

AALBORG UNIVERSITY



AALBORG UNIVERSITY  
DENMARK

# **If you come to Hungary...**

---

Hungarian Civil Society Initiatives in the wake of the  
influx of refugees

**Krisztina Hetyési**

Master Thesis,

Global Refugee Studies, Department of Political Science,

Fall 2016

Supervisor: Michael Alexander Ulfstjerne

## Abstract

In 2015, an unexpected influx of migrants arrived in Hungary which resulted in various measures by the government and the mainly negative discourse on the migrants in the Hungarian media. However, despite the Government's anti-immigration campaign, a small segment of the Hungarian society understood the need of these people and joined forces to provide aid. Facebook-based volunteer grassroots groups emerged and provided street-based social aid which was – unlike in many other European countries – a fairly new phenomenon in Hungary. This thesis analyses the emergence and nature of these volunteer-based grassroots groups in Hungary, as well as their operation, motivations, and relation to other stakeholders.

As a method, this thesis uses *case study* and *document analysis* together with several theories. The collected data consists of online sources, such as information collected from web pages and Facebook pages of the grassroots groups and online newspaper articles. The data from documents is organized into major themes, categories, and case examples through *content analysis* followed by *thematic analysis*, which implies a careful, more focused re-reading, review, and interpretation of the data.

The analysis consists of three parts. The first part examines the organizational structure and positioning of the grassroots groups by applying the *New Social Movements* (NSMs) approach. The second part investigates the underlying motivational drivers of volunteers to engage in providing street-based assistance to migrants by applying a modified *multifactor model*, the Volunteer Motivation Inventory (VMI). The third part applies relevant theories of *securitization*, *moral panic*, and *state of exception* to explore the relationship between the emergence of the social movements and the wider political and public context.

The first part of the analysis seeks to explore the dynamics of the three emerged grassroots groups (MigSzol Szeged; Migration Aid and Let's Help the Refugees Together) considered them as new social movements. The analysis of the social initiatives is based on five criteria: demands and objectives, social base, organizational structure, mobilization strategies and medium of action and social location. The social initiatives can be considered as NSMs based on the above-mentioned five criteria. However, the analysis can only shed lights on the short-term impact of these movements. Therefore it is necessary to conduct research focusing on their operation on the long run as well as their long-term impact on the state policies and the public.

The second part of the analysis seeks to explore the underlying motivational drivers of volunteers to engage in helping asylum seekers. Based on the results, we can say that the underlying motivations of becoming a volunteer of the newly emerged grassroots groups are diverse and most of the cases there is more than one reason behind the decision to become a volunteer. Most frequently one of the reasons is the inner urge to help or to protest against the government's anti-immigration policy. Religious beliefs and moral values are as important motivators as the sense of belonging or the need to foster one's personal growth while career development and social networking are not relevant motivation factors in this case.

The third part of the analysis seeks to explore the relationship between the social movements and the wider political and public context. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded, that the Hungarian Government followed a hard line of anti-immigration policy from the beginning of 2015, even before the influx of refugees reached Hungary. The rhetoric, communication, billboard campaign and decisions made regarding the 'migration crisis' by the government were consistent and had an effect on the society in large and on the relationship between the established charity organizations and the grassroots groups.

The unfriendly relationship and the tension between the government and the civil society initiatives and the government's attitude and no interest in providing care for the asylum seekers reflected in the debates between them.

The established charity organizations have been criticized for being passive or non-visible at the beginning of the summer, and their answer to the criticism was that the government had not asked their help and without their request, they did not take actions. Later on, their attitude showed a low degree of willingness to contribute and to share the burden with the civil initiatives and their work remained almost invisible to the public.

Despite the emergence of the volunteer-based grassroots groups, the majority of the society felt to be threatened by the asylum seekers and the level of xenophobia increased sharply. There were examples of actions and atrocities driven by fear and xenophobic attitudes which can be considered at least partly as an outcome of the government's anti-immigration campaign. The campaign generated *moral panic* by arousing concern and fear about the negative effects of migrants on the Hungarian society and consequently hatred among citizens and encouraged them to act upon their fears and hatred.

**Keywords:** asylum seekers, Grassroots groups, migration crisis, New Social Movements, securitization, volunteers, Volunteer Motivation Inventory, xenophobia.

## **Table of content**

<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1.1. Research question.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>2. Methodology.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2.1. Note on Terminology .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>2.2. Structure of the Analysis .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3. Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>3.1. Theoretical framework to analyze the Grassroots groups .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>3.2. Theoretical framework to analyze the motivations of volunteers.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>3.3. Theoretical framework to analyze the political situation .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>4. Analysis.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>PART I: The nature of the emerged Grassroots Groups.....</b>	<b>21</b>
4.1.1. Historical overview of migration in Hungary.....	21
4.1.2. Historical overview of the social movements in Hungary .....	24
4.1.2.1. Before the democratic transition.....	24
4.1.2.2. During the democratic transition (from the end of the 1980s to the 2000s).....	25
4.1.2.3. The 2010s: the decline of liberal democracy .....	26
4.1.3. Introduction of the grassroots groups emerged in the wake of migration influx.....	29
4.1.4. Organizational structure and positioning of the Grassroots groups .....	32
4.1.4.1. Demands and Objectives .....	32
4.1.4.2. Social Base.....	34
4.1.4.3. Mobilization Strategies and Medium of Action .....	34
4.1.4.4. Organizational Structure.....	35
4.1.4.5. Social Location .....	36
4.1.4.6. Conclusion.....	37

<b>PART II: Volunteers' motivations .....</b>	<b>38</b>
4.2.1. Volunteers in Hungary .....	38
4.2.2. Motivation of the volunteers in Hungary .....	40
<b>PART III: Political and public response to the 'migration crisis' .....</b>	<b>45</b>
4.3.1. The Government's response .....	45
4.3.2. Role of the established charity organizations .....	50
4.3.3. The public context: anti-solidarity and xenophobia .....	52
<b>5. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>6. References .....</b>	<b>57</b>

## List of Abbreviations

ÁVH	State Security Police (in Hungarian: <i>Államvédelmi Hatóság</i> )
CSS	Critical Security Studies
EU	European Union
FIDESZ	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (In Hungarian: <i>Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség</i> )
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (from French: <i>Frontières extérieures</i> for "external borders")
HaHa	Student Network (in Hungarian: <i>Hallgatói Hálózat</i> )
IOM	International Organization for Migration
Jobbik	Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (in Hungarian: <i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i> )
MA	Migration Aid
MigSzol Szeged	Migration Solidarity Szeged
Milla	One million for the freedom of press (in Hungarian: <i>Egymillióan a magyar sajtószabadságért</i> )
MKKP	Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (in Hungarian: <i>Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt</i> )
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMHH	National Media and Communication Authority (in Hungarian: <i>Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság</i> )
NSM	New Social Movement
OIN	Office of Immigration and Nationality (in Hungarian: <i>Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, BÁH</i> )

SEM	Let's Help the Refugees Together (in Hungarian: <i>Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek</i> )
SOLIDARITY	Hungarian Solidarity Movement (in Hungarian: <i>Magyar Szolidaritás Mozgalom</i> )
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VFI	Volunteer Functions Inventory
VMI	Volunteer Motivation Inventory

# 1. Introduction

In the past few years, large numbers of people have fled the Middle East and Africa because of conflicts and persecution in their countries and in a hope for a better life. Many of them chose to make a perilous journey through sea and land in order to seek asylum in Europe. The flow of migrants to Europe has drastically increased in 2015, and the world started to talk about a ‘European migration crisis’ (Aisch et al. 2015; Fergusson 2015; Lackey & Hjelmggaard 2015; Peter 2015).

According to the estimation provided by IOM and the UNHCR, more than one million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, and according to FRONTEX, more than 764 thousand illegal border crossings were reported through the Western Balkan route (FRONTEX 2016; Miles 2015). This massive influx of migrants and refugees and the consequences accompanied with the flow had a great impact on all stakeholders including the people fleeing, the European Union, the member states of the EU, the International and Regional Charity and Aid Organizations, as well as the citizens of the states. The European Union was not prepared for this massive influx of migrants and refugees. The common EU’s migration policy, especially the Dublin Regulation failed to keep this level of flow under control. Thus the member states made decisions according to their own interests. The reactions of the member states differed greatly as well as the willingness to share the burden. The countries where the migrants entered the territory of the European Union – especially Italy and Greece – were struggling to control the situation. Some countries tightened their regulation and disregarded the EU obligations, while others – such as Germany and Sweden – showed welcoming attitude and promised help to the refugees.

Besides the above-mentioned stakeholders, new actors appeared in the form of grassroots aid movements all over Europe to provide help to the migrants and refugees. These volunteer-based groups were formed through different platforms of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter within few days at the beginning of summer in 2015 and started to operate immediately as aid providers or human rights activists either locally or as a joint international movement. These new forms of social movements raised the attention of both the public and the academic world.

As part of the eastern border of the Schengen area, Hungary became an attractive entry point to the European Union for the migrants arriving from the Western Balkan route. In 2015, approximately 390 thousand refugees and immigrants entered the Schengen area through



Hungary which was without previous precedent. Hungary has always been an emigration country rather than a destination for immigrants. This unexpected influx resulted in various measures by the government and in the mainly negative discourse on the migrants in the Hungarian media. As it will be explained in more detail, the Hungarian Government followed a hard line of anti-immigration policy from the beginning of 2015. However, despite the Government's anti-immigration campaign and the negative media campaign, a small segment of the Hungarian society understood the need of these people, and has joined forces to provide aid in different ways, such as life-saving emergency assistance or offering legal assistance. Beside the NGOs and charity or aid organizations with a mission to help asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants operating in Hungary, Facebook-based volunteer grassroots groups emerged and provided street-based social aid.

Unlike many other European countries, the emergence of these grassroots groups is a fairly new phenomenon in Hungary. Since the regime change in 1989, there have been examples of civil society movements in Hungary, but most of them were protests against issues concerning the society and the country (Bácsván 2010). This time, people joined to serve a cause which provided benefits to those who arrived from foreign lands and did not belong to the Hungarian society and culture. It is even more curious in the view of the fact that Hungary – as some researchers and studies indicate – is a country characterized by low level of trust in the society, weak civic and political participation and high degree of xenophobia in general (Boda & Medve-Bálint 2012; Keller 2013; Bernát et al. 2015). To better understand this phenomenon, an in-depth analysis would be necessary for the circumstances and reasons why these volunteer-based grassroots groups emerged in Hungary.

### **1.1. Research question**

How should we understand the emergence of grassroots groups in the midst of migration influx in 2015?

1. How should we consider the mobilization of civil society in the wake of migration influx? Is it a new form of social movements and if so, in what way?
2. What motivated volunteers to engage in providing assistance to migrants?
3. What is the relationship between these social movements and the wider political and public context?

## 2. Methodology

In order to answer the research questions, unobtrusive research methods are employed by applying *case study* and *document analysis* as a qualitative research method. Since this research is focusing on past events, field research and quantitative research methods did not seem to be adequate while case study and document analysis are particularly applicable to study a single phenomenon, event or organization within its real-life context (Stake 1995; Yin 1984; 1994). As Bowen (2009) puts it “*document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material*” (p. 27) in order to gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss 2008).

Documents, as Atkinson and Coffey said, are ‘social facts,’ which are produced, shared, and used in socially organized ways (Atkinson & Coffey 1997: 47) and therefore can be used for studying the related social phenomenon. For instance, documents provide background information and historical insight into the past events which can help researchers to shed light on the conditions that impinge upon the investigated phenomenon. Moreover, documents provide a clear picture of how an organization or phenomenon changed and developed over time (Bowen 2009: 29-30).

Previous studies about the phenomenon are usually used to provide the basis for analyzing the raw data of collected documents, and as such are part of the analyzed documents (Bowen 2009). In this case, the basis of analysis is the study presented in *The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary* published by Simonovits and her colleagues (2016) and the collected data consists of online sources, such as web page and Facebook pages of the grassroots groups and online newspaper articles.

The analytic procedure consists of the following steps: finding, selecting, appraising, and synthesizing data contained in documents. The data from documents is organized into major themes, categories, and case examples through *content analysis* (Labuschagne 2003) followed by *thematic analysis*, which implies a careful, more focused re-reading, review and interpretation of the data (Bowen 2009).

Due to the time frame of this study, it was not possible to collect and analyze all the existing newspaper articles about the topic; therefore selecting a sample was needed. The selection process consisted of three steps. First, the selection of eight news media was carried out by using purposive or judgmental sampling. “*Purposive or judgmental sampling is a type of*

*nonprobability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher's judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative*” (Babbie 2016: 187). Eight news media were selected that are national-wide and publishing their articles online. The sample was chosen that it includes news media attract the largest audience and covers all sides of the palette of politics in order to ensure an objective analysis. Therefore two left-wing (Népszava, Népszabadság<sup>1</sup>), four independent (Index.hu, Origo.hu, HVG, 444!.hu) and two right-wing (Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet) news media were selected.

As a second step, search for articles published online based on keywords was carried out in the archive of the above mentioned eight news media. The keywords were the names of the three biggest grassroots groups emerged, such as ‘Migration Aid,’ ‘MigSzol Szeged’ and ‘Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek.’ The search was limited to a timeframe between January 2015 and December 2015, as the main events took place within this period. In total, the search resulted in 548 hits.

As a third step, the collected newspaper articles were sorted by categories for further analysis. 314 articles from the 548 were not selected because their content was – based on a preliminary assessment – off the topic or taking over from other newspaper articles without adding additional content. As a result, 234 newspaper articles were selected and sorted by categories, such as the operation of the grassroots groups; motivation of volunteers; solidarity and protests; anti-solidarity and xenophobia; political acts and events; roles of established charity and aid organizations. The articles of each category are analyzed by applying the above presented *thematic analysis* along with the theories introduced later.

## **2.1. Note on Terminology**

For the purpose of clarification, I find it necessary to indicate that the terms “refugee”, “asylum seeker”, “migrant”, “illegal migrant” and “economic migrant” are all used in this thesis to describe the people arrived in Hungary with the influx of migrants which reflects the different usage of words of the different stakeholders. I am aware of the definition of the different terms, but since the government, the media, the different established charity organizations and the grassroots groups used different terms in their communication which corresponded to their rhetoric, I considered it important to illustrate it.

---

<sup>1</sup> On 8 October, 2016, the publisher, Médiaworks Zrt.suspended the publishing of the opposition daily Népszabadság and shut down its website as well (Euronews 2016). Therefore the selected articles of Népszabadság are not accessible anymore online.

## 2.2. Structure of the Analysis

The first part of the analysis is intended to examine the organizational structure and positioning of the grassroots groups considering them as examples of *New Social Movements* (NSMs) by contrasting them with the ‘old’ or ‘conventional’ class-conflict-based social movements based on the following five aspects: their demands and objectives; their social base; their mobilization strategies and medium of action; their organizational structure; and their social location (Johnston et al. 1994; Koca 2016). Prior to the analysis, first, a historical overview of migration and social movements in Hungary is given to help the reader put the phenomenon of emerged grassroots groups in context and to provide a better understanding of it and followed by the introduction of the grassroots groups emerged in the wake of migration influx.

The second part of the analysis is investigating the motivation of the volunteers to engage in providing street-based assistance to migrants. First, a historical overview of volunteerism in Hungary is provided to give the reader an insight. Numerous newspaper articles were written about the grassroots groups emerged, and several interviews were done with volunteers of these grassroots groups. These interviews are the basis of the analysis. The answers of the volunteers will be assessed and categorized by using the twelve category classification of motivations defined in the theory chapter under the subsection of ‘Theoretical framework to analyze the motivations of volunteers’ below. The quotes from the interviewees are translated by the author of this thesis since the language of the original articles is Hungarian.

The third part of the analysis is using secondary literature and document analysis of the collected newspaper articles as well as relevant theories of *securitization*, *moral panic*, and *state of exception* to explore the relationship between the emergence of the social movements and the wider political and public context. This part consists of three sections: the first section analyzes the government’s response to the migration crisis and its main effects; the second section reveals the role of the established charity organizations during the migration crisis, while the third section sheds light on the society’s different reactions to the situation.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

The set of theories I am going to use in order to answer the above-mentioned research questions can be divided into three groups. The theories in the first group are going to help to understand the nature of these grassroots groups emerged in the wake of the influx of migrants. While the theories in the second group are going to help to understand and assess the motivation of volunteers to engage in providing assistance to migrants, and the theories in the third group are going to illuminate the relationship between the emergence of the social movements and the wider political and public context.

#### 3.1. Theoretical framework to analyze the Grassroots groups

Getting a clearer understanding of the *grassroots movement* is essential in order to establish a conceptual and theoretical framework of this research but to be able to define what a *grassroots movement* is, it is necessary to introduce some other concepts first, such as *collective action* and *social movement*. These concepts have an extensive literature and numerous theories in many areas of the social sciences. A detailed overview of the literature falls outside of the scope of this study, thus here only the relevant concepts and theories are presented.

One often-quoted definition is Marshall's (1998) who defined *collective action* as “*the action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members' perceived shared interests.*” There is a large diversity of acts that are considered to be collective action depending on the goals of the group of people carrying them out. The literature refers to the group of people who carry out these acts in pursuit of their shared interests as a *social movement*.

As Paul James and Paul van Seeters define “[...] *a social movement as a form of political association between persons who have at least a minimal sense of themselves as connected to others in common purpose and who come together across an extended period of time to effect social change in the name of that purpose*” (James & van Seters 2014: xi). Typology of social movements (Aberle 1966) differentiates the various social movements based on their scope; the type of change they would like to effect; their targets; their methods of work; their range, and if they are old or new movements.

The volunteer-based grassroots groups emerged in the summer of 2015 in Hungary can be considered as one type of *social movements*, namely *grassroots movements*. According to the

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, *grassroots movements* are defined as bottom-up political movements which utilize collective action from the local level to effect change at the local, regional, national, or international level (Gove 1993: 991).

To analyze the grassroots groups emerged in the wake of migration flow in Hungary, the theory of *opinion-based group membership* developed by McGarty and his colleagues (2009) is necessary. They argue that opinion-based groups come into being if two conditions are met: the members share the same opinion, and this shared opinion became part of the social identity of the group. This approach explains why people from very different socio-cultural backgrounds might come together and carry out collective action on behalf of others, for instance, a disadvantaged group such as the migrants arrived in Hungary in the summer of 2015. According to a more recent publication of Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty, the groups – besides the sharing of opinions – share norms and moral values as well. When the group perceives injustice against a disadvantaged group, the moral outrage of the opinion-based group will instantly initiate social action (Thomas et al. 2012).

Van Stekelenburg and his colleagues examined ideological motives in political protests and distinguished the power-oriented political movements from the value-oriented protests (van Stekelenburg et al. 2009). They found that when collective action is value-oriented, people will participate regardless of the outcome because the process of participation and the expression of their opinion are satisfying. Moreover, the moral convictions help people to identify with a disadvantaged group and increase the likelihood of participation in collective action on behalf of this disadvantaged group.

How do these new movements differ from movements in the past? Are they different at all and in what way? To get a better understanding of the phenomenon, the concept of *New Social Movements* (NSMs) is going to be used as an approach to analyzing the qualitative differences between the volunteer-based grassroots groups and the 'old' or 'conventional' class-conflict-based social movements (Johnston et al. 1994; Koca 2016). The conventional social movement paradigm was coined by Marxist theorists to examine the social movements of the industrial era at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Marxist approach defines social movements as actions deriving from the fundamental economic logic of capitalist production and are based on class relationships rooted in the process of production with matters of economic redistribution, such as working class movements (Buechler 1995). The *New Social Movements* (NSMs) approach, by contrast, claims first, that the rise of the post-industrial economy is responsible for the new wave of

social movement. Its second claim is that the demands of these movements in advanced industrial societies have moved away from materialist issues of industrialism, – such as physical and economic safety, – to post-materialist issues concerned with individual values of belonging, autonomy and self-expression, and the quality of life values (Buechler 1995, Burklin 1984, Inglehart 1990, Parkin 1968 in Pichardo 1997), such as environmental, civil rights, feminist, gay rights, human rights, etc.

There are four main characteristics of these new movements. First, these new movements are primarily social and cultural and only secondarily political in the sense that they engaged in conflicts about cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization (Habermas 1984-1987; Charles 2002). Second, new social movements put a great emphasis on the post-material values, such as the cultural production of social relations, symbols, and identities (Melucci 1980). Third, unlike the ‘conventional’ movements, the new movements are located in civil society or the cultural sphere as a major arena for collective action and tend to focus on a single issue connected to a broad theme such as peace or human rights, and represent the interests of marginal or excluded social groups. In line with this, the new social movements are locally based and decentralized with a high degree of tolerance of political and ideological differences among its members (Offe 1985:831) And finally, the class base of the new social movements differs from the ‘old’ social movement, as well. The base of the new social movements, as Claus Offe suggests, is threefold: ‘the new middle class’; elements of the old middle class; and peripheral groups outside the labor market (ibid.:831-832). While the base of the “old” social movement were the lower classes (Pichardo 1997:412). As it is going to be presented through examples later, the Facebook-based grassroots groups emerged to provide assistance to asylum seekers in Hungary – based on the above-mentioned characteristics – are considered to be new social movements.

### 3.2. Theoretical framework to analyze the motivations of volunteers

From the 1970's, increasing numbers of studies on social behavior appeared that were interested in understanding of volunteer motivations and different models, such as the *two or three factor models* (Fitch 1987; Horton-Smith 1981; McClelland et al. 1953; Morrow-Howell & Mui 1989), *unidimensional model* (Cnann & Goldberg-Glen 1991) and *multifactor models* (Clary et al. 1998; Esmond & Dunlop 2004), were developed to assess the underlying motivational drives of volunteers.

A functional approach that is explicitly concerned with the personal reasons and purposes that move people to action (Clary et al. 1998; Snyder 1993) is adopted in order to answer the question "what motivated volunteers to engage in providing assistance to migrants?"

A central tenet of functional theorizing is that people can and do perform the same actions, but with serving different psychological functions. In this tradition of theorizing, Clary, Snyder, and their colleagues suggest:

(...) that acts of volunteerism that appear to be quite similar on the surface may reflect markedly different underlying motivational processes and that the functions served by volunteerism manifest themselves in the unfolding dynamics of this form of helpfulness, influencing critical events associated with the initiation and maintenance of voluntary helping behavior.

(Clary et al. 1998: 1517)

Clary, Snyder and their colleagues (ibid.:1517-1518) developed the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) and identified a set of six primary motivational functions served through volunteerism. These motivational functions were: (1) *Values* – to express values related to altruistic and humanitarian concerns for others; (2) *Understanding* – to gain new learning experiences and exercise previously gained knowledge, skills and abilities; (3) *Career* – to advance in the work environment or explore job opportunities; (4) *Social* – to engage in an activity the influence of important others; (5) *Protective* – to escape from negative qualities or feelings, such as guilt over being more fortunate than others; (6) *Enhancement* – to enhance the person's self-esteem.

McEwen and Jacobsen-D'Arcy (2002) studying the motivations of volunteers in Australia developed a similar scale to understand and assess the underlying motivational drives of volunteerism and developed the so-called Volunteer Motivation Inventory (VMI) and identified a set of eight motivational factors that partially derived from the VFI. These factors were: (1) *Values* – volunteering is part of the individual's value system learned from family;



(2) *Career* – to gain beneficial experience and skills and eventually find employment; (3) *Personal Growth* – part of the individual’s personal growth; (4) *Recognition* – to feel being recognized through individual’s skills and contribution; (5) *Hedonistic* – to enjoy the heady feeling to help; (6) *Social* – the opportunity to built social network and interact with other people; (7) *Reactive* – to heal or address the individual’s own issues; (8) *Reciprocity* – to consider it as a very equal exchange.

Esmond and Dunlop (2004) by combining four factors of the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) of Clary et. al. and six factors of the Volunteer Motivation Inventory (VMI) of McEwen and Jacobsen-D’Arcy further developed the Volunteer Motivation Inventory with identifying a set of ten motivational factors. These factors were: (1) *Values* – to express or act on firmly held beliefs of the importance to help others (adapted from VFI); (2) *Reciprocity* – ‘doing good’ to others will result in good things for the individual themselves; (3) *Recognition* – being recognized for their skills and contribution and enjoying this recognition; (4) *Understanding* – to learn more about the world and exercise often unused skills (adapted from VFI); (5) *Self-Esteem* – to increase the individual’s feelings of self-worth and self-esteem; (6) *Reactivity* – the need to heal and address the individual’s own issues; (7) *Social* – to seek to conform to normative influences of significant others (e.g. friends and family) (adapted from VFI); (8) *Protective* – to reduce negative feelings, such as guilt over being more fortune than others (adapted from VFI); (9) *Social Interaction* – to built social networks and to interact with other people; (10) *Career Development* – gaining experience and skills and making connection that may eventually be beneficial in finding employment.

There were also studies investigating the volunteer motivations among Hungarian volunteers (Czike & Bartal 2005; Czike & Kuti 2006; Bartal 2010b). In the research of Bartal and her colleagues (2010b) the Volunteer Motivation Inventory was applied by adding three additional factors: *Religion* – motivated by religious beliefs or the compliance with them; *Government deficits* – to complement the lack of government resources and state aid; *Local Government deficits* – to complement the lack of local government resources and aid. As Bartal and Kmetty argue, “*volunteering is a social act, which appearance and forms are greatly influenced by the historical situations, culture, politics and the views about the role and duties of the state and the civil society*” (own translation of Bartal & Kmetty 2011: 28) which explains the decision behind adding three additional factors.

The inclusion of the *Religion* motivational factor into the study was inspired by the previous results of the researches about the Hungarian volunteers that have shown that there are a high

proportion of persons claiming themselves to be religious (64 per cent) among the Hungarian volunteers (Czike & Kuti 2006; Bartal 2010a). The inclusion of Government/Local Government deficits motivational factors were justified by the theory of voluntary nonprofit sector of Weisbrod (1975) that non-profit organizations in response to the failures of the private and government/local government sectors may replace correct or supplement the needs for public goods. The researchers thought that the perception of failures and deficits of the government/local government may be relevant motivation not only in the formation of nonprofit organizations but to undertake voluntary work as well (Bartal 2010b).

**Table 1** The 12 underlying reasons of volunteers to engage providing assistance to migrants

VALUE factors	EGOISM' factors	SOCIAL MODEL- SOCIAL INTERACTION factors	PSYCHOLOGY factors
Values	Understanding	Social	Protective
Reciprocity	Recognition	Social interaction	Reactivity
Government/Local Government deficits	Career development		Self-Esteem
Religion			

Source: Bartal & Kmetty 2011 with modifications initiated by the author

The final set of motivational factors – which is used to analyze the motivation of volunteers of the grassroots groups, – consists of twelve categories divided into four groups, such as factors concerned with Value, Egoism, Social, and Psychology (see Table 1). The Government deficits and the Local Government deficits have been aggregated into one category, as the author of this paper does not see significant differences between the two types of motivations.

### 3.3. Theoretical framework to analyze the political situation

To better understand why and under what circumstances the volunteer-based grassroots aid movements emerged in the summer of 2015 in Hungary, the political context has to be explored, as the emergence of this kind of movements is by their very nature associated with political events. Therefore an analysis of the political situation and the government's strategy is essential. As it has been already mentioned and it will be later elaborated on, the Hungarian Government followed a hard-line anti-immigration policy from the beginning of 2015 using several strategies in order to legitimize extraordinary means to be used against the refugees. These strategies are going to be analyzed by applying the theories of *securitization*, *moral panic*, and *state of exception*.

*Critical Security Studies* (CSS) offers theoretical tools to scrutinize the process that state actors use to transform issues into matters of 'security' in order to legitimize extraordinary means to solve a perceived problem. According to CSS, the security includes the military, economic, cultural, and societal security as well (Buzan et al. 1998). The concept of *societal security* was coined by Ole Waever, researcher of the Copenhagen School. In his work, societal security implies a primary threat to cultural identity – for example to values, language or religion, – thus, for instance, migration could be considered as a security issue and can come to be seen as a threat to a given country (Waever 1993: 17-40). The concept of *securitization* – developed by the Copenhagen School – refers to the process of labeling something as a 'security issue' through *speech act* which has political effects. For example, when an issue is related to security, its political priority becomes greater, and it justifies actions that would otherwise be considered disproportionate. The process of *securitization* requires four components: a securitizing agent, who is constructing something as a security problem by using *speech acts*; an object that has been identified as potentially noxious; a referent object that is being threatened and needs to be protected; and an audience, that needs to be persuaded in order to accept the issue as a security threat (Buzan et al. 1998).

In order to persuade the *audience*, i.e. the society (in our case) that, the migrants poses a threat to their cultural identity, certain strategies can be applied. One strategy is to use *moral panic* as a tool to arouse social concern over the migration issue. The notion of *moral panic* was developed by Stanley Cohen. In his view, moral panic occurs when „[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media” (Cohen 2002:1). The role of the mass media is essential. The media presents the group of

persons defined as a threat in a simplified way and creates a sensational campaign, thus the group becomes easily identifiable. The action of the media creates a kind of public sentiment which urges even authoritarian solutions. As a result of the attention of both the authorities and the public, the registered numbers of the phenomenon is increasing, thus legitimates the actions – even legal restrictions – taken to restore the order. (Cohen 2002). According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, *moral panic* can be characterized by five characteristics: first, the members of the society have to become concerned about the negative effects that the group in question could have on society. Second, the hostility towards the group in question has to increase. The members of society differentiate themselves from the members of the group in question by using the terms ‘them’ and ‘us.’ Third, there must be a minimum consensus in the society that the group in question poses a very real threat to society. Fourth, the perception of the threat posed by the group in question is excessive compared to the actual threat. Finally, moral panics are volatile; they appear and disappear quickly to hand over the terrain to the next sensation (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994).

Besides using *moral panic* as a tool to legitimize extraordinary means, it also serves as a tool of those in power to distract the attention from the deeper social problems (Hall et al. 1978). In order to have control over the moral panic, those in power have to control the discourse taking place in the mass media, as well. Using the theory of *moral panic*, it is going to be demonstrated if and to what extent the situation in Hungary can be considered as a case of *moral panic* according to the term used by Cohen (2002).

In times of crisis, governments may proclaim a “state of emergency” when the decisions and actions made by the government are legitimized in the name of the public good. Agamben’s notion of *states of exception* describes the government’s decision-making process within the state of emergency while constitutional rights can be diminished, superseded and rejected by the government. Within the state of emergency, the government can operate outside of the laws and can turn the democracy into a modern totalitarianism by prolonging the *state of exception* (Agamben 2005).

In my view, *securitization* of an issue by arousing *moral panic* in society is a powerful tool in the hand of any government, in order to lawfully announce a “state of emergency” and to become a *state of exception* which provides an opportunity to operate outside of the law, to suspend juridical order, and ultimately turn a democracy into totalitarianism. This is particularly interesting in the case of Hungary if we look into the strategy that the government followed since the influx of migrants arrived in Hungary.

## 4. Analysis

In order to answer the above-posed research questions, the analysis focuses on the emerged grassroots groups from three different angles. The first part examines the organizational structure and positioning of the grassroots groups by applying the *New Social Movements* (NSMs) approach. The second part of the analysis investigates the underlying motivational drivers of volunteers to engage in providing street-based assistance to migrants by applying a modified *multifactor model*, the Volunteer Motivation Inventory (VMI). The third part of the analysis applies relevant theories of *securitization*, *moral panic*, and *state of exception* to explore the relationship between the emergence of the social movements and the wider political and public context.

### PART I: The nature of the emerged Grassroots Groups

The first part of the analysis focuses on the nature of the emerged Facebook-based grassroots groups. To give a context to the recent events, the first two sections of this part present a historical overview of migration and social movements in Hungary followed by an introduction of the grassroots groups in question. Then, these groups are going to be analyzed considering them as examples of *New Social Movements* (NSMs) by contrasting them with the ‘old’ or ‘conventional’ class-conflict-based social movements.

#### 4.1.1. Historical overview of migration in Hungary

Hungary’s history and geographical location indicate that Hungary has mainly been an emigration country. Between the 1880s and World War I, two million people left the country, primarily for economic reasons. After World War I, due to the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost a significant proportion of its territory and as a consequence, thousands of people remained outside the new Hungarian border (see Figure 1). These people, from one day to the next, became ethnic Hungarians. Between 1918 and 1924, the government offered them Hungarian citizenship and possibility to resettlement and 200,000 ethnic Hungarian took this opportunity (Juhász 2003).

The following brief anecdote perfectly illustrates the context of frequent changes to the political map of Hungary and the surrounding Central and Eastern Europe:

Uncle Cohen is speaking about his life: "I was born under the monarchy, I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I got married in Hungary, worked in the Soviet Union, and I am a Ukrainian citizen." One listener remarks, "You are a much traveled person." "Not at all," Uncle Cohen answers, "I never left my hometown..."

(Juhász 2003:1)

**Figure 1** The Dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary in Trianon, 1921



Source: [http://www.dvhh.org/genealogy/au\\_hu\\_maps.htm](http://www.dvhh.org/genealogy/au_hu_maps.htm) [Accessed July 14, 2016]

The first immigration flow since centuries arrived in Hungary from September 1939. Polish civil and military refugees seeking asylum arrived in Hungary and received protection from the government. From the fall of 1940, few thousand of French, Italian, British, Dutch and Soviet soldiers fleeing from German captivity arrived in the country and got protection (Tóth 1994). After World War II, as part of an “exchange of population” 200,000 ethnic Germans and 73,000 Slovaks left Hungary and around 300,000 ethnic Hungarians resettled from Czechoslovakia, Transylvania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Juhász 2003).

In 1947, due to the Communist takeover, the borders of Hungary were closed and between 1947 and 1987 the state prohibited migration. There were only three exceptions. The government provided asylum to some thousands of Greek refugees fled the Greek civil war in the 1950s and Chilean Communists arrived in the 1970s which was rather an internationalist and party political decision. In autumn of 1956 the borders opened for a short time as a consequence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (see a more detailed description about the revolution in the next chapter), and nearly 200,000 Hungarians fled the country (Tóth 1994; Juhász 2003). At the end of the 1980s was the period of détente of the Communist era, and in 1987, Hungary organized the Formula-1 race for the first time. Many Romanians got passports and permission from the Ceausescu-regime to attend the race, and most of them took the opportunity to either travel further, for example, to Sweden or reunite with their

families in Hungary. The state did not consider these people as refugees, rather foreigners who stay for a longer period in Hungary and the society had a positive attitude towards them based on ethnic and cultural similarities (Tóth 1994).

On 14<sup>th</sup> March 1989, Hungary joined the Geneva Convention but with a geographical restriction: Hungary undertook the application of the Convention towards refugees fleeing only from other European countries (UNHCR – Central Europe 2014). This geographical restriction limited the number of the potential asylum seekers on one hand, and on the other hand, suggested that Hungary did not want to give shelter to people with very different cultural and ethnic backgrounds from the Hungarian. This is evidenced by the fact that from 1991-1992, Hungary received refugees from former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnians and Serbians (Tóth 1994) who were not ethnic Hungarians. They came from different cultures and did not speak Hungarian. As the report of IDEA points out “[t]he term ‘refugee’ was no longer connected with the feeling of sympathy based on ethnic and cultural similarity” (IDEA 2009: 3) and the majority of society could not feel solidarity with them (IDEA 2009; Tóth 1994).

The democratic transition in the 1990s turned the country’s attention to the internal problems and resulted in excessive measures, such as the Acts on Immigration and Citizenship which came into force in 1993 and dealt with migration as a security issue and the Parliament considered the foreign workforce as a threat to the Hungarian labor market. This is an early example of *securitization*. Double standards characterised the Hungarian migration policy: returnees were welcomed while other refugees with no ties to Hungary were viewed with suspicion (IDEA 2009). The geographical restriction of the Geneva Convention was resolved only in 1997 (Kováts 2014) due to the fact that Hungary submitted a request to join the EU in 1994 and the negotiation about the accession to the EU began in 1997 (Origo.hu n.d.).

Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and the Schengen area at the end of 2007. This was an important turning point in the history of Hungary and to be part of the Schengen area had a twofold significance. On the one hand, migration within the EU became a promising opportunity – especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis – for Hungarians (Lakatos et al. 2015:157). After 2011, the domestic economic recession triggered substantial outflows of Hungarians (ibid.:159). On the other hand, Hungary has performed the task of the Schengen border control since 2007, therefore has been playing important role – primarily as a transit country – in accepting asylum-seekers (Juhász 2003).

## 4.1.2. Historical overview of the social movements in Hungary

To better understand whether the emergence of the volunteer-based grassroots groups is a new and unusual phenomenon, we need to look into the nature of earlier social movements in Hungary.

### 4.1.2.1. *Before the democratic transition*

After World War II, Hungary was invaded by the Soviets, and a Stalinist dictatorship was introduced in the country which lasted until 1989. The totalitarian regime inhibited the emergence of social movements. The only exception was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which was a nationwide revolt against the government. The upspring started as a student demonstration, – a march through central Budapest to the building of the Hungarian Parliament, – but the demonstrators were fired upon by the State Security Police (ÁVH) which caused the death of one marching student. This incident was the start of the revolution which lasted from 23 October until 10 November 1956. During the revolution, over 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviets were killed, and 200,000 Hungarians fled as refugees. Mass arrests and denunciations had been continued for months thereafter and the communist order was restored until 1989 (Soós 2002; UN General Assembly 1957).

Until the 1980s, the emergence of social movements was inhibited by the totalitarian regime. Beside the political movements, civil movements were considered undesirable in the eyes of the power. The bottom-up initiatives were not supported or even tolerated in the communist and socialist regimes. The period of the transformation from communist into socialist regime was characterized by the monopolization and institutionalization of the social movements sector – i.e. the labor movements, – and led to the dominance of the characteristic types of *pseudo-movements* (highly formalized and institutionalized organizations with little or no ties to social movements which expropriate the ‘social movement identity’) and *quasi-movements* of socialism (social movements that are compelled to emerge within institutions and organizations, but their true “social movement identity” could not really develop) (Kolinsky & Patterson 1976 in Szabó 1993).

Moreover, a middle-class with post-materialist values, which could become the basis of the movements, was absent from the society which also prevented the emergence of social movements. The Hungarian economy in the 1970s and 1980s was what Kornai calls a ‘shortage economy,’ which means that the supply of certain items was reduced by systematic flaws or by the low prices enforced by the government (Kornai 1985:189-192). Therefore the



shortage of consumer goods had an effect against the development of post-materialist values in the society (Bácsván 2010) since precisely it is the materialist values which were primary for large segments of the Hungarian society in this ‘shortage economy’.

#### *4.1.2.2. During the democratic transition (from the end of the 1980s to the 2000s)*

According to Szabó (1993), three phases of the spontaneous civil initiatives can be distinguished in Hungary: from the 1960s the cultural sector, from the second half on the 1970s the economic sector and from the beginning of the 1980s the political sector is in the focus. The first movements appeared in Hungary were the environmental movements at the end of the 1980s, although they did not have great influence (Musza 1999). The regime change was accompanied with the passivity of the majority of the society, though numerous local civil initiatives started off, but with the process of democratization, the forming parties absorbed most of these new initiatives and the new political elite dominated and controlled the discourses to secure the peaceful transition (Bozóki 1995). In the late 1980s, different movements appeared, such as the ecological-, peace- and student movements, furthermore some self-help and alternative lifestyle groups, and subcultures were formed, but the movements with an anarchist/autonomous orientation and squatters have not yet appeared in Hungary (Szabó 1993). The feminist group was formed in 1990, but it could not become a broad-based movement (Neményi 1994). There is still no feminist movement in Hungary nowadays, and according to Lévai, this will unlikely change in the near future (Lévai 2000). The movements concerned with third world issues were also absent. According to Szabó, there is a correlation between the development of a certain country and the intensity of dealing with the problems of the third world. In his opinion, the economic conditions and living standards of Hungary in the 1990s did not provide a breeding ground for social movements concerned with third world problems (Szabó 1993).

Despite all efforts, the new social movements could not gain influence. According to Bácsván (2010), some possible explanation could be the inadequate level of cooperation between the different movements, the re-politicization of the society and the underdevelopment of the civil society. The transition occurred primarily in the political terrain; therefore the various social issues were articulated exclusively in the political sector especially in the absence of a strong civil society. After the transition, the role of the protests has gradually decreased, and the disillusionment with politics has grown rapidly, which hindered the development of civil society (Fricz 1996).

After the democratic transition, the number of political protests increased, and numerous movements and NGOs were formed, but their role was narrowed. As Benyik puts it:

Following the systemic change, Hungarian civil society went through considerable development, yet with the exception of some influential NGOs in the area of legal defense and civil liberties, most civil organizations have assumed a pure service delivery role. This process was inspired by the state and development agencies, and made NGOs leave behind the “real” civic functions they had fulfilled around the changes – that is, those of critical reflection, demonstrating alternatives, building new institutions in local communities and society in general, and influencing and taking part in decision-making and control processes.

(Benyik 2012)

In the 1990s, there were two remarkable protests. One of them was the so-called ‘taxi blockade’ between 25 and 28 October of 1990, when taxi drivers were protesting against the drastic increase in the price of the oil by paralyzing the transport of Budapest and the main cities (Szegő 2010). The other was ‘the Democratic Charta’ which was a movement formed by artists, scientists and politicians in order to save the democracy in Hungary which was in danger according to the founders. The movement was established on 25 September of 1991 and lasted for three years (origo.hu 2001). Later, the protests were less frequent, less spontaneous and were primarily linked to economic power conflicts (Szabó 1995), until the strengthening of an extreme right-wing movement in 2007. The Hungarian Guard Movement was the *de facto* paramilitary wing of the radical nationalist Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) party in Hungary with the objective of defending Hungary, which was considered “defenseless physically, spiritually and intellectually” (European Union 2013:40). The movement was banned in 2009, but then it formed into two new factions: the New Hungarian Guard (*Új Magyar Gárda*) and the Hungarian National Guard (*Magyar Nemzeti Gárda*) (ibid.).

#### ***4.1.2.3. The 2010s: the decline of liberal democracy***

In April 2010, the left-wing party, FIDESZ won the elections and formed a government with a two-third majority in the Parliament and implemented its anti-liberal democratic policies starting with changing the Fundamental Law of Hungary on 25 of April 2011. This was one of the first steps among the measures introduced by the government and together with the global economic crisis have prompted the civil society to engage in a battle against the overweight political power of the FIDESZ (Bozóki 2015; Benyik 2012).

Several groups appeared to protest against the new laws implemented by the Parliament. One of them was the new media law entered into force in 2010. The law created a media

supervisory authority, – the National Media and Communication Authority (*Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság*, NMHH), – which got legal power to curtail press freedom by controlling the editing practices and the policies of news agencies and state television, issuing financial penalties to television programs, print and electronic media and even bloggers that failed to abide by the media law, and the power to dismiss employees which created an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship among journalists and television reporters (Bozóki 2015; Wilkin 2015). A former FIDESZ representative became the President of the NMHH (Bozóki 2015) which provided an opportunity to the government to keep under control of about what news and from what point of view do the mediums make their reports. Suddenly, the political debates and the appearance of the opposition politicians and independent experts began to decrease in the media (Bozóki 2015). To minimize the broadcast of relevant political debates and the appearance of opposition politicians and independent experts in the media have a huge impact on the opinion-making process of citizens.

One of the first movements formed in opposition to the FIDESZ government was the “One million for the freedom of press” (Milla) which was using social media to mobilize the population to protest against the new media law of 2010 (Bozóki 2015; Wilkin 2015). Milla used its Facebook page to provide a platform for news articles which were violating the media law and were subjects to penalties set by the NMHH as well as to mobilize civil society and to organize widespread protests against the FIDESZ authoritarian and anti-liberal politics. As Wilkin argues that “a social media driven protest group can only succeed to the extent that it connects with actors in civil society and builds a grassroots movement willing to support it through concrete actions” (Wilkin 2015: 1), and that was exactly the problem Milla faced. Milla overlooked the fact that the internet penetration was around 75% and the Facebook penetration was only 43% in Hungary (Wilkin 2015), which means that the use of social media limited the outlook of the people joining to Milla and excluded the poorest, most marginalized and dispossessed citizens. Thus, Milla could not build links with every segment of the society and could not sustain itself over the long-term (ibid.).

Another social movement was the so-called HaHa (Student Network) which was established in 2011 and organized student protest in 2012 and 2013 against the education reforms introduced by the government (Hallgatói Hálózat n.d.). The reforms included the centralization of public education; the homogenization of the curriculum of public schools; the reduction of the age for compulsory education from 18 to 16 years; the limitation of the

number of seats at universities and colleges with financial aid provided to students; and the new conditions set out of receiving financial aid (Bozóki 2015).

The Hungarian Solidarity Movement (SOLIDARITY) was formed on 1 October 2011 to counteract the Orbán government's anti-democratic measures which violate the constitutional state (Szolidaritás 2011), but alone it could not gain great influence. The biggest democratic opposition movement, the 'Together 2014 Movement' (Together) was formed in October 2012 from the collaboration of three civil organizations: Homeland and Progress Association, Milla, and SOLIDARITY. However, since an association cannot participate in the elections, on 8 March 2013, they announced that the association became a political party under the name of 'Together 2014 Electoral Alliance Party' (Bozóki 2015).

FIDESZ won the elections in 2014 again and formed government second time in a row. The government continued its anti-liberal democratic policies which led to further protests of the civil society. As Bozóki summarizes:

Since the autumn of 2014 a new wave of street protest emerged in Hungary. These protests were more widespread, by moving beyond the capital and covering more and more countryside cities and towns. Protesters displayed more bitterness and stronger dedication for resistance than their forerunners. Instead of nicely formulated speeches they were less well articulated but more radical. A new generation of protesters appeared who not only wanted to remove the Orbán regime but aimed to rethink critically the general achievement of the democratic regime of the past 25 years.


(Bozóki 2015)

The mass of immigrants reached Hungary in this tense atmosphere which resulted in the anti-migration policy of the government, and the emergence of a new movement consisted of self-appointed volunteers from various segments of society. This was the first remarkable movement in the Hungarian history when people had joined an initiative which was not concerned with home affairs, but with the rights and well-being of the "aliens," the migrants arrived in Hungary.

### 4.1.3. Introduction of the grassroots groups emerged in the wake of migration influx

In the summer of 2015, from one day to another, thousands of asylum seekers showed up in several train stations of different cities of Hungary such as Szeged, Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs and Cegléd, which resulted in the raising of awareness among people and the media. This phenomenon occurred due to the asylum procedure followed by the authorities. The mass of refugees arrived in Hungary from Serbia through the border at Röszke (see Figure 2), where the police arrested them and initiated asylum procedure in cooperation with the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN).

**Figure 2** Routes of asylum seekers from Serbia via Röszke to the designated reception centers



Source: CSER, L., 2006 *Topographic map of Hungary*, Wikimedia Commons. Available from: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hungary\\_topographic\\_map.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hungary_topographic_map.jpg) [Accessed September 24, 2016] (Further edited by the author of this paper)

Generally, the asylum seekers spent a day in custody before they were sent to a designated reception center where they supposed to stay until a decision was made on their case (Pardavi et al. 2014). By that time, there were 4 reception centers for asylum seekers in Bicske, Balassagyarmat Vámoszabadi and Debrecen (which has been closed since 16<sup>th</sup> December, 2015) (Origo.hu 2015); and two facilities for unaccompanied minors in Fót (in the north of

Budapest) and Hódmezővásárhely (in the south of Hungary, near the Romanian and Serbian border) (Pardavi et al. 2014).

Instead of taking them directly to the designated reception centers, the asylum seekers had to travel through the country by themselves. The closest train station was in Szeged, from where they could travel further. Although, using the trains was free of charge within 48 hours after registration, but the information on the documents asylum seekers got from OIN was poor and in Hungarian. No schedule of train or map with guidelines where to change from one train to another were attached to the documents. Thus asylum seekers had difficulties to understand what to do and how to travel to the reception centers (Dercsényi 2015; Lévai 2015; Botos 2015).

The OIN sent people to reception centers without considering the national train schedules, did not provide any food supply for the journey or place to sleep during the night which would be necessary since there was no train service at night (Tanács 2015a). This is the reason that different sized groups of people appeared and stuck at railway stations affected by the routes from Röszke to the designated reception centers (see Figure 2) and the beginning of the civil movements all across Hungary. Citizens feeling solidarity with these asylum seekers started spontaneously and voluntarily to go to the affected railway stations and helped with giving information regarding trains and routes and giving food and water to the people. Soon the individuals joined forces and as a result of the collaboration of the people formed voluntary groups on Facebook.

The first Facebook-based group, the Migrant Solidarity Szeged<sup>2</sup> (*MigSzol Szeged*) (ca. 2500 members) was established on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2015 and operated in the railway station of Szeged (Szlavkovits 2015a). As Szeged is the closest city to the Serbian-Hungarian border, hence it was the first station where masses of asylum seekers showed up after crossing the border (Simonovts et al. 2016). Their activities included distribution of food among asylum seekers and providing interpretations/translations, guidance, explanations, and advice (Szlavkovits 2015a).

Let's Help the Refugees Together (*Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek*, SEM) (ca. 10,000 members) was the first Budapest-based grassroots group established on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2015 which initially operated at Budapest Keleti railway station but due to parallel activities of other volunteer groups, they moved to other locations, such as the II. János Pál Pápa square in the

---

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/groups/378084205735188/> [Accessed September 23, 2016]

vicinity – which was another hub of migrants – and to a facility that hosts many civil society organizations and movements. As many of SEM's volunteers and donors were foreign citizens living in Hungary, SEM founded another, English speaking Facebook group, Let's Help the Refugees Together in Hungary<sup>3</sup> (currently called: Let's Help the Refugees Together in Hungary and Europe – English wing of SEM). After having several conflicts with Migration Aid, the other grassroots group operated at the same location as SEM; their main activity became to be the distribution of food – both sandwiches and cooked food – among asylum seekers. The group also decided to avoid publicity (László 2016).

Migration Aid (*MA*) (ca. 10,000 members) was the largest and most complex, Budapest-based group which was established on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015. Its volunteers were operating primarily in the main railway stations of Budapest, such as Keleti-, Nyugati-, Kőbánya-Kispest and Déli railway stations, in Cegléd (where the asylum seekers had to change train towards Debrecen) and in Debrecen where one of the most important reception centers was at the time. The group maintained a main open Facebook page<sup>4</sup>, a main closed Facebook group<sup>5</sup> and each subgroup of different locations had its own closed Facebook group to facilitate the communication between the volunteers (Simonovts et al. 2016). After having several conflicts with SEM, their main activity became to be providing information by using multilingual printed informational materials as well as interpreters; giving away food, water, hygiene things, baby care products, clothes, blankets, sleeping bags and toys collected from donations to asylum seekers; providing medical care by working together with volunteer doctors and nurses; and playing the role of asylum seekers' advocacy in the public life. Migration Aid together with MigSzol Szeged undertook the duty of PR and became the representative of the civil initiatives in the media.

---

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1481045622191344/> [Accessed September 23, 2016]

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/migrationaid.org/> [Accessed September 23, 2016]

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1602563053360018/> [Accessed September 23, 2016]

#### 4.1.4. Organizational structure and positioning of the Grassroots groups

This section focuses on the nature of the emerged Facebook-based grassroots groups considering them as examples of *New Social Movements* (NSMs) by contrasting them with the ‘old’ or ‘conventional’ class-conflict-based social movements based on the following five aspects: their demands and objectives; their social base; their mobilization strategies and medium of action; their organizational structure; and their social location (Johnston et al. 1994; Koca 2016).

##### 4.1.4.1. Demands and Objectives

According to the Marxist theorists, the conventional working class/labor movements were primarily concerned about class interests and materialist issues, such as economic redistribution (Buechler 1995). While, in contrast, NSMs are concerned with “*cultural and symbolic issues that are linked with issues of identity*” (Melucci in Johnston et al. 1994: 7), such as environmental issues, human rights, civil rights, feminist, gay rights, and minority protection. Often, they focus on protecting and promoting the rights of marginalized groups, such as minorities, poor, women, gay or refugees. In this sense, the demands and objectives of the emerged grassroots groups were similar to the NSMs, as they tried to protect the asylum seekers rights as well as the fundamental human rights by organizing demonstrations.

Both, MigSzol Szeged and Migration Aid held demonstrations to show solidarity with asylum seekers and to protest against the government’s inhumane treatment and its anti-immigration policy. However, they were protesting against to government’s policy; they stressed that the grassroots groups were civil initiatives and they were free from all politics and economic interests and that the presence of politicians was only welcomed as private individuals.

The volunteers of MigSzol Szeged defined themselves as “*a group of helpful people from Szeged*” (Kékesi in Tanács 2015b). They organized the first demonstration on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2015 under the name ‘*If you go to the wall, we will be the wall!*’ (in Hungarian: *Ha elmentek a falig, mi leszünk a fal!*), referring to the government’s decision to build a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border, and in the description of the event posted on Facebook, they stated that: “*The asylum seekers are neither angels nor devils, they are humans. As humans, they have the right (not in legal terms) to be treated as humans, to have a fair hearing to see if they are indeed entitled to refugee status*” (MigSzol Szeged 2015).



Migration Aid organized two anti-government protests for two following days on 2 and 3 September 2015 under the name: ‘*Not in my name*’ (in Hungarian: *Nem az én nevemben*) to protest against the legislative proposals which were waiting for adoption in the Hungarian Parliament. Their mission posted on their Facebook group’s wall stated that “*the Migration Aid civil movement aims to help the alleviation of social tension caused by the migration flows and to support the care of refugees corresponding to the European values from humanitarian and legal point of views*” (Migration Aid 2015). This statement shows that the views of the civil movement were opposing to the views of the government regarding the questions of immigration and asylum seekers and despite or rather precisely because the government’s standpoint they were still willing to help asylum seekers and to stand up for asylum seekers. As a matter of fact, in her speech, Zsuzsanna Zsohár (2015), spokeswoman of Migration Aid listed their demands to the government which were:

- “the elimination of the government’s fear-generating sham measures that do not provide real, long-term solution;
- to acknowledge all people, because there are no illegal persons and the cessation of demonization of any group of people;
- to respect and to protect the fundamental human rights, such as the right to freedom, freedom of expression, rights of the individual to prosperity;
- engagement in the integration policy of the EU;
- the government does not use the term, transit zone to the camps were built near the border” (2015).

These demands could be considered as an effort to resist the government’s securitization strategy – which will be presented in the third part of the analysis – and this protest could be considered as a way of trying to “desecuritize” refugees.

Let’s help the Refugees Together (SEM) did not organize demonstrations, but their mission stated on their Facebook page<sup>6</sup> clearly shows their objectives: “*Our mission is to help and fight for everyone who has been or may be in trouble because of the despotism of others*” (SEM 2015). The term, ‘despotism of others’ is a broad definition, but it clearly refers, inter alia, to the Hungarian government and its anti-immigration policy; and ‘the help provided to everyone who has been or may be in trouble’ because of them is obviously a form of protest

---

<sup>6</sup> [https://www.facebook.com/bk41segitsunkegyutt/about/?entry\\_point=page\\_nav\\_about\\_item](https://www.facebook.com/bk41segitsunkegyutt/about/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item) [Accessed October 3, 2016]

against the government and one way to show solidarity and promoting the rights of asylum seekers.

Transparency was crucial to all three civil initiatives as they had to build trust among both the donors and the asylum seekers. Only Migration Aid collected money at the beginning of their operation, but after losing several sponsors because of inadequate accounting, they stopped collecting money and only accepted commodities as the other two groups in order to remain transparent.

#### **4.1.4.2. Social Base**

As theorists of NSMs pointed out, the social base of NSMs is diverse. According to Claus Offe, it consists of ‘the new middle class’, elements of the old middle class, and peripheral groups outside the labor market (Offe 1985:831-832). While Johnston and his colleagues (1994) think that “[t]here is a tendency for the social base of new social movements to transcend class structure. The background of participants find their most frequent structural roots in rather diffuse social statuses such as youth, gender, sexual orientation, or professions” (p. 6), while the base of the “conventional” social movement were the lower classes and members of labor unions (Pichardo 1997: 412).

In line with the assertion of Johnston and his colleagues, the composition of these grassroots groups was diverse. There were all sorts of people regarding their age, gender, profession or religion. As the above already cited Márk Kékesi said, “[t]here is all kinds of people: religious, atheist, busy businessman who comes out once a week for a few hours, a teacher with three children, students, pensioners, university lecturers” (Kékesi in Szlavkovits 2015b). Women and men, young and old, Christians, Muslims and Jewish people, Hungarians, Foreigners and former refugees were working together to provide help for asylum seekers. Moreover, the ideological orientation of the volunteers did not play a role in participating in the work of these grassroots groups as all of these groups stated that they were free from all politics and economic interests and did not represent any ideological stances (see the full statement of MigSzol Szeged in Appendix 2).

#### **4.1.4.3. Mobilization Strategies and Medium of Action**

New social movements tend to use “new mobilization patterns characterized by nonviolence and civil disobedience..., while often challenging dominant norms of conduct” (Johnston et al. 1994: 8). This assertion is confirmed by the three grassroots groups in question. The mobilization strategies used by these grassroots groups was closely linked to the widespread

use of social media. The grassroots groups were formed by forming Facebook groups, and most of their communication took place via these Facebook groups, such as the coordination of volunteers and the different tasks; recruitment or more precisely the acceptance of new volunteers' applications; fundraising; and organizing events, such as commemorations and demonstrations. Information technologies were used to reach donors, to update donation lists, to share information and update the volunteers about the news and changes, to keep in touch with volunteers, to provide a platform for discussions among members and to provide information for asylum seekers.

Migration Aid developed the InfoAid, a mobile phone application for asylum seekers which shares information and news concerning the refugees in different languages (English, Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi). Using the InfoAid, refugees can get information about the following topics:

- what rules apply to them;
- where they can get care or what happens in traffic;
- it is safe to drink the tap water in Hungary;
- how and where to buy their train tickets;
- where they can get medical care;
- to collect the garbage they produce;
- where, when and why to register, and what is exactly it entails.

The application is free, advertising-free and does not contain any in-app purchase.

Before the era of social media, all of this would not have been possible in a single interface and the fast reactions and effectiveness of the grassroots groups were mainly due to the speed and the penetration of the Internet.

#### ***4.1.4.4. Organizational Structure***

One of the important differences between NSMs and “conventional” social movements lies in their organizational structure. While the “conventional” movements have formal structures which are generally centralized and hierarchical, the NSMs are claimed to be decentralized and more informal. As Gunathilake argues:

Most “old” social movements embraced the idea of leadership roles, with consensual and centralized decision making by a selected few members, while new social movements have adopted a leaderless horizontal structure by employing an organizational format they refer to as the people’s assembly.

(Gunathilake 2012: 3)

This is illustrated by the way the co-founder of MigSzol Szeged summed up the essence of their own group: “[w]e are not an organization, but a group of helpful people from Szeged who give to the people in need what other helpful people from Szeged donated” (Kékesi in Tanács 2015b). These groups were all formed to bring together singular volunteers into a more efficient group of volunteers, therefore at the beginning; there were no designated leaders and hierarchical structures. Everybody was equal, and the decisions were made by means of meetings. Parallel to the increases in the number of members, various functions have evolved. However, the groups kept their flat organizational structure. MigSzol Szeged set up different “professional groups,” such as fundraisers, health care, cleaners, interpreters, sandwich makers, transporters. By August of 2015, Let’s Help the Refugees Together had seven Facebook administrators with specific tasks. One was responsible for the online food orders and the administration and follow-up of the stocks. Two members were responsible for answering all the questions received – they worked in shifts. Four members monitored the online members and their posts as well as the profile of the people who wished to join the group in order to filter out racist, homophobic, Islamophobic or xenophobic people.

Migration Aid operated in several locations, therefore beside the large collective Facebook group, the volunteers were divided into smaller units based on the location they were volunteering. All units were independently organized their own work and were in constant contact with other units as well as with the other grassroots groups.

#### **4.1.4.5. Social Location**

Finally, there is a difference between the NSMs and the “conventional” social movements in their social location. “*Unlike the relatively ‘local’ character of the latter, ...the former tend to transcend national boundaries and form alliances with similar movements in other countries with the help of developments in communication and information technologies*” (Koca 2016: 103-104).

This characteristic of the emerged grassroots groups became visible in the lights of the events. In the beginning, the different volunteer groups tried to establish themselves as well as cooperation with the authorities and with the other volunteer groups across Hungary. When the location of the events shifted to the Hungarian-Serbian border and later to the Hungarian-Croatian border, the grassroots groups relocated their operation to these new venues and expanded their networks at transnational levels by started cooperation with other international and local (Serbian and Croatian) movements and organizations. Since the flow of migrants

trapped outside of Hungary, – thanks to the fence built by the government, – the grassroots groups went through changes. MigSzol Szeged still collects and forwards donations to asylum seekers waiting in the transit zones at Röszke and Tompa and to people waiting in the reception centers, but they expanded the range of supported groups with Hungarian people in need, such as homeless people, the poor and orphans.

Let's Help the Refugees Together decided to establish an association to provide a legal background for its activities and fundraising, which went together with changing its name to BK41 – Let's Help Together Let's in order to indicate that they do not only help the refugees anymore, but the people in need as well, such as homeless people, people in need in the countryside including Roma minority members and other marginalized groups. Migration Aid became a formal and international organization by registering the organization under the name Migration Aid International with its headquarters in the United Kingdom. Their main profile did not change; they only expanded their activities over borders, and they were involved in local integration or reintegration programs.

#### ***4.1.4.6. Conclusion***

This part of the analysis explores the dynamics of the three emerged grassroots groups (MigSzol Szeged, Migration Aid and Let's Help the Refugees Together) considered them as new social movements. The analysis of the social initiatives is based on five criteria including their demands and objectives, social base, organizational structure, mobilization strategies and medium of action and social location. The social initiatives can be considered as NSMs based on the above-mentioned five criteria. However, the analysis can only shed lights on the short-term impact of these movements, and it is necessary to conduct research focusing on their operation on the long run as well as their long-term impact on the state policies and the public.

## **PART II: Volunteers' motivations**

The second part of the analysis seeks to answer the question: what motivated volunteers to engage in providing assistance to migrants? First, a historical overview of volunteerism in Hungary is provided to give the reader an insight. Then, the answers of the volunteers interviewed by newspapers are going to be assessed and categorized by using the twelve category classification of motivations defined in 'Theoretical framework to analyze the motivations of volunteers' subsection of the theory chapter.

### **4.2.1. Volunteers in Hungary**

Volunteering in Hungary had different meanings during different periods of history but its main characteristic is rooted in the Hungarian culture: taking care of the members of the community was important. The community had an obligation to help the people in need and the poor. One particular example is the practice of 'kaláka' which was a form of communal work in the rural areas of the traditional Hungary. The families of a given community offered each other help in farming tasks, such as harvesting or weaving, and in return got help from the other families of the community. This exchange of workforce worked on a voluntary basis, and the work was accompanied by entertainment (singing, dancing, and story-telling) to provide a good atmosphere and had a community building effect. Another example for the community cohesion is the practice of 'komatál' – friends and family members prepare food for a mother who had recently given birth – which was the expression of thoughtfulness (F.Tóth & Hadrévy 2004).

Another manifestation of volunteering in the Hungarian history is the voluntary care services provided by local medical workers to the local communities. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a public-private funding model of social services emerged which means that there were "foundation places" in public institutions, such as schools and hospitals financed by donations. As in other European countries, the different religious institutions and the large, established charity organizations – such as the Hungarian Red Cross – were engaged in volunteering in Hungary as well (GHK 2010).

After the World War II, the development of the voluntary sector was halted by the communist regime and the voluntary work lost its voluntary nature as most of the voluntary sector was nationalized and brought under state control. The regime introduced the so-called 'Communist Saturdays' which was a quasi-compulsory form of volunteering in support of the

Nation and the Party which resulted that people considered volunteering equivalent to unpaid work (F.Tóth & Hadrévy 2004; GHK 2010).

During the democratic transition, the government established the conditions of a more pluralistic and decentralized welfare system by entering into dialogue with civil society and making changes in legislation. These changes – the codification of the freedom of association; introduction of the favorable tax treatment of non-profit organizations – were intended to facilitate the advancement of citizen participation and the development of the third sector. Nevertheless volunteering was still considered negatively by citizens due to the memories about the compulsory volunteer work during the communism (F.Tóth & Hadrévy 2004; GHK 2010). “The United Nations “*International Year of Volunteers*” in 2001 was an important catalyst for the development of the sector as it increased cooperation between the various ministries and the NGOs and paved the way for a law on volunteering as well as the creation of the National Volunteer Centre Foundation” (GHK 2010:1). In the past two decades, the public opinion has positively changed about volunteering and the number of volunteers has increased. According to the *European Value Study* in 2008, the proportion of the volunteers of formal organizations in the Hungarian society was 10.8% (EVS in Batta 2013:22). While according to a more recent study, about a third of the Hungarian population carried out volunteer activities directly or through voluntary organizations, though it is not so conscious and regular than in Western Europe (Batta 2013:22). According to these studies, the people who are volunteering in Hungary are typically wealthy, highly educated and have a high status in society (ibid.).

In 2011, the parliament approved a bill that requires from high school students to carry out 50 hours of volunteer work as a prerequisite for obtaining graduation certificate. It has four objectives, namely: community development, education for active citizenship, personality development, career orientation. The law applies to the students graduating after 1 January 2016 and; therefore information on the effectiveness of this initiative is not yet available (Eduline.hu 2015; Bódó 2015). However, it is questionable if it is going to attract the willingness to volunteering and increase the number of volunteers in the youth generation of the society or will it have the same effects as the ‘Communist Saturdays’ had under the communist regime (i.e. students will consider volunteering equivalent to compulsory unpaid work).

### 4.2.2. Motivation of the volunteers in Hungary

A previous study was made by Simonovits and her colleagues (2016) which examined the volunteers' motivation to help asylum seekers. They conducted three focus groups (with twenty-one participants in total) and conducted 16 individual interviews with volunteers working in three different cities. They identified three main motivational structures, namely: the traditional motivational structure – “the good Samaritan,” involvement and a sense of duty – “the countryman” and the political motivations – “the activist.” In the first group belonged the volunteers with a human desire to help or feeling sorry for the refugees. According to the study (ibid.: 112), people in this group had altruistic aims and often religious reasons to help which is the most common motivational structure among Hungarian volunteers. In the second group, the main reason of volunteers to help was personal involvement. Most of them had their own experiences as migrants or had family members being migrants and therefore they considered themselves belonging to the group of asylum seekers. The third group of volunteers was motivated primarily by the feeling of outrage at the government's policy regarding asylum seekers which manifested in taking a stand against government's communication either online or in political action and helping as volunteer of one of the Facebook-based grassroots groups (ibid.: 111-115).

By using the results of the study of Simonovits and her colleagues as a starting point for this current analysis, research was conducted about the motivation of volunteers using a different method. Many newspaper articles have been published on the Facebook-based grassroots groups and their volunteers to showcase the people who work together and the operation of these groups. Interviews were done with founders, spokesmen, representatives and ordinary volunteers of the different grassroots groups to give an insight into their work, struggles, and motivations to the society. The composition of these grassroots groups was diverse. As Márk Kékesi, one of the founders of the MigSzol Szeged said, “[t]here is all kinds of people: religious, atheist, busy businessman who comes out once a week for a few hours, a teacher with three children, students, pensioners, university lecturers. Everybody comes as much as he or she wants and as much as they can” (Kékesi in Szlavkovits 2015b). The majority of volunteers were women; however, as the quote above shows, there was all kind of people. Since the busiest period was during summer time, there was school break, and lots of people were on vacation, so they had free time to volunteer.

As diverse the composition of the groups was as diverse the motivation of the volunteers was. The collected newspaper articles have done interviews with a total of 31 volunteers asking



them about their motivation to engage in helping the asylum seekers. Based on their answers, it looks like volunteers usually had more than one motivation. The most frequently cited reason – 87% of the interviewed volunteers mentioned – was the inner urge to help asylum seekers. Most of the volunteers were driven by altruistic motives. As another founder of the MigSzol Szeged – the first Facebook-based grassroots group – said: “*We just wanted to help some refugees; we did not think that such forces would move across the country*” (Szőke-Tóth in Szlavkovits 2015b).

The founders of these grassroots groups were not alone with their motivation. As a matter of fact, not only Hungarians joined the grassroots groups, but people from all around the world arrived to help. Some joined while they were visiting Hungary, but some arrived specifically with the purpose to join the volunteers and help the asylum seekers. The 444.hu made interviews with nine volunteers of Migration Aid: Dóra, Enrico, Maria Yolanda, Selina, Rita, Mark, Attila, Krisztina, and Yvette. Some of them are Hungarians; some arrived from Germany, and one of them is from the United States. All of their motivation was primarily altruistic. They joined the helpers, “*because [as they said] they feel obliged to help*” (in Surovecz 2015).

Ilona had difficulties to put into words why she became a volunteer, but the answer lies in the modesty of her reaction: “*I do not know why I am doing it. Perhaps the service: it is good to go to bed at night with a feeling that I was serving today*” (Szlavkovits 2015b).

Volunteers driven by altruistic motives were often motivated by the principal of ‘one good turn deserves another’ (*Reciprocity*) as well.

The second most frequently cited reason – which was mentioned by one-third of the interviewed volunteers – is to protest against the negative attitude of the government towards the asylum seekers and its anti-immigration campaign. Nina was a volunteer of Migration Aid who even invited asylum seekers to spend the night over in her place said: “*Anyone can give water to those who are thirsty. This is not a big refugee rescue; I would do that to anyone in Hungary if he/she were in trouble. I was outraged by the government’s billboards; I liked the response of the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party; building the fence is ridiculous. I imagine it quite differently*” (Nina in Rab 2015b).

Dr. Judit Mogyorósi, a doctor, providing medical aid as a volunteer of Migration Aid expressed her opinion as well: “*I have nothing to do with politics. And yet, I do politicize in a sense that I cannot agree to live in a country where masses of people are classified illegal*

*based on their religion, skin color or any other attribute. However, if they are illegal, I undertake to illegally deal with them”* (Mogyorósi in Sombor 2016).

At the beginning of the summer Zsuzsanna Zsohár – spokeswoman of Migration Aid – was only raged because of the anti-immigration billboard campaign of the government, then she saw the Migration Aid group that had just been formed on Facebook and she immediately joined. As she said, she felt that the selfless help is a good response to the government’s incitement to hatred (Boda 2015). The above-cited volunteers were not the only ones whose motivation to help was driven by the need to protest against the government’s behavior and actions. Many people felt in the same way. As Panni Puskás – journalist of HVG and volunteer of Migration Aid – aptly put it in her article written about this topic:

If one feels that things are going in the wrong way in the country where one lives, one will likely want to change this. The average citizen has, of course, possibilities, to say no to the reigning government’s madness within democratic conditions. For example, one can shake his fist at the pub or can go to protest in front of the Parliament, – which is an excellent weekend program, – then one can go home and note that nothing happened. It is possible to spark a revolution, or at least a street riot, knocking bins over, insulting police, or shouting after any names of people to get out.

And one can also do what the Migration Aid does: to get organized and demonstratively perform the duties neglected by the state - their work is one of the noblest forms of opposition activism. This is so even if they are likely to refuse to politicize. [...] And we, who have a bad conscience from this [i.e. the anti-immigration campaign of the government], we want to prove that we are humans. Perhaps this is the stake of all: we have to prove that there are people in this country who are capable of solidarity, are not xenophobic and do not fall for the government’s campaign, who see what the problem is and they know it cannot be resolved by a fence. And hate campaign or not, there are more and more of these people.

(Puskás 2015)

The motivation to protest against or for something was not included in the final set of motivational factors listed in the theoretical chapter, and it was not part of the previous studies conducted about the motivations of volunteers. However it appears clear from the collected data that the need to protest had strong motivational effect on the volunteers of the grassroots groups emerged in Hungary to help asylum seekers. Therefore, the *Protest* – to protest against or for something – motivation factor was added as a thirteenth category to the previously listed motivators.

The motivation to protest and the inner urge to help asylum seekers were often accompanied with the motivation to complement the lack of government resources and state aid and the

motivation to reduce or compensate negative feelings, such as guilty conscience or sense of shame over the way asylum seekers were treated. According to Zsuzsanna Zsohár, the spokeswoman of Migration Aid: “*because of the campaigns, many people have some sort of sense of shame that they try to compensate*” (Zsohár in Dercsényi 2015a). However, the lack of local government resources and state aid as motivator did not appear. As a matter of fact, in most cities where these grassroots groups operated the local government and authorities cooperated with the volunteers.

As Lévai pointed out in her article about the volunteers, these people are working all day long to correct the Hungarian government’s hostile attitude towards asylum seekers and to substitute the conspicuous absence of the established aid organizations and the lack of action of opposition parties (2015). The collected data shows that to complement the lack of government resources and state aid was an important motivator. Whereas the interviewed volunteers did not mention the lack of local government resources and aid as motivator, perhaps because the grassroots groups could build up and maintain a good relationship with local authorities (Szlavkovits 2015b; DA & KK 2015; index.hu 2015).

The motivations of *Recognition* and *Self-Esteem* often go hand in hand. Oftentimes, it is hard to separate these motivators from each other, and many times more than one of them are playing a role in becoming a volunteer. Increasing self-esteem and being recognized and appreciated for doing something good are similar needs and some of the volunteers mentioned both of them. Erzsike is a disability pensioner who did not feel appreciated by her surroundings. She began to help with food distribution at the railway station in Szeged, to help as much as she can, and she finally felt that she is needed (Szlavkovits 2015b).

The desire to learn more about the world and being open-minded had clearly an important role in becoming a volunteer of these grassroots groups however it was not clearly manifested in the answers. As Dr. Judit Mogyorósi explained to a journalist, she went through a change; her set of values along with her priorities had changed. As she said, she and her colleagues felt that: “*we got much more from the refugees than we gave to them*” (Mogyorósi in Sombor 2016).

The *Religion* as motivator had a role in some cases, but the composition of the religious volunteers was assorted. There were Buddhist, Christian, and Jewish among the interviewed volunteers whose religious beliefs were affecting them to engage in helping the asylum seekers in need.

Based on the collected data, another important group of the helpers is the ones who became volunteers because they were refugees at the moment or in the past and knew from their own experience what the asylum seekers went through. This group consists of members of the Syrian, Egyptian, Afghan communities living in Hungary, young asylum seekers speaking foreign languages, – especially English, – who had an inner urge to help their fellow asylum seekers. They helped mostly with translations and interpretations. This is an example for being urged to help by the sense of belonging. Motherhood and parenthood are the other examples of the sense of belonging which made people engage in helping refugee families and their children.

It is clear from the interviews made with volunteers that the *Career development*, *Social*, and *Social interaction* motivators do not play a role in becoming a volunteer of these newly emerged grassroots groups. One possible explanation is that these grassroots groups are not established organizations; therefore they do not attract people with a desire to gain experience and skills or to build social or professional networks. To help asylum seekers by joining one of the grassroots groups was a prompt decision in which long-term goals and motivation such as career development and social interaction did not play a role.

To sum up, we can say that the underlying motivations of becoming a volunteer of the newly emerged grassroots groups are diverse and most of the cases there is more than one reason behind the decision to become a volunteer. Most frequently one of the reasons is the inner urge to help or to protest against the government's anti-immigration policy. Religious beliefs and moral values are as important motivators as the sense of belonging or the need to foster one's personal growth while career development and social networking are not relevant motivation factors in this case.

## **PART III: Political and public response to the ‘migration crisis’**

The third part outlines the political and public contexts surrounding the migration crisis in order to understand the emergence of the civil initiatives in Hungary. This part consists of three sections: the first section analyzes the government’s response to the migration crisis and its main effects; the second section reveals the role of the established charity organizations while the third section sheds light on the society’s different reactions to the situation.

### **4.3.1. The Government’s response**

In the following, the main relevant political events that occurred in Hungary will be outlined in connection with the so-called ‘migration crisis’ and the emerged grassroots groups in order to provide an insight into the situation.

The Hungarian Government followed a hard line of anti-immigration policy from the beginning of 2015, even before the influx of refugees reached Hungary. The first event that revealed this strategy was the Prime Minister Orbán’s speech in Paris after the Charlie Hebdo terror attack<sup>7</sup>. He stated that:

Economic migration is a bad thing in Europe. We should not look at it as something useful, because it only means trouble and danger to the European people. Migration should be stopped. That’s Hungary’s opinion. We don’t want to ingest a significant minority with a cultural nature and background that is different from ours. We would like to keep Hungary Hungarian.

(Victor Orban in Euronews 2015)

The speech is a clear example for *securitization* of migration, because Prime Minister Orbán interpreted the Charlie Hebdo terror attack – an event happened in abroad without any previous precedent in Hungary – as direct threat to Hungary and migration as *societal security issue* by considering it as a threat to the cultural identity of Hungary and the Hungarians.

The speech was followed by a so-called ‘national consultation’ on immigration initiated by the government. In April, the government sent out a questionnaire to all Hungarian adults to survey their opinion on immigration (see it in Appendix 3) and in May the ‘national consultation’ on immigration took place. Related to this, the government launched an anti-immigration billboard campaign. Although the campaign was said to address the migrants themselves, it was nevertheless in Hungarian making it unintelligible to them. The following messages were read on the poster (see it in Appendix 4):

---

<sup>7</sup> January 11, 2015

“If you come to Hungary, do not take the jobs of Hungarians!”

“If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture!”

“If you come to Hungary, you have to keep our laws!”

(Own translation)

This campaign was the first step in the government’s strategy to generate *moral panic* by arousing social concern over the migration issue by giving the impression to the people that asylum seekers are economic migrants who are going to take the jobs away from Hungarians; that they will not respect the culture of Hungarians and will involve in illegal activities.

As a response, a fringe political party, the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (in Hungarian: *Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, MKKP*), started a counter billboard campaign (see it in Appendix 5) with pro-immigration messages in which they criticized the government and its attitudes and actions. The first poster says that “[t]he migrants do not work and take the jobs away from us!” (own translation). Which points out the government’s controversial arguments regarding why the migrants are a threat to Hungary. On the one hand, they do not want to work; they are all reprobates and bums. However, on the other hand, they will take the jobs away from the Hungarian people.

The second poster quotes from the Act on Criminal Code in force at that time (see it in Appendix 5):

BTK 332§ Any person who incites to hatred before great publicity against:

- a) the Hungarian nation;
- b) any national, ethnic, racial group or certain groups of the population;
- c) against certain groups of the population – particular with regard to disability, gender identity, sexual orientation – is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.

(Own translation)

This message clearly points out that the government committed hate speech against migrants which was a crime according to their own previously enacted law principles which entered into force on 1 July 2013.

The third message – “Come to Hungary, we have got jobs in London!” – is cynical and refers to the fact that in the past few years – due to the economic crisis – thousands of people left Hungary in the hope of better life and settled down in Western-European countries and one of the most popular destinations was London. This is, on the one hand, critique towards the government’s failure to creating jobs and providing decent pay to the Hungarian citizens and on the other hand, it shows the overstatement of the government that the migrants will take

away the jobs of Hungarians. As a matter of fact, there have been reports about which sectors of the labor market are struggling from labor shortages (24.hu 2016).

The fourth message is a quote from the Bible which refers to the statement of the Fundamental Law of Hungary – which was changed by the Second Orbán Government on 25 of April 2011 – according to which Hungary is a country based on Christian values. “*For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in*” (Matthew 25:35<sup>8</sup>). If one reads between the lines, one can understand the critique according to that the Christian values, – promoted by the government, – such as mercy and helpfulness were not present in the government’s measures related to the influx of asylum seekers.

The next poster is in English apologizing because of the Hungarian Prime Minister. “*Sorry about our Prime Minister!*” It is short, and it speaks for itself.

The following quote is from St. Stephen’s *Admonitions* to his son, Prince Imre: „*Because a country using only one language and having only one custom is weak and frail.*” St. Stephen was the first king, and state founder of Hungary and his words were used to point out that the problem with the policy followed by the government was not only its inhumane nature towards the asylum seekers but rather its effect on the country itself by isolating Hungary from everybody coming from outside of the country.

The following poster draws attention to the fact that, “[i]f you are the Prime Minister of Hungary, you have to keep our laws!” (own translation) just like anyone else. This message criticizes the Prime Minister for tailoring the law frequently according to his needs.

The last poster criticizes the measure of the government which forbade the commercial units to be open on Sundays which led to dismissals of employees: “*Welcome to Hungary! Closed on Sundays.*”

Besides the billboard war between the government and the fringe party, there were other evidence, measures that have shown the government’s hard-line anti-immigration policy. Firstly, the rhetoric of the government built on inaccurate, misleading and exaggerating statements about the asylum seekers arrived in Hungary. For instance, their vocabulary was lacking the terms refugees and asylum seekers; instead they used the terms: migrants, illegal

---

<sup>8</sup> English version is retrieved from <https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2025:35> [Accessed October 7, 2016]

migrants, economic migrants to describe the people arrived in Hungary and labeled them “criminals”, “terrorists” and as causes of risk of epidemic in order to frame them as a threatening group. This seems to be supported by the instruction leaked out that minors may not appear on the reports about refugees at MTV, the nationwide public television broadcasting organization in Hungary which Chief Executive Officer is a person close to FIDESZ. The reason could be that minors would have weakened the threatening image painted about migrants.

This move was a clear example of *securitization* and provided an opportunity to the government to take actions which would otherwise be considered disproportionate. Due to this strategy, the people's sense of threat has grown, thus allowing the government to build a fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border<sup>9</sup> in order to prevent the illegal border crossing of asylum seekers and reduce the numbers of legal asylum seekers. This measurement aroused great indignation not only in domestic public life and media but also in international politics and the press, but it still did not stop them. On 15 September, the government closed the Hungarian-Serbian border and only a month later the Hungarian-Croatian border as well, which caused the end of the mass inflow of migrants and refugees into Hungary.

According to members participating in the faction meeting held in Velence on 20 September 2015, Prime Minister Orbán practically admitted that from mid-August, the government deliberately did not intervene in the chaos emerged due to refugees at Keleti railway station and several parts of the country, but left the situation to escalate. So the people had their first-hand experience, how big was the problem which the government protected them from. Moreover, the “crisis governance,” besides increasing the support of the party (which was at a low point at the time), was also good to reunite the political camp and to distract the attention from the controversial and uncomfortable issues. This is a clear example of using *moral panic* as a tool, to distract the attention from the deeper social problems and it confirms the government’s intention to create a crisis situation.

This move was followed by the Parliament’s launching the new asylum law on 21 September 2015 which went into force on 22 September 2015. As Júlia Iván, the lawyer of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee stated: “*Since 15 September 2015, the institution of asylum has been essentially eliminated in Hungary*” (Iván in Serdült 2015). This new law contained several changes. The crossing of closed borders or damaging the fence became a criminal act; the

---

<sup>9</sup> The construction of the fence started on July 13, 2015.



armed forces such as the military and the police got special powers and tasks, and it allowed carrying out construction works free of legal obstructions related to the management of the refugee situation. Moreover, the new law introduced the notion of “crisis caused by mass immigration” (**migration crisis**) which provides an opportunity to the government to proclaim a “state of emergency” and to take extraordinary measures, in other words, act as Agamben calls, a *state of exception*.

Although the flow of asylum seekers stayed away from Hungary, the government continued its strategy. As a next step, the ruling party, FIDESZ started to collect signatures in order to launch a referendum against the EU’s migration quota on 4 of November. Then, on 12 January 2016, the government proposed an amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary regarding special rules and measures applicable in the case of terror threats, but on 5 March 2016, the government had to withdraw the proposal because it was unable to gain the two-thirds support of the parliament.

After Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia tightened admission rules for illegal immigrants and practically closed Western Balkans route for migrants, the Hungarian government referring to Section 80/A. (1) c) of the Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (“*the development of any circumstance related to the migration situation directly endangering the public security, public order or public health of any settlement*”) declared a state of „migration crisis” for the entire country on 9 March 2016 (Orbán 2016b). Sándor Pintér, Minister of Interior justified the decision that the Balkan measures “*no way to know exactly what kind of reactions trigger from migrants*” (Pintér in HVG.hu 2016). According to the opposition parties, the legal conditions for the publication of the crisis did not exist. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee filed a public information request to the Guard of Order (in Hungarian: *Rendőrség*) and the OIN, however, the authorities respond stated that the reasons for ordering a crisis were secret for ten years (presshelsinki 2016). With this measure, the government proclaimed the “state of emergency” and on 5 September 2016, the government even extended it until 8 March 2017 (Orbán 2016a) and prolonged its role to act as a *state of exception*.

The government’s strategy followed since the beginning of 2015 paid off. By *securitizing* the migrants, the government was able to arouse *moral panic* in society then quasi-lawfully announce a “state of emergency” and to become a *state of exception* which provides it an opportunity to operate outside of the law, to suspend juridical order, and even to turn a democracy into totalitarianism.

### **4.3.2. Role of the established charity organizations**

Ideally, the cooperation of civilians, professional aid organizations and the state would be normal to manage the situation due to the influx of refugees. However the established charity organizations have been criticized for being passive or non-visible at the beginning of the summer, when thousands of migrants were traveling through the country in order to arrive at the designated reception centers and stuck at the train stations without the authorities had provided them a place to sleep, food or water.

The answer of the Hungarian Interchurch Aid and the Hungarian Baptist Aid to the criticism was that the government had not asked their help and without their request, they did not take actions. After public criticism, finally the request arrived from the Ministry of Human Capacities which initiated that the Charity Council had their first meeting only on 15 July 2015 with its members – the Catholic Caritas, the Hungarian Reformed Church Aid, the Hungarian Maltese Charity Service, the Hungarian Baptist Aid, the Hungarian Red Cross and the Hungarian Interchurch Aid – where they discussed and made plan for a harmonized and organized joint work. The different organizations undertook different tasks. For instance, the Hungarian Baptist Aid operated two temporary shelters for only families already received refugee status with a capacity of 80 people and was planning to expand the number of seats with 20 or even 40 for unaccompanied minors who already received refugee status. As they stated, they tried to provide humanitarian help within their capabilities by taking and distributing donations once among the asylum seekers waiting in Szeged railway station.

The Hungarian Interchurch Aid supported two of the temporary reception centers with a total of 4 million HUF at the beginning of July. This is especially interesting in the light of that the donation was handed over by Anikó Lévai, the wife of the Prime Minister who happened to be the Goodwill Ambassador of the Hungarian Interchurch Aid as well. The organization also launched a donation line. The donations were meant to be spent on providing care for children arriving in Hungary. Moreover, they undertook to help in providing psychosocial assistance.

The Hungarian Maltese Charity Service focused on providing health care for asylum seekers on the move with its mobile medical clinics and social workers while the Hungarian Red Cross operated primarily in Rösztke by providing psychosocial care for women and children to ease their trauma.

The Catholic Caritas opened a donation line and provided help in the reception centers particularly to unaccompanied children and elderly people with tangible donations, such as

clothes, blankets, towels and toiletries. As they said: “[f]ollowing the guidance of Pope Francis, the Charity continues to monitor the situation of refugees coming to and transiting through Hungary and it is ready to help those displaced from their homes” (Catholic Caritas 2015). However, they stated that they did not provide street-based aid.

The Hungarian Reformed Church Aid, as they stated, tried to help where deficiency of capacity occurred, primarily in providing care for infants. Moreover, they had been working on integrating families already received refugee status into the Hungarian society, and they had been helping the inhabitants of one of the reception centers (in Debrecen) with food and clothes.

Although the organizations claimed that efforts had been made, their work remained almost invisible to the public, and it appears that not every asylum seeker could count on help from these organizations. The target of most of the charity organizations were mainly the unaccompanied minors and those who had already been received refugee status. This distinction that to whom they are willing to provide help seems to be discriminatory, and it shows their low degree of willingness to contribute and to share the burden with the civil initiatives which is evident from their reaction time as well.

During the days 21 and 23 September, the government and the grassroots groups had a debate on Prime Minister Orbán’s statement that “*We gave significant financial support to NGOs - I just say quietly*” (Origo.hu 2015). The grassroots groups immediately reacted to it and stated that they had not received any state funds. Shortly, FIDESZ responded that “*The Hungarian government provides care for immigrants in the refugee camps, and its work is also assisted by some officially registered and highly experienced aid organization*” (Origo.hu 2015). According to their statement, the government had recently decided to support with 200 million HUF the three humanitarian organizations - the Hungarian Red Cross, the Interchurch Aid and the Hungarian Maltese Charity Service - which helped to provide care for refugees. They added that “[t]he Facebook group, called Migration Aid which – according to its own admission – was launched in June 2015, does not belong, and because of the lack of transparency cannot belong to the organizations supported with public money” (Origo.hu 2015). This debate clearly shows the unfriendly relationship and the tension between the government and the civil society initiatives and the government’s attitude and no interest in providing care for the asylum seekers still on the move, only to those who had already arrived at the designated reception centers.

### 4.3.3. The public context: anti-solidarity and xenophobia

Despite the emergence of the volunteer-based grassroots groups, not the whole society showed solidarity with the asylum seekers. As a matter of fact, the majority of the society felt to be threatened by the asylum seekers and the level of xenophobia increased sharply.


TÁRKI Social Research Institute – an independent, employee-owned research organization in Hungary – has been conducting trend study regarding xenophobia in the Hungarian society since 1992. The study divides the society into three groups: people with xenophobic attitudes; ‘thinkers’ who are inclined to evaluate the pros and the cons; and people with xenophile attitude. The results of the study show that:

The level of xenophobia rose sharply between 1992 [15%] and 1995 [40%] (...). This era was followed first by an oscillation period between 1996 and 2001, and a relatively stable period between 2002 and 2011 when the level of xenophobia fluctuated between 24–34 per cent and still the “thinker” attitude dominated (57–70 per cent) the scene. Since 2012 the level of xenophobia has been rising at the expense of the “thinker” attitude, but lately (since 2015) the xenophile attitude has also been shrinking. In January 2016 the level of xenophobia reached an all time high, and xenophilia practically disappeared.

(Simonovts et al. 2016: 41)

The study compares the results of the latest five measurements. The first data is from July 2014 (before the government’s anti-immigration campaign started), then there were four measurements during the main events of the migration crisis: three in 2015 (April, July, and October) and one in 2016 (January).

**Table 2** The proportion of xenophiles, xenophobes, and ‘thinkers’ in Hungary 2014-2016 (%)



Source: Simonivits et al. 2016 – TÁRKI Omnibus 2014-2016

The study found that the level of xenophobia compared to 2014 (39%) jumped to a very high level in April 2015 (46%). Then, both xenophobia and xenophilia surprisingly decreased in favor of ‘thinkers’ between July and October 2015 which the researchers explained that people were affected by the government’s and the civil society’s reactions and their debates and the visibility of the migrants in the media. However, then the inflow of migrants into Hungary has ceased, yet at the same time, the government’s anti-immigration campaign was still going strong which explains why xenophobia increased sharply at the cost of both xenophilia and ‘thinkers’ and led to the disappearance of xenophilia in 2016.

The study (Simonovts et al. 2016) also investigates people’s perception of migration related threats. Scholars argue (Velasco González et al. 2008) that the perceived threats can be symbolic and realistic in relation to migration-related attitudes. According to Velasco and her colleagues (ibid: 669), realistic threats refer to competition over material and economic resources, such as social services and labor market, and the perception that these resources are threatened by outsiders (in our case by migrants). While symbolic threats are based on perceived group differences in values, norms, and beliefs. Out-groups that have a different worldview (the migrants) can be seen as threatening the cultural identity of the in-group (in our case the Hungarian culture). The study conducted by researchers of TÁRKI found that the level of realistic threats was somewhat higher than the level of symbolic threats among people which means that more people feared that they would be excluded from the labor market and social services because of the migrants than that the migrants would destroy the Hungarian cultural identity. The results confirm that the government’s anti-immigration campaign was successful in generating fear.

In light of the results it is not surprising that besides the solidarity showed by the volunteers of the civil initiatives, there were examples of actions and atrocities driven by fear and xenophobic attitudes. The media has been most often reported on actions of ultranationalist right winger organizations, such as the Betyársereg, an outlaws’ army. The members of this organization appeared several times at railway stations, but the police usually handled the situation, and bigger atrocities did not happen, but there were also incidents caused by train conductors, taxi drivers and ordinary passers-by who expressed their mostly negative opinion regarding asylum seekers. Other forms of the manifestation of fear and xenophobic attitudes were the demonstrations against the opening of new reception centers in certain towns and a counter-demonstration which appeared at the protest, ‘*Not in my name,*’ organized by Migration Aid on 2 of September 2015.

However, few incidents happened driven by hatred and got media attention in the summer of 2015. One of the great stir cases was when a group of men beat up a couple because they believed that the man was a migrant. Another well-known case was when Petra László, a camerawoman of a right-wing Hungarian TV channel, tripped refugees who were running from the police in Röszke at the Hungarian-Serbian border on 8 September 2015.

As a matter of fact, not only civil initiatives were formed on Facebook. The so-called “migrant hunters” groups have sequentially opened in where people could “discuss” their opinion regarding “migrants.” Every time the Facebook deleted one group, a few hours later a new opened with a slightly modified name. However these groups and organization were not new, they had been existed before 2015 as well, only they become louder and more visible to the public, and the number of their members increased hand in hand with the increasing level of xenophobia in the country.

All these examples of anti-solidarity can be considered at least partly as an outcome of the effect of the government’s anti-immigration campaign as the government expressed openly their hostile attitude towards asylum seekers the people felt that it was acceptable to express their xenophobic attitudes as well. The government’s campaign generated *moral panic* by arousing concern and fear about the negative effects of migrants on the Hungarian society and consequently hatred among citizens and encouraged them to act upon this hatred.

## 5. Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the main findings of the analysis conducted about the three sub-questions to provide the reader with an answer to the research question: **How should we understand the emergence of grassroots groups in the midst of migration influx in 2015?**

To answer the first sub-question: *‘How should we consider the mobilization of civil society in the wake of migration influx? Is it a new form of social movements and if so, in what way?’*, firstly, the phenomenon of emerged grassroots groups was placed in context by providing a historical overview of migration and social movements in Hungary. Then, by applying the *New Social Movements* (NSMs) approach, the analysis of the dynamics of these grassroots groups along five criteria was carried out. We can draw the conclusion from the analysis that these civil initiatives – due to the homogeneous (not multicultural) society and the underdevelopment of the civil sphere in the society, – are hybrids of charity organizations, advocacies, and human rights activists, even though all of these groups claim to be free from all politics and economic interests and do not represent any ideological stances.

The composition of these grassroots groups was diverse as these groups were formed to bring together singular volunteers into a more efficient organization which implies that at the beginning; there were no designated leaders and hierarchical structures. Later on, the grassroots groups expanded their networks sometimes even at transnational levels by started cooperation with other movements and organizations, and became formal organizations, but still kept their flat organizational structure. Further research on the further development of these organizations, their position occupied in and contribution to the development the civil sector would be necessary.

Based on the results of the analysis, we can answer the second sub-question: *‘What motivated volunteers to engage in providing assistance to migrants?’* by concluding that not only the composition of the volunteers was diverse, but their underlying motivational drivers as well. The results of analyzing the motivation of volunteers show that usually a combination of two or more reasons made people involve in providing help for asylum seekers. The most common reasons are the altruistic motivation and the need to show a certain degree of protest against the government’s anti-immigration policy. These motivational drivers played an important role in the mobilization of the civil society and could have long-term effects on the development of volunteerism in Hungary which topic needs to be further studied.

Based on the results of the analysis, we can answer the third sub-question: ‘*What is the relationship between these social movements and the wider political and public context?*’ by concluding that the relationship between the social movements and the government and established charity organizations was not ideal which clearly reflected in the debates between them. The Hungarian government followed a hard line of anti-immigration policy and kept under control most of the relevant actors and communication channels, so events happened as it was in their interest. This control manifested in the low level of willingness showed by the responsible authorities and established charity organizations to contribute in the normalization of the escalated situation, as well as in the increase in the level of xenophobia in the Hungarian society. The strategy of *securitization* of the migration issue and the migrants themselves and generating *moral panic* among members of the society by arousing concern and fear about their negative effects on the Hungarian society led to desperate and aggressive actions, as well as to turning blind eyes (by the society) over the government’s questionable measures. Nevertheless, the social movements were able to raise their voice thus they represented a very different, "opposition" stance from the government, and alternative proposals for solutions to the society.

Finally, as this thesis could only shed lights on the short-term impact of these movements, therefore as it was stated above, it would be necessary to conduct research focusing on their operation on the long run, as well as their long-term impact on the state policies and the public. Nevertheless, in the lights of the results, we can say that becoming a member of one of these grassroots groups can be considered as a way to protest against the government’s measures and to protect human rights. These are qualities of a more active, responsible and also more critical member of a society which is the cornerstone of the modern democracy. The role of the civil initiatives and social movements are also important elements of democracies. Since Hungary considered to be a democracy in its infancy characterized by – as some researchers and studies indicate – weak civic and political participation (Boda & Medve-Bálint 2012; Keller 2013), therefore the emergence of these grassroots groups can be considered as signs of further development of democracy despite the government’s measures.



## 6. References

- 24.hu, 2016. Munkaerőhiány | 24.hu. *24.hu*. Available at: <http://24.hu/tag/munkaerohiany/> [Accessed October 7, 2016].
- Aberle, D.F., 1966. *The Peyote Religion among the Navaho*, Chicago: Aldine.
- Agamben, G. (Translated by K.A., 2005. *State of Exception* T. Denholm, ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aisch, G. et al., 2015. The Scale of the Migrant Crisis, From 160 to Millions - The New York Times. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/10/world/europe/scale-of-migrant-crisis-in-europe.html> [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Atkinson, P.A. & Coffey, A., 1997. Analysing documentary realities. In D. Silverman, ed. *Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice*. London: Sage, pp. 45–62.
- Babbie, E., 2016. *The Practice of Social Research* 14th ed., Boston: Cengage Learning.
- Bácsván, L., 2010. Anarchizmus és új társadalmi mozgalmak Magyarországon. Available at: <http://www.communicatio.hu/doktoriprogramok/kommunikacio/cikkek/bacsvan/anarchia.htm> [Accessed June 15, 2016].
- Bartal, A.M., 2010a. Élnek köztünk boldog emberek is...-a magyar önkéntesek és nem-önkéntesek jellemzői. In G. Rosta & M. Tomka, eds. *Mit értékelnek a magyarok?*. Budapest: OCIFE Magyarország; Faludi Ferenc Akadémia, pp. 143–186.
- Bartal, A.M., 2010b. Mit mutat a kaleidoszkóp? Az Önkéntes Motivációs Leltár (Volunteer Motivation Inventory) adaptálása, fejlesztése és kipróbálása a magyar önkéntesek körében. *Civil Szemle*, 7(1), pp.5–35.
- Bartal, A.M. & Kmetty, Z., 2011. A Magyar Önkéntesek Motivációi. *Civil Szemle*, 4, pp.7–30.
- Batta, Z., 2014. *Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2013*, Budapest.
- Benyik, M., 2012. The situation of social movements in Europe with special attention to Hungary. *ATTAC Magyarország*. Available at: <http://www.attac.hu/2012/11/the-situation-of-social-movements-in-europe-with-special-attention-to-hungary/> [Accessed June 30, 2016].

- Bernát, A. et al., 2015. *Attitudes towards refugees, asylum seekers and migrants*, Budapest. Available at: [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20151203\\_refugee.pdf](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20151203_refugee.pdf) [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Boda, Z. & Medve-Bálint, G., 2012. Intézményi bizalom a régi és az új demokráciákban. *Politikatudományi Szemle*, 21(2), pp.27–51. Available at: [http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2012\\_2szam/boda.pdf](http://www.poltudszemle.hu/szamok/2012_2szam/boda.pdf) [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Bódó, M.D., 2015. *IKSZ Kutatások, Tapasztalatok*, Available at: [http://ofi.hu/sites/default/files/attachments/bodo\\_marton\\_konf0220\\_uj\\_jav.pdf](http://ofi.hu/sites/default/files/attachments/bodo_marton_konf0220_uj_jav.pdf).
- Bowen, G.A., 2009. Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), pp.27–40.
- Bozóki, A., 1995. Demokraták a demokrácia ellen? In A. Bozóki, ed. *Konfrontáció és konszenzus*. Szombathely: Savaria University Press.
- Bozóki, A., 2015. The Politics of Worst Practices: Hungary in the 2010s. *Les dossiers du CERI*. Available at: <http://www.sciencespo.fr/cei/fr/content/dossiersduceri/politics-worst-practices-hungary-2010s> [Accessed June 30, 2016].
- Buechler, S.M., 1995. New Social Movement Theories. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36(3), pp.441–464.
- Buzan, B., Waever, O. & de Wilde, J., 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2015. *Hungary: Jobbik Party [The Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom] and the Hungarian Guard [Magyar Garda], including activities and impact on the government; relationship with the Roma community, including instances of violence and*, Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/55bf51ba4.html>.
- Charles, N., 2002. *Feminism, the State and Social Policy*, London: Macmillan.
- Catholic Caritas, 2015. Összefogás a menekültekért - Katolikus Karitás. Available at: <http://www.karitasz.hu/aktualis/korabbi-hirek/osszefogas-a-menekultekert> [Accessed October 28, 2016].

- Clary, E.G. et al., 1998. Understanding and Assessing the Motivations of Volunteers: A Functional Approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(6), pp.1516–1530.
- Cnann, R.A. & Goldberg-Glen, R.S., 1991. Measuring Motivations to Volunteer in Human Services. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 27(3), pp.269–284.
- Cohen, S., 2002. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* 3rd ed., London: Routledge Classics.
- Corbin, J. & Strauss, A., 2008. *Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory* 3rd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
- Czike, K. & Bartal, A.M., 2005. *Önkéntesek és nonprofit szervezetek – az önkéntes tevékenységet végzők motivációi és szervezeti típusok az önkéntesek foglalkoztatásában*, Budapest: Civitalis Egyesület.
- Czike, K. & Kuti, É., 2006. *Önkéntesség, jótékonyosság, társadalmi integráció*, Budapest: Nonprofit Kutatócsoport, Önkéntes Központ Alapítvány.
- EduLine.hu, 2015. FigyeljeteK, mert 2016-tól már csak ők kaphatnak érettségiK. Available at: [http://eduline.hu/erettségi\\_felveteli/2015/10/2/FigyeljeteK\\_mert\\_2016tol\\_marcsak\\_ok\\_kaphat\\_9DZ85X](http://eduline.hu/erettségi_felveteli/2015/10/2/FigyeljeteK_mert_2016tol_marcsak_ok_kaphat_9DZ85X).
- Esmond, J. & Dunlop, P., 2004. *Developing the Volunteer Motivation Inventory to Assess the Underlying Motivational Drives of Volunteers in Western Australia*, Perth.
- Euronews, 2016. Hungarian opposition daily Népszabadság shut down suddenly. *Euronews*. Available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2016/10/08/hungarian-opposition-daily-nepszabadsag-shut-down-suddenly>.
- Euronews, 2015. Hungary's Orban warns economic migration endangers Europeans | euronews, world news. *Euronews*. Available at: <http://www.euronews.com/2015/01/16/hungary-s-orban-warns-economic-migration-endangers-europeans> [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- European Union, 2013. *Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary*, Available at: [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-thematic-situation-report-3\\_en\\_1.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-thematic-situation-report-3_en_1.pdf) [Accessed June 30, 2016].

- F.Tóth, A. & Hadrévy, B., 2004. *AVE in a professional perspective: Assessing voluntary experiences*, Budapest.
- Fergusson, J., 2015. Migrant crisis: Only by working together can EU states hope to deal with refugees fleeing violence, poverty and drought | Commentators | Voices | The Independent. *The Independent*. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/migrant-crisis-only-by-working-together-can-eu-states-hope-to-deal-with-refugees-fleeing-violence-10467283.html> [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Fitch, R.T., 1987. Characteristics and Motivations of College Students Volunteering for Community Service. *Journal of College Student Personnel*, 28, pp.424–431.
- Fricz, T., 1996. A politikai demokrácia problémái Magyarországon. *Valóság*, 39(6), pp.11–21.
- FRONTEX, 2016. Western Balkan Route. Available at: <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/>.
- GHK, 2010. *Study on Volunteering in the European Union – Country Report Hungary*, Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1024\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1024_en.pdf).
- Goode, E. & Ben-Yehuda, N., 1994. *Moral Panics: The Social Control of Deviance*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gove, P., 1993. *Webster's Third International Dictionary* 3rd., Springfield, MA.: Merriam-Webster Inc.
- Gunathilake, L., 2012. New Social Movements and Effective Mobilization of People. Available at: [https://www.google.dk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjDtpzY6MDPAhUM2SwKHQPDCIoQFggcMAA&url=http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2012/3A\\_Dias.docx&usg=AFQjCNE4oSSWS7C5skj7TJwYCLQBhooSQw](https://www.google.dk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjDtpzY6MDPAhUM2SwKHQPDCIoQFggcMAA&url=http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2012/3A_Dias.docx&usg=AFQjCNE4oSSWS7C5skj7TJwYCLQBhooSQw).
- Habermas, J., 1987 [1981]. *The Theory of Communicative Action* 2 volumes. Translated by T. McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hall, S. et al., 1978. *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*, London: Macmillan.

Hallgatói Hálózat, Hallgatói Hálózat. Available at: <http://hallgatoihalozat.blog.hu/> [Accessed June 30, 2016].

Horton-Smith, D., 1981. Altruism, Volunteers, and Volunteerism. *Journal of Voluntary Action Research*, 10, pp.21–36.

HVG.hu, 2016. Itthon: Migrációs válsághelyzetet hirdet a kormány az egész országra - HVG.hu. *HVG.hu*. Available at: [http://hvg.hu/itthon/20160309\\_migracios\\_valsaghelyzetet\\_hirdettek](http://hvg.hu/itthon/20160309_migracios_valsaghelyzetet_hirdettek).

IDEA, 2009. *Policy Oriented Executive Summary – Hungary*, Warsaw. Available at: [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/POES\\_Hungary\\_PB\\_9.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/POES_Hungary_PB_9.pdf).

James, P. & van Seters, P., 2014. *Globalization and Politics, Vol. 2: Global Social Movements and Global Civil Society*, London: Sage Publications. Available at: [https://www.academia.edu/7305007/Globalization\\_and\\_Politics\\_Vol.\\_2\\_Global\\_Social\\_Movements\\_and\\_Global\\_Civil\\_Society\\_2014\\_](https://www.academia.edu/7305007/Globalization_and_Politics_Vol._2_Global_Social_Movements_and_Global_Civil_Society_2014_).

Johnston, H., Laraña, E. & Gusfield, J.R., 1994. Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements. In H. Johnston, E. Laraña, & J. R. Gusfield, eds. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 3–35.

Juhász, J., 2003. Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West. *The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute*. Available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-country-between-east-and-west>.

Keller, T., 2013. *Értékek 2013*, Budapest. Available at: [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/2013/2013\\_zarotanutmany\\_gazd\\_kultura.pdf](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/2013/2013_zarotanutmany_gazd_kultura.pdf) [Accessed June 3, 2016].

Koca, B.T., 2016. New Social Movements: “Refugees Welcome UK.” *European Scientific Journal*, 12(2), pp.96–108.

Kolinsky, M. & Patterson, W.E., 1976. *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe*, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Kornai, J., 1985. A hiány magyarázó elméletéről. *Közgazdasági Szemle*, 32(2), pp.179–192. Available at: [http://www.kornai-janos.hu/Kornai1985\\_A\\_hiany\\_magyarazo\\_elmeleterol\\_KSz.pdf](http://www.kornai-janos.hu/Kornai1985_A_hiany_magyarazo_elmeleterol_KSz.pdf).

- Kováts, A., 2014. Migrációs helyzetkép Magyarországon. In I. Tarrósy, V. Glied, & Z. Vörös, eds. *Migrációs tendenciák napjainkban*. Pécs: Publikon, pp. 329–348.
- Labuschagne, A., 2003. Qualitative research: Airy fairy or fundamental? *The Qualitative Report*, 8(1). Available at: <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/labuschagne.html>.
- Lackey, K. & Hjelmgaard, K., 2015. Why Europe’s migrant crisis is surging now. *USA Today*. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/09/03/why-europes-migrant-crisis-surg-ing-now/71631834/> [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Lakatos, M.D., L. Rédei, M.D. & Kapitány, G., 2015. Mobilitás és foglalkoztatás. *Területi Statisztika*, 55(2), pp.157–179. Available at: [https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/terstat/2015/01/redei\\_etal.pdf](https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/terstat/2015/01/redei_etal.pdf).
- László, L., 2016. Illegális fakanál. *Beszélő*. Available at: [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:beszelo.c3.hu/onlinecikk/illegalis-fakanal&strip=1&gws\\_rd=cr&ei=Nm56V4SzCoPv6QTp8IrwDw](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:beszelo.c3.hu/onlinecikk/illegalis-fakanal&strip=1&gws_rd=cr&ei=Nm56V4SzCoPv6QTp8IrwDw).
- Lévai, K., 2000. *A nő szerint a világ*, Budapest: Osiris.
- Marshall, G., 1998. *A dictionary of sociology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199533008.001.0001/acref-9780199533008-e-312?rsk=ZF6ef3&result=314>.
- McClelland, D.C., Atkinson, J.W. & Lowell, E.L., 1953. *The Achievement Motives*, New York: Irvington.
- McEwin, M. & Jacobsen-D’Arcy, L., 2002. *Developing a Scale to Understand and Assess the Underlying Motivational Drives of Volunteers in Western Australia: Final Report*, Perth.
- McGarty, C. et al., 2009. Collective Action as the Material Expression of Opinion-Based Group Membership. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65(4), pp.839–857.
- Melucci, A., 1980. The new social movements: A theoretical approach. *Social Science Information*, 19(2), pp.199–226.
- Miles, T., 2015. EU gets one million migrants in 2015, smugglers seen making \$1 billion. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0U50WI20151222> [Accessed May 28, 2016].

- Morrow-Howell, N. & Mui, A., 1989. Elderly Volunteers: Reasons for initiating and Terminating Service. *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, 13, pp.21–33.
- Musza, I., 1999. A Levegő Munkacsoport. In M. Szabó, ed. *Környezetvédelmi civil kezdeményezések Magyarországon*. Budapest: Villányi Úti Könyvek. Politikatudományi sorozat, pp. 90–109.
- Neményi, M., 1994. Miért nincs Magyarországon nőmozgalom? In M. Hadas & M. Lampland, eds. *Férfiuralom*. Budapest: Replika Kör.
- Offe, C., 1985. New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics. *Social Research*, 52, pp.817–868.
- Orbán, V., 2016a. A Kormány 272/2016. (IX. 5.) Korm. rendelete. *Magyar Közlöny*, 135, p.68592. Available at: <http://kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK16135.pdf> [Accessed October 30, 2016].
- Orbán, V., 2016b. A Kormány 41/2016. (III. 9.) Korm. rendelete. *Magyar Közlöny*, 33, p.3504. Available at: <http://kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK16033.pdf> [Accessed October 30, 2016].
- Origo.hu, 2015. Cáfolta Orbán Viktort a Migration Aid. *origo.hu*. Available at: <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20150921-migration-aid-orban-viktor-tamogatas-menekult-parlament-cafolat.html>.
- origo.hu, 2001. Civilek a demokráciáért vagy kommunista összeesküvés: 10 éve alakult meg a Demokratikus Charta. *origo.hu*. Available at: <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20010928civilek.html>.
- Origo.hu, Magyarország és az EU Története. Available at: [http://www.origo.hu/adsminisites/eu/mo\\_tortenete.html](http://www.origo.hu/adsminisites/eu/mo_tortenete.html).
- Pardavi, M. et al., 2014. *National Country Report Hungary*,
- Peter, L., 2015. Migrant crisis: How can EU respond to influx? - BBC News. *BBC News*. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34139348> [Accessed June 3, 2016].
- Pichardo, N.A., 1997. New Social Movements: A Critical Review. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23, pp.411–430.

- presshelsinki, 2016. Tíz évre titkosították, miért is van most válsághelyzet - Helsinki Figyelő.  
*presshelsinki*. Available at:  
[http://helsinkifigyelo.blog.hu/2016/04/05/tiz\\_evre\\_titkositottak\\_mitol\\_is\\_van\\_most\\_valshelyzet](http://helsinkifigyelo.blog.hu/2016/04/05/tiz_evre_titkositottak_mitol_is_van_most_valshelyzet) [Accessed October 30, 2016].
- Puskás, P., 2015. Nyüzsi: Emberi erőforrások - HVG.hu. *HVG.hu*. Available at:  
[http://hvg.hu/velemenynyuzsog/20150717\\_Emberi\\_eroforrasok](http://hvg.hu/velemenynyuzsog/20150717_Emberi_eroforrasok).
- Simonovts, B. et al., 2016. *The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary*, Budapest.
- Snyder, M., 1993. Basic research and Practical Problems: the Promise of “Functional” Personality and Social Psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19(3), pp.251–264.
- Soós, K., 2002. 1956-os magyar menekültek a statisztikai adatok tükrében. *Levéltári Szemle*, 52(3), pp.56–60.
- Stake, R.E., 1995. *The art of case study research*, Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
- van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B. & van Dijk, W.W., 2009. Context Matters: Explaining how and why mobilizing context influences motivational dynamics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65(4), pp.815–838.
- Szabó, M., 1993. *Alternatív mozgalmak Magyarországon*, Budapest: Gondolat.
- Szabó, M., 1995. Politikai tiltakozás, mint az új politikai kultúra eleme: Magyarország, Szlovénia, Szlovákia. *Szociológiai Szemle*, 5(3). Available at:  
<http://www.szociologia.hu/dynamic/9503szabo.htm>.
- Szegő, I.M., 2010. Mementó 1990: a taxisblokádtörténete és következményei. *HVG.hu*. Available at: [http://hvg.hu/tudomany/20101024\\_memento\\_1990\\_taxisblokad](http://hvg.hu/tudomany/20101024_memento_1990_taxisblokad).
- Szlavkovits, R., 2015a. Itthon: Csodálatos összefogás kibontakozóban Szegeden - HVG.hu. *HVG.hu*. Available at:  
[http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150628\\_Csodalatos\\_osszefogas\\_kibontakozoban\\_Szeg](http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150628_Csodalatos_osszefogas_kibontakozoban_Szeg).
- Szlavkovits, R., 2015b. Itthon: Mikor lettem függő? – Önkéntesek a menekültválságban - HVG.hu. *HVG.hu*. Available at: [http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150713\\_onkentesek\\_menekult](http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150713_onkentesek_menekult).



- Szolidaritás, 2011. Mi. *Szolidaritás*. Available at: <http://www.szolidaritاس.org/mi/> [Accessed June 30, 2016].
- Tanács, I., 2015a. Belföld: Migráns-krízis Szegeden – kifosztva és megalázva - NOL.hu. *Népszabadság*. Available at: <http://nol.hu/belfold/egy-pohar-meleg-tea-a-hideg-ejszakaban-1548829>.
- Tanács, I., 2015b. Belföld: Negyven betyár még belefēr - NOL.hu. *Népszabadság Online*. Available at: <http://nol.hu/belfold/negyven-betyar-meg-belefer-1552709>.
- Thomas, E.F., Mavor, K.I. & McGarty, C., 2012. Social identities facilitate and encapsulate action-relevant constructs: A test of the social identity model of collective action. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 15(1), pp.75–88. Available at: <http://gpi.sagepub.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/content/15/1/75.full.pdf>.
- Tóth, J., 1994. Menekültügy Magyarországon. In J. Tóth, ed. *Menedékjog – kérdőjelekkel*. Budapest: KJK, pp. 69–86.
- UN General Assembly, 1957. *Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, New York. Available at: <http://mek.oszk.hu/01200/01274/01274.pdf>.
- UNHCR – Central Europe, 2014. *Operations in Hungary*, Budapest. Available at: <http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/where-we-work/operations-in-central-europe/hungary.html>.
- Velasco González, K. et al., 2008. Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47, pp.667–685. Available at: <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/2706988/VelascoGonzalezK-Prejudice-2008.pdf>.
- Waever, O., 1993. Societal Security: The Concept. In O. Waever et al., eds. *Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 17–40.
- Weisbrod, B., 1975. Towards a Theory of Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy. In E. S. Phelps, ed. *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 171–195.

Wilkin, P.D., 2015. Hungary's "Milla" movement shows that social media driven protest movements only succeed when they connect meaningfully with civil society. *Democratic Audit UK*. Available at: <http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=15674>.

Yin, R.K., 1994. *Case study research: Design and methods* 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.

Yin, R.K., 1984. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage.