# Problematizations in Anti-Radicalization Policy

## The Case of Aarhus

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**31-05-2017**

# Abstract

Since 9/11, much research has been conducted on the topic of radicalization. However, researchers cannot seem to agree on what the term actually means, what causes it or how to counter it. One of the major points for critique in connection to radicalization research is that there is too much focus on Islam as a key factor, and that this has resulted in Muslim communities being perceived as 'suspect communities' in the West. In the Danish city of Aarhus, the political approach to radicalization has received much positive attention. I therefore found the Aarhus approach interesting for analysis. Based on the confusion and disagreement in the existing research on radicalization, I found it relevant to study how a 'successful' case of anti-radicalization policy approaches the 'problem' of radicalization. This thesis is thus based on the research question: *How is the problem of radicalization represented and approached in the Aarhus Model, and what is the relation between the Aarhus anti-radicalization policy and public discourses concerned with radicalization?*

For the thesis, existing theory on radicalization is reviewed in terms of approaches to the concept, agreements and disagreement; and popular models for explaining and countering radicalization will be discussed. Furthermore, theory on the relation between anti-Muslim discourses and radicalization will be discussed alongside reflections on the concept on islamophobia, and finally the concept of moral panic will be discussed in connection to the development in discourses on radicalization.

In order to answer the research question, the thesis is based on the methodological framework *what's the problem represented to be?,* developed by Carol Bacchi. This is an alternative to conventional policy analysis, and focuses more on how policies are used to create rather than solving problems.

The analysis is divided into four parts. The first is concerned with the anti-radicalization efforts in Aarhus and what assumptions lie behind these initiatives. The second part is concerned with the development of the anti-radicalization policies on both the national Danish level and at the local level of Aarhus. The third part reflects on the 'silences' of the Aarhus approach to radicalization. The fourth part provides more contextual reflections on how anti-Muslim and anti-immigration discourses have developed. This part will further discuss how such discourses might influence the Aarhus approach to radicalization as well as how such discourses are addressed in the anti-radicalization work in Aarhus.

Through the analysis and a discussion of it, I have discovered that though several areas are emphasized in the Aarhus approach, there are certain parts of the approach that stand out. Firstly, there is rather much focus on *foreign fighters*, who have participated in militant conflicts abroad. In Aarhus, a relatively large number of foreign fighters has returned after fighting in conflicts mainly in Syria and Iraq, and in Aarhus

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these foreign fighters are welcomed with so-called *exit-programs*, through which they will receive help to exit extremist social environments. It has also been found that Aarhus approaches radicalization as a phenomenon, which is connected to violent criminal activities rather than religion. By this approach, people are not targeted for holding 'radical' beliefs, but for breaking Danish law. Moreover, an interesting finding is that although islamophobic discourses are prevalent in Danish society and do affect the work with anti-radicalization in Aarhus, the Aarhus approach does address such discourses by 'reversing' the anti-radicalization work in a way, in which the broad society is approached with information, pro-diversity and anti-discrimination initiatives.

# Contents

# 1 Introduction

*Radicalization* has in the last couple of decades become a highly popular term. Terrorism has been one of the predominant security threats in many parts of the world since the 9/11 attacks, and although terrorist attacks have happened in several other places and regions of the world, the tragic events of 9/11 have been given particular attention in the Western world. As a means to prevent terrorism, both academics, politicians and the media have adopted and make use of the term of radicalization, which nowadays proliferates both within academia, among local, national and international organizations and administrations as well as in the mainstream media and in social media. However, no one seems to agree neither on what radicalization actually is nor what to do about it. Whereas radicalization used to refer to political deviation and resistance, it has now become a term concerned with Islamism (Mandel, 2009, p. 104). Though it can still refer to political extremism, the usage of it has changed along with the increased number of terrorist attacks carried out by Islamists in the Western world.

Along with the increased number of terrorist attacks against the world, the view on Muslims in the Western world has also changed. Nationalism and anti-immigration discourses are continuously gaining more support, leading the way for right-wing political parties in most Western countries. Each time a terrorist attack happens and an Islamist organization takes responsibility, Muslims and Islam are blamed, even though only a few extremists were involved. This tendency not only creates fear, but is also dividing people and leaving little space and tolerance for diversity.

Denmark has become world-known for its anti-radicalization approaches. This is especially due to the so-called *Aarhus Model*, which is the popular name for the anti-radicalization policy in the Danish city of Aarhus. Many parts of the model have been found so successful that they have also been implemented in national anti-radicalization policies as well as been topic for international discussion. It is quite interesting why this exact approach has received so much attention. Therefore, this thesis will investigate how radicalization is approached in Aarhus, and what implications are associated with this approach. Because radicalization is a much debated issue, I will analyze how the local anti-radicalization policy perceives and represents the 'problem' of radicalization, as this may provide more insight as to why the *Aarhus Model* is arguably a leading example of anti-radicalization policies. The *Aarhus Model* is furthermore an interesting case to study because it as a local policy can show what specific measures can be taken on ground.

In order to fully understand the radicalization approach of the Aarhus Model, including the thoughts behind the approach, its effects as well as the influence of public discourses, I will focus on the problematizations of the approach. This I will do by attempting to answer the following research question:

*How is the problem of radicalization represented and approached in the Aarhus Model, and what is the relation between the Aarhus anti-radicalization policy and public discourses concerned with radicalization?*

## Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in a way that provides theoretical perspective on central issues of radicalization and a methodological overview of how the research question has been approached, followed by a four-part analysis. Central issues will then be discussed and conclusions will be drawn. The following will explain the different chapters in more detail.

Firstly, I will in the theory chapter present and discuss the concept of radicalization and how it has been perceived and approached over time. Furthermore, I will discuss how concepts such as certain discourses, identity-loss and islamophobia are related to radicalization.

After the theory will be the methodology chapter, in which I will explain the methodological framework, that is, the 'what is the problem represented to be' (WPR) framework, which will be applied in the analysis. Key concepts for this approach will be explained, followed by a discussion of academic approach and analyzed data.

Next will be the analysis chapter. In order to follow the thought of the WPR framework, the analysis will be divided into four parts. The first part will reflect upon the initiatives included in the Aarhus anti-radicalization model, and how these initiatives altogether create a certain representation of the 'problem' of radicalization. The second part will analyze how the policy approach to radicalization has developed on both national and local level. The third part will discuss the underlying 'silences' of the Aarhus Model, that is, what issues are not addressed in the representation of the 'problem' of radicalization. The fourth part will address and analyze the issue of discourses on radicalization, and how discourses do not only frame the debate about radicalization, but can also lead to identity loss caused by fear, social division and generalization, which may have the effect that more people will be radicalized.

As the analysis takes a variety of aspects into consideration, a discussion chapter will follow the analysis in order to recapitulate on important findings and discuss them further in relation to the Aarhus anti-radicalization model.

Finally, there will be a conclusion, in which the research question will be answered based on the findings from the analysis and discussion chapters. This chapter will further discuss how the findings of this thesis can be used as starting point for future research.

# 2 The 'Aarhus Model'

The anti-radicalization initiatives in the city of Aarhus originally started in 2007. The initiatives were started in connection to the PET anti-terror campaign from 2005, "Politi mod terror" (Police against terror), in which the police all over Denmark was to be involved in the fight against terrorism. In Aarhus this was taken a step further and became a matter, which included not only the local police but also instances of the municipality (appendix 2). Instead of working against terrorism as such, Aarhus Municipality named the local initiatives as a 'preventive effort against violent radicalization' (forebyggende indsats mod voldelig radikalisering), and as suggested by the name, the local efforts were more directed at radicalization than at terrorism. In 2007, a pilot project started as a means to undertake the main responsibilities in preventing radicalization, and this was the start of what was later to be called the 'Aarhus Model'.

The 'Aarhus Model' was from the beginning targeting radicalization and discrimination, building on central thoughts from the Amsterdam model "Wij Amsterdammers" (We Amsterdam'ers) (appendix 3). The model was designed to focus on both political and religious radicalization as well as discrimination in Aarhus in order to promote safety and well-being among the citizens (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). The original model had three major focal areas: Establishing an information center (Infohus) to handle citizen concerns regarding radicalization; establish contact with key persons dealing with youth and kids on a daily basis through presentations/workshops on radical behavior; and run theme days for relevant youth and police personnel in order to improve competencies among such groups (appendix 3). Furthermore, the model is, to a large extent, based on regular crime prevention strategies undertaken by the police force, in collaboration with social services.

In year 2011, the operation and leadership of the anti-radicalization activities were handed over to SSP (a local corporation between social services, schools and the police). SSP usually do not handle cases concerning people over the age of 18 but in the prevention of radicalization, people up to 25 are covered.

For the model, the objectives have been reformulated since the initial pilot project and are now given through the following objectives: designing and executing a coordinated prevention of radicalization; provide guidance and counselling on radicalization, covering the topic of radicalization in a group- or individual level; and handling individual cases of radicalization of vulnerable young people (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). In practice, the anti-radicalization policy is operated through the following initiatives (Appendix 2; Agerschou, 2014/2015):

- Education on radicalization for staff working with radicalization in the Aarhus area
- Guidance and counselling of worried citizens through the established Info House

- Parent networks for parents to young people involved with extremist right-wing environments and for parents to young people who have gone to Syria to fight. These networks were established to help parents share their experiences with people in the same situation.

- Workshops for school classes about radicalization, extremism, discrimination and prejudices.

- Counselling support for parents of both current and former Syria volunteers. This counselling is provided by Aarhus Municipality and the regional East-Jutland Police.

- Guiding mentor support has since 2010 been offered to young people in risk of radicalization or already involved in extremist social environments. Mentor support of an individual is seen as social services casework and therefore needs to be approved by social services.

- Exit program for radicals involved in extremist political or religious activities. This program is intended to help people leaving the extremist social environments, de-radicalize and become included in the society. This program is designed for the individual's needs and will only be started in cases, where the individual is highly motivated to detach from the extremist environment. Like the mentor support this goes under the category of social services.

- A digital project was started in 2012, with the purpose of creating online debate and dialog among young people.

- Community outreach, which includes dialog with the Somali community about integration and radicalization, dialog with the Grimhøj Mosque in Aarhus and a Salafist youth association, MUC, based in the Grimhøj mosque. This dialog started in 2014.

The Aarhus anti-radicalization model has also been illustrated through the so-called *prevention triangle*. The triangle consists of three different stages of action. The green part is concerned with those who are not considered in risk of becoming radicalized, the yellow part is concerned with those who are in risk of becoming radicalized, and the red part is concerned with the few, who are radicalized and need individually targeted help to become de-radicalized. A translated version of the prevention triangle can be seen below. The original is to be found in appendix 2 to this thesis.

*The Prevention Triangle*

The Aarhus Model has received much attention both nationally and internationally as having identified a well-suited and innovative solution for countering radicalization (Ertel & Hoppe, 2015; Ravn, 2015). Nationally, the municipality of Aarhus was in 2007 chosen as 'model municipality' for developing new counter-radicalization strategies (Agerschou, 2014/2015), and strategies inspired by the Aarhus Model have also been implemented in national radicalization policies (Regeringen, 2014).

# 3 Theory

In this chapter, I will account for the concept of radicalization and how it is and has been perceived by academics in various fields. I will moreover introduce some of the most common explanations and important models of what leads to radicalization. Furthermore, I will introduce theory on how islamophobia and public discourses can affect levels of radicalization, as well as briefly discuss the concept of moral panic in relation to the public debate on radicalization.

## 3.1 The concept of radicalization

Radicalization has always, though not necessarily defined by this term, existed in one way or the other. It is generally used to describe what happens when people go from what is considered moderate in a given societal context to the point when they stand out of this 'moderate' category and instead become 'radicals' (Neumann, 2013). The perception and conceptualization of *radicalization* has, however, changed in different ways over time. Up to the 18th century, the term 'radical' referred to the fundamentals of society, and in the 18th century the use of the term changed to define those who challenged the fundamentals (Mandel, 2009, p. 104). In the beginning of the 19th century, the term 'radical' changed and was then used to describe major political change; and by the end of the same century, the term was starting to be used in relation to extremist political tendencies (Mandel, 2009, p. 104). Whereas the terms radicalization and radicalism had previously been linked with political and/or social motives, Islamist terrorism started to influence the terms to such a degree that the term 'radicalization' started to be more commonly associated with Islamic radicalization. Especially in the wake of 9/11, Islam was suddenly seen as a major threat to Western societies, and islamophobia started to spread (Allen, 2004), targeting Muslims all over the world as a potential threat. Recent research on radicalization has in this connection often been focusing on Islamic radicalization rather than politically inspired radicalization, and often in relation to 'home-grown' terrorism and securitization issues (Kundnani, 2012; King & Taylor, 2011).

When going through the large amount of academic material on radicalization, it soon becomes clear to the reader that this term does not have one agreed definition. The term is used both to describe why individuals engage in violent, anti-democratic activities and what process people go through to get from being 'moderate' to being 'radical' (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015; King & Taylor, 2011; Kundnani, 2012). As some put it, radicalization is 'what goes on before the bomb goes off' (Mandel, 2009). Although many scholars agree that radicalization refers to the process which leads to extremist behavior, there is not much consensus about what the whole process is all about, what it encompasses and how to approach it. Furthermore, there are also critics who argue that there is not empirical support for the assumption that radical beliefs lead to violent behavior (Neumann, 2013).

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## *Defining radicalization*

Many scholars have pointed out that radicalization is a concept, which is much studied without any agreed definition (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013; Kundnani, 2012). Githens-Mazer (2012) is one of them and provides a good overview of how radicalization has been used to describe different, although to a certain extent related, phenomena. He argues that it has been used to describe "forms of populism related to revolutionary opportunity'; 'revolutionary act in response to declining power"; "an 'ultra' form or intensification of existing political orientations and behaviours", emphasizing how people adopt violent behavior; "the process by which political moderates become militant or increasingly support extremists and their positions"; and "an individual sense of becoming hyper-aware of critical issues, resulting in a 'radical irrationality' and 'a subsequent willingness to act violently on this awareness'" (Githens-Mazer, The rhetoric and reality: radicalization and the political discourse, 2012, pp. 557-558). This overview of the use of radicalization as a term illustrates quite well the varieties of definitions among scholars engaged with the topic. Githens-Mazer's listing does not, however, come anywhere closer to a definition of the term. Many different angles have been used to explain the process of radicalization, but although most of these do reach some interesting and at times logic explanations to why radicalization happens, it is a common feature of most of the approaches that there are certain aspects of radicalization which cannot be fully explained. In the section below, I attempt to account for the most influential approaches to explaining and understanding radicalization.

### 3.1.1 Approaches to radicalization: a diverse scholarly field

In the field of radicalization research, many different approaches have been applied in order to understand the phenomenon. Whereas radicalization research has addressed both *how* and *why* radicalization happens, newer research has mainly been concerned with how radicalization takes place (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 8), in terms of how the radicalization process proceeds in contrast to the reasons for why it happens in the first place. The approach as to *how* it happens can for example be seen in the variety of 'process models' that have been developed in order to understand the actual process of radicalization (see pp. 14-16). However, one might argue that the focus on *how* has left the *why* more or less unaddressed (Kundnani, 2012, p. 10), which seems strange, as the *why* would much more helpful in order identify the root causes and thus to prevent radicalization altogether. When narrowing the focus down to *how*, the research will only serve to understand how to stop the process of radicalization when it is already in progress.

Before continuing to explore how process models represent the process of radicalization, I will first go through some of the main causal explanations for why radicalization happens. Three major explanatory

approaches to understand why radicalization happens relate to the fields of socio-economics, psychology and geo-politics. These are accounted for in the following sections.

## Socio-economic explanations

The main argument for scholars arguing that radicalization is mainly a result of socio-economic factors is the same as for many other kinds of *reactive behavior*. Strikes, demonstrations, bans or even vandalism are examples of how people might react in cases where social groups are negatively affected by political or economic changes or conditions. When experiencing sudden urbanization, overpopulation, unemployment, poverty and marginalization, people and especially young people are likely to seek changes, and this can then be expressed through different kinds of protests, which in some cases can be complemented by violent behavior (Ashour, 2009, p. 20). Though socio-economics might have proven to be an important factor in different kinds of radical behavior, it does not explain all aspects of radicalization. Firstly, it does not explain why Islam as religion is so central in the protests, but would only imply that people would address the social elements that were seemingly unfair. Secondly, it does not address cases where people from the upper class are getting involved in the protests (Ashour, 2009, p. 20). Third, socio-economics cannot fully explain the rather puzzling history of radicalization. In many years, there have been attacks against Europe, but those did not have a great effect on Muslims in Europe or on the mainstream European attitudes and perceptions of European Muslims (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 11-13). It was not until the Paris bombings in 1995 and particularly after the events on 9/11 that the attitudes towards Western Muslims changed drastically (ibid.). The scholars arguing that certain socio-economic conditions, for example that the life quality for immigrants are not as good as for native citizens, are the reason for radicalization therefore have a problem in explaining this historic discontinuity and sudden change of attitudes towards Muslims in the West (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 13).

## Psychological explanations

While some scholars focus on socio-economics when accounting for radicalization, others have turned to psychology as a way to understand radicalization. Ashour (2009) argues for instance that identity is key in understanding radicalization. He divides the psychological approach into two separate, though connected, ways of understanding how *identity* can be used to explain radicalization. One understanding is that the radicalization process happens as a reaction or 'cultural defense' against the 'imperialism' of non-Islamic Western culture (Ashour, 2009, p. 20). Another quite different perception of the importance of identity in the radicalization process is that (Islamic) political culture is what leads to radicalization. The approach is based on the assumptions that *"(…) Muslims possess a strong sense of religio-cultural identity that affects their behaviors and worldviews"* as well as that *"(…) Muslim political behavior is influenced by Islamic scriptures and classics"* (Ashour, 2009, p. 21). In this second assumption, Ashour further writes that the

mentioned textual sources are often quite vague, and that this is what lays ground to the sometimes radical interpretations of their messages. There have been some heavy points of critique directed towards these identity focused approaches. Firstly, when it comes to culture, it is extremely difficult methodologically to conduct research on cultural issues without being biased to some extent. Secondly, there are many questionable assumptions included in the approach. One is that all Muslims, no matter if involved with Islamist movements or not, have a strong religio-national identity, and another is that such identities are likely to encourage political action (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Ashour (2009) lists several cases which directly disprove the linear way of approaching the relation between identity and violent anti-democratic behavior. He further emphasizes the fact that connecting political culture with political behavior fails completely in explaining why Islamist movements change over time, since "*if identities are primordial, classic scriptures do not change and Islamist movements strongly uphold both, why would these groups change their behaviors and ideologies and therefore radicalize, de-radicalize or moderate?"* (Ashour, 2009, p. 22).

Like Ashour, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015, pp. 8-11) also discuss how scholars have attempted to explain radicalization through psychological measures. Here, their main focus is how radicalization research has often focused on what personality traits are characteristic for terrorists. The authors argue that psychological terrorism research has been inconclusive in determining unique psychological and personal features, such as radical religious beliefs, relative deprivation, identity crisis, social status etc. (see for example Silber & Bhatt, 2007), characterizing terrorists and thereby separating the 'radicals' from the 'moderates', and that there is a list of radicalization aspects which cannot be explained through psychology. Where psychological explanations fall short is for example in explaining why some well integrated young Muslims in a Western society become radicalized. When scholars try to explain this by arguing that hatred towards Western values is transmitted through generations, yet another problem arise: why are second- and third-generation Muslims more radical than their parents, and what links them to radicalized forms of interpreting Islam when they have no direct affiliation with Middle Eastern contexts? (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 10). Some argue that the engagement with radicalized activities and jihad is attractive to some second- and third generation Muslim immigrants, because these may find it hard to identify with both the traditional culture of their parents and the modern Western culture and to settle with this 'dual cultural identity' (King & Taylor, 2011). Then some will turn to extreme ideologies, through which they can create a new, alternative identity as part of a bigger global Muslim community (Rabasa & Benard, 2015, p. 58).

Above, we saw how Ashour accounted for the inability of psychological approaches to explain why Islamist movements change over time (Ashour, 2009). Similarly, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi mention how psychological

approaches fail to explain changes also at the individual level. It cannot explain why a person who was earlier considered 'moderate' at some point can change his/her beliefs and behavior in more 'radical' directions (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 10). Furthermore, it does not provide good reasoning as for why most individuals with 'high risk' psychological traits do not become radicalized (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 10). If such psychological traits were the reason for some people to become radicalized, then why would the majority of people with such traits never develop any sign of radicalization?

With all the pitfalls, it might seem strange that so many scholars attempt to explain radicalization through psychology. However, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi suggest a reason for why it is so popular by referring to 'attribution theory' (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 9), which suggests that people tend to consider own behavior as stemming from situational or environmental forces, whereas the behavior of others is considered as stemming from internal forces, such as personality (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 9). This could explain why Western scholars as well as governmental institutions tend to blame radicalization on the psychology of those men and women who are seen to 'deviate' from social standards through 'radical' ideas and in some instances violent behavior.

### Political pressure/Geo-political explanations

The third explanation to radicalization is concerned with the influence of political pressure or repression. The arguments here are that political 'stress' in terms of strong authoritarianism, state repression and foreign military occupations are all factors that are likely to induce reactionary radicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 22; Pape & Feldman, 2010). Scholars following this approach take distance to the understanding that religious and psychological factors are central factors for radicalization. The approach does not suggest that everyone facing political pressure will react politically and/or become radicalized, but instead suggests that political pressure can function as a contributing factor in the process of radicalization. Though much of the literature on radicalization consistently focus on identity and political culture as the main 'causes' for radicalization, there is interestingly substantial empirical support for the approach focusing on political pressure and military occupations (Ashour, 2009, p. 22; Pape & Feldman, 2010).

Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) discuss politics as the basis of one of the popular scholarly explanations to radicalization. However, whereas Ashour talks about political pressure in a Western context, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi refer to geo-politics in the Middle-Eastern context, more specifically political conflicts and wars in the Middle-East, such as those seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel/Palestine in which Western powers are involved. Major geo-political events such as wars in the Middle-East led by Western nations are often mentioned as motivators for Western Muslims for getting involved in terrorism against the West (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 13). However, like the explanations previously mentioned, also geo-politics cannot

fully explain radicalization. Unlike the other explanations, it provides an explanation for the historic discontinuity of radicalization as phenomenon, stating that although not much has changed in the geo-politics of the Middle-East in recent decades, the conflicts in the area have changed character and become a 'fight for Islam'. This change of focus to religion can explain why also Muslims in the Western world, including second- and third-generation migrants without much affiliation to the Middle-East, can start feeling a connection to Middle-Eastern conflicts.

### 3.1.2 Process models

In the previous sections, I attempted to give an overall account of how existing research on radicalization has been dominated by a variety of theoretical approaches that strive to find explanations to what causes radicalization. Not only have many different reasons been considered – there are also quite a few models that have been developed in order to describe the actual process that is perceived as being central for radicalization. Whereas some of the models suggest that the radicalization process emerges from a combination of a specific set of factors (McCauley & Moskalenko, Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism, 2008), others suggest it to be a linear progressive process with certain stages (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 15).

One of the most well-known models within radicalization research was developed by the New York Police Department as a reaction to the rise in terrorism against the West after 9/11 (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Silber and Bhatt take a bottom-up approach and portray the radicalization process in four main stages, through which a cognitive opening to 'radical beliefs' takes place in the mind of the radicalized individual. The model consists of four separate phases, which can lead an individual with 'moderate' beliefs and opinions into a pattern of gradually radicalizing stages. The first phase is named 'pre-radicalization' (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 22), and is concerned with those most vulnerable to adopting radical ideas. Characteristics for such vulnerability are arguably many and varied, but what is interesting is that the mentioned characteristics describe a very large group of people. Silber and Bhatt argue that the typical person for this first phase is: a Muslim male under 35, who live in a Western liberal society, is second or third generation immigrant, well-educated with a middle class background, non-criminal, non-radical and "unremarkable" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Furthermore, it is argued that converts are especially vulnerable to radicalization. These characteristics are quite remarkable, because they more or less describe a normal, well-functioning human being. The only characteristic that stands out as non-standard for a Western citizen is the Muslim background. This is arguably extremely counterproductive, as the model then targets Muslims as a whole homogeneous group. Muslims who blend in well in a Western society and who are quite successful are portrayed as being most vulnerable to radicalization. Through this representation, it becomes impossible

for Muslims to live as part of a Western society without being object to constant suspicion from their surroundings. The second phase of the model is that of 'self-identification' and this is when the individual will start adopting 'radical' Salafi religious ideas. Silber and Bhatt argue that this is often a result of a major event for the individual, be that economic, social, political or personal in character. The third phase is that of 'indoctrination', and this is the phase in which the individual intensifies his ideas and fully adopt jihadi ideology. In the fourth and final phase, the 'jihadization', the individual will have accepted his or her duty to participate in jihadi activities and terrorist attacks (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). In the model, it is emphasized that even though an individual goes through some or all of the phases, it is not necessarily the case that they will carry out terrorist attacks. Some will not go through all four phases, but if they do they can be considered a serious threat to the society (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 84). In the model, it becomes clear that even though the purpose of the model developed by Silber and Bhatt has the purpose of countering radicalization leading to terrorism in the West, there is no focus on political radicalization whatsoever. Instead the focus is on how to counter religiously inspired radicalization, or more specifically Islamist radicalization. This shows by the way terms such as jihadization and Salafism are used in the description of the radicalization phases in the model.

Similarly to Silber and Bhatt's model, there are several other models which follow the structure of 'steps' in the radicalization process. However, there are also models that do not follow this linear structure of development, based on an escalation of radical views, attitudes and actions. An example of a non-linear model is that developed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). In their model, they visualize the radicalization process as a pyramid, where terrorists are the apex of the pyramid. In the pyramid model, there is a rising level of violence or support for violent activities as one moves from the bottom to the top. The violent terrorists are visualized as the apex of the pyramid, because they are rather few in numbers in relation to the number of people who share their beliefs. McCauley and Moskalenko argue that the reason for why individuals move towards the top of the radicalization pyramid is to be found in the in-group relations of the individual, and that radicalization and terrorism are made possible through group-dynamics in small groups (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 16). This is interesting as it deviates from the more linear approaches such as the one by Silber and Bhatt above and thus provides a more complex understanding of how the radicalization process develops and progresses. This, however, does not make it any easier to determine one general process of radicalization and therefore one 'correct' way to counter it. It does therefore not help governments and anti-radicalization efforts much to develop effective strategies, but can instead help understanding the complexity of the issue and why a certain counter-strategy might not be as efficient as it was thought to be if based on a linear process model.

With a review of existing models, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) have developed their own approach to understanding the radicalization process. They argue that there are certain aspects that have not been addressed much in previous process models but which do, however, have much influence on how the radicalization process takes place. Public discourse is an aspect, which they consider to be of utter importance, and they have therefore studied how the use and changes in public discourse have affected forms of radicalization in Europe. As part of these studies, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) have attempted to understand the relationship between integration and public discourse, in terms of how certain public discourses regarding Muslims can affect the identity of Muslims in Europe and thereby also their integration into Western societies. They see public discourse as a means to not only create or establish certain identities within individuals but also as a means to destroy identities. This loss of identities can then push individuals onto a rather single-minded track, where one dominating identity will take over from lost identities and thereby make individuals more vulnerable to radical ideas; ideas which would have been rejected if more identities had influence on the perceived in- and out-groups. This point about a strong correlation between identities, public discourse and radicalization will be further elaborated in a later section, as this is a correlation which is of much importance for this thesis.

## *Radicalization as a relative concept*

When discussing radicalization, a reoccurring point is that there are several different perceptions on what exactly the term covers. Here it is important to understand that it is not possible to give a universal definition of radicalization, as it is a concept which is relative to the perception of social 'standards', more specifically what people consider normal or acceptable behavior. People from the same society might have very different perceptions of what is 'normal', 'moderate' behavior, and this entails that people from within the same society can also have quite different perceptions of what can be considered 'radical' and 'deviant' behavior. In order to understand what the term 'radical' truly covers in a certain social context, one must first understand and define what is 'moderate' (Neumann, 2013, p. 876; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 28). As Goerzig and Al-Hashimi put it, "*[t]he perception of the existing order is decisive of the evaluation of what is radical*" (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 28).

### 3.1.3 Radicalization and terrorism

The correlation between radicalization and terrorism is also a cause for critique among some scholars. There are scholars who have widely criticized this relationship, arguing that research on radicalization has mainly been produced for governments and anti-terrorism institutions, and that this makes the research biased and leaving out elements such as the actual root-causes for radicalization (Kundnani, 2012, p. 8; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013, p. 378). The researchers concerned with terrorism and its relation to

radicalization are much focused on finding specific causes for radicalization and personality features of the individual terrorists. If such specific things are identified and the whole issue of radicalization is de-politicized, it becomes much easier to justify counter-policies and action plans targeting individuals in order to prevent radicalization and terrorism (Kundnani, 2012, p. 7). This focus on determining features of the 'standard' terrorist in terms of their radicalization process supports Goerzig and Al-Hashimi's statement that recent literature on radicalization is more concerned with *how* radicalization happens rather then *why*.

It is not surprising that many people make the connection between radicalization and terrorism. It is, however, important to understand that there is a significant difference between the two. While terrorism refers to violent anti-democratic actions against the society, radicalization can be many things and does not necessarily entail violent behavior (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Though some might argue that violent actions are part of radicalization, thus erasing the line between terrorism and radicalization, researchers would agree that radicalization is merely the process which in some, but not all, instances results in terrorism (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). As McCauley and Moskalenko argue, *"(…) beliefs alone are a weak predictor of action"* (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, p. 279), and it is therefore useful to be able to distinguish between 'cognitive radicalization' and 'behavioral radicalization' (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 29).

Similarly, the existing research on both radicalization and terrorism is quite often paying much attention to (Islamic) religion as a cause for radicalization. Such research is based on the assumption that because many of the terrorist attacks against the West in the last two decades have been carried out by self-proclaimed fighters of Islam, their actions are also by scholars attributed to Islam. However, in recent years, this approach to identifying causes for radicalization has received much critique for being generalizing to Muslims and for equating Muslim faith with violent activities (Abbas, 2012; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Similarly, it appears that many researchers do not distinct much between radical beliefs and violent radical activities. Many of the radicalization models, for example, describe how a person by going through a process will end up carrying out terrorist activities. Radical beliefs are in such models merely seen as beliefs developed as part of the process towards violent radicalization, and it is not considered an option that radical beliefs may not lead to violence. This is a strong point for critique among scholars challenging the post-9/11 radicalization research, as there has no empirical support for the assumption that radical beliefs are a preceding factor for violent radicalization (Neumann, 2013). Because this assumption in imbedded in much of the research on radicalization, certain branches of Islam, especially Salafism, have often been targeted as dangerous religions, because they are what some would refer to as 'radical' religions (Kundnani, 2012, pp. 9-10). Again, this has not been documented (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010), and targeting certain people as dangerous based on their religious views are therefore more islamophobic and

discriminatory than it is academic. In the following section, islamophobic approaches to radicalization will be further discussed.

## 3.2 Islamophobic approaches to radicalization

When reviewing the existing literature on radicalization and the critiques of it, there are certain terms that appear more often than others. One of these, and indeed a very important one, is that of islamophobia. Islamophobia is not a new term, and neither are the interreligious conflicts, fear and racism, to all of which islamophobia is highly related. However, before the 21st century and especially before the tragic events of 9/11, islamophobia was not addressed to the degree as has been seen along with the increase in terrorist attacks against the West. Because many of these terrorist attacks have been carried out by militant groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL, who claim to be fighting for Islam, large parts of Western communities have come to think of Islam as a violent religion and an enemy to the Western world. Therefore, Muslims all over the world with no connection to this violent interpretation of Islam have also been targeted as enemies of the West. Before moving on to a discussion on how islamophobia is becoming main-stream in many approaches to radicalization, I will first briefly introduce the concept of islamophobia and its development.

### *Conceptualizing islamophobia*

The first important piece of literature on islamophobia is the Runnymede Trust report that was published in 1997 under the title 'Islamophobia a challenge for us all' (The Runnymede Trust, 1997). The report addresses the concept of islamophobia and further addresses the societal issues related to it. In the report, islamophobia is referred to as "*recognisably similar to xenophobia and Europhobia, and is a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims*" (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1). The fear and hatred against one group of people based on a single characteristic shared by the group is very similar to the definition(s) of racism. In the debates about islamophobia, scholars have discussed how to define islamophobia, and although the term is still contested, most scholars have agreed upon discrimination and hatred against Muslims as being central features of islamophobia (López, 2011, p. 557). However, it is still debated whether such discrimination and hatred are directed against skin color, ethnic origin or religion, and this has further prompted a discussion on whether or not it even makes sense to use the term islamophobia, or if it is not simply a type of racism targeting Muslims (López, 2011, p. 557). When reviewing a definition of racism, it is not hard to understand why some scholars consider islamophobia as a subcategory to racism. Take for instance the definition from the Oxford Dictionaries, which defines racism as "*prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior*" (Oxford Dictionaries). Alhough there is much similarity between the concepts of islamophobia and racism, scholars often refrain

from equating the two. Instead, they attempt to provide a more specific explanation of how the two are related. One scholar, Tariq Modood has referred to islamophobia as 'cultural racism' and similarly, Fred Halliday uses the term 'anti-Muslim' when describing the nature of islamophobia (López, 2011, p. 557). These two terms are building upon the same thought that islamophobia is not simply directed at the religion of Islam, but rather that the discrimination and hatred are directed against Muslims. Modood's term 'cultural racism' is in itself an argument against recognizing islamophobia as a phobia based upon religion. Instead, he argues that it is based on Muslims, who *"(…) are identified in terms of their non-European descent, in terms of them not being white and in terms of their perceived culture"* (López, 2011, p. 557). Because islamophobia is not directly directed at biological characteristics of the target group, it cannot be equated with racism. However, as Modood argues, the intolerance is more concerned with the non-European characteristics and perceived culture of Muslims than it is with Islam. Following these thoughts, Fred Halliday used the term 'anti-Muslim', stating that islamophobia does not have much to do with religion but is plain intolerance towards Muslims in general (López, 2011, p. 557). Modood and Halliday both reject the notion of islamophobia completely. In this case of intolerance towards a large group of people, not necessarily sharing more than an attachment to a certain religion, the term islamophobia is merely a better sounding word than intolerance, racism or whatever word that could potentially be applied.

## *Mainstreaming of islamophobia*

Since 9/11, there has been much focus on terrorism in the West, and in that connection Muslim immigrants have been profiled as a dangerous group in a national (and international) security context. This way of profiling a large group of people as dangerous based on their appearance rather than their behavior or intentions is yet another factor for pushing Muslim citizens further towards the margins of Western societies (Humphrey, 2007).

Surveillance programs targeting Muslims, hardened migration policies and strong anti-Muslim political discourses have become reality in many Western countries (Kundnani, 2014), and all over Europe there is a continuous rise in support for anti-migration politicians and parties (Akkerman, Rooduijn, & de Lange, 2016). Examples of such include the Dutch 'Freedom Party' led by Geert Wilders, the German party 'Alternative für Deutschland' led by Frauke Petry and the 'French party Front National' led by Marine le Pen (Schuster, 2017). These are examples of some of the parties using the strongest anti-Muslim rhetoric. The anti-Muslim tendencies is not limited to politics, but have also been strengthened through media coverage. Although the media have often reported rather critically on political anti-Muslim statements, they are still placing much focus on whether or not people can be Muslim and share Western democratic values at the

same time. The increased surveillance of Muslims along with the anti-Muslim discourses, which can be seen all over Europe, are contributing factors in creating an acceptance of the construction that Muslim communities are 'suspect communities' (Kundnani, 2012). The rise in anti-Muslim political discourse and the establishment of 'suspect communities' in the Western world is only adding to the increasingly common understanding that Muslims are dangerous and incompatible with Western values, and this has and will inevitably put more pressure on the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims in Western societies.

Douglas Pratt takes part in the above discussion by suggesting that the increased islamophobic attitudes in Western Europe can be seen as a 'co-radicalization' to Islamic radicalization (Pratt, 2015). Pratt argues that certain right-wing Christian or quasi-Christian religio-political discourses portray Islam as a threat which deserves strong countermeasures; and that the strong anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions, being either exclusionary or even eliminating, thereby seem justified (Pratt, 2015, p. 216). When the 'threat' of Islam is continuously highlighted, and actions against it are being justified on basis of fear of the 'other', the anti-Muslim attitudes, which were previously considered extreme, are increasingly gaining support and acceptance, and this is when islamophobia tends become more main-stream than extreme (Pratt, 2015, p. 216). Western fear of the Muslim 'other' is surely fueled by Islamist radicalization and Islamist terrorism against the West, but the relation between radicalization and islamophobia is more comprehensive than that. Ironically, islamophobia can also fuel Islamic radicalization further, as the homogenization and exclusion of Muslims are dividing Muslims and other Western citizens in a way that will not allow for Muslims to be both 'Western' and Muslim at the same time (Abbas, 2012; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015). Simultaneously, the Western implementation of anti-Muslim policies is creating an image of 'a Western war on Islam' (Abbas, 2012; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015). The next section will discuss how the radicalization debate fosters islamophobic discourses, and how such discourses can affect the risk of non-radical Muslims to become radicalized.

## 3.3 Radicalization and islamophobic public discourse

In the discussion of radicalization, its causes and how to counter it, certain discourses are created. As suggested in some of the literature on radicalization and terrorism, islamophobic discourses can have much influence on Islamist radicalization (Abbas, 2012; Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015; Kundnani, 2014). This section is therefore dedicated to the use and development of discourses concerned with Muslims and radicalization in a Western context. Goerzig and Al-Hashimi's model for radicalization, the 'radicalization circle' will be accounted for, as this theoretical approach provides a good analytical tool for analysis of the relation between discourses and radicalization. When applying this theory to the analysis, the point is not

only to identify public discourses in Denmark, but also to identify how the public discourses on the matter might influence or be influenced by the 'problem' of radicalization as represented in the Aarhus anti-radicalization model.

### 3.3.3 The 'Radicalization Circle'

Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) have conducted research on the correlation between public discourse about Muslims and the development of radicalization among Western Muslims. From existing radicalization research, they have adopted the idea that discourse can be a factor in the creation and development of certain identities. Discussing how discourses can contribute to building identities, they introduce the idea that discourses can also be a factor in breaking down identities. From their perspective, this process of losing identities equals the process of radicalization (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 144).

Goerzig and Al-Hashimi describe how discourses can lead to identity loss by categorizing identity loss into three different categories: Private vs. public identity; public vs. political identity; and political vs. national identity. Common for the three categories is the idea of a 'radicalization circle', in which discourses portraying Muslims and Islam as being in contrast with Western values lead to identity loss, which leads to radicalization, which again leads to the use of certain discourses (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 132-140). Through this process, strong in- and out-groups are formed, and this is what creates a social cliff between Western societies and some Muslims members of them. Below is depicted Goerzig and Al-Hashimi's model of the radicalization circle.



(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 145)

In order to understand the idea of this model on a more concrete level, this model will now be briefly explained through the three categories mentioned above.

## *Private vs public identity*

The first category is the one dealing with private versus public identity. When the public discourse portrays Islam as being in opposition to Western society and values, a (Western) public in-group will be formed and equalized with a non-Muslim out-group. This will lead to identity loss among some Muslims, who will then identify their private in-group as a contrast to the non-Muslim out-group. The loss of identification with the public in-group will then push the individual into replacing it with private in-groups characterized by being in opposition to the non-Muslim public. Because the discourse portrays Islam and Western society as incompatible, the individual will thus be pushed into letting the identity of being a European Muslim replace his or her public identity (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 132-135). When depicting this process in the radicalization circle, it looks as follows.



(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 135)

## *Public vs political identity*

The second category is concerned with public versus political identity. Here the focus is first on how public discourse portrays Islam as being in opposition to European democratic values. This forms a political in-group, which, when contrasted to Islamic values, can also be viewed as a non-Muslim outgroup. This can

result in identity loss for the Muslim individuals, whose public in-group will then be characterized by being in contrast with the non-Muslim out-group. The lost political in-group will next be replaced with the strengthened public in-group, which is defined by being in opposition to European politics and democratic values. The political identity will hence be overridden by the new and strong public identity of the 'European Muslim' (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 135-137). A visual overview of this category of identity loss is given in the model below.



(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 137)

## *Political vs national identity*

The third category of identity loss is the one concerned with political versus national identity. Here the focus is on how the media creates a discourse which depicts the wars fought by European nations as being wars against Islam - not other nations. The national in-group is equalized with a non-Muslim out-group. The European Muslim will thereby lose his or her political identity or in-group, and strengthen his or her in-group as a European Muslim defined by being in contrast with the non-Muslim out-group. Lastly, the lost national in-group will be replaced by a political in-group, which is characterized of opposing non-Muslim European politics (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 137-140). Discourses depicting a European war on Islam can thus cause the political identity of European Muslims to be characterized by being in opposition the national identity. Below, it is visualized through the radicalization circle how this process evolves.

(Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 139)

## *Reflections in the 'radicalization circle'*

The three categories of identity loss might seem quite similar. This surely is the case as the identity losses in all three cases are leading towards the same outcome, but the lost identities are quite different in each case. In the category of private versus public identity, the European Muslim is forced into making a choice between his or her Islamic and Western identities, as the discourses claim these two to be incompatible. In the category of public versus political identity, the choice will be between Islam and democracy as these are also discursively presented as incompatible, and in the third category of political versus national identity, the choice will be between Islamic belonging and a national feeling with the Western country of residence. Though the three lost categories are quite different, they share the identity, with which other identities are replaced in the radicalization process, namely that of Islamic identity. The loss of several identities binding the Muslim individual to a Western society will create an over-identification with Islam, and because the public discourses in the West claim that Islam in many aspects is incompatible with the West, this can make individuals with a strong Islamic identity narrow minded and potentially make them target the non-Muslim Western world as one big out-group. This is, according to Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015, pp. 144-145), the radicalization process.

There are many aspects of Goerzig and Al-Hashimi's model which are interesting, both for radicalization research in general but also for the purpose of this thesis. In their discussion of the radicalization process

and of factors which can unintentionally accelerate such a process, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi mention for example that a high level of integration in a Western society might have a counterproductive side. When a European Muslim is well integrated a Western society, his or her 'Western' identity is strong. In this case, discriminating public discourses against Islam will, according to the radicalization circle theory, force the individual to choose between the Islamic identity and the Western identity. If that of Islam is chosen, the individual will start destroying identities which are much related to Western culture and society. Integration, if accompanied by anti-Muslim discourses, is indirectly making the way for more radicalization, because when public discourses are destroying identities among the European Muslim, only existing identities can be lost. Therefore, the more the individual can identify with Western culture and society, the more likely a loss of identities will be (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, p. 142).

As mentioned, the public Western discourses are often establishing a representation of Islam and European values as being incompatible. Because this discursive cliff is made, people might feel like there is no middle ground for being both Muslim and 'Western' at the same time. It is wrong to say that Muslims do not enjoy Western ideas and values in general (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 146-147), but when the Western society then turns on Islam and representing it as a 'bad' and violent religion, it is not surprising that some Muslims do not appreciate it. When some Muslims then led their Islamic identity override their Western identities, they create one big in-group consisting of Muslims only and hence also an enormous non-Muslim out-group. This out-group will then be characterized by stereotyping and de-personalization. When this happens, it will further provoke more radical anti-Muslim public discourses, and this is how the radicalization circle keeps going around. Because of the circular progressing of the radicalization circle, it is very hard to say, whether Islamism provokes islamophobia and discriminating discourses, or whether it is the other way around (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015, pp. 147-148). In the analysis chapter of this thesis, public discourses and the Aarhus Model will be examined, and to understand the relation between discourses and radicalization in Aarhus the 'radicalization circle' will be applied.

### 3.3.4 Moral panic

When discussing radicalization, there is a term that can be quite useful in order to understand how radicalization is related to the concepts of islamophobia and public discourse. This term is called 'moral panic'. Moral panic is a concept which was originally introduced by Stanley Cohen. Cohen studied societal reactions to anti-social outgroups and how the society reacted to such groups with fear and moral panic. In his thesis, he defined the term 'moral panic' as follows:

*"A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral*

*barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something that has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself."* (Cohen, 1980, p. 9)

One of the main points in Cohen's theory on moral panic is that the society in need of a scape-goat for social changes will direct its attention to a certain group of people who deviate from societal norms and standards and turn the people of the group into 'folk devils' (Hunt, 1997, p. 631). Another point is that moral panic is created by the media or through the media by interest groups, also called 'moral entrepreneurs' (ibid.). These can use the media to shed light on any topic and, by using certain language in the representation of the topic, create moral panic in the society. A very important variable of Cohen's theory is that the mass media is involved. Without it, certain topics would not receive enough attention to create panic throughput the society. It should be noted, however, that even though moral panic is often a result of mass hysteria and delusion, the social issues on which it is based, would exist no matter the attention (Hunt, 1997, p. 631).

Since the introduction of the concept of moral panic, other scholars have contributed with knowledge as to why and when moral panic happens in the first place. In Cohen's theory, moral panic originates directly from the media. In research carried out by Stuart Hall and others in 1978 (Hunt, 1997, p. 634), the media was considered of much importance, just like it was in Cohen's own research. However, where Cohen considered the media as being the instance creating the base for moral panic, Hall et al. considered the media simply to be reproducing and sustaining news creating panic. They instead see the news as originating from members of the police and the judiciary. The media can then, consciously or not, function as an instrument of state control (Hunt, 1997, p. 634). Another difference between the two theories on moral panic lies in the attitude towards the rationality of the panic. Hall et al. define moral panic by arguing that "[*when] the official reaction to a person, group of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat*" and "*when the media representations universally stress 'sudden and dramatic' increases (in numbers involved or events) and 'novelty', above and beyond that which is sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic*" (Cohen, 1980, p. 16). This definition of the term implies, in opposition to Cohen's theory, that by addressing the structures

and conditions under which moral panics tend to be created, there is a chance to avoid moral panic from happening (Hunt, 1997, p. 635). Furthermore, the take on moral panic by Hall et al. suggests that moral panic is a political phenomenon. This differs quite a lot from Cohen's theory, which implies that moral panic is a result of cultural strains and ambiguity, and the theories on moral panic have therefore shifted from focusing on social control and cultures, into focusing on political operations (Hunt, 1997, p. 636).

As Hunt (1997) writes, Goode and Ben-Yehuda have in their 'elite-engineered' moral panic model further expanded the notion of moral panic as it was formulated by Hall et al. They have redefined the term, arguing that "*the ruling classes 'deliberately and consciously' create a moral panic about 'an issue that they recognise not to be terribly harmful to the society as a whole' in order to divert attention from more serious problems*" (Hunt, 1997, p. 635). Whereas this and the previous theory suggest that moral panic is a 'top down' process, Goode and Ben-Yehuda have further identified another theory of moral panic. In this theory, moral panic is seen as 'bottom up' process, based on the assumption that the elite, including both politicians and the media, cannot create concern about topics, about which no concern existed before (Hunt, 1997, p. 636). This theory therefore suggest that moral panic must originate from *"(…) genuine public concern, reflected or magnified by the media, perhaps, but arising more or less spontaneously"* (ibid.). It is further argued that moral panic happens as a result of real fears among the people. Fears of specific criminal problems in the society are magnified by the media, resulting in moral panics (Hunt, 1997, p. 637). In that sense, this theory takes distance from words such as 'hysteria' and 'panic' from the previous theories and replaces these with 'fear' and 'alarm'. The reaction to societal issues is therefore considered much more rational in this theory than in the other theories on moral panic. It also takes distance to Cohen's factor of interest-groups in the development of moral panics.

In relation to this thesis, the concept of moral panic is interesting on several levels. Though there are some quite different views on what moral panic is, how it arises and who are involved in the process of it, there are aspects which are included in all the views on moral panic and which are very relevant to the study of counter-radicalization efforts in a political context; in the media coverage of radicalization; public representation of Muslims in a Danish context; as well as how these different 'factors' might merge and create a certain discourse which can influence the level of radicalization. One could argue that there is indeed a high level of moral panic about terrorism, radicalization and to some extent Muslims living in the West. Assuming that there is some level of moral panic related to these in the West and more specifically in the municipality of Aarhus, Denmark, the question is not only whether or not it is there, but also if it has an influence on the development of radicalization in general.

# 4 Methodology

*The WPR approach to policy analysis*

In this thesis, I will attempt to analyze the Aarhus anti-radicalization model also known as the 'Aarhus Model' in terms of not only the policy itself, but also different contextual aspects which might have had influence on the policy. Within the methodological field of policy analysis, there are different opinions how to research policies. Whereas the literature on policy analysis has often been concerned with how policies are used to address certain societal problems (see e.g. Dunn, 2016), the scholar Carol Bacchi (Bacchi, 2009) has turned the concept of policy analysis up-side-down, introducing a new approach for analyzing policies. Bacchi (Bacchi, 2009) suggests that instead of researching how politicians address problems through policies, the focus should be expanded and redirected into focusing on how the problems addressed in policies are *created*. She argues that politicians do not only attempt to solve given problems, but that they are also involved in the process of producing those specific problems, through the way they frame certain issues.

Bacchi's approach to understanding how policies are used to frame societal problems goes under the name of *what's the problem represented to be?* (WPR). In order to conduct a policy analysis based on the WPR approach, Bacchi argues that there are certain questions that need to be addressed (Bacchi, 2009, p. xii; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 20):

1. What's the problem represented to be in a specific policy or policies?
2. What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the "problem" (*problem representation*)?
3. How has this representation of the "problem" come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the "problem" be conceptualized differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the "problem"?
6. How and where has this representation of the "problem" been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?

Bacchi also account for why she finds these exact questions important for a WPR analysis. The first question mainly serves to clarify the 'problem' which is addressed by the policy. As Bacchi argues, "policies are problematizing activities" (Bacchi, 2009, p. 4), so they must contain implicit problem representations. The second question serves to elaborate on the first question by reflecting on the logics behind the given problem representation, that is, why the given problematization(s) makes sense. The third question is

concerned with identifying what conditions allow for the given problem representation to take form and gain acceptance (Bacchi, 2009, p. 11). The fourth question serves to identify and reflect upon 'silences' in the problem representation, that is, what problematizations are not included in the policy (Bacchi, 2009, p. 15). The purpose of the fifth question is to identify and reflect upon the effects produced by the identified problem representation. The sixth and final question builds upon the third question by investigating why and how some problem representations become dominant and legitimized, while others do not. As Bacchi writes it, "*[t]he goal of Question 6 in a WPR approach is to pay attention both to the means through which some problem representations become dominant, and to the possibility of challenging problem representations that are judged to be harmful*" (Bacchi, 2009, p. 19).

Although Bacchi argues that all the six questions should be addressed when using WPR for policy analysis, I am not going to apply all the questions to the analysis in this thesis. For my analysis, I will work with the questions in four separate analytical parts. For the first part, I will attempt to answer questions 1 and 2 from the WPR framework, as these questions are key to understand what the policy problems are represented to be. The next two parts will be based on questions 3 and 4 from the WPR framework, respectively, as I find these important for understanding the development of the 'problem' as well as for identifying the unaddressed issues in the approach of the Aarhus anti-radicalization policy. Finally, I will look at public discourses in order to investigate the relation between anti-radicalization policies, more specifically the local policy approach in Aarhus, and public discourses and their effects. In doing so, I will combine what I find most important in the final two questions of the WPR framework.

## Background theory for the WPR approach - Foucault

The WPR framework is strongly inspired by the French philosopher Foucault's thoughts on concepts such as governmentality, genealogy, discourses and the functioning of a society in general (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, pp. 27-53). In order to fully understand the framework, one must have some background knowledge on Foucauldian theory and poststructuralism in general. Poststructuralism can be described as (…) *a thorough disruption of our secure sense of meaning and reference in language, of our understanding of language, of our understanding of our senses and of the arts, of our understanding of identity, of our sense of history and of its role in the present, and of our understanding of language as something free of the work of the unconscious*" (Williams, 2014, p. 3). Poststructuralism is thus based on the idea that all aspects of how we perceive 'reality' can be disrupted, and that reality in that sense is rather liquid and changeable. In order to understand the concepts of poststructuralism, which are most central to this thesis, they will now be accounted for..

One of the Foucauldian concepts which are essential to the WPR approach is that of *power*. Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) base their perception of power relations on French philosopher Foucault's point that power is not a static 'thing', but is something that shapes our reality in a number of ways: *We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes," it "represses," it "censors," it "abstracts," it "masks," it "conceals." In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him (sic) belong to this production.* (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 29). Because power is important for the realities of a society, the purpose of the WPR approach is to investigate in depth how power is producing certain realities and excluding others by creating certain 'problem representations' through policies (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, pp. 28-31).

In addition to the understanding of power, *discourse* is a concept that is seen in connection to policy analysis (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 35). The concept and approach to discourse therefore need to be clarified when analyzing it within the framework of the WPR approach to policy analysis. Discourses are used to frame issues in a way that gives them meaning and justifies action of those in power (Bryman, 2012, 528). Discourse can thus be seen as "*(…) constitutive for the social world that is a focus of interest or concern*" (ibid.). Bacchi and Goodwin argue that discourse is important in terms of representing societal issues in a certain way, and not least in political contexts, but also that it is important to distinguish between the Foucauldian perception and the linguistic perception of what the central aspect of discourses is. Whereas linguistic theory is concerned with "what *people* say", Foucauldian theory is concerned with "*what* people say" (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 36). In alignment with Foucault, Bacchi and Goodwin therefore write that within the WPR framework, "discourses are understood as *socially produced forms of knowledge* that set limits on what is possible to think, write or speak about a "given social object or practice" (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 35). In this study, the theory on the 'radicalization circle' by Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (see pp. 21-25) will be applied in order categorize discriminatory discourses by the way they may influence the overall discourse on radicalization and thereby also the Aarhus approach to radicalization.

In order to fully understand the WPR approach, also the term *problematizing* needs to be clear. Embedded in the WPR approach are two distinct views: Firstly, when conducting a WPR policy analysis, the researcher will examine a policy by analyzing it on the level of *deep-seated assumptions and presuppositions* (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 38). Secondly, a rather different perception is that *problematizing* is the process of putting something forward as a problem or shaping an issue as such (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 38). When applying the WPR framework, there is a strong interest in how policies are producing and conceptualizing

'problems', and thus how the given 'problem' is shaped. For Foucauldian post-structuralists, there is no such thing as a 'natural' problem. Instead, problems are constituted by a variety of social factors, which will be framed and merged into something that will be socially accepted as a problem. Therefore, post-structural policy analysis is not concerned with policies as problem-solving activities, but rather as producers of problems (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 39).

Another term that is important for conducting a full WPR policy analysis is *genealogy*. Genealogy is to be understood as a long historic line of (dis)continuity influencing current practices (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 46). Understanding how practices and procedures have evolved over time can open up for a deeper understanding of the present 'realities' and 'truths', which is considered as produced through power apparatuses. Foucauldian genealogy further implies that everything has a history and that nothing is 'objectively given' (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 47). Genealogy is useful in understanding how practices and perceptions have changed over time, forming particular 'problematizations' in certain socially accepted ways (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 48). Using genealogy in policy analysis will hence provide a more historical understanding of how political 'problematizations' are formed and developed. In the case of this study, genealogy will be applied in the third part of the analysis, which serves to investigate how current problematizations in anti-radicalization policies on both national level and on local level in Aarhus have come about.

## *Application of the WPR approach to the case of the Aarhus anti-radicalization model*

In the case of this thesis, the WPR framework will be applied in order to analyze the 'Aarhus Model' in terms of how and why the main "problems" of radicalization are produced and represented the way they are. Because the Aarhus Model has received positive attention both nationally and abroad for its approach to radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization (Ravn, 2015), I suggest the possibility that the "problems" at the core of such debates are represented differently in the Aarhus Model than in anti-radicalization policies elsewhere. It is on this background that I have chosen the Aarhus Model as my case, as its celebrated uniqueness makes it a very interesting case for analysis. It is not only to be seen as a representative case, but rather as a unique case (Yin, 2009), due to the point that the case has been selected on basis of it having been promoted as standing out from other policies on radicalization. Even though the case will be considered a unique case, the findings of the analysis will still contribute to a more general theoretical knowledge and understanding of the radicalization policies. Whereas the most obvious features of the Aarhus Model are already publicly known, this study will serve to understand what 'problems' are addressed and defined, and how the policy contributes to representing the 'problems' of

radicalization in a certain way. The most important findings are therefore how problems are represented, and since radicalization policies can be seen in both local, national and international levels, the problematizations and their effects discovered through this case can be useful for other policy makers who wish to gain more awareness about underlying features of radicalization policies and thereby be able to target policies more accurately to fulfill their intended purpose.

The Aarhus Model will not be compared to other cases, as the purpose here is not to evaluate how the Aarhus Model differentiates itself from other policies. Instead, the purpose is to investigate how the "problem" is represented in this particular case; why it is so; and what effects this representation have had on the development and implementation of this particular policy approach to radicalization in the Aarhus municipal area. In order to understand the context of the anti-radicalization policies of Aarhus, I will look at the anti-radicalization polices at a national level. By studying national policies, I can gain more knowledge of the genealogy in Danish radicalization approaches, and thereby also understand the development of the policies at municipal level better. To contextualize the problematizations found present in the Aarhus Model, I will also look into what public discourses on radicalization are present and important for the Aarhus Model, and how such discourses are addressed by the Aarhus Model.

## *Data collection*

The main purpose of this thesis is to understand the Aarhus Model on a deeper policy level, and to do so, many different aspects related to the policy will be taken into account. Because of the variety of aspects covered as part of the policy analysis, the data used for the analysis is also much varied. For the initial parts of the analysis, especially official documents concerned with the Aarhus anti-radicalization efforts will be used, as reflections on these can contribute to identity what 'problems' are addressed through the Aarhus Model. The official documents and information are retrieved from anti-radicalization website of Aarhus municipality (Aarhus Municipality, 2016). Documents found there include flyers for use in schools, for professionals and for the 'concerned citizen'; and public descriptions of the initial pilot-project and continued anti-radicalization efforts and activities in the Aarhus area. The documents which are used as main sources for the analysis are provided as appendices 2 and 3 for the thesis. In addition, a document published in the academic journal *Journal for Deradicalization* by the leader of the anti-radicalization efforts, Toke Agershou, will be widely used, as it describes the anti-radicalization efforts in Aarhus more in detail than other documents. However, the documents available through the website do not hold much specific information about the people involved in the activities, how decisions are made in regard to anti-radicalization efforts, which problems are related to the work etc. Therefore these documents do not suffice as data for a thorough analysis.

To supplement the knowledge gained from official documents, an interview with police officer Rune Andersen has been conducted. This will contribute with more elaborate inside knowledge on the activities of the Aarhus Model. Rune Andersen is along with another police officer one of the key persons in running the 'Info house' which is a rather central unit in the Aarhus Model. He holds much knowledge about procedures and issues of the Aarhus Model and can thus provide the analysis with the perspective of his expertise as an insider. The interview takes form as a semi-structured interview covering not only general themes of the Aarhus Model, but also themes which have emerged throughout the first part of the analysis, namely that concerned with uncovering the actual problematizations of the Aarhus Model and the context of these. A transcription of the interview (in Danish) is to be found as appendix 1 to the thesis. In order to gain a holistic understanding of the anti-radicalization policy in Aarhus, it would also have been of much use to interview decision-makers at a higher local-political level. This would have contributed to understand the background of the policy, who have been directly involved in the design of the policy as well as to clarify the reasoning behind designing the policy in the way it has been done. However, after reaching out to several of the local politicians working within fields related to anti-radicalization, especially in the Children and Young People's Department (Børn og Unge), as well as the SSP-chief in charge of the Aarhus anti-radicalization efforts, Toke Agerschou, I received no responses to my request of interviews.

In addition to data concerned with the local anti-radicalization efforts in Aarhus, data sources concerned with national radicalization policies will also be used for the analysis. These include published action plans for national anti-radicalization policies as well as published risk assessments and yearly reports from the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET). These data sources are included as a means to contextualize the Aarhus anti-radicalization policies in terms of how it is related to current security issues and the national approaches to radicalization.

Furthermore, in order to investigate how the Aarhus approach to radicalization is related to public discourses on radicalization and Muslims, media sources will also be included in the fourth part of the analysis. Although the focus of this thesis is on the local political level, included media sources are mainly retrieved from national media agencies. National media sources are chosen because they will be used to clarify how events, be that local, national or international, may have had influence on the general discourses related to radicalization, and which in that connection also need to be addressed at the local level. Although some of these events are strongly related to Aarhus, they are events which have been central in national debate, and I have therefore chosen to discuss them and their influence from the national perspective. Including the public debate about radicalization will help determining the role of public opinion in the local approach to radicalization.

## *Academic approach*

Bacchi's WPR methodological framework for analysis is based on questions, which are quite open-ended. I have therefore mainly used the approach as a tool to structure the analysis. In the application of the WPR framework, theory on the concepts of radicalization and islamophobia will be applied in order to understand how radicalization is conceptualized and problematized in the Aarhus Model. Moreover, theory on the interrelation between discourses and radicalization will be applied. This is done in order to understand the relation between anti-Muslim discourses and anti-radicalization activities in Aarhus.

For the purpose of this study, the thesis will to a certain extent be based on existing literature on concepts such as radicalization and the use of public discourses in relation to radicalization. Based on this, the study could be considered deductive (Bryman, 2012, pp. 24-27). However, there is no hypothesis involved in the investigation of the Aarhus Model. Instead the study is designed in a way that makes it open to whatever findings are discovered in the analysis. The findings will then function as the basis of new theory on anti-radicalization efforts. This can be considered an inductive approach (Bryman, 2012, pp. 24-27), although as it is combined with a deductive approach and I through the study will move back and forth between data and theory, the approach characterizing this study can overall be considered as iterative (Bryman, 2012, p. 26).

# 5 Analysis

As mentioned, the analysis of this study will be divided into four separate parts. The first section focuses on how radicalization is problematized in the Aarhus Model; the second focuses on the development of Danish anti-radicalization policies; the third focuses on what is not sufficiently problematized in the Aarhus Model; and the fourth focuses on what discourses might interfere with the level of radicalization and the approaches to countering radicalization, and how such discourses have developed. As all the sections will serve to create a full picture of the Aarhus approach to radicalization, there will at times be overlaps between the four sections.

## 5.1 The 'problem' of radicalization in the Aarhus Model

In this first part of the analysis, I will start with a policy analysis of the Aarhus Model by attempting to answer to the two first question of the WPR approach, as these two questions are strongly related to one another. The first question asks: *what's the problem represented to be in the policy?* In order to answer this question, I will look through the Aarhus municipality anti-radicalization website (Aarhus Municipality, 2016) and the public documents describing the local anti-radicalization activities (appendix 2, 3; Agerschou, 2014/2015). This part is rather descriptive and will therefore be presented along with the part for the second question of the WPR framework which asks: *what deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the "problem"?* The aim here is to address and analyze how and which 'problems' are constructed in relation to radicalization. The section will therefore not only describe the policy initiatives, but also provide reflections on the reasoning behind the policy's representation of 'problems'.

Several of the policy documents start by mentioning that the Aarhus Model serves to prevent radicalization (appendix 2, 3), whether this is conditioned by political or religious factors. Radicalization is considered to be a process, which primarily occurs among younger generations and alters their way of thinking in a negative manner. The original 'purpose' of the Aarhus Model was therefore to promote safety and well-being among young people (appendix 3). To state the purpose as such implies two assumptions. One is that if the purpose with the anti-radicalization efforts is to promote safety, then radicalization must be considered as a process leading to dangerous behavior. This assumption is thus based on the thought that radicalization is a causal factor for extremist violence. The other assumption imbedded in the purpose of promoting safety and well-being is that people who hold 'radical' beliefs are not feeling well. This is a problematic way of viewing radicalization, as it implies that well-being is reserved for people holding more mainstream beliefs, which fits into the society's perception of what is moderate. However, as will be discussed later, none of the initiatives directly target people on the basis of their beliefs alone.

The theory chapter discussed radicalization as a concept, and it should be clear here that it is a concept which does not rest on one agreed and clear definition by experts, pundits or practitioners (Mandel, 2009). This also makes the Aarhus Model and its problematization of radicalization rather interesting, as radicalization is such a contested term that can potentially imply and include a large variety of 'problems'. In order to understand how the term 'radicalization' is understood in the Aarhus Model, we will need the definition of radicalization as it is given in the policy documents. Here it is defined as *"[a] process that leads to a person increasingly accepting the use of violence or other unlawful means to achieve certain political or religious goals.*" (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). The term is further elaborated as *"[r]isk behaviour in relation to others (security) and oneself (well-being). Defined in the context of this work as violent extremism, which is understood as: The use of violence or other unlawful means to achieve certain political or religious goals. Radicalization is seen as a phenomenon that can occur in extreme political and religious environments"* (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). The first part of this definition is rather broad as does not clarify what specific 'means' are used to reach what specific 'goals', but it does contain an element which is important for what is perceived being problematic in regard to radicalization, that is, 'accepting the use of violence'. This implies that it is indeed behavioral radicalization (see p. 17) that is the central problem. It does not directly say that one must be violent to be considered radicalized, but in the following and more elaborated part of the definition saying that radicalization is seen as a phenomenon which can occur in extreme environments, radicalization is further defined as risk behavior. It is even taken to the next step, stating that radicalization in the context of the Aarhus Model is understood as violent extremism, hence arguing that radicalization entails violent behavior. In the theory chapter (see p.17) it was briefly discussed whether or not radicalization refers to both radical beliefs and behavior, or if it only refers to radical beliefs, which can then as a result of the radicalization process lead to violent behavior such as terrorist activities. Violent behavior can therefore be seen as a central issue to the 'problem' represented in the Aarhus Model.

In the beginning of this thesis, the main initiatives of the Aarhus anti-radicalization model were briefly stated. To recapitulate, the main initiatives include guidance for concerned citizens, parent networks, youth workshops, counselling for parents of foreign fighters, mentor support for radicalized or vulnerable young people, an 'exit program', and community outreach dialog. These initiatives are rather diverse, so in order to understand how they individually contribute to the 'radicalization prevention', they will firstly be individually examined. This will make it more clear how they correlate in solving the 'problem' of radicalization. It will further help in determining exactly what the 'problem' is perceived to be.

## *The 'Info house'*

The first initiative is providing guidance for 'concerned citizens'. This is an initiative which is operationalized through the established *Info House* (Infohus), which is a central unit in the Aarhus anti-radicalization model. The Info House is staffed by local police officers who, in collaboration with social workers (see appendix 1), undertake the task of providing guidance to citizens and family members *"(…) who are worried about a person who displays concerning behavior and/or is a part of an extremist milieu"* (Aarhus Municipality, 2016). This initiative allows the 'normal' citizen to react to concerns about potential radicalization, and is thereby not directly linked to the 'problem' of radicalization, but rather to make sure that concerns among community members are addressed. I would therefore argue that the 'problematization' implied in the initiative is not radicalization as such, but instead the inability among community members to handle extremist behavior.

The Info House is furthermore involved in most parts of the anti-radicalization efforts. It does not only function as an informative unit for the broad community, but is also involved in the all the cases of radicalization within the Aarhus area (appendix 1). As police officers, the central employees at the info house have certain restrictions in their work, as they are only allowed to 'have interests' in criminal activities (appendix 1), not ideological beliefs. The interesting point here is as to where the police officers, who are part of the Info House, are allowed to be involved. The interviewed police officer, Rune Andersen, does himself reflect on this point during the interview, which shows that the limit of interference is not an overlooked point in the work of the Info house. They can work with prevention of crime, similarly to regular police work. However, there might be a risk that the presence of police in the anti-radicalization efforts will have some side-effects, for example that people might feel like they are being criminalized when approached or contacted by the police. When needing information about radicalization, for example if a parent is concerned with a child, they will be set in contact with the police working in the Info House. This might hinder communication of the actual problem of concern, if the parent is in doubt whether or not the child is involved with criminal activities and therefore will be hesitant in revealing information to the police. It is of my understanding, however, that most of the community outreach activities taking place directly within in the local communities are facilitated mainly by social workers.

## *Parent network*

The second initiative is the 'parent network', which allows parents of young people who are radicalized or involved with extremist environments to share experiences and obtain advice from others in the same situation. There have been two groups; one for parents of young people involved in right-wing extremist activities, and one for parents of young people who have travelled to Syria or Iraq as foreign fighters. This

initiative addresses the 'problem' that parents of people holding extremist views or carrying out extremist activities do not know how to handle their children's devotion to an 'extreme' cause. The parent networks are currently not running, but according to Rune Andersen, the parent network has in general been a very successful initiative, because it has created a rather unique forum for parents in the same situation (appendix 1).

Interestingly about this initiative is moreover that one of the groups is dedicated to parents of 'Syria fighters' and not 'Islamists' in general. This suggests that the focus is on the actual problem about participating in the conflict in the Levant and not on radical interpretation of Islam in general. Thereby the problem focus is shifted from a Danish context to a Middle-Eastern context, suggesting that the main cause of the 'problem' with foreign fighters is to be found in the Levant region instead of within the Danish society.

## *Workshops*

As a third initiative, workshops are being conducted for pupils in their final year of school and for those in 'further education programs' (Aarhus Municipality, 2016). The workshops are conducted as a way to create knowledge and awareness about discrimination and radicalization, and this is a rather interesting point, as it implies that radicalization happens on the basis of ignorance. Ignorance about radicalization and discrimination is thus problematized and represented as a central issue of radicalization. In this regard, it is quite interesting that discrimination and radicalization are perceived as two closely connected phenomena. This is not only expressed in connection to the workshops. It is also clearly expressed in the policy documents (appendix 2 and 3), where it is explained how discrimination can lead to radicalization. Even more explicitly, the Aarhus Model is as policy presented under the name 'prevention of radicalization and discrimination in Aarhus' (appendix 2). The argument that discrimination is a factor for radicalization puts attention on the Danish society as being part of creating the problem of radicalization. This is interesting in relation to the discussion of the parent network above, which had focus on the Middle-Eastern region as the place where the problem of radicalization is formed. The two initiatives do not focus on the same origin of the 'problem'. This might be an advantage for the Aarhus anti-radicalization efforts, as several causes are considered as contributing to the 'problem'. Thereby, no particular groups are 'blamed' for causing radicalization, and it further allows the anti-radicalization model to approach the 'problem' in a more holistic way than would have been the case if only one cause for radicalization had been identified.

## *Mentor support*

The fourth initiative is to provide mentor support for young people who are 'vulnerable' to radicalization and people who are already radicalized and active in extremist environment. The documents do not specify who are considered vulnerable in the context, but one must assume that 'vulnerable' people in this context are people who are involved with extremist environments but are not thought to have carried out radical (violent) activities. One might argue that this point alone is problematic, as it targets people based on their beliefs, based on the assumption that holding such beliefs is a step on the way towards violent radicalization. The initiative is carried out on approval by social workers, who are affiliated with the working group for prevention of radicalization and extremism in Aarhus (Aarhus Municipality, 2016). The main purpose is to help young people with getting a 'solid grip on life'. Whatever this means more specifically is not stated, but it does imply that young people without 'a solid grip on life' are in risk of becoming radicalized. However, I would argue that when it comes to young people, most are still figuring out who they are in terms of identity. This would suggest that every young person is in danger of becoming radicalized, so arguing that the main purpose of the mentor support initiative is to help young people without a solid grip on life, does not make much sense. However, the mentorship support initiative is most likely, although this is not specified, directed at young people who choose more radical paths in the process of developing their identity. This approach follows the theoretical thought that when feeling lost and not knowing one's purpose in the world, individuals can be pushed into seeking more radical paths in order to find their 'purpose' (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015).

## *Exit programs*

The fifth initiative is one that has been up for much debate. This is the so-called 'exit program', which targets adults who are radicalized, either politically or religiously, to an extent where they will need help to leave the extremist social environment with which they are affiliated. The point of the exit program is to help people out of extremist groupings and back to the 'normal' community. The exit program is tailored according to individual needs, but consists of efforts like guidance, psychological counselling, and help with education and work (Aarhus Municipality, 2016). The represented problem is here that some people will want to leave extremist groups and return to the community but do not have the resources to do so. This initiative has been much debated due to the fact that it is a very 'soft' approach to handling extremists (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2014), as it is also used for helping people who have been actively involved in violent activities, including fighting for terrorist groups such as ISIS/ISIL in the Middle East.

## *Community outreach dialogue*

As part of the anti-radicalization efforts, the municipality started in 2014 dialogs with the Grimhøj Mosque and the associated Salafist youth center MUC. This dialog was stated in addition to an already established dialog with the Somali community in Aarhus, and started as a reaction to the discovery that most of the foreign fighters from Aarhus were affiliated with either the Grimhøj Mosque or MUC (Politiken, 2014). According to the interviewed Info House police officer, the dialogs are not a matter of integration or interference with people's way of life. Instead it is a matter of ensuring that people affiliated with these places do not force their religious beliefs upon others (appendix 1). The problem addressed by this initiative is thus not expressed to be the people themselves or their beliefs, but instead that they might attempt to use their religious beliefs to suppress others.

As seen in the previous sections, the 'problem' of radicalization is approached by a variety of angles. To sum up, the identified problematizations are: that silence and potential inability among community members to handle extremist behavior exists; that parents of people holding extremist views or carrying out extremist activities do not know how to handle their children's devotion to an 'extreme' cause; that ignorance among about radicalization and discrimination can push young people into adopting radical ideas; that young people volunteer to fight in the conflict in Syria; that some young people lack competencies in living a balanced life and therefore are vulnerable to extremist ideologies; that some people will want to leave extremist groups and return to the community, but do not have the resources to do so; and that the Grimhøj Mosque and MUC are home to too many foreign fighters.

The variety in approaches shows that radicalization is not perceived as a simple concept in the Aarhus Model, but that it is perceived as a umbrella term for various 'problems'. The central problematizations, however, concern foreign fighters, ignorance or inability to cope with radicalization, and the inability of radicalized people to leave extremist groups. It can moreover be seen that although both political and religious radicalization is addressed, the focus on Islamic radicalization is somewhat larger than the focus on political radicalization.

In the next section of the analysis, I will account for how the given problem representation has come about. The next part of the analysis will hence take departure in the problematizations identified in this first part.

## 5.2 The development of anti-radicalization policies

In this section, I will continue the analysis by answering the third question of the WRP approach, that is, *how has the "problem" come about?.* To answer this question, I will look the development in policies at both national and local level, as the local level will inevitably also be influenced by development in national approaches. Aspects of how the two levels correlate will finally be discussed.

### 5.2.1 National radicalization policies

In 2005, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) presented new strategies for fighting terrorism and radicalization. After 9/11, a large fund of more than 1,5 bill. Danish kroner was assigned to the Danish anti-terror efforts in the years of 2001-2009, and an anti-terror package was implemented in 2002 (Justitsministeriet, 2002). However, after the London bombings in 2005, it was assessed that there was a need to reassess existing strategies (Regeringen, 2005, p. 3). When going through the report describing the suggestions for improved strategies (Regeringen, 2005), there are many different aspects which are addressed for improvement. These include knowledge exchange between sectors, surveillance of public places, residence permits/deportations and dialog with Muslim communities. In the report, 17 out of the 49 suggested strategies are concerned with more surveillance. Even though there is such a large focus on more and better surveillance in the report, it is stated that the government "*pays much attention to maintaining the balance between security and legal rights*" (Regeringen, 2005, p. 5), and that "*the government does not wish for a surveillance society*" (ibid.). This statement is quite interesting as it contradicts the fact that the report also includes a large number of suggestions for an expansion of the surveillance measures available to the authorities and thereby gives the authorities power to investigate citizens' communication without needing probable reasons for it.

On January 1 2007, the Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) was started. The CTA consists of a cross-sectoral team of members from the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (FE), the Danish Intelligence and Security Service (PET), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (PET). The CTA has access to all data from the four involved authorities, and undertakes the main tasks of assessing security threats against Denmark as well as the Danish international interests. Because the CTA is concerned with identifying and assessing terror threats on all levels, be that in relation to events, individuals or organizations (PET), the work in handling the threat is naturally easier if they have local departments, such as the anti-radicalization team in Aarhus, who can handle the identified threat and prevent new threats. This division of the work with CTA and PET identifying threats on a national level and local departments also creates space for the local knowledge to be used in handling specific cases of radicalization. The collaboration between PET and local police departments was initiated in 2005 through

the already mentioned campaign 'Police against terror'. However, in 2005 radicalization was still nothing but a matter for the police forces. This changed with the anti-radicalization pilot project in Aarhus, which was the first one to approach radicalization through close collaboration between social authorities, schools and the police (also referred to as SSP).

Besides establishing the CTA and making suggestions for improved national anti-terrorism efforts, the government has presented anti-extremism/anti-radicalization reports three times: first in 2009, then in 2014 and latest in 2016. The following section will investigate how the national approaches to anti-radicalization have changed through the three reports.

*2009*

The national anti-radicalization policy report from 2009 (Regeringen, 2009) was the first of its kind and can therefore also be seen as a test for how to regulate policy on the matter of radicalization. In the report, radicalization is defined as "*a process, by which a person increasingly accepts the ideas and methods of extremism*" (Regeringen, 2009, p. 8). This definition does not, like in the case of the Aarhus anti-radicalization model involve the perspective that radical beliefs will necessarily lead to violent actions. Instead it is concerned with how people through the radicalization process come to support such actions.

The report covers seven focus areas and 21 practical initiatives, which are quite many, compared to the later policy reports on the matter. What is interesting about this is that even though the Aarhus Model has received much appraisal from politicians on national level, also in connection to the later reports, the 2009 report is the one that seems most in alignment with the ideas of the Aarhus Model. The 2009 report is, in opposition to the 2014 report, much focused on prevention of radicalization. Furthermore, it follows the 'soft' approach of the Aarhus Model more than the other reports, as it is the only one to not introduce harsh approaches toward certain Muslim groups and instead focus on helping and guiding people considered at risk of radicalization. The issue of foreign fighters did not become a large 'public problem' until after the beginning of the civil war in Syria, and so there was not much call for action on this matter when the 2009 report was published.

*2014*

In 2014, the policies on radicalization were revised in a new report under the name *Prevention of radicalization and extremism* (Regeringen, 2014). This report differs from the 2009 report in regard to several aspects. To start with one of the most obvious aspects, the definitions of radicalization are rather different in the two reports. In the 2014 report, radicalization is defined as follows:

*Radicalization is not an unambiguously defined term. It is a process which can occur in different ways and which can happen within a relatively short periods of time, but also over longer periods of time. There are no simple causal relations, but radicalization can be triggered on the basis of many different factors and have different ultimate aims. Radicalization can be manifested through support for radical viewpoints or extremist ideology and can further lead to acceptance of the use of violence or other illegal means for reaching a political/religious target.* (Regeringen, 2014, p. 5)

Not only is this definition more comprehensive than the one from the 2009 report. It is also different in perception and approach to the causes and effects of radicalization. Whereas the 2009 definition is not very specific, it does suggest that radicalization is a linear process taking the individual from a state of being 'moderate' to 'radicalized' as is also suggested in theoretical process models such as the well-known model developed by Silber and Bhatt (2007). The definition from the 2014 report differs from the 2009 definition in the sense that although radicalization is still perceived as a process, much more variables are taken into consideration, both in terms of causal factors and potential outcomes of radicalization.

Another aspect, in which the 2014 policy report differs from the one from 2009 is that it is rather limited compared to the 2009 report. The number of focus areas is limited to four, and the practical initiatives are limited to 12. There are various potential reasons for this delimitation in the 2014 report.

Firstly, the policy area of anti-radicalization was completely new when introduced in 2009, so there were no experiences or theoretical knowledge to build upon. This might explain why so many focus areas were found relevant.

Secondly, the government changed in 2011, replacing the central-right wing government with a central-left one, which might have had a different view on how to approach radicalization. One major difference between the two governments was the influence of the right-wing nationalist party, the Danish People's Party, whose anti-immigration views had much influence on the central-right government, and who has often expressed a perceived connection between radicalization and Islam (Petersen; Schmidt, 2016).

Thirdly, the 2009 policy model received much critique (Lindekilde, 2015). This was especially due to the way the model connected radicalization and societal cohesion. By connecting insufficient integration with radicalization, it was argued that immigrant communities, and especially Muslim communities were targeted as dangerous to society, and that these communities as a result were turned into 'suspect communities' (Lindekilde, 2015, p. 429). In the 2014 policy, radicalization was disconnected from the policy area of integration, most obviously by changing the anti-radicalization policy area from the Directorate of Integration to the Directorate of Social Affairs (Lindekilde, 2015, p. 434).

Fourthly, the focus on Islam in the radicalization policy field was in 2011 challenged when the Breivik attack on a social-democratic youth camp in Norway made it clear that security threats exist on much different grounds than that of radical Islam.

Finally, in connection to the civil war in Syria, there was much pressure from the population to take more action against those who had travelled to militant conflict areas to fight Danish troops. The pressure came in connection to the statistics showing that Denmark after Belgium was the European country producing most foreign fighters, measured as relative to the population size (Neumann, 2015).

## *2016*

In 2016, yet another report was presented, introducing the updated Danish anti-radicalization policies under the name *Prevention and abatement of extremism and radicalization* (Regeringen, 2016). What first appears as a major difference between the 2016 report and the reports from 2009 and 2014, respectively, is the number of focus areas and practical initiatives included. Whereas the 2009 report covered 7 focus areas and 21 initiatives, and the 2014 report covered only 4 focus areas and 12 initiatives, the 2016 report covers 9 focus areas and 41 initiatives. This is a striking difference between the anti-radicalization policy approach in 2014 and 2016. When comparing the initiatives from the 2016 report with the initiatives included in the previous reports, there are many similarities. The 2016 report includes and elaborates on many of the existing initiatives, such as support and coordination of local anti-radicalization and anti-extremist efforts, involvement of the civil society, a strengthened international collaboration etc. However, there are also new initiatives included, such as focus on radicalization in prisons and an increased focus on online-radicalization. The major difference between the 2016 anti-radicalization policy and the previous ones, especially the one from 2014, is the way radicalization is perceived. In the 2016 report, radicalization is defined as follows:

*Radicalization denotes a short- or long-term process, in which a person subscribes to extremist viewpoints or legitimizes his/her actions according to extremist ideology.* (Regeringen, 2016, p. 7)

This definition is not particularly specific. It is quite similar to the 2009 definition (see p. 42), but not remotely as comprehensive as the definition from the 2014 report in terms of potential factors for radicalization as well as potential results thereof. It is quite interesting why the 2016 definition is so much more similar to the 2009 definition than to the 2014 definition. However, there might be a rather simple explanation for this. Between each publishing of the three reports, the Danish government has changed. In 2009, it was a central-right wing government, in 2014 a central-left wing government, and in 2016 again a central-right wing government, with more influence from the Danish People's Party, a nationalist-right

party. Whereas the 2014 government moved the radicalization policy area from the Danish Agency of Integration to the Danish Agency of Social Affairs, the government publishing the 2016 report has moved the policy area back to the Danish Agency of International Recruiting and Integration, which falls under the ministry of Immigration and Integration (SIRI, 2017). That radicalization as policy area again is closely connected to the policy area of immigration and integration implies that radicalization is perceived to be a phenomenon which occurs mainly among immigrants, due to a lack of integration. This is exactly what created debate in connection to the 2009 anti-radicalization policy report, as it was argued to be fostering a discourse that immigrants, and especially Muslims, to some extent are dangerous to Danish society (Lindekilde, 2015).

That radicalization is perceived as being related to Islam more than political radicalization in the 2016 policy is also made rather explicit in the introduction of the report (Regeringen, 2016, p. 10). In this introduction the main focus is clearly Islamic terrorism and ISIS/ISIL. Political radicalization is mentioned in the end of the introduction but more or less dismissed through the statement, even though it exists, "*the terror threat from political extremist environments in Denmark is, however, limited*" (Regeringen, 2016, p. 10).

A point from the 2014 report, which has received much public attention, is that of foreign fighters. The 2014 report presented suggestions to forfeit passports of people suspected of being about to participate in armed conflicts, to issue bans on travels to armed conflict areas and to tighten citizenship regulations for returned foreign fighters (Regeringen, 2014, p. 14). By the time of the 2016 report, the proposed initiatives against foreign fighters had been implemented, and in addition to this, the authorities had been granted more access to personal data in order to monitor people suspected of partaking in armed conflicts more closely. Because the current government equates radicalization with immigrants, and because the increased surveillance is concerned with conflicts in Muslim countries, there is a potential risk that much of the surveillance will be directed at the Muslim minority in Denmark, and thus contribute rather much to the construction of Muslim communities as 'suspect communities' .

### 5.2.2 Local development
*The introduction of a local anti-radicalization policy*

The Aarhus Model started as a pilot project in 2007 and was built upon a national campaign against radicalization, which was led by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) in 2005 (Danish Security Intelligence Service, 2005, p. 37). The campaign was named 'Police against terror', and the main purpose of it was to strengthen police competencies for better anti-terrorism efforts as well as to create better local collaboration between the police and other local instances and communities for anti-radicalization (ibid.).

In itself, it is rather interesting that PET launched their anti-terror campaign at this point in time. Surely, terrorism had made its way to the West several years before, manifested by the 9/11 attacks and followed by attacks such as those against Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, and it is therefore interesting, why exactly 2005 became the year when this reaction from PET came. It is indeed possible that the London bombings pushed for more action against terrorism in Denmark because northern Europe up to that point had avoided major attacks, but there may be more to it than that. In 2005, Denmark found itself in a much tensed situation, based on the highly debated and rather controversial 'Muhammad cartoons'. A large conflict emerged from the drawings and the debate which followed it and the conflict quickly spread beyond the Danish borders. The issue in this conflict was that the drawings published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten depicted the most important prophet of Islam, Muhammad, with a bomb in his turban. Westergaard, the cartoonist, later argued that the drawings should be seen as a response to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, leaving little space for democratic values (Brinch, 2006). However, it served as an extreme provocation of many Muslims all over the world, who were angry with the drawings and the act of blasphemy, which many found it to be (Weaver, 2010). Danish flags were being burned on several occasions in the Middle East, and Denmark was suddenly object to much anger from Muslim all over the world (ibid.). Threats towards Denmark were being made, and it is likely that the whole situation may have increased PET's risk assessment to such an extent that a reaction and countermeasure seemed at place.

Because it started as a pilot project and later evolved into an actual policy, the Aarhus Model has also seen changes since it started in 2005. In 2012, more funding was assigned to the local anti-radicalization efforts in order to further include adults over 18 years of age, and especially the exit program has benefitted from this increased funding (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 10). The exit program is the initiative of the Aarhus Model that has received most political and media attention. It is so, because it is not only directed at Danish extremists, but also returned foreign fighters. This has created much debate internationally, because it by some is considered a rather 'soft' approach to handling people who have potentially been involved with terrorist activities (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2014).

The general efforts for dealing with returned foreign fighters started in the end of 2013 as a reaction to the number of people travelling to Syria to fight (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 9). According to the Danish Security Intelligence Service, approximately 80 people travelled to Syria up to the end 2013 (CTA, 2013), and by the end of 2015 this number had risen to around 125, including travelers to both Syria and Iraq (CTA, 2015). The number of people who had travelled from Aarhus to join the Syrian civil war was by the end of 2013 at 32, and by 2015, this number had only increased by two (Hagemann, 2015, p. 15). Though the local data is

retrieved earlier in 2015 than the national data, I have found no sources claiming that more residents of Aarhus have travelled to Syria to fight by the end of 2015. This suggests that whereas the percentage of the foreign fighters originating from Aarhus by the end of 2013 was at 40% of the total number of Danish foreign fighters that year, the percentage was down to 4,4% within the following two years. This is quite a drastic decrease and surely suggests that the Aarhus Model has worked well in regard to this aspect.

The high number of people travelling to Syria in 2012 and 2013 was also widely addressed in the national policy reports in both 2014 and 2016 (Regeringen, 2014; 2016). While these policies focused on improving mentor- and exit-programs, they also introduced rather harsh initiatives against foreign fighters. This move might hold the purpose of scaring people from engaging themselves with international armed conflicts. However, this harsh line focusing on how to punish foreign fighters does seem to conflict with the 'soft' approach which is that of the Aarhus Model. When the national approach seems to be more concerned with prosecuting people who travel to certain conflict areas, and the local approach is more about helping people out of radicalized environments it is hard to say, what should be done. The Aarhus Model includes an exit program exclusively targeting returned Syria volunteers. However, if the national policy on the area says that all travel to the conflicted area is banned and that ignoring the ban will have legal consequences, it is hard to say what should actually be done. In the interview, Rune Andersen stated that if there is evidence that a person has committed crimes while in the conflicted area, this will surely need to be addressed. But if travelling to the conflicted area is illegal in the first place, and people who travelled there anyway returns, then what is the purpose of the exit program? The implementation and conflict of both harsh and soft approaches to foreign fighters is something that should be addressed by both national and local authorities. It does not seem possible to follow both approaches at the same time, so there is a risk of the anti-radicalization policies to become counter-productive on all levels.

Another aspect, on which the Aarhus Model and the national policy reports are not quite clear, is as to what the purpose of the de-radicalization parts of the policies actually is. It is not hard to understand the purpose of the preventive initiatives, but when it comes to the initiatives directed at people already involved with extremist environments and/or activities, the purpose is not particularly clearly defined. It is therefore not clear if de-radicalization initiatives such as mentor- and exit-programs aim at separating people from the extremist environment, with which they are involved, or if the programs cannot be considered successful until the particular radicalized individual has dismissed his or her radical ideas. In the interview with Rune Andersen, he said to the question of when an exit-program is to be finished that the exit-programs are individually tailored and end when the involved radicalized person beliefs that he or she can function normally in the society outside the extremist environment which is to be left behind (see

appendix 1). This does not completely clarify the matter of intended outcome of the de-radicalization initiatives, but it does suggest that there is no simple answer to this question. Furthermore, it does imply that leaving the extremist environment is indeed a criteria for success, although the individual will also need to develop skills, networks etc. in order to fully function outside the extremist environment.

## 5.3 Silences of the Aarhus Model

In this section, I will, in addition to the discussion of the problematizations present in the Aarhus Model, look more into what issues are *not* problematized in the model, by answering the fourth question of the WPR framework, which asks: *What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the "problem" be conceptualized differently?* The first sub-section will be concerned with discrimination and how prevention of discrimination is implemented in the Aarhus Model. In the second sub-section, I will investigate to what extent Muslims, who in the first part of the analysis were identified as being a major target group for the Aarhus Model, have been involved in the development of the Aarhus Model. In a third sub-section, I will look into the underlying problems of the established dialogs, exemplified by the dialog with the Somali community. Finally, I will discuss how the increasing focus on foreign fighters may be a problem in itself.

### *Preventing discrimination*

In the Aarhus Model, discrimination is considered of much importance in connection to radicalization. However, there are issues of discrimination which are not directly addressed. I will here look into how discrimination is addressed in the Aarhus Model, followed by reflections on how the Aarhus Model itself may contribute to discrimination.

In the policy documents it says that *"[d]iscrimination is considered as one of the most important factors in creating the conditions for the growth of radicalization"* (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). It is further stated that the practical initiatives of the Aarhus Model are based on the premises that "*a sustainable and cohesive community is developed across social backgrounds, ethnic and cultural affiliations"; "cohesion is supported by the fact that everyone experiences and utilises citizenship*"; "*the experience of discrimination and lack of experience of citizenship is one of several factors that can lead to radicalization"; and* "*prevention of radicalization in Aarhus also includes an active effort against discrimination*" (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). Especially the argument that the experience of discrimination and lack of experience of citizenship can lead to radicalization follows quite well the academic thought of for example Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), who argued that discriminating discourses are what leads to social division and potentially radicalization.

The youth workshops are the initiative which most directly addresses the issue of discrimination. In the most comprehensive document concerning the youth workshops, the model for these workshops is explained (Aarhus Kommune, 2014). It says in this document that the purpose of the workshops is to start a dialog with the youth of Aarhus at an early stage and create knowledge and understanding about radicalization, extremism, terrorism, discrimination and prejudice. The interviewed police officer argues

that the workshops are one of the best functioning anti-radicalization efforts of the Aarhus Model. However, as he also points out, the workshops are solely preventive in the sense that they focus on young people who are not considered as being in risk of becoming radicalized (appendix 1). Although the workshops may function well, it is hard to say with any certainty that they are successful, as there is no evidence of this. It does, however, by promoting diversity, tolerance and social inclusion follow the thought that social exclusion is a factor in developing radicalization (Abbas, 2012).

It makes good sense to focus on discrimination in the Aarhus Model. There is, however, an aspect of discrimination, which is not addressed in the model. This aspect is how the Aarhus Model itself can potentially contribute to discrimination. As discussed earlier, the model focuses more on Islamist radicalization than other sorts of radicalization such as political radicalization. Surely these two kinds of radicalization are both addressed, but it can still be argued that when the predominant focus is tied to one religion, members of this religion might feel targeted even if they are not affiliated with any extremist groups (Lindekilde, 2010). The policy, which has been developed exactly for countering and preventing radicalization, might therefore to some extent be counterproductive in the sense that it by problematizing Islamist radicalization indirectly is re-producing the 'problem' of Muslims in Europe, which in itself will not promote diversity and social inclusion. Addressing this issue would set up a difficult question for the municipality. The Aarhus Model is an attempt to prevent radicalization in connection to national anti-terrorism initiatives. Because the main terrorist threat for several years has been assessed to be Islamists attacking Western societies (CTA, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017), it would be strange not to address this as a problem.

The political tendencies all over Europe have changed in recent years, giving more power and support to far-right wing politicians (Schuster, 2017). As far-right wing attitudes are facing a more general reaction of acceptance, the lines for what is considered 'radical' by society may be moved. When extreme right wing attitudes are accepted by large parts of society, these can arguably be considered as included in what is 'moderate', and a large part of the 'problem' with right-wing radicalization will hence have resolved itself. It should here be noted that even though there has been a shift towards the right in European politics, this does not mean that all right-wing governments and politicians are extremists. Rather, this discussion should be considered an underlying issue for counter-radicalization, counter-extremism and counter-discrimination policies. In the case of a far-right led government using strong anti-immigration and anti-Muslim discourses, the lines of what is considered 'moderate' may be moved to the right. This can potentially mean less tolerance of cultural/religious diversity and result in a more narrow space for how much one can differ from societal standards while remaining in the category of what is moderate.

*The voice of young Muslims in local policy development*

Another issue, which has not been problematized in the Aarhus Model, is who the policy makers include. Because the policy is based upon the inter-sectoral collaboration between the police, schools and the municipality, all these instances have had the chance to contribute with their perspective. Furthermore, a professor/life psychologist, Preben Bertelsen, from Aarhus University has been involved in developing the policy based on what he refers to as the 'life psychological model of radicalization' (Bertelsen, 2015). Although the joined SSP team and Bertelsen altogether have much knowledge and expertise about different social aspects, there might still be blind spots in terms of knowledge. SSP workers have assumedly taken into consideration what they have been told in their daily work, but as they are 'outsiders' to some of the social groups with whom they interact, it is likely to be the case that they do not witness and are not told everything that goes on in the more 'closed' communities. A way to address this issue would have been to allow for the targeted (Muslim) communities to be part of the policy development. I have not been able to uncover any hearing records from the time of the initial pilot project back in 2007, which could have clarified what parties were officially involved in the project. Alternately, I have retrieved documents from a 2014 hearing on enlarged funding for the anti-radicalization efforts in Aarhus (Aarhus Byråd, 2014). Although these documents do not explicitly provide information on the involved parties in 2007, it is yet a strong indicator, as one could assume that most of the involved parties in the 2014 hearing were also involved in the 2007 project. In an appendix of the 2014 hearing (Aarhus Byråd, 2014), hearing replies from the involved parties are gathered. The replying parties are the Police of Eastern Jutland (regional police force), the housing organizations in Aarhus, the Department for families, children and youth, the HotSpot center (undertakes tasks of the Social Services in 'exposed' local areas), the Family Center, the Department for Social Psychiatry and Exposed Adults, the main MED committee (HMU), the social services MED (employee participation) committee, and the organization 'Børn og Unge' (children and youth). All these are social units, which have more or less direct interest in local anti-radicalization policies. However, what is strange is that there are no Muslim parties or community organizations involved. As earlier discussed, the main target group of the Aarhus Model is to be found within local Muslim communities. Therefore, I find it rather strange that the community is not represented in the hearing. This could easily have been done by inviting for a hearing reply from local mosques and/or Muslim unions, such as the Union of Islamic Associations in Aarhus (Forbundet af Islamiske Foreninger i Aarhus). If such parties had been involved, they could have contributed with their opinions on the matter of radicalization and the efficiency of anti-radicalization efforts.

In the Aarhus policy documents, it is mentioned that Aarhus Municipality has started a dialogue with important social Muslim units in Aarhus, namely those of the Grimhøj Mosque and the associated Muslim youth center (MUC) as well as with the Somali communities (Agerschou, 2014/2015, pp. 9-10; appendix 2). However, it does appear to be the case that these dialogs are more a working tool for preventing members of the particular communities from participating in the conflict in Syria and Iraq rather than a means to involving them in the anti-radicalization approaches. Leader of the anti-radicalization efforts, Toke Agerschou, writes about the dialog with the Somali community that "*[t]here is an open dialogue on the areas of cooperation that exist between the Somali associations and the municipality/police regarding promoting integration and prevention of radicalization – including prevention of travel to Syria, which is included as a discussion point in the dialogue*" (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 9). That he includes the example of preventing travels to Syria again establishes how much focus is put on that conflict and on young Danish people both in the Aarhus Model but also in the dialogs. Similarly, he writes in the section about the dialog with the Grimhøj Mosque and MUC that:

"*[t]hrough the work to uncover risk groups in relation to radicalization it has been established that some individuals spend their time at Grimhøjvej Mosque - both travelers to Syria and people for whom there is some other concern for radicalization. At the beginning of 2014 therefore, dialogue was initiated with the board of the mosque on how to handle the situation and more generally on the prevention of radicalization. As an extension of this, dialogue was launched with The Muslim Youth Centre of Aarhus (A Salafist Association), which is based at the mosque*" (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 10).

Again, the focal point for the dialog is explicitly to prevent people from travelling to Syria. The fact that this focal point returns repeatedly might be problematic. Surely, preventing the traffic to Syria is an important part of the anti-radicalization discussion, but there is a risk that other important points will be missed. If the main purpose is to prevent people from going to Syria, issues such as well-being and a sense of belonging in the Danish society, which are also expressed goals of the Aarhus Model (appendix 2), might not be addressed to the extent which was first intended. The effect of letting the prevention of 'Syria travelers' dominate the general anti-radicalization efforts could potentially be that the anti-radicalization unit will lose overview of the situation of radicalization and that new behavioral patterns would arise in extremist Muslim communities as an alternative to fight in Syria. If that happened, there would also be a bigger risk that neither the local nor national anti-radicalization and intelligence services would have the knowledge to approach it well, and, needless to say, this would be a serious problem to face.

In the interview, Rune Andersen argued that the people who leave Aarhus to go and fight for ISIL/ISIS cannot be characterized by simple shared similarities, but that they leave for many different reasons: some

will go in order to improve their status upon return to Denmark, others hold grievances against the Danish system, and others again simply do not see a better future, if they stay in Denmark (appendix 1). Rune Andersen does say that although there are not any shared features of the foreign fighters from Aarhus, it is shared that they want to 'make a difference for their religion'. For Andersen as representative of the anti-radicalization team in Aarhus, the purpose of going abroad as a foreign fighter can therefore be understood as related to religion, since ISIL/ISIS is fighting for an Islamic system, but also that religion is not always the most important factor for those who decides to go and fight.

The other group, with which the municipality has a dialog about radicalization, is that of the Grimhøj mosque and MUC. It is not surprising that contact to this particular mosque has been taken. The Grimhøj mosque is rather infamous for radicalizing Muslims attending it as well as for making some extreme statements against Jews (Jyllandsposten, 2016). In 2014, it also became known that many of the foreign fighters previously residing in Aarhus had been involved with the Grimhøj mosque and MUC (Willumsen, 2014; Politiken, 2014).

## *Dialog with the Somali community*

When reviewing the Aarhus anti-radicalization model, we learned already that one of the main focuses of the policy is to prevent radicalization altogether. This happens on the basis of various initiatives through dialogs with communities, who by the municipality are considered vulnerable to radicalization, as well as through informatory work such as workshops on key aspects of radicalization. As for the dialogs, it may be fruitful to create dialog and collaboration between the municipality and communities vulnerable to radicalization. However, how is it determined that these particular communities are vulnerable? In the interview with one of the police officers, who on a daily basis run the Info House, which is a central unit of the Aarhus anti-radicalization model, we discussed the issue of the 'selection' of communities who are assessed to be 'vulnerable', and he argued that as for the Somali community, there was a strong interest from the Somali side to collaborate with the municipality, but that it was a natural place to start because some young Somalis sympathized with the Somali militant group, Al-Shabaab (appendix 1).

In terms of discourse, specifically targeting the Somali community in the Aarhus area as particularly vulnerable to radicalization has some downsides. When being represented as a group, which is more than averagely vulnerable to radicalization, a discourse is created claiming that this is a group of people, whom the Danish society should pay much attention to. This might both create fear and suspicion towards the Somali communities in Denmark and also make the Somali communities draw themselves away from the broader society. The discourse that Danish-Somalis pose a threat to Danish society was strengthened in

2010, when the Muhammad cartoonist Kurt Westergaard was attacked in his house in Aarhus by a Somali man with an axe (Boserup & Søgaard Rohde, 2012). Kurt Westergaard managed to escape, but the attacker was arrested and charged with attempted murder and terrorism. The terrorism charge was based on the point that that the attack was not only an attack against Kurt Westergaard, but also against the freedom of speech (ibid.). Such an event is adding to the creation of divisive discourse between both Danish political values and Islam but also Danish society and Somalis, more specifically.

As pointed out in the interview with Rune Andersen, the Somali community in Aarhus is very well-organized. One of the main Aarhus-based Somali organizations is AarhuSomali, which often initiates cultural and informatory events in order to promote diversity and delimit prejudices against Somalis. On their website, there are several articles discussing central issues as seen from a Somali point of view. In one article, leader of the youth club "Kontaktstedet" in Gellerup says that after the attack on Kurt Westergaard, a stereotype that Somalis are terrorists has emerged (AarhuSomali). He argues that whereas it is his perception that Somalis are no longer perceived as people who do not bother to work and who are criminals; the new perception that Somalis are terrorists is once again labelling Somalis in Denmark as being of no good to the Danish society (AarhuSomali). He further states that the focus on Somalis in the radicalization debate is very offensive.

In 2010, a conference was held in Aarhus with the theme of preventing radicalization amongst Somalis (Aarhus Kommune, 2010). Such an event is a good example of how problems are produced rather than simply 'existing' as a natural problem. A conference bringing together experts on radicalization and other fields such as integration and terrorism (ibid.) to discuss radicalization among Somalis produces the 'problem' that many Somalis are in fact being radicalized and hence posing a threat to society. The problem with this is that there is not much empirical evidence supporting the claim that Somalis are of more threat than other nationalities. Furthermore, the threat from foreign fighters fighting for Al-Shabaab can be argued to be largely overrated (Andersen & Moe, 2015), as there is not much evidence supporting the claim that Al-Shabaab is a global movement fighting Jihad all over the world. Rather it is mainly a regional organization; and when recruiting foreign fighters there are no real indicators that the Western recruits will be used to carry out attacks outside the East-African region (ibid). Naturally it is a problem if people travel to this region and support an organization, which is considered a terrorist organization (Hansen, 2014, p. 2), but it does not directly pose a risk for Western countries, as there is no evidence that foreign fighters fighting with Al-Shabaab are involved in terrorist activities outside the East-African region. Therefore targeting Somalis as particularly vulnerable to radicalization in Aarhus may portray the whole Somali community as 'suspect', rather than solving any problem of radicalization.

*Foreign fighters – the major threat?*

At this point it should be clear that foreign fighters constitutes for a large part of the Aarhus Model. By some, it is considered potentially problematic that so much focus is directed at foreign fighters. The following section will discuss how this set of problems.

In a study conducted by researchers from the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS), it is argued that Al-Shabaab on several occasions has been blamed for being involved in terrorist attacks in Europe, even though it was discovered that the attacks were examples of solo-terrorism (Andersen & Moe, 2015). It is suggested in the article that the increasing focus on foreign fighters is actually counterproductive in the sense that the focus of foreign fighters as the major 'global threat' might have experts underestimating the threat from solo-terrorism (Andersen & Moe, 2015, p. 37). The article suggests that cases such as the attack against Charlie Hebdo and the Copenhagen shootings in January 2015 were falsely connected to the issue of foreign fighters; and even though it was discovered that none of the perpetrators had a background as foreign fighters, authorities and the media quickly resorted to blame and debate the phenomenon of foreign fighters (ibid.). When terrorist incidents are handled this way, focus is shifted from the actual problem, which still seems to be rather mysterious when it comes to the causes behind radicalization and terrorism, onto a 'problem' that is easier to address: in order to address the risk from foreign fighters, just do not let them travel to conflict zones. In Denmark, this has already been done in the case of the conflict in Syria, so that travel to conflicted parts of the region has been banned altogether (Justitsministeriet, 2016). However, the question is, whether or not this will make much of a difference, if solo-terrorism is actually a bigger problem. Interestingly, when I interviewed Rune Andersen, one of the central people for the operationalization of the Aarhus Model, he also expressed that he finds the focus on foreign fighters, and more specifically 'Syria fighters', to be out of focus. He said that "*diplomatically, it [the issue of foreign fighters] is an unbelievably small problem which just has unbelievably large costs for society*" (see appendix 1). He compared the problem of foreign fighters with that of burglaries in the Aarhus region, arguing that in that perspective radicalization quantitatively is much less of a problem than burglaries, but also that the challenge about the anti-radicalization work is that "*(…) when there is this one person, who gets through [becomes radicalized], then the whole society is falling apart*" (see appendix 1). This is a good point indeed, which addresses the dilemma of how many resources can be justified for the anti-radicalization work. For more reflections on the matter of how much focus should be places on the issue of foreign fighters, see the discussion chapter.

## 5.4 The relationship between events, discourses and radicalization

In this section I will address the WPR questions 5 and 6, which ask: *what effects are produced by this representation of the "problem"?* and *how and where has this representation of the "problem" been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?*. I will apply the theory of Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), and thereby analyze the relation between anti-Muslim discourses and the radicalization approach in Aarhus. In order to do so, I will discuss how certain events have had influence on the attitudes towards Muslims. Moreover, by focusing on the example of the foreign fighters, I will analyze how this 'problem' represented in the Aarhus Model has been reproduced by the media and discuss this in relation to the theory on moral panic (see pp 25-27).

### 5.4.1 Islamic identity in the West

To recapitulate the theory of Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), they argued that Western discourses contrasting Western and Islamic values can lead to more Islamist radicalization, because such discourses diminish the possibility of Western Muslims having multiple co-existing identities and hence establish a divide between Western Muslims and non-Muslims based on strongly defined in- and out-groups characterized by affiliation with Islam. More specifically, the theory includes three different aspects of identity loss: Private versus public identity; public versus political identity; and political versus national identity.

#### *Private vs public identity*

For the category of private versus public identity of young Western Muslims, this section will seek to investigate the discursive relation between Islam and Danish society in terms of how discourses are produced to contrast the two.

#### *'Danishness' – what is it?*

It has been up for debate before, but in the last year the debate about when someone can be considered Danish has been reignited. The Danish People's Party (DPP) is, not surprisingly, a large player in the debate. The DPP has expressed some very specific demands which have to be met for an individual before they are considered Danish and can perceive themselves as such. An example of such is the debate about pork meat in Danish day care institutions, which by the DPP and others was argued to be a symbol of 'Danishness' and should therefore be an obligatory constituent in the food served in day care institutions (Krarup, 2013). Many people found the discussion ridiculous, because it made Danish identity a matter of food and served to exclude those who would not eat certain foods (Berlingske, 2014). The debate about 'Danishness' only got expanded when the Danish parliament approved a proposal saying that there are areas in Denmark, where there are more than 50 percent non-Western immigrants or descendants thereof, and that no areas

in Denmark should have less than 50% Danish residents (Henriksen, Engel-Schmidt, Lindahl, & Khader, 2017). This again provoked the big question of when you can be considered Danish, as the opposition, which voted against the proposal, demanded the government and its supporting parties to define who belongs in the 'Danish' category (Vestergaard, 2017). Strongly implied in the proposal was that no-one with non-Western descent were considered Danish. The point that even descendants of non-Western immigrants were included in this category suddenly excluded a very large group from being 'Danish', including people born and raised in Denmark and no matter whether or not they felt Danish.

As most of the non-Western immigrants and descendants in Denmark are from predominantly Muslim countries, this group was obviously challenged on their public identity as Danish. This is an example of how to exclude a minority from society, and it is also an example of an event that, according to the theory of Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), can make people lose their public identities. In a case like this, it would not be unthinkable that some of the people excluded from the 'Danishness' would feel forced into replacing their public Danish identity with another. Because they were excluded based on their non-Western origin, the most obvious identities to replace the public identity would be related to their 'roots' in terms of nationality. If a stronger mental bond to their national origins was formed, some might not have much else in common with the country of origin than the religion and culture, and this could potentially mean a stronger emphasis on being Muslim. Depending on the extent to which the 'Danish' public identity would be replaced by other cultural and/or religious identities, the Danish population with Western descent would then, when following the theory of the radicalization circle (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015), be considered more or less an out-group.

In some of the Aarhus suburbs, such as Gellerup, there are areas in which there are high percentages of Muslims and people of non-Western descent. As these therefore are places, where many will potentially feel like they are deprived their 'Danishness' in the debate about who is Danish and who is not, these are also places upon which it makes sense to focus the anti-radicalization efforts, such as it is done by the Aarhus municipality. However, focusing on exactly the people who are already of the sense that they are being targeted by society brings out a paradox. On one hand, it makes sense to focus on areas which are considered as exposed to radicalization, because they are facing discriminatory discourses towards them. On the other hand, might the increased focus by the municipality not actually add to these people's sense of being different and targeted by the Danish society, from which they already feel excluded? This is one of dilemmas, the Aarhus anti-radicalization model, and other anti-radicalization models, should take into consideration. Important in this regard must be to emphasize to the people, who are involved and approached in the anti-radicalization activities that the efforts towards radicalization are not a matter of

interfering with people's lives or beliefs (appendix 1), but simply making sure that no one is forgotten and overlooked, if they are adopting ideologies and attitudes which can potentially be harmful to themselves and society. This is where dialogs with different parts of the communities can be very useful.

### *Public vs political identity*

The category of public versus political identity among Western Muslims is rather interesting. Goerzig and Al-Hashimi argued that Islam is often contrasting Islam with Western political values such as democracy. In this regard, the Aarhus Model is interesting due to the point that it does not produce discourses contrasting Islam with Danish political fundamentals. Although the main focus area within anti-radicalization policies, including the Aarhus Model, is that of radical Islamists, the Aarhus Model does not represent the 'problems' of Islamist radicalization as being related to political differences. In their discussion of how discourses are contrasting the public identity of Western Muslims with political democratic values in the West, Goerzig and Al-Hashimi are referring to discourses which portray Islam as an undemocratic religion. However, in the Aarhus Model the approach to countering radicalization is concerned with making everyone feel as they belong in the Danish society, and it is argued that a major factor which can promote high levels of radicalization is that of discrimination (Agerschou, 2014/2015, p. 5). In this sense, the focus is moved from Muslims to the entire society. According to the theory, this must be considered a very good approach, as it will not 'force' young Muslims into choosing between their identities linked to Islam and Western democratic principles, respectively.

## The Mohammed cartoons

Discourses contrasting Islam with democratic values may not be prevalent in the Aarhus Model. In the public sphere, however, it is not rare to meet discourses which imply that Islam is incompatible with democracy, human rights and general values which are important to Danish society. To illustrate this, I again refer to the example of the so-called 'Muhammad cartoons', which were published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005 and portrayed the prophet Muhammad for example with a bomb in his turban. According to the Quran, it is not allowed to draw the prophet (Burke, 2015), and to ridicule him by portraying him as a terrorist was found not only blasphemous but also extremely insensitive by Danish Muslims as well as Muslims from all over the world (Jyllands-Posten, 2015). Simultaneously, the Danish press joined forces with many politicians in emphasizing the importance of the freedom of speech in a democracy. This is one of the most obvious examples of a 'clash' between Islam and Western democratic values. However, one might argue that it was also an extremely unnecessary act with the main purpose of provoking Muslims and that it therefore was merely an opportunistic 'test' for whether or not Islam is compatible with one of the most fundamental rights in Western democracies. An event like this can offend

Muslims in such a way that they will take distance to the Danish society and to that extent let go of the identities supporting democratic values, if these are seen as conflicting with central religious beliefs.

## The example of the Grimhøj Mosque

Another, more recent example of public discourses contrasting Islam and democratic values is to be found in the media coverage of the Grimhøj mosque located in the outskirts of Aarhus. In 2016, a documentary, 'The Mosques Behind the Veil' (Moskeerne bag sløret) (Jensen, 2015), was broadcasted by one of the major national television networks, TV2. In the documentary, it was exposed how leaders of the mosque, and leaders of other Danish mosques, provided advice for people in a way which was directly striving with Danish law in terms of marriage, women's rights, domestic violence etc. The documentary reignited the debate about the activities in Danish mosques and, to some extent, whether or not Danish Muslims live by Danish law or not. Again the debate questioned the compatibility between Islam and Western legal regulation. This time, it was particularly important for the anti-radicalization efforts because the Grimhøj Mosque was one of the hotspots for 'producing' foreign fighters (Willumsen, 2014; Politiken, 2014), and that a dialog between the Grimhøj Mosque and the Aarhus Municipality therefore was established (appendix 1). Although the dialog is still in place, the documentary did have an effect on the local political discourse on Muslims. This could be seen in the very obvious case of the city council cancelling the plans of allowing for a large new mosque in western Aarhus, on the grounds that the documentary had uncovered radical, un-democratic attitudes within the Muslim community in Aarhus (Christiansen, 2016). Because the new mosque was a wish from the Union of Muslim Association in Aarhus the cancellation of the mosque was a major strike against not only radical individuals but against all Muslims in the area.

### Political vs national identity

The theory by Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015) suggested that there is a third discursive category, in which Islam can be represented as being in opposition to the West. This third category is concerned with how the discourse that 'the West is at war with Islam' can provoke radicalization among Western Muslims. The point is that if Western Muslims, who have already been 'forced' to choose between their religion and Western politics and values, respectively, and who have chosen religion, the Muslim identity has become strengthened, while the 'Western' identities have been lost or weakened. Therefore, there is also a risk that these people will take side based on their religious affiliation in conflicts between the West and the Muslim world. If that is the case, they might sympathize with messages of militant Islamic movements, and in extreme cases become willing to carry out terrorist attacks.

## A Western war on Islam?

Since 9/11 a large number of initiatives targeting non-Western immigrants and refugees have been implemented in Danish politics, and the rhetoric has also changed and become more hostile (Pedersen & Rytter, 2012). This is part of the 'war on terror', as it was formulated after 9/11. However, it has by some been argued that this Western 'war on terror' has become a 'war on Islam' (Kundnani, 2014); an argument which has also received support from academic circles in the case of Denmark (Pedersen & Rytter, 2012).

In 2008, the Danish Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) published a report which suggested that in order to prevent radicalization and terrorism, the rhetoric in Danish politics would have to shift away from using religiously loaded wording such as fundamentalists, Islamists, 'jihad' and Islamic terrorism in cases where religion would not be of much importance and where 'terrorism' or 'terrorists' therefore would be sufficient (CTA, 2008). These suggestions were made based on the reason that by using religious wording in connection to terrorism, terrorist propaganda arguing that there is a war going on between Islam and the West would be supported. However, these suggestions do not seem to have had much effect on Danish politics. The religious element seems to have become even more important in Danish politics than before. Right-wing politicians take advantage of terrorist events to promote and support their views that Islam and immigrants are dangerous to the Danish society; and the central-right government has since 2015 introduced much hasher regulation on the immigration and integration areas (Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, 2017). These especially target people from predominantly Muslim countries (Pedersen & Rytter, 2012).

When the public discourse on Muslims become negative and portrays Islam as being much related to terrorism, it is almost inevitable that islamophobic attitudes will spread in the population. Disturbingly, a survey in 2016 showed that around 1/3 of the Danish population thinks that Denmark and its allies is at 'war with Islam', and not only 'radicalized Muslims' (Andersen K. V., 2016). It is concerning that so much of the Danish population is of that perception, not only because it creates hate and exclusion within the population, but also because it supports militant Islamists in their statements that there is an ongoing war against Islam, and that Muslims therefore must fight for Islam. If terrorist organizations use the 'war on Islam' for recruiting more Muslims in the West, while right-wing nationalists use the same expression for excluding Muslims from being 'Danish', it is not hard to understand why some develop stronger Islamic identities and lose their 'Danish' sense of belonging. According to theory, this is when people are most vulnerable to radicalization, because counteraction seems both necessary and justified (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015). This is, however, a point which is imbedded in the Aarhus Model through anti-

discriminative initiatives, for example the workshops, which focus on information and promotion of diversity.

## *Application of the radicalization circle*

In Goerzig and Al-Hashimi's take on radicalization, the process of radicalization is understood as loss of identities. First, the 'Western Muslim' loses his or her Western public identity and so the person is narrowed down to being a Muslim rather than simply being a member of the society. The sense of being reduced in this way will strengthen the Muslim identity. When discourses then claim that Western democratic values are incompatible with Islamic faith, for example by taking the freedom of speech to the extreme as it was seen in the case of the 'Muhammad crisis', the already strengthened Muslim identity might get even stronger, because the democratic values are used in a way that provokes and challenges the Islamic identity and certainly are used to contrast Islamic values with liberal democratic values. Some might feel repulsed by this way of using political values to contrast and exclude the large minority group of Danish Muslims, and this might result in people turning to their Muslim identity while erasing their identities supporting democratic values. At this point, when both public and political identities related to Western values are lost, the individual will, according to Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015), feel more Muslim than Danish. When then witnessing conflicts in the Muslim dominated regions, such as the wars on Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and now the Syrian civil war, some Western Muslims might feel more connected to the side of the conflict fighting for example for a Sharia system based on strict and radically interpreted Islam. This sharia based 'Caliphate' is what organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and ISIS/ISIL fight for, and this might explain why a few Muslims, who have lost their western and democratic identities, might feel attracted by and be supportive of such organizations.

Through the general information and prevention efforts, the problem of radicalization is addressed before it occurs, through initiatives such as mentor programs, intervention happens in the on-going radicalization process, and through exit-programs intervention happens in the final phase or after radicalization has happened. Radicalization as a process is thus addressed at all levels, and this might well be one of the major strengths of the Aarhus radicalization model.

### 5.4.2 Fear of foreign fighters as a moral panic

In this section, I will look more into the 'problem' of foreign fighters, which has been identified as one of the most important problematizations in the Aarhus Model and the Danish debate about radicalization. I here work under the assumption that not all the problem of foreign fighters are completely rational, but have been lit by how it is represented through the media and political activities and statements. However, whether or not this is the case will be clarified through this analytical section. Although the Aarhus Model

deals with radicalization at the local level, I find it highly relevant to investigate how the 'problem' of foreign fighters has been represented both on a local and national level, and why it has caused the reactions that it has.

The term 'Syria fighters', which in a more general context can also be referred to as 'foreign fighters', is a term that has become quite common in the Danish media in recent years. When conducting a search on the Danish database *Infomedia.dk*, including all Danish media and applying the keywords of *"Syrienskriger(er)", "fremmedkriger(er)"* and *"Syriensfarer(er)"*, which are the Danish words used in connection to the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the development in the number of articles on the matter appear to be quite dramatic. The results of the search can be seen in the table below, along with the results of the same search, slightly moderated so that articles must include the tag 'Aarhus'.

| All Danish media | Number of articles on foreign fighters |
|---|---|
| Before 2013 | 1 |
| 2013 | 33 |
| 2014 | 676 |
| 2015 | 1728 |
| 2016 | 2302 |
| 2017 (up to May 1) | 484 |

| All Danish media incl. 'Aarhus' tag | Number of articles on foreign fighters |
|---|---|
| Before 2013 | - |
| 2013 | 6 |
| 2014 | 112 |
| 2015 | 212 |
| 2016 | 167 |
| 2017 (up to May 1) | 20 |

It is quite obvious that the 'problem' of foreign fighters has received a large amount of attention in Danish media over the years 2014-2016. However, two tendencies are quite interesting about this development. Firstly, both searches show that the amount of media coverage was much larger in 2015 and 2016 than in 2013 and 2014, when a large number of foreign fighters was actually leaving Denmark. Furthermore, it is interesting that the number of articles in the first search peaks in 2016, while the number of the second search peaks in 2015. This implies that although the 'problem' of foreign fighters was still widely produced in Danish media in 2016; some of the focus has been shifted away from Aarhus as being home to many of the foreign fighters.

Besides the press, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) has also discussed the problem of foreign fighters in their reports. The issue was first addressed in a report from November 2012 (CTA, 2012), in which the threat of foreign fighters with relation to Denmark was assessed. In the report, no numbers of foreign fighters is given. It is argued that foreign fighters pose a threat to Danish society, based on their acquired military skills and a change of beliefs which might justify terrorist attacks against Denmark (ibid.).

A year later, PET again published a report on the threat of foreign fighters. Except for the fact that the 2013 report include estimated numbers of foreign fighters, the contents of the two reports are quite similar. Whereas the 2012 report argues that many of the Danish foreign fighters have a background in gang-related activities or Islamism in Denmark (CTA, 2012), the 2013 report states that Islamist groupings in Denmark are actively recruiting for new foreign fighters (CTA, 2013, p. 3). In the 2013 report, it is further stated that foreign fighters who return to Denmark can pose a threat without an extremist network, as they have potentially acquired both the mentality and skills to carry out a terrorist attack without the support of local Islamist groups (CTA, 2013, p. 6). However, they also pose a threat in connection to Islamist groupings, in which they can promote for others to go to Syria as well as increasing the levels of radicalization in Islamic environments in general (ibid.) No reports specifically concerned with foreign fighters have been published by PET in 2014-2017. However, the issue has been addressed in yearly reports, which have stated that the number of people going to Syria as foreign fighters has decreased (CTA, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017).

The PET reports do say that not all people holding Islamic beliefs will carry out violent activities or travel to Syria. They also mention in the 2013 report that not all returned foreign fighters pose a threat to the Danish society. However, when covering the issue of foreign fighters, it has a much larger sensational effect to stress the point that foreign fighters pose a threat to the Danish society, rather than pointing out that not all of them are. The media can thus choose to reproduce parts of the 'problem'.

In the moral panic theories, the media is argued to have the role of potentially creating a stir in the political agenda and thus affect when, how and which political decisions are made. However, in the case of the 'problem' with foreign fighters, this is not the case as the media did not put much focus on the issue until 2014, which was after the PET and Aarhus Municipality addressed the issue in 2013. Instead of the media discourses affecting political decisions such as the change of focus in the Aarhus Model, the situation can be seen up-side-down. When the Syria initiatives were introduced as part of the Aarhus Model with for example the exit program for returned foreign fighters along with the PET reports stating the danger of returning foreign fighters, this created a basis for public debate in the media.

Two of the main theories on moral panic, namely those of Cohen (1980) and Hall et al. (Hunt, 1997, pp. 634-636), agree on several aspects of the concept in question. However, one important aspect in which they disagreed was on the rationality of the 'problem' underlying the panic (see p. 26). Whereas Cohen considered the moral panic as being based on a more or less rational fear, Hall et al. perceived moral panic as being grounded in irrational fears of problems which are represented in an overly exaggerated manner (Cohen, 1980, p. 16). When reviewing the numbers of articles concerning foreign fighters published over the years 2013-2017, Hall et al.'s point about the irrationality of the panic provide an explanation for why

the numbers are not matching the 'problem'. It would have been somewhat rational to represent the Danish foreign fighters as a problem back in the end of 2013, when the relative numbers of foreign fighters was quite high, but this does not explain why so much more articles were published in 2015 and 2016 than in 2014, as the problem allegedly was much larger at that point in time. However, when following the theory by Hall et al., it makes sense that the initial, and rational, problem of foreign fighters has been reproduced in such a way that it no matter the rationality of it has become a good scapegoat for terrorism in Europe in the years following the actual problem.

# 6 Discussion

In this section, I will elaborate on some the most important points made in the analysis. The discussion will thus focus on where the Aarhus Model can be placed in the context of causal factors and outcomes of radicalization; the 'problem' of foreign fighters; the conflict between harsh and soft de-radicalization approaches; whether or not 'suspect communities' are established; as well as how radicalization relates to public opinion and discourses on Muslims.

## *Perceived factors and outcomes of radicalization in the Aarhus Model*

One way the Aarhus Model excels is as to how it approaches radicalization in terms of causes and outcomes of the individual process. As it was started in 2005 when there was not much knowledge of radicalization, its broad approach to what might cause or influence the radicalization process can be considered quite very well-thought for its time. Even though several initiatives have been added to the policy over the years since it started and although it was based on the ideas from a similar Dutch project, it did include some new-thinking ideas from the beginning. Such ideas include the focus on discrimination as a factor for radicalization. Much of the radicalization literature (see chapter 3) has attempted to determine personal characteristics of radicalized individuals, but has not focused much on the role of society in the process of radicalization. The Aarhus Model includes quite many variables that might lead to radicalization, for example discrimination, ignorance, prejudices, social exclusion. It further includes different potential outcomes of radicalization, and approaches this by tailoring individual efforts according to the assessed needs of radicalized individuals. Radicalization is not simply perceived as a process that leads a person from being 'moderate' to 'terrorist', but instead as a process which alters a person's perception of the world in a way, which will affect the individual's well-being in society and potentially, but not necessarily, lead to the person becoming a threat to the surrounding society.

## *The focus on foreign fighters*

In the analysis, the issue of how to approach foreign fighters was discussed. It constitutes a large part of the Aarhus Model and is that problematization of the model which has received most attention. However, as discussed (see pp ??-??), it may take too focus, as there are indeed other 'problems' in connection to radicalization. The 'problem' of foreign fighters as the major threat to the Danish society is widely co-produced by the media and this only enlarges the focus on this particular problem. In this connection, Rune Andersen said in the interview that the anti-radicalization work carried out in Aarhus is influenced not only by terrorist attacks and related events, but also by what topics related to radicalization are kept on the agenda by the media. This is interesting because it implies that some of the efforts made in the Aarhus anti-radicalization model are more concerned with the needs, fears and concerns of the broad society more

than the main represented 'problem' of people becoming radicalized. One might argue in this regard that the broad society, which can be seen as the unit facing the large consequences of radicalization, is actually a major instance to take into consideration when fighting radicalization. An anti-radicalization task thus becomes to calm down public panics about 'problems' which are represented as much larger than they really are. As Rune Andersen also expresses that not many local resources are actually focused on foreign fighters, as the number of foreign fighters is not very high. An important part of the work instead becomes to acknowledge that foreign fighters are a problem, no matter how big the problem is. The municipality has developed an alternative model for returning foreign fighters and has therefore received much, mainly positive, attention. Rune Andersen does predict that returning foreign fighters may be the next big challenge for the Aarhus anti-radicalization model and more specifically the exit programs, as the number of returning foreign fighters might be quite high in the near future (appendix 1).

When it comes to radicalization, it can be quite difficult to figure out whom to hold responsible. Because both local and national authorities, including experts from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, have co-produced the problem representation that foreign fighters are a threat to society, foreign fighters are easy to blame, when scapegoats for violent actions in society are needed.

The 'problem' of the foreign fighters is much related to another 'problem', which is often represented in both media and politics. This 'problem' is that of radicalized young Muslims and Islamist groupings. Islamist radicalization, although mainly in regard to foreign fighters, makes up for quite a large part of the Aarhus Model. Similarly to the phenomenon of foreign fighters, also radicalization as a more general concept is arguably a result of moral panic. In the theory section I discussed how radicalization has become a much more common term, both within politics and the media. Even though radicalization is a phenomenon which can be both political and religious, it is mostly Islamist radicalization that is discussed and assessed as a threat to (inter)national security, and this can be very problematic in several ways. Firstly, the increased focus on Islamism in Denmark can result in islamophobia and suspicion of Muslims. When being met by fear and suspicion, Danish Muslims might find their Danish identity and sense of belonging challenged, and this is when a single Muslim identity can take over. As a result, the whole non-Muslim Danish population is seen as an out-group.

## *Harsh versus soft approaches*

In the discussion of foreign fighters, there is one aspect, which is important but is not addressed in neither national policy documents or at the local level in the Aarhus Model. This is the question of what approach to choose in connection to foreign fighters. On one side, the Aarhus Model takes a rather soft approach to

handling returned foreign fighters by helping them through an exit program designed for this very purpose. Similar 'soft' initiatives have been implemented at the national level. However, a new approach, focusing on punishment has been implemented side by side with the existing 'soft' initiatives. As discussed in part 2 of the analysis, it seems difficult to follow both approaches at once, as the 'soft' approach can easily be overruled by the 'harsher' approach. This can potentially prove problematic for the anti-radicalization work in Aarhus. In the interview conducted for this thesis, Rune Andersen predicted that the work with returned foreign fighters will be the next big challenge for the anti-radicalization work in Aarhus (see appendix 1). If this happens to be the case, the challenge will only become larger and harder in light of the conflicting approaches as to how to handle returned foreign fighters. The exit program directed against returned foreign fighters has the opportunity to get tested in terms of both strengths and weaknesses, if a large number of foreign fighters return. However, it may never come to that if the foreign fighters upon return immediately will face legal charges and possibly expulsion from Denmark. The major challenge for the anti-radicalization work in Aarhus might therefore become how to navigate under national policies on the matter rather than actually be working to de-radicalize returned foreign fighters.

## *Creation of suspect communities through anti-radicalization approach*

In the Aarhus Model, there is much focus on productive dialog between the Municipality and communities 'vulnerable' to radicalization. First of all, it is problematic that there is no specific explanation of when a community can be considered 'vulnerable'. From the ongoing dialogs, it seems to be the case that the 'vulnerable' communities are communities who hold large percentages of people with non-Western immigration background. Even though the Aarhus Model, as expressed by Rune Andersen in the interview, does not hold the purpose of becoming a 'police of opinions' (*meningspoliti*), the work with establishing dialogs can potentially have a counterproductive side-effect. When Muslim communities are targeted as 'vulnerable' to radicalization, they are also labelled as potentially dangerous to the broad Danish society. Seemingly, the dialogs are introduced with the purpose of uniting different parts of society, but when certain minority groups are publicly connected to the concept of radicalization, and hence categorized as potentially dangerous, division of communities within society seems more likely than unification. However, this should be seen as a side-effect of the dialogs, which can surely promote and contribute to more understanding across communities and authorities.

Even though it may have been the intention in the model, the issue of integration has not been completely excluded from the equation of solving the 'problem' of radicalization. However, in opposition to the current national anti-radicalization policy (Regeringen, 2016), the Aarhus Model appears to be more aware that integration should not be addressed in the anti-radicalization work. The operationalization of the policy is

in Aarhus municipality undertaken mainly by the SSP (schools, social services and police), and does not fall under the responsibility of the integration department of the Aarhus municipality (Aarhus Municipality, 2017). Through this distance made between the policy fields of integration and radicalization, the Aarhus Model differs from the national approach to radicalization in a way that, according to theory (Lindekilde, 2015, p. 429), must be considered positive. However, it may not be possible to completely remove focus from the Muslim communities at the local level, due to the large focus directed at Muslims on the national level as well as in the media.

## *The influence of public opinion*

As investigated in the fourth part of the analysis, there is a relationship between public opinion and radicalization policies. During the interview, Rune Andersen stated that the focus of the Aarhus anti-radicalization policy changes not only in relation to terrorist events but also along with issues debated in the public sphere (see appendix 1). It may be the case that issues which receive much media attention can create enough pressure to force action from politicians, but in connection to radicalization, this has some potentially dangerous side-effects. In connection to radicalization, events such as terrorist attacks or cases of crime committed by immigrants can have major effects. People will need scapegoats to blame when they feel like their existence as they know it is being threatened, and along with the political tendencies in Europe and Denmark, the role as scapegoat is likely to be attributed to non-Western immigrants (Kundnani, 2014). Targeting immigrants, and especially Muslim minorities, is, however, rather counterproductive in connection to anti-radicalization. Targeted minorities might feel alienated, discriminated against and generally unaccepted in the Danish society. This may push the targeted minorities out of society and lead to the establishment of parallel societies on the basis of clearly defined in- and out-groups (Goerzig & Al-Hashimi, 2015). When this happens, individuals will be more vulnerable to radicalization, and if they become radicalized to an extent where they become dangerous to their surroundings, this will only foster more negative prejudices, discrimination and fear, for example in form islamophobia. This negative spiral can keep going, unless the anti-radicalization work starts to dismiss public attitudes and address this problem itself. I would argue that although the Aarhus Model takes into account what the tense radicalization issues are in the public sphere, it also addresses the negative spiral of fear, discrimination and radicalization through many of the preventive efforts included in the model. Through information and anti-discrimination work, the Aarhus Model therefore also addresses the issue of radicalization of mainstream discourses on Muslims, immigrants and radicalization. I would argue that this 'reversed' focus on the broad Danish society, or at least in the local area of Aarhus, is one of the major strengths of the Aarhus Model.

# 7 Conclusion

In this thesis, I have attempted to create understanding of the anti-radicalization efforts in the city of Aarhus, as well as the context which have had influence on the approach. I have investigated how Aarhus municipality perceives the 'problems' of radicalization and how this representation of the problems can be seen in the practical initiatives for radicalization prevention and de-radicalization. Furthermore, I have focused on the relation between the political approach in Aarhus and discourses on radicalization as seen in media and national politics. In this regard, I have worked under the assumption that public discourses will inevitably effect policies, as policies are often attempting to solve 'problems' produced elsewhere (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 39). In order to address these issues, the thesis has been structured around answering the main research question, which asked: *How is the problem of radicalization represented and approached in the Aarhus Model, and what is the relation between the Aarhus anti-radicalization policy and public discourses concerned with radicalization?*

Through the analysis, I have discovered aspects which make the Aarhus Model special and good based on the theoretical reflections included in this thesis. However, there are also issues related to the approach which are potentially problematic for the future work. Introduced below are the main findings of the analysis.

First of all, much of the attention directed against the anti-radicalization efforts in Aarhus has been concerned with the approach to the 'problem' of foreign fighters. Mentor- and exit programs have been established along with preventive measures, and since the start of these initiatives, the number of foreign fighters from Aarhus have decreased quite remarkably. However, harsh national approaches to returned foreign fighters seem to conflict with the 'soft' Aarhus approach. This conflict in approaches might hinder the de-radicalization work in Aarhus in the future.

Another point which makes the Aarhus Model special is the approach to radicalization more generally. There is much focus on prevention of radicalization, but because the Aarhus perception is that a person is not radicalized until he or she commit crimes based on anti-democratic beliefs. Because radicalization is problematized as a matter of criminal activities, the work is quite similar to regular crime prevention, and the focus is thereby shifted from targeting ideologies into targeting criminal activities. In this sense, the model refrains from creating 'suspect communities'. However, targeting particular communities, such as the Somali community in Aarhus, may have the side-effect that some suspicion will be directed at these communities. Moreover, it is in the interview conducted for this thesis expressed that public debates and events do have influence on the anti-radicalization work in Aarhus. This is problematic as it allows

discourses, which are increasingly anti-Muslim, to affect the work in a way which can potentially create 'suspect communities'.

In the analysis, I further investigated how anti-Muslim discourses have emerged and how these discourses have affected the Aarhus approach to radicalization. It was found that whenever violent activities are carried out by people claiming to act in the name of Islam, discourses which target Islam in general are quickly established. Although such discourses were found to influence anti-radicalization policies, both locally and nationally; the Aarhus anti-radicalization team does indeed address the issue. By focusing on discrimination, inclusion and diversity, the Aarhus Model addresses what one may call the 'co-radicalization' of the mainstream Danish society and the predominant immigration- and Muslim-hostile discourses. Thereby, the Aarhus approach addresses an otherwise much overlooked problem of radicalization.

## *Limitations*

An issue faced in the work with this thesis was the lack of official documentation and information. Although a few documents describing the practical initiatives are publically available, there is much documentation such as how and by whom the Aarhus policy on radicalization has been developed as well as statistics or other material concerned with results of the anti-radicalization work. This has problematized the work with the actual policy. Due to this lack of information, I wanted to conduct interviews with some of the local politicians in Aarhus, who are involved in the anti-radicalization efforts and would be able to clarify some of the issues not addressed in the official documents. This, however, was not possible.

## *Outlook*

In this thesis, many aspects have been considered in regard to the radicalization approach in Aarhus. For further research there are several aspects, which would be interesting to investigate. It would be very interesting to compare the Aarhus anti-radicalization approach to other local approaches, both within Denmark and internationally, as this would contribute with more clarification of why the Aarhus approach is considered so special. Furthermore, it would also be useful to conduct a study based on interviews with Muslims in Aarhus in order to gain more knowledge on anti-radicalization policies and discourses as seen from this perspective. A third study which would be extremely interesting, although rather difficult, would be to interview radicalized people involved with the anti-radicalization activities in Aarhus, in order to gain deep empirically based knowledge on why the people became radicalized as well as how or if they have benefitted from initiatives in the Aarhus Model.

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# Appendix

## Appendix 1. Interview with Rune Andersen (May 2 2017/in Danish)

Q1: Først kunne jeg godt tænke mig at høre lidt mere om, hvad I laver i infohuset. For eksempel i forhold til opgaver og målgrupper

A1: Jamen målgruppen for Infohuset er bekymring om radikalisering. Og det kommer jo alle steder fra, kan man sige. Vi skal måske lidt længere tilbage.. Nu startede du med at sige Aarhusmodellen, og det er ikke unikt for Aarhus, at vi kan gøre det, men det er måske unikt, at vi gør det så godt, for det beror jo bare på et fantastisk samarbejde med Aarhus Kommune.. som jo også gør det, og det gør de jo også i alle andre kommuner og politikredse, for det er jo et tosidet problem, hvor politiet tager sig af kriminalitet og kommunerne skal tage sig af deres borgere. Og så er man så så heldig, både for kommunen og Østjyllands politi, at man har valgt at se en radikalisering som en risikofaktor, der kan føre til kriminalitet. Og så kan vi forebygge på det. Så når vi mødes, så arbejder vi under retslovens paragraf 115 i Infohuset. Det medfører jo så også, at det ikke er til efterforskning hos mig og min kollega som politifolk sammen med Aarhus Kommune arbejder med bekymring for radikalisering for at forebygge. Og det gør jo så, at vi kan få bekymringer ind fra borgere, det kan være fra en skolelærer, der har hørt noget i en klasse; eller en gademedarbejder, der har set noget en lørdag aften; en socialrådgiver, der har haft en samtale med en familie. De henvender sig så til os eller til nogen andre, og via det helt store tragtsystem flyder det så lige så stille ned og lander på bordet i Infohuset, og så kan vi arbejde med dem. Det er det vidensflow, der gør, at vi kan få skabt det hele billede, for ellers er politiets opgave jo at finde nogle kriminelle. Vi bryster os jo med, mig og min kollega, at det ikke er vores absolutte fokus, men det er jo et overordnet politifokus. Men det gør jo også, at vores system er gearet til at finde den slags oplysninger om en person. Men når vi så sidder sammen med kommunen og kan finde ud af, at så har han sagt sådan til en socialrådgiver, eller har brug for sådan og sådan, så har vi et helt andet billede. Så kan det godt være, han engang har været oppe at sige noget om Islamisk Stat, men det kan jo egentlig være lige meget, og lige pludseligt giver det hele meget mere mening i forhold til, han har læseproblemer, og han har altid sagt hans store drøm er at blive ingeniør.. Hvad ved jeg! Så skal vi have sat noget støtte op omkring, at han kan komme til at færdiggøre et ingeniørstudie, hvis han ellers har hovedet til det.

Q2: Hvor mange sidder I og arbejder på det? Både socialarbejdere og politifolk?

A2: Jo, vi er både socialrådgivere og politi. 7-8 mand i alt. Over os er der en større arbejdsgruppe, hvor vi også er med. Det er det lidt mere ledende hold i kommunen, men på jorden er vi mig og min kollega som politifolk, og så er der socialrådgivere beskæftiget med folk under 18, over 18 og beskæftigelse. Og så efter behov har vi nogle kompetencepersoner inde over skoleområdet

Q3: Hvad får I typisk henvendelser om? Er der nogen mønstre i forhold til, hvad henvendelserne drejer sig om?

A3: Altså vores arbejde afspejler jo også i høj grad, hvad temperaturen er i samfundet. Man kan sige, at lige efter et terroranslag som med Krudttønden eller det i Frankrig med lastbilen, så går bølgerne højt, og der er mange andre faktorer, hvor det ligesom er det, der ofte bliver snakket om i samfundet og også det, som unge mennesker, hvis de ellers har ondt i sjælen, så er det også det, de ville bruse over med, fordi det fremkalder en provokation. Så altså en skolelærer, der kører et fjernsyn ind i en samfundsfagstime og viser

billeder af et eller andet fra Islamisk stat, eller tager et andet emne op. Og så er der måske nogen med muslimsk baggrund, der fuldstændig bare står skråt af, fordi de måske i forvejen er følt sig trådt på af alt muligt andet og følt sig marginaliseret som Muslimer, og så kan de føle sig angrebet igen, som om at de bliver påduttet det, de ser i fjernsynet. Men de tager det ikke som en offerrolle, de går til modangreb på det etablerede samfund. Og så får de måske sig selv misforstået for at sige, at nu er det kraftedeme nok. Hvad fanden, det der er da ikke mig, men I kan da også ramme Islam og stikke fingeren i vejret. Og så bliver folk bange, fordi langt størstedelen af danskerne ikke har et dybdegående indblik i religion, og det eneste, man egentlig hører om, er jo bare at Islam er lig terror, fordi det er det vi hører om i Syrien og Levanten, men altså der bor næsten 1 mia. mennesker i Indonesien og måske 800 af dem er Muslimer – dem hører man ikke så meget om. Det bliver den der trælse fortælling igen.. og det er det, de hører, mens de samtidig kan være marginaliserede på alle mulige andre områder, og så at få den der oveni igen, at din historie og religion er sådan og sådan. Det er hovedparten. Heldigvis, kan man sige, for det er jo rimelig nemt at pille fra hinanden.. det er jo ikke religion, der er problemet her, det er andre ting. Som også er vigtigt. Det balancerer jo på en knivsæg ligesom så meget andet. Hvis du er rockerkriminel, og der bliver slået ned på kriminalitetssiden, så skal vi jo efterforske på personen. Og på den anden side er det jo ikke noget, der som sådan er til interesse for befolkning. Men lige netop med radikalisering, uanset om det er politisk eller religiøst, det falder jo ned på om, det er noget kriminelt, eller noget, hvor man som politimand netop ikke må have nogen interesser. Fordi det er jo grundlovssikrede rettigheder, at du må gerne være religiøst eller politisk overbevist, heldigvis, men det er jo hele tiden et meget fint spil, kan man sige, at folk må jo gøre som de har lyst til, men hvor går linjen.

Q4: Hvad med højrefløjsradikalisering, ser I stadig meget af det?

A4: Vi har haft en del. Det er lidt et modefænomen.. For nogle år tilbage kiggede alle tilbage på White Pride i Aarhus, og det var blevet udråbt som Danmarks højborg, men det er nu ikke vores blik på det. Der var problemstillinger, men som man også ser med religiøs overbevisning i dag, så var det mere pustet op i medierne, end det i virkeligheden var, og det blev det også selvforstærket af i virkeligheden. Egentlig var de fleste af dem jo bare nogle fodboldtosser. Der var selvfølgelig nogle, der politisk overbevist, og dem har vi haft exit-programmer på. Og der holdt befolkningen også meget øje med de højrefløjsradikale, fordi de hele tiden var oppe i medierne. Nu er det meget med Islam, der er oppe i medierne, og det er så også det, folk holder øje med.

Q5: Udover at der kommer flere henvendelser i perioder med øget mediedækning, har I så generelt oplevet, at der er kommet flere eller færre henvendelser om radikalisering fra borgere?

A5: Jeg tror faktisk, det ligger nogenlunde på niveau med da vi startede. Jeg har været her i tre år, og min kollega har været her siden 2010 eller 2011, og det var jo dengang, borgerkrigen startede i Levanten, Irak og Syrien. Og der er lige gået nogle år, som ikke rigtig er noget, hvor hele verden bare kigger på og ikke rigtigt har forstået, egentlig mildt sagt. Og lige pludselig så kommer Islamist Stat jo ind, og så bliver der en helt anden fortælling. Så bliver samfundet og medierne pludseligt meget opmærksomme, og det gør jo lidt, at hele dagsordenen for vores arbejde og fortællingen bliver anderledes fra den dag, kan man sige. Og så er der jo lige pludselig mulighed som overbevist at rejse ned og kæmpe for noget, som Koranen siger, man skal. At her er kalifatet, og det skal vi hjælpe til med. Og det var der så nogle, der var overbevist om at gøre det på den måde, og så var der nogle, der var tro mod noget andet og ikke synes, det skulle tages med magt; det skal opnås gennem folket. Så det var sådan to forskellige retninger inden for militant Islam. Siden

dengang, med forbehold for, at jeg ikke har været med fra start, tror jeg, det har ligget på et meget stabilt lejde, og jeg kan ikke huske det præcise antal. Men det er stabilt, bortset fra når der sker noget. Hotlinen laver jeg ikke selv statistik på, men vi svarer godt nok på den. Det er jo i samarbejde med os i denne her politikreds og VINK i Københavns Kommune. Det mener jeg også er rimelig jævnt i forhold til henvendelser. Men altså vi passer telefonen fra kl 7.00 til kl 22.00, og det er til at være i at passe telefonen.

Q6: Hvilke punkter ved Aarhusmodellen har I haft mest succes med? Er der nogen punkter, der har vist sig utilstrækkelige ift. hvad der først var tiltænkt?

A6: Ja, nu snakker du med mig som politimand. I forebyggelsestrekanten ligger infohuset i det gule felt og en smule ind i det røde. Og heldigvis, er langt hoveddelen af det, som kaldes Aarhusmodellen rent kommuneopgave ude i det grønne felt. De ting er der ret stor succes med, og det hele er blevet finjusteret undervejs. En ting som, fungerer helt fantastisk, men som jeg dog ikke er en del af, er vores workshops, som er meget tidlig forebyggelse, hvor man ikke som sådan kan sige, at nu er vi bekymrede for noget. Det henvender sig jo mere til den grønne del, som ikke er truede. Men jeg er overbevist om, at det er en fantastisk succes. Og en anden ting, jeg synes har været en stor succes, er forældrenetværkerne, som er lidt mere over i det gule, og som har været en sammenslutning af forældre, der har mistet børn i Levanten eller børn, der bare er udrejst. Så har det været nogle samtalegrupper og sorgbearbejdningsgrupper. Det er så faset ud nu, men jeg vil sige, uden at være inde i hovederne på forældrene, at det er en lidt unik ting. For mange er det jo også en lidt skamfuld ting i et minoritetsmiljø.. mit barn er rejst sydpå, og vi er flygtet fra det her. Det er et paradoks for nogle af forældrene, at vi er jo flygtet fra det her, det var jo præcis det samme i Afghanistan. Kommer herhjem og så vælger deres knægt at rejse til Syrien, og forældrene står, jamen det er det her, vi er flygtet fra. Denne her totalitære undertrykkelse er vi kommet til Danmark for at slippe for, og nu rejser min dreng ned til det. Hvad er der lige sket? Og det kan være skamfuldt, og der har de haft et godt forum.

Q7: Så de har lidt bedre kunne dele de ting med hinanden end med jer?

A7: Ja med nogle ting. Det har været meget komplekst, for så er det jo forskellige former for religiøsitet og nationalitet, der mødes, for sådan er det jo. Så det har været meget komplekst, men også meget unikt for forældrene i forhold til at kunne dele ting med hinanden. De har trods alt været i samme båd med at have børn, der er rejst ud. Samtidig tror jeg også, de har været glade for at kunne dele nogle ting med os, men det har måske mere været bekymringer, hvor det, de har kunnet dele med forældrene, bare har været rart at komme af med og at kunne spejle sig i nogen og se, at der også er andre, der har det ad helvede til over, at deres børn er rejst ud. Men hvis de har delt noget med os, har det måske mere været for konkret at få gjort noget, og det tror jeg nu også, de har været rigtig glade for, for det har været bekymring, og så har vi skullet handle på det efterfølgende – er deres barn dødt? på vej hjem - skal vi gøre klar til en eller anden form for modtagelse; og kan de risikere at blive retsforfulgt?. Alle de her usikkerhedsmomenter, man så også har som forælder, og der har de jo kunnet få lidt mere konkret viden, også fra de andre forældre.

Q8: Er der nogen ting, I har lavet om på, eller er det hele kørt som fra starten?

A8: Nej, vi har lavet om på en masse. Der er blevet tilføjet mange ting, for eksempel forældrenetværket, og det er der så heller ikke lige nu, fordi det ikke er nødvendigt. Der er for stor forskel på dem, der har mistet børn og dem, der ikke har mistet børn, og kan de sidde i samme rum. Og så er der forældre til konvertitter,

der ikke vil sidde i samme rum som muslimske forældre. Det bliver mere komplekst, og det er et sted, hvor det er nødt til at ændre sig. Og har de overhovedet lyst? Skal vi prøve at overbevise dem om at det er godt for dem at mødes, eller skal de selv henvende sig. Så er der hele Infohuset, som jo også er en samarbejdsøvelse i sig selv, i forhold til at vi kommer fra vidt forskellige kulturer, hvornår og hvad vi skal være bekymrede for. Det er også under konstant udvikling. Så det er meget dynamisk. Vi laver selvfølgelig de samme ting sådan helt skematisk, men så er der hele den her interpersonelle ting, der også er en ret stor del af det. En ting er, at man rent strukturelt kan gøre tingene, en anden er at man som personer har tillid til det samarbejde, man laver. Og der er vi kommet enormt langt. Det betyder bare meget, når sådan to forskellige kulturer skal arbejde sammen, som politi og kommune.

Q9: Hvad var indsatserne mod radikalisering inden 2007?

A9: Jamen der har ikke rigtig været nogen indsats på det. Det var før min tid, jeg var jo næsten kun lige udlært politimand på det tidspunkt. Efter min bedste overbevisning, vil jeg mene, at hvis der har været noget så grelt, har det været sager for PET eller efterforskning i det åbne politi, så når de har kørt deres sager, har det været terrorsager. Jeg tror faktisk ikke, at man før har set radikalisering som noget, der kunne føre til kriminalitet, og at man kunne forebygge på det. PET laver jo det, de skal lave, og de holder jo øje, men der har ikke været nogen i det åbne politi, der har bekymret sig om det, før bomben er sprunget. Det er jo også en ting, der er med radikalisering, at du må godt være overbevist, men lige pludselig er du for overbevist og vil handle på det, og så er det forkert. Så hvornår skal vi gribe ind? Politimæssigt er der jo ikke noget, før de har sprunget bomben eller stukket nogen ned, kun hvis man så går kriminalpræventivt til det, og det har man så ikke gjort, før nogen har sagt, at det kan man jo forebygge. For det ender jo med, at hvis du bliver radikal nok, så har du jo gjort det her, der er kriminelt, og så kan vi forebygge på det. Så vi skal lige have den langt nok ud til, at vi kan vende tilbage og lave tidlig forebyggelse på det, som kommunen jo har gjort med alt i mange år, hvis de har været bekymrede for noget.

Q10: Hvornår betragter I folk som radikaliserede?

A10: Ja, det er noget, vi tit skal forklare folk, fordi de bliver nervøse. Vores definition er at du tiltagende bliver overbevist, enten politisk eller religiøst, om at dine holdninger er mere rigtige end andres, OG at du vil bruge voldelige eller ulovlige midler til at gennemføre det. Og det er jo ret vigtigt for vores definition af radikalisering for, at vi kan arbejde med det. Hvis du for eksempel er Salafist, så har du jo en radikal tilgang til Islam, eller hvis du er mega dyreværnsaktivist, så har du også et radikalt forhold til, hvordan dyr skal behandles. Hvis du ikke handler på det, så er det jo helt okay. Men i offentligheden vil man synes, hold da op, du er godt nok radikal.

Q11: Så det er først, når man bryder loven?

A11: Ja, lige præcis, det bliver det jo nødvendigvis nødt til at være, og det er vi meget skarpe på, for ellers så bliver vi jo et meningspoliti, og det ville være helt utroligt kontraproduktivt. Sådan et land kunne jeg ikke engang tænke mig at bo i. Det er jo det, der er så dejligt ved Danmark. Og det er også en stor del af arbejdet at forsikre folk om, at folk må altså godt have nogle holdninger, du er uenig i, og som jeg er uenig i. Heldigvis da. Det skal vi altså ikke gå ud og fortælle dem om er rigtigt eller forkert, medmindre de laver noget ulovligt omkring det.

Q12: De dialoger I iværksætter med forskellige grupper, bl.a. det Somaliske miljø, hvordan udvælger I de grupper, som I vurderer, der er behov for at starte en særlig dialog med?

A12: Ja, community outreach delen er også starten før min tid, men jeg ved, at kommunen har kørt med det somaliske miljø, der er kendetegnet ved at være rigtigt organiseret – på en god måde – og har haft rigtig stor interesse i at få et samarbejde. Meget af det her problem med radikalisering, der var før det her med Irak og Syrien, startede også med Al-Shabaab i Somalia. Så derfor har det været helt naturligt, at det har været dem, man er startet med, fordi der historisk set har været nogle unge, der har sympatiseret med Al-Shabaab, der går ind for det samme, som de vil med kalifatet i Islamisk Stat. Jeg ved ikke, om man som sådan har udvalgt nogen, eller man bare er kommet til at snakke med dem, der har været talsmand for miljøet - det har jeg faktisk ikke indblik i.

Q13: Hvad er det så I diskuterer i de dialoger? Er det diskrimination, integration eller noget helt andet?

A13: Ja, det er i hvert fald ikke, hvordan man integrerer sig bedst muligt. Vi er meget opmærksomme på ikke at pådutte folk meninger og holdninger. Dem skal de selv lave, og det er jo også en styrke ved Danmark, at det skal man selv have lov at udvikle og ændre, men vi kan kriminalpræventivt have snakket med dem om, hvad vi ser som problematisk, og det kan være en eller anden læsegruppe, der begynder at diskutere, at nu har de fundet den ene hadith frem for en anden og begynder at pådutte.. altså lave social kontrol. Så kan vi have en snak om dem om, om de har lagt mærke til, at den her gruppe har vi faktisk fået ret mange henvendelser om, og at drenge og piger har fået at vide, at de går forkert klædt, og at vi finder det problematisk og høre, hvad de siger til det. Nå, men det er fordi sådan og sådan, og der er en, der prøver.. det er den slags snakke.

Q14: I forhold til Syrienskrigere, som jo er et emne, der har været meget oppe i medierne; hvad ved I så om, hvor og hvordan der bliver rekrutteret i Aarhus? Der har blandt andet været meget snak om Grimhøj og Muslimsk Ungdomscenter?

A14: Ja, og der tænker jeg, at der skal vi nok ikke ud over det. Grimhøj og Muslimsk Ungdomscenter er jo samfundsmæssigt set to ting, der går radikalt til værks i forhold til, hvordan de synes, religion skal defineres. Men ikke på nogen, for os, beviselig måde. Det ville jo være at rekruttere. Så det mest diplomatiske svar ville være, at vi ikke har nogen anelse om, hvordan rekrutteringen sker, udover vi har en stor formodning om, at en stor del af det sker i personen selv, som selv har lyst til at rejse. Og så må vi jo konstatere, at der er nogle ting med logistikken, selvom det bare er at køre sydpå og dreje til venstre. Så det er åbenbart for enhver, at det er ikke alle der har lyst til bare at køre derned af. Men de her såkaldte "mørke mænd" har vi ikke nødvendigvis det helt store overblik over, men det er jo heller ikke os, der skal gøre. Det har vi en anden tjeneste til.

Q15: Ved du hvor mange, der er taget afsted siden 2013?

A15: Jeg kan ikke huske det, men det er ikke så mange.

Q16: Tænker du, det er jeres arbejde, der har gjort det, eller er der andre faktorer, der spiller ind?

A16: Det kunne vi rigtig godt tænke os, der var nogle forskere, der beskæftigede sig med. Jeg tænker både og. Der er jo altid nogle konkrete tal, hvor man kan sige, man har gjort det godt.

Q17: Ved du, hvor mange der er kommet hjem igen?

A17: Ja, jeg kan ikke huske det, men jeg har et cirka tal.. altså der er jo nogle, der er kommet hjem, men hovedparten er jo kommet hjem, inden de er blevet kriminelle. Vi arbejder jo hele tiden under det her med, hvad skal vi lige gøre med kriminalitetsforebyggelse, og hvad har vi lige af oplysninger. Og så skal vi til at efterforske, eller nogen skal efterforske dem og finde ud af, hvilke oplysninger kan bruges, men sådan rimelig modemæssigt kan man sige, om vores arbejde har haft en indflydelse, at det bilder jeg mig ind, at det har. Samtidigt så er det jo også åbenbart for enhver, at situationen i Irak og Syrien har ændret sig markant siden sidste forår. Det er jo bare blevet mindre attraktivt for nogen at tage derned. Ligegyldigt hvor overbevist man er om at sagen er den rigtige, så virker det jo lidt fjollet at tage ned og tilslutte sig det tabende hold. Der er i hvert fald andre elementer, der gør det forståeligt, at der ikke er så mange udrejsende lige nu, og den næste problembølge bliver jo nok, at der er mange fra hele Europa, der kommer hjem igen. Der vil vi nok se et øget pres, at de pludselig er hjemme. Man kan i hvert fald sige, at man bliver mere radikaliseret af at være i sådan en konfliktzone, end man gør eksempelvis i Danmark. Så det tror jeg bliver den næste udfordring.

Q18: Er der noget til fælles for dem, der tager ud i forhold til nationalitet, tidligere kriminalitet og så videre?

A18: Jeg er jo ikke forsker på området, men jeg tror ikke, man kan sige, der er et overordnet fællestræk. De vil gerne gøre en forskel for deres tro. Så er vi jo inde i motivationsfaktorer, og der er nogle, der gør det for egen vindings skyld, i forhold til at de får kredit, når de kommer hjem. Der er nogle, der har gjort det, fordi de bliver så sure på det danske system og pludseligt bliver overbevist om, at det er det, de vil. Der er nogen, der har gjort det, fordi de simpelthen ikke kan se en bedre fremtid. De lønner jo også deres soldater i IS. De gjorde i hvert fald. Jeg ved ikke, hvor stor en motivationsfaktor det kan have været for de danske rekrutter, men det er for eksempel ret stort for libanesere og palæstinensere, der bor i flygtningelejre dernede. Hvor så kan de jo pludselig tjene en månedsløn. Hovedparten af dem, vi har haft, har været ikke-kriminelle, men så er der jo altid nogle, der lige stikker af.

Q19: Så det er ikke nogen, I har kendt noget til, de fleste af dem?

A19: Altså klassisk politimæssigt, nej. Nogle kan jo være taget afsted, hvor der har været bekymring, men det er jo først sidste sommer, det er blevet ulovligt at tage af sted. Før har det jo kun været et kriminalpræventivt arbejde, hvor vi skal arbejde på at holde folk hjemme, fordi det ville kunne skade dem og føre til kriminalitet, hvis de bliver yderligere radikaliserede. Det har jo også været svært at bevise, hvem man har kæmpet for dernede. Det skulle man jo kunne bevise indtil sidste sommer, og sidste sommer blev det så gjort ulovligt at forsøge at rejse ind, så der var en del, der blev vendt om i Tyrkiet og sendt hjem. Indtil sidste år var det mere, jamen det er halvskidt, at du vil derned, og nu skal vi finde på et eller andet herhjemme, men nu er det bare ulovligt, og du kan få flere års fængselsstraf for det, viser det sig også med den nye dom, der har været.

Q20: Hvor mange af dem, der er kommet hjem, er blevet retsforfulgt, og hvor mange har været med i exit-programmer? Hvordan vurderer I, hvem der skal hvad?

A20: Ja, og det er jo så igen det, at vi laver kriminalitetsforebyggende arbejde i Aarhusmodellen, i Infohuset. Politiet sidder med det materiale, der ikke er tilgængeligt for os, hvor det er efterforskning, der skal finde noget kriminalitet. Så det er jo ikke os, der vurderer det. Så kan vi samarbejde med politiet ud fra de

oplysninger, vi får gennem det forebyggende arbejde, for eksempel hvis en vil afsted eller har været, eller har sagt, han har skudt en, så er vi jo nødt til at gå videre med det. Så det er ikke vores vurdering. Og med exit-programmerne kan man sige, at der skal man have noget at "exitte" fra. Det er lidt ligesom med bande-exit. Man kan ikke komme i et exit-program, bare fordi man synes, det kunne være rart at få noget hjælp. Vi kan godt hjælpe, men for at være med i exitprogrammet, kræver det, at man er i et miljø, hvor det giver mening, at du kommer i exit.

Q21: Og hvordan vurderer I så, om de er ude af det? Hvornår afslutter i exit-programmerne?

A21: Jamen det gør vi, når vi mener, vi er færdige. Det er jo ikke noget, man kan pålægge med tvang. Så det er jo hele tiden et samarbejde, både med personen, os, kommune og al den information, vi får ind. Hvad har personen lyst til – de kan jo også selv afbryde programmet og sige, jeg er ude. Og så kan vi jo bare sige tillykke og forsøge at bevare kontakten, så det er samarbejde. Normalt løber exit-programmerne over 1-2 år, men det er både nogle holdninger i en selv, man skal have fundet, og man skal også lavet et alternativt socialt netværk til personen. Man skal finde sig selv et andet sted.

Q22: Nu når der ikke er lige så mange, der tager afsted, har I så tænkt jer at have lige så meget fokus på det som tidligere og bruge ligeså mange ressourcer på det, eller er det noget, der skal rykkes et andet sted hen?

A22: Ja, vi har tænkt os at have lige så meget fokus på det. Det er så mine chefer, der bestemmer det, men jeg kunne ikke forestille mig, man tager noget fra os. Men man kan sige igen, apropos medierne, at det er jo diplomatisk set et utroligt lille problem, der bare har helt utroligt store samfundsmæssige omkostninger. Den samlede problemstilling ved indbrud for eksempel udgør jo langt mere end det arbejde vi laver, så det ville jo ikke give mening at have lige så mange til at arbejde med radikalisering som med indbrud. Udfordringen ved vores arbejder er bare, at når der er denne her ene, der slipper igennem, så er hele samfundet jo ved at falde fra hinanden. Det har i hvert fald store omkostninger, i forhold til frygt og panik.. og indstilling til verden og tilværelsen, men man skal bare hele tiden huske at tage det i den kontekst. Nu er det omkring 30, der er taget afsted over en årrække. I Østjylland er der over 1000 indbrud om året, så ja, det er en meget lille ting samfundsmæssigt, men med meget store konsekvenser.

# Appendix 2. Prevention of radicalization and discrimination in Aarhus (2015/Danish)

## Østjyllands Politi og Aarhus Kommune

Socialforvaltningen & Børn og Unge

## Forebyggelse af radikalisering og diskrimination i Aarhus

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Den 5. november 2015

**Kort beskrivelse af strategier og indsatser vedr.:**

**"Forebyggelse af radikalisering og diskrimination i Aarhus"**

Indsatsen er startet i 2007 som et pilotprojekt med det formål at forebygge radikalisering af unge – såvel politisk som religiøst - og derved fremme tryghed og trivsel. Pilotprojektet overgik pr. 1. januar 2011 til drift.

**Definitioner og begrebsafklaringer:**

Radikalisering forstås som en proces, der fører til, at en person i stigende grad *accepterer* anvendelsen af voldelige eller andre ulovlige midler for at opnå bestemte politiske eller religiøse mål. Voldelig ekstremisme forstås som *anvendelsen* af voldelige eller andre ulovlige midler, herunder terrorisme, for at opnå bestemte politiske eller religiøse mål.

Radikalisering ses som risikoadfærd i forhold til andre (tryghed) og i forhold til egen person (trivsel). Radikalisering indebærer i denne forståelse en risiko for kriminalitet, men det er en proces, der kan forebygges. Radikalisering ses som et fænomen, der kan være både politisk eller religiøst begrundet.

Diskrimination forstås i overensstemmelse med dansk lovgivning som en forskelsbehandling, der medfører, at en person får en ringere behandling og muligheder end andre på grund af f.eks. køn, hudfarve, religion, politisk anskuelse, national, social eller etnisk oprindelse.

Diskrimination, anses som en betydende faktor i skabelse af vækstgrundlaget for radikalisering. Vi tager derfor i indsatsen, for så vidt angår vækstgrundlaget, afsæt i:

- At oplevelse af diskrimination og manglende oplevelse af medborgerskab er en af flere faktorer, der kan føre til radikalisering.

- At forebyggelse af radikalisering i Aarhus også omfatter en aktiv indsats mod diskrimination.

Indsatsen hviler værdimæssigt på Aarhus Kommunes integrationspolitik, hvor der er fokus på aktivt medborgerskab, og følger målsætningen fra denne politik om "at styrke sammenhængskraften i det århusianske samfund, og at alle uanset etnisk eller kulturel baggrund indgår som aktive medborgere med respekt for de grundlæggende demokratiske værdier.

**Forebyggelse af**

**Radikalisering og
diskrimination i Aarhus**

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**Organisering:**

Indsatsen er et samarbejde mellem Østjyllands Politi og Aarhus Kommune,
der gennemføres som et supplement til den eksisterende kriminalpræventive
indsats. I indsatsen benyttes så vidt muligt de eksisterende
kriminalpræventive tiltag og arbejdsgange, suppleret med en tværsektoriel
og tværfaglig arbejdsgruppe med særlig viden om radikalisering.
Indsatsen er iværksat og styres overordnet af direktøren for Børn og Unge,
Socialdirektøren og Politidirektøren. Indsatsens daglige drift udføres af
en ledelsesgruppe og den tværfaglige arbejdsgruppe, bestående af Socialforvaltningen,
Østjyllands Politi samt Børn og Ungeforvaltningen.

**Mål og delmål:**

Strategien er at anskue forebyggelse af radikalisering på samme måde
som øvrigt kriminalitetsforebyggende arbejde, der kræver en generel, en
grupperelateret og en specifik indsats.
Der arbejdes løbende med fire centrale delmål/indsatser:
- Planlægning og udførelse af en koordineret forebyggelse af radikalisering.
- Vejledning og rådgivning om radikalisering.
- Afdækning af radikalisering i grupper eller hos enkeltpersoner.
- Håndtering af enkeltsager vedr. radikaliseringstruede personer.

1

- Forebyggelse af radikalisering og diskrimination i Aarhus

# Model - Forebyggelsestrekant

**Forebyggelse af
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**Indsatser:**

Byrådet vedtog i foråret 2012 en handlingsplan for en udvidelse af den eksisterende anti-radikaliseringsindsats på børn og ungeområdet i Aarhus Kommune, således at den tilpasses og målrettes de over 18-årige.

Opgaven er forankret i Socialforvaltningen, og er pr. 1.jan. 2015 i drift. Udvidelsen er integreret i den eksisterende arbejdsgruppes virke og dermed de forskellige indsatser.

Det kræver viden at kunne spotte / identificere radikalisering samt særlige kompetencer at kunne gennemføre en forebyggende indsats.

Arbejdsfeltet ligger mellem på den ene side de grundlovssikrede rettigheder om ytringsfrihed samt politisk og religiøs aktivisme, og på den anden side overtrædelser af Straffelovens § 114 (terrorparagraffen) eller anden lovgivning, der sætter grænser for de midler, hvormed man kan fremme sin sag.

For de fire 4 centrale delmål/indsatser udmøntes dette således:

A. Planlægning og udførelse af koordineret forebyggelse af radikalisering:

- Drive en tværsektoriel og tværfaglig arbejdsgruppe med deltagelse af Østjyllands Politi og Aarhus Kommune.

- En selvstændig organisering under arbejdsgruppen af de enkelte aktiviteter/indsatser med tydelig ledelses- og koordinatorfunktion.

B. Vejledning og rådgivning om radikalisering

- Drive et Informationshus til modtagelse af henvendelser om radikalisering samt rådgivning og vejledning i forbindelse hermed.

- Opkvalificere og udbrede viden om radikalisering og forebyggelsen heraf til medarbejdere, der arbejder med større børn og unge.

- Udbrede viden om radikalisering til institutioner og foreninger.

- Udbrede erfaringerne fra indsatsen i Aarhus Kommune til de øvrige kommuner i Østjyllands Politikreds.

- Være i direkte dialog med unge via den dialogbaserede workshop.

C. Afdækning af radikalisering i grupper eller hos enkeltpersoner

- Ved henvendelser om bekymring for radikalisering at undersøge om der er tale om radikalisering, og hvordan det i givet fald kommer til udtryk samt anbefale mulige handlinger til arbejdsgruppen.

D. Håndtering af enkeltsager om radikaliseringtruede personer

- Ved konstatering af bekymrende radikaliseret risikoadfærd at rådgive og vejlede om passende forebyggende indsats, og/eller iværksætte specialiseret mentorforløb til forebyggelse af eller stoppe yderligere udvikling af radikaliseret risikoadfærd.

- Tilbyde potentielle eller hjemvendte Syriensfrivillige rådgivning, vejledning og evt. exitprogram.

- Tilbyde forældre til radikaliserede eller radikaliseringtruede unge rådgivning og sparring – f.eks. i form af forældrenetværk.

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**Opmærksomhedsoplæg:**

I forlængelse af hensigten om, at implementere forebyggelsen af radikalisering
og diskrimination i de eksisterende netværk og fagsystemer, har
det haft stor prioritet at klæde fagvoksne og frivillige på til opgaven.
Derfor har der været en koncentreret indsats for at udbrede viden om
radikalisering som risikoadfærd, der kræver opmærksomhed og handling.
I Aarhus Kommunes geografiske område er der fra dec. 2008 – til september
2015 gennemført ca. 120 opmærksomhedsoplæg inkl. dialog med
forskellige fag- og personalegrupper samt frivillige fra foreninger.
Derudover har der været afviklet et stort antal oplæg inkl. dialog med faggrupper
fra andre kommuner/politikredse og udenlandske besøgsgrupper.

**Infohus:**

I januar 2010 blev Infohuset igangsat. Her kan offentlige ansatte og private
borgere henvende sig med bekymringer om radikalisering.
Infohuset er bemandet af Politiet (direkte modtager af henvendelser) og
Socialforvaltningen, som bag sig har indsatsens ledelsesgruppe, der medvirker
til en afklaring af nogle af henvendelserne – dvs. er der tale om
radikalisering, eller er der tale om et "ungdomsoprør", identitetsafprøvning
eller lignende. På baggrund af denne vurdering besluttes evt. tiltag – rådgivning
og vejledning, sociale tiltag, tilbud om mentor.
Endelig beslutning om igangsættelse af konkret mentorindsats er en myndighedsafgørelse,
der foretages af rådgivere i Socialforvaltningen.

**Mentorindsats:**

Fra foråret 2011 har der været mulighed for at tilbyde en mentor til en
ung, hvor der er bekymring for radikalisering. Ultimo september 2015 har
der været igangsat 20 forløb, hvor en ung og dennes forældre (hvis vedkommende
er under 18 år) har sagt ja tak til at få tilknyttet en mentor.
Fra efteråret 2011 startede et samarbejde med Aarhus Universitet Psykologisk
Institut v/professor Preben Bertelsen, som via sit arbejde med begrebet
tilværelsespsykologi har bidraget til kompetenceudvikling af mentorkorpset
(p.t. 10). Hensigten er at implementere brugbare redskaber i
arbejdet med de unge mentees, som ofte mangler grundlæggende tilværelseskompetencer,
hvilket kan være medvirkende til at de fastholdes i
ekstremistiske miljøer.

**Dialogbaseret workshop for unge:**

Indsatsens idé er via tidlig generel indsats at opnå kontakt og komme i en
mere nærværende og involverende dialog med unge, end den der opnås
ved en generel oplægsbaseret information.
Workshopmodellen består af et 2½ timers forløb + materialepakke og lærervejledning
inkl. elevopgaveforslag.
Fra august 2012 til okt. 2015 er der gennemført workshop i 157 klasser.
Der er tilknyttet 6 instruktører, som gennemfører workshops.
Siden foråret 2013 er der sideløbende arbejdet med udvikling af en voksenmodel
workshop målrettet dels forældre, dels fagvoksne med tilknytning
til unge. Fagmodellen forventes testet færdig over efterår/vinter
2015-16, hvorefter der tages stilling til den videre udbredelse. Forældremodellen
er efter to tests p.t. på stand by af ressourcemæssige årsager.

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**Beredskab ift. Syriensfrivillige fra Aarhus**
Der er i slutningen af 2013 etableret beredskab ift. Syriensfrivillige fra
Aarhus. Beredskabet er forebyggende, og foregår i et samarbejde mellem
Østjyllands Politi, Aarhus Kommune og Aarhus Universitet.
Der arbejdes forebyggende med personer med ophold i Aarhus-området.
Der arbejdes på grundlag af internationale forskningsresultater, der viser,
at ophold i konfliktzoner øger risikoen for radikalisering betydeligt.
Beredskabet søger at forebygge radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme
som følge af deltagelse i konflikten i Syrien med tre typer ydelser:
- *Individuel vejledning og rådgivning* til personer, der påtænker at rejse
til Syrien enten som nødhjælpsarbejder eller kombattant, eller er
kommet tilbage, efter at have deltaget i konflikten.
- *Efterværn* til de tilbagevendte der kan indeholde debriefing, psykologsamtale,
lægehjælp, mentorkontakt og deltagelse i exit-program.
Exit-program er udviklet, og elementer derfra bruges i flere sager. Der
arbejdes for at motivere for deltagelse i programmet.
- *Vejledning og rådgivning til pårørende* til personer, der påtænker at
rejse til Syrien og deltage i konflikten eller er kommet tilbage, efter at
have deltaget i konflikten. Foregår både i netværk og individuelt. Der
er i efteråret 2014 uddannet forældrecoaches, hvoraf 2 faciliterer netværk
samt yder vejledning og rådgivning.
**Forældrenetværk:**
Fra efteråret 2013 har der på individuelt og netværksbasis været arbejdet
med forældre til unge fra højrefløjsmiljøet samt forældre og familie til Syriensfrivillige.
Sidstnævnte netværk har frem til september 2015 afviklet 20 møder inkl.
deltagelse af fag- og myndighedspersoner efter deltagernes ønsker og
behov. Netværket har iflg. deltagerne opfyldt sit formål og opløses.
Med udgangen af 2015 forsøges samlet deltagere til et nyt netværk med
afsæt i religiøs radikalisering.
**Community outreach**
Med afsæt i bl.a. amerikanske erfaringer arbejdes der i efteråret 2015 på
udvikling af en sammenhængende strategi og indsatser i forhold til forskellige
nærmiljøer og etniske minoritetsgrupperinger.
En planlagt international konference 19.-20.nov.2015 i regi af Aarhusindsatsen
"Building resilience to radicalisation and violent extremism", skal
bl.a. medvirke til at kvalificere udvikling af strategi og indsatser.
Indtil videre har der på dette felt været arbejdet med:
a. Dialog med det somaliske miljø
Som opfølgning på konference i maj 2010 vedr. potentiel radikalisering
i det somaliske miljø, er der ført løbende dialog med de somaliske
foreninger i Aarhus om mulige samarbejdsfelter mellem de somaliske
foreninger og kommune/politi vedr. fremme af integration og forebyggelse
af radikalisering (bl.a. forebyggelse af Syriensrejser indgår som diskussionspunkt
i denne dialog).
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b. Dialog med bestyrelsen for moskeen Grimhøjvej og MUC
Det blev under arbejdet med afdækning af risikogrupperinger ift. radikalisering
konstateret, at nogle persongrupperinger i denne målgruppe

havde deres gang i moskéen på Grimhøjvej – både ift. Syriensrejsende
og personer, hvor der er anden bekymring for radikalisering.
Fra starten af 2014 blev der indledt dialog med bestyrelsen for
moskeen om håndtering af denne situation og mere generelt om forebyggelse
af radikalisering. I forlængelse heraf har der været dialog
med MUC (Muslimsk UngdomsCenter – en salafistisk forening), som har
base i moskeen.
c. Om at leve med sin religion i det danske samfund
Der har fra forår 2015 været forsøgt dannet en tværreligiøs gruppe,
som skulle arbejde med temaet, at kunne lande sin religion og leve
med den på fredelig vis i det moderne danske samfund.
Det er ikke lykkedes at danne og fastholde en gruppe, hvorfor yderligere
forsøg på udvikling af indsatsen p.t. ikke er prioriteret.

**Udbredelse af antiradikaliseringsindsats i Østjyllands Politikreds**
I efterår 2012 og forår 2013 har der været dialogmøder i politikredsens
6 Lokalråd udover Aarhus, samt oplæg for frontmedarbejdere i de kommuner,
der ønskede det.
Herefter foregår løbende erfaringsudveksling via organiseringen SSP i Østjylland.

**Samarbejde på landsplan:**
Siden den daværende regering i 2009 lancerede: **"**En fælles og tryg fremtid
– Handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikalisering
blandt unge", har Aarhusindsatsen deltaget aktivt i dialog og
sparring om udvikling af strategier og indsatser med skiftende ministerier
og styrelser.
Aarhus Kommune er desuden i dialog med VISO (den nationale Videns- og
Specialrådgivningsorganisation på det sociale område og i specialundervisningen)
med henblik på at blive leverandør på radikaliseringssager.

**Presse og besøg**
Aarhusindsatsen har efter sommerferien 2014 oplevet en massiv interesse
fra specielt udenlandsk presse og medier (mere end 250 henvendelser,
hvoraf mange indebar besøg/research i Aarhus – inkl. overværelse af
workshops).
Dette har affødt en længere række af besøgsdelegationer inkl. politikere
og forskningsmiljøer fra udlandet, som vil høre om og evt. lære af Aarhusindsatsen.
*Toke Agerschou, Natascha M. Jensen, Allan Aarslev, Hans S. Kristoffersen*
*Radikaliseringsindsats Aarhus*

## Appendix 3. Description of pilot project „Prevention of radicalization and discrimination in Aarhus"

## Beskrivelse af pilotprojekt
## "Forebyggelse af radikalisering og diskrimination i Aarhus"

**Indsatser:**

Aarhusindsatsen baserer sig i nogen grad på den hollandske tænkning bag projekt "Wij Amsterdam-mers", der var et projekt mod diskrimination og radikalisering blandt borgerne i Amsterdam (ophørt i 2011).

Indsatsens samarbejde mellem Østjyllands Politi og Aarhus Kommune gennemføres som et supplement til den eksisterende kriminalpræventive indsats for unge op til 18 år. Indsatsen mod radikalisering er desuden målrettet unge op til 25 år.

Radikalisering er indført i det kriminalpræventive arbejde (med afsæt i forebyggelsestrekanten) som risikofaktor på linje med andre adfærdsparametre – f.eks. skoleforsømmelser, misbrug, udadreagerende adfærd o.l.

**Mål og delmål:**

Strategien er at anskue radikalisering på samme måde som andet kriminalitetsforebyggende arbejde, der kræver en generel, en grupperelateret og en specifik indsats.

Målet er at forebygge radikalisering af unge, hvad enten den er politisk eller religiøst betinget, og derigennem fremme tryghed og trivsel.

Der arbejdes løbende med fire centrale delmål/indsatser:

☐ Planlægning og udførelse af en koordineret forebyggelse af radikalisering.

☐ Vejledning og rådgivning om radikalisering.

☐ Afdækning af radikalisering i grupper eller hos enkeltpersoner.

☐ Håndtering af enkeltsager vedrørende radikaliseringstruede unge.

**Organisering:**

Indsatsen er iværksat efter et fælles initiativ fra direktøren for Børn og Unge, Socialdirektøren og Politidirektøren. De er i flere omgange blevet orienteret om status på indsatsen, og har her givet grønt lys for at fortsætte de igangværende og planlagte initiativer.

Indsatsens strategi gennemføres af en tværfaglig arbejdsgruppe bestående af SSP, Social- og Beskæftigelsesforvaltning, Østjyllands Politi samt Børn og Ungeforvaltningen.

**Indsatser:**

Det kræver særlig viden for at kunne spotte/identificere radikalisering og særlige kompetencer for at kunne gennemføre en forebyggende indsats.

Forebyggelse af radikalisering er en gren af den generelle kriminalitetsforebyggelse, der især forholder sig til Straffelovens § 114 (terrorparagraffen) og andre politisk eller religiøst motiverede kriminelle handlinger.

Der er særlige udfordringer mellem på den ene side de grundlovssikrede rettigheder om ytrings- og forsamlingsfrihed og på den anden overtrædelse af denne del af Straffeloven inklusiv en særlig risiko for andres sikkerhed og for den unges egen fremtid og trivsel.

En specialiseret indsats indenfor dette arbejdsfelt indeholder derfor i Aarhus følgende indsatsområder:

A. Planlægning og udførelse af en koordineret forebyggelse af radikalisering:
☐ Drive en tværsektoriel og tværfaglig arbejdsgruppe med deltagelse af Østjyllands Politi og Aarhus Kommune.

B. Vejledning og rådgivning om radikalisering
☐ Drive et Informationshus til modtagelse af henvendelser om radikalisering samt rådgivning og vejledning i forbindelse hermed.

☐ Opkvalificere og udbrede viden om radikalisering og forebyggelsen heraf til medarbejdere, der underviser/arbejder med børn og unge.

☐ Udbrede viden om radikalisering til institutioner og foreninger.

☐ Udbrede erfaringerne fra indsatsen i Aarhus Kommune til de øvrige kommuner i Østjyllands Politikreds.

☐ Komme i direkte dialog med unge samt etablere et internetbaseret dialogforum for unge om radikalisering og ekstremisme.

C. Afdækning af radikalisering i grupper eller hos enkeltpersoner
☐ Ved henvendelser om bekymring for radikalisering at undersøge om der er tale om radikalisering, og hvorledes dette i givet fald kommer til udtryk.

D. Håndtering af enkeltsager om radikaliseringstruede unge
☐ Ved konstatering af bekymrende radikaliseret risikoadfærd rådgive og vejlede om passende forebyggende indsats, og/eller iværksætte specialiseret mentorforløb til forebyggelse af eller stoppe yderligere udvikling af radikaliseret risikoadfærd.

**Infohus:**
I januar 2010 blev Infohuset igangsat. Her kan offentlige ansatte og private borgere ringe eller maile ind med deres bekymringer om specifikke unge. Infohuset er bemandet med en ½-tids politiassistent, som bag sig har indsatsens tværfaglige arbejdsgruppe, der medvirker til en afklaring af henvendelserne – dvs. er der tale om "uskyldigt ungdomsoprør", eller er der basis for en undersøgelse af den unges omgangskreds, skolegang osv.
På baggrund heraf tager den tværfaglige arbejdsgruppe stilling til evt. tiltag – fra starten af 2011 har der været mulighed for at tildele den unge en mentor (se beskrivelse nedenstående).
**Mentorindsats:**
Sammen med Københavns Kommune og PET var Aarhusindsatsen i 2010-2012 partner i Integrations-ministeriet projekt: "Deradicalisation – targeted intervention".
Projektets formål var at indhøste erfaring med at begrænse tilgang til de radikaliserede miljøer og hjælpe personer ud, ved at udvikle bekymringssamtaler og mentorprogram.
Vi har 9 lokale Aarhus-mentorer (2013), som i lighed med den øvrige del af Aarhusindsatsen, skal handle i forhold til højre- og venstrepolitisk radikalisering samt religiøs funderet radikalisering - kompetencemæssigt er mentorkorpset sammensat i henhold til dette.
3 kommunalt ansatte og 1 politiansat har løbende sparring med og coaching af mentorerne under titlen mentorkonsulenter.
Fra foråret 2011 har der været mulighed for at tilbyde en mentor som en intervention i forhold til en ung, hvor der er bekymring for radikalisering.

Der har pr. april 2013 været igangsat 12 mentorforløb (og flere er under udvikling/aftale), hvor en ung og dennes forældre har sagt ja tak til at få koblet en mentor på.

Pr. 1. januar 2014 er det planen at gøre mentorerne til en del af Socialforvaltningens støttekontaktpersonsordning – men stadig med forankring i den tværfaglige arbejdsgruppe. Siden efteråret 2011 har der været samarbejde med Aarhus Universitet Psykologisk Institut v/professor Preben Bertelsen, som via sit arbejde med begrebet tilværelsespsykologi har bidraget til en yderligere kompetenceudvikling af såvel mentorer som mentorkonsulenter. Hensigten er at implementere nogle redskaber til brug i arbejdet med de unge mentees, som ofte mangler grundlæggende tilværelseskompetencer, der kan være medvirkende til fastholdelse i ekstremistiske miljøer.

**Dialogbaseret workshop for unge:**

Under titlen "Udvidet dialog med og rådgivning af unge i bl.a. tosprogede miljøer om radikalisering" er der via en puljebevilling fra Social og Integrationsministeriet i foråret 2012 udviklet en såkaldt dialog-baseret workshop målrettet unge i folkeskolernes 9. og 10.klasser samt gymnasieskolernes 1. og 2.g samt 1.HF.

Projektets idé er via tidlig indsats at opnå kontakt og komme i en mere nærværende og involverende dialog med de unge, end den der opnås ved en mere generel information om radikalisering.

Workshopmodellen der består af et 2 timers forløb + lærermaterialepakke med elevopgaver er inspireret af en engelsk model – WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent). Frem til juni 2013 er gennemført workshop i 30 klasser.

Forår 2013 arbejdes der sideløbende med udvikling af en voksenmodel workshop målrettet forældre og andre voksne med tilknytning til unge.

**Digitaliseret indsats mod radikalisering blandt unge:**

Ligeledes via en puljebevilling fra Social og Integrationsministeriet er Aarhusindsatsen i 2012 indgået i et projektsamarbejde med Center for Digital Pædagogik (tidl. Cyberhus - et online klubhus med rådgivning for børn og unge).

Formålet er, at inddrage målgruppen af unge i digitale dialoger og debatter, og derigennem begrænse radikaliseringen af unge. Samtidig skal de unge gerne få reelle digitale alternativer og modbilleder til at imødegå misinformation. Det sker via udbygning af en velfungerende unge-hjemmeside med 10.000 månedlige besøgende, hvor en gruppe frivillige ungeredaktører, under vejledning af pædagogisk ansatte, er aktive i debatter, blogs, vblogs, brevkasse og temasider.

Projektet er i fuld gang med udvikling af metoder og teknik samt inddragelse af såvel unge som voksne ressourcepersoner.

**Udbredelse af antiradikaliseringsindsats i Østjyllands Politikreds:**

Via en pulje i PET er Aarhusindsatsen i gang med at udbrede erfaringerne fra Aarhus om forebyggelse af radikalisering blandt unge, til hele Østjyllands Politikreds. Projektet er igangsat i foråret 2012 med dialogmøder i politikredsens 6 Lokalråd udover Aarhus. Det forventes ved projektets afslutning (udgangen af 2013), at organisering og metode for en helhedsorienteret indsats, er implementeret i de øvrige 6 kommuner i Østjyllands Politikreds.

**Modelkommune:**

På ønske fra Demokratikontoret under Social- og Integrationsministeriet er Aarhus indgået som model-kommune i relation til arbejdet med dels at afdække dels at forebygge radikalisering blandt unge. En aftale er godkendt og underskrevet ultimo marts 2012.