

AND THE WINNER IS...

- AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF RIO DE JANEIRO
SURROUNDING THE 2016 OLYMPIC GAMES



Line Hede

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Author: Line Hede

Supervisor: Martin Bak Jørgensen

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Abstract

In this thesis, I aim at examine the social and political processes in Rio de Janeiro in connection to the hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games. I examine the social distortion between the favela-dwellers and the elite with root in colour separation, which has existed since the fall of the dictatorship under the surface, now having surfaced through a process, which I call the Olympic Transformation. With this concept, I describe the agenda setting tools utilised by the municipal government in preparation of the hosting of the Olympic Games. The agenda setting tools, which I examine, are urban planning, Public-Private Partnership and media conduct, and I argue that the municipal government produces a sense of public crisis and fear. This crisis paves the way for the government to ignore human rights abuse throughout the Olympic Transformation in order to “resolve” the public crisis by a pacification of the favelas and an indefinite instalment of UPP (police). These actions allows the government to prioritise the elite and the development of the affluent neighbourhood, Barra de Tijuca, which also is the main Olympic venue. Thus, the elitism in Rio is thriving through the urban development of the Olympic Transformation.

However, this period of preparing for the hosting of the Olympics has also sparked a previously unseen mobilisation and uprising among the favela-dwellers. Ignited through the efforts of one family of a missing person in 2013, the wider part of the evicted, displaced, subdued and terrorised favela-dwellers of Rio, caused by the Olympic Transformation, are now demanding access to their civil rights through a process of insurgent citizenship. I examine a case study of the uprising of one particular favela, which shares land with the Olympic City, namely Vila Autódromo. The case shows how the favela-dwellers have mobilised through social media and visual presence in Rio, resulting in wide support in their fight. Having endured shock troops, deprivation of basic necessities as well as physical and psychological abuse, the community rose victoriously as of April 2016, when the remaining families won legal rights to their land. This case may the beginning of a wider mobilisation of favela-dwellers in the fight for civil rights.

Lastly, this thesis discusses the social possibilities of a politicisation of sports and a reform of the current Olympic Games-model. Based on equality, the Olympism could be used to facilitate higher social equality in the host nation through policy-making by the International Olympic Committee, bringing the visions of the global political scene, such as the 2030 agenda into play.

Preface

From “*Look Into My Eyes*”, *Outlandish*

Look into my eyes
Tell me what ya see
You don't see a damn thing
'Cuz you cant relate to me
You blinded by our differences
My life makes no sense to you
I'm the persecuted one
You the red, white and blue

Each day you wake in tranquillity
No fears to cross your eyes
Each day I wake in gratitude
Thankin' God, He let me rise
Ya worry bout your education
And the bills you have to pay
I worry bout my vulnerable life
And if Ill survive another day

Ya biggest fear is getting a ticket
As ya cruise your Cadillac
My fear is that the tank that's just left
Will turn around and come back

Yet do you know the truth of where ya
money goes?
Do you let the media deceive your mind?
Is this a truth that nobody knows?
Has our world gone all blind

Terror is the robbery of my land
And the torture of my mother
The imprisonment of my innocent father
The bullet in my baby brother
The bulldozers and the tanks
The gasses and the guns
The bombs that fall outside my door
All due to your funds

You blame me for defending myself
Against the ways of my enemies
I'm terrorized in my own land
And I'm the terrorist

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1. Introduction

The Olympic Games are a socio-political phenomenon, which brings the world together through sports. It is a prime example of globalisation, as the mega-event is a process of international integration of culture, history, idea and worldviews. This summer of 2016, the Olympic Games will capture Rio de Janeiro and the eyes of the world as the many different types of sport will bring the global society together in a brief state of unity. However, the ties of unity between Rio de Janeiro and the global society do not include everyone in the tropical city – only the ones who are allowed to partake. A large part of the population in Rio is being excluded, namely the favela-dwellers.

As a part of my master's degree, I was able to go to Rio de Janeiro for 6 months between 2015 -2016 while doing an internship, related to political and social processes in a Latin American country. I was offered to do my internship in a NGO, created and run by favela-dwellers in the favela of Cantagalo in the rich South Zone of Rio. As a North European, I am used to being the obvious outsider, when I travel, and people treat me accordingly. In Rio, I experienced the opposite. Even with a limited knowledge of Portuguese, I was accepted by my surroundings, everywhere I went on the *asfalto*¹. The warm-hearted citizens of Rio, *cariocas*, are used to living in a multi-colour composed society. As a foreigner, I felt accepted. However, through my work at the NGO in the favela, I soon discovered, how some *cariocas* are a part of the formal society, and others are not. The people, I worked and socialised with in the favela, did not experience the same acceptance, when they moved about on the *asfalto* despite having lived their whole lives in the city. Their mere presence often spark a general atmosphere of suspicion and fear, purely based on their appearances or fashion of speaking. This social friction was ever-present throughout my stay and became the foundation for my thesis.

Rio de Janeiro will reach a social and political climax as the Olympic Games begin in August after seven years of preparation for the staging of the two weeks long mega-event, as we will explore in the analysis. Social and economic inequality have severely increased during those seven years, and the most vulnerable part of the population, the favela-dwellers, are no closer to

¹ The flat parts of Rio de Janeiro are called *asfalto*, which describes the material of the road but more so who lives on those roads. In Rio, it is the higher-middle and upper class, creating a discursive opposition to the favela-dwellers of the *morro*, meaning the hilltop and the location of favelas in general.

becoming an integrated part of the formal city. To provide the reader with a deeper understand of, what it feels like to be an excluded citizen of a society, I was inspired by the Danish band Outlandish, and the lyrics to their song *“Look into my Eyes”*, which I have included as a part of the preface. The interpretation of social and political reality in Rio de Janeiro depends of viewpoint. On one side, there is the municipal government and the ruling elite and on the other side the favela-dwellers. The text of *“Look into my Eyes”* resembles the reality of the favela-dwellers, which I observed during my time and work in Cantagalo. The *asfalto* cannot relate to the favela-dwellers, because they are *“blinded by our differences”*. While the ruling elite is shielding themselves off in gated communities (Perlman 2010) with tennis courts, swimming pools and security guards, the favela-dwellers have been pacified through a national occupation and contained by an indefinite police-instalment. Gunfights on the streets, stray bullets and extrajudicial killings by the police have become a part of life for favela-dwellers during the preparation for the Olympic Games. The media is an active player in construction of a distorted image of the true nature of favela-dwellers, which leads to increasing social separation. In the media, favela-dwellers are synonyms with *bandidos* or *criminais* (Perlman 2010), who need to be pacified and contained at the hands of the municipal government. This contradiction is captured by Outlandish, *“You blame me for defending myself. Against the ways of my enemies. I’m terrorized in my own land. And I’m the terrorist”*.

The images on the wall, displayed on the front page of the thesis, I discovered while living in Rio in an upscale neighbourhood next to one of Rio’s top tourist sights. I chose it for the front page to illustrate the viewpoint of the favela-dwellers on the current social distortion and one form of demonstration – through means of visual images, such as graffiti. The first picture reads, *“Stop the war in the periphery”*, referring to the occupation and pacification process of the favelas, in which the ordinary favela-dwellers are caught in the crossfire of the police and the organised crime. The second picture is inspired by the events of terror in Paris anno January 2015. The powerful rhetorical tool of *“je suis”* conveys a notion of fellowship and unity regardless of colour, creed or nationality, and is used to show support and unity with the victims of the pacification process, such as police-killed Eduardo age 10 (note 1). The police officers behind the killing of Eduardo on his doorstep have not been persecuted, due to claims of self-defence. These two examples of protest-graffiti are two of countless creative and capturing visuals, reminding the rest of the society that favela-dwellers are a part of the city as well with the entitled social and political

rights. When Brazil won the bid for hosting the Olympic Games, the favela-dwellers stood to lose everything – their freedom, their right to self-determination and their communities if located in the way of Olympic construction and of special interest to the municipal government. However, the 7-years preparation for the Olympic Games have ignited a wave of change and may be a historical turning point for favela-dwellers in Rio de Janeiro. This social distortion and subsequent change prior to the Olympics will be the foundation of my thesis, which I will be examining from a top down and bottom up perspective.

My problem formulation is as follows:

What are the implications of hosting the 2016 Olympic Games on the social and political landscape of Rio de Janeiro?

- To which extent has winning the bid for hosting the Olympic Games affected the favelas in Rio de Janeiro?
- What are the social reactions to the transformation of Rio de Janeiro in preparation of the Olympic Games?
- Which lessons can be learned from the social, political and economic implications of hosting mega-events such as the Olympic Games?

First, I will present the methodology (section 3) of the thesis, followed by a contextualising section (section 4) through which I aim to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the social and political dynamics of the socially segregated Rio de Janeiro. Setting the theoretical frame (section 5) for the analysis, I present the terms and tools, which will help us understand the effect of hosting the Olympic Games from a top down and bottom up perspectives, which unfolds through a two-part analysis. Prior to the analysis, I provide a contextualising frame (section 6.1) of the preconditions of becoming an Olympic host nation and the political processes involved before reaching the point of intersection of the analysis (section 6.2). Lastly, I provide a discussion (section 7) of what can be learnt from Rio de Janeiro about the implications of hosting a mega-event, and how mega-events provide a platform for socio-political improvement globally if used correctly.

2. Concepts and terms

Brazilianisation: section 5.1.

Agenda setting strategies: 5.2

Urban planning: section 5.2.1

Media conduct: section 5.2.2.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): section 5.2.3.

Apartheid and social segregation: section 5.3.

Social acknowledgement: section 5.3.1.

Carioca: a citizen of Rio de Janeiro

Morro: hillside, where most of the favelas are located.

Asfalto: concrete roads of Rio, where the middle and upper class live. Also used by the favela-dwellers to describe the people living there, opposite the favela.

Favela: informal housing. There are also other types of informal housing, which differs from favelas, but in this thesis we will focus on favelas, as they have a different social dynamic than loteamentos and conjuntos (Perlman 2010).

Favela-dweller: a person, who lives in a favela. Usually, favela-dwellers belong to the lower middle class or working class. A large percentage of the favela-dwellers in Rio are “black” or “brown”. See section 5.3.

Marginais: meaning marginal in plural. Also associated with bandidos (bandit or criminal)

Pinta da passoa: the overall appearance of a person including fashion of speaking, manners, residence and more.

MCMV: Minha Casa Minha Vida meaning My House My Life. Social housing programme.

UPP: the police instalment after the pacification process. Seen from the favela-dwellers’ point of view, it is an occupation. I will be using both terms throughout the thesis.

IOC: International Olympic Committee

3. Methodology

3.1. Approach

I work from a social-constructivist perspective of the social and political processes in Rio with a hermeneutic approach. These two approaches supplement each other, supporting the understanding that we view the world through the social construction of our surroundings. The approach also supports that we are in a continuous interpretation of our constructed reality (Holm 2011). In this thesis, I work towards an understanding of the perspective of the favela-dwellers throughout the preparations of hosting the Olympic Games and the constructed reality by the municipal and the elite, which surrounds them. I examine the construction of reality through the way it is communicated in the society (*ibid.*). Accordingly, the understanding of the reality depends on the beholder. Through a hermeneutic approach, I observed the reality, which I met in Rio and through texts and analysed accordingly, which I applied to my semi-structured interviews. I work through a thematic analysis throughout the thesis to provide the reader with a consistent understanding of the process. I utilise three tools of agenda setting strategies (socially constructed by the municipal government), which occur throughout the thesis, namely 1) urban planning, 2) media conduct and 3) Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

I approach a contemporary phenomenon (the social and political distortion of Rio de Janeiro prior to the Olympic Games) through a broad scope of the society based on academic texts, own observations, three qualitative interviews and articles, while a case study of the favela Vila Autódromo provides a micro-level scope. The extent of the thesis is delimited to the socio-political developments during the past seven years with a focus on the mobilisation of favela-dwellers. The topics of mass eviction, demolition, relocation as well as violence and killings by the police are not exhausted here, due to the size of the thesis. The validity and relevance of my approach can be applicable to other cases of social exclusion and subsequent mobilisation, but my findings do not have a generalisability. My case study is specific to the combination of political and social distortion, historical relation between the social classes and the requirements of hosting the Olympic Games.

3.2. Scope of data:

As my data, I use both primary data (qualitative interviews and own observations) and secondary data (articles and video clips). With my use of both primary and secondary data, I aim at describing the different levels of the society, and how the preparation for the Olympic Games is effecting the levels. My limitations are connected to my knowledge of Portuguese to the extent of everyday conversations but not written texts or conducting interviews, thus I was not able to explore written material on the subject, which was not in English, nor conduct any interviews of favela-dwellers, who has experienced removal or demolition. Subsequently, I am only able to include two interviews of the same favela-dwellers, because the subject is capable in written and spoken English. Therefore, I must rely on secondary data such as websites, articles and books. To obtain general knowledge on the topics, I look especially to the Perlman (2010), the dossier from Committees for People's World Cup and Olympics "*Mega Events and Human Rights Violation in Brazil*" (2015), Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015) as well as my own personal observations as described below. For the case study of Vila Autódromo, I rely on the interviews of Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015, "*SMH 2016: Removals in the Olympic city*" containing several interviews of residents from Vila Autódromo, as I did not have the opportunity to obtain any interviews or visit Vila Autódromo myself.

3.2.1. Primary sources

- Observations: Throughout the autumn of 2015 and the spring of 2016, I did an internship for six months in Rio de Janeiro. I was part of the university of PUC-Rio and worked for Museu de Favela, a NGO created and run by favela-dwellers in Cantagalo, South Zone to collect and conserve narratives of favela-dwellers. The combination of the two gave me a thorough insight of the social and political processes and implications on an academic, practical and personal level. I was able to attend some teaching and discuss the topic at the university, whereas I gain first-hand knowledge of the life in a favela through my work and activities in Cantagalo. Furthermore, during my stay, I visited different favelas, spoke to the local and observed the community. As part of those visits, I met with several NGOs run by favela-dwellers or foreigners.
- Interviews: I have conducted three qualitative, semi-structured interviews – two interviews were conducted in person, and one was done by email.

Interview 1 (track 1 on cd):

In February of this year, 2016, I conducted an interview with professor Karl Erik Schøllhammer affiliated with both PUC-Rio and Aalborg University, whom is a resource contact for the Danish media such as DR² on political and social issues in Brazil. In doing so, I aimed at obtaining a better understand of the society at the different level as a quasi-insider due to Schøllhammer's 25 years of living and teaching in Rio, thus providing me with a frame for my thesis process. My interview with him pointed to a series of issues, such as the delay of construction for the Olympics, the spread of Zika and the political turmoil concerning now-impeached president Dilma, which are the main public concerns of in Rio de Janeiro as of February 2016. When I asked him about the human rights abuses based on report from the UN (Rolnik 2009) or Amnesty International (2015) concerning displacement and surge of violence and death among favela-dwellers, these topics are not part of the formal or informal discourse of *cariocas*, who do not live in favelas. On this basis, I take my starting point towards finding the effect of the 2016-Olympic Games on the society of Rio de Janeiro.

Interview 2 (track 2 on cd):

During my stay in Rio de Janeiro, I conducted an interview of a favela-dweller from Cantagalo for my 9th semester project. In this thesis, I used samples of the interview and my own observations from the semester project appear in this thesis too with the appropriate reference.

Interview 3 (appendix 8):

Furthermore, I followed up on interview 2 and asked the same subject to give her accounts of being occupied by the BOPE and describe living in a pacified favela by email. The full emails with no linguistic correction can be seen as appendix 8.

² DR meaning Danish Radio

3.2.2. Secondary sources:

Being able to use online sources has provided me with insight in the development of Vila Autódromo, from the reporting on the legal matters to the personal experiences of the residents, which I would not have obtained otherwise. Video clips also enables me to view the topics from other perspective, e.g. favelas before the pacification in 2009, or inside reporting from the drug gang, which I would never be able to or willing to excess.

- Articles: I rely heavily on the use of online articles in connection to the case study of Vila Autódromo. I have since the autumn of 2015 been collecting and reading article relevant to my stay in Rio and this thesis. Specifically I have followed:

RioOnWatch (www.rioonwatch.org),

Observatorio de Favelas (<http://www.observatoriodefavelas.org.br/>)

Catalytic Communities (<http://catcomm.org/>)

Viva a Vila Autódromo (www.facebook.com/vivaavilaautodromo)

All of my references to websites are marked with a note in the text, which leads to the full list of references in section 9, under “Notes”.

- Videos:

I use video clips from Youtube for general knowledge, e.g. on the experiences of favela-dwellers or the pacification process done by news agencies, freelance agencies, , or specific cases such as the TedTalk of Mayor Paes or the incident between activists and the mayor while showcasing the model homes. The specific cases, where I use information from videos appear with a time mark for the quotes and a referenced on the web link in the section “Notes”.

4. Historical context of favelas in Rio

In these following three sections, I will describe the historical context of the favelas, the opposition between the favela-dwellers and the *asfalto* as well as the pacification process, the instalment of the UPP, the mass eviction and demolition of favelas as part of the preparation process for the Olympic Games.

4.1. *A Cidade Partida*

Rio de Janeiro is known as *a Cidade Partida* (the divide city) among favela-scholars such as Perlman (2010), who work with the socially intricate and fractured mega-city. Today, Rio has more than 6 million citizens and roughly 20 % (note 2) is living in favelas and informal housing. Since the first settlement in the late 19th century, favelas have been separated from the formal city – geographically and socially. For a better understanding of the municipal government's actions and the reaction of the society of Rio during the Olympic transformation, it is crucial for the reader to understand that there exists many different notions of what a favela is – in Brazil and globally. The two, I will present and examine throughout the thesis, are 1) the stereotypical and damaging public image produced by mass media of favelas as being slum, and 2) the more complex image of the socially segregated urban areas shows a vast heterogeneity and diversity in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

The first favela emerged in the late 19th century as soldiers returning from war, were denied their promised salary in the form of land-ownership by the authorities, resulting in the first illegal settlement in the outskirts of Rio. During the next 100 years, the number of settlements increased as poor, unskilled and often illiterate settlers from the countryside came to Rio, looking for jobs and the opportunity of a better life. These newcomers were never accepted, like the soldiers, into the formal city as citizens by the existing population of Rio, the *cariocas*, and are still seen as outsiders today, even though the descendants have been living in Rio for three generations or more. Likewise, the state did not acknowledge the presence of favela-dwellers until the mid-80s as part of the city's population in terms of rights and social benefits. Today, there are more than 1000 different favelas with about 2 million residents (Perlman 2010). The term *favela* is popularly used in a number of ways to describe the living condition of these communities, such as slum, shantytown, squatter community or ghetto. The online Oxford English Dictionary (note 3) defines

slum as “overcrowded urban area inhabited by very poor people” and “a house or building unfit for human habitation”, and favela is defined as “a Brazilian shack or shanty town; a slum” (note 4). Favela-scholar Janice Perlman (2010) argues that favelas are thriving communities in continuous growth, and the majority of houses are well-constructed and permanent, unlike slum in other cities around the world. Throughout this thesis, the term favela is applied according to Perlman’s definition.

These communities possess diverse qualities in terms of social composition, economical means and infrastructural development. Frequently, national and international mainstream media portray favela-dwellers one-dimensionally, which fuels dangerous stereotypical profiling of the life in favelas (note 5). The social, economic and infrastructural differences throughout Rio’s numerous favelas are significant. Some favela-dwellers live in slum-like conditions in rat-infested houses on the verge of collapsing, where running water and power in the houses are inconsistent or non-existing. Others live in high-quality brick houses with rooms enough for the whole family and fully equipped kitchen with running water and a living room with a big flat-screen. Many favelas appear to be well-functioning and self-sufficient small villages inside the mega-city with shops, banks, traffic network, schools etc. with proper infrastructure. Other favelas have dirt roads and lack basic infrastructure such as roads, street lighting and urban services such as schools, health centres, rubbish collection etc.

Contrary to most mega-cities with informal or slum-like settlements in the periphery, the informal settlements of Rio are scattered all over the city, providing the cariocas of different social classes plenty of opportunity to mix and integrate. The richest and the poorest neighbourhoods of Rio are situated side by side, and although they are not divided by geographic distance, the social class division seems far too great for mere proximity to bridge neighbours of different social classes. Labelling of people according to their residence is an unspoken social mechanism in the society, which furthers the division. Favelas in Rio are often situated on the hilltops, *morro*, whereas the higher middle and upper class live on the plain asphalted roads, *asfalto*. These two geographical descriptive terms have become social indicators of belonging to the formal or the informal city, thus favela-dwellers will talk about “those on the *asfalto*” and vice versa as a geographical version of “us and them” dichotomy. Other terms describing used on the *asfalto*, in media and by the municipal government about faveladwellers are *favelado*, which has a strong

negative connotation, or *moradores* created from the word *morar* (living), a neutral word for citizen, but never used for citizens of the *asfalto*. Thus, in both informal and formal public discourse there are distinct social markers, a type of name-calling with derogative connotations, which seems to exacerbate the social exclusion of favela-dwellers. Furthermore, as described by Perlman (2010), the mainstream media often describes favela-dwellers as *bandidos* (bandits or criminals) or *marginais* (marginal) with strong links to the historical ties to organised crime and drug gangs.

At the end of the dictatorship of Brazil in 1985, the power system was in flux, and drug lords and gangs seized total power in a majority of the favelas, thus adding to the already tarnished reputation of favelas and confirming the middle and upper class of their prejudices of drug trafficking and crime in favelas. The favela-dwellers were considered incompetent, lazy and uneducated or dangerous and drug traffickers. Even today, this view is common among the middle and upper class on the *asfalto*, although scholars from the Federal University of Rio argue in a recent study that only 1 % (Guilhon & Peres 2007) of the favela-dwellers are connected to drug trafficking. As a result, the majority of *asfalto-cariocas* avoid all interaction with the favelas unless they want to buy drugs or join the infamous funk bailes (funk parties). The lack of knowledge and prejudices of the middle and upper class *cariocas*, and the unwillingness to engage in dialogue and bureaucratically hostility of the municipal government, detain the favela-dwellers in systematic social exclusion and deprivation of rights based on residential occupation as well as appearance.

The expression *a pinta da passoa* means the “the way that people come across” (Perlman, 2010 : 326) and refers to an unspoken social assessments of income, education, living situation, occupation and overall-appearance. According to the mind-set of residents of the *asfalto*, these markers determine whether people are *gente* or not. *Gente* means “being human” in its most basic translation. Body-language, clothes, speech as well as skin colour are other markers used to determine, who is a part of the socially constructed “us” category and considered “normal humans”. These markers are not used by the favela-dwellers. Judged by their *pinta da passoa*, favela-dwellers experience discrimination and exclusion when applying to jobs or university, when shopping or attending social events outside the favelas, in the judicial system, on the job market etc, which we will see in the analysis.

4.2. Systematic occupation, pacification process and gentrification

At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil experienced economic growth under the federal government of President Lula and was considered a solid global economy, according to the international sports organisations (note 6), as Brazil's bids for the World Cup of 2014 and the Olympics of 2016 were accepted in 2007 (note 7) and 2009 (note 8) respectively. Together, these events formed the starting points of a historical transformation of Rio, affecting millions of people, dramatically and often violently changing lives and communities – however, only the lives of the people in favelas. A new era of Rio began, as the Public Security Secretariat, together with newly elected mayor Eduardo Paes, put into motion the pacification process of Rio's favelas in late 2008.

Displayed as concern for citizens of Rio, who were living in areas of risk or other undefined excuses (Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015), the process of systematic occupation of favelas based on proximity to wealthy neighbourhoods, tourist attractions and the Olympic localisations began. The process was executed by special trained para-military forces known as BOPE³ and followed by an indefinite instalment of police, the UPP⁴. A process, which has over the course of seven years fundamentally changed the lives of millions of favela-dwellers – for better or worse. For some, it has brought a sense of peace and pushed the drug trafficking to other parts of the city or at least away of the street corners. For the majority, the pacification process has brought a constant atmosphere of unease and uncertainty due to the lack of trust in the police and the constant presence of a governmental body, an violent and ongoing fight for power with increased frequency of shoot-outs in the street between the police and drug gangs, as well as increased extortion – now also from the police. As told by a favela-dweller in pacified Maré, uncertainty in an ever-present factor: "*The police have a history of corruption [...] police treat people in favelas like second class citizens so it's going to depend.*" (note 9) The pacification process has been characterised as a national colonisation by scholars such as Freeman (2014) referring to the colony-like relationship between favela-dwellers and the authorities through constant monitoring and regulating by the armed UPP.

³ BOPE = Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais, the name of the special police unit of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State. Colloquially, they are known as the death squad as well as in international media e.g. International Business Times <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/police-death-squad-bope-called-calm-brazilian-slums-1440534>

⁴ UPP = Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora

Another aspect of the pacification is the gentrification. Favelas in the wealthy south zone of Rio such as Vidigal, Rochina, Cantagalo and Babilônia, experienced an extreme increase in rent, public taxes and power bills, which forces many to move involuntarily. Three days after the pacification of Rochina, the value of homes increased between 50 % – in other favelas the value increased with 400 % (Gaffney 2012). Another example of huge economic change in the wake of pacification is given to us by Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015), who reported an 803 % increase of the power bills in various favelas. Such extreme overnight economic changes either push poor families further into poverty or force large numbers of families to move from pacified to non-pacified favelas and often more criminal affected favelas in the periphery of Rio far away from job, education and social networks. According to the President of the Vidigal Neighborhood Association (note 10), the gentrification accelerates a de-characterisation of the community since its 2012-pacification, confirming that families are forced to cut ties with their social network when leaving for cheaper houses.

Also to be considered in the wake of the pacification programme is the alarming increase of killings by the police as the police operate with “shoot first ask later” tactics (Perlman 2010, Freeman 2014, Amnesty International report 2015). Repeatedly, NGOs and human rights organisations report on random, unexplained and uninvestigated killings of favela-dwellers who were “confused” with criminals – even small children and elderly people – or were innocent bystanders caught in a shootout between gangs and police. The Amnesty International (2015) report, containing investigations of the living conditions and human rights abuse leading up to the Olympics, reveals that killings of favela-dwellers by on-duty police approximates 16 % of the total homicides in Rio de Janeiro during the last five years, which counts to 1,519 killings. The most recent update on the official UPP-website (note 11) acclaims to 38 UPP-instalments covering 264 territories and affecting more than 1.5 million people.

4.3. Mass evictions and destruction of community

Since 2009, favela-dwellers have been evicted and removed as far as 70km from their place of birth, place of work, schools, family, social network etc. Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015) explain that even though mayors Pereira Passos (1902-1906) and Carlos Lacerda (1961-1965) are historically infamous for mass evictions and destruction of favelas, Eduardo Paes has executed the evictions of

favela-dwellers and demolition of favelas on a much larger scale due to the World Cup and the Olympics and the deadline, these mega-events create. In 2015, the number of compulsory removals of favela-dwellers was more than 67.000 – which is more than ten families evicted every day, since the process began in 2009. The eviction process means uncertainty and unbearable stress for families in affected communities, as no one knows, if they will return from work or shopping to find the fatal mark of “SMH” on their house – the mark for demolition of the Municipal Housing Secretariat.

Faulhaber & Azevedo explain that the procedure of a successful removal of a favela-community happens through different illegal and disgraceful steps from the municipal government. Officially, the government initiate legal negotiations with all affected families and communities after the areas or specific houses are declared at risk by an governmental expert or are situated on a piece of land, which has “special interest” for the government. The specifics of the “special interest” or the volume of “risk” are rarely explained to the affected favela-dwellers or communities, Faulhaber & Azevedo argue. The legislation concerning lands of “special interest” is very vague and can be interpreted and applied to numerous situations by the government. There are examples of communities, where the houses of favela-dwellers have been situated next to properties of richer families, hotels or companies, where the properties of favela-dwellers were “at risk”, but the neighbouring properties were not. Some communities have learned from the tragic history of other favelas and have subsequently reached out to non-governmental experts to re-evaluate the findings of the government, often with an astoundingly different result where less houses are actually at risk or need to be demolish for the government to realise the plan for the area. When entering negotiations with families or entire communities, the government offers a couple of alternatives for the affected people to choose from, such as relocation to a governmental housing programme, financial compensation or help to buy a new house close by. On official records, this looks both fair and legal, whereas the reality is a completely different story.

By interviewing favela-dwellers in the midst of a total community eviction, Faulhaber & Azevedo show, how the government housing called *Minha Vida Minha Casa* (cf. MVMC, my life my house) is not the better option, proclaimed by the municipal government, as the housing projects are revealed as poorly build houses full of cracks in the walls and are placed between 30 to 70 km

from their original homes. As Faulhaber & Azevedo argue, “A big part of the resettled families left areas very close to their work and went to live in the west of the city. The programme, which promised social inclusion through adequate housing, has become a tool for spatial segregation, especially in Rio de Janeiro.” (Kindle Locations 1030-1031). The interviewed favela-dwellers shed light on how the transportation options are inconsistent and for some, getting to work will now take up to 3 hours, as the housing projects, seemingly strategically, are placed in the periphery of Rio in burdened areas, furthering the social exclusion from the formal city. Families from a demolished community are scattered all over the different MVMC sites resulting in new, artificial communities with no shared history, unity or trust, thus making it an easy target for organised crime such as the drug gangs. The second option is compensation, but the families who choose to accept the compensation often receive an offer far below the actual market price of the property, which is not nearly enough for them to find new housing in a standard equal to that, which they are forced to leave. The third option is “assisted purchase” of a new house, but there are yet to be positive reports from the affected families of a successful process, according to Faulhaber & Azevedo.

If an entire community resist the government’s offers, the government has employed shady methods, such as bribing the community president or destroying the community from within as extra beneficial offers are made to individual families, as illustrated by the interviews of Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015). Those families, who then give into the once-in-a-lifetime offer, repeatedly experience not receive the promised money or house, before the rest of the community falls into line, thus the government creates strife between friends or families in the community and through this, the government breaks down the resistance from within. When individual families resist, Faulhaber & Azevedo strongly suggest human rights abuse in the government’s tactical response, as they use as physical threats or physiological terror. Another method is a full block of the families’ supply of power and water, or everyday commodities such as gas or food. Several independent actors such as the Rio-based NGOs RioOnWatch (note 12) and Observatório de Favelas as well as individuals via social media have provided evidence of severe abuse of power by police, using tear gas, pepper spray, shock grenades, rubber bullets or beatings. Faulhaber & Azevedo points to the tragic psychological effects of the uncertainty during the

eviction process as stress and depression increasingly develops into physical sickness such as hypertension or heart attacks.

Thus, having contextualised the historical relationship between favela-dwellers and the rest of the city as well as the pacification process and the effect of eviction, I will now connect it to the theory behind the preparation of hosting the Olympic Games in Rio and the implications on the favela-dwellers.

5. Theory

This section sets the theoretical framework of the social and political changes happening in Rio prior to the Olympic Games of 2016, which I use throughout my thesis. I will present terms and identify processes, which may help us to understand the implication of the preparation of Olympic hosting in a socially segregated society with restriction of citizenship and civil rights in connection with subjective identity based on colour. I will present the theories according to the different interpretive levels – start off with Brazil's relation to global politics and its significance for the social segregation in Rio de Janeiro, followed by political strategies on the local level and ending at the social fabric of Rio in terms of citizenship on the interpersonal level.

5.1. Political dynamics

To reach a deeper understanding of the social and political development in Rio de Janeiro during the past seven years as the city has been preparing for hosting the Olympic Games, we must first understand the social class dynamics in Brazil, which can be explained by a process of Brazilianisation. The term Brazilianisation describes the social processes behind elitism, which was coined by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck to conceptualise the nexus of marginality, social exclusion and globalisation through analysis of the social ranking and production section, which he had observed as a partial source of social segregation in the labour section in Brazil. Beck suggests that a property-owning global capitalism emerged after the cold war, causing “a historical bond [to break] between capitalism, welfare state and democracy” (Beck et al. 2000 : 401), increasing the segregation in a society, which we see in Rio de Janeiro during the preparation of the Olympic Games. Despite its name, Brazilianisation is applicable to any country, marked by social segregation and marginality.

Applying the theoretical concept in a North American context, Michael Lind (1995) argues that *Brazilianisation* captures the tendency of "increasing withdrawal of the White [...] overclass into its [...] world of private neighbourhoods, private schools, private police, private health care, and even private roads, walled off from the spreading squalor beyond. Like a Latin American oligarchy, the rich and well-connected members of the overclass can flourish in a decadent America with Third World levels of inequality and crime." (1995 : 14). The same withdrawal is happening in Rio de Janeiro. It has been present in the Brazilian society since the arrival of democracy in 1985, but the tendency has become clear during the preparation for the Olympics. Other scholars such as Curi et al. (2011) describes as fortified enclaves and Perlman (2010) as gated communities.

We look to Joanildo A. Burity (2008) to understand Brazilianisation into the socio-political globalisation context, in which Burity finds the concept to be a process of global/local frictional logic. That is, the politicians today reach their decisions focussing on benefiting the global political relations, while continuously trying to secure the interests of their constituents, which may cause political differences and friction, when the global and the local political goals are not similar. Burity examines the political conditions of societies in the semi-periphery of the world, such as the BRIC countries⁵, and finds, although emerging powers, such intermediary societies are severely marked by their history, cultural identities and uneven political institution. Such factors restrain these societies, and they are not able to command trust from the Euro-American partners, causing impact on a local level. When such nations strive to secure a place as equals on the global political scene, the interest of the global world are prioritised rather than the local interests (p. 737). Accordingly, the political decisions and actions are based on "the tension between the assertion of demands by the local people and the need for considering and making room for the interests of 'external' actors" (2008 : 736) as is the case of Brazil and its favouring of neoliberalist politics and pro-market reforms. Furthermore, Brazil has prioritised the interest of the upper class, international business and real estate market, furthering the economic and social divide of the Brazilian population. In summation, political strategies that follow the logic of Brazilianisation are directly linked to segregation, social and economic inequality and elitism, which Burity argues have

⁵ BRIC refers to the political collaboration between Brazil, Russia, India and China.

grown simultaneously with globalisation during the last four decades.

5.2. Political alignment strategies

In the understanding of a global/local frictional logic, governments are influenced on the process of international political alignment in national policymaking. In Brazil's case, the alignment is to the Euro-American political institution as an emerging global political player through soft power (de Almeida et al. 2013). Soft power is in this thesis understood as the ability to attract and shape the opinion nationally and internationally instead of using force to make changes (cf. hard power). As the Brazilian political synergy⁶, places focus on international political relation and national economic partnerships, the social equality paradigm shifts in favour of relations to real estate market, the public-private partnership (cf. PPP), international business partners etc. Brazilianisation may appear through a variety of agenda setting strategies. In this next section, I will identify a few of such strategies, which will frame the context of my analysis of Rio de Janeiro and the social divide enhanced by the preparations of Olympic Games of 2016.

The theory of agenda setting communication is best known as a strategy within mainstream media and journalism to affect the public perception of news and newsworthiness, coined by McCombs and Shaw (1972) in a 1968-study of a local election. Follow-up theories have included the effect of the public opinion on the mainstream media as well as correlation between mainstream media and policymaking (Rogers & Dearing 1988). However, as a theoretical tool, agenda setting strategies can be used as means of influencing the view of the surroundings and in this thesis, I will analyse the growing social divide of Rio by identifying such agenda setting strategies used by the politicians in the preparation of the Olympic Games, a process I will refer to as the Olympic Transformation. I will delimit my focus to the use of urban planning and development, media conduct and the public-private relation as agenda setting strategies, and in my analysis I will examine how these correlate to the Brazilianisation of the society of Rio de Janeiro. In the following sections, I will elaborate on the theory of urban planning and development, media conduct and the public-private relation as a general socio-political tool, whereupon I will touch upon apartheid as a mechanism of differentiating, and how social

⁶ In Brazil, there are three levels of government: federal, state and municipal.

apartheid has emerged through Brazilianisation in Rio de Janeiro. Lastly, I will examine forms of citizenship different to the conventional under the term insurgent citizenship.

5.2.1 Urban planning and development

The discipline of urban planning deals with the different political and technical levels of any development of a city, such as the use of land, transportation, environmental impact, public welfare etc. Therefore, as a fundamental part of urban development and maintenance, any municipal government must implement strategies of urban planning. In context of urban planning before hosting a mega-event such as the Olympics, theorists such as Vale & Gray (2013) and Gaffney (2012) have observed tendencies of favouring neo-liberalistic political alliances with the national and international businesses, rather than the sustainability of the social development. Olympic-theorists such as Zhou et al. (2009) explain how event-tourism has become a mayor global economic phenomenon, with the Olympic as the biggest, through which the different levels of the society can benefit from urban development due to the vast amounts of tourists and huge economic boost during the event. Thus follows the understanding that mega-events such as the Olympic Games provide the hosting nation with the opportunity to works towards a levelling of the social imbalance through infrastructural development and urban development with the purpose of social interaction across social classes. However, despite the fundament of the Olympic Charter (see appendix 1) being visions of equality and inclusion through the Games, International Olympic Committee (cf. IOC) turns a blind eye to human rights abuses caused by urban development by the host nations. In turn, the passive role of the IOC allows governments to prioritise their own economic and political agenda rather than social sustainability, according to Olympic-theorist Bruce Kidd (2010) and Derek Van Rheenen (2014). Accordingly, such governments can launch their economically focused plans of urban planning without equal consideration for the individual or collective human impact, as long as the buildings for tourism and Olympic venues finish on time. Present examples of such human rights abuses ignored in order to meet the deadlines of mega-events, we find the first in Qatar (note 13 & 14) in preparation for the 2022 World Cup, where migrant workers are exploited in slave-like conditions and the death rate of set workers is alarmingly high. Secondly, the Chinese population suffered greatly in preparation for the 2008 (note 15), as Humans Rights Watch (cf. HRW) underlines, *“Hosting of the [2008] Games has been a catalyst for abuses”* (note 16).

We turn our attention to Rio-based Professor in Architecture and Urbanism, Christopher Gaffney (2012) to understand the social impact and emerging mechanisms of exclusion through the extensive urban development, Rio de Janeiro has undergone prior to the Olympics, which we may understand as the use of urban planning as a tool of agenda setting. The agenda setting strategy in this context is creating a sense of crisis to achieve a legacy, which is a clear goal of the municipal government connection with hosting the Olympic Games. We will return to the understanding of legacy in the analysis in connection to the growing elitism and social segregation.

Gaffney examines the nexus of mega-events, urban planning and the promise of legacy in Rio de Janeiro. He argues that by creating a sense of crisis and the need for urgent action of change, the municipal government is able to steer the urban development almost unchallenged for the benefit of a positive economic outcome of the mega-event.

"There is almost no evidence that mega-events bring lasting structural benefits to cities or improvements to income, employment, housing, democratic processes, or quality of life - especially in societies marked by already strong socio-economic disparities. These market-orientated, consumer-based [mega-events] are not predicated on long-term urban and social planning but on producing 'deliverables' to be consumed within strict timeframes. Thus, in order to convince populations that massive public expenditures and extraordinary policing measures are for the common good, rhetorical and discursive justifications for mega-events focus on legacies in social programs, infrastructure, tourism, employment and security." (2012 : 78)

Here, Gaffney points to the use of "rhetorical and discursive justifications" to ensure public support to proceed with pro-market political strategies. We may understand such justifications in the sense that the government constructs a sense of urgency and crisis to reach to the point of legacy. The justification redirects the public attention away from the lack of consideration for social implications, as we will see is the case in Rio throughout the thesis. The politically constructed urgency "forces" the government to cut corners, and the sense of crisis allows a political disregard of legal rights. That is, when using such justifications the government in Rio is able to prioritise their goals of urban planning through strong relations to the ruling class and private sector and yet generate a wide public support. This agenda setting strategy has cruel social implication for some parts of the society, namely the favelas and peripheral parts of Rio, which we address in the analysis. Concrete examples of justification of urban planning and development,

which do not consider the social implications, can be the political choice of urban upgrading in selective areas, such as the tourist spots and Olympic venues in Rio, curfews or building of walls to creating socio-political city limits, which in Rio take shape in the UPP instalment or building of walls.

5.2.2. Media conduct

As argued by Rogers and Dearing (1988), the agenda setting communication does not only provide a platform for the mainstream media to influence the formal and informal discourses of the public but also the policy makers, and they argue that the agenda setting theory should examine the relation between mainstream media and elite policymaker's agenda. Accordingly, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) have presented their research on the influences of agenda setting communication on elite policymaking, in which they found that depending on the political level of agenda making, the coverage of media has a different influence. Relevant to our understand of the Olympic Transformation and the role of the media, Walgrave and Van Aelst found that "as a rule, the [lower levelled] government agendas are less flexible and more cemented [...], substantial policy initiatives are immunized against media impact" (p. 104). Whereas the president and the highest level of the political scene are more prone to media impact. Therefore, in the Brazilian context we may assume that the municipal government of Rio is not as such influenced by the reporting of the mainstream media.

On the contrary, Curi et al. (2011) show, how the media output is controlled by the policymakers in order to create a positive image and legacy in connection with mega-events in BRIC countries. Curi et al. contextualise the influence of policymakers on national image in the globalised world using agenda setting strategies to influence the media in developing countries. They refer to it as the BRIC way of organising, "It seems like these countries want to affirm themselves not only in the economic area, but in terms of their global profile." (p. 141). In this understanding, creating a global profile can happen through fictional representation of the society. Political actors will provoke an international positive image making via strategic and contained media coverage and tourism experiences. In this way, the policymaking elite create a front fit for a country of growing global power into the First World and immaterial legacy, according to Curi et al. The viewers of mega-events, such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, view the events through a lens of deceit, where only certain parts of the society are shown

such as safe and beautiful areas for leisure and sports, which Curi et al. call fortified enclaves reserved for the rich, well-connected locals and tourists.

Having looked at the global effect of bias media conduct by the policy makers, I will now close this section with a brief look at the local effect. Here, we find a high level of influence by policy makers on mainstream media as the municipal government of Rio deliberately provoke a negative image of favelas to gain support of the public while enforcing a pacification of the favelas, according to Daniel S. Lacerda (2015) supported by the findings of Perlman (2010). Lacerda presents a critical discourse analysis of texts from mainstream media stories and press releases of the municipal government pointing to such a deliberate negative image construction. Lacerda finds that the state of praxis reproduces an “understand of slum as a phenomenon detached from the rest of society” (p. 74) which in turn reinforces exclusion and blames the poor, thus yielding a social apartheid legitimised by discursive praxis. We will go further into the findings of Lacerda and subsequent implication for the favela-dwellers in section 6.2.3.

5.2.3. Public-private relation

In winning the Olympic bid, Brazil gained international recognition and symbolic power, as we know from Bourdieu, also called soft power. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (de Almeida, 2013 : 274), and this concept of attraction (through increased tourism, media attention and international business) is a fundamental part of hosting mega events such as the Olympics. De Almeida et al. (2013) provide us with an understanding of the political agenda of the Olympic-preparing Brazil, which shows how the Brazilian politicians use this mega sports event to increase the status of Brazil in the international sphere. To do so, the politicians need to enhance a positive image of Rio and making a political and social legacy through urban planning and public containment (cf. the drug trafficking and crime), all of which require extensive funding, which the municipal government of Rio appear to lack (Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015), thus a public-private partnership is required. Popularly used, this partnership is known as PPP (meaning Public-Private Partnership) and is a practise well known within the construction industry. Such practises date back to the 18th century, thus not a modern practise but globally utilised, and the approach to such an intersectional partnership varies from country to country and from culture to culture.

Tang et al. (2010) present definitions of PPP from different societies, two of which we will look here to define what the objectives of a PPP is. The first definition is from the American society, “A contractual arrangement between a public sector agency and a for-profit private sector developer, whereby resources and risks are shared for the purpose of delivery of public service or development of public infrastructure”. The second definition is from Canadian society, “A cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, which best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards”. In sum, to distinguish the difference between regular PPPs and that, which is occurring in Rio de Janeiro between the municipal government and developers behind the Olympic venues, we will use the definition of the aforementioned as being regular PPPs with respect for the social implication. I will especially underline that the outcome of any PPP according to our regular PPP definition should be “delivery of public service and development of public infrastructure” and meeting “public needs”. In Rio, the development companies behind most of the construction for the Olympic Games have strong economic ties to the government, which in turn may influence the policymaking surrounding the development of the Olympics to the advantage of the private sector. Therefore, we conclude that the strong correlation in the PPPs is another sub-component of the agenda setting strategies and means of influencing the formal and informal public discourse towards a favourable image of the Olympic Transformation.

I will be examining the PPPs and its influences on policymaking and social repercussions as I put it into context of the Olympic Transformation in the analysis, but first I will look at the social implications of Olympic Transformation in terms of exclusion based on colour.

5.3. Signs of apartheid

The social segregation tool apartheid consists of mechanisms of differentiating. In Brazil, a socially constructed colour marker reveals itself as a sub-component of apartheid, which I will work with throughout this thesis as a segregation tool used in the Olympic Transformation. Apartheid has emerged through policymaking in societies with visible racial differences, such as historically infamous racially segregated periods in South Africa or the United States. Through policymaking, the white elite socially maintains a division in the society in question, assigning human value according to skin colour with the purpose of social hierarchy. Apartheid may also influence economic standing and political influence among the population. The excluded group is not likely

to receive the same level of urban development and social benefits e.g. higher education, health care, entering the formal job marked with its trade union security and politically limited working hours, access to and exercising citizen rights or partake in the development of the society as the policy making group and the elites. Although popularly associated with a certain historical period in South Africa, the term apartheid is continuously applicable to describe any political and social system, which contains social exclusion and discriminating mechanism.

Lacerda (2015) argues that societies with strongly marked class issues, like the Brazilian, yields social apartheid which in turn is legitimised by discursive praxis uphold by the elite. However, in Brazil we find that the mechanism of apartheid happens through social practices rather than direct policymaking, but the political body is still very much involved in the exclusion process, e.g. through urban planning, media conduct and PPP, none of which happens through direct policy making. Historically, Brazilian law promoted rather than prohibited race mixing (Holston 2008), because the colonising Portuguese wanted to increase in numbers, despite racial differences. At the abolishment of slavery in 1888, as the last country of the West, apartheid tendencies emerged as an effect of the former slave-master relation (Perlman 2010). Public census since 1940 has divided the population into colours of branco (white), pardo (brown), preto (black), amarelo (yellow or of Asian ancestry) and since 1991 indigena (indigenous). These classifications appear in terms of colours (Portuguese: cor), but since 1991 the governmental body has altered the question to be “colour/race” (Carvalho et al. 2004, Loveman 2011), thus officially bringing back the term race as part of the government language, which had been banned for much on the 20th century due to negative historical connotation.

Guimarães (2012) explains how the elements of the term race were transferred to the word colour, and in Brazil colour is more than skin tones – it includes the texture of a person’s hair and the shape of their nose and lips and also cultural traits such as upbringing and manners. Accordingly, as presented in section 4.1 “A Cidade Partida”, Perlman’s *a pinta da passoa* (meaning the way a person comes across) is an unspoken socially and culturally constructed colour classification, a social marker. This view is supported by Carvalho et al. (2004), saying, “Subjective identity in Brazil is therefore based on physical appearance in combination with other factors such as income, education, and related insignias of social rank”. It is this interpretation of the socially constructed colour marker, which I apply to the analysis of the Olympic Transformation in Rio as a

segregation tool to systemise social ranking.

5.3.1. Citizenship in Rio

Axel Honneth theorised the relation between power, recognition, and respect, leaning on the theories of Hegel, a framework through which I will contextualise the tendencies of apartheid in Rio. Honneth aims at providing moral grammar to social conflicts, and he argues, “All forms of social interaction contains reciprocal morale demands, and social relationships are relations of recognition.” (My translation, Nørgaard 2005 : 63). Honneth analyses the requirements of the creation of identity: we need emotional recognition by the family, cognitive recognition we should receive from the state in form of legal rights, participation and equal possibilities, and lastly, self-appreciation through the solidarity of the society and social interaction. As humans beings, we naturally seek recognition, and when excluded from legal rights and social relations, people tend to search for recognition through other processes as argued by Holston (2004). He examines the circumstances in which citizens demand rights and achieve it through a different approach to the system such as mobilisation, which Holston calls insurgent citizenship.

To understand the complexity of citizenship in Brazil, Holston points to the inegalitarianism, which permeates Brazilian history. The 1824 Brazilian Constitution, almost identical to the Constitution of the French Revolution, left out the foundational article of “man are born and remain free and equal in rights”. Instead, the Brazilian state developed and legislated a system for the differential distribution of rights, which the Brazilian society still practises socially. “On the basis of social distinctions not inherent to the definition of national membership, the state discriminated citizens into different categories of unequal rights, privileges, immunities, and powers,” Holston explains (2004 : 64). That is, some Brazilians are citizen with rights and other Brazilians are not. The latter group is viewed and treated as “marginal”, who do not have rights, which Holston describes as “a distinction that only makes sense from within the system of differentiated citizenship.” (p. 255) Even though constantly promoting biological and spatial race-mixing through legislation, the apartheid notion “the whiter the better” has always been a dominant cultural orientation in Brazil, a phenotypical and cultural whitening process, because the “white genes” historically were thought stronger than any other (p. 69).

Loveman et al. (2011) argue that the category brown in national census is a whitening process of blacks, which can be achieved through social and economic success. Furthermore, Loveman et al. argue that this category is misleading and should be deleted, thus empowering the blacks and lead the social science and the Brazilian society to a more precise understanding of the extent of segregation of Brazil. In recent years, a social change has occurred in Brazil and Holston (2008) presents it as an empowerment of excluded citizens, who work to reclaim and secure citizenship by mobilising and working against the system, as they assert their rightful portion in the society, having “unconditional worth in rights, not dependent on their personal social or moral status”. Insurgent citizenship is in its essence “*looking for your rights*” and “*running after them*” (p. 254). One such way of securing insurgent citizenship is to mobilise and fight for the right for living in their place of residence – a theme, which will become central throughout the second part of the analysis as an ongoing battle between the favela-dwellers and the state of Rio prior to the Olympic Games.

With the theoretical frame placed around the centralised social and political currents during the Olympic Transformation in the society of Rio de Janeiro prior to the Olympic Games, we will now proceed to the analysis, beginning with a contextualising perspective of the Olympic Games.

6. Analysis

This first section will provide as an introduction to the historical development of the Olympic Games and the social implication for a hosting nation, such as the Brazilian. The section will include a presentation to the political and social potential, which the Games bring into the hosting nation’s sphere – a topic, which will be addressed in the discussion. Following, the Olympic Transformation will be analysed from a top down perspective (section 6.2) with focus on the use of three types of agenda setting strategies – urban planning (section 6.2.1), PPPs (section 6.2.2.), and media conduct (6.2.3). Lastly, we close the analysis with a bottom up perspective (section 6.3) on the Olympic Transformation with occupation of favelas, mass eviction and demolition, and how the favela-dwellers have mobilised and created insurgent citizenship for themselves (section 6.3.3. and 6.3.4).

6.1. Creating a legacy

2016 is a historic year for the South American continent as it marks the year of the first hosting of the Olympic Games (see appendix 2 for overview of all the Olympic Games). South America and Brazil in particular have hosted other mega-events, but nothing as big and epoch-making as the Olympic Games, which is closely linked to global image-making. Hosting the Olympic Games is full of prestige, and it opens many political possibilities. Madrid and Chicago were strong contestants, but both lost the victory to Rio de Janeiro. When winning in 2009, then-president Lula said,

"Rio will deliver an unforgettable Games. You will see for yourselves the passion, the energy and the creativity of the Brazilian people. It will not be just Brazil's Games but South America's. It will serve to inspire the 180 million young people on the continent. It is time to redress the balance. It is time to light the Olympic flame in a tropical country." (note 18)

From the very moment Rio won the bid for hosting, the political goal has been to create a legacy for Brazil and for Rio de Janeiro. The national government wanted to draw attention to the development of Brazil to strengthen the global political image as a growing soft power (de Almeida et al. 2013), whereas the municipal government of Rio wanted to improve the image of the city to increase tourism and international business. The city had ambitious goals for the New Rio – the better version of Rio. Upgrading transportation to ease the severe congestion problems (new metro lines and rapid bus lanes), extensive urban development and a new water front for leisure (Porto Maravilha), ecological sustainability through reduction of the carbon emissions produced during the Games (replanting of 24 million trees) (note 17), and reducing the crime and violence by pacification and the UPP-installment.

All of the above were promised benefits for the entire population to enjoy. The competition brief of the Master Plan for the Olympic preparation reads, *"The physical, social and economic legacy of the Games at the Olympic and Paralympic Park in Barra de Tijuca will establish for the people of Rio the future direction of sustainable urban development and city growth."* (My underlining) (Vale & Gray 2013). However, the Olympic Transformation did not bring about benefits for the entire population. It brought benefits to the upper and middle classes, whereas the poor and vulnerable parts of the society experienced deprivation of rights and freedom and increased marginalisation. Section 6.2 will analyse the preparation process from a top down

perspective to highlight, how the three types of agenda setting strategies are used by the government to maintain public support and enforce the Olympic Transformation despite the social implications leading to further segregation. However, to understand why the municipal government of Rio is able to prioritise the market over the people through the agenda setting strategies, we need to understand the framework of being an Olympic host. Thus, section 6.1.1. and 6.1.2. function as a contextualising frame before the analysis.

6.1.1. Becoming the Olympic host

Wining the bid for Olympic hosting is a long and expensive process, in which the bidding cities are obligated to present their plans for an Olympic upgrade of their city, bringing forth the unique strengths of their own city according to the Olympic Charter with focus on development and inclusion – the foundation of the Charter (appendix 1). Becoming the Olympic host and realising the promised goals demands substantial transformation of the city as a whole. However, historically, such a transformation seems to increase rather than decrease existing division of classes, ethnicities or subgroups in those societies preparing for the Games. Olympic history shows examples of discrimination against individuals e.g. women, blacks, the LGBT community, ethnic minorities or indigenous people, or subgroups such as the Jews in Nazi Germany, the Aborigines in Australia, the working class, the political protesters and the journalists of China as well as the population of Taiwan and Tibet in connection to China (Kidd 2010, Van Rheenen 2014).

When hosting the Games, the host nation will briefly become the centre of global attention, and these internal social and political inequalities are often concealed from the eyes of the world through a beautification of the hosting nation (Curi et al. 2011). Vale and Gray (2013) conceptualise the socially weaker parts of a society preparing for a mega-event, such as the Olympic Games, as a *Displacement Decathlon*. “[W]ell-trained residents compete for the right to remain in their homes and on their land. The contenders in this quadrennial event represent communities rather than nation-states, and they face long odds in a match against those with better funding and stronger political connections [...] Most participants do not emerge victorious.” (2013, web version) Vale and Gray reveal that more two million residents, primarily poor, have been displaced due to Olympic development during the last 20 years.

We will now take a short look at the breach between the Olympic opportunity of promoting equality and human rights locally and the actual embodiment of the Olympic spirit in hosting cities, examining whether the Olympic spirit divides the hosting population rather than bringing unity.

6.1.2. Olympism and Olympic activism

As seen below, the Olympic Charter (appendix 1) seeks fundamental equality, social responsibility and human rights as principles and guidelines of the Olympic Games, which is called *Olympism*. The quotation below does not appear in its entirety and has been selected to emphasise the close correlation between Olympism and basic human rights.

From §1 *“Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.”*

From §2 *“[...] promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”*

From §6 *“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Olympic Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kinds, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”*

Bearing the ability to promote human rights and boost demands of equality in its DNA, the Olympic Games, organised by the IOC, holds a self-proclaimed non-political profile, causing much critique among human rights organisations. Before the 2008-Beijing Games, when the IOC’s refused to directly interfere in the internal political turmoil of China concerning the human rights abuses in the conflict between China and Tibet, IOC-president Rogge defended IOC’s position by claiming, *“We are not a political body, we are not an NGO.”* (Kidd, 2010 : 906). However, throughout its century long history, the IOC has repeatedly been involved in the internal politics of the host nation such as exclusion of Jews at the Olympics in Nazi Germany, Apartheid struggles of South Africa, ongoing debates about recognition of countries like Israel and Palestine, a parted Korea, the Soviet Union, China and Taiwan etc. Kidd argues, *“Each of these issues challenged the assumptions of non-intervention, and drew the IOC willy-nilly into the politics and calculation of human rights.”* (p. 904). That is, when building the foundation of the Olympic Games on principles like *“social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles”* and *“the*

preservation of human dignity" (Olympic Charter, §1 and §2), it is impossible for the IOC to be politically neutral.

According to Kidd, the presence of the Games can have powerful political and social impact on the host nation, participating countries and global politics, e.g. the Jewish participation in 1936-Olympic Games, which was facilitated by IOC. The political choices concerning the banning of South Africa from any Olympics until the end of Apartheid, cemented the IOC's political involvement, Kidd argues. The IOC-banning of South Africa was the first of many international boycotts, which put a considerable political strain on South America, and de facto placed the IOC and the Olympic Games in the political field of global politics, equality and human rights. As a famous 2006-quote of Nelson Mandela goes, "*Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than government in breaking down racial barriers.*" (note 19) This is a strongly political quote from a powerful political icon and equality fighter, whom the IOC wanted to join the committee work (note 20), supporting the notion that the IOC is willing to embrace some aspects of the fight for human rights throughout their work and socio-political abilities. Many historical statements and actions of the IOC lead us to believe that it the committee is willing to fight for human rights, yet the committee does not want to embrace the role and shies away from political hot spots. Kidd emphasises that cowering before the hosting nation, when human right abuse become apparent, seriously damages the legitimacy and moral integrity of the movement (p. 903).

Mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, have the ability to call attention to social and political frictions in the society of the host nation, and if politically capable organisation, such as the IOC, take the lead instead of shying away from getting politically involved, the mega-event can be used to make substantial social changes, according to Van Rheenen (2014). One recent example could be the Olympics in Sochi in 2014, where the mega-event was used to draw attention and a call for action to the internal social and political struggle between the government and the LGBT community in Russia. Such a process is call politicisation of sports. As IOC is responsible for choosing the host nation, the committee is indirectly a part of the Olympic Transformation, which, in some cases, increases the exiting division between groups in the hosting nation. As the Olympic Games, and subsequently the IOC, can act as a catalyst of severe human

rights abuses (Kidd 2010, Van Rheenen 2014, Freeman 2014, Kidd 2010, Van Rheenen 2014, World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee of Rio de Janeiro 2015, Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015), as seen most recently in China 2008, Russia 2014 and Brazil 2016, the IOC should focus on advocacy to enhance adherence of basic human rights in the hosting society.

6.2. Part one: the top down Transformation

As the Olympic flame draws near to the Olympic host, so do the eyes of the world. The host nation is on full display, as the Games unfold within the course of two weeks. Yet, the Olympic Transformation and Olympic image are years in the making, influencing various parts of the society of the host nation – the political and social aspects as well as very tangible changes of the urban planning and development, the economy, tourism, the real estate market and more. In this section, we will look at the implications of the Olympic Transformation, and how it has changed the social reality of Rio.



Figure 1: Map of the Olympic venues with most benefits of the Olympic Transformation. The Copacobana circle includes Leblon, Ipanema, and the Maracanã circle includes the business centre and the Porto Maravilha. Source: <http://totallympics.com/index.php?/topic/124-summer-olympics-games-2016-venues/>

6.2.1. Urban planning to change Rio

First, we look at the gentrification and colour division (section 6.2.1.1.) of the South Zone and other popular destinations in Rio, which has been in progress for decades, but winning the bid for hosting has speeded up the process and increased the volume. Secondly, we will look at the beautification process (6.2.1.2.) while preparing for the arrival of the 2016-Games.

6.2.1.1 Colour division as a part of urban planning and development

Since the arrival of UPPs in 2009 in the South Zone favelas, Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015) identify a process of “white removal” (Kindle Locations 169) with an increasing level of “white” people moving into pacified favelas of the upscale South Zone. Such a gentrification triggers social and economic segregation, forcing the poorer favela-dwellers to move to the periphery of Rio, where infrastructure and transportation are far from the South Zone standard, thus the citizens of Rio de Janeiro live very different lives.

To better understand the impacts of the pacification, the UPPs, the subsequent gentrification and social segregation, we turn our attention to the findings of Hugo Nicolau Barbosa de Gusmão (note 21), a geography university student from São Paulo. He has created a powerful visual of the social segregation of Rio de Janeiro through detailed racial mapping specifically of the South Zone, and one of the entire city as comparison, based on data from the 2010 census from Brazil’s federal statistics agency (see appendix 3-5). Here, we are able to visualise the result of the removal of favela-dwellers whether through gentrification or eviction from the main beneficiary area of the Olympic Transformation, including Barra de Tijuca, Copacobana, Leblon, Ipanema, the business centre, Guanabara Bay and the Porto Maravilha (See map above). Data show, that the majority of the population in the South Zone consider themselves white (appendix 3, map B); almost 80 % of the residents would categorise themselves as white. In comparison, the national share of Brazilians who would identify themselves as white is only 48 %.

In support of the fight for racial equality and recognition, Gusmão works to add visual evidence to the public discussion of racism, disparity and criminal justice issues based on colour in

Brazil. Besides easy access to education, jobs and well-functioning transportation, the South Zone offers places of leisure and social interaction e.g. the beaches, green spaces and social interaction parks, such as Lagoa in Leblon and Ipanema or Parque Carioca at the Porta Maravilha. Leisure time is a human right⁷, and access to areas of leisure is a basic social right of any citizen, however the favela-dwellers are being excluded from the aforementioned leisure areas in Rio. On map A (appendix 3) we see how the blue representing “white” is concentrated along the beaches, the green spaces, and business centre, whereas the green and red representing “brown” and “black” mostly live in the West Zone, the inland of Rio. Inferring to Loveman et al. (2011), the colour category “brown” functions as a whitening process of the “black”. If the “brown” category were to be annulled, map E (appendix 5) would look very different, as the removal of “blacks” to the periphery would appear much clearer. Being relocated to the West Zone with poor infrastructure, minimum transportation options, little or no leisure options and governmental blockage e.g. the police stopping favela-dwellers going into the upscale areas for leisure time at the beach, keep the favela-dwellers from realising their citizenship, according to the social and governmental acknowledgement-theories of Honneth (Nørgaard 2005). The distance and lack of social interaction between the classes create an alienation, suspicion and irrational fear. For the favela-dwellers, the result becomes a negative self-valuing (Hede 2016) caused by the reactions of society through avoidance on the street, suspicion when entering social interaction on the *asfalto*, e.g. in shops, at university, on the job etc. An example of such suspicion is explained by a young favela-dweller age 19, we will name her T, living in the pacified favela, Cantagalo in the South Zone.

In an interview I did while working in Cantagalo in the autumn of 2015 (Hede 2016, also track 2 on the enclosed cd), we see the result of spatial distancing in Rio, which increases the stereotypical images of favela-dwellers. T explains that the *asfalto cariocas* get their perception of favela-dwellers only “on tv! And they don’t know us. They just know us on tv.” (track 2 : 23:04). In her opinion, the news is increasing the segregation by negative reporting on favela-dwellers, which she believes to be one-sided. “It makes me feel sad. It makes me feel, I don’t know. Like they only show one side of the story. The same side, always.” (track 2 : 30:55). Using a commonly known tool of creating an “us” and “them” dichotomy, the news consistently label favela-dwellers

⁷ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948

as otherness (as an opposite to the rest of the *cariocas* in middle and upper class neighbourhoods) and as criminals by referring to them as *marginais* – the Portuguese word meaning people in the marginal. This word is used in a derogative way and gives the favela-dwellers the sense of not belonging to the society, according to T, a point supported by the findings of Perlman (2010).

When the news use the label *marginais*, they indicate that favela-dwellers “*deserve to be in prison. You are not supposed to go to the beach, to the shopping, cinema, museums, or even university*” (track 2 : 33:27). T says that even when “*they don’t talk about it in words, [...] they are trying to show us this – that we are marginais*” (33:55). According to Perlman, the use of *marginais* (marginal) is widely spread, has “a dual connotation of the ‘poorest of the poor’ and ‘outlaws and criminals’” (2010 : 157). In everyday conversation *marginais* is used interchangeably with the word *bandidos* (bandit or criminal), which also refers to drug traffickers and organised crime in Perlman’s words (2010 : 157). Thus, with the popular use of *marginais* when referring to favela-dwellers, mainstream media and, in T’s opinion, more specifically the sensation-seeking televised news paints a picture of the favela-dwellers having a joined identity with criminals and organised crime, simply because they live in a favela.

This stereotypical image is reinforced by the systematic exclusion by different parts of the governmental body, such as the police on the streets, creating irrational public fear purely based on the *pinta da passoa*. A 2015-article (note 22) in the Independent reports on how the police, as a part of the governmental body, prior to the Olympics stops and searches busloads of young, black youths from favelas on their way to the famous, tourist-crowded beaches, located in the South Zone. In the middle of August 2015, the police detained 150 youths, who had not committed any offences, as part of an Olympic safety training strategy. Subsequently, this strategy has been through legal proceedings and was found to be illegal practise, labelled as symbolic apartheid.

The article also exemplifies the experiences of two young favela-dwellers, who identify the damaging outcome of the actions of the police, when detaining or arresting youth based on *pinta da passoa*, and creating alienation and irrational public fear. One young man, who lives in a favela in Rio’s North Zone, is used to being viewed as a criminal by police or other citizens on the *asfalto*. “*It’s intimidating. The other day, I was in a supermarket and a girl of only about 10 was buying*

fruit. When she saw me, she started shaking and ran out of there.” The other interviewed man has also experienced being singled out: *“I was on the bus coming back from university and the police stopped it. A policeman said they were looking for a thief. He looked directly at me and asked to search my bag. He didn’t ask the other passengers.”*

These are the experiences of just two individuals, out of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable favela-dwellers, who do not, through Honneth’s understanding, receive adequate recognition by society through social interaction, when outside the favela or cognitive recognition in encounters with the governmental body. Through these examples, we begin to understand how favela-dwellers of Rio are systematically excluded from enjoying equal citizen rights and experience mechanism of differentiating, which we understand as social apartheid. In my interview of Schøllhammer in February 2016, I find support for this interpretation of social apartheid and Brazilianisation at a national level as much as the local level.

There is a clear rightward turned nationalism, which is against the government [under Dilma] [...] to go back to a whole other form of Brazil, which we thought somehow had been abandoned with time, but it has now returned, and people [non-black elites] are saying it was better with the military dictatorship. People say that it was better in the old days [...]. They are saying now there is a process of increased race-based privileges towards the blacks [favela-dwellers] with quota systems [...]. There is too much ‘mimimi’, they say, which means too much over-indulgence towards prisoners, criminals, blacks and Indians. Which would have not have been expressed so openly 10 years ago. There is an obvious discourse dictation of this kind in the inner core of the federal parliament. [...] And, it is being supported by the media. (track 1 on the enclosed cd, 32:23-34:10).

The white elite longs for the privileges for the “whites”, which the dictatorship provided, and the political landscape, with the support of the mainstream, media is increasingly displaying a rightward turning towards nationalism, with parallels to apartheid in South Africa, through direct policymaking. The contra-parliament tendencies, which Schøllhammer identified in February 2016, became even more obvious, when President Dilma, historically known as a political maverick and insurgent guerrilla worrier fighting the dictatorship, was impeached as of the 12th of May 2016 (note 23) and replaced by Michel Temer, the famously pro-elite vice-president. Pro-elite policies are now in the works, and only 12 days after the impeachment, acting president Temer is announcing drastic cut in social programmes aimed at the most vulnerable in Brazil, such as the

Bolsa Família social housing programme, which was announced the 29th of May 2016 (note 24). This impeachment was identified as a political coup by Dilma herself, and it very likely to further the Brazilianisation and apartheid tendencies in the entire country.

6.2.1.2. *Olympic beautification through safety measurements*

Belonging and safety are the two components of the municipal government's beautification process, the social side of the Olympic Transformation. The powerful upper class together with the vast middle class in Rio want to feel safe – physically and economically. The public image of the danger in the favelas sheltering gangs and trafficking is ever-present, and these two social classes of the *asfalto* want to distance themselves from this danger. As a direct effect of Brazilianisation, identified by Schøllhammer (Interview February 2016), elitism re-emerges in Rio de Janeiro, making the best parts of the city less accessible for the non-elite. This happens through economic exclusion e.g. continuous sky rocketing real estate prices of central properties in neighbourhoods with proper infrastructure, and physical exclusion of the favela-dwellers by mass removals and demolition of favelas in the rich South Zone and business centre.

As analysed in the paragraph above, negative stereotypical images of favelas as a hive for criminals and poor, create feelings of uncertainty and fear, xenophobia. The municipal government is using these reactions to manufacture a crisis with a deadline, being the opening day of the Olympics, before which the government needs to be able to control the unknown dangers of favelas. Security and reduction of violence have been top priority of the government in order to prepare for the Olympics, hence the pacification of favelas and instalment of the UPPs supposedly benefitting the safety of both *asfalto* and *morro cariocas* (the population of Rio on the flat streets and on the hillsides – the middle class/upper classes and favela-dwellers). Yet, if we look at the map of pacifications and UPP-instalments (appendix 6), we find that these security measures are conveniently placed around the clusters of Olympic venues and do not benefit the majority of favela-dwellers against the violence of gangs, rather, it protects the Olympic investments, the tourism and the upper and middle class neighbourhoods. If we cross-examine map E (appendix 5) with the colours of the population with map F and G (appendix 6) showing the UPP-instalments and the urban development such as the bus lines, we find that one area in particular is not

benefitting from the Olympic Transformation, namely the West Zone, which in turn is receiving a large percentage of the 67.000 evicted favela-dwellers since 2009 (see map H, appendix 7).

Even with such vast amounts of favela-dwellers being evicted from key Olympic locations and relocated to the West Zone, the government still needed to speed up the beautification process for the first of two mega-event milestones, when the World Cup unfolded in 2014. The pacification process did not deliver the hopes of beautification in time for the arrival of the World Cup and thus, the government choses another method of beautification through urban development. The government chose to build walls to screen off the tourists from the harsh reality of life during the occupation in some of Rio's favelas. Therefore, in 2014 as the World Cup commenced and the eyes of the world were looking at Rio de Janeiro, they only saw, what the administration wanted them to see e.g. the beach, the palms, the careless and playful *carioca* life. Curi et al. (2011) argue, "Public money is used to build safe and beautiful areas perfectly able to host the tournament. Only people with enough money or the correct invitation have access to these precincts. The TV pictures are produced exclusively from the inside of the stadiums and transmit images of a well developed First World country." (p. 145). Curi et al. call this constructed reality of Rio fortified enclaves, inside which the tourists and rich locals are free to relax and enjoy the show as thousands of guards, police and volunteers are keep the unknown and ugliness of Rio out. As we will look close at later in the analysis, the beautification of the main Olympic venue in Barra de Tijuca is becoming a fortified enclave, where the Olympic Transformation is causing elitism to grow. Here, we may draw a parallel to Lind's (1995) understanding of Brazilianisation, the removal of rich upper class into a life of exclusive privacy, away from the poorer part of the society. Lind also touches upon physical isolation as he says the upper class is "walled off from the spreading squalor beyond", a metaphorical distancing which has taken physical form in Rio. The neighbourhood of Dona Marta (also known as Santa Marta) has experienced social isolation and confinement by a concrete wall being built around the community.

In a 2010 Fault Lines-video report (note 25) on the dark side of hosting the Olympics, the crew visits the favela with the captain of the Dona Marta-UPP, who says "*in other countries walls have been built to symbolize division, or separation, but here it is not the case, it is only for environmental protection.*" (3:24-3:36). This statement holds no ground, as the findings of Curi et al. underlines that urban development of the city famously known for its natural beauty does not

protect but rather damages the heritage landscape. Furthermore, the aforementioned video report interviews Christopher Gaffney (section 5.2.1.), who argues that the walls are “*animalizing a class, it is criminalising poverty, and so by walling someone in, you are limiting their ability to move freely*” (3:40-3:53). He goes on to say that the pacification is a intersectional political (from the national actors such as former president Lula to the municipal mayor Paes of Rio) move to make a safe place for capital, which he calls “the Olympic Project” with beneficiaries such as the real estate speculator, private security forces, wealthy merchants by using urban planning to separate the classes of Rio and advance the profiting of the capital. The PPP of Rio is strongly linked to the policymaking and subsequently the media conduct through which the government influences the opinion of the public, validating the neo-liberalistic pro-marked actions of the PPP rather than development meeting the wider public needs.

6.2.2. Using PPP to create a city for elites

Faulhaber & Azevedo argue, “If there is no sense of crisis, it is difficult to forge an operational public-private consensus.” (Kindle Locations 450). They point to the strong connection between the property legislation of Rio and the urban development section prior to the Olympics – the event that naturally creates an urgency to develop the city.

“As well as the expropriations, investigations into the output of the Rio de Janeiro City Council between 2009 and 2012, found a noteworthy number of laws and decrees regarding greater urban flexibility and stimulus for public-private partnerships, both designed to offer favourable conditions for large-scale urban interventions, disregarding the impact on the people who live in this space.” (Kindle Locations 573-576)

The IOC turned down Rio’s first attempt for the 2012-Olympics, because the government wanted to use the rundown governmental island as venue for the Olympic Games, but when IOC were presented with the possibilities of lucrative Barra de Tijuca, Rio won the 2016-Olympic hosting. The Olympics allowed Mayor Paes to direct tens of billions of reais to the infrastructure of the neighbourhood besides better water pipelines, sewage lines and more power lines, which accelerated the prospects of Barra de Tijuca by 30 years, according to Carlos Carvalho, the heavyweight property tycoon of Rio and mastermind behind the development of Barra de Tijuca. “*The most difficult part of the development plan was the service infrastructure and the Olympics has brought that. It’s a billion-dollar jump,*” he states (note 26).

Thus, by using the urgency of the transformation needed prior to the Olympics, Mayor Paes was able to give the development business in Rio a jumpstart without losing political popularity. In return the success of his political efforts were guaranteed by endorsements of a handful of the most influential development companies in Rio, e.g. Carvalho Hosken (Olympic Park), Cyrela (Golf Course) and OAS (Porto Maravilha, Transolímpica and Transcarioca BRT corridors) (Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015). These companies want to reshape the image of Rio to bring in more wealth and business through increased tourism and a more lucrative real estate market, a vision they share with the municipal government.

Using the notion of legacy for Rio in comparison with other globally thriving mega-cities creates a sense of national pride and belonging among the upper and middle classes, the PPP obtains a wide public support. By attracting private investors and maintaining a strong PPP, the costs of the city's public spending when hosting the Olympics is estimated to being half of the enormous public funds used on the World Cup (note 27). Such an economic gain lies well with the wider public. Creating a "strategic plan [...] plays the same role of deregulating, privatising, fragmenting, and giving absolute dominance to the market. It reinforces the idea of an autonomous city, a city that needs to equip itself to compete with other cities for investments, becoming an "urban machine for income production." (Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015. Kindle Locations 271-273)

One investor in particular is a heavyweight in the strong PPP bond. The property tycoon of Barra de Tijuca Carlos Carvalho has been promised the right to buy and develop the Olympic City after the games, who wants to make it to the new heart of Rio. Carvalho started buying the land of now upscale Barra de Tijuca in 1973 and has since transformed the swamp and abandoned coffee plantation to the most lucrative and affluent neighbourhood in Rio as well as the rest of Brazil. This area does not have many favelas unlike the rest of Rio, and Carvalho is determined to keep it that way. He is planning to make this neighbourhood the home for elites, the New Rio, and he does not want to favelas close by. "[*The favela-dwellers*] are going to housing at their standard. *They have to go.*" (note 28) (My underlining to point at his public and outspoken dissociation towards the poor). He argues that the favelas have the periphery of the city to live in, and the rest of the city belongs to the elite. Carvalho's vision for Barra de Tijuca is enforcing mechanism of differentiating and can be interpreted as systematic apartheid, when he through PPP heavily

influences the policymaking in an area designed to keep a particular part of the society out – namely the poor, black favela-dwellers.

A concrete example of the powerful bond between the government and the property developers is the Olympic golf course, a sport which has returned to the Olympic games after 112 years hiatus. The golf course is being built on an area of environmental protection, which suspiciously also is an area in high demand on the real estate market. Activists are claiming that the government is using the Olympic as an excuse to reclaim the area and sell it off after the Games, as is the plan with the Olympic City. The developers stand to make an R\$1bn in property sales after the Games. Biologist Sonia Peixoto, working for a conservation unit under the municipal government, explains that the decision to build the golf course was expedited without proper consultation. *“There was no technical study, no public meetings, no democratic process,”* she states (note 29). As a consequence of allowing the golf course to be built, the government has waived building restrictions in the area, thus making it possible for another company to build luxury condominiums on the previously restricted area. The companies in charge of developing the golf course and the luxury condominiums have an openly lucrative partnership, and the latter contributed to R\$500,000 to Mayor Paes’ political party for his 2012-re-election, of which 75% went to the mayor’s campaign. The professor of environmental law at PUC-Rio University, Fernando Walcacer confirms the strong link between PPPs and mega-events such as the Olympics. *“Property developers have always had huge political influence in Rio. The developers have been looking at this space for years, and now the Olympics has given them their chance.”* (note 30)

According to the definition of a regular PPP, which ensures “delivery of public service and development of public infrastructure” and meeting “public needs” (section 5.2.3.), Rio does not meet such standards of urban development which benefits the entire public and its needs. Orlando Santos Jr, professor of urban planning at Rio’s federal university, argues that the city’s poorer areas such as the North Zone and Northwest Zone have seen few or no benefits from the Olympic Transformation. *“Concentrating the event in Barra da Tijuca legitimises public investment in infrastructure and mass transportation in the area,”* he said (note 31).

6.2.3. The Olympics and media conduct

Having examined the social and economic exclusion mechanisms of PPPs through urban planning in the Olympic Transformation, we will now look at how the municipal government is able to maintain a high level of public support through the use of agenda setting media conduct. Here, we will look at the direct and indirect use of biased media conduct and some examples of media conduct internationally and locally in Rio. We will look at the use of media to 1) create the feeling of insecurity and crisis, which in turn creates the need for and justifies the pacification of favelas and instalments of UPPs, and to 2) construct an image that favela-dwellers are getting what they deserve and are being adequately compensated.

The indirect media conduct happens through official statements on the subject of favela upgrading, eviction, demolition, the pacification process, UPPs and other related issues, as examined by Lacerda (2014). He argues, “The appeal to hegemonic moralizing discourses to address material class-based differences is a recurrent political strategy” and a part of discursive logic of exclusion (p. 75). The political discourse on misrepresentation of favelas is reproducing and abusing power. He points to importance in a deeper understanding of dynamics of favelas as they have become the focus of public programmes and development for the first time in 100 years. Such public programmes could provide a natural inclusion process of the informal city parts into the formal city, but instead the government is using them to create goodwill towards the dissections and actions of the government. By misrepresenting the dynamics and reality of favelas and their residents, the municipal government is able to shape the public consciousness on the understanding of favelas.

Examining an article in *O Globo* on the upgrading programme *Morar Carioca* (Living Carioca) in which the wording suggests how the municipal government understands its own role of urbanising the city by removing favelas to restore and provide order as a part of the social legacy of the Olympic Games. The Olympics is used as a cover and a means of justifying the actual message of the government – to justify removal of the unwanted, namely favelas. The favelas are generalised to areas and numbers, making them impersonal and inanimate. The actions of “eviction” become “moving off” and the association between favelas and risk areas is amplified throughout the text. The reader of the text is left believing that the government is fulfilling the responsibility of a removal process including adequate housing offered to all families “moved off”

their property. One sentence of the article (p. 82) reads: “If the strategy is to integrate communities (*morro*) with the roads (*asfalto*, meaning the rest of the city), we need [...]” In this quote from Mayor Paes, we see how he is indirectly underlining the social class division and placing the favela-dwellers opposite the “we” and the rest of the city. He uses the synecdoche *morro* commonly associated with the middle and upper class neighbourhoods.

Furthermore, Lecerda argues, this sentence allows the notion that favelas are illegitimate occupations, putting them in an outlaw position, thus justifying the correctional actions of the government. The overall analysis by Lecerda of compiled texts and interviews provides an understanding of the government as a dynamic and achieving agent opposite the favela-dwellers as being the cause of their own misery and poverty, which reinforces exclusion as a result. In conclusion, Lecerda states the hegemonic struggle in Rio is based on discourse to attain and maintain power. Therefore, we may understand public discourse on the subject of favelas to be a powerful tool in the hands of politicians and the political society of Rio, the elite, which in turn exercises power over the government as we see throughout the PPP in Rio.

6.2.3. *The image of favelas*

The following sections will explore three examples of active discourse production. In the paragraph above, we saw how the government uses of passive wording and simplifies favelas into numbers, statistics and inanimate entities through press releases or articles. This can be seen as a passive discourse production. The government is conveying a message and constructing an image of favelas in the subconscious mind of the reader. In the following examples show active wording and describing the favelas as communities full of people with both positive (example 1) and negative connotations (example 2). Example 3 is contains both. The government wants to actively create a negative or positive understanding of favelas in the conscious mind of the viewer/reader; therefore, the three examples can be seen as active discourse production. In all three examples, Mayor Paes and the municipal government are creating a particular image of favelas to order to convey a certain agenda, thus an agenda setting strategy. The first example is a TEDtalk, which Mayor Paes gave in 2012 to the international society on city development. The second example is a sample of the media coverage of the process of pacification, and the third example is a video

report where Mayor Paes proudly displays the model homes for Minha Casa Minha Vida for journalists and activists from the favelas.

6.2.3.1. *Example 1: favelas as a resource*

In a TEDtalk (Feb. 2012, note 32) Mayor Eduardo Paes presents his views on how to develop and manage a “city of the future”. He presents ideas on mobility and inclusion making a point of saying that *“favelas are not always a problem. I mean favelas can sometimes really be a solution – IF you deal with them, if you put public policy inside the favelas”*. Paes refers to policies as bringing basic services such as education, health and infrastructure into the favelas. Using a notion of unity in Rio with positive connotation, Paes proclaims that *“Rio has the aim to have all its favelas completely urbanised”*. By using the wording *“Rio has...”*, Paes assigns the city anthropomorphic qualities as an wilful actor and favelas becomes the object of transformation, a passive entity without identity, not the vibrant community and home of 20 % of the city’s citizens. A complete urbanisation of the favelas is surely a joined aim of the entire population of the city, but not in the way, which is happening now in Rio. In reality, the Rio Paes refers to is the determined municipal government with a strong PPP bond and wide public support of the middle and upper class, which Perlman (2010) confirms, saying the upper and middle class will ignore human rights abuse as long in exchange for personal safety.

When Mayor Paes states that *“favelas are not always a problem. I mean favelas can sometimes really be a solution...”*, he seems to extend an olive branch to those communities he and the government determinately have been demolishing. With this optimistic phrasing, Paes creates the notion that the government is willing to work towards social inclusion and to cooperate with the communities which he seconds earlier refers to as *“favelas or slum, what ever you call them”* thus giving the audience mental pictures that favelas really are slum. The willingness and proactive strategy Paes seems to suggest leaves the audience with an understanding of the municipal government’s will to include favelas into the formal society.

Many ambitious plans for urban development and upgrading of favelas were promised in 2009, such as *Morar Carioca* and MCMV. Yet, many such programmes have since been stopped half way through or cancelled entirely (note 33 and 34). Some communities have been waiting for upgrades on pavement, water lines, sewage, street lighting for 6 years. Instead of favelas becoming a resource for the city and socially included through urbanisation prior to the Olympics,

the Olympic Transformation is amplifying the social division and human rights abuse. Mass mobilisation of favela-dweller has brought numerous cases to light, which shows how the government has ignored their citizen rights, used violence and threat to evict people with less resistance.

Heavyweights such as UN, Amnesty International and WITNESS all report on forcible mass evictions through illicit behaviour of the government. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, Raquel Rolnik demanded in 2012 the government to “*stop planned evictions until dialogue and negotiation can be ensured*” (note 35), a demand unmet. Theresa Williamson, CEO of Rio-based NGO Catalytic Communities, reports that favela-dwellers are being threatened with a cut in their rightful compensation if they contact a lawyer or wait to accept the offer, which is a difficult choice for families who have struggled financially their whole lives and are not aware of their citizen rights (note 36). A MIT report (note 37) shows that 12.275 people across 24 communities have been directly displaced because of the two mega-events in Rio and have not received market rate compensation. Evidence points to the conclusion that the government does not believe favelas to be any type of solution to the future of Rio.

6.2.3.2. Example 2: favelas as the enemy

In the example below, we see how the mainstream media such as *O Globo* cooperates with the government to portray the pacification process as a necessity to benefit the wider population of the *asfalto*. This agenda setting strategy exemplifies the findings of Lecerda, who argues that the mainstream media creates a public consciousness in which favelas are “*a phenomenon detached from the rest of society*” (2014 : 74) and blaming the poor for their poverty. Thus, the media reinforces the notion that the pacification is for Rio, for us (the upper and middle class) and against them (the favela-dwellers).

When the para-military forces BOPE invaded and occupied the Complexo do Alemão in November of 2010, the event was nationally televised with war-like images focusing on open gunfights, roadblocks, shock troops storming houses and fleeing traffickers shot from police helicopters (Gaffney, 2012 : 75). As a follow up on the dramatical, and for many favela-dweller fatal, event, one of the biggest Brazilian news agencies, *O Globo*, ran a series on the pacification process called “The war for Rio” (my underlining). With televised violent war-like images of the

battles inside the city limits of Rio, where the BOPE emerges victoriously as heroes fighting for a fictional *greater good* and defeating the crime-ridden favela with the written articles on the event described as a “war”. In these scenarios, the favela-dwellers appear as an enemy and are fighting against Rio. These journalistic choices of focus follows the classical use of agenda setting strategy of the mainstream media, in which the media heavily influences the informal public opinion as well as the formal public discourse on the issue. As the media repeatedly run stories of violence so close to home, the public (not including the favela-dwellers) demands a governmental answer to restore peace. Thus, the circle which the government started, finishes and the end justifies the means as the government successfully has evicted and removed parts of or entire communities with a wide public support.

6.2.3.3. *Example 3: the favela-dwellers get what they deserve*

The third example is a video report (note 38) on public housing, in which we see the mayor and his right hand man as they proudly show a small scale model of the housing project as well as an actual size model home. There are many members of press and upscale businessmen watching, as cameras focus on the smiling mayor. In the background, we see a few activists and residents from Vila Autódromo, a favela under eviction and demolishing. One well-known favela activist, Altair Guimarães, interrupts the event. He calls out to the crowd: *“They call us invaders. It is not true. We are workers of this city, and we should have land rights. Governments elected every four years don’t have the right to decide my life, my history.”* Directly to Paes, he says *“I’ve tried many times with you to find an alternative that wouldn’t mean the removal of the community. What we want to discuss here is our history. Twice I’ve been removed from places I was living. Even though I’m 58, I have no rights in this city. I get very upset that you, with a mandate of eight years have the right to decide my story, my life.”* (6.20-6.42) The sound feed cuts off as the narrator explains the circumstances, but it is clear to see that Paes is trying to cut him off and get on with the programme at hand.

When the mayor is confronted with concrete examples of inadequate compensation for evicted individuals, he responds *“what we always do is try to negotiate [...] we’ve been negotiating this whole time. Obviously, sometimes, not good negotiation might happen. And every time I’m told, I’m aware of these situations, I always intervene”* (7.16-7.46). Such an answer seems to be full of consideration and respect for the process and affected individuals. However, the video

report immediately after show a scene, where Paes says to the crowd *“Let’s go [on with the programme] with much calm, much talk. Let them scream and we’ll go ahead”* (7:47-49), smiling and inviting the guests to see model of a decorated apartment, indirectly undermining the message and plea for equality and respect of the favela-dwelling activists from Vila Autódromo.

Next picture shows the mayor and his right hand man saying *“come here, woman, let her come”* and ushering a woman from a favela to stand in front of the camera and smile about the promised luxury of their new home. The mayor is eager to show the “beautiful home” to the media, as they snap pictures of him and favela-dwellers in the high quality model home, joking *“this one [the woman] wants to move in [the model home] tomorrow”* (08.03). The women from the favela ask *“will it really be like this”*, which the mayor with confidence confirms. However, when Altair with a lifetime in the building trade assesses the model home, he calls out the false promises of government, saying the reality will not be like this. *“This is all just for show. This flat is to dupe people, to bring them here to be dazzled. Check later, when it’s been built, whether all this is still here.”* (08.19-08.30) He is not fooled by the beautiful model home. His assessment is backed up by the finding of Faulhaber & Azevedo (2015) (section 4.3), where interviews of favela-dwellers, who moved into “beautiful homes” which the mayor proudly shows off in the video, reveals that a majority of the houses in Minha Casa Minha Vida are quickly built houses of poor quality and with several fundamental construction errors. Such errors are carelessly made in an effort to house some of the 68.000 evicted favela-dweller before the Olympic Games.

The video report also includes a statement from Catalytic Communities’ Theresa Williamson who argues that if Rio had not been chosen for the Olympics, there wouldn’t have been enough political clout for Rio to undergo such an eviction process. *“This can only happen because the Olympics creates a deadline and it forces a set of goals,”* she says. (11.40). Here we conclude the third and last example of agenda setting strategies of the government’s media conduct to construct a certain public image of favelas, the Olympic Transformation and the government’s role in the making of an Olympic legacy.

With a deeper top down understanding of how the government is using the Olympic Games to transform the city through urban planning and development, PPPs and media conduct, we will now look at the bottom up reaction of favela-dwellers to the Olympic Transformation.

6.3. Part two: bottom up Transformation

In this part of the analysis, we will be looking at how the favela-dwellers realise Holston's concept of *insurgent citizenship* as a reaction to increasing violence caused by the occupation and the systematic social exclusion of the government and the middle and upper class in Rio. We will be looking at the impact of the Olympic Transformation through occupation of favelas and the presence of UPP, the reaction through mass mobilisation and insurgent citizenship process through three levels: the personal level, the community level and the general level of favela-dwellers in Rio. We start with the personal experience of a favela-dweller and her accounts of living under the rules of the UPP to give an understanding of what it is like for favela-dwellers to be deprived of their freedom (section 6.3.1. and 6.3.2.). Then we move on to contextualise the favela-dwellers reaction to the occupation and lack of rights on the general level in Rio (section 6.3.3.) and we finish with a case study of Vila Autódromo (section 6.3.4) – a legal settlement, which lost its right due to the Olympics and is currently fighting the government to reclaim civil rights and recognition. The case study will also contextualise the agenda setting strategies of urban development, PPP and media conduct from a bottom up perspective.

6.3.1. Being occupied by your own government

One Sunday morning in the autumn of 2013, while people were waking up in the favela of Gamba community of the Lins complex in the North Zone, they heard the following message from loudspeakers in the street while hundreds of heavily armed members of the paramilitary troop BOPE swept through the narrow streets: "*People of Rio de Janeiro. As part of the ongoing pacification of our city, your community is being occupied. We rely on your co-operation to maintain stability. The new era begins now.*" (My underlining). The message coming through speakers of the impending occupation (BOPE's own words) by the heavily armed force, better known as the Death Squad in Brazil, seems like a leap in time to the beginning of the dictatorship era⁸. However, this has been the reality in 21st century concerning 264 territories⁹ in Rio, affecting the lives of more than 1.5 million favela-dwellers. A young favela-dweller from Cantagalo in the South Zone, narrates the

⁸ The dictatorship in Brazil lasted from 1964 – 1985.

⁹ Numbers taken from UPP's official website.

reality of favela-dwellers, which changed with the arrival of the UPP (track 2 on enclosed cd)¹⁰. In the following section, we look at her experiences of life in the favela before and after the occupation.

Before the occupation, the favela was a vibrant and united community. The residents lived life on their own terms with parties and celebrations of local traditions. The young woman recounts, *“I remember living in a place with so many things happening at the same time. Every weekend we used to have funk bailes without a time when it finished! It was a good thing for the adults. They had a lot of fun at that time.”* According to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every human being is entitled to have leisure time. In the favelas, most of the dwellers are hardworking people. According to Perlman (2010), the favela-dwellers are often being exploited to work more hours and without the same security of keeping their job, because they are being excluded from the formal job market. Favela-dwellers are much more likely to lose their job with no warning than people from outside a favela, e.g. like being late for work due to traffic jams or taking a sickness day. The favela-dwellers, who are not located in the South Zone often have a journey of several hours by public bus, which more than often is stuck in traffic in the mega-city, which can result in them being fired. Furthermore, the favela-dwellers experience exclusion based on their *pinta de passoa*¹¹ on the *asfalto*. Thus, the favela-dwellers need an outlet, when they are among their family and friends inside the community, e.g. funk bailes. With the arrival of the UPP, the favela-dwellers are always on guard and not able to relax inside their own community. Thus, favela-dwellers live in a constant state of unease.

The favelas have cohabited with the drug traffickers since the end of the dictatorship, which presents duality of the life in a favela. The residents do not approve of drugs and trafficking, but at the same time, they depend on the help of the gangs. For many poor families, drug trafficking is the solution for a stable income, when they experience exclusion from the education system or the formal job market. The stigma and criminalisation of poverty through media-induced frenzy excludes many favela-dwellers from the job market, according to Perlman. “No one wants to let favela residents into their home or shop or office – it’s *‘just too dangerous’*”. The cycle

¹⁰ This version of the narrative has been slightly corrected, grammatically and structurally, to secure a better understand when read. To see the original version in full, see the appendix.

¹¹ Pinta de passoa = Overall appearance

is self-reinforcing, since the fewer jobs there are, the stronger the temptation to enter the traffic.” (2010 : 185) Infamous drug lords become larger-than-life antiheroes in the eyes of favela youth. “Kids now prefer to enter the traffic because they earn more money than if they stay in school and then go out looking for work.” (p. 186). The traffickers was a part of life like a double-edged sword. They helped the community economically and socially, but they also damaged the residents physically and mentally.

“I think almost of all who were involved with traffic lived here. Anytime that someone needs help, they helped. Like buying medicine and food. They helped the favela be alive. If you had a problem, you would go look for them. If you need any kind of helping, they will help. Traffic was never a good thing. At the time, kids saw things that they were not supposed to see. It is the reality, we had.”

Among favela-scholars, there is an ongoing disagreement whether the traffickers and gangs provide a parallel state inside the communities, due to the lack of presence from the state. Burgos argues, “Today many favelas constitute territories privatized by parastatal groups [...]” (1998 : 44). Downey supports this view, “This traditional absence of the state led to the emergence of important local figures known as *donos* [strong men or drug lords].” (2003 : 52). Perlman (2010) and Freeman (2014) oppose these views, as they argue how the drug gangs never have provided real infrastructure such as roads, pipelines for power, light or water, street lighting, schools or health care. Both scholars concluding that the drug gang cannot act as a de facto state, rather, the gangs safeguard their own interests by maintaining the community only when beneficial to their own plans. With the presence of two power groups, the drug gangs and the UPP, the favela-dwellers do not know whom to turn to when in need. Both groups claim to bring security to the communities, but none of them seems to be present for maintain the rights of the favela-dwellers.

“When the UPP came we did not know what was happening. We did not know they will “live” here with us “forever”. We had deaths and blood on the ground. I do not like living with them here. I know they are supposed to control things here, but most of the time, they use their power to do bad things they abuse and use their power to do things they are not supposed to. Like breaking into people’s houses without any permission, saying horrible things to us, not letting us do the funk bailes we used to do, treat us like nothing, and also kill the innocents. They think they can do and say anything they want to. We don’t have voice next to them. Only they can speak. Living with UPP

is like living in a birdcage. They keep an eye on us even though we are not doing anything. They treat us like a dangerous animal.” (see appendix 8 for full unedited version)

The interviewee captures how the presence of the UPP works as a confinement equal to building walls around the favela. I draw a parallel to the Gaffney’s analysis (section 6.2.1.2) of building walls around favelas as a process of “*animalizing a class, it is criminalising poverty, and so by walling someone in [whether by wall construction or constant containment by the UPP], you are limiting their ability to move freely.*” With the Olympic Transformation, the government promised safety for the city’s residents, but for favela-dwellers it has brought fear and confinement. It is not because the favela-dwellers would prefer being controlled by the drug gang and organised criminals, but through the occupation, they live in a constant state of alert and uncertainty. The UPP treats the favela-dwellers with a lack of respect as equal human beings and citizens of the city, thus not achieving the cognitive recognition of the government in accordance with Honneth’s theory.

The favela-dwellers are not able to exercise their civil rights of freedom and leisure, as the UPP controls the frames of socialising in the community through daily patrolling and periodic curfews. The residents do not possess control over their own community. They are constantly watched and contained. They experience prejudice on the *asfalto*, e.g. they are being excluded from leisure time when police keep them away from the beaches like in aforementioned case in 2015 (section 6.2.1.1.), a governmental action which leads to deprivation of the self-appreciation through social interaction. When the residents do not feel free to interact with the surroundings, they retract themselves into their community, relaxing with funky bailes and no prejudice, which is no longer a possibility either. The powerlessness, lack of respect and uncertainty of being at the mercy of the UPP is loss of liberty, which the young woman captures in her metaphor of living in a birdcage.

6.3.2. Being caught in the crossfire

The presence of the UPP causes ongoing power struggles in the everyday life of favela-dwellers between the government, embodied by the UPP, and the drug gangs. Both parties fight with violence and intimidation, if not blatantly then in secret, and it is the favela-dwellers, who are caught in the middle. Hardworking, regular people, who for one reason or another live in a favela,

find themselves in the middle of warlike situations with open gunfights on the streets during the day, intimidations and interrogations from both sides. The lines of law and criminal are not easily drawn in these tight knitted communities. For the gangs and traffickers are not just criminals, they are sons, fathers, neighbours and part of the many different communities. Although they control the communities through violence, extortion and power plays, simultaneously they try to protect the communities and create a stable frame around the everyday life with the insider knowledge of the community, as we saw in the section above. Whereas the governmental system is a foreign body trying to control the areas with force and intimidation, they do also provide a range of social benefits and some levels of urban development to the communities.

Favela-scholars (such as Burgos 1998, Downdey 2003, Perlman 2010, Freeman 2014) continuously debate whether the gangs in favelas can be proclaimed an actual parallel govern, because complexity of the favelas, the social hierarchy and the social dynamics are not simple to decode. Perlman argues, “The notion that the traffic constitutes ‘a parallel power’ or ‘a parallel state’ that provides service to the community in lieu of government services is totally misguided.” (2010 : 187). The gangs themselves view their presence as a protection from the state. The current leader of the infamous drug gang Third Command believes he and the powerful network of the gang help favela-dwellers to stay safe from police, we learn from an excerpt in Luiz Eduardo Soares’ book “Rio de Janeiro: Extreme City” (note 39). When asked about why he does not flee for his own safety, the leader explains,

*“That’s what I should do, but I can’t. I’ve too many responsibilities here. The community needs me. I have a family, a mother, a small son, my buddies. If the cops came in here and just f***** us up, that’d be one thing, war is war. But coming in here and abusing the community is something else entirely, I can’t accept that. And that’s what they do. They’re cowards. They kill innocent people. They don’t care.”*

Rio de Janeiro has an alarmingly high number of police killings in favelas. According to Amnesty International (note 40), 8.466 have been killed in Rio during police interventions since 2004. Within the last two years, the killings have increased with 54 % making the police responsible for one in five killings in Rio and in the North Zone-favela Acari nine out of 10 killings. The prosecution of corrupt police, extrajudicial killings and contamination of evidence are very low. Prior to the Olympics, human Rights’ activists, local NGOs and international NGOs such as the Amnesty

International are documenting a surge in police killings during the spring and especially April this year, as the violence marked mega-city passes the 100-day mark for the opening of the Olympic Games. *“Despite the promised legacy of a safe city for hosting the Olympic Games, killings by the police have been steadily increasing over the past few years in Rio. Many have been severely injured by rubber bullets, stun grenades and even firearms used by police forces during protests,”* says Atila Roque, Executive Director of Amnesty International Brazil (note 41).

The surge in killings by the police is connected to the production of crisis by the municipal government. The killings of favela-dwellers have colloquially been proclaimed as a “cleaning up process”, enforced by the death-squad, BOPE, and the UPP, to heightened security for the Olympic guests and tourists, which the government excuses as a necessity to enforce before the deadline of the Olympic Games. Furthermore, these extreme measures of heightening the security level benefits the local population as well, according to the municipal government. However, the promise of legacy, which is inextricably linked with the need for security, is only benefitting certain parts of the society, thus the global/local frictional logic (Burity 2008). The municipal government prioritises the safety of Olympic tourism, international and local capital (cf. Gaffney section 5.2.1.) rather than the wellbeing of the entire population, leading to human rights abuse, violence and killings, through the presence of the UPP.

The Brazilianisation is thus in function, as the elite withdraws into gated communities (Perlman 2010) with the assistance of the municipal government in the Barra de Tijuca neighbourhood, which now possesses some of the best infrastructure on the local and national level, owing to the crisis and legacy of hosting the Olympic Games. As a result of the Brazilianisation, the favela-dwellers are as exposed and vulnerable as ever, if not more now the police and drug gang are in constant war. The legacy of the Olympic Games is not accessible for favela-dwellers. Robert Muggah, head of research at a Rio-based security think tank, the Igarapé Institute, explains how the level of safety in Rio during the Olympics is closely linked to place of residence and colour.

“If you are young, unemployed male and black, and if you come from a low-income area or a favela, the Olympics are going to be very bad news for you. If you are white, middle class or wealthy, and you’re a foreigner, you’re probably going to be as safe as you are in a Northeastern city in the United States.” (note 42)

Rio will deploy 80.000 security personnel and circa 30.000 members of the army and reserves to insure the safety of the tourists, media and athletes as they travel through the newly constructed corridors between the Games venues and the airport and hotels. As a result, the UPP is extracted from favelas at the expense of the favela-dwellers and their personal security. While the eyes of Rio and the rest of the world are fixed on the fortified Olympic enclave in all its splendour, the drug gangs are very likely to be focusing on the abandoned favela territories.

The safety duality in Rio de Janeiro based on colour and the global/local frictional logic based on social class are explained by Atila Roque as “[...] *a tale of two cities. On the one hand, the glitz and glamour designed to impress the world and on the other, a city marked by repressive police interventions that are decimating a significant part of a generation of young, black and poor men.*” (note 43) This socio-political phenomena of two cities, the formal and the informal, where only one is visible to the global society is conceptualised by Curi et al. (2011) as global profiling in BRIC countries through the means of positive image and legacy production in connection with mega-events, as “the BRIC-way of organizing mega-events.” (2011 : 140).

6.3.3. The beginning of change through mass mobilisation

In addition to the surge in killings of favela-dwellers, 38.000 persons from the favelas have disappeared in connection to the war on drugs and heightening of safety in Rio since the announcement of the World Cup and the Olympics in 2008/2009. The families of missing persons are too afraid to speak out, because if they do, they might be the ones missing tomorrow, says the Dan Jackson the director of a new documentary, “In the Shadow of the Hill” (note 44) on the human costs of “cleaning up” in the favelas. He lived in the largest favela of Rio, Rochina, among traffickers, criminals and ordinary people, who just want to live a peaceful life, but are caught in the middle. However, one case of a missing person in 2013 ignited the will to fight among favela-dwellers and a mobilisation began – a national fight for rights and a process of insurgency began. To understand why this mobilisation happened so quickly, we need to contextualise the overall public mentality of Brazilians in 2013.

During the 2013 preparation for the World Cup in Brazil, a national mobilisation of infuriated Brazilians rose up, protesting against the rule of the different levels of government –

the national, regional and municipal governments – in what the mainstream media called Brazilian Spring in mainstream media. What started as a discontentment of a R\$ 0,30 raise of the public transportation tickets, ended up as mass demonstration against political corruption, police brutality, government spending on mega-events, poor infrastructure, health and education levels, and discrimination against gender, sexuality and race. More than 100 cities experienced demonstrations and millions of people took to the streets (note 45 and 46) from April to July, but the main days of protesting happened between June and July.

On the 14th of July, a favela-dweller named Amarildo de Souza was taken by the police for questioning during a period of reinforcing the control of favelas by the name “Armed Peace”. He never returned home, and the family took immediate action. For the first time, since the 2009-beginning of occupations, increased violence and deaths, favela-dwellers rose up in action, demanding answers and justice. Within a couple of days the family, friends and neighbours of de Souza mobilised and stopped traffic on the main street of Rocinha, demanding the attention of the UPP, the government, the community, and the media. The story was widely broadcasted two days after his disappearance. It became a headline story locally, nationally and internationally, as the number of discontented favela-dwellers joined in the fight increased, sending a message to the government. The mobilisation went viral on social media under the slogan “Onde está Amarildo” (Where is Amarildo). The Brazilian Spring had provided the people with an effective tool, and demonstrators were able to force the government to take action in the disappearance of Amarildo and persecution of the police officers involved. Later demonstrations gathered more than 600 people in Rio (note 47) while 300 protested in São Paulo, changing the fundament of the demonstrations from a local dispute to a national issue – civil rights for the favela-dwellers. In reaction to the issue, internationally famous author of “City of God” Paulo Lins added, *“The police are always like this. It’s one of the forces that kills most in the world, according to statistics, including those from the UN. This man who disappeared in Rocinha is only one among many.”* (note 48)

The mobilisation and uprising, initiated by de Souza’s family, has been a turning point for the socially excluded and marginalised favela-dwellers. Since the instalment of the UPP, the governmental body has ignored police actions of brutality, misconduct, physically or psychologically threats and killings. Nevertheless, through the actions of de Souza’s family and

later friends and network in Rochina, favela-dwellers elsewhere have found the courage to stand up for justice and demand their rights. In a recent interview¹² (note 49), de Souza's niece explains the impact of de Souza's disappearance and the subsequent uprising, a decision with fundamental consequences, which earned the family recognition and a medal. *"The struggle is not in vain, I mean maybe we didn't deserve a medal, maybe, because we didn't achieve everything, we wanted to achieve, but we didn't remain silent. We cried out. And this helped to raise awareness for lots of other people [...] this gave them the courage to say something [...] this is our way of saying basta – enough!"* (17.02-18.00)

2014, 2015 and 2016 have also seen national mass mobilisation among the Brazilian population, but whereas the 2014 demonstrations were directly aimed at the social implications of the World Cup, the uprising of the last two years have been about the political frenzy with corruption in all parts of the Brazilian politics, not about the human rights' abuses of the Olympics. The mobilisation of favela-dwellers, in turn, has been growing ever since the first major uprising in 2013. It is not only about personal safety (the violence of the UPP) but also housing rights (mass evictions and demolition). There have been organisations such as Plataforma Dhesca (note 50), RioOnWatch (note 51), Observatório de Favelas, Pastoral Commission for Favelas who have helped the favela-dwellers to understand their housing rights and put them in contact with the Public Defender's Office since 2009. However, it is evident that the biggest changes take form when favela-dwellers are the prime force in knowledge sharing and increasing the information level. It is the power of gatekeepers and the trust amongst favela-dwellers internally that will make a change, as communities all over the city are fighting against the same bureaucratic machine.

6.3.4. A case study of Vila Autódromo

We will now turn to a case study of the efforts of one unique favela, which is adjacent with the Olympic city in the West Zone, which displays the fight for citizenship on a micro level. Within the last nine months, as I have been following this case through the community's own Facebook uploads, Rio-based NGOs and the broader outlet on social media, many changes has happened to Vila Autódromo. The story of Vila Autódromo is the story of a legal settlement whose rights were

¹² the radio programme The Current at CBC Radio

ignored by the government, and they fought to reclaim their rights. It is a story of inspiration to all evicted and eviction-threatened favela-dwellers, but also a story that still does not have an end.

The eviction process started in 2011 and community has been through many legal and social ups and downs, as illustrated through a timeline (note 51) of the development by Rio-based NGO, RioOnWatch. The a detailed timeline provides us with a better understanding of the prolonged demolition of the community and the fight through which the residents reclaim of their civil rights for adequate housing according to the universal human rights. Questionable court rulings in favour of the government and policy making in favour of the PPP cause systematic exclusion from civil legal rights. There have been numerous promises and deceits from the government since 2009, which makes it is difficult to predict if the battle between community and the government has finish, or whether the government will break their latest promise of preservation of the remaining community during the next three months before, during and after the Olympic Games.

6.3.4.1. The history of Vila Autódromo

The area in which Autódromo is situated was an empty plain far away from Rio and a lagoon where fishermen came to fish in the 1960ies and 70ies. The settlement started in the 1980, when Steliano Francisco dos Santos, known as “Seu Pernambuco” set up the very first shack. Seu Pernambuco divided the vast, empty plain into plot and accepted every family that wanted to settle down in this lush area with a lagoon and rich wild life. For 34 years, he lived there and saw how the community blossomed around him, from a few families to a more than 600 families. Vila Autódromo is a unique community, partly because it is well organised and have a decent level of infrastructure paid for and maintained by the residents themselves, and partly because it is a legal settlement unlike the vast majority of favelas in and around Rio.

Before the demolition of the community, Vila Autódromo had 11 wide streets with street names and hand painted signs. The well-constructed houses look like part of a middleclass neighbourhood. The community is socially well organised and have design and participated in several urbanisation project. In 2013, the community won an award the Jorge Careli Human Rights Medal by the employees’ union of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation in 2013. The community also received US \$ 60,000 for the best popular urbanisation project, through the Urban Age Award, by

the Deutsche Bank and the London School of Economics. During the work, the community has been working in partnership with the urban planning institute at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and the Fluminense Federal University (Faulhaber & Azevedo 2015). Nevertheless, initiatives for urban development, participation in the surroundings and international recognition did not prevent the municipal government from working towards a total removal before the Olympics. Even the legality of the specific settlement has not stopped the government. In the 90ies, the community received regal rights to land of their settlement lasting for 99 years, from the Housing and Land Secretariat. Resident and activist Jane Nascimento says *“It is all ownership here. People won ownership and they have the right to have everything legalised and urbanised, because they have title. We have won the right to be here.”* (Kindle Locations 1518-1519).

However, less than a decade later the area was declared an area of special interest and the government once again began the harassment and threats. The Olympics have not been the sole goal for demolishing of Vila Autódromo, because it is a desirable area for the biggest construction companies in Rio.

“When Cesar Maia was mayor [1993], Eduardo Paes [the current mayor] came personally on the tractor to demolish the community. The residents lay on the road, with women and children, to stop the machines. In spite of the legend that says he swore to remove Vila Autódromo by any means necessary, I do not believe that it is a matter of personal vanity, although he is extremely vain. The issue here is the interest of three big construction companies [Carvalho Hosken, Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht]”, the president of the residents’ association Altair Guimarães believes. (Kindle Locations 1483-1486).

The first threats of removal happened six months after the original settlement of Seu Pernambuco, as the police came to destroy the one shack on the empty land (then) far away from the city. He resisted and have resisted ever since. *“Housing is not about the four walls, but about history, community ties, the sense of identity that each one of us feels in relation to the place where we live. We will resist until the end.”* (Kindle Locations 1538-1539). Altair Guimarães says that greed is the sole reason for demolishing the community, as the community is adjacent to the Olympic City and the most affluent neighbourhood of Rio, Barra de Tijuca. *“They want to put in pedalos, build a cycle path, make it look nice for the residential developments. And for that they*

want to remove more than 500 families, their identity, their sociability.” (Kindle Locations 1497-1499).

The on-going conflict has two storylines. There is the official one, where the Mayor assures the public and critics of the legality of the process through dialogue. “*The slogan is negotiate, negotiate, negotiate,*” (Vale and Gray 2013) as Mayor Paes promises that only the ones who want to go, will go. A phrase which the residents have painted on wall to remind the Mayor of his own word, as they are daily live in the shadow of the other side of the story imbued with physical threats and psychologic terror. The area has often been the object of interest of the government and the threats have never been far apart. However, the threats have amplified since the announcement of the Olympics and they are far worse than ever before. During the last two years, the government has used physical threats and psychological terror to break the community. Individual, economic offers have been made, and it has created mistrust and strife in the community. Power lines and water pipes have been cut. The government has sent armed police forces and even stock troop (note 52) to the historically famous non-violent favela with no connection to drug gangs or organised crime. Rubber bullets and percussion grenades have wounded residents in clashes with troops (note 54).

The government have systematically broken down the majority of the community. Even though most families wanted to stay during the first round of eviction threats after the 2009-announcement of the Olympic hosting, the majority of the community has chosen to leave, mainly because of fear, leaving around 20 families to fight for the rights of the land. Even those, who resisted for a long time, gave in eventually. Seu Pernambuco said in the interview in 2015, “*I have resisted all of this for the last 34 years. It will not be now, with so many people alongside me, that I will give up.*” (Kindle Locations 1561-1562). Five months later the government finally pressured him out of his home, causing his death a week later, according to neighbours and family.

6.3.4.2. *Displacement Decathlon*

Vale and Gray (2013) argue that mega-events magnify the differences of uneven societies, and the Olympics acts as the most powerful catalyst. They conceptualise *Displacement Decathlon* as the fight between a group of citizens and the state over the rights to land, in which the power of the

state often trumps the will of the people, which was the case prior to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Vale and Gray compare Vila Autódromo to the Techwood case with mass eviction of Afro-Americans, who lived close to 1996-Olympics venue and suffered the loss of their homes because the demands of surrounding business, a strong PPP and political favouritism of the profits of the Olympics rather than the civil rights of the residents.

However, the outcome of the conflict between the municipal government in Rio and Vila Autódromo is not yet settled, but unlike the community of Techwood, Vila Autódromo has been both proactive and mobilised within the community as well as involving a wide circle of actors, such as Rio-based NGOs and favela-dwellers from other parts of Rio. The community of Vila Autódromo chose to be proactive through willingness to cooperation. The community, which already has proven to be creative in urban planning, worked with the two biggest universities of Rio to compile a proposal in which the community was incorporated in the development plan of the Olympic City in 2011. In this way, the community showed willingness to cooperate and negotiate the alteration of their legal property.

The government responded by published the plan with a total demolition of the community. The residents were forced to read their fate in the popular newspaper *O Globo* before any officials had given notification or opened a dialogue with the community as a whole. The director of the activist network Catalytic Communities, Theresa Williamson reveal to us how media conduct continually is being used by the government as tool to psychologically pacify the favela-dwellers long before the actual demolition process begins.

“Several times now we have seen the City’s plans announced to the community through the local newspaper, when they are in fact not yet finalized, given the legal process is still very much open, in order to pressure residents into thinking certain things are inevitable or already determined, or that their neighbors have consented, and to stop resisting.” (Vale & Gray 2013)

The agenda setting strategies of the government, here an example of media conduct, should be understood as a power play aimed at subordination through fear and uncertainty. One resident phrased it as follows, *“The administration proceeds in a way intended to mistreat those who resist. They play with our nerves, with our psyche.”* (Kindle Locations 1639-1640). The government has been using methods of confusing and retraction of promises in the guise of their actual plans for

the community. Since 2009, the government has change the official reason behind the evictions numerous times. In 2013, the government agreed to the permanence of the community. The architect firm behind the Olympic City believed that a majority of Vila Autódromo could be spared and even integrated successfully, which the head-architect stated is *“the right thing to do”* (Vale & Gray 2013).

Despite the official promises, governmental personal kept pressuring the residents to move to the housing project, while the community experiences cuts in water and power lines, no collection of rubbish causing an increase of vermin or other methods of psychological pressure. Two recent examples of using confusing to keep the activist at a distance illustrates the tactics of the government. A power play unfolded on the 8th of March this year, as the press, activists and the residents of Vila Autódromo were invited to a press conference to discuss the development plans for the remaining families of Vila Autódromo (note 55). However, the venue and time of the meeting were changed three times within the span of a few hours and none of the activists or the residents were able to make it to the meeting and participate in the outcome of their immediate future. On the same day, a key actor in the fight and Vila Autódromo resident, Maria da Penha, went to receive a prize for her persistence in the fight against eviction, while shock troops, who early that morning had occupied the community and forcefully subdued the remaining residents and activists, executed the demolish of Penha’s house. This tactic is called symbolic demolition, and reinforces a notion of symbolically subjugation of powerful actors, such as Maria de Penha or Altair Guimarães, whose house was illegally demolished (note 56).

6.3.4.3. *The battle of the rich and the poor for a piece of land*

Looking at the context to PPPs and urban development of the land of Vila Autódromo, there is a clear pattern of cooperation, which has been en route much longer than the plans for the Olympic Transformation. Vale and Clay state that this is not uncommon. In the case of the Olympic Games in Atlanta, the CEO of Atlanta Housing Authority, Renée Lewis Glove assured the residents in question *“Redevelopment is not being done because the Olympics [are] coming. It is facilitated because the Olympics are coming.”* However, to the surrounding society, she stated,

“These things are fortuitous, or sometimes you can say they are God-ordained, or however you want to put it, but with Olympic dormitories being right across the street [from Techwood], it “wasn’t no

prettyin' it up"; you couldn't have painted it enough or locked it down enough. It was just right there. All of the world's TV cameras were going to be there. You couldn't help but ask, "Well I know we're here at the Olympics but what the heck is all that over there?" So something had to be done." (Vale & Gray 2013)

The city administration used the mega-event to beautify a run-down area and start a gentrification in the process. Vale and Gray argue "almost always such aggressive displacement reveals the powerful undercurrents that have been influencing the growth politics of the host city for decades." Residents of Vila Autódromo are not blinded by the promises of legacy or urban upgrading. One resident states "*the mayor is using our lives, our homes, as a way to pay back the loans from the big construction companies that financed his campaign. But it's our lives, our homes*" (note 57). Another resident says "*It's strange that we are being forced out of our homes in the name of public works, yet this is a private investment.*" (note 58)

As we examined earlier in context of PPPs (section 6.2.2.), much evidence points to the same process in Rio as the one in Atlanta. There is a strong bond between the government and the development companies, who are responsible for the majority of construction in the Olympic Transformation. This bond is profitable for the higher social classes of the population, and it has triggered a gentrification of favelas and beautification of the city as a whole. The development company behind the majority of constructions for the Olympics, Carvalho Hosken, has openly stated that he is planning to develop the South Zone as a city for elites after the Olympics. He has named the Olympic City *Ilha Pura* (the Pure Island), and the buildings will be fit for kings, according to Carvalho. He has not be hesitant when saying that the residents of Vila Autódromo is not welcome in his transformation of the city, the New Rio for national and international elites. "*We think that if the standards [of the buildings in Ilha Pura] were lowered, we would be taking away from what the city – the new city – could represent on the global scene as a city of the elite, of good taste. Ilha Pura could not scratch this destiny that has been given to the region. For this reason, it needed to be noble housing, not housing for the poor." (My underlining) (note 59). As I have pointed out in the earlier section on PPPs and Carvalho, he openly dissociate himself from the poor favela-dwellers, who in his view do not belong on the "Pure Island".*

The conduct and statements of Carvalho proves how Brazilianisation is present in Rio in 2016. That is, the shaping and designing a part of Rio solely for elites, so they can feel safe from

the criminals and the poor. The upper and middle class will ignore human rights' abuses, as long as the government keep them safe, Perlman (2010) argues and calls it "gated communities". Barra de Tijuca is naturally encircled by hills, which function as protective, natural gates, for the rich to hide behind, turning a blind eye to the injustices and human rights' violations of the Olympic Transformation.

6.3.4.4. *Who is the winner in the end?*

On the 13th of April this year, 2016, an official announcement (note 60) from the municipal government's offices was made after the conclusion of a nerve-wracking trial for the residents of Vila Autódromo. The ruling of the trial favoured the remaining 25 families, the only remaining residents of a once vibrant community of over 600 families. The government has realised that the majority of their eviction goals, and the residents have suffered physically and psychologically. However, the government is now responsible for upgrading the remains of the community and building new houses for the few families, who persisted while "*living in a war zone,*" (note 61) with the physical threats and psychological terror, stock troops, no power or clean water – all of the government's methods to kick them out of their homes for the enforcement of the Olympic Transformation.

The victory seems small compared to the costs of the community of Vila Autódromo, but the victory has a greater meaning for the social dynamics of Rio de Janeiro with a historically crucial impact. The victory marks the first legally binding outcome of insurgent citizenship among favela-dwellers in Rio. "*This is a victory not only for those who remain in Vila Autódromo but all those in the same situation [...] With the agreement being made official and the mayor's office assuming responsibility for building the houses, other communities will perceive that where there is resistance, there will be a response,*" stated the legal aid lawyer João Helvecio de Carvalho (note 62) after the trial.

Beyond the 2016 Games in Rio, this victory could mark a turning point in the Olympic DNA as well, according to Theresa Williamson from Catalytic Communities.

"[This] will be an example to communities anywhere the Olympics travels in future. The community's main mantra is 'not everything has a price', and that refers to residents who were

unwilling to negotiate with the city, even when the city began divvying up public housing, giving multiple apartments to one family as payment, and offering millionaire compensations in some cases. This community's assets cannot be bought or sold: they are made up of the people who live there, their stories and struggles – and the community fabric and structure that resulted from that," she says. (note 64)

The way forward, according to Vila Autódromo resident and activist Sandra Maria, is not to hide the reality of poverty, but rather to work towards a bridging of the social classes and heighten the equality, when preparing for a mega-event. In her words *"Poverty exists here and everyone knows it. If you don't want to show poverty to the world, end poverty!"* (note 65)

Insurgent citizenship has become apparent in Rio de Janeiro as a reaction to the Brazilianisation through the Olympic Transformation. We remember Holston's analysis of the Brazilian society, where some citizens have rights and some do not. "On the basis of social distinctions not inherent to the definition of national membership, the state discriminated citizens into different categories of unequal rights, privileges, immunities, and powers," according to Holston (2004 : 64). That is, the Olympic Transformation has revealed the elitism, which has been present since the fall of the dictatorship, but now has surfaced, as identified by Schøllhammer (interview 2016). These actions by the government with the elite watching over it, has triggered a reaction from the favela-dweller, who in turn have mobilised and continue to do so, as we saw in the case of Vila Autódromo.

6.4. Summary of analysis

In the analysis, I have presented and analysed the course of processes utilised in the preparation of the 2016-Olympics in Rio de Janeiro from 2009 until present day, which I call the Olympic Transformation. These processes have affected all social classes as well as political and economic conditions of the society of 2016-reality in Rio. The conditions of Rio have taken shape through tangible step such as the pacification, instalment of the UPP, urban development of the locations connected to the Games and tourist hot spots, and social programmes like *Morar Carioca* and MCMV. A Brazilianisation has become obvious in the society. The social segregation and economic inequality are increasing caused by the Olympic Transformation. The most affluent neighbourhoods in Brazil has advanced 30 years of development through private development

companies because of the close relationship with the public sector in just a few years. The ruling class of Rio has a power over the government, as the latter is dependent on the economical endorsement, which the present government with Mayor Paes at the helm used in 2009 and 2012 to political campaigns.

The primary development companies behind the Olympic venues and the transportation to and from the airport and main areas for hotels are a part of the elite in Rio, who have endorsed the mayor in his last two terms in office. The PPP in Rio is very strong and much evidence point to this as being the reason for the growing segregation in connection to the Olympic Games. Besides the PPP, urban planning and development as part of the Olympic Transformation is dictated by the deadline of August 2016. This deadline has enabled the municipal government to manufacture a series of “public needs” such as better transportation (the rapid bus lanes and metro lines), develop common public spaces (Porta Maravilha, Parque Carioca) and upgrade of public security (the war on crime and drugs, UPP and the pacification). Especially the area Barra de Tijuca has benefitted by these “public needs”. To maintain a wide public support in the Olympic Transformation the government needed to create a crisis and amplify the insecurity of the *asfalto* cariocas, which historically has existed between the formal (*asfalto*) and the informal (*morro*) residents. For this purpose, the government uses agenda setting strategies through media conduct, which reproduces fears and prejudice from the society. Section 6.2.3. illustrated different strategies the government uses to set the agenda in formal and informal discourse, e.g. the featured articles on the pacification process in O Globo, which described the occupation of the favelas as “War for Rio”. On different occasions, the mayor has presented the eviction of more than 67.000 since 2009 as a successful process through negotiation, when in fact there have been clear signs of systematic social and legal exclusion and abuse of human rights. Racial maps of Rio show a whitening process and how the black and brown parts of the population have been relocated to the periphery, while the white elite is enjoying the most affluent and well-developed parts of Rio. As a response, the favela-dwellers have mobilised and are demanding access to civil right, such as the case study of Vila Autódromo.

7. Discussion

Having analysed the social, economic and political dynamics of Rio and implications of the Olympic Transformation prior to the mega-event, I will now discuss the future of the transformed Rio to give a perspective of the success of the Olympic Transformation. In recommendation of future studies, I will present my assessment of the fundamental socio-political mechanism of the Olympic Games and how the humanistic principals of Olympism hold significant properties, which can be implicated as a global political tool in a social equalisation.

7.1. Rio after the Olympic Games

We begin in the new reality of Rio de Janeiro. The political hopes, dreams and promises of the Olympic Legacy were grand. The federal politicians dreamed of become a shooting start on the global political scene by cementing a global image of a developed economy, and the municipal government of Rio dreamed of reshaping the legacy of the city, which had been in decay since the fall of the dictatorship. By committing to PPPs resulting in an economic relief of public funds, the politician synergy aimed for economic surplus and rebranding of Brazil, partly using the 1984-model¹³ (note 66) of Olympic economy generation. The reality of the Olympic Legacy is proving to be far from the dream, according to Karl Erik Schøllhammer (Interview 2016, track 1). Many building and facilities will become a dilapidated scenery like the many, deserted World Cup facilities, e.g. the expensive and lavish \$ 233 million football stadium in Manaus, which has been degraded to a parking space for locals (note 67). The misjudgement in production of the World Cup Legacy and spending of public funds have become a national mark of shame throughout the Brazilian nation, to such an extent that the current Sport Minister felt compelled in promising that unlike the World Cup "*the Olympics will leave a [positive] legacy.*" (note 67). However, Schøllhammer emphasises the Greek tragedy, which is in due course. Once again, the major construction for a mega-event are destined to abandonment and will put a strain on the local economy of Rio despite strong PPPs, as it happened in Olympic Games in Greece of 2004 alongside

¹³ In 1984, the Olympic Games were hosted by Los Angeles in the United States, where the main organisers of the mega-event utilised existing infrastructure and bringing in major cooperate sponsors to share the expenses, rather than building a complete set of new venues on public funds. This has generally been considered a healthy profit model throughout the 80s and 90s, but recent Olympics have proven this model inadequate. In the case of Brazil, the model is not fully being implemented as the host has chosen to build all new infrastructure.

political turmoil, increase of unemployment and public shame that persist even today, 12 years later (note 69). Schøllhammer identifies these features as being sub-components of the Olympic economy (Track 1 in enclosed cd : 04.41-12.29), if the goals of hosting the Olympic Games remain the same, using the 1984-model of economic growth.

In Rio, the only fulfilment of the Olympic Legacy for the public is the upgrading of public transportation thus improving severe congestion, according to Schøllhammer. The rest of the city's legacy in the form of social programmes and urban upgrading outside of Barra de Tijuca and other upscale neighbourhoods are not likely to be realised¹⁴. Thus, the city is missing out on the benefits of the Olympic opportunity exemplified in the 2012-London Olympics, where a large rundown area was successfully upgraded through sustainable goals beyond the two weeks of sport events. Rio might have been able to do the same with the rundown governmental island, which was the basis of Rio's previous bid, but the IOC was not interested. Thus, the IOC is partly responsible for the deselection of urban upgrading in an underdeveloped area, compared to the affluent Barra de Tijuca. Schøllhammer concludes that there is not real Olympic Legacy for the majority of Rio's population. On the contrary, the population of Rio will be facing a surge in unemployment rate and further distortion of the social imbalance with no evident benefits of urban development for the poorest of Rio. Schøllhammer estimates a staggering 60.000 people will be without job after the Games in city with an increasingly high unemployment rates (note 70).

The process of the Olympic Transformation add up to a distorted society, where the rich have become richer and will continue to do so once the Olympic Games have passed, as the Olympic venues will be sold off. They also possess a strong influence on the political landscape and the policymaking. Simultaneously, the poor and vulnerable in Rio de Janeiro have been evicted, displaced or become homeless, facing mass unemployment and cancellations of social programmes.

Can we conclude that the Olympic Transformation has been purely bad news for the favela-dwellers? Is there no Olympic Legacy for them? On the contrary, the Olympic Transformation has brought about a fundamental social and political change, as analysed in section 6.3.3. and 6.3.4. During the Transformation the favela-dwellers created a change in the social fabric of Rio, when

¹⁴ E.g. Morar Carioca, Minha Bolsa and other social programmes aimed at the favelas and poor parts of the population

they mobilised and started fighting back. The case study of Vila Autódromo exemplifies how the underdog can fight and accomplish change despite of the losses and violence the community has endured. Furthermore, the residents of this one favela have inspired favela-dwellers all over Rio and beyond the city borders. A new era has begun – unlike the terrifying announcement from BOPE and subsequent pacification, the favela-dwellers are now revolting against the pacification and taking charge of their destiny as citizens by demand civil rights.

According to German philosopher Carl Schmitt, a true democracy consists of the coherent division of roles in a group of legally recognised citizens of a constituted democratic state – the ruler (or ruling group) opposite the ruled group. If the two groups stop agreeing on the practice of the rule, it leads to annulment of democracy. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy describes the process as follows, “If [...] those who live together as legally recognized citizens of a constituted democratic state do not share a political identity in Schmitt's sense, the identity of the rulers with all the ruled will no longer obtain, and the constituted democratic state will no longer be truly democratic. The rule of the majority will degenerate into an illegitimate form of indirect rule of one social faction over another” (note 71). In sum, when the ruled group does not possess the same political identity as the rulers, the ruling functions as a dictatorship. The mobilisation of the favela-dwellers points to a process of annulment of democracy. During the dictatorship of Brazil, the favela-dwellers did not have civil rights, because they were not officially acknowledged by the rule. The favela-dwellers co-existed with the rest of the society in a separate world (Perlman 2010). When the democracy was established, the favelas gained civil rights officially, which in practice works differently than the rest of the citizens of Rio and exacerbated throughout the Olympic Transformation. However, the favela-dwellers may end up emerging in victory in the post-Olympic Rio. Unlike the government seem to face debt and the end of political clout, the favela-dwellers are at the beginning of change. The next few years may be the turning point in current form of social segregation in Rio de Janeiro and presumably in Brazil.

7.2. The potential of future Olympism

When Brazil won the bid for hosting in 2009, an underlying construct became apparent – the notion that the Olympic Games is in dire need of a reform. Many European and North American cities were considering to bid, however due to high costs, low public support and security demands all candidate withdrew. The Olympic Games are no longer perceived as a beneficial

economic generator, according to economic scholars and business publishing. *"There is very little evidence to suggest hosting the Olympics provides much of an economic benefit,"* (note 72) said Victor Matheson, professor of economics at College of the Holy Cross. Stefan Szymanski, professor of sports management at the University of Michigan concurs, *"Olympics is and should be a great sporting event, but it is not and should not be considered a major economic event."* (note 73) Forbes writes, *"Without real reform, the Olympics will die a broken, pathetic, and forgotten death."* (note 74)

The mega-event, arguably still the most powerful mega-event of the world, has become means of improving global image. With 16 editions in Europe, 6 in North America and 2 in Australia out of 27 editions since 1896 (appendix 2), the Western countries have until now been heavily in control of the development and political agenda behind of the Olympic Games. Brazil's former president Lula identified the shift, when Brazil won their bid for hosting, *"It is time to address this imbalance. The opportunity is now to extend the Games to a new continent. It's an opportunity for an Olympics in a tropical country for the first time, to feel the warmth of our people, the exuberance of our culture and the sensation of our joy."* (note 75) Changes of global political and economic powers have introduced new players such as China, South Korea and Japan besides Brazil, who seem to have recognised a golden opportunity as each country is hosting the Olympic Games of the next 6 years, cf. PyeongChang (2018), Tokyo (2020), Beijing (2022). The shift of hosts also reflects the shift in the fabric of Olympism, changing to main value of the mega-event from local economic generation to global image improvement. *"Beijing did it as an advertisement. They got tremendous value, because they didn't care about the cost. It was like buying a ton of television ads,"* (note 76) said Mark Rosentraub, professor of sports management at the University of Michigan. The former heavyweight western countries seem to be on hiatus for now, while the new players use the mega-event to brand their nations. We may ask ourselves, if branding thus the future of the Olympic Games, what are we to expect of the promises of the Olympic Charter and Olympism?

Kidd (2010) underlines that the image of IOC, Olympism and ultimately the Olympic Games, is increasingly damaged, every time the committee shy away from political issues. When the IOC in August 2015 were choosing the host of the 2022-Olympics, they had to choose between two human rights nightmares, Almaty in Kazakhstan or Beijing, as described in a 2015-Guardian

article (note 77). In either case, Olympism and the image of ICO stand to lose, says the article. When Beijing won the Olympic Games of 2008, then-president Jacques Rogge believe in the humanistic improvements that the Games would bring to the Chinese people, *"It is clear that the staging of the Olympic Games will do a lot for the improvement of human rights and social relations in China."* (note 78). This statement proved to be profoundly wrong, as human rights-NGOs monitored and documented extensive human rights abuse and worsening of the freedom of press. Human Rights Watch argue that the Olympic Games was a catalyst for abuse and set back the clock in China regarding democracy, equality and freedom. The aforementioned article from the Guardian appeal to the IOC to take a socially responsible stand and reform the Olympics. Their suggestion is to implement a time-out rather than proceed towards an Olympics with such extensive social risks. Despite all criticism and warnings of what social catastrophe another Olympics in China may bring, the IOC chose to award Beijing with their second Olympic Games, the 2022 winter Olympics, once again shying away from taking a political stand.

A time-out might be efficient in a short term perspective, yet if the global society wishes to enjoy and partake in such a unique, global unity as the Olympic Games offer, the long term solution seems to be a reform to interlink the humanistic foundation of Olympism and the practise of the Olympic hosting. I believe such a reform can be accomplished through socio-political and socio-economic policymaking. If the western countries are truly on hiatus, they will return to the scene, which may be already in 2024¹⁵ with the current majority of bids being European. In this case, such a reform would be natural, since branding and global image are not the desired outcome of the enormous cost of hosting among the Western countries. We find the sub-components for a fundamental reform of the Olympics in Lula's statement when winning the bid, *"It is time to address this imbalance [...] It's an opportunity for an Olympics [...] for the first time, to feel the warmth of our people, the exuberance of our culture and the sensation of our joy."* The current of global conditions towards humanitarian sustainability¹⁶ and climate adaptation¹⁷ demands action and reformed Olympism could provide such a socio-political launch pad for the

¹⁵ The selection of the 2024-host will be finalised in 2017

¹⁶ Such as the "Agenda 2030" – a set of sustainable development goals to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity. <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>

¹⁷ There is much to discuss on the topic of climate adaption and the Olympic platform, but the focus in the discussion is on the prospects of a social change when prioritising the population rather than the economy.

changes. These changes could be applied through transparent and directional politicising of sports, which Van Rheenen (2014) utilises in his analysis of the humanistic opportunity in Olympism.

Using the 2014-Sochi Olympics as basis to describe the process of local insurgency among the LGBT community to a global mobilisation, he identifies the platform of the Olympic Games to be a powerful socio-political tool, as the mega-event contains measures of the equalising of social differences in the hosting nation by placing the people and climate in centre rather than economy. Van Rheenen emphasises that the host nation needs to be willing to take up the fight to reach sustainability, but the main components are already present. Furthermore, he believes there is grounds for “a shared convergence of human rights ideals between host country, the United Nations and the IOC,” (2014 : 135) as he relays UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s statement the 2014-Olympic Opening Ceremony, *“The Olympic spirit prevails. Fair play. Mutual respect. Friendly competition. Let us take that spirit and spread it around the world. For peace – and a truce between warring parties around the world. For human rights and an end to discrimination. For a life of dignity for all.”* (2014 : 135) In conclusion, if the IOC is willing to politicise the sport by implementing socio-economic minimum requirement of the budget and in the execution of an Olympic Transformation of the hosting nation as well as post-Olympic goals for the social strengthening, not only would the Olympic Games reclaim its importance in the global world, it would also have sustainable long term conditions to continue existing.

7.3. The future for post-Olympic Rio

Returning to the Brazilian context, we can contextualise the importance of such a social reform to the post-Olympic Rio de Janeiro and the favela-dwellers. With the documented changes of the social fabric of Rio through the mobilisation, we may assume that Rio is at a cross road with social tension building and favela-dwellers mobilising. With the neo-liberalistic current and strong bonds between the private and public section, Rio is not likely to change its attitude towards the favela-dwellers prior to or during the Olympics. However, a political shift is en route. Mayor Paes is ending his two terms in office after the Olympic Games, and the looming unemployment bobble, which Schøllhammer estimates to be 60.000 workers, may force the government to evaluate their political line and work towards Mayor Paes’ assessment, when he proclaimed in his 2012-Tedtalk, *“Favelas can be the solution”*. ”

Perlman (2005) writes on the “*Myth of marginality*” in Rio between the favela-dwellers and the formal city, where she finds that the favela-dwellers are “not separate from, or on the margin of the system, but are tightly bound into it in a severely radically asymmetrical form.” (2005: 8) The favela-dwellers contribute with hard work and loyalty, but are exploited and kept from benefitting from the goods and the services of the system. Perlman argues that the ruling class want to exclude the favela-dwellers socially from the formal city, but the formal city does not function without the presence of the labour force, which the favela-dwellers provide. The present dynamics of the labour force and the labour market might be on the verge of a reform as a consequence of the mobilisation and insurgency fight for rights in Rio, as presented in the analysis. The favela-dwellers can become a benefit to the city, socially and economically, if the government choose to prioritise the human value and work towards inclusion of the vast amount of quasi-citizens.

Remembering the quote of Vila Autódromo resident and activist Sandra Maria, as she appeals to the municipal government to prioritise the human value and potential of Rio instead of discarding it, when she says, “*Poverty exists here and everyone knows it. If you don’t want to show poverty to the world, end poverty!*” (note 79). By utilising the socio-political tool of through politicisation of sports and the humanistic platform of Olympism, vulnerable and social segregation grouping could become a sustainable Olympic Legacy in future host nations.

Once again, we return to Lula’s quote of the possibilities of the Olympic Legacy, “*Rio will deliver an unforgettable Games. [...] It will not be just Brazil’s Games but South America’s. It will serve to inspire the 180 million young people on the continent.*” (note 80). Here, Lula promises that the Games in Brazil will inspire 180 million young people, and we may ask to which young people he is making a promise. Lula is painting a picture of a society in developing country that want to grow and enter the political level of the Western countries. He talks of inspiration, youth, balance, creativity. The Games in Rio will no doubt be unforgettable, but depending on the view point it may be a once in a lifetime experience of exciting adventure among the *cariocas* with tropical beaches and sports events, or it might be the end of a life time in a close community because of mass evictions and demolition. The youth, Lula wants Brazil to inspire through the unfolding of the Olympic Games should include all the young people regardless of class or colour, if the Brazilian society should “redress the balance” and enter the level of the Western countries, but most likely

Lula means the balance of international politics and not social equality. In the last section, we briefly look at the potential of social inclusion as the Olympic Legacy.

Involving volunteers and engaging the youth in the host nation before and during the Games are fundamental building blocks in Olympism, but the IOC does not embrace the opportunities or the platform, which the Games create. There have been example of social initiative by the host nation, e.g. language classes for the volunteer tourist guides of Rio. However, with an involvement of the IOC and the UN through policymaking of the economic distribution in the Olympic budget, improvements of the socio-political and socio-economical levels could become a reality. With funds directed at such programmes, the volunteers could engage the youth politically through social activities. The Olympic volunteers could provide teaching of social components, e.g. civil and legal rights or concert skills for the youth to enter the formal job market alongside sport training. A socio-political synergy of the IOC and the UN could also implement policies of social involvement of the athletes prior to the Olympics. We see such an example with New Zealand's team, which has chosen to encourage and stimulate the youth in poor areas such as favelas by devote time to socialise and exercise sport with youth prior to the Games of 2016 (note 81). Implementing social programmes through sport and education by the involvement of the international teams and Olympic volunteers might bring about the fundamental social change in the host nation, which Olympism presently lacks and realise the true power of sport in this globalised world, as identified by Mandela, *"Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than government in breaking down [...] barriers."* (note 82)

8. Conclusion

I set out to answer the following question: What are the implications of hosting the 2016 Olympic Games on the social and political landscape of Rio de Janeiro? In my discussion, I approached which lessons can be learned from the example of Rio. I will sum up in four points below:

8.1. The Olympic Transformation:

We explored the transformation of Rio de Janeiro prior the Olympic Games through three agenda setting methods, namely urban development, media conduct and Public-Private Partnerships.

These three tools have enabled the elite in partnership with the municipal state of Rio to advance

the lives of the elite by heightened security, through the pacification of favelas and the UPP- instalment and providing the affluent South Zone, in particular Barra de Tijuca, with some of the best infrastructure in Brazil. Signs of apartheid have emerged through the Olympic Transformation as the poor black parts of the population are relocated in the periphery in large numbers, whereas the white elite is living in gated communities, enabled by a Brazilianisation process. The lasted political events of May 2016 and the impeachment of President Dilma may cause a worsening of the social distortion for already vulnerable people. The media conduct of the government have at the same time enabled the government to maintain a wide public support of pacifying the favelas, by constructing a fear based on stereotypical image-making and negative discourse construction. Thus, the image of the government is of a proactive sustainable force in the eyes of the *asfalto*, whereas the favela-dwellers are living in constant fear and systematically being excluded from citizen rights.

8.2. Insurgent citizenship for favela-dwellers:

However, the Olympic Transformation has also paved the way for the favela-dwellers to rise up and mobilised, thus fighting for their rights. Mass mobilisation in form of protests in 2013 took to the streets, when the family and friends of a missing person would not subdue to the police violence and killing anymore. The efforts on one family spread and ignited resistance all over Rio as well as across Brazil and other countries. We studied the case of Vila Autódromo, which showed the fight for citizenship and recognition for housing rights through persistent resistance. The favela community has suffered huge loses, but has also won a historical victory, which may become the first of many legal victories over the municipal government.

8.3. The Olympic Legacy:

We explored the political hopes and dreams in connection to winning the Olympic Games, which promised legacy to the entire population through the Olympic Transformation through urban development. The political dreams of the federal government was to establish Brazil as growing economic power and international partner to the Euro-American political institution, whereas the municipal government was dreaming of building a safe haven for capital and improving the image of the city. However, the prospects of fulfilling these dreams seem to crumble away. The economic spending on the World Cup in 2014 is a national shame, which has caused a deficit in the Brazilian economy, eroding the image of a global player, which Brazil desired. The

unemployment rate is high nationally, and in Rio it might hit dangerous heights after the Olympic Games, as the city will lay off all the construction workers of the Olympic Transformation. The future of the security in form of the pacification and the UPP in Rio is uncertain, thus the goals of the municipal government may not be met either.

8.4. The tool of Olympism and the Olympic future:

Lastly, we examined the tool of Olympism through a politicisation of sports, which could change the future of the Olympic Games. If the IOC is willing to enter into a political partnership with the nation hosts and maybe even the UN, the Olympic Games could become a catalyst for social equality and climate adaptation rather than a catalyst for human right abuses. Policy-making by the IOC could promote social programmes for the benefit for the local population in the host nation prior, during and after the Olympic Games.

9. Notes

The list of all the web sites used through this thesis.

All sites were accessed between 01.02.2016 - 31.05.2016:

Note 1: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/world/americas/no-charges-against-rio-police-in-fatal-shooting-of-10-year-old-boy.html>

Note 2: Tedtalk of Mayor Paes
https://www.ted.com/talks/eduardo_paes_the_4_commandments_of_cities?language=pt#t-447717

Note 3: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/slum>

Note 4: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/favela>

Note 5: *Best and Worst International Reporting on Rio's Favelas: 2015*,
<http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=26032>

Note 6: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/leeigel/2015/12/13/rio-2016-plans-show-olympics-are-becoming-an-expensive-farce/>

Note 7: <http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2007/m=10/news=brazil-confirmed-2014-hosts-625695.html>

Note 8: http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/olympic_games/8282518.stm

Note 9: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/03/guns-drugs-teen-gangsters-rio-favela-police>

Note 10: "Brazilian Institute of Architects Calls for Protection of the Favelas"
<http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14840>

Note 11: <http://www.upprj.com/>

Note 12: "Vila Autódromo Residents Describe Psychological Terror as City Emits Demolition Orders" <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=27279>

Note 13: World Report 2015: Qatar <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/qatar>

Note 14: The 2022 World Cup is being built on forced labour, according to the campaign group, with many workers paid half of what they were promised before beginning their employment:
<http://www.goal.com/en/news/745/fifa/2016/03/31/21753942/amnesty-qatar-human-rights-abuses-a-stain-on-world-football>

Note 15: China: Olympics Harm Key Human Rights <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/06/china-olympics-harm-key-human-rights>

Note 16: Beijing and Almaty contest Winter Olympics in human rights nightmare
<https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/jul/30/china-kazakhstan-winter-olympics-2022>

Note 17: Rio Behind on Olympic Promise to Plant 24 Million Trees
<http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=13625>

Note 18: www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/olympic_games/8282518.stm

Note 19: “How Nelson Mandela used sport to transform South Africa's image”
<http://www.bbc.com/sport/25262862>

Note 20: [http://sportchangeslife.com/newsstory/A Tribute to Nelson Mandela](http://sportchangeslife.com/newsstory/A_Tribute_to_Nelson_Mandela)

Note 21: <http://www.globalpost.com/article/6678753/2015/10/30/brazil-rio-racial-maps>

Note 22: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/outrage-over-rio-de-janeiro-polices-symbolic-apartheid-10478273.html>

Note 23: <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/12/477761956/brazils-president-impeached-by-senate-and-is-suspended-from-office>

Note 24: <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Brazil-Coup-Government-to-Make-Drastic-Cuts-to-Housing-Program-20160529-0008.html>

Note 25: Rio's Favela Wars Part 2 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4KdXSiKxks>

Note 26: <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/aug/04/rio-olympic-games-2016-property-developer-carlos-carvalho-barra>

Note 27: *ibid.*

Note 28: *ibid.*

Note 29: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/25/rio-2016-occupy-takes-swing-at-olympic-golf-course>

Note 30: *Ibid.*

Note 31: *Ibid.*

Note 32: Tedtalk of Mayor Paes
https://www.ted.com/talks/eduardo_paes_the_4_commandments_of_cities?language=pt#t-447717

Note 33: <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=28808>

Note 34: <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=28023>

Note 35: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/11/brazil-forced-evictions-must-not-mar-rio-olympics/>

Note 36: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QBdCFyKs1k>

Note 37: Mayor Announces Eminent Domain in Vila Autódromo as MIT Report Criticizes City Policy
<http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=20983>

Note 38: 100 Days Until The World Cup: How Is Rio Transforming?
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QBdCFyKs1k>

Note 39: Meeting Brazil's public enemy number one, the violent gang 'owner' of a Rio de Janeiro favela
<https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/world/meeting-violent-gang-owner-favela/>

Note 40: Brazil police 'killed hundreds' in Rio - Amnesty <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33757212>

Note 41: BRAZIL: SURGE IN KILLINGS BY POLICE SPARKS FEAR IN FAVELAS AHEAD OF RIO OLYMPICS
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/brazil-surge-in-killings-by-police-sparks-fear-in-favelas-ahead-of-rio-olympics/>

Note 42: Rio Olympics Crime Risk: 'If You're A White, Wealthy Foreigner, You're Safe' Despite Brazil's Murderous Reputation
<http://www.ibtimes.com/rio-olympics-crime-risk-if-youre-white-wealthy-foreigner-youre-safe-despite-brazils-2368360>

Note 43: Brazil: 'Trigger happy' military police kill hundreds as Rio prepares for Olympic countdown
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/brazil-trigger-happy-military-police-kill-hundreds-as-rio-prepares-for-olympic-countdown/>

Note 44: Documentary exposes human cost of cleaning up Brazil's favelas before Olympics
<http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-april-29-2016-1.3558646/documentary-exposes-human-cost-of-cleaning-up-brazil-s-favelas-before-olympics-1.3558699>

Note 45: Brazil erupts in protest: more than a million on the streets
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/brazil-police-crowds-rio-protest>

Note 46: The Mass Protests in Brazil in June-July 2013 <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-mass-protests-in-brazil-in-june-july-2013/5342736>

Note 47: Brazil youths protest in Rio, Sao Paulo over missing citizen
<http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1293786/brazil-youths-protest-rio-sao-paulo-over-missing-citizen>

Note 48: Where's Amarildo? How the disappearance of a construction worker taken from his home by police has sparked protests in Brazil

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/where-s-amarildo-how-the-disappearance-of-a-construction-worker-taken-from-his-home-by-police-has-8745464.html>

Note 49: Documentary exposes human cost of cleaning up Brazil's favelas before Olympics

<http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-april-29-2016-1.3558646/documentary-exposes-human-cost-of-cleaning-up-brazil-s-favelas-before-olympics-1.3558699>

Note 50: Voices of the Mission - Morro da Providência (English version)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QocXg5q32m8>

Note 51: Forced Removals in Pavão Pavãozinho https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqueXdp_xc

Note 52: http://www.rioonwatch.org/?page_id=28610

Note 53: "What Can We Do Against Armed Troops?" Illegal Demolitions in Vila Autódromo

<http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=26839>

Note 54: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/forced-evictions-vila-autodromo-rio-olympics-protests>

Note 55: <https://riorealblog.com/2016/03/09/mayor-at-last-presents-urban-upgrade-plan-for-vila-autodromo/>

Note 56: <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=27420;%20>

Note 57: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/forced-evictions-vila-autodromo-rio-olympics-protests>

Note 58: *ibid.*

Note 59: The Rio property developer hoping for a \$1bn Olympic legacy of his own

<https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/aug/04/rio-olympic-games-2016-property-developer-carlos-carvalho-barra>

Note 60: Rio: prefeitura e Defensoria Pública firmam acordo para urbanizar Vila Autódromo

<http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2016-04/rio-prefeitura-e-defensoria-publica-firmam-acordo-para-urbanizar-vila>

Note 61: Change beckons for Vila Autódromo, the favela that got in the Rio Olympics' way

<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/26/rio-de-janeiro-favela-change-vila-autodromo-favela-olympics>

Note 62: *ibid.*

Note 63: *ibid.*

Note 64: *ibid.*

Note 65: SOS Vila Autódromo: Neighborhood Association and Home of Heloisa Helena Demolished Today <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=27075>

Note 66: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/leeigel/2015/12/13/rio-2016-plans-show-olympics-are-becoming-an-expensive-farce/2/#19ad0e82191a>

Note 67: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/05/11/405955547/brazils-world-cup-legacy-includes-550m-stadium-turned-parking-lot>

Note 68: *ibid.*

Note 69: <http://www.news.com.au/sport/more-sports/athens-olympic-site-in-ruins-10-years-on-from-2004-games/news-story/be7db5728f668c45b6048477be116445>

Note 70: <http://www.latinone.com/articles/27795/20151125/brazil-economy-unemployment-rate-rises-to-8-9-percent.htm>

Note 71: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schmitt/#TheDemConThe>

Note 72: <http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/30/news/economy/olympics-cost/>

Note 73: *ibid.*

Note 74: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/leeigel/2015/12/13/rio-2016-plans-show-olympics-are-becoming-an-expensive-farce/3/#279845617a26>

Note 75: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-idUSTRE58S1H820091003>

Note 76: <http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/30/news/economy/olympics-cost/>

Note 77: Beijing and Almaty contest Winter Olympics in human rights nightmare <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/jul/30/china-kazakhstan-winter-olympics-2022>

Note 78: *ibid.*

Note 79: SOS Vila Autódromo: Neighborhood Association and Home of Heloisa Helena Demolished Today <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=27075>

Note 80: www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/olympic_games/8282518.stm

Note 81: <http://www.newshub.co.nz/sport/rio-olympic-organisers-keep-fingers-crossed-2016031917#axzz49nXTFoOX>

Note 82: "How Nelson Mandela used sport to transform South Africa's image"
<http://www.bbc.com/sport/25262862>

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