre n.d.) Through the generations, Indigenous Peoples have developed a set of knowledge and skills necessary for the survival in the Arctic. This concept is referred as traditional knowledge and is based on everyday observations of flora and fauna, together with knowledge about history, culture, and food. (Hansen et al. 2016) Considering its multi-generational character, and wide range of applicability, traditional knowledge represents a complex knowledge collection, which may offer new insights to tackling the climate change, or as Hansen et al. (2016) argue, traditional and local knowledge (TLK) may be applied in medicine agriculture, herbal industry, and growing tourism, mining and fishery industries. (Hansen et al. 2016) Thus, it is argued that the way traditional knowledge is framed determines it´s applicability.

Scientific knowledge has been predominantly used in climate change research, as "Science has not only pointed out problems, but also identified many of the solutions." (United Nations 2014) However, as expressed by Aleqa Hammond, the former premier of Greenland, "Science and traditional knowledge must go hand in hand," as in her opinion only cooperation between traditional and scientific knowledge will provide benefits for policy-makers. (United Nations 2014) Her opinion is further supported by Carson and Sommerkorn, who conclude in the Arctic Resilience Assessment (2016), that a comprehensive base of knowledge is complicated to obtain due to different perspectives on the Arctic and many social sub-systems. The changes occurring in the Arctic require bridging multiple knowledge traditions into the science. As such, traditional knowledge of Indigenous People

may contribute to tackling the data and knowledge gaps considering its observational and experiential character. Additionally, these authors also suggest that bridging of the traditional and scientific knowledge can contribute to holistic approach on social-ecological resilience in the Arctic region. (Carson & Sommerkon 2016) Scientific knowledge is still perceived as a dominant contributor not only to climate research, but to research in any field. As argued by several authors, traditional knowledge offers a unique multi-disciplinary and long-term evidences, which may enhance the scientific research.

Some of the Arctic States, like Canada, require the incorporation of traditional knowledge into its environmental assessments and resource management. (Usher 2000) Additionally it has been proved that the community-based monitoring programs in Greenland, "increased the speed of decision-making to tackle environmental challenges at operational levels of resource management." (Danielsen et al. 2010, p.1166) These two examples serve as evidences that traditional knowledge is not only used in local communities, but reaches the local decision-making process.

Even though it may look like traditional knowledge is a well-known term in the High North, this thesis will analyse how is this knowledge concept communicated among the Arctic States, and by the Arctic Council. Previous sections have provided an extensive list of areas in which TLK may be used. Therefore, it is the purpose of this paper to analyse which are the dominant areas for the use of traditional knowledge among the Arctic States, and in the Arctic Council.[1]

Therefore, the following research question will be answered in this paper:

How is the concept of traditional and local knowledge communicated among the Arctic States and in the Arctic Council, and how has it developed while setting the agenda of the Arctic Council?

1.1   Synopsis

In this section, the structure of the thesis will be presented to provide the reader with the essential overview about how the research question will be answered. The introduction was presented at the beginning and provided the background information about the challenges in the Arctic region and the role of traditional knowledge. Followingly, the research question has been stated. The chapter two briefly introduces the Arctic Council since the thesis is aiming to analyse its agenda development. The

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[1] The author´s interest towards this case follows her internship experiences in the Greenlandic house in Aarhus, where the author attended the academic discussion, where traditional knowledge was presented as an enhancing factor for Greenlandic development.

chapter three subsequently presents the definition and applicability of TLK, as this term is in the spotlight of this thesis. The fourth chapter explains the methodological choices and presents the analysed documents. The fifth chapter provides introduction to the theories applied in this thesis, namely realism, liberalism, and agenda-setting theory. Based on the chosen theories, the chapter further presents three hypotheses which will be tested in the analysis. The analysis is divided into two chapters, following the character of selected document. In the sixth chapter, the national Arctic strategies of eight Arctic States are analysed, and the chapter seven provides the analysis of the Arctic Council´s documents. In these two chapters, the hypotheses are tested. Lastly, the findings are interpreted and illustrated in the eighth chapter, followed by future work possibilities and conclusion.

2   What is the Arctic Council?

The following chapter presents the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum for Arctic cooperation oriented on sustainable development and environmental protection. First, the events leading to its establishment are presented followed by the description of its organizational structure. Lastly, the perspective of continuously transforming Arctic Council into a policy-formulating institution is introduced.

An idea to establish the circumpolar forum regarding the environment-related issues has originated in Finland, as a reaction to the Chernobyl Incident in 1986. The sudden threat of transboundary pollution and environmental contamination triggered the negotiations among the Arctic States and led to the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The AEPS has been in function from 1991 to 1997 and has served as a predecessor for the Arctic Council. (Nord 2016b, p.13) The second important event which led to the Arctic Council´s creation has been Gorbachev´s speech in Murmansk in 1987 in which he called for radical lowering of the military confrontations in the Arctic, establishing the North as a zone of peace, developing resource and energy cooperation, and suggesting research and scientific cooperation leading to setting up a joint Arctic Research Council. In the conclusion, he called for establishing the North as a "genuine zone of peace and fruitful cooperation." (Gorbachev 1987)

As a response to Chernobyl incident and Gorbachev´s speech, Canada took patronage over the process of establishing the Arctic Council. Following the series of negotiations between the Arctic States as well as leading indigenous NGOs in the region, the Ottawa declaration has been signed in 1996 establishing the Arctic Council as a project oriented, problem-solving forum with rotating

Chairmanship and main focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. (Nord 2016b) Subsequently, the Arctic Council has been established as:

> "a high-level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic." (Arctic Council 1996)

The membership structure of the Council is tripartite in character. According to the Ottawa declaration, the Arctic Council consists of the Arctic States[2], Permanent Participants (PPs)[3], and Observers[4]. (Arctic Council 1996) However, as being primarily an interstate forum, the Council is ruled by the Arctic States through their responsible ministers and Senior Arctic Officials. (Nord 2016b, p.24) The member states are the only ones who possess voting privilege, determine policy and make project-related decisions. (Charron 2012) PPs are empowered with the right to actively participate and to be consulted. However, PPs can exercise ´informal vetoes´ as it has been seen in Kiruna (2013) and Iqaluit (2015) ministerial meetings, where the EU´s observer application has been postponed due to PPs´ opposition. (Nord 2016b, p.38) Lastly, the role of the Observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council and make relevant contributions at the level of working groups. (Charron 2012) The list of the PPs and Observers is attached as Annex 2.

Other distinctive organizational feature of the Arctic Council is its rotatory Chairmanship. The Arctic States serve two-years leadership terms, which was predominantly adopted as a cost-sharing measure. The main responsibilities of the Chairmanship include organizing the meetings, establishing their agenda and control the speaking time of the national delegations. Besides these powers, the presiding state issues the Chairmanship priorities, in which it outlines what will be its primary areas of focus. These issues may be further reinforced, as the Chairmanship also prepares the agenda for the Ministerial and lower-level meetings. Thus, the chairing States have the power to suggest projects and initiatives, which will be prioritised over their Chairmanship period. (Nord 2016b, p.41-43) The full list of Chairmanship responsibilities, revised at the Kiruna Ministerial meeting in 2013, is attached as Annex 3. According to Charron (2012) the predominantly organizational role of the Chairmanship leaves one with the impression that "the chair is no more than a glorified administrator." (Charron

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[2] Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America

[3] Refers to Arctic Indigenous representatives´ organizations

[4] Observer status is opened to non-Arctic States, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organization, non-governmental organization

2012, p.769) On the other hand, she argues that the role of the agenda-setter gives the Chairmanship an opportunity to: "(…) suggest new issues to be explored by the working groups, to set an ambitious and active agenda, and to work toward major decisions that can impact many in the Arctic." (Charron 2012, p.769)

The organizational structure of the Arctic Council consists of three levels: task forces and working groups (WGs), Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) group, and Ministerial meetings. The task forces study and report on specific policy issues and very often last only over a limited time (one Chairmanship). The WGs represent the main organizational structure of the Arctic Council. These groups are: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). (Arctic Council 2015d) Each working group has its own mandate and organizes its individual research projects, developed by its research team, but the academic contributions are welcomed together with the input provided by the PPs as "the process of incorporating traditional knowledge insights and perspectives into their final reports." (Nord 2016b, p.48) Observers may also participate in the research projects and attend the WGs´ meetings. The second position in its hierarchical organizational structure belongs to the SAO meetings. This unit is formed by the member states governmental representatives and PPs delegates. The SAOs review the WGs progress and task forces, and suggest future initiatives. Lastly, on the top of the hierarchical pyramid is the ministerial meeting. The ministerial group represents the main decision-making body which meets biennially to set up future directions, evaluate the accomplishments, adopt organizational reforms and approve the next Chairmanship priorities. (Nord 2016b, pp.51–53) All decisions at the Council are made unanimously and informally including PPs. (Nord 2016b, p.70)

The Council´s predominant orientation on environmental protection and sustainable development emerged from the negotiations between Canada and the U.S. in which the latter unconditionally rejected inclusion of any security- or military-related issues on the Council´s agenda. (Nord 2016b, p.21) This condition has been included in the Ottawa declaration: "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security." (Arctic Council 1996) However, Charron (2012) argues that by signing the Ilulissat declaration in 2008, the security has entered the agenda of the Arctic Council, as coordination of States´ military, coast guard, police, and transport services has been agreed upon for rescue purposes. (Charron 2012, p.774)

According to Nord (2016b) and Loukacheva (2015) the Arctic Council has transformed from being simply a ´talk shop´ into a ´policy-guiding´ and ´policy-formulating´ institution with a considerable influence in the process of international Arctic governance. This transformation has occurred due to its organizational changes (establishing a permanent secretariat) and political development, where the most significant event has been the signing of the Ilulissat declaration, which has included the ´hard law´ instrument into the otherwise ´soft law´ orientation of the Arctic Council. (Loukacheva 2015; Nord 2016b) The future of the Arctic Council is determined by the way how it will cope with the current and future challenges, which according to some academics includes the questions of representation, evolving mandate and increasing global importance, expanding agenda and consequently workload, funding, and leadership issues. (Loukacheva 2015; Nord 2016b; Charron 2012)

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the Arctic Council to the readers. Following the international events, the Council was established as a high-level forum for environmental and sustainable development cooperation in the Arctic. Since its establishment, the Council has expanded the scope of its activities and strengthened the organization structure, which is by some scholars perceived as a step further towards becoming a "policy-formulating" institution.

3   What is Traditional Knowledge?

In this section, TLK will be defined. Based on its characteristics, several areas of use have been promoted, as presented below. However, due to the inconsistency in the naming and broad area of use, TLK is also depicted as a contested term.

Traditional knowledge (TK) has been used for centuries by aboriginal people, but only in the 80s it has been recognized by Western scientific communities as a valuable source of ecological information. (Johnson 1992) Its recognition emerged due to growing environmental issues, as some scholars considered traditional or old knowledge and the Indigenous Peoples´ resource management to be a sustaining alternative to scientific suggestions tackling environmental problems. (Matsui 2015)

TK is a wide concept which may be referred to in several names. Huntington (2005) states terms such as traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), Indigenous knowledge, local and traditional knowledge (TLK) and wisdom. Furthermore, Johnson (1992) labels this knowledge as folk ecology, ethno-ecology, customary law, and knowledge of the land. Sejersen in his book *Rethinking Greenland and the Arctic in the Era of Climate Change* (2015) uses the term Indigenous knowledge in a political-historical

manner, as he argues that this term better reflects the asymmetrical colonial power relation. (Sejersen 2015) For the purposes of this thesis, the term TLK will be used to cover all subtypes of knowledge coming from Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups that according to Johnson (1992) "have also acquired their knowledge and skills through hands-on experience living in close contact with their environment." (Johnson 1992) Even though the Arctic Council refers to traditional knowledge also in terms of Indigenous knowledge, its latest recommendation called for integration of TLK into its work, which also has impacted the choice of terminology.

According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), "there is not yet an accepted definition of TK at the international level." (WIPO 2017) Due to this fact, many authors and organizations have produced their own working definitions. Even though TK has been recognized as important for the work of the Arctic Council since its establishment, it has been lacking its definition. Only in 2015 when the PPs gathered in Ottawa and developed the *Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles* (2015), the working definition of TK has been established:

> "Traditional Knowledge is a systematic way of thinking and knowing that is elaborated and applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cultural and linguistic systems. (…) It is a body of knowledge generated through cultural practices, lived experiences including extensive and multigenerational observations, lessons and skills. It has been developed and verified over millennia and is still developing in a living process, including knowledge acquired today and in the future, and it is passed on from generation to generation." (Arctic Council 2015b)

Following this definition, TK is a holistic system transmitted primarily through the language, but also through cultural performances, and teaching the experience. The process of acquiring the knowledge is emphasized, as it creates the context of, in Zamparo´s words "intimate and intuitive understanding of the environment." (Zamparo 1997, p.261) In his point of view, the holders of TK are people living in a close relation with the nature who derive their livelihood from the land and sea, like fishermen, hunters, and farmers. Due to their way of live, they are directly and constantly observing the nature, which together with detailed understanding of the local environment, establishes the empirical base for TK. Once the knowledge is created through experience, the stories are told to preserve and pass it to other generations. TK is more demonstrative, rather than descriptive, and at the same time cumulative and dynamic, as combines information collected over generations together with present technological and socioeconomic changes. TK represents more than just the act of ´knowing´ something. For Indigenous Peoples, it includes being, learning and knowing. (Zamparo 1997; Johnson 1992)

The importance and usability of TK is related to Indigenous Peoples´ long-established experience and interaction with the environment. Most of the scientists, governments and Indigenous Peoples agree to incorporate TK into environmental decision-making, as its deeper and holistic understanding of the relationships between organisms and environment can contribute to sustaining living and environmental practices alongside with predicting and preventing the potential environmental impacts of development, and informing about land use and resource management. (Ellis 2005; Johnson 1992; Fondahl et al. 2015) Furthermore, Huntington (2000), Usher (2000), Zamparo (1997), and Ellis (2005) identify the TK´s comprehensive, ethical and informational character as an enhancing factor for scientific research, land-use, resource management, and environmental impact assessments. Additionally, Pearce et. al. (2015) describes the role of TEK in adaptation to climate change.

Ellis (2005) notes that based on increased self-determination in many regions, Indigenous Peoples are calling for empowerment and increased role in environmental decision-making as it is affecting more their traditional lands. The use and recognition of TK may advocate for increased role of its holders, which ergo empowers their status. (Ellis 2005) On the other hand, Sejersen (2015) argues that traditional knowledge may not only serve as enhancing factor for Indigenous Peoples, but it may cause disempowerment and undermine Arctic peoples´ possibilities to address and engage in development taking place in the Arctic, if the climate change dimension is prioritised over the human aspects. (Sejersen 2015, p.191) However, he also recognizes the additional value of Indigenous knowledge as a factor which changes the perception of Indigenous Peoples from "knowledgeable adaptors to climate change" to future-makers in the sense how humans can build on the historical experiences while establishing expectations and potentialities for the future. (Sejersen 2015, p.192)

Koivurova and Heinämäki (2006) support these statements and argue that Indigenous Peoples are interested in gaining access to international treaty-making process, as many problems are nowadays solved only at the global or regional level, which is not the Indigenous Peoples´ primary sphere of influence. In this regard, Sejersen (2015), and Koivurova and Heinämäki (2006) consider the Arctic Council as an example of intergovernmental organization which enables Indigenous Peoples to develop a strong voice at the negotiation table, which can be interpreted as an act of including other voices, experiences and knowledge system, by the so called right-holders. Due to the Council´s soft law characteristics, PPs can participate on the development of international norms better than in traditional law-making process. The position of Indigenous Peoples has developed from being local experts and knowledge providers in the AEPS into more cooperative relationship in the Arctic Council,

giving them higher status in comparison with NGOs, which are only Observers. (Sejersen 2015; Koivurova & Heinämäki 2006) The impacts of the climate change have placed Inuit in the forefront of climate debates and portrayed them as witnesses to climate change, as they are "literally seeing their world melting around them." (Sejersen 2015, p.195)

Johnson (1992) claims that the extent to which TK will be integrated with the western science depends on the political power. In Canada, for example, "(…) it has become a policy requirement (…) that traditional knowledge or traditional ecological knowledge be considered and incorporated into environmental assessment and resource management." (Usher 2000, p.184) In this regard, Fondahl et. al. (2015) claim that recognition and incorporation of TK into governance is less advanced in the Eurasian North, than in North America. An exception may be Greenland, where according to Danielsen et. al (2014) most of the monitoring of living resources comes from hunters and fishermen. Based on their research in Greenland, Danielsen et. al. (2014) conclude that: "our results provide preliminary support for the idea that community-based monitoring (CBM) in the Arctic can yield locally relevant results that can be as reliable as those derived from professional scientist-executed monitoring." (Danielsen et al. 2014, p.82) TK may contribute to CBM in many ways, i.e. management of land and resources, wildlife, vegetation, abiotic phenomena such as ice, snow, water, socio-cultural attributes such as language transmission, health, and wellness. (Johnson et al. 2016)

An important variable which is affecting the political and scientific recognition of TK is the absence of its internationally relevant definition. As mentioned previously, several definitions of TK have been presented together with various usability opportunities. Matsui (2015) argues that the contested character of the TK emerges from its inconsistent definition and several labels. Some scholars prefer to use the term traditional knowledge, others suggest calling it traditional ecological knowledge, and some may prefer to use the term Indigenous knowledge, which does not evoke a romanticized notion of the term traditional. (Matsui 2015) Furthermore, Fenge & Funston (2009), and Usher (2000) acknowledge that to explore the contribution of TK in the international governance agreements, institutions and decision-making process, it is necessary to understand what TK is, otherwise its inconsistent definition constitutes the key problem in policy recognition.

The contested character of the TK does not only evolve from the inconsistent definition, but also from numerous ways in which it may be used. Sejersen (2015) argues, that TK is used as an environmental or even as instrumentalist and tactical approach, as this knowledge system is predominantly related with weather, ice and animals. Moreover, he claims that the Inuit´s dependence on the environment may lead to disassociation of Inuit from their daily lives, as their environmental knowledge may narrow

down the attention towards certain ´resources´, ´problems´ and ´solutions´ instead of the human dimension. This may be the case if some researchers isolate climate issues from social life, even though these are inherently connected. In conclusion, he recommends that the Indigenous knowledge should not only revolve around environmental issues, but should also include social issues, even though these might not be directly linked with the environment. Thus, "researchers should not be preoccupied with the study of how people adapt to climate change, but rather with the study of how people adapt climate change to their lives and future imaginaries. (Sejersen 2015, p.225)

This chapter has presented TLK, as it is the term used the most in this thesis. Following the inconsistent naming and numerous examples of the use of TLK, this knowledge concept became contested and may not only empower Indigenous Peoples, but according to some authors may even disempower them, as the human dimension will be ´lost in translation´.

4   Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how is the concept of TLK communicated among the Arctic States and at the Arctic Council´s agenda. To fulfil the objective of this research the analysis of various national and international documents will be conducted guided by the methods further specified in this chapter. Followingly, the research limitations and design will be presented at the end of this chapter.

4.1   Research methods

Firstly, the data collection method will be presented which casts light into the process of selecting the documents and presents the criteria of inclusion and exclusion. Based on these criteria, the selected documents are presented in Table 1. Secondly, the thematic analysis is introduced as a method for analysing the data.

4.1.1   Data collection

Bryman (2012) states that the choice of a sampling method to be used to select the units, necessary to answer the research question, should correspond with the question itself. (Bryman 2012) As the objective of this research is to analyse how is TLK communicated on the national and the Arctic Council´ agenda, the analysed data consists of documents published by Arctic States and the Arctic Council. Thus, the purposive sampling has been applied as these documents were intentionally

selected due to their direct correlation with the research question. To ensure the relevance of the units, researcher must set up the criteria of inclusion or exclusion of the units. The criteria applied in this thesis represent geographical, time, and contextual restrictions. By focusing exclusively on the Arctic region, only eight States were recognized as Arctic States – Canada, the U.S., Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the Russian Federation, and thus the national Arctic strategies of only these states were analysed. Additionally, the agenda of the Arctic Council with the focus on TLK communication, has been analysed. Secondly, the time criterium limited the Arctic states´ national Arctic strategies to the latest ones, and in case of the Arctic Council only documents produced from 1996 and 2017 have been considered relevant. Thirdly, the contextual criterium, based on the research question of this thesis, specified three relevant categories of the Arctic Council´s documents – Chairmanship priorities, SAO´s reports, and the Arctic Council´s declarations. The documents were intentionally selected to exemplify the dimension of interest, in this case differences between the communication of TLK and the national and international level, which may be referred as typical case sampling. (Bryman 2012, p.419) For a better overview, the table below presents the analysed documents:

Table 1: Analysed documents

Arctic States´ national Arctic strategies	The Arctic Council documents		The Arctic Council´s declarations
	Chairmanship priorities	SAO´s reports	
Statement on Canada´s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010)	U.S. Chairmanship 1998-2000	Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council, Iqaluit 1998	Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa 1996
Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (2011)	Program for the Finnish Chair of the Arctic Council 2000-2002	Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers, Barrow 2000	The Iqaluit Declaration, 1998
Finland´s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013)	Program for the Icelandic Chair of the Arctic Council 2002-2004	Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council Ministers, Inari 2002	Barrow Declaration, 2000
A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland´s Arctic Policy (2011)	Program for the Russian Federation Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2004-2006	Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik 2004	Inari Declaration, 2002
Norway´s Arctic Policy (2014)	Program for the Norwegian chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2006-2008	Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fifth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Salekhard 2006	Reykjavik Declaration, 2004
Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period till 2020 and for a further perspective (2009)	The Kingdom of Denmark. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2009-2011	Senior Arctic Official (SAO) Report to Ministers, Tromsø 2009	Salekhard Declaration, 2006
Sweden´s strategy for the Arctic region (2011)	Sweden´s Chairmanship Programme for the Arctic Council 2011-2013	Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers, Nuuk 2011	Tromsø Declaration, 2009
Department of Defence Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region (2016)	Canada´s Arctic Council Chairmanship 2013-2015	Senior Arctic Officials´ Report to Ministers, Kiruna 2013	Nuuk Declaration, 2011
	U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2015-2017	Senior Arctic Officials´ Report to Ministers, Iqaluit 2015	Kiruna Declaration, 2013
		Senior Arctic Officials´ Report to Ministers, Fairbanks 2017	Vision for the Arctic, Kiruna 2013
			Iqaluit Declaration 2015
			Fairbanks Declaration 2017

As presented in Table 1, only the latest national Arctic strategies of eight Arctic States have been analysed. Some states like Norway, Canada or the U.S. have issued several Arctic strategies over the years, and others like Denmark, Sweden and Iceland have instead developed long-term Arctic policy visions. Therefore, to ensure the consistency of the research, from those states who had issued several Arctic strategies, only the most recent have been analysed, as they present the current national perspective towards the Arctic region. If possible, the academic insides have been included in the analysis of the national Arctic strategies to provide better characterization and validate the findings.

Since the Arctic Council does not possess a permanent presidency, the Arctic States´ rotatory Chairmanship represents the administrative, representative and organizational leadership. (Arctic Council 2013a) As the Chairmanship is responsible for setting the agenda of the Arctic Council, the Chairmanship programs were selected to analyse how the Arctic States intend to communicate TLK during their two-years Chairmanship terms. However, the first Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, led by Canada from 1996 till 1998 will be excluded due to lacking materials and its predominantly organizational character. As Nord (2016b) explains, Canada chaired the Council during its first two years of existence and thus had to handle mainly institutional challenges, like integrating the pre-existing work of the AEPS to the new format of the Arctic Council, providing information to member states, PPs and Observers, scheduling ministerial meetings, and preparing the rules of procedures and terms of reference. (Nord 2016b, p.25)

The SAO´s Ministerial meeting reports represent the second category of the Arctic Council documents. Even though the SAO officials meet at least twice a year to review the Council´s progress, for the purposes of this thesis only the SAO reports issued at the end of each Chairmanship will be analysed, as these provide the overall Chairmanship evaluation and the WGs´ progress. Moreover, by analysing the Chairmanship priorities and subsequently the progress reports provided by the SAO, one can observe if and to which extent were the Chairmanship priorities accomplished and thus, also how has been the TLK truly communicated.

Lastly, the Arctic Council´s declarations have been selected as they represent the ´soft law´ policy outcomes of the biennial Ministerial meetings and according to Kankaanpää (2012) may contain recommendations about "(1) their own activities and products, (2) Arctic States´ regional and national policies, and (3) their common views in global arena." (Kankaanpää 2012, p.62) Therefore, the declarations are perceived as the Council´s final acts presenting its values, achievements, commitments and future endorsements, and were analysed to identify how is the TLK presented in the Council´s highest documents. Moreover, the document called *Vision for the Arctic* adopted at the

Kiruna Ministerial meeting in 2013 has been included into the Arctic Council´s declarations category as it has been issued after the first round of Chairmanships has been concluded and thus, marked the Council´s accomplishments. As the Council has marked its 20th anniversary in 2016, it has issued the joint Ministerial statement concluding its main achievements and reaffirmed its commitment to the Ottawa declaration´s principles. Nevertheless, this document has not been included as it has not provided new insides into the Council´s agenda or future perspectives, but only summarized the information already presented by previous declarations or SAO reports.

4.1.2   Thematic analysis

To analyse the data, the thematic analysis approach has been chosen. Braun and Clarke (2017) define thematic analysis as "a method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of meaning (themes) within qualitative data." (Braun & Clarke 2017, p.297) As an outcome of this approach Bryman (2012) considers: "an index of central themes and subthemes, which are then represented in a matrix." (Bryman 2012, p.579) The themes and subthemes are the results of repeated reading of the documents which contain the data. (Bryman 2012, p.579) In case of this research, this applies for the documents presented in the previous section and data are understood as references towards TLK. After reading the documents, the data are organized into themes and subsequently into subthemes. The outcome is a table presenting the themes in which the TLK is communicated the most in the Arctic states´ national Arctic strategies and on the Arctic Council´s agenda.

Braun and Clarke (2017, 2006) identify five steps in conducting a thematic analysis. Firstly, the reading of the documents take place, followed by the process of coding. Codes represent the smallest units of analysis and "(…) identify a feature of the data." (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.88) Thirdly, themes are generated by sorting the codes, as their building blocks, into the categories and sub-categories which them provide a framework for data interpretation. (Braun & Clarke 2017, p.297) Fourthly, the naming and reviewing of the themes occur, followed by writing the report. (Braun & Clarke 2017, 2006) This method will be applied to national Arctic strategies and the Arctic Council documents. First, the documents will be read and the references towards TLK will be coded. Afterwards, the codes will be organized into the sub-themes, and these will be grouped to the themes. At the end, the findings will be illustrated in the table and the results will be interpreted.

As a criterion established for the data to be considered a theme, the principle of repetitions will be applied, which means that if certain topics occur regularly they will be perceived as a theme. (Bryman 2012, p.580) Nevertheless, repetition by itself does not automatically creates a theme, thus only the

data relevant for the research will be included. The inductive thematic analysis will be conducted, which is driven by the data, and without a priori objective to fit the data into pre-existing coding frames. (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.83) As the analysis aims to reveal the main themes of TLK communication, the documents will be first read and afterwards categorized according to ascribed codes. While conducting the analysis, the emphasis will be placed not only on the data itself, but also on the underlying conceptualizations and features which have formed its meaning. Thus, a latent thematic analysis will be preferred instead of semantic one. (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.84)

Even though thematic analysis is predominantly connected with analysing the interviews or focus group data, as Braun and Clarke (2017) mention, its flexibility makes it suitable for a wide range of application. (Braun & Clarke 2017, p.298) Moreover, they argue that thematic analysis may be used as a method to unravel the reality. (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.81) Therefore, despite its common use within the psychology, this analytical method will be applied in this research, as it is believed that the research question can be the best answered by identifying the main themes of TLK communication on the national´ and on the Arctic Council´s agenda.

4.2   Limitations

The non-transparency of the Arctic Council documents has been recognized as a limitation for this research. Firstly, the documents from the first Canadian chairmanship 1996-1998 have neither been uploaded in the Council´s official archive nor provided after the email request. Thus, these documents are excluded from the analysis. Secondly, the documents from the TLK workshops in Reykjavik (2014) and Ottawa (2014) were also neither officially published nor provided after the email request. Thus, the only available information about these workshops has been published in May 2017, on the Indigenous Peoples´ Secretariat´s website. Thirdly, the PP´s perspective on the Council´s agenda development has been only partially included due to the lack of relevant documents.

The time difference between the adoption of national Arctic strategies and performance of the Chairmanship has been regarded as the main limitation of this thesis. In case of Iceland, Russia, Finland, Norway, and Denmark the national Arctic strategies have been adopted after their Chairmanship in the Arctic Council. Due to this reason, the second hypothesis is inapplicable to some of these states, and the applicability of the third hypothesis will also be limited. Nevertheless, it has been decided to analyse these strategies, despite their limited applicability for the hypotheses, as these data contribute to answering the research question.

As all the documents were in English, no language limitations have occurred. To prevent the academic and cultural background limitation, an extensive reading about the topic a priori to the research has taken place, to provide the researcher with a comprehensive knowledge eligibility.

4.3 Research design

The chapter on the research design is included to provide a framework for data collection and analysis. As the criteria for the research evaluation, reliability, replication, and validity are stated. (Bryman 2012, p.46) Since all the documents used in this research came from sources with high validity, either national governments (national Arctic strategies) or official archive of the Arctic Council´s documents, the reliability of the sources has been secured and gives an opportunity to replicate the research. Thus, the credibility of the research has been maintained.

The case study has been chosen as a research method, as it "(…) entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case." (Bryman 2012, p.66) The term ´case´ usually associates with a location, organization or events. (Bryman 2012) For the purposes of this research the case study is understood as communication of the TLK on the national and Arctic Council´s agenda.

This chapter has presented the methodological approaches applied in this research. Firstly, purposive sampling has been introduced as a data collection method, together with Table 1 displaying the selected documents. Afterwards, as the data analysis method a thematic analysis has been presented with its focus on categorizing data into themes and sub-themes. And lastly, the chapter recognizes the research limitations and presents the research design.

5 Theory section

The following chapter will present theoretical framework of this thesis. Two grand theories, realism and liberalism, will be applied to reveal the nature of national Arctic strategies. The agenda-setting theory, with the emphasis on framing and institutional venues, will be introduced to understand the processes influencing the development of the Arctic Council´s agenda.

5.1 Realism

Realism is emphasizing the nation-states´ interests rather than ideology, pursuing peace through strength and acknowledging that anti-ethical values and beliefs do not prevent great powers to raise. The single doctrine which determines the behaviour of state leaders in the international politics is in

realist point of view the *raison d´état*, reason of state. Consequently, the state is perceived as the key actor in international politics and statesman must follow the doctrine to preserve health and strength of the state. Perceiving the state as the key player together with the treacherous nature of international politics represent the essential core of realism. (Dunne & Schmidt 2014, p.100)

Even though realism is divided into several schools, three core elements are relevant for all realists – statism, survival, and self-help. The first refers to the state as the "(…) legitimate representative of the collective will of the people". (Dunne & Schmidt 2014, p.101) Due to this legacy, the state enjoys sovereignty to apply authoritarian rule and guarantee security within its domestic borders. However, outside of the state´s borders, the international politics are not controlled by central authority, which creates insecurity and danger. The absence of sovereign actor constitutes in the realist´s perspective the concept of anarchy ruled by the zero-sum terms. Therefore, the lack of central authority serves as the main disparity between state and international sphere, which ergo differentiates domestic and international politics. The realists´ explanation for this variation in state´s performance is based on contrasting organizational structure of internal and external politics. While in the domestic politics the state enjoys the hierarchical structure including various other players in distinct levels, the international politics are ruled by rules of anarchy, in which "(…) each of the independent sovereign state considers itself to be its own highest authority and does not recognize a higher power." (Dunne & Schmidt 2014, p.101) Moreover, international environment is characterized as struggle for power. The power is understood as a relational concept: does not occur in vacuum, but in relation to other actor; and power is relative concept, which means that the power capabilities of other state actors must be considered together with state´s own power estimations. (Dunne & Schmidt 2014, p.107)

The second element, survival, is by realists depicted as the highest priority for state leaders. In the anarchical nature of international politics, the state´s survival is not guaranteed, as all the states wish to maintain their existence. A crucial variable in the process of survival is power, in the realists´ understanding – the military and strategical power. Supposedly, states with more power have higher chance to survive. Regardless the power resources available to state´s purposes, the focus of national interest of all states must be to survive. (Dunne & Schmidt 2014) As mentioned in the previous sections, structural realists distinguish between defensive (security maximizing) and offensive (power maximizing) realism. While in defensive realism the state seeks only the amount of power needed to survive and to ensure a status quo, offensive realism aims to utilize all power resources and opportunities to achieve a hegemonic position in the international politics. John Mearsheimer as a representative of offensive realism suggests that relative power is more important for states than

absolute power and the state should be always prepared for expansionary activities from another state. On the other hand, defensive realists understand that the costs of war outweigh its benefits and that war is mainly caused by irrational and dysfunctional forces in a society. Thus, defensive realists consider cooperation at the international level as a tool for providing security. Even though the idea of international cooperation may fit more into neoliberalism, defensive realism still does not recognize institutions to be the most effective solution for preventing the wars. (Lamy 2014, pp.130–131)

Lastly, the element of self-help, is understood as the principle of action in an anarchical system where war is always possible. In realists´ point of view security is only achievable through self-help and therefore it is not advisable for states to give custody over its safety and survival to another actor or international organization. Thus, the principle of self-help suggests that if the state feels threatened, it should enhance its own military capabilities to ensure its survival. However, the power mobilization may not be efficient if a small state has been threatened by a large one. Therefore, the concept of power balance has been considered fundamental to maintain the state´s status quo, to ensure equilibrium of powers, and to prevent any state to dominate the others. The problem with cooperation on the international level lies in the difference between individual and collective interests. In realism perspective, cooperation is conditioned by the amount of relative gains which state can obtain, and is therefore difficult to achieve in self-help system. (Dunne & Schmidt 2014)

From various schools of realism, I depict to further introduce structural realism (neorealism), as it distinguishes internal and external factors of international political systems and describes international politics as a system with precisely defined structure. (Waltz 1990, p.30) As the leader of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz said: "It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states." (Waltz 1979, p.65) Therefore, neorealism assumes that system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. When defining a structure, the attributes of units (kinds of political leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments) must be excluded. Furthermore, the relation between units matters for structure definition. Mutually interacting units are ignored by Waltz, as he insists that only the way how units are arranged or positioned towards each other reflects the structure of the system. (Waltz 1979, p.80)

Waltz, identifies three structural elements of international system – organizing principle, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities. (Dunne & Schmidt 2014) While defining the internal political structure first, Waltz distinguishes between expectations about behaviour and outcomes in the internal and external realms. As mentioned under the principle of statism, domestic politics are hierarchically ordered, while international systems are decentralized, anarchic, chaotic, all

actors are equal and none is entitled to command or required to obey. Therefore, anarchy and hierarchy becomes Waltz´s organizing principles. (Waltz 1979, p.88)

Second principle of international system is a differentiation of units. Waltz claims that states are not the only international actors, but are the major ones, and therefore he defines the international political structure in terms of interactions between units - states. (Waltz 1979, p.93)

Lastly, the distribution of capabilities is the third principle of international system and in Waltz´s opinion the most convenient one to explain critical international outcomes. In the hierarchic system, its parts are related to each other according their functional differentiation and extent of their capabilities. On the other hand, units in anarchic system are functionally comparable. Therefore, the international systems are distinguished only according to number of great powers, regardless their traditions, forms of government, or any other attribute except their capabilities. The final picture then reflects an environment based on placement of units, rather than their qualities. (Waltz 1979, pp.98-99) Neorealism believes that placing states on various positions according to their power, explains their behaviour and fates. (Waltz 1990, p.31)

According to Waltz, the natural state is a state of war. The violence occurs due to absence of government in anarchical international environment which forces all states to be prepared for war. (Waltz 1979, p.102) In anarchic order the principle of self-help is necessary, as integration and interdependence are seen to reduce individual´s benefits. Waltz introduces the theory of balance of power, which applies to a self-help system, where states fear to suffer and to fail prosperity, which motivates them towards power balance. (Waltz 1979, p.118)

The choice of neorealism as a theory has been made since it argues that the states´ behaviour is influenced by the structure of the international system. As Waltz claims, international system is ruled by anarchy, which generates the need of security and power balance, rather than demand for power. Thus, this theoretical approach will be used to characterize national Arctic strategies and to reveal the correlation between the realist Arctic strategies and TLK support in the Arctic Council.

5.2   Liberalism

Liberalism is by Dunne perceived as the historic alternative towards realism. (Dunne 2014, p.114) While liberalism promotes individualism, tolerance, freedom, and constitutionalism, realists focus on conservativism, high value on order and authority, and are willing to put the stability of community before individual´s liberty. However, the common feature of these two grand theories is their belief

that wars appear due to anarchic system. Unlike realism, liberalism does not recognize anarchy as the cause of war. Different liberal strands consider different causes of war, like imperialism, failure of balance of power, or undemocratic regimes. According to liberals, the war can be prevented by collective security. (Dunne 2014, p.114)

For liberals, peace is not a natural condition, and must be constructed. Therefore, the establishment of an international authority for the management of international anarchy has been recognized as the most suitable for securing peace. The international organization should be endowed with a set of regulations and international military force to enforce collective security. A part of collective security, the second characteristic element of liberalism is its emphasis on the self-determination, democracy, human rights and norms of sovereignty. (Dunne 2014, p.118) International cooperation is not enforced only due to its security purpose, but also to increase modernization and to resolve common problems. Furthermore, liberalists believe that prosperous cooperation in one sector will lead to extending the range of collaboration, states will become more integrated, and the costs of not being a member will attract even more members. (Dunne 2014, p.119)

Even though the core idea of liberalism is to promote democratic peace, free trade and open borders, Lamy argues that in neoliberal foreign policy the national interests take precedence over morality and universal ideals, and economic interests are prioritized over geopolitical ones. (Lamy 2014, p.127)

Several branches of liberalism have emerged, for example commercial liberalism, sociological or liberal institutionalism. The theory of neoliberal institutionalism suggests that the plurality of international systems leads towards complex system of interdependence. (Lamy 2014, p.132) The concept of interdependence replaces the absolute state autonomy, dominated concept of state leaders. Interdependence means that: "changes in one part of the system have direct and indirect consequences for the rest of the system." (Dunne 2014, p.120) This system is characterized by increasing linkages among state and non-state actors; a new agenda of international system with no distinction between low and high politics; a recognition of multiple channels for interaction among actors across national boundaries; and the decline of the efficacy of military force. (Lamy 2014, p.132)

Neoliberal institutionalism, even though it shares some assumptions with neorealism, sees institutions as being a mediator in the process of establishing cooperation among actors in the system. As globalization is expanding, the states´ interests are changing. It is no longer only trade and development issues, which dominates among state priorities. New threats of security like terrorism, drug trafficking or environmental changes, are calling for regional and global regimes that promotes cooperation among states and coordination of policy responds. Regimes and institutions in neoliberal

institutionalists´ point of view govern a competitive and anarchic international system and they encourage or require multilateralism and cooperation for securing national interests. (Lamy 2014, pp.132–133)

According to Lamy, the key assumptions about neoliberal institutionalism are:

- States are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant actors. States behave as rational or instrumental actors and always seek to maximize their interests in all issue areas.
- In a competitive environment, states seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation. Rational behaviour leads states to see value in cooperative behaviour. States are less concerned with gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative arrangements. The greatest obstacle to successful cooperation is non-compliance or cheating states.
- Cooperation is never without problems, but states will shift loyalty and resources to institutions if these are mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their international interests.

(Lamy 2014, p.133)

The choice of neoliberal institutionalism as a second theory to be applied in this thesis has emerged from its relevance for studying issues related cooperation where states share mutual interests. The Arctic has been recognized as a zone of peace and cooperation. Lessons learnt from the history, underlined by Gorbachev´s speech, emphasize the need of collaboration instead of individual acts. Thus, this theoretical approach will be used to characterize national Arctic strategies and to reveal if there is any correlation between the liberal Arctic strategies and TLK support in the Arctic Council.

5.3   Agenda setting and framing theory

The concept of framing theory is related with the agenda-setting theory. Kingdon (2014) defines agenda as: "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time." (Kingdon 2014, p.3)

The political agendas change over time as some issues may obtain more recognition than others which rearranges the agenda order. To be placed on the agenda means to gain attention of policy- and decision-makers. However, several agendas are recognized. Kingdon distinguishes between governmental and decision agenda, where the first mentioned refers to subjects getting attention and

the second relates to subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision. (Kingdon 2014) Additionally, Princen identifies also public agenda (issues which are important in public opinion), and media agenda (issues which receive a lot of attention in the media). (Princen 2013) Within the main agendas, various sub-agendas at distinct levels can be distinguished. These agendas may partly overlap, be hierarchically ordered or be run by their own internal dynamics. (Princen 2013) If we look at the Arctic Council, its overall agenda is formed by sub-agendas of individual WGs, which may differ due to their primary orientation.

The agenda is not a fixed set of issues. According to Kingdon´s definition, issues are on the agenda if they receive serious attention from officials. However, Princen argues that there is no clear dividing line between issues being ´on´ and ´off´ the agenda and even if issues reached the agenda, the amount of attention they get may differ. (Princen 2013, p.193) Kingdon presents two categories of factors, which may potentially influence the agenda-setting: the active participants and processes. The term participants can be interpreted as policy entrepreneurs, characterized as actors willing to "(…) invest their resources - time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money - in the hope of a future return." (Kingdon 2014, p.122) These actors can be divided into actors inside (president, bureaucrats, executive branch) and outside (media, interest groups, political parties, public, academics) of the government, who may be the sources of agenda or may cause that some issues will rise or decline on the agenda. (Kingdon 2014)

In case of the Arctic Council, the inside actors refer to Arctic States who are members of the Arctic Council and hold the privileged decision-making powers. (Arctic Council 1996) On the other hand, the outside actors who are also present in the Arctic high-level intergovernmental forum, include PPs and Observers. (Arctic Council 2017a)

Secondly, Kingdon divides the processes which help to set up the agenda into three streams: problem stream, generation of policy proposals, and political events. Problems may set the agenda as response to crisis, prominent event or a change in a widely-respected indicator. The term focusing events refer to events which do not bring new topics to the agenda, but reinforce the issues which are already on the table, but did not receive enough attention. (Princen 2009; Kingdon 2014) In case of policies, their contribution to agendas lies in the continuous knowledge and perspective accumulation among the specialists in each area, who may also generate policy proposals. Apart of science and knowledge, a persistent discussions, speeches, hearings, and legislative introductions may also shape the agenda. The origins of policy proposals evolve in the process of recombination of the previous aspects, rather than introducing unfamiliar issues. As Kingdon says: "(…) there is no new thing under the sun".

(Kingdon 2014, p.124) Lastly, the political processes which to great extent impact the agenda include swings in national mood, public opinion inconsistency, election results, and changes of administration. Each of these factors may either stimulate the agenda through promoting issues on higher agenda levels, or on the other hand through prevention of issues rising may restrict the agenda character. (Kingdon 2014)

Aside from participants and processes, which have an impact on placement of the issues on the agenda, the rise and fall of issues on the agenda may be driven by two factors: issue framing and institutional venues. The first element, is by Princen defined as: "the process of defining an issue, and the problem underlying it, in more certain terms". (Princen 2013, p.194) The importance of the framing lies in the fact that issues may be looked at in several perspectives, thus framing may highlight some characteristics and disregard the others, even if all the aspects are relevant. Framing is acknowledged as a natural process, because for people it is difficult to consider all sides of an issue at the same time. (Princen 2009)

Framing of the issue is directly related with the characteristics of the institutional environment. Some institutional frameworks are more favourable to certain interests than others. Thus, the rise of issues on the agenda is determined also by the availability of institutionally favourable conditions within the political system. Framing and institutional venues are inherently associated, as the venues by themselves create borderlines which determines the framing opportunities. Certain venues are set up to be more open and favour particular participants and standpoints. Princen summarizes three venues´ characteristics influencing successful framing: (1) institutional task, where the framing of issue should be in accordance with the institution´s sphere of activity; (2) institutional authority, where one must take into consideration if the issue corresponds with institutional agenda and jurisdiction; (3) institutional composition, as it is easier to frame an issue for people who understand the topic and, essentially, care about it. (Princen 2009, p.35)

To conclude, the interplay between framing and venues determines the agenda-setting, because the way in which the issue is framed decides which venue will pick it up. The issue may rise at the agenda, if its frame is contested or it there are attempts to move policy making from one venue to another. (Princen 2013)

The agenda-setting theory will be used to analyse the development of the Arctic Council´s agenda, with a focus on TLK. Furthermore, the framing and institutional venues frameworks, will be used to explain the themes of communication used for TLK in the Arctic Council, and in the national Arctic strategies.

5.4 Other relevant theories and approaches

One of the firstly examined theories for this thesis has been the theory of formal leadership, introduced by Tallberg. (2010) This theory is applicable for international organizations or conferences, in which the formal leader fulfils the functions of agenda manager, broker, and representation. (Tallberg 2010) Furthermore, Tallberg (2010) argues that rotatory Chairmanship possesses higher capability of shaping the distributional outcome, as it represents the opportunity for pushing national interests and generated partnership dynamics, which are not present in case of supranational chairs, or elected chairs. (Tallberg 2010) It is argued that the theory of formal leadership is relevant to study the Chairmanships in the Arctic Council, as they fulfil the main functions presented by Tallberg (2010) and significantly influence the negotiations and outcomes of the Arctic Council. On the other hand, to obtain proper data about the Chairmanship´s performance in the office, one should have access to primary documents or interviews/participant observations, not only because the Arctic Council is still not fully transparent, but also due to fact that inner perspective may reveal personal´s reflections upon the Chairmanship´s use of privileged power resources. In that case, one could in detail analyse how has TLK developed on the Council´s agenda, and to what extent was the role of the Chairmanship critical. However, due to the lack of relevant and first-hand data, this theory has not been applied in this thesis. Berger (2015) represents an example of the thesis in which the agenda of the Arctic Council has been studied by applying the theory of formal leadership on Canadian and Norwegian chairmanship. (Berger 2015)

Secondly, to explain why have some states decided to include TLK (and in which area) in their Arctic strategies and during the Chairmanships, the rational choice institutionalism approach could be applied. In its nature, this approach enables interpretation of individuals´ behaviour and prediction of future events on a basic assumption that individuals are goal-seeking and utility-maximizing oriented. Under the guide of the logic of consequentiality, individuals tend to choose the most likely course, with the lowest costs, to accomplish their goals. (Pollack 2006, p.32) Even though this approach has been predominantly used in relation to the EU, I argue that rational choice institutionalism could explain the inclusion/exclusion of TLK from national Arctic strategies, and Chairmanship´s behaviour, by using the assumptions that States will promote the priorities, which combine the lowest cost with the highest profit. In such, TLK could be excluded e.g. from Icelandic priorities, as it does not have any Indigenous population and thus finding an expert could be costly. However, since the objective of this thesis is to find in which areas is TLK communicated the most, it is not relevant to focus on justifications for including or excluding of TLK from the agenda.

Lastly, the post-imperial sovereignty games theoretical framework could have been applied to study how is TLK used by Indigenous Peoples. Adler-Nissen & Gad (2014) argue that sovereignty can be played strategically. They define a sovereignty game as involving two or more players, who make claims about authority and responsibility, with a reference to a concept of sovereignty, not only in territorial meaning, but also functional. (Adler-Nissen & Gad 2014, p.19) Despite its applicability on the triangular relations between the small Nordic countries, their metropoles and the EU, this theoretical framework could be used for studying relations and behaviour between Indigenous Peoples, their home states, and the Arctic Council.

5.5 Hypotheses:

The hypotheses presented in this section are based on the theories introduced in the previous chapter. Thus, the first hypothesis reflects the realist characteristics and is aimed at the analysis of the national Arctic strategies of the Arctic States. The second hypothesis refers to liberal nature of national strategies as a precondition to TLK recognition in the Arctic Council. Lastly, the third hypothesis demonstrates the agenda-setting theory and applies to the Arctic Council´s agenda development.

Hypothesis 1: The concept of TLK is excluded from the Arctic States´ national strategies for High North policies because it does not correspond with states´ ultimate interest – to survive.

Hypothesis 2: Arctic States with liberal national strategies towards High North policies have higher tendency to support TLK in the Arctic Council.

Hypothesis 3: TLK is on the Arctic Council´s agenda communicated in the same areas as in the Arctic States´ national Arctic strategies.

These hypotheses will be tested in the following chapters. The results will be presented and illustrated in the eighth chapter.

6   Arctic States´ national strategies

This chapter presents the analysis of the Arctic States national Arctic strategies. The objective of this part of the analysis is to identify the realist or liberal character of the Arctic strategies and to examine if, and in which areas, is TLK communicated in these documents. To decide upon the realist or liberal character of the national strategy, the strategy will be analysed and the decision will be based on the prevailing characteristics of one of the theories.

6.1   Danish national Arctic strategy 2011-2020

Within its priority of peaceful and safe Arctic, the Danish national Arctic strategy emphasizes future cooperation as established by international law, the maritime safety, and sovereignty enforcement. Its objectives to ensure national security apply predominantly to anticipated increased traffic in the Arctic region, and civilian matters: "(…) the armed forces play an important role in the provision of a range of more civilian-related duties." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.20) However, the objective of sovereignty enhancement includes the visibility and presence of the Kingdom´s armed forces around Greenland and Faroe Islands, "(…) with regard to the enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.21) According to the realist view, the state´s survival in an anarchic system of international relations is conditioned by military or strategical power. In case of the Kingdom´s Arctic strategy, the military power refers to enhanced armed forces visibility and surveillance activities. The strategical power is reflected by its objective to continue international cooperation in the region.

An aspiration to develop international cooperation is present in the whole strategy and with focus on: "(…) maintaining the Arctic as a region characterised by peace and cooperation." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.13) Within the regional cooperation, the Strategy promotes its relations with the Arctic Council, the EU, the Arctic 5[5], and the Nordic Council of Ministers. As the global partners the Strategy recognizes WTO, IMO, UNEP, NATO; and lastly the Kingdom´s bilateral cooperation includes Arctic states and northeast Asian countries. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) However, to achieve its national interests, the Kingdom is further open to cooperation with new partners, stating that, "To optimise the safeguarding of interests, the Kingdom will upgrade bilateral cooperation and dialogue regarding the Arctic, both with established and new partners." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.49)

The Strategy recognizes the following primary areas of cooperation: climate change, environmental protection, global maritime rules, Indigenous Peoples´ rights, world trade, research and education, health, social sustainability, renewable energy, cooperation in conflict resolution and in the Arctic development, search and rescue, sea shelf claims, maritime safety, and surveillance. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011) As presented, the Strategy promotes cooperation for security, modernization and development purpose, and is open to expand the number of partners to accomplish national interests. According to the liberal theory, this state´s behaviour can be explained in line with the

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[5] Arctic five is a common name for Arctic coastal states (Canada, the U.S., Denmark, Russia and Norway)

premise that the costs of not being included in cooperation, can be higher than the ones of being a member. Therefore, the Strategy promotes cooperation in all its priority areas, including security and surveillance, which are traditionally under the state´s control. Cooperation with non-state actors on low and high politics and through multiple channels together with maximizing state´s interest are characteristics of neoliberal institutionalism.

The concept of TLK in the Strategy has been related with (1) sustainable use and management of living resources, where "Management must be based on scientific advice that is founded on the collection, processing and analysis of data, including from hunters and industry, (…)" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.32), (2) increasing the knowledge base of climate change and its impacts, which "(…) include monitoring and research activities with the involvement of Greenland, Faroese and Danish research centres, (…) as well as incorporating local and traditional knowledge." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.44), (3) enhancing the scientific knowledge, including to "Work continuously to ensure regular scientifically based monitoring of living resources in the Arctic with the involvement of its citizens." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.32), and (4) strengthening the armed forces. Regarding the enhancement of the armed force, the Strategy aspires to include Greenlanders in the armed forces´ tasks and trainings, as "the armed forces will thereby also greatly benefit from Greenland local knowledge." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.21) In this regard, local knowledge has been recognized as beneficial for security purposes. However, as Bailes and Heininen (2012) acknowledge, the Strategy focuses on re-establishing Danish-Greenlandic relations after founding a self-government in 2009. As defence and security policy remained under Danish jurisdiction, inclusion of Greenlandic local knowledge into the Kingdom´s armed force may be explained as an action to satisfy Greenlandic representatives.

As outlined above, the Kingdom´s Arctic strategy reflects realist (enhancement of sovereignty and visibility of armed forces) and liberal characteristics (international cooperation in several high and low politics). However, I argue that the Strategy may be perceived as liberal in its nature, as the liberal characteristics prevail over the realist. Moreover, within its priority of peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic, the Strategy combines liberal and realist features, which diminishes otherwise the realist character of this Strategy´s objective. Thus, the first hypothesis is inapplicable. According to my second hypothesis, the liberal character of this national strategy increases the State´s tendency to support TLK in the Arctic Council. This hypothesis will be examined in the next chapter. Moreover, the Strategy has recognized the use of TLK in areas of security, sustainable development, climate change, and

cooperation with the scientific knowledge, which is on the base of my third hypothesis. These findings will also be further tested in the next chapter.

6.2   Sweden´s strategy for the Arctic region

The Swedish Strategy highly accentuates multilateral cooperation as a tool to achieve security and peace in the region: "The area is characterised by high level of cooperation and a low level of conflict. Overlapping claims must be dealt with according to international law." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.37) The Strategy emphasises cooperation and respect of law rather than development of military instruments. That is further confirmed by the Swedish priority to preserve the Arctic as an area with low security tensions and promotion of security reached by using civil instruments instead of military means. (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.4) The Swedish preference of collective security is explained by the present system of interdependency in Europe, where changes in one state´s policy have consequences for other states: "(…) Sweden´s security policy position based on ´security in cooperation´ means that the security policies of the EU Member States and Nordic countries will strongly influence Swedish security policy." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.14)

Besides cooperation in security issues, the Strategy promotes strengthening of relations with other partners, i.e. the Arctic Council, the EU, the UN, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Sámi Council. (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b) International cooperation has been encouraged in areas of climate change adaptation strategies, knowledge-building, environmental protection, research, transportation, shipping, search and rescue, tourism, education and trade: "The free movement of future traffic in the Arctic can contribute significantly to economic development and make people realise that free trade, coupled with respect for the rights of Indigenous Peoples, promotes peace and prosperity." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.31)

The Swedish Arctic priorities can be best understood in line with the liberal theory. First, according to liberals, collective security can serve as a tool to prevent wars and establish peace. Sweden complies with this premise by promoting ´security in cooperation´ and compliance with international laws as a response to growing system of interdependence across the world. A second doctrine of liberalism suggests that states tend to build cooperation in one sector and later extend the range of cooperation to attract more members. Regarding Sweden, its ambition to establish free movement in the Arctic, further leads to economic grow, prosperity and peace, which may be appealing concepts for other

states. Free trade, and promotion of democratic rights (in this case also the respect towards Indigenous Peoples´ rights) represent core ideas of liberalism.

TLK has been included in the Strategy in relation with Sámi people and the knowledge-building process. As Sámi people have been recognized as a link between Sweden and the Arctic, the Strategy presents the respect for Sámi culture, which includes also TK: "Historically, [the culture] is based on self-sufficiency, unwritten tradition, knowledge of the surrounding natural and meteorological conditions." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.46) Secondly, its benefits for enhancing science has been recognized and promoted through research programs oriented on knowledge transfer: "Knowledge transfer between, for example, researchers and Indigenous Peoples must be improved and structured so that knowledge is available to the Sámi and other populations in the Arctic." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011b, p.47)

To conclude, the Swedish Arctic strategy demonstrates several characteristics of liberal approach, like cooperation in a wide range of areas, recognition that peace and stability can be achieved by civilian means instead of military, promoting free movement and respect for Indigenous Peoples´ rights. Therefore, the first hypothesis is inapplicable and the second hypothesis will be further tested. TLK has been presented as a part of Sámi culture and in line with science and education. According to my third hypothesis, Sweden may promote TLK in the same areas also on the Arctic Council agenda.

6.3   Statement on Canada´s Arctic foreign policy

The perception of the Arctic as a fundamental element of Canadian national identity and, "(…) home to many Canadians, including Indigenous Peoples," is presented at the beginning of the Statement. (Government of Canada 2010, p.2) Thus, one would assume that the human dimension will dominate the Statement. However, the opposite is true and the human dimension and Indigenous Peoples are only superficially included as a sub-priority within ´Improving and devolving governance´. (Government of Canada 2010, p.21)

As a number one priority the Statement recognizes "Exercising sovereignty over Canada´s North, as over the rest of Canada," (Government of Canada 2010, p.2) To exercise its sovereignty in the Arctic, Canada aims to increase its presence in the Arctic, invest in new patrol ships, establish a new Arctic Training Centre, launch a polar icebreaker, which will be "the largest and most powerful icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet," and expand the capabilities of Canadian Rangers, including people from Indigenous communities, who can provide "eyes and years in remote parts of Canada."

(Government of Canada 2010, p.5-6) These measurements securing sovereignty can be interpreted in line with realism as primary determinants of survival, particularly security maximizing actions.

According to Bailes and Heininen (2012) the Canadian Arctic strategy represents a response to current significant and far-reaching challenges present in the Arctic. (Bailes & Heininen 2012) This statement corresponds to the realism understanding of the world as ruled by anarchy, where each player recognizes itself as the highest authority. Canada is not an exception, as the Statement claims that "Given our extensive Arctic coastline, our Northern energy and natural resource potential, and the 40 percent of our land mass situated in the North, Canada is an Arctic power." (Government of Canada 2010, p.3)

In case of international cooperation, Canada recognizes the need to establish bilateral, regional, and multilateral relations. The U.S. is presented as the Canadian premier Arctic partner, followed by other Arctic States. As an example of regional cooperation, the Canadian engagement in the Arctic Council is emphasized, and lastly, the cooperation with International Maritime Organization and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is presented as multilateral cooperation. According to the Statement, the principal areas of international cooperation are "(…) trade and transportation, environmental protection, natural resource development, the role of Indigenous Peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation and scientific cooperation." (Government of Canada 2010, p.23) Subsequently, within its international cooperation Canada focuses on issues related with environment, and economic/social development, instead of security purposes. This follows the neoliberal institutionalism assumptions that even though states are key actors in international relations, they seek to maximize their interests through cooperation.

In the Statement, TLK has been presented as complementing scientific knowledge. In regard with the domestic economic and sustainable resource development the Statement suggests "(…) developing regulations, guidelines and standards that are informed by Arctic science and research, including traditional knowledge." (Government of Canada 2010, p.11) Moreover, the compatibility and enhancement of these knowledge sources has been promoted also in environmental monitoring, where "The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of Indigenous knowledge and the need to use it in tandem with Western science in our efforts to better understand polar bears and their habitat." (Government of Canada 2010, p.17) The direct involvement of TLK reflects the Canadian respect towards Indigenous Peoples, as affirmed in the Statement: ""(…) Northern economic and social development includes a deep respect for Indigenous traditional knowledge, work and cultural activities." (Government of Canada 2010, p.15) By recognizing the value of TK and its potential to

enrich scientific research, the Canadian government entitles Indigenous Peoples to contribute to Arctic knowledge-building.

Based on the outlined information, the Canadian Arctic strategy reflects realist and liberal features. However, I argue that the realist nature is prevalent. This conclusion has been made due to Statement´s orientation on enhancing the military power to secure its survival in the present challenging nature of international relations and exclusion of security issues from the scope of international cooperation. Nevertheless, the Statements does not confirm the first hypothesis, mainly because, despite its realist nature, it has included TLK, even in the security area. Due to the realist character of its Statement, the second hypothesis is inapplicable. TLK has been in the Statement communicated within the security, sustainable development, and science areas. The third hypothesis will be further tested to examine if Canada will promote the use of TLK in the same areas also in the Arctic Council.

6.4   The United States Arctic Strategy

The U.S.´ Arctic strategy has been published by the Department of Defence in 2016 and updates the previous Strategy released in 2013. The Strategy refines its priorities for the Arctic as: "a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges." (Department of Defense 2016, p.2)

The strategical, defensive and even military character of the new U.S. Arctic strategy has been welcomed by Senator Dan Sullivan: "I am pleased that we finally have a much more serious military strategy for the Arctic region." (The Maritime Executive 2017)

The fact that the Strategy is released by the Department of Defence only underlines its defensive character. Mr. Sullivan´s reference to the Strategy as ´military´, is further confirmed by its military objectives in the Arctic: "It is also in DoD´s interest to shape military activity in the Arctic region to avoid conflict while improving its capability to operate safely and sustain forces in a harsh, remote environment (…)." (Department of Defense 2016, p.3) Additionally, the importance of safeguarding the U.S. national interests in the Arctic is included as an objective of the Strategy, where the "DoD´s strategic approach is guided by its main objectives of ensuring security, supporting safety, and promoting defence cooperation as it prepares to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies in the Arctic in the years to come." (Department of Defense 2016, p.3) The Strategy promotes cooperation with its partners, predominantly Canada, Sweden, Finland, and NATO.

(Department of Defense 2016, p.6, p.10) In addition, the U.S. promotes cooperation with "(…) militaries, interagency partners, and other stakeholders in the Arctic," as this leads to a stable Arctic region, in which the U.S. national interests are safeguarded. (Department of Defense 2016, p.14) The U.S. further supports bilateral and multilateral trainings, exercises, and military-to-military engagements, which according to the Strategy "(..) help establish, shape, and maintain international relations among like-minded nations preparing to work together to meet security challenges." (Department of Defense 2016, p.10)

The previously presented U.S. Arctic strategy reflects several characteristics which suggest a realist character. Firstly, the Strategy emphasises safeguarding of national interests as its top priority, which is in line with one of the core elements of realism – survival. To maintain the state´s own existence, military and strategical power resources may be enforced. In case of the U.S. Strategy, military actions have been presented by ´shaping military actions´ as a conflict prevention. On the other hand, the strategical power may be understood as the U.S. objective to develop collaboration with its like-minded allies, as presented through trainings and other military-to-military activities. Secondly, the U.S. security and defence collaboration reflects the concept of power balance, in which the U.S. aspires to prevent any state to dominate it. By achieving power equilibrium, the U.S. aims to maximize its security, which corresponds to Waltz´s assumptions about defensive realism.

Since the Strategy does not include any reference towards TLK, it confirms the first hypothesis, that the realist Arctic strategies focus predominantly on securing the State´s survival and tend to exclude TLK. The second hypothesis is inapplicable in this case, due to realist character of the Strategy. This finding further determines testing of the third hypothesis regarding the TLK support in the Arctic Council, which will be included in the next chapter.

6.5   The Iceland´s Arctic Policy

In case of the Icelandic Arctic policy, Bailes and Heininen (2012) point out the fact, that the Icelandic Arctic document left out the concept of sovereignty. They argue for sovereignty to be included on the Icelandic agenda in general, but mostly in relations with the EU´s financial and fishery disputes. In addition, Iceland does not declare any territorial claims, which confirms the argument for excluding sovereignty from the Icelandic Arctic strategy. (Bailes & Heininen 2012, p.76)

Even though the Iceland´s Arctic document is lacking the concept of sovereignty, it expresses Icelandic frustration over not being included in the Arctic five conference in Ilulissat (2008) and Chelsea (2010).

Moreover, Iceland anticipates consequences for future Arctic cooperation, if similar exclusive meetings will continue: "If consultation by the five States develops into a formal platform for regional issues, it can be asserted that solidarity between the eight Arctic States will be dissolved and the Arctic Council considerably weakened." (Althingi 2011) Iceland perceived the Arctic five meeting as a threat to its national interests and called for future avoidance: "(…) individual Member States must be prevented from joining forces to exclude other Member States from important decisions, which would undermine the Arctic Council and other Arctic State, including Iceland. "(Althingi 2011)

The Icelandic orientation on civilian instead of military means to achieve security is also emphasized in the document: "Safeguarding broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through civilian means and working against any kind of militarisation of the Arctic." (Althingi 2011) As Bailes and Heininen (2012) argue, the lack of Icelandic armed force makes it dependent on others´ good behaviour, which explains the emphasis on non-militarisation of the Arctic. (Bailes & Heininen 2012, pp.76–77) Considering also the Icelandic preference to enhance cooperation on common security interests, including surveillance and response to danger, the Icelandic Arctic policy is oriented on developing cooperation instead of expanding its own security methods.

Moreover, cooperation within the Arctic Council has been presented as the main priority for the Icelandic Arctic policy, by "Promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum on Arctic issues and working towards having international decision on Arctic issues made there." (Althingi 2011) Besides this, sectoral cooperation has been promoted with Greenland and Faroe Islands regarding trade, energy, resource utilization, environmental issues and tourism; defence cooperation with the Unites States; and defence and security cooperation with Norway, Denmark and Canada. The cooperation with Russian and the EU has been also promoted through the EU´s Northern dimension.

The above presented arguments lead to a conclusion that the Icelandic Arctic policy focuses on developing and enhancing cooperation rather than prioritising military and power related forms of securing national interests. These findings correspond with a liberal approach of safeguarding collective security and peace by establishing international organizations. Iceland attempts to strengthen the Arctic Council as an institution primarily oriented on environmental issues and sustainable development, but at the same time enhancing cooperation with other Arctic States in security and defence matters. There is also an emphasis in the fact that Iceland does not want to be left out of any negotiations which could pose a threat to its national interests, and actively comes with

proposals and arguments why it should be a relevant partner in discussion, which allows to conclude that the Icelandic Arctic policy prefers to achieve its priorities in line with liberal approach.

Due to the liberal nature of the Icelandic Arctic strategy, the first hypothesis is inapplicable. Thus, in line with the second hypothesis, Iceland is expected to support TLK on the Arctic Council´s agenda, even though this concept has been excluded from its national strategy. In this regard, the third hypothesis will be likewise tested to reveal if and in which areas is Iceland promoting TLK in the Arctic Council.

6.6   Russian Federation´s Policy for the Arctic to 2020

One of Russian´s national priorities in the Arctic is to maintain the Arctic as a "zone of peace and cooperation" (President of the Russian Federation 2009, p.2) However, in the sphere of military security, defence, and borders protection, the Strategy emphasizes the "(…) maintenance of favourable operative regime in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintenance of a necessary fighting potential of groupings of general purpose armies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military formations and organs in this region," (President of the Russian Federation 2009, p.2) and recognizes as necessary for the Russian Federation to be "(…) capable to provide military security under various conditions of a military-political situation," (President of the Russian Federation 2009, p.4) The Strategy strongly accentuates the military power as a tool for achieving national security "(…) to create a complex safety system for protection of the territories, population and objects of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation which are crucial for the national security of the Russian Federation from threats of extreme situations of a natural and technogenic character." (President of the Russian Federation 2009, p.3) As stated above, the Strategy promotes power as a tool to maintain the state´s survival in anarchical international politics. The emphasis has been placed on defensive measurements, like protection of borders, territories, and people, which corresponds with the security maximizing objective of defence realism.

The Strategy, regarding international cooperation, promotes bilateral and multilateral cooperation with sub-Arctic states. (President of the Russian Federation 2009, p.2) This cooperation also includes the Arctic Council and the Barents/EuroArctic region Council. Cooperation with its partners has been recognized in the areas of science, technology, cultural interaction, resource management, and environmental preservation. (President of the Russian Federation 2009) Thus, the Strategy enhances cooperation only in areas of low politics, and in case of achieving national security it relies on its own power resources, which is in line with the self-help principle of realism.

By not referring towards TLK in its national Arctic strategy, the Russian federation confirms the first hypothesis about exclusion of TLK from realist national strategies, and prevents the applicability of the second hypothesis. Further, the third hypothesis will be still tested to find out if this fact prevents Russia from supporting TLK in the Arctic Council´s agenda.

6.7   Finland´s Strategy for the Arctic Region

Finland´s Strategy promotes a comprehensive concept of security, which means "(…) a high level of overall preparedness to be achieved through close collaboration between the authorities, industry and NGOs as well as through international cooperation." (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.14) A military conflict is not anticipated by Finland, as it refers to the agreement among the Arctic States to solve any disputes "(…) peacefully and in accordance with international law." (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.40) The importance of stability and security is further perceived as a prerequisite for economic growth and improvement of welfare of local populations. (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.40) Even though the international law and cooperation are promoted, references towards Finland´s defence preparedness and "(…) excellent capabilities," to operate in the Arctic environment have not been omitted. (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.40)

Regardless of the cooperation within security and stability, one of Finland´s key objectives is to "(…) bolster its position as an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arctic cooperation. "(Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.43) The Strategy emphasizes Finland´s tradition of Arctic cooperation by stating the international organizations and networks in which Finland is involved, together with its leading role at the beginning of international environmental cooperation, which later evolved into the Arctic Council. Building upon its past activities, Finland´s aim is to "continue to pursue a proactive and responsible role in the context of international cooperation in the Arctic." (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.8) From its perspective, the international, national, and regional cooperation should be enhanced. An example of such enhanced international cooperation would be to reconsider the status of the Arctic Council and transform it into an international treaty-based organization and to expand its scope of activities. (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.44) The significance of the rule of law is present in all aspects of the Strategy and represents the pillar for Finland´s actions and thinking. That is further reflected in the Strategy´s call for increased use of international law as a response to growing interest in the Arctic region and mutual dependency among the states.

Finland´s Arctic strategy resembles the liberal characteristics, as it focuses on multiple areas of cooperation as a tool to prevent conflicts. The fact that the Strategy does not refer to any military

actions and ambitions, except on one sentence commenting on Finland´s preparedness, and promoting instead international cooperation and compliance with the international law, proves the liberal nature of the Strategy. Moreover, the Strategy recognizes the growing interest in the Arctic region and calls for further appliance of international law and expanding of cooperation. From a liberal perspective, Finland recognizes the growing competition in the Arctic and seeks to maximize its gains through cooperation, rather than individual activities. This behaviour is characterized as mutually beneficial, as it allows Finland to secure its international interests e.g. economic and business development, and on the other hand sharing its Arctic expertise and know-how with its international partners.

TLK has in the Strategy been included in relation to biodiversity conservation: "Closely linked to biodiversity is the preservation of the traditional knowledge possessed by the Indigenous Peoples." (Prime Minister´s Office 2013, p.14) In this case, TLK is referred to being a part of Indigenous Peoples´ heritage which must be conserved in the era of globalization and protected from the impacts of climate change.

Assuming the liberal character of Finland´s Arctic strategy, the first hypothesis is inapplicable, and thus the second hypothesis will be further tested in the next chapter. The third hypothesis will be tested as well, to reveal if Finland supports TLK use in the same areas as it stated in its national Arctic strategy.

6.8   Norway´s Arctic Policy

Norway´s Strategy defines the Arctic as "(…) Norway´s most important foreign policy priority." (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.3) Building upon this statement, Norway recognizes international cooperation and compliance with the international law as tools to achieve stability and development in the Arctic. The respect for international law and cooperation has been particularly accentuated regarding Russia´s military activities in Ukraine in 2014: "(…) we are standing firm in defence of international law and international rules in the face of Russia´s conduct in Ukraine." (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.11) Even though the Strategy clearly opposes to Russia´s activities in Ukraine and regards them as contravening international law, the cooperation between Norway and Russia has been promoted in areas where these two Arctic actors have common interests. The Strategy later priorities the enhancement of Artic diplomacy and close cooperation with the U.S. on Arctic issues, and with Nordic countries on business cooperation. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.18) Norway´s choice of international partners can be explained by neoliberalism, where the concept of collective security is recognized as a prerequisite for peace,

stability and development. Norway´s ambition to achieve collective security is reflected by its statement: "It is in everyone´s interest that the Arctic remains a peaceful and stable region." (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.9) Furthermore, according to neoliberalism, the state´s national interests regarding foreign policy may be superior to moral values and universal ideas. Therefore, this statement explains Norway´s choice of Russia as international partner, as Norway´s economic interests took precedence over ethical values.

Norway´s strategy highlights cooperation in health, transport, business development, research and knowledge-building, environmental and cultural issues, and in case of Russia, also in border cooperation. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.11) The choice of areas of cooperation resembles the liberal approach, as Norway´s priority of international cooperation includes areas of modernization, common problems, and to some extent also national security, as border control represents states´ instrument to control peoples´ flow. Furthermore, according to liberalism, a successful cooperation in one area leads to extending the range of collaboration, as it is also stated in Norway´s strategy: "Contact and cooperation across national borders strengthens business activity, enhances knowledge and provides a basis for a forward-looking and sustainable society." (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.16) Here it is argued that international cooperation enhances knowledge development and business, which further leads to a sustainable society. Therefore, the costs of not being a member of cooperation are higher, as the areas of cooperation overlap or naturally expand.

To reach its objective of being "(…) a leader in knowledge about the north, for the north and in the north," Norway intends among others, to "(…) document and disseminate traditional Sami knowledge, "via Sami University College´s multi-year project. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, p.26, p.30) As this represents the only reference towards TLK, it allows testing the third hypothesis to examine if Norway promotes TLK in the same area also in the Arctic Council´s agenda. As the second hypothesis states, the liberal character of the Norwegian Arctic strategy suggests its tendency to support TLK recognition in the Arctic Council, which will be further tested in the next chapter, while the first hypothesis has been regarded inapplicable.

The first part of the analysis has presented the Arctic States´ national Arctic strategies and thier characterization as liberal or realist. In this regard, the Canadian, the U.S. and the Russian Arctic strategies were recognized as realist, and the Danish, the Swedish, the Icelandic, the Finnish, and the Norwegian strategies were characterized as liberal. These findings provide the knowledge necessary for the second part of the analysis, where the second and third hypotheses will be additionally tested.

7 The Arctic Council´s agenda

By analysing the Arctic Council´s documents (Chairmanship priorities, SAO reports and declarations) this chapter aims to provide an answer on how is TLK communicated on the Arctic Council´s agenda. Moreover, this chapter tests the second hypothesis regarding the tendency of states with liberal Arctic strategies to support TLK in the Arctic Council, and the third hypothesis concerning the areas of TLK support.

7.1 The Ottawa declaration 1996

As the first declaration establishing the Arctic Council, the Ottawa declaration mentions TLK as "Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic." (Arctic Council 1996) Therefore, TK has been officially a part of the Arctic Council´s agenda since its establishment, and regarded as an important contribution to collective understanding of the Arctic. Keeping in mind Kingdon´s differentiation between governmental and decision agenda, TK has in this case been placed on the governmental agenda, as it has not been a subject of decision-making.

7.2 The SAO report and Iqaluit declaration 1998

Due to the lack of data about the first Canadian chairmanship 1996-1998, this period is only represented by the SAO report and Iqaluit declaration adopted at the end of the Canadian chairmanship.

Subsequently, TLK has in the SAO report been referred stating that: "The SAOs further recommend that this Sustainable Development Working Group take special note of proposals which reflect the importance of traditional and Indigenous knowledge and the perspectives of Indigenous communities in developing a sustainable future for the Arctic." (Arctic Council 1998a, p.5) The same reference towards the use of TLK in SDWG's agenda has been made by the Iqaluit declaration. (Arctic Council 1998b, p.2)

Thus, as TLK has already been placed on the governmental agenda of the Arctic Council, the SAO report and the Iqaluit declaration represent a shift of the issue from the main agenda, to the sub-agenda, namely to the SDWG´s agenda. This working group has been newly established by the Iqaluit declaration and comprised of SAO and PPs. (Arctic Council 1998b, p.2) The placement of TLK on the

SDWG´s agenda may be understood in the light of Kingdon´s problem stream, particularly as the focusing event. The creation of SDWG reinforced TLK, as it had already been on the Arctic Council´s agenda, however had not received enough attention.

7.3   The U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 1998-2000

Nord (2016b) claims that the U.S. preserved its reluctant attitude towards the Council´s establishment, as it was obvious from its unpreparedness and approach to not "devote any considerable amount of energy or attention to the work of the body," during its first Chairmanship. (Nord 2016b, p.25)

Even though the U.S. chairmanship priorities have not included any reference towards TLK, the SAO report issued at the end of the Chairmanship acknowledges that during the U.S. chairmanship, SDWG´s projects regarding the Saami fisheries, "(…) have Indigenous knowledge at their core." (Arctic Council 2000b, p.8) Similarly, the Barrow declaration (2000) issued together with the SAO report, has not referred to TLK. These observations suggest that in period of 1998-2000, TLK has remained placed on SDWG´s agenda in relation with Saami fisheries. Since the Saami population does not reside in the U.S., the TLK involvement on the Council´s agenda at that time corresponds with its general objectives, and does not reflect any U.S. national priority in that area. This finding may be explained by the U.S. original opposition towards the Arctic Council, and reluctance to invest many resources to its first Chairmanship. However, since the first U.S. national Arctic strategy has been adopted in 2009, the second and third hypotheses are inapplicable to this Chairmanship. Nevertheless, the analysis of the first U.S. chairmanship still proved to be important in obtaining the answer on how was TLK communicated on the Council´s agenda. In this regard, the Council has confirmed a continuous placement of TLK on SDWG´s agenda in relation with the Sámi fishery project.

7.4   Finnish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2000-2002

The Finnish chairmanship priorities has recognized the relevance of TLK, as expressed by Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs: "All our activities must be based on appreciation of the link between the environment and the people, and of the knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples and other people living in the region." (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001, p.2) Thus, Finland aspired to include TLK on the agenda of the Arctic Council, however without any specifications in which WG´s agenda this concept should be used.

Based on the SAO report (2002), the Arctic Council under the Finnish chairmanship succeeded to fulfil Tuomioja´s wish to include TLK in its work. The project oriented on mapping and identifying the conservation value of sacred sites of Indigenous Peoples, included Indigenous representatives and inspired other areas in Northern Russia to conduct similar research. (Arctic Council 2002b, pp.16–17) Moreover, another project oriented on co-management of marine resources in the Arctic, included TLK while gathering information about marine resource management in Canada, Greenland, and Alaska and therefore promoted interaction between Indigenous Peoples from different regions. The above-mentioned information regarding the involvement of TLK in the Arctic Council´s project indicates a change at the agenda. During the Finnish chairmanship, TLK has expanded from SDWG´s agenda to CAFF´s agenda, regarding conservation of Indigenous Peoples´ places. However, TLK has remained placed also on SDWG's agenda in case of co-management of marine resources.

This change of placement of the issue at the agenda may be explained by Kingdon´s change in the administration, as the Finnish chairmanship took over from the U.S and since its beginning has recognized the importance of TLK. Therefore, during its Chairmanship, the Arctic Council conducted several projects where TLK was included directly or indirectly, and its contribution to another sphere of activities has been recognized. (Arctic Council 2002b)

Together with the SAO report (2002) at the end of the Finnish chairmanship, the Inari declaration (2002a) has been issued. In case of TLK, the declaration only confirmed the placement of the issue on SDWG´s agenda: "(…) approve as a priority project under Iceland´s lead, the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) to be developed into a comprehensive knowledge base for the Arctic Council´s Sustainable Development Programme and request that traditional knowledge be fully used in this report,". This has been simultaneously confirmed on CAFF´s agenda: "(…) recognize that enhanced monitoring of biodiversity at the circumpolar level, fully utilizing traditional knowledge, is required to detect the impacts of global changes on biodiversity and to enable Arctic communities to effectively respond and adapt to these changes." (Arctic Council 2002a)

To summarize, under the Finnish chairmanship 2000-2002, TLK has continued to be placed on SDWG´s agenda and further included in new areas. Additionally, for the first time it has also been included in CAFF´s agenda in relation to environmental monitoring and sites´ conservation. Therefore, it is assumed that due to the change in the administration, TLK has received higher recognition. Since the first Finnish Arctic strategy has been adopted in 2010, the second hypothesis is inapplicable. However, Bailes & Heininen (2012) argue that, "Finland has also had some sort of ´de facto´ Arctic/Northern

policy since the beginning of the 1990s," (Bailes & Heininen 2012, p.64) This policy was based on support for international environmental cooperation, and resulted in establishing the Arctic Council and the EU´s Northern Dimension policy (Bailes & Heininen 2012) Assuming that these Finnish Arctic policy actions indicate liberal values, which were further emphasized in its 2010 national Arctic strategy, it is believed that Finland confirms the second hypothesis that, a state with liberal Arctic approach has significantly supported TLK on the Council´s agenda. Lastly, because Finland during its Arctic Council´s chairmanship has communicated TLK in relation to sustainable development and nature conservation, while in its national Arctic strategy TLK was included only in relation to biodiversity conservation, the third hypothesis is disproved.

7.5 Icelandic chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2002-2004

The Icelandic chairmanship priorities have included Indigenous Peoples, even though Iceland by itself is not home for any of them. In this regard, Iceland argued that "Icelanders, as a small independent nation reliant on the use of natural resources, understand the conditions and expectations of the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic." (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2002) The Chairmanship´s focus on the human dimension in the Arctic may be understood as a continuation of the previous Council´s agenda focused on completion of the AHDR. As acknowledged in the SAO report (2004a) issued after the Icelandic chairmanship, the AHDR has been completed, and the human dimension has been brought to the agenda of the Arctic Council, including also community viability, as one of the Icelandic chairmanship´s priorities. (Einarsson et al. 2004; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2002)

The importance of knowledge building has further been acknowledged as the Chairmanship priority to achieve sustainable development: "Research on sustainable development of the Arctic region must be based both on international science and on the experience of local communities." (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland 2002) The SAO report (2004a) has concluded that the Chairmanship considered it instrumental to increase "(…) involvement of science and education authorities, as well as Arctic residents, in such cooperation." (Arctic Council 2004a, p.9) Therefore, the priority to enhance cooperation between local communities and science has been accomplished during the Icelandic chairmanship.

At the end of the Icelandic chairmanship, the CAFF working group has acknowledged that the number of projects aimed at conservation of Arctic plants has incorporated TLK. (Arctic Council 2004a, p.20) This conclusion confirms the placement of TLK at CAFF´s agenda. Additionally, the continuation of the

use of TLK at SDWG´s agenda has also been recognized during the Icelandic chairmanship. (Arctic Council 2004a)

Similarly, like the whole Icelandic chairmanship, also the Reykjavík declaration (2004b) further acknowledged the use of TLK in circumpolar and international cooperation on sustainable development: "Welcome the continuing contribution of Indigenous and traditional knowledge to research in the Arctic." (Arctic Council 2004b) In addition it supported "the continued cooperation with Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, the use of their traditional knowledge of flora and fauna, and efforts toward community-based monitoring of the Arctic´s living resources." (Arctic Council 2004b)

Based on the above presented information, during the Icelandic chairmanship in 2002-2004, TLK has kept its placement on SDWG´s and CAFF´s agenda, and expanded its use to new areas, namely scientific cooperation under SDWG, and plants conservation under CAFF. There, it can be assumed that during the Icelandic chairmanship no agenda-setting factors regarding the TLK has been present in the Arctic Council. Despite of its liberal character, the Icelandic Arctic strategy cannot be applied for testing the second hypothesis, as it has been adopted after the Chairmanship. Since Iceland has supported the use of TLK on the Council´s agenda during its chairmanship, while on its national Arctic strategy issued in 2011 this concept has not been included, the third hypothesis is disproved. The absence of TLK from the national Arctic strategy may be explained by the lack of Indigenous population in Iceland. On the other hand, its orientation on TLK during its Chairmanship may be interpreted as an effort to be perceived as an Arctic state in all aspects and to secure its position as a team-player within the Arctic Council.

7.6   Russian Federation chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2004-2006

Even though, the Russian chairmanship priorities (2004) has not included TLK in any reference, the SAO report (2006a) issued at the end of the Chairmanship, noted its involvement in CAFF´s and SDWG´s agenda.

Within CAFF´s agenda, the Arctic Council has decided to develop the Biodiversity Assessment, which would include data and knowledge from many various sources, one of them being Indigenous Peoples, and to "(…) incorporate traditional knowledge to every extent possible to form a complete picture of the current state of Arctic biodiversity (…)." (Arctic Council 2006a, p.19) The SDWG has through its project, *EALAT: Reindeer herding, traditional knowledge and adaptation to climate change and loss of*

grazing land, supported "(…) the transfer of traditional knowledge to restore and develop reindeer husbandry and the traditional livelihoods related to it." (Arctic Council 2006a, p.32)

As previously stated by the Inari declaration (2002a), also the Salekhard declaration (2006b) promoted the use of TLK in relation to climate change: "Requests the SAOs and the Arctic Council working groups to continue supporting, analysing and synthesizing Arctic climate research, including the gathering and compilation of Indigenous and local knowledge of the effects of climate change (…)," (Arctic Council 2006, p.2) Additionally, the role of TLK in the Arctic flora and fauna conservation has been promoted: "Support the continued cooperation with Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, welcome the contribution of their traditional knowledge of flora and fauna to the scientific research, and encourage further cooperation in the development of community-based monitoring of the Arctic´s living resources," (Arctic Council 2006, p.7) Thus, TLK has been recognized as a part of CAFF´s and SDWG´s agenda, as previously acknowledged by the Inari and Reykjavik declarations, which also explains the welcoming approach of the Salekhard declaration towards "(…) continuing contribution of Indigenous and traditional knowledge to research and culture in the Arctic." (Arctic Council 2006, p.1)

However, the Salekhard declaration has been the first declaration of the Arctic Council which recognized the relevance of TLK for the purposes of the International Polar Year: "(…), the effective involvement of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in IPY activities and recognize that their traditional and Indigenous knowledge is an invaluable component of IPY research." (Arctic Council 2006, p.3) As the role of the IPY is to "stimulate cooperation and coordination of Arctic research and increase awareness of the importance of the Arctic region," it only takes patronage over Arctic research activities in 2007-2008 to bring global attention towards the Arctic. (Arctic Council 2006b, p.3) The involvement of TLK on the IPY agenda can be interpreted as a response to a prominent event, in this case the IPY, which has influenced the agenda setting in the Arctic Council. The role of the prominent even is not to bring a new issue on the agenda, but to reinforce the topics which are already on the table, but did not receive enough attention. As TLK has already been placed on CAFF and SDWG´s agenda, the IPY represents the prominent event aimed to bring the Arctic into focus, which may result in moving the issue up on the agenda.

During the Russian federation´s chairmanship, TLK has continued to be communicated in SDWG and CAFF context. Due to the IPY, considered as a prominent event, TLK and scientific cooperation has been promoted across the whole Arctic Council and is perceived as a cornerstone for future scientific and TLK cooperation. Referring to the hypotheses, the second hypothesis is inapplicable to this instance, since the first Russian Arctic strategy has been published in 2009 and has been characterized

as realist in nature. Additionally, the third hypothesis is disproved, as TLK has been further included in the Council´s agenda during the Russian chairmanship, but excluded from its Arctic strategy issued in 2009. This represents inconsistency in the use of TLK on domestic and Council´s agenda, which is in contradiction with the third hypothesis.

7.7   Norwegian chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2006-2008

During the Norwegian chairmanship, the added value of TLK to Arctic cooperation has been recognized: "(…) cooperation under the Arctic Council and integration of Indigenous Peoples´ knowledge into these efforts has yielded results far greater than could have been achieved by national efforts alone." (Arctic Council 2008, p.1) Its further utilization has been encouraged together with involvement into the future assessments and Council´s projects. (Arctic Council 2009a) These statements confirm the placement of TLK on the Arctic Council´s agenda, as previously observed.

As stated by the Norwegian chairmanship priorities and SAO report issued at the end of the Chairmanship, TLK has been encouraged to be used under the auspices of CAFF working group as a continuation of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring programme (Arctic Council 2009a), and in cooperation with scientific knowledge for sustainable natural resources utilization: "(…) any future exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic must be based on the best available scientific and traditional knowledge and thorough impact assessments (…)," (Arctic Council 2009a, p.5) Moreover, the Chairmanship promoted the continuation of the project EALAT oriented on knowledge gathering and "(…) transfer reindeer herders´ knowledge into action for adaptation to changing conditions and sustainable development of the Arctic." (Arctic Council 2009a, p.9) The continued use of TLK on SDWG´s and CAFF´s agenda has been further proved by the Tromsø declaration. (Arctic Council 2009b)

Due to the IPY, which took place simultaneously with the Norwegian chairmanship and its orientation on building up a coordinated Arctic research, the Tromsø declaration strengthened the cooperation between traditional and scientific knowledge in future assessments: "Encourage the exploration of ways to continue the innovative forms for IPY outreach and the presentation of outcomes of the IPY, including the use of scientific data and traditional knowledge in future assessments." (Arctic Council 2009b) Thus, the IPY as a prominent event has succeeded in putting the TLK on the agenda of the Arctic council in relation to scientific knowledge enhancement.

Under the Norwegian chairmanship, TLK remained to be communicated in the same areas as during previous Chairmanships, except for the newly established involvement of TLK into the area of

sustainable use of natural resources. Due to the legacy of the IPY, TLK and scientific knowledge cooperation has been promoted mostly during this Chairmanship. To test the second hypothesis, the 2006 Norway´s Arctic strategy would have to be analysed, as it preceded the Norwegian chairmanship in the Arctic Council. However, due to the 2006 Arctic strategy orientation on "environment, humans, foreign policy, business, knowledge and Indigenous Peoples," (Bailes & Heininen 2012, p.31), it is assumed that it indicates liberal values and under this condition, the second hypothesis would be confirmed. By analysing the data only from the 2014 Arctic strategy, the second hypothesis is inapplicable. In case of the third hypothesis, it has been proved that TLK has been supported in different areas at domestic and Council´s agenda, thus the third hypothesis is not confirmed. This fact may be explained by the Council´s focus on the issues related with environmental protection and sustainable development, as its main pillars. Thus, TLK was utilized more in the Arctic Council, due to better framing and institutional venue character of the Council as an institution oriented exclusively on sustainable development and environmental protection.

7.8   Danish chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2009-2011

During the Danish chairmanship, TLK has been presented as a valuable contribution to scientific research, due to its character, "Drawing on personal experience, information shared with others and knowledge handed down through generations enables residents of the Arctic to recognize local environmental changes. The interaction between traditional knowledge in the local communities and scientific research is therefore of great value." (Danish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2009, p.2) Further cooperation between scientific and TLK has also been recognized as relevant by the SAO report issued at the end of the Danish chairmanship: "The integration of local and traditional knowledge and collaboration that include Indigenous Peoples and Arctic communities as respected partners in research is a critical link to building knowledge and capacity at the community level." (Arctic Council 2011b, p.27) As specific examples of this cooperation, the document stated the continuing project EALAT regarding the reindeers´ TK and adaptation to climate change, and the Circumpolar Mining Guide for Indigenous Peoples and Northern Communities. (Arctic Council 2011b, p.27) Both projects have been developed under the auspices of SDWG.

During the Danish chairmanship, PAME has issued a questionnaire about offshore oil and gas extraction. Besides stakeholders and public consultations, this questionnaire also included TK, which affirms the solid involvement of Arctic residents and Indigenous Peoples into the Arctic Council´s

agenda and suggests the gradual expansion of the concept also on other WG´s agendas. (Arctic Council 2011b, p.24)

Even though the cooperation between traditional and scientific knowledge has been previously promoted by the Tromsø declaration, the Nuuk declaration further accentuated its relevance in relation to the University of Arctic´s patronage: "(…) recognize its contribution in developing specialized education aimed at building capacity and fostering traditional and scientific knowledge relevant to Indigenous Peoples, Arctic communities and policy-makers," (Arctic Council 2011a, p.5) Thus, the growing recognition of TLK has been observed at the Arctic Council´s agenda. In comparison to the Salekhard declaration, where TLK was recommended to be included in the IPY, and the Tromsø declaration, where the cooperation between scientific and TK has been recognized beneficial, now the Nuuk declaration has related TLK with the University of Arctic and its scientific and monitoring oriented education.

Even though the Danish Arctic strategy has been adopted at the end of its Council´s chairmanship, it is assumed that its structure and support for TLK has been already known during the Chairmanship, which confirms the second hypothesis. Furthermore, the third hypothesis has also been confirmed, as Denmark promoted the use of TLK in the same areas in its national Arctic strategy as during its Chairmanship. An exception may be the use of TLK for security reasons, as presented in the national Arctic strategy, and not including this aspect in the Council´s agenda. However, since the Council has explicitly excluded the issues of security from its agenda, it is not possible to promote TLK in this regard. Therefore, the third hypothesis is regarded as confirmed. Under the Danish chairmanship, the Arctic Council continued to communicate TLK in relation with SDWG and CAFF, and expanded its use in PAME. Additionally, TLK has been recognized as a valid source of information for scientific research and recently also for University of Arctic.

7.9   Sweden´s chairmanship programme for the Arctic Council 2011-2013

Following the concept of the two previous Chairmanships, the Swedish chairmanship priorities referred to TLK as a beneficial contribution to scientific knowledge and further to the decision-making process: "Strong support for research in this part of the world will give decision-makers data on which to base an effective response to challenges arising in a rapidly changing region. It is also important to take advantage of the knowledge that exists among the people living in the region." (Government Offices of Sweden 2011a, p.5) This confirms the successful placement of TLK on the agenda of the Arctic Council, as an enhancing contribution to scientific knowledge. This fact may be explained by the

role of a prominent event, in this case the IPY 2007-2008, which brought more attention to the issue and resulted in its grow on the agenda. However, as the IPY has ended, and TLK remained on the agenda as a supplementing factor to scientific knowledge, it is due to the issue framing that the two following Chairmanships continued to link the traditional and the scientific knowledge. As the TLK may be perceived from several perspectives, the IPY has accentuated its importance for scientific research, and therefore framed the issue to increase its position at the agenda. By highlighting some characteristics of the TK, like its personal character and handing over from one generation to another, its added value has been recognized and remained appreciated over the Chairmanships.

This is further recognized by the SAO report issued at the end of the Swedish chairmanship, and the *Vision for the Arctic*, which have acknowledged the scientific and TK cooperation: "We have also demonstrated the importance of science and traditional knowledge for understanding our region and for informed decision-making in the Arctic." (Arctic Council 2013d) In this regard, the cooperation between two knowledge systems has been perceived as beneficial for the whole agenda of the Arctic Council. More specifically, TLK has contributed to knowledge-building within the CAFF working group: "The results of CAFF projects are intended to bridge the science/policy gap to suggest options for actions appropriate at the circumpolar level based on sound evidence from both scientific and traditional knowledge." (Arctic Council 2013c, p.17) Therefore, the placement of the issue at the main agenda, may cause its relegation to the sub-agenda, in this case to one of the working groups.

The Swedish chairmanship intended to make progress in environmental protection and sustainable development concerns by reconciling the proponents of each issue. Due to its behaviour as an ´honest broker´, Nord (2016a) acknowledged that Sweden "was able to advance research efforts in both areas during its leadership term." (Nord 2016a, p.111) The Swedish emphasis on the environmental and sustainable development issues has further reflected the relevance of TLK as it aimed at bridging scientific and TK for decision-making purposes.

Subsequently, the Kiruna declaration referred to TLK aiming to "Recognize that the use of traditional and local knowledge is essential to a sustainable future in the Arctic, and decide to develop recommendations to integrate traditional and local knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council." (Arctic Council 2013b, p.2) This reference confirms the placement of TLK on the Council´s agenda, and correspond with the Canadian request to develop a set of recommendations which would incorporate TLK in the work of the Arctic Council. The Saami council, one of the PP of the Arctic Council, has expressed that it was: "(…) pleased to see that the Kiruna Declaration and the Canadian chairmanship have placed a strong emphasis on the incorporation of traditional knowledge in the Council´s work."

(Retter 2015) In general, the objective to integrate TLK into the work of the Arctic Council has been welcomed by the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, to include their expertise into the Arctic Council working group´s assessment, since they represent recommendations for decision-makers. (Retter 2015)

During its next Chairmanship under the Swedish lead, the Arctic Council continued to use TLK in SDWG and CAFF. However, for the first time it has been suggested to include TLK together with scientific knowledge, into the decision-making process. Therefore, the Swedish chairmanship has expanded not only the use of TLK but increased its value. As in case of Denmark, when referring to Sweden, the second and third hypotheses have been confirmed. Firstly, Sweden has adopted a liberal national Arctic strategy and further promoted the use of TLK on the Arctic Council´s, which is in line with the hypothetical statement. Secondly, by supporting the use of TLK predominantly in research and science cooperation, Sweden confirms the third hypothesis, as these have also been the areas in which Sweden has promoted TLK at domestic level.

7.10 Canada´s Arctic Council chairmanship 2013-2015

The most significant priority of the second Canadian chairmanship, regarding Indigenous Peoples, has been its orientation on "(…) developing recommendations for incorporating traditional and local knowledge into its [Council´s] work." (Government of Canada 2013) To accomplish this priority, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat has organized two workshops to develop a collective understanding and vision for the TLK on the Arctic Council´s agenda. (SDWG 2014) The definitive version of the *Recommendations for the integration of traditional and local knowledge into the work of the Arctic Council*, as delivered at the Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit in 2015, is attached as Annex 1. It states that, "At the outset of a project, incorporate traditional and local knowledge considerations into WG proposal templates and/or work plans so that every project proposal or outline describes how it will use TLK in the project, if applicable." (SDWG 2015)

Even though the process of systematic integration of TLK into the work of the Arctic Council has been on its way, several WGs have declared its incorporation in their projects. The CAFF working group has claimed: "CAFF has a longstanding recognition of the importance of Traditional Knowledge and Community Based Monitoring and has endeavoured to incorporate them into its work plans." (Arctic Council 2015c, p.24) Moreover, this statement is in line with the previous findings that the CAFF working group has incorporated TLK into its work since the Finnish chairmanship 2000-2002.

Secondly, SDWG has recognized benefits of this knowledge as "support[ing] sustainable development in the Arctic," and noted that the further use of TLK "will lead to better results." (Arctic Council 2015c, p.73) In addition, the project EALLU oriented on rising awareness about climate change effects on reindeer husbandry will also "(…) raise awareness of the traditional knowledge of food cultures of Arctic Indigenous reindeer herding peoples." (Arctic Council 2015c, p.76)

Thirdly, TK has been involved in the AMAP project Adaptation for a Changing Arctic, where "Traditional knowledge and PPs are involved in all three regional assessments." (Arctic Council 2015c, p.97) The ACAP working group has included TLK by expanding the coverage of an existing monitoring tool of its Indigenous Peoples Contaminants Action Program. This new tool linked scientific analysis and TK, by enabling Indigenous Arctic communities to "(…) identify and prioritize their environmental needs, by collecting critical observational data." (Arctic Council 2015c, p.48) As this has been the first references on how has TK been beneficial for AMAP and ACAP WGs, it may be explained in line with Kingdon´s policy stream process, which says that the agenda may be shaped by, among others, policy proposals, which emerge from a combination of previous proposals or ideas. This creates a perception that there is ´nothing new under the sun´, which applies also to the concept of TK, as it has been present on the Arctic Council´s agenda since 1996, continuously receiving more and more attention.

The Iqaluit declaration recognized the exceptional position of TLK on the Council´s agenda and called for "(…) emphasizing the unique role played by Arctic Indigenous Peoples and their TK in the Arctic Council," (Arctic Council 2015a, p.1) Secondly, the declaration welcomed the Canadian ambition to incorporate TLK into the Council´s work, and appreciated "(…) the work done by the PPs to develop their own principles for the use of traditional knowledge," (Arctic Council 2015a, p.2) This initiative has been further welcomed by Jim Gamble, Executive Director of Aleut International Organization, who stated that, "PPs organizations came together really for the first time and talked in a substantive way about how do they want TK to be approached." (Arctic Indigenous Peoples Secretariat 2017) The Aleut International Organization has in general expressed gratitude for the Canadian orientation on TK: "During the past two years very encouraging progress has been made on the use of traditional knowledge in the Arctic Council, including a set of very good recommendations (…)." (Aleut International Association 2015)

For the Chairmanship´s main achievement, Exner-Pirot (2016) considers its focus on strengthening the human dimension, which in his opinion has been supressed by environmental and sustainable development issues. (Exner-Pirot 2016) This is also shown by the second Iqaluit declaration which states that the Chairmanship, "(…) has put Arctic peoples at the forefront of the Arctic Council´s

agenda. The Council has taken steps to better the lives of Arctic peoples by enhancing sustainable economic development, promoting mental wellness in Arctic communities, and ensuring traditional and local knowledge of Arctic peoples is consistently integrated into the work of the Council." (Arctic Council 2015b, p.1)

Canada represents an extraordinary case regarding the TLK. Firstly, as presented in the first part of the analysis, the Canadian realist Arctic strategy disproves the first hypothesis, as it has included TLK. Additionally, the second hypothesis turned out to be inapplicable. Lastly, it disproves the third hypothesis as on the Council´s agenda it promoted the use of TLK in a much broader meaning than on the national agenda. This may be explained by the overall character of the Council´s agenda, as oriented also on issues of contamination and Arctic monitoring, spheres which are not so developed on the national level. However, on both, domestic and national agenda, the cooperation between TLK and science has been promoted, which shows the Canadian devotion to this objective. Besides, under the Canadian chairmanship, TLK continued to be placed on CAFF and SDWG agendas, and expanded also on AMAP and ACAP agendas, which made it for the first time to be communicated in relation with four out of six WGs.

7.11 The U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship Program in 2015-2017

Despite the absence of TLK on the U.S. chairmanship program priorities, the SAO Report to Ministers (2017e) confirmed that this knowledge system has been included on the agenda of all the WGs. This increase of the WGs may be related with the new recommendations about the use of TLK adopted at the Iqaluit Ministerial meeting in 2015.

It is no surprise that CAFF and SDWG continued to place TLK on their agendas, as this trend has been followed since 1998 (SDWG) and 2002 (CAFF). However, CAFF acknowledged the predominant use of TK instead of local knowledge within its projects: "CAFF has a long history of recognizing the importance of Traditional Knowledge and has endeavoured to utilize such knowledge into its activities, however Local Knowledge has not been utilized so far." (Arctic Council 2017e, p.31) In the period of 2015-2017, CAFF has produced the report oriented on the involvement of northern communities and TK holders in the Arctic Coastal Biodiversity Monitoring Plan, focused also on cooperation between science and TLK. (Arctic Council 2017e, p.32)

SDWG has recognized the importance of cooperation between science and TK in the process of improving economic and living conditions of communities, promoted the continuation of the EALLU

project regarding knowledge transfer, and called for involvement of TLK and Indigenous Peoples in the Environmental Impact Assessments and marine activities. (Arctic Council 2017c) The AMAP has already indicated its aim to incorporate TLK into its regional assessments and this has been further initiated during the U.S. chairmanship, together with the future vision of: "Preparation for an updated AMAP strategic framework document, including consideration of how to better incorporate TLK in AMAP work." (Arctic Council 2017c, p.27)

PAME has already referred to TLK in 2011, but since then this concept was not mentioned anymore. However, the SAO report to Ministers (2017e) presents PAME´s intention to "(…) dedicate space for interactions and discussions among technical and country experts (e.g. researchers, government scientists, MPA managers, TLK-holders), PPs, and other." (Arctic Council 2017c, p.59) The involvement of TLK-holders represents the continued ambition of PAME to include TLK into its assessments. As mentioned in the Canadian chairmanship section, ACAP working group has launched a new tool to expand existing monitoring activities. This tool, the Circumpolar Local Environmental Observer (CLEO), has been further developed during the U.S. chairmanship by deploying a ´LEO reporter´ app. This app enables local environmental observers and topic experts, who use traditional, local or scientific knowledge, to document unusual or unprecedented changes in their environment. (Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium 2017; United States Department of State 2016)

The only working group which has not previously included TLK into its agenda has been EPPR. However, in the SAO report to Ministers (2017e) EPPR committed itself to "develop project proposals within its mandate for approval as Arctic Council projects, considering the needs of Indigenous Peoples and incorporating TLK when appropriate." (Arctic Council 2017c, p.41) This instance represents a change in the agenda-setting, a reaction to policy proposal, which falls under the Kingdon´s policy stream. In this regard EPPR reacted to the recommendations about more consistent use of TLK in the work of the Arctic Council, approved at Iqaluit ministerial meeting in 2015.

The cooperation between scientific and TLK has been for the first time promoted in the Salekhard declaration (2006). Since then, every Chairmanship has shown interest in promoting this knowledge system cooperation. The U.S. chairmanship has advanced traditional and scientific knowledge cooperation by adopting the legally-binding *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*, which is "(…) encouraging the use of traditional and local knowledge." (Arctic Council 2017c, p.79)

During the second U.S. chairmanship, TLK has been for the first time communicated in relation with all the Council´s working groups´ agendas, which is perceived as a consequence of the Canadian TLK

initiative. Additionally, the second hypothesis turned out to be inapplicable to the U.S. chairmanship, as it has adopted a realist Arctic strategy. Furthermore, the third hypothesis is disproved, as the U.S. has not included TLK into its national Arctic strategy, and thus did not communicate it in the same areas on domestic and Council level. Thus, during the U.S. chairmanship, TLK gained more attention in a theoretical approach, but de facto it kept its position on the agendas of working groups where it has already been applied. The Fairbanks declaration (2017b) as the latest adopted declaration only confirmed the U.S. chairmanship achievements in relation to TLK recognition and use in the Arctic Council´s agenda.

This chapter has analysed the Arctic Council documents to reveal in which areas is TLK communicated on the Council´s agenda and how has it developed. The results suggest that TLK is in the Arctic Council predominantly used within SDWG and CAFF. Additionally, the second and third hypotheses have been tested and the results will be further interpreted and discussed in the following chapter.

8   Interpretation of the results

In this chapter, the findings of this thesis are presented. For better understanding, the results are illustrated in three tables. The first two tables show the communication of TLK within the national Arctic strategies and on the Arctic Council´s agenda. The third table presents which states proved, or disproved the hypotheses, or if it was inapplicable. Additionally, the discussion and future research possibilities will be presented.

Table 2: TLK in the national Arctic strategies

Theme	Sub-theme	Denmark	Sweden	Canada	U.S.	Iceland	Russia	Finland	Norway
Security	Strengthening the armed forces	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Including Indigenous communities in security monitoring	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Sustainable development	Sustainable use and management of living resources	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Participating on sustainable resource regulations	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Climate change	Conservation of biodiversity	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
	Increasing the knowledge about climate change impacts	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
General recognition	Part of culture	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
	General respect	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Science and education	Research oriented education programme	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Knowledge transfer	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
	Cooperation in environmental monitoring	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Knowledge base reinforcement	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

As presented in Table 2, TLK is within the national Arctic strategies predominantly communicated in relation to science and knowledge enhancement, while the other themes used for TLK communication are divided equally. Three Arctic States have not included TLK into their Arctic strategies, and Norway and Finland referred to it only in one and two instances. However, these findings prove that liberal or realist character of the Arctic strategy does not have an impact on the TLK communication, since also the realist Canadian strategy has included TLK in its strategy. On the other hand, Iceland with its liberal strategy has not included TLK. These findings may be explained by the framing factor, which has shown that TLK can be framed in a way which fits both, liberal and realist Arctic strategies. As no general conclusions could be drawn upon these findings, it is assumed that framing can be used as a tool for including or excluding TLK from national Arctic strategies. However, this finding could be challenged, if one would apply the rational choice approach to explain why TLK has been included in both, liberal and realist national Arctic strategies.

It is worthy to mention that in two instances, TLK has been communicated under the security theme, as an enhancing factor for Danish armed forces and Canadian Rangers. In the Danish case, it is argued that Greenlanders´ local knowledge has been promoted in the armed forces because of post-self-government division of competences. This argument is supported by Bailes and Heininen´s (2012) acknowledgement that the Danish Arctic strategy is, "(…) very much on Copenhagen´s relations with Greenland and the devolution of responsibilities and competences." (Bailes & Heininen 2012, p.40) Therefore, I argue that this act has been from the Danish perspective understood as compromising move to give Greenlanders ´a piece of pie´ from otherwise exclusive sphere of Danish jurisdiction.

In case of Canada, I argue that the idea to include Indigenous communities´ members into the Rangers forces has emerged due to the Canadian policy requirement to include TLK in the decisions and activities of particularly the Northwest territories, if applicable. Therefore, following also Usher (2000) it is argued that the political recognition of TLK is higher in Canada, than in other Arctic states.

Regardless of the domestic political situation, the various recognition and incorporation of TLK into national Arctic strategies, could be explained by the agenda-setting´s framing factor. It has been shown that on the domestic level, the education and research themes were used the most to communicate TLK. It is argued, that this fact may have occurred because of Indigenous Peoples´ framing of TLK´s usability mainly as an enhancing factor for scientific research, attracting the attention of decision-makers the most. These findings could be used to advise Indigenous Peoples how to best frame TLK to secure its sustainability.

Table 3: TLK on the Arctic Council´s agenda

Themes	Sub-themes	Ottawa decl. 1996	Iqaluit decl. 1998	U.S. 1998-2000	FIN 2000-2002	ICE 2002-2004	RUS 2004-2006	NO 2006-2008	DK 2009-2011	SE 2011-2013	CAN 2013-2015	U.S. 2015-2017
General objectives	General recognition	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Science knowledge cooperation	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	IPY	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
	University of Arctic	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
	Contribution to decision-making	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
	Incorporation of TLK into the Council´s work	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
SDWG	Cooperation with scientific knowledge	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	No	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
	Clim. change research	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
	Sustainable future	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
	Saami fisheries	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Marine activities	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
	AHDR	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Knowledge transfer	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
	Sustainable use of natural resources	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
CAFF	Sites´ conservation	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Environment. monitoring	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
	Plants conservation	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
	Biodiversity assessment	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
PAME	Resource extraction	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
AMAP	Adaptation to changes	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
ACAP	Contaminants observations	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
EPPR	Incorporation of TLK	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES

Table 3 presents the areas in which TLK has been communicated since the Arctic Council´s establishment, and which Chairmanships have promoted the use of TLK in these areas. It has been

found that TK has been recognized by the Ottawa declaration in 1996, which placed this concept on the Council´s governmental agenda since its establishment. Since 1998, TLK has expanded on SDWG´s agenda, where it has been applied mostly in relation to cooperation with scientific knowledge, knowledge transfer, climate change research, and sustainable future development. It has been found out that every Chairmanship had, to some extent, contributed to the expansion of TLK on SDWG´s agenda, by either promoting a new area of applicability, or providing continuous support of inclusion of TLK in the projects.

Secondly, since the first Finnish chairmanship, TLK has started to be included also on CAFF´s agenda, predominantly related with the environmental monitoring and biodiversity assessments. During the last four Chairmanships, TLK has been partially included on the agenda of other working groups, PAME, AMAP, ACAP, and EPPR. However, its usability has been inconsistent and not developed to the same extent as on SDWG and CAFF.

The agenda-setting theory explains the prevailing appearance of the issue on a certain agenda by framing and institutional venues. These two concepts are inherently linked, as the institutional venues create borderlines within which the framing of the issue may occur. Based on the Princen´s (2009) venues characteristics for successful framing, TLK has received the most attention at SDWG due to its (1) institutional task, as TLK is related with the human dimension of the Arctic, which represents the sphere of activity of SDWG, and sustainable development has been recognized as one of the ´pillars´ of the Arctic Council, (2) institutional authority, as TLK corresponds with SDWG´s agenda and fall within its jurisdictions, as has been e.g. confirmed by involvement of this knowledge system into its EALLAT project, (3) institutional composition, as members of SDWG consist of Arctic States national´s representatives and PPs delegates. Therefore, the human dimension has been recognized as the main form of framing, for successful involvement of TLK on SDWG agenda. This further explains why SDWG has been chosen to take patronage over the process of developing recommendations for integration of TLK into the work of the Arctic Council. (SDWG 2014)

These findings disprove the second hypothesis, stating that Arctic states with the liberal national Arctic strategies will tend to support TLK on the Council´s agenda, as every Chairmanship has included and to some extent applied TLK and/or expanded its use. The missing correlation between the liberal/realist nature of the national Arctic strategy and TLK recognition in the Arctic Council, may be explained by the Council´s limited sphere of activity. Its exclusive orientation on sustainable development and environmental protection, excluded other themes, like security and military, even though they were also proved to be related with TLK in the national Arctic strategies. Secondly, I argue

that the character of the national Arctic strategy has not influenced the TLK recognition on the Council´s agenda, because Indigenous Peoples, as the main TLK-holders, have not participated on the process of developing these documents. Therefore, they could not influence its content. While, on the other side, a priori to adopting its Chairmanship priorities, Canadian minister Aglukkaq has met with the Saami Council representatives and other PP´s delegates to provide input about the issues that concerns them. (Exner-Pirot 2016, p.86) This may be observed also in the absent human dimension in the Canadian Arctic strategy, while its Arctic Council chairmanship priorities has focused primarily on strengthening the human dimension. Due to the higher level of representation, Indigenous Peoples´ requirements were better reflected in the Chairmanship priorities, than on the national Arctic strategies, whose primary orientation was to define the state´s position in the international relations. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to continue this research path and reveal what are the factors for more consistent and robust incorporation of TLK in the Chairmanship priorities.

The process of incorporating TLK may seem challenging, as one of the PPs´ representatives has stated, referring to the exclusion of several sections regarding, "(…) in-depth concepts of how to apply traditional knowledge, or how to recognize it," from the definitive version of *Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles* (2015b). (Arctic Indigenous Peoples Secretariat 2017) Despite the enormous efforts made by PPs to push TLK further to the Council´s agenda, still "more has to be done," as claimed by Evon Peter, the vice Chancellor for Rural Community and Native Education, University of Alaska. (Arctic Indigenous Peoples Secretariat 2017) Karen Pletnikoff, a representative of Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association refers to TLK naming as one of the problems for better incorporation of TLK, "(…) the PPs were all comfortable with the term traditional knowledge. But that is not the term we use today. Now we use traditional and local knowledge. Who slipped that ´local´ in?" (Arctic Indigenous Peoples Secretariat 2017) She points out to one of the challenges which meet TK as also presented at the beginning of this thesis – the inconsistent naming. Due to various names and definitions, TK is losing its meaning, or the meaning is strategically formulated. The various names have been present also on the Council´s agenda, where even the establishing Ottawa declaration uses term ´traditional knowledge´, the following Iqaluit declaration uses also the term ´Indigenous knowledge´ and the recent Fairbanks declaration uses term ´traditional and local knowledge´. I argue that the absence of a consistent definition may be perceived as both, strength and weakness. By applying several definitions, TLK may be included in more areas, which consequently increases its use and recognition. However, the different meanings contribute to the loss of meaning, as acknowledged by Karen Pletnikoff.

Therefore, it is further argued that to achieve a more satisfying incorporation of TLK in the Council´s agenda, the role of PPs would have to be strengthened, enabling them to push their requirements forward more effectively and to become more visible and vocal actors.

Table 4: Compliance with the hypotheses

	Denmark	Sweden	Canada	The U.S.	Iceland	Russia	Finland	Norway
Hyp. 1	NA	NA	D	P	NA	P	NA	NA
Hyp. 2	P	P	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Hyp. 3	P	P	D	NA D	D	D	D	D

Table 4 presents the overall compliance with the hypotheses. In case of Denmark and Sweden, the first hypothesis was inapplicable, as their national Arctic strategies were characterized as liberal. Followingly, the second and third hypotheses were confirmed, as both states supported TLK on the Council´s agenda, even in the same areas as within the national strategies. Canada turned out to be an extraordinary case. Firstly, it disproved the first hypothesis because it has included TLK into its otherwise realist Arctic strategy, which caused inapplicability of the second hypothesis. However, Canada has promoted TLK also on the Council´s agenda and in a wider range, which disproved the last hypothesis. The U.S. has proved the first hypothesis, since TLK has been excluded from its realist Arctic strategy. Secondly, the second hypothesis has been inapplicable, and the third hypothesis turned out to be also inapplicable in case of the first U.S. chairmanship, due to the time difference between Chairmanship priorities and national Arctic strategy. In case of the second U.S. chairmanship, the third hypothesis was disproved, as during its Chairmanship, TLK was communicated in regard with all the WGs. In case of Iceland, Finland, and Norway, the first hypothesis was inapplicable, as all these states adopted liberal Arctic strategies. Furthermore, the second hypothesis turned out to be inapplicable as well, as all the states chaired the Arctic Council before their national Arctic strategies were adopted, thus, it was not possible to examine if the liberal nature would have had an impact on TLK communication. Followingly, the third hypothesis has been disproved in all three cases, as during the Council´s chairmanship, TLK has been promoted in more areas compared to the national Arctic strategies of all three states. Lastly, the Russian Federation has proved the first hypothesis as it excluded TLK from its realist Arctic strategy, which further prevented the applicability of the second hypothesis. The third hypothesis was disproved, as during the Russian chairmanship, TLK has been supported on the Council´s agenda.

9   Conclusion

This thesis has aspired to answer the research question: *How is the concept of traditional and local knowledge communicated among the Arctic States and in the Arctic Council, and how has it developed while setting the agenda of the Arctic Council?* Three hypotheses were formulated to provide an analytical guidance for answering the research question.

Based on the thematic analysis of eight Arctic States´ national strategies towards High North, it can be concluded that TLK is within the Arctic States communicated predominantly in relation to science and research enhancement. Besides revealing the main themes of TLK communication, it has been found that not all the Arctic States include TLK into their Arctic strategies. In this regard, it has been proved that realist or liberal character of national Arctic strategy does not have an impact on TLK communication and recognition on the domestic level. It has been argued that the way in which TLK has been framed, had more impact on its inclusion to national Arctic strategies, than the character of these strategies.

Secondly, TLK has developed significantly on the Arctic Council´s agenda. Even though TLK (more precisely TK) has been a part of the Council´s agenda since its establishment, it has not been included in all the WGs. TLK has been on the Arctic Council´s agenda communicated predominantly in relation to SDWG, and partly also CAFF, which has been explained by the framing factor and institutional venues of the Arctic Council, especially SDWG. Nevertheless, PPs representatives have expressed their dissatisfaction with the current state of TLK recognition. They argued that the process of incorporating TLK into the Arctic Council is challenging mainly due to disagreements about the definition of TLK.

The inconsistent naming represents one of the reasons why TLK is still regarded as a contested concept and prevents its consistent applicability and recognition. It has been argued that the Arctic Council´s exclusive orientation on sustainable development and environmental protection determined the extent within which the framing of TLK could have been applied to support its wider communications. This finding explains why the third hypothesis has been mostly disproved, as the Arctic States have communicated TLK in different areas on domestic and international level. Considering these findings, the discussion has provided suggestions for future research possibilities.

10 Bibliography

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Annex 1

Recommendations for the Integration of Traditional and Local Knowledge into the Work of the Arctic Council

(i)   Continue development on consensus-based guidelines and processes for the more systematic inclusion of traditional and local knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council.

(ii)   Support the use of consistent terminology regarding traditional and local knowledge throughout the work of the AC.

(iii)   a) At the outset of a project, incorporate traditional and local knowledge considerations into WG proposal templates and/or work plans so that every project proposal or outline describes how it will use TLK in the project, if applicable. If TLK is not applicable, a section of the project proposal or outline must explain why. In doing so, efforts should be made to communicate project goals, objectives, and methods in terminology accessible to non-technical audiences in order to facilitate early identification of potential traditional and local knowledge components.

   b) At the conclusion of a project, in the final report to SAOs, there will be a requirement to describe how TLK was used in the project and any lessons learned as to how TLK may be better incorporated in the future.

(iv)   Include a traditional and local knowledge column in the ACS project tracking tool.

(v)   Develop within Working Group processes an inventory of lessons-learned and best practices for AC projects which integrate traditional and local knowledge components.

(vi)   Recognize/credit traditional and local knowledge holders' and community contributions to AC projects and reports, including co-authorship where appropriate.

(vii)   Establish best practices for communicating the results and findings back to TLK holders, communities, and those that have contributed.

Annex 2

The list of Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council:

- Aleut International Association (AIA)
- Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC)
- Gwich´in Council International (GCI)
- Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)
- Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAPON)
- Saami Council (SC)

The list of Observers of the Arctic Council:

- **Non-Arctic state:**
    o France
    o Germany
    o The Netherlands
    o Poland
    o Spain
    o United Kingdom
    o People´s Republic of China
    o Italian Republic
    o Japan
    o Republic of Korea
    o Republic of Singapore
    o Republic of India
- **Intergovernmental and Interparliamentary organizations:**
    o International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies
    o International Union for the Conservation of Nature
    o Nordic Council of Ministers
    o Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
    o North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission
    o Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region
    o United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
    o United Nations Development Program
    o United Nations Environment Program
- **Non-governmental organizations:**
    o Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas
    o Arctic Institute of North America
    o Association of World Reindeer Herders
    o Circumpolar Conservation Union
    o International Arctic Science Committee
    o International Arctic Social Science Association
    o International Union for Circumpolar Health
    o International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
    o Northern Forum
    o University of the Arctic
    o World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program

Annex 3

The Chairmanship responsibilities as revised on the Ministerial meeting in Kiruna in 2013:

- The Chairmanship shall act as chair of the Arctic Council from the conclusion of a biennial Ministerial meeting to the conclusion of the next biennial Ministerial meeting, and shall coordinate arrangements for Ministerial meetings. The Chairmanship shall be responsible for facilitating preparations for Ministerial and SAO meetings, in coordination with the Secretariat, and carrying out such other tasks as the Arctic Council may require or direct.

- The Chairmanship, an Arctic State, or the other subsidiary bodies may undertake communications on Arctic Council matters with other international for a as may be agreed to in advance by the Arctic States

- During the discussion of any matter, a representative of an Arctic State or Permanent Participant may rise to a point to order and the point of order shall be decided immediately by the chair-person in accordance with these Rules

- After consultation with Arctic States and Permanent Participants, the Chairmanship may place reasonable limits on the size of all delegations for a meeting and shall notify all delegations accordingly

- Subject to the concurrence of the Arctic States, the Chairmanship shall be entitled to designate the chairperson for Ministerial meetings. At the initial session of the Ministerial meeting, the Arctic States may also designate one or more vice-chairpersons of the meeting who shall preside in the absence of the chairperson

- The Chairmanship shall propose a date and the location for a biennial Ministerial meeting at least 6 months in advance of the proposed date

- After consultation with Arctic States and Permanent Participant, the Chairmanship shall circulate a draft agenda at least 90 days prior to the date of a Ministerial meeting. Arctic States and Permanent Participants may propose supplementary agenda items by notifying the Chairmanship 60 days prior to the Ministerial meeting. No later than 30 days prior to a Ministerial meeting, the Chairmanship shall circulate the revised draft agenda to Arctic States and Permanent Participant along with any explanatory or other documents. A final agenda shall be adopted by a decision of the Arctic States at the opening session of each Ministerial meeting.

- At least 7 days prior to a Ministerial meeting, Arctic States, Permanent Participants and Observers should provide in writing to the Chairmanship the names of individuals in their respective delegations

- The Chairmanship shall provide the chairperson for the SAO meetings, subject to the concurrence of the Arctic States represented at the SAO meetings

- Meetings of Senior Arctic Official should take place at least twice yearly at the call of the Chairmanship, after consultation with the representatives of the Permanent Participants. The date, location and agenda of SAO meetings shall be decided by the SAOs. A draft agenda shall be circulated no less than 30 days in advance of such as a meeting, and shall be approved at the initial session of the meeting.

- An application by a potential Permanent Participant shall be circulated to Arctic States and Permanent Participants by the Chairmanship at least 90 days prior to the Ministerial meeting at which the matter is to be decided. Unless any Arctic State objects at least 30 days prior to the Ministerial meeting, the agenda for that meeting shall include an item to decide whether the organization should be granted Permanent Participant status

- The primary role of Observers it to observe the work of the Arctic Council. Observers contribute through their engagement in the Arctic Council primarily at the level of working groups. In meetings of the Arctic Council´s subsidiary bodies, to which Observers have been invited to participate, Observers may, at the discretion of the Chair, make statements after Arctic States and Permanent Participant, present written statements, submit relevant documents and provide views on the issues under discussion. Observers may also submit written statement at Ministerial meetings.

- The Chairmanship shall make reasonable efforts to provide for Russian interpretation at Ministerial and SAO meetings

- The Chairmanship may release minutes, if any communications and documents of the meeting after obtaining approval from the relevant officials of each Arctic state. The Chairmanship is responsible for preparing a report of the meeting which will be formally released after it has been approved by the relevant official of each Arctic State

- The Chairmanship shall designate a point of contact for communications and shall inform all Arctic States, Permanent Participants and Observers accordingly. All communications with the All communications with the Arctic Council or Chairmanship required by these Rules shall be directed to the designated point of contact

- Not later than 120 days before a Ministerial meeting, the Chairmanship shall circulate, to al Arctic States and Permanent Participants, a list of entities that have applied for Observer status

- Every four years, from the date of being granted Observer status, Observers should state affirmatively their continued interest in Observer status. Not later than 120 days before a Ministerial meeting where Observers will be reviewed, the Chairmanship shall circulate to the Arctic States and Permanent Participants a list of all accredited Observers and up-to-date information on their activities relevant to the work of the Arctic Council

- The Chair is responsible for information to the media, e.g. press releases, press conferences, interviews, speeches, articles, etc.

- The Chair is responsible for disseminating information and appearing publicly at relevant conferences, seminars and meetings of international organisations in order to increase the profile of the Arctic Council.

- The Chairmanship and the Secretariat have key roles on coordinating the Arctic Council´s communication work and in creating and developing effective routines for internal communication. Member States, Permanent Participants and Working Groups are also responsible for creating routines for providing relevant information in an effective and timely manner

- The Chairmanship and the Secretariat are responsible for the newsletter, with contribution from other actors within the Arctic Council

- The Chairmanship has overall responsibility for the implementation of the communication strategy and takes its guidance from the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs). The Chairmanship provides the Secretariat with guidelines and cooperates closely with the Secretariat in long-term and short-term communication work. In accordance with the Arctic Council Communications and Outreach Guidelines, the Chairmanship should communicate on behalf of the Arctic Council. Without express consent from the SAOs, the Chair should make clear that he/she is speaking on behalf of the Chairmanship, rather than the Arctic Council

(Arctic Council 2013a)