

Table of Content

Introduction.....	3
Problem formulation	7
Theoretical Framework	8
Critical Discourse Analysis	8
The Political Discourse.....	10
Cold War Mentality	11
Cold War Mentality in General.....	12
‘Western’- and ‘American’ Cold War Mentality	15
The Notion of Mentality	17
Methodology	19
Philosophy of Science	19
Ontological Approach	20
Epistemological Approach	21
Methodological Approach	21
Research Design and Strategy	22
Relationship between Theory and Data	23
Data Collection	23
Limitations	25
Analysis	26
Part One: The Reagan-Administration (1981-1986).....	26
President Ronald Reagan, November 18, 1981.....	26
President Ronald Reagan, March 8, 1983	28
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, June 15, 1983	30
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, November 28, 1984.....	31
Part Two: The Obama-Administration (2015-2016).....	32
President Barack Obama, October 2, 2015	32
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, November 7, 2015.....	34
Secretary of State John Kerry, October 15, 2015	36
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, February 2, 2016	38

Secretary of State John Kerry, February 13, 2016.....	39
President Barack Obama, April 25, 2016.....	40
Reflection	43
Conclusion	45
Bibliography	48

Introduction

“Though there were soon signs that its specific quarrels might die down and disaster be avoided, the rhetoric and mythology of Cold War went rolling on, embittering attitudes long after they ceased to reflect reality”

(Roberts, 2000, p. 451)

The Second World War caused dramatic change to the international political system, from being a multipolar system to a bipolar one with two superpowers, respectively the United States of America (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (Soviet Union). The two fought together in the Second World War against Hitler's Germany, but it was not long after the victory that tension between the two superpowers arose and their relationship cooled. The world was in a new type of war – a so called 'cold' war (Heywood, 2011, p. 38).

The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had global impact – directly and indirectly. Besides the two superpowers, several other actors were to various extent involved in the war. The world was split into two blocs – the East with the Soviet Union as the key figure and the West with the US as key figure (Baylis et al., 2011, p. 57). The Cold War was characterized by the rivalry, mutual distrust, antagonism and enmity between the US and the Soviet Union. It has been portrayed as a contest between competing systems – that of the US or 'the West' and that of the Soviet Union or 'the East'. The nature of this contest was both psychological and material, because it involved intangibles, such as attitudes, images, beliefs and public opinions, and tangibles such as spheres of influence, geography, markets and military alliances (Medhurst et al., 1997, p. 19). Many of the battles of the Cold War was fought with words and not weapons. In fact, the two superpowers never had any direct military confrontation during the Cold War, which is why the war is a 'cold war', though at times the antagonism between the US and Soviet Union were so intense that had the circumstances allowed, it could have led to direct military confrontation. At times, the tensions between the two superpowers were so intense that it almost pushed to the brink of nuclear warfare. The rhetoric between the US and Soviet Union was both a prelude and substitute for armed conflict (Medhurst et al., 1997, p. 11; Heywood, 2011, pp. 38-41).

The importance of the Cold War were not only paramount to international political environment of the second half of the 20th century, but its legacy still appears to linger and may even still affect current international political affairs. Despite the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the mentality of the Cold War have apparently not completely vanished from today's political landscape (Heywood, 2011, pp. 38-44). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-communist Russian Federation (Russia) underwent many internal changes and the relationship to the US had to be defined. After

the end of the Cold War, many attempts at improving the relationship between the US and Russia have been made, but results have been small and they have never really succeeded in building any lasting bridges between the two (Baylis et al., 2011, pp. 72-73).

Though Russia is not the Soviet Union, that different ideologies are not the cause of a conflict between the US and Russia, and that bipolarity is over, the Cold War legacy still haunts the bilateral relationship between the US and Russia. Some recent causes for conflict of interests between the US and Russia have been the Ukrainian crisis and the growing threat Russia pose to Europe, the Syrian conflict, Russia granting political asylum to American whistleblower Edward Snowden, and Russian warplanes' flying close to American military units and also flights close to borders of Russian neighbors, just to mention a few. This recent growing of tensions between the US and Russia and the more frequent appearances of conflicts of interests have led to the debate on, whether the world is at the brink- or even the beginning of a New Cold War (Sanchez et al., 2016). Especially the Ukrainian crisis have been a major factor in this discussion of a New Cold War and it is in relation to this particular event that the talk of so-called 'Cold War mentality' resurfaced (People's Daily Online, 2014).

The Cold War illustrates the significance of rhetoric and communication between governments, and how communication (or lack here of) can lead to tension, disputes and eventually conflict - and not just a conflict between two nations, but potentially have global impact. As mentioned, many of the battles of the Cold War were fought with words instead of weapons and there appears to be similar tendencies now. The recently increased tensions between the US and Russia appear to have manifested rhetorically in the communications of the two nations. And as we have seen with the Cold War, the communication between governments is important and can have great impact on the turn of events. This is also, why both Russia and the US have been called upon to change the hostile tone in communication and why this is a concern (Hunter, n.d.). Because of the geopolitical impact of both the US and Russia, due to their size and international influence, the bilateral relation between the two matters not only the two nations in question, but also for the rest of the world, since there is not a global issue that is not affected by this bilateral relationship (Charap, n.d.). Therefore, this thesis will take a closer look to this supposedly lingering Cold War mentality, but solely focus on the American side of the US-Russia relationship by investigating, whether there are similarities between communication by the current American government and communication by the American government during the Cold War. To explore this alleged currently existing 'American Cold War mentality', this thesis will investigate the following research question:

How does the current American government portray Russia in communication specifically regarding the Syrian conflict and the growing threat Russia pose to European security, in

comparison to how the Soviet Union was portrayed in communication by the American government during the period 1981 to 1986 of the Cold War?

By 'communication' is here meant information transmitted or conveyed either verbal or written, such as speeches, remarks, interviews, statements etc. The communication will be political i.e. it will have an agenda.

Communication from the Cold War will have expressions of Cold War mentality, so by comparing communication from the Cold War to communication by the current American government and exploring how respectively the Soviet Union and Russia is portrayed, it can be determined if there are any resemblance in rhetoric, use of words etc. If there is a strong resemblance in how the two American governments portray respectively the Soviet Union and Russia, it could be a strong indicator of possible expressions of Cold War mentality towards Russia by the current American government. If there is not any significant resemblance between how Russia and the Soviet Union are portrayed, there is admittedly reason to question if the current American government is expressing Cold War mentality towards Russia. Though, should this be the case, one should not simply dismiss the existence of Cold War mentality, since this research as mentioned only investigate one side of the US-Russian bilateral relation. This research can therefore not determine whether the Russian government is expressing Cold War mentality towards the US, nor can it determine if other American entities besides the government is expressing Cold War mentality. Therefore, there could still be American expressions of Cold War mentality, but it is interesting to investigate the American government specifically, because it represents the US and the American people in international affairs. The reason for choosing the period 1981-1986 of the Cold War for the comparison will be addressed in the data collection section of the methodology chapter.

In order to investigate, whether the current American government is expressing Cold War mentality through its communication, one would need to understand what Cold War mentality exactly is. Since there exists no broadly accepted academic definition of the concept, it is necessary to determine what 'Cold War mentality' means to this thesis. Therefore, this thesis will also address the following sub-research question:

How can the concept of Cold War mentality be understood from the literature and articles addressing this concept?

The findings from the analysis of the communication by the American government during 1981 to 1986 can be helpful in verifying the reached understanding of the concept of Cold War mentality, because Cold War mentality can be manifested in- and expressed through communication both written and oral. Therefore,

the communication by the American government during the Cold War will have expression of Cold War mentality.

This thesis is inspired by the research 'Cold War Mentality: The US and the Ukrainian Crisis' (2015) by Jensen & Suta, which investigated, whether the American government expressed Cold War mentality towards the Russian government in communication related specifically to the Ukrainian Crisis. The Jensen & Suta research is a qualitative case study, where in total six pieces of communication by President Barack Obama, Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry are analyzed (pp. 9-11). The research found that there were grounds to believe that the American government to some extent expresses Cold War mentality towards the Russian government through communication related to the Ukrainian crisis (Jensen & Suta, 2015, pp. 43-44). However, the Jensen & Suta research cannot answer, whether the expression of Cold War mentality by the American government towards Russia is consistent throughout current American foreign policy, or if the case of the Ukrainian crisis is a singular incident. The Jensen & Suta research therefore inspired to investigate whether this expression of Cold War mentality towards Russia also can be detected in communication by the American government on other US-Russian conflicts of interest.

Though this thesis is inspired by the Jensen & Suta (2015) research, the research questions, problem formulation and the approach to answering the problem formulation differs, since this thesis is a comparative study and - as mentioned - will have a broader focus of US foreign policy than solely the Ukrainian crisis. The chosen approach of this thesis will be further elaborated in the methodology chapter below.

As mentioned, because of the geopolitical impact of both the US and Russia, the bilateral relation between the two matters not only for the two nations in question, but also for the rest of the world, since there is not a global issue that is not affected by this bilateral relationship (Charap, n.d.). It is due to both the US' and Russia's geopolitical impact that studying the bilateral relation between the two is of relevance and interest academically. Moreover, because of the history between the two, their bilateral relationship is intriguing, especially with the increasing tension between the two with regards to recent events. Though there has been a lot of research on the Cold War, the mentions of a New Cold War is recent and ongoing, so academic research on this topic is yet limited, but will presumably increase in the years to come as future events unfold. As for Cold War mentality specifically, the awareness of the concept has expanded with the Ukrainian crisis and the respectively American and Russian reaction to this. Though the concept of Cold War mentality previously have briefly been mentioned in some academic literature, there have been limited research on Cold War mentality specifically and not much research placing it in a current context. Nevertheless, as well as with the topic of a New Cold War, there is expected to be made further research on the concept of Cold War mentality. This thesis will therefore be an addition to the so far limited

recent research on Cold War mentality, expand on- and presumably verify the findings of the Jensen & Suta (2015) research.

Problem formulation

The recently increased tensions between the US and Russia has raised debate on whether the world is at the brink- or even beginning of a New Cold War, and the US have been accused of having 'Cold War mentality'. Based on the findings of the research questions stated above, this thesis will seek to answer the following problem formulation:

Does the current American government express Cold War mentality towards Russia through communication regarding US-Russian conflicts of interest, such as the Syrian conflict and the growing threat Russia pose to European security?

Theoretical Framework

This section will present the theoretical framework used in this thesis. In addition, the theoretical concept of this thesis, namely 'Cold War mentality' will be explained.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Before Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is explained, the term 'discourse' must be addressed. There are various definitions of 'discourse'. Discourse refers in its most general usage "to any form of 'language in use' or naturally occurring language" (Baker & Ellece, 2011, p. 30). Jorgensen and Phillips further elaborates that a discourse "does not just contribute to the shaping and reshaping of social structures but also reflects them" (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61). Therefore, social realities are produced and made real through discourse.

Just as there are several definitions of the term 'discourse', there are various conceptualizations of 'discourse analysis'. Discourse analysis is - simplistically put - the analysis of discourse. Discourse analysis provides various approaches with different theories and methods, which is why it can be applied to many different research areas (Baker & Ellece, 2011, p. 32). Even though, discourse analysis can be applied to many different research areas, it cannot "be used solely as a method of analysis detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations" (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 3-4). However different the various approaches to discourse analysis are, they all stress the importance of examining naturally occurring 'texts'. A 'text' includes every act of communication – it is not limited solely to written communication.

CDA is an approach to discourse analysis that focuses on why and how linguistic features are produced instead of describing and detailing them. Furthermore, CDA typically deals with unequal encounters, which is interaction, where one participant has a position of authority towards other participant. Examples of such encounters are news and also political speeches and interviews, which will be examined in this thesis (Fairclough et.al., 2011, pp. 357-373).

CDA provides "theories and methods for the empirical study of the relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains" (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 60). So similar to discourse analysis, there is no fixed set of methods for CDA, because it includes a variety of approaches with different research methods, theoretical models and agenda (Fairclough et.al., 2011, p. 357). CDA is unique from other types of discourse analysis, because it is critical. Being critical enables the researcher to reveal causes and connections that are hidden. Prominent CDA scholars, Wodak and Fairclough, have summarized eight key theoretical and methodological principles of CDA. They are as follows:

- CDA addresses social problems.
- Power relations are discursive.

- Discourse constitutes society and culture.
- Discourse does ideological work.
- Discourse is historical.
- The link between text and society is mediated.
- Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
- Discourse is a form of social actions (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, pp. 52-53).

All aspects of CDA are of course not necessarily relevant for this thesis. As mentioned, CDA consists of various critical approaches. Therefore, this thesis will only include the approach that have been found most suiting and relevant to this research. The chosen approach of CDA for this thesis is Norman Fairclough's approach.

Fairclough's approach to CDA is viewed as one of the most developed, in terms of theory and method for research in communication, culture and society. His approach consists of "a set of philosophical premises, theoretical methods, methodological guidelines and specific techniques for linguistic analysis" (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 60). Fairclough outlined a three-dimensional model for analysis of discourse, which is designed to be "an important first step towards the analysis of language and power in different types of text" (Mayr & Simpson, 2010, p. 53). The model aims to connect three separate forms of analysis. Fairclough considers discourse to be part of the process of social interactions, and he outlines three dimensions of this process of social interaction. The first is the text or product, second is the process of text production and the last is the process of interpretation. Thereby, Fairclough suggests that CDA goes beyond text analysis, because the context, in which the text occurs, must be considered as well. The first dimension, the text, involves analysis of language. It focuses on patterns in vocabulary, cohesion and grammar. Second dimension focusses particularly on intertextuality – the aspect of discourse, which links the text to its context. In the final dimension, focus is on the power relation and the ideological features, which discourse produces and/or reproduces, challenges or transforms in some way (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, pp. 53-54).

Fairclough's model for analysis of discourse will loosely be applied to the analysis of this research. The analysis will not take a step-by-step approach, where every dimension of Fairclough's model will be explored, but more apply the overall "idea" behind Fairclough's three dimensions to the analysis and use the methods for investigating each throughout the analysis.

CDA is useful to this thesis, because it enables the researcher to reveal what is "hidden". Furthermore, it can be helpful in uncovering how power structures are being constructed in and through discourse. In addition, CDA has the objective to perceive language usage as a social practice i.e. language users function in a set of social, cultural and psychological frameworks. Therefore, CDA enables the

researcher to use tools, such as intertextuality and rhetorical devices that should be useful in revealing expressions of Cold War mentality.

The Political Discourse

The political discourse will be investigated in the analysis chapter of this thesis. What constitutes as 'political' is a matter of interpretation (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 303). Therefore, there are various interpretations of what constitutes as political discourse. The simplest but incomplete definition of political discourse is that it is discourse produced by politicians (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, p. 42). This thesis will view the political discourse as language that is political. Thus, political discourse is not solely produced by politicians, but could also be produced by political institutions, and other actors. Political realities are constructed in and through discourse, just as social realities are.

Language and politics are closely connected. Ancient Greek and Roman writers thought of the study of rhetoric as a sort of political science (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 303). Today, politicians have unprecedented access to big audiences on a regular basis. This provides better opportunities for politicians to shape opinion and win support, but also greater risks of discredit and public exposure (Fairclough et.al., 2011, p. 359). Because of this, there is increased focus on language, which leads "to a greater level of conscious intervention to control and shape language practices in accordance with [...] political objectives" (Fairclough et.al., 2011, p. 360).

One of the politicians' main goals is persuasion, which for example can be used to convince the public of the validity of their claims or to sell a specific point of view (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, p. 43). Through the political discourse, this can be achieved in various ways, for example through rhetorical devices. The political discourse also has strategic functions. Chilton & Schäffner (2011) proposed three strategic functions of the political discourse as coercion and resistance, legitimization and delegitimization, and representation and misrepresentation (pp. 311-312). The politician's ability to coerce largely depends on his or her resources and power (Mayr & Simpson, 2010, p. 46). Political actors will often act coercively through discourse by "setting agendas, selecting topics in conversation, positioning the self and others in specific relationships, and making assumptions about realities that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept in order to process the text or talk" (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 311). Linguistic coercion can for example also be discourse backed up by legal or physical sanctions (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, p. 46). Legitimization and delegitimization has to do with how politicians or political institutions will legitimize themselves or their power, because they cannot act by physical force alone – at least not in the liberal Western world. Therefore, their power needs to be legitimized, in order to convince the public to accept them to be obeyed. Thereby legitimization links to coercion (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, p. 46). Positive self-presentation is a way to reason

why one should be obeyed. Delegitimization is basically the counterpart. In order to delegitimize others, negative other-presentation can be utilized. This can for example be achieved by “the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting etc.” (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 312). The third strategic function of political discourse, namely representation and misrepresentation, relates to self-presentation and other-representation among other things. The self-representation will typically be positive, whereas the other-representation often will be negative (Simpson & Mayr, 2010, pp. 46-47). Representation and misrepresentation also has to do with what a politician choice to include and exclude i.e. the control of information. Political control involves the control of information. The strategy of preventing people from receiving information is secrecy, and it is the inverse of censorship. In the most extreme manifestation, misrepresentation is simply lying (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 312). As the above-mentioned three strategic functions of the political discourse indicates, these strategic functions are closely related and they are enacted by choice of language (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p 312). The strategic functions are of interest to this research, because through them, it might be possible to uncover expressions of Cold War mentality. What Cold War mentality exactly is will be further elaborated in a section below.

The Cold War Discourse – also a political discourse – is realist based, and the core of the discourse surrounds the three concepts of security, state and sovereignty (Chilton, 1996, pp. 405-421). The Cold War discourse also entails a regularized set of geographical descriptions that represented international politics at that time, namely the East and the West. The two sides were further distinguished by using contrasts, where the West often were depicted as democratic and the East as aggressive, oppressive and suppressive of personal freedoms (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 194). These characteristics of the Cold War discourse are helpful in understanding Cold War mentality, and if these characteristics are detected in discourse by the current American government, it can be expressions of Cold War mentality.

Cold War Mentality

Before addressing the methodological choices of this thesis, the central concept of this thesis, Cold War mentality, must be addressed. This section is divided into three sections. Firstly, Cold War mentality in general will be explored. The second part will investigate the Cold War mentality of the West, and more specifically the U. Lastly, some notions on ‘mentality’ will be made. It should be noted that this thesis views the concept of Cold War mentality as something that is socially constructed i.e., it is not a biologically heritable, behavioral human trait; it is constructed by social environment and experiences. Furthermore, Cold War mentality is not something that can be measured or weighed, its existence depends on the eye of the beholder. Since it is a social construction, different people have different views and understandings of what Cold War mentality exactly is. E.g., an American’s view of Cold War mentality could differ greatly from a

Russian's view of it. The view presented below, is the researcher's interpretation of the concept, derived from various sources, which have addressed or mentioned the concept of Cold War mentality.

Cold War Mentality in General

The concept of 'Cold War mentality' firstly appeared during the Cold War and have since been mentioned only relatively few times in the post-Cold War era. When mentioned post-Cold War, it has mostly been in literature in correlation to the Cold War as something belonging to that period of time, but it has also been argued to still linger after the end of the Cold War. In 1996 American foreign-policy commentator, Robert Kagan, warned in an article against the return of Cold War mentality, and thus implying that the Cold War mentality had for the time being disappeared, but could possibly return (Paul, 2001, p. 109). However, others such as Cameron (2005) have also argued that Cold War mentality were still present long after the end of the Cold War (p. 202). After 9/11 in 2001 it was debated, whether the Cold War mentality might be abandoned due to the war on terror and new changes in the international political system (Cameron, 2005, p. 202). In 2013, the concept "resurfaced" and gained media- and political attention, especially in relation to the Ukrainian crisis.

Since 2013 there have been different instances, where both 'the West', the US specifically and Russia have been accused of Cold War mentality. One such instance occurred in 2013, when President Obama on the Tonight Show with Jay Leno was asked whether he was surprised that Russia granted Edward Snowden asylum. Obama answered that Russia at times have slipped "back into Cold War thinking and a Cold War mentality" (Obama, 2013, 3:40-3:47). Another instance occurred in 2014, where the Chinese newspaper People's Daily criticized the West for expressing Cold War mentality towards Russia in relation to the Ukrainian crisis and the Sochi Olympics (People's Daily, 2014). Recently, there have further accusations from the Chinese about the US having Cold War mentality. The US and the Philippines have been planning to deepen military ties in the South China Sea, and this has not been well received by China. The Chinese Defense Ministry reportedly said: "A strengthening of the US-Philippine military alliance [...] is a manifestation of the Cold War mentality and is not conducive to peace and stability in the South China Sea" (Goh, 2016). The fact that both the US and Russia have been accused of Cold War mentality, establishes that Cold War mentality is not limited solely to one party of the Cold War; it is something that both sides are capable of. However, there are different views on what constitutes as Cold War mentality, depending on who is accused of it and the context it is used.

Though there is a general public "understanding" of the concept of Cold War mentality, a broadly accepted academic definition of the term has not yet been coined. Moreover, it is difficult to produce only one definition that covers all the different usages of the concept, since it is used in such different

contexts. That Cold War mentality is a social construct, and that different people have different perception of what it is, is why there are not only one definition of the concept, but multiple varying understandings of Cold War mentality. From the name itself, we understand that the concept has something to do with the Cold War and that it is - simply put - 'a way of thinking' i.e. a mentality. When the concept is mentioned e.g. in literature, it is only very vaguely - if at all - explained what 'Cold War mentality' covers. Often one have to guess, what 'Cold War mentality' is from the context it is used in. E.g., a post from the Carnegie Corporations' 'Perspective on Peace and Security: Rebuilding the U.S.-Russia Relationship' writes: "Both the United States and Russia need to get past the Cold War mentality that persists in some quarters in both countries. That mentality, supported by outdated ideological bias and further advanced, on occasion, by commercial interests, is itself a continuing threat to world peace" (Spindler, n.d.). From this quote we can to some extend get an understanding of, what Cold War mentality is, or at least what Spindler believes it to be. The quote indicates that, accordingly to Spindler, Cold War mentality still lingers in some quarters of both the US and Russia, which is in accordance with the previous statement that both "sides of the Cold War" are capable of it. Furthermore, the 'outdated ideological bias', which support the Cold War mentality according to Spindler, could refer to the ideological conflict of the Cold War between capitalism and communism. There are no ideological struggle between communism and capitalism in current US-Russia relations, so Spindler are possibly saying that Cold War mentality is 'outdated' in the sense that this ideological conflict do not reflect the relationship today. Though, he also says that Cold War mentality includes more than just this "outdated ideological bias", when saying it has been "further advanced". The notion that Cold War mentality can be "a continuing threat to world peace today" is why it could be problematic if Cold War mentality still lingers today. In conclusion, Spindler indicates that Cold War mentality is something negative that could cause great conflict today, partly because it is something of the past. The quote illustrates the complexity of the concept and reflect the vague explanation of, what Cold War mentality entails. However, from the various articles and literature using the concept, it can be derived that Cold War mentality can be expressed both verbally and in writing through communication, and physically by actions.

Jensen & Suta (2015) writes that "Cold War mentality was developed and formed during the Cold War, and is therefore characterized by it" (p. 27). These characteristics of the Cold War reflected in Cold War mentality is e.g. the enmity between the US and the Soviet Union, the mutual distrust and suspicion, the bipolar thinking, including the geographical distinctions with 'the East' and 'the West' and the competition between the two parties i.e., the Soviet Union and the US. The Jensen & Suta (2015) study then argues that if any of these characteristics can be detected in rhetoric by the US, it can be an expression of Cold War mentality manifested rhetorically (p. 27). The study also argues that the use of strategic, aggressive rhetoric similarly to Cold War rhetoric can be expressions of Cold War mentality, depending on the context (Jensen &

Suta, 2015, p. 27). The study specifically mentions Ronald Reagan's 'Evil Empire'-speech as an example of strategic, aggressive rhetoric of the Cold War. Therefore, comparing how the Soviet Union is portrayed in this speech to how Russia is portrayed in pieces of communication by the current American government, could give indications of possible rhetorical expressions of Cold War mentality, should there be similarities in how the Soviet Union and Russia are portrayed.

The Jensen & Suta (2015) study also observes that some traits of Cold War mentality and neo-realism rest on the same ideas (p. 27). According to neo-realism, the international system is an anarchic system, and this international anarchy have a tendency to lean towards conflict rather than cooperation. Neo-realists then believes that the security dilemma, which argues that the relationships between states are always characterized by uncertainty and suspicion, is a reason as to, why there is this tendency towards conflict rather than cooperation in the international system. States will treat other states as enemies, due to the uncertainty about other states' motives, and this result in permanent insecurity. States will always presume the worst about other states, as they believe every state's goal is to accumulate more power. Hence, one state's military build-up will be perceived as aggressive or hostile actions by other states, despite the build-up were possibly made purely for defensive reasons (Baylis et al., 2011, pp. 91-92). Included in the Cold War mentality is also the mutual suspicion and distrust of the counterparts' intentions. During the Cold War, the US regarded the creation of the Eastern bloc was proof of the presumed Soviet imperial ambitions. Another explanation for the Soviet's creation of the Eastern bloc would be to create a so-called buffer zone between the West and itself. Both the US and the Soviet Union presumed the worst about the other's intentions, and thus began the arms race of the Cold War (Heywood, 2011, p. 40).

To sum up the main points on Cold War mentality in general:

- Cold War mentality was formed during the Cold War, but it is not limited to the Cold War; it could appear post-Cold War.
- Cold War mentality is not limited to solely one party of the Cold War – “both sides” are capable of it.
- Cold War mentality can be expressed both verbally and in writing through communication, and physically by actions.
- Characteristics of the Cold War such as enmity or antagonism, distrust and suspicion, bipolar thinking including geographical distinctions, and competition are reflected in Cold War mentality, though not every listed characteristic may be present, when Cold War mentality is expressed. Similarly, actions committed, as a response to the counterpart's actions, due to the suspicion or distrust of the counterpart's intentions, can also be perceived as expressions of Cold War mentality.

'Western'- and 'American' Cold War Mentality

Now that we have explored Cold War mentality from a general point of view, we will take a closer look at, what it entails, when expressed by the West, which includes the US.

Cameron (2005) describe the American Cold War mentality as the way of thinking during the Cold War, "whereby all US actions abroad were of strategic significance to combat and contain the "communist threat"" (p. 115). Compared to today, American expressions of Cold War mentality could entail actions abroad, conducted with strategic purpose to combat or contain the Russian 'threat'. Cameron further observes that the end of the Cold War was an opportunity for the US to change the way it conducts affairs abroad, but that "there was little sign of America's foreign and security policy elite engaging in any such reflection in the 1990s" (Cameron, 2005, p. 192). Cameron further argues that the US as the "top dog" in the international arena had "no wish to see radical changes in international relations" and therefore prefers the status quo mentality, which inhibits "the development of a flexible mindset that is able to view the world in different shades of gray rather than black and white" (Cameron, 2005, p. 192). This observation somewhat relates to observations made by Hayakawa (1983) during the Cold War. In an article from 1983, Hayakawa argues that Americans are stuck in the Cold War mentality, as they are unable to change their ingrained habits of thoughts – the mental habits "with which Americans think about Communism or anything else for that matter" (Hayakawa, 1983, p. 374). He further explains that the general American is trapped by what he calls 'the Law of Identity', and is therefore stuck in the track that 'communists are communists, and Communism is the most evil force in the world today, ergo communists are evil' (Hayakawa, 1983, p. 376). Hayakawa seems to hint that there have been created an American "stereotype" of a communist, and that the Americans are not capable of thinking differently about communists, until they stop this 'stereotypical mind-track' of what they believe a communist is. Similarly, there have been created a "stereotype" of what Americans perceive a Russian to be, and a stereotype that have been formed by past perceptions, and thereby do not necessarily reflect the present (pp. 376-378). Thereby, the view the US have of Russia and Russians today is heavily influenced by how they used to perceive Soviets and the Soviet Union. Hence, Americans' view of Russians, will not change until they start thinking differently about Russians, and not think of them as former Soviet Communists, but accept that Russians are susceptible to change. It is not possible to get past the Cold War mentality until Americans stop thinking about Russians today as Soviets during the Cold War. This could serve as an explanation as to why these similar tensions exists between the US and Russia to this day - as the West have not been successful in getting past the Cold War way of thinking about things i.e. not successful in getting past the Cold War mentality.

In the article *'Western Negative Perceptions of Russia: "The Cold War Mentality" over Five Hundred Years'*, Paul (2001) writes that negative views of Russia are often attributed to Cold War mentality, and he observes that such negative views have been voiced even more than a decade after the end of the Cold War (pp. 103-104). Interestingly, Paul (2001) argues that these negative Western views of Russia as an evil or uncivilized country are not creations of the twentieth century nor products of the Cold War; they existed centuries before the Cold War even began (p. 114). Because these negative Western views of Russia existed long before the Cold War, they are not likely to disappear with the end of the Cold War, which can be why such views are present even today. Thus, expressions of Cold War mentality from the West can entail a negative portrayal of Russia, but there would argumentatively need to be more indicating expressions of Cold War mentality than simply negative views of Russia, since these were present prior to the Cold War. Paul also observes that though the Western negative perspective on Russia may have a basis due to Russian actions, such as the invasion in Georgia and Ukraine, there is no basis for the same negative views such behavior causes, when a Western country such as the US or Great Britain perpetrates similar behavior. Meaning, when a Western power interferes in another country, it is not viewed as inherently imperialistic acts, such as it would have been had it been Russia, but merely as acts carried out as a last resort and in the name of civilization and freedom (Paul, 2001, pp. 112-113). Paul explains that "when Russia destabilizes a foreign regime, it is seen to be doing so merely to gain power and territory, and not to protect itself from foreign invasion, militant Islam, or other real or imagined threats, and certainly not as an effort to establish freedom or democracy" (Paul, 2001, p. 114). Paul also emphasizes that there have been few nations beside Russia, who in the last century have been perceived to be "so insatiably or inherently imperialistic as Russia" (Paul, 2011, p. 110). Whereas Japan and Germany during the 1930s and 1940s were seen as evil, they are typically not portrayed as such today; today they are American allies (Paul, 2001, p. 105). Therefore, the negative views on Russia and the Soviet Union are not merely negative views on communism as an ideology, but negative views on Russia or the Soviet Union itself. Paul even speculates that these negative views might be Western "Russophobia" (Paul, 2001, pp. 104-109).

Jensen and Suta (2015) also observes that negative views on Russia are included in Cold War mentality. They further explain that the West uses contrasting attributes in portraying the Soviet Union and the West. An example of such is the West being portrayed as democratic, whereas the Soviet Union is portrayed as totalitarian and undemocratic (p. 27). Western expressions of Cold War mentality can thus entail portraying Russia negatively or similarly to how the Soviet Union was portrayed and possibly using contrasting attributes to describe oneself and Russia. This closely relates to the strategic functions of the political discourse, namely representation and misrepresentation. Paterson et.al. (2010) supports these observations by Paul (2001) and Jensen & Suta (2015), that the American Cold War mentality entails a

negative view of Russia and this contrasting element in describing the US compared to the Soviet Union and Russia respectively. Paterson et.al. (2010) states that the American Cold War mentality rests on binary thinking, where the American national identity is defined by referencing to the un-American 'other' (pp. 272-273). They present an example, where the Soviet Union is portrayed as the "predatory expansionist power", whereas the US portray itself as a "defensive status quo power" (Paterson et.al., 2010, p. 273).

To sum up on the main points of the Cold War mentality of the West and specifically the 'American' Cold War mentality:

- Expressions of 'Western' or 'American' Cold War mentality could entail actions abroad, conducted with strategic purpose to combat or contain the Russian 'threat'.
- Expressions of 'Western' or 'American' Cold War mentality could be negative views on the Soviet Union and Russia, and not merely simply negative views on communism as an ideology.
- 'Western' or 'American' Cold War mentality rests on binary thinking, where the West and the US are portrayed positively, contrasting to the East or Russia, who is portrayed negatively. According to Paul, "double-standards" towards Russia also exists, where if Western nations behave in similar fashion to Russian behavior, it is not considered as for example imperialistic behavior, but as acts carried out in the name of freedom. In other words, the Soviet Union or Russia is portrayed as having imperialistic intentions or as a predatory expansionist power, whereas the West is portrayed as the "defender" of freedom.

The Notion of Mentality

Now some thoughts on the notion of 'mentality' of the concept Cold War mentality will be presented. The simple definition of mentality is a particular way of thinking. However, mentality can also be the ability to think and learn (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Hence, one's mentality can provide a mindset or an outlook that affects how one think about things, and how one interpret and respond to situations. As mentioned previously, a mentality is learned; it is not a biologically heritable behavioral human trait, it is developed by social environment and experiences. One might not be consciously aware that one is expressing Cold War mentality, because it is ingrained into a person to think this way. Thus, simply put Cold War mentality is a way of thinking, which relates to the Cold War, and it influences one's outlook and response to certain situations.

The scholars, politicians etc., addressing Cold War mentality above, have different approaches to the mentality part of the concept. Some address Cold War mentality as something that can come and go

or as something that can be suppressed or ignored in periods, but then reappear from time to time. This is for example how Obama addresses it in the Jay Leno interview (Obama, 2013, 3:40-3:47). Hayakawa (1983) addresses mentality as a something that is ingrained habits of thoughts (p. 374). Hayakawa thereby does not deny that Cold War mentality can be in various degrees “evident” or “covert”, but he does state that it will not disappear until the Americans start to think of Russia differently i.e. they need to change their mindset and stop this ‘stereotypical mind-track’ (Hayakawa, 1983 pp.376-378).

Now that the concept of Cold War mentality have been looked upon closely, we now have a better understanding of what it is, and the kind of indicators of expressions of it could entail.

Methodology

This chapter will concern the chosen approach to the research question, and explain and justify the methodological choices made for this thesis.

Philosophy of Science

Bryman (2012) defines a paradigm as “a cluster of beliefs and dictates that for scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how research should be done, and how results should be interpreted” (p. 714). Guba (1990) has a more simple definition of a paradigm as “the basic set of beliefs that guides action” (p. 17). A paradigm, or the researcher’s fundamental beliefs and way of perceiving reality, therefore guides the research. Guba further elaborates on paradigms that they “can be characterized by the way their proponents respond to three basic questions, which can be characterized as the ontological, the epistemological and the methodological questions” (Guba, 1990, p. 18). Where Bryman describes constructivism as an ontological position, Guba argues that it constitutes a paradigm (Bryman, 2012, p. 32; Guba, 1990, p. 17).

The constructivist paradigm emphasizes that “research is a product of the values of researcher and cannot be independent of them” (Mertens, 2010, p. 17). Therefore, the basic assumptions that guides the constructivist paradigm are “that knowledge is socially constructed by people active in the research process and that researchers should attempt to understand the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Mertens, 2010, pp. 16-17). In addition, Guba describes constructivists as relativists, since reality is something constructed and can only exist in the context of a mental framework; hence anything and everything is relative (Guba, 1990, p. 18).

Though Guba and Bryman do not use the same terms to describe constructivism, they are both in agreement that constructivism view reality as being constructed, and thereby dismiss the notion of reality as being something, where absolute truth can be found (Guba, 1990, p. 19; Bryman, 2012, p. 32-33). Bryman (2012) even acknowledge that constructivism can be “in relation to the nature of knowledge of the social world” (p. 33) and that “the researcher always presents a specific version of reality, rather than one that can be regarded as definitive” (p. 33), which is in accordance with the basic assumptions guiding the constructivist paradigm. Hence, Bryman recognize that constructivism can be more than just an ontological position. researcher’s own accounts of the world are constructions In this thesis, Guba’s position to constructivism is used, and will therefore be addressed as a paradigm. In doing so, the epistemological-, ontological- and methodological approach of the constructivist paradigm are adopted.

As mentioned, this thesis views the concept of Cold War mentality as something that is socially constructed, meaning it cannot be measured or weighed; its existence depends on the eye of the beholder. The constructivist paradigm been chosen, mainly because it views reality as something that is constructed, and thereby oppose the notion of reality as being something ‘out there’, where absolute truth can be found. As mentioned, the constructivist paradigm allows the researcher to be active in the research process and attempt to understand the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it. Furthermore, in the constructivist paradigm “qualitative methods such as interviews, observations, and document reviews are predominant” (Mertens, 2010, p. 19). Since Cold War mentality is a social construct and as mentioned cannot be measured, qualitative research can enable the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of this complex issue.

Ontological Approach

Guba describes ontology as being concerned with questions such as “what is the nature of the “knowable”? Or, what is the nature of “reality”?” (Guba, 1990, p. 18). Thus, ontology relates to the nature of reality, and it questions whether the researcher should be objective or subjective (Bryman, 2012, pp. 32-33).

The ontological approach of the constructivist paradigm is relativism. Relativism views reality as something that exists “in the form of multiple mental constructions” (Guba, 1990, p. 27). Moreover, since constructivists rejects the notion of an objective reality that can be known, constructivists commend subjectivity and abjure objectivity (Guba, 1990, p. 17). Since constructivists view reality as something that is constructed, multiple constructions of reality can be apprehended, the researcher must then strive to understand the multiple social constructions of meaning and knowledge (Mertens, 2010, p. 18). With the ontological position of relativism, the researcher distances oneself from the positivist position, which view reality as an external objective reality. Therefore, by adhering to relativism as the ontological position, this thesis does not strive to find an objective, absolute truth. The relativistic approach will enable the researcher to be open-minded throughout the research process.

The data for the analysis will consist of rhetoric by the American government such as, press releases, speeches, interviews etc. The data will be further explained in a section below. The American government have thereby “authored” the data analyzed in this thesis, since it consists of rhetoric by the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Why these three figures of the American government have been chosen will be addressed in the data collection section below. The reality examined in this thesis is thus to a certain extent constructed by the American government, and partly by the researcher’s constructions made by interpretations of the data and by deconstruction of the reality produced by the American government. Furthermore, with the ontological position or relativism, the researcher

acknowledges that there can exist several different meanings of the concept of Cold War mentality. Therefore, the understanding of the concept used in this thesis is thus partly constructed by the researcher.

Epistemological Approach

Guba poses the epistemological question as “what is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the inquirer) and the known (or knowable)?” (Guba, 1990, p. 18). Epistemology therefore regards what passes as acceptable knowledge – how some things are come to be accepted as true and how this acceptance is justified (Bryman, 2012, p. 711).

The epistemological approach of the constructivist paradigm is subjectivism. Guba describes subjectivism as interaction with respondents in interviews (Guba, 1990, p. 26). However, in this thesis it is not to be understood in the exact terms Guba uses, since interviews are not conducted here. Instead, with ‘subjective’ in this thesis is to be understood closer to the interpretivistic approach. In this thesis, the attitude is that being completely objective when doing research is neither possible nor desirable. The reason behind this stance is that the researcher influences the research in multiple ways. For instance, the researcher selects the data examined in the research as well as the methods used for analyzing the data. In addition, constructivists believe that it is important to interpret the data to understand one particular constructed reality out of multiple realities, and this is dependent on the researcher’s approach. In this thesis, does not examine an external reality, but a particular one out of multiple realities, and this particular reality is dependent on the researcher and the researcher’s approach.

In the thesis it is also recognized that the researcher is biased and can therefore not be completely objective. The researcher will approach a research carrying his or hers own values and pre-knowledge. The findings of this thesis will be products of the researcher’s interpretations through the analysis and can therefore not be objective.

Methodological Approach

The methodological question formulated by Guba is “how can the inquirer go about finding out the desired knowledge?” (Guba, 1990, p. 18).

Guba states hermeneutics as the methodological approach of the constructivist paradigm, and describes hermeneutics as “the study of interpretive understanding or meaning” (Guba, 1990, p. 16). In the constructivist paradigm, all meaning is fundamentally interpretive. Debesay, Nåden & Sletterø describes hermeneutics as “a process where [...] we attempt to render clear something that appears unclear” (Debesay et al, 2008, p. 58). This can be achieved by interpreting texts -written or spoken – in order to gain

understanding. This understanding can be reached by going back and forth between interpreting individual parts and the text as a whole – you cannot understand the one without interpreting the other. In order to understand individual parts of a text, the whole must be interpreted; and in order to understand the whole, the individual parts must be interpreted (Debesay et al, 2008, p. 58). This is somewhat similar to the methods Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for analysis of discourse outlines.

Research Design and Strategy

The research design “provides the framework for the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2012, p. 46). This thesis will have a comparative research design. Simply put a comparative design entails studying two or more cases, and as the name entails – comparing. By comparing, you can get a better understanding of social phenomena. The comparative research design can be used both for quantitative and qualitative research (Bryman, 2012, p. 72).

The comparative research design have been preferred in this thesis because, by comparing how Russia now is portrayed to how the Soviet Union was portrayed and presumably find similarities in the communication by the American government then and now, the comparison will help in exposing the Cold War mentality expressed towards Russia by the current American government. How respectively the Soviet Union and Russia is portrayed will be uncovered by using discourse analysis, which has been explained in the theoretical framework above. Though the research design is comparative, it can also be argued that this thesis in a way represents a case study, and the case studied being the American government. But since multiple cases or ‘conflicts of interest’ of the US-Russian relations are taken into account, and the importance of the comparison between communication from the Cold War to current communication, this thesis is not categorized as simply a case study. This differs from the Jensen & Suta (2015) research, where the focus was solely on communication related to the Ukrainian crisis and where there was not this direct comparison between how respectively the Soviet Union and Russia are portrayed then and now (p. 5).

Bryman (2012) describes the research strategy as “the general orientation to the conduct of research” (p. 715). The strategy of this research is of a qualitative nature. According to Bryman (2012), qualitative research “can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (p. 36). Qualitative research can thereby enable the researcher to gain deeper understanding of specific issues. This is valuable to this research, since the aim is to investigate whether the American government express Cold War mentality towards Russia. Similar to the Jensen & Suta (2015) study, this research will analyze communication regarding US foreign policy by three spokespersons, who all are prominent key figures in the American government, namely the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. (WHY THE PERSON SPEAKING IS IMPORTANT)

This thesis will aim to find, if the expression of Cold War mentality towards Russia that Jensen & Suta found in communications related to the Ukrainian crisis, transcends to other foreign policy areas. This will thereby solidify that the expression of Cold War mentality is in fact a mentality – a general attitude of the American government – that penetrates several policy areas and not just solely on policy related to the Ukrainian crisis. Using qualitative methods is, as mentioned, in accordance to the constructivist paradigm where “qualitative methods such as interviews, observations, and document reviews are predominant” (Mertens, 2010, p. 19).

Relationship between Theory and Data

In the theoretical framework, it has been stated, why the theory of CDA has been chosen to examining the problem formulation of this thesis, namely, whether the current American government express Cold War mentality towards Russia through communication regarding US-Russian conflicts of interest, such as the Syrian conflict and the growing threat Russia pose to European security. Furthermore, an understanding of the concept of Cold War mentality has been reached, by examining how existing literature addresses the concept. The following will address the relationship between the theory and data in this thesis.

Bryman (2012) states that “the researcher’s views about the nature of the relationship between theory and research also have implications for research” (p. 5). A mainly deductive relationship to theory will be applied for the analysis of this thesis. The theory is thereby used as a guiding tool for the analysis. Thereby, instead of generating theory from the analysis, which an inductive approach entails, this thesis will use existing theory in a relevant way. However, there is arguably an iterative element in this thesis, in the sense that there was no existing broadly accepted academic definition for the concept of Cold War mentality, so an understanding of the concept had to be derived from existing literature addressing or mentioning the concept. Nonetheless, since a deductive approach will be applied to the main element of this research - the analysis – the overall relationship between theory and data is formulated as deductive. Even though, Bryman does also argue that a researcher cannot have neither a completely deductive or – inductive relationship to the data, since there always will be a movement back and forth between theory and observations, however small (Bryman, 2012, pp. 24-26).

Data Collection

The data analyzed in this thesis is, as the research questions indicates, communication by the current American government (the Obama administration) and communication by the American government from the period 1981 to 1986 (the Reagan-administration). The communication can be both written and spoken

language, such as press statements/releases, speeches, interviews etc. Though it must be clarified that the data will be analyzed as written texts, and therefore should the data be a speech, a transcription of the speech, available from sources online, is used for the analysis. Hence, the data analyzed in this thesis will only consist of written text. The communication by the current American government includes speeches, interviews etc. from 2015 and onwards. This ensures that the communication used for the analysis is recent, and will therefore be currently relevant. Because the Cold War stretches over almost half a decade timewise and during this had cooler and hotter phases, the communication from the Cold War that will be compared to recent communication will be from the years 1981 to 1986. This specific period of time will be in focus, because it is in the late period of the Cold War, but not during the final years of the Cold War, where the Soviet Union were dissolved. Furthermore, this specific period of the Cold War is also called the 'second cold war', because during this specific window of time of the Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union greatly increased, which caused a "reawakening" of the Cold War after years of 'détente' between the two (Baylis et al., 2011, pp. 59-60). This can be compared to the situation today, where US-Russian relations have been through a relatively peaceful period, but lately tensions between the two have increased to the point, where it is questioned, whether we are seeing the beginnings of a new Cold War. From 1970's and onwards, the bipolarity model of the Cold War became less accurate with the rise of other power centers such as China, Japan and West Germany (Heywood, 2011, p. 41). Today we also have a multipolar international system. It should be noted that the Reagan-administration is republican, whereas the Obama-administration is democrats. However, the party alignment of the two administrations should not be a noticeable factor influencing the results. The Reagan-administration sought to cooperate more with the Soviet Union, similarly to how the US today is trying to cooperate with Russia.

The analysis will be based on communication by three key figures from the American government: the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. From the current American government that is President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, and from the American government from 1981-1986 it is President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. These three are all central figures in the American government and in US foreign policy and security policy. Therefore, each is expected to comment on issues related to the Soviet Union and Russia. The pieces of communication by these three figures of the American government are empirical data in the form of speeches and statements, which are primary sources.

The pieces of communication from the current American government have been meticulously selected. Contrary to the study by Jensen & Suta (2015), this analysis will not solely focus on a single case such as the Ukrainian crisis, but will include different other topics such as the Russian involvement in Syria and the increasing Russian threat to European security. Speeches directly related to the Ukrainian crisis will

as far as possible be avoided, since the study by Jensen & Suta (2015) already covers this specific case. Though including communications on more than one topic will not give a clear focus as in comparison to studying a single case, it have been found beneficial to this study. In order to prove that the expression of Cold War mentality is in fact a mentality and not just a single incident, it is necessary to include communications on different topics and not just one. If it is in fact a mentality and not just a single incident, the expression of Cold War mentality will also be present in communication regarding other topics than the just Ukrainian crisis. The pieces of communication from the Cold War in the analysis will also not solely focus on a single topic, but be about various topics. Though it should be noted that all topics included in the analysis of this thesis would have affected- or been sources of a conflict of interest in the US-Russian relations.

This thesis will only focus on whether the American government is expressing Cold War mentality, and not on whether the Russian government is, because of the data available. Since the communication by the Russian government would either be in Russian or translated, slight alterations might have been made during translation that could have affected the outcome. Furthermore, solely focusing on the American government and not both, will also give the research a clearer focus.

Other sources have also been utilized for this thesis, such as academic literature that relates to the research, as well as articles on topics relevant for the study, such as Cold War mentality. These sources have mainly been used for the methodological and theoretical framework.

Limitations

This research is limited to solely revolving around whether the American government expressing Cold War mentality towards Russia and the findings can therefore not be generalized to be the same for other 'Western' governments. In addition, since it solely focusses on the American government, it is off course not possible to conclude from the findings of this research, whether the Russian government expresses Cold War mentality towards the USA. Similarly, the findings of the thesis cannot be generalized to be valid for the general American public nor every American politician. The findings will only include what is expected to be the general political opinion throughout the current American government, or at least the opinion depicted by the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In fact, the personal opinion of each of the three key figures of the American government represented in this research, may differ from the overall opinion of the government and from the political line, they have to follow.

Since this thesis is interested in whether the American government is expressing Cold War mentality towards Russia, there may be produced more examples of Cold War mentality expressions in this research, than other scholars without this specific focus would find.

Analysis

The analysis is organized in two parts. The first regards communication by the American government during the years 1981-1986 of the Cold War – the Reagan-administration, and the second regards communication by the current American government – the Obama-administration. It should be noted that both sections of the analysis will present analysis of selected excerpts from the speeches, interviews etc., that are of relevance for this thesis. Many of the speeches, interviews etc. include various themes, but since this thesis is interested specifically in respectively US-Soviet Union- and US-Russian relations and how the Soviet Union and Russia is portrayed, the analysis will only focus on the parts of the speeches etc. that deal with this.

Part One: The Reagan-Administration (1981-1986)

As mentioned, this section presents the analysis of communication by the American government from 1981 to 1986 – the Reagan-administration. The following is the analysis of four pieces of communication by central figures of the Reagan-administration, namely President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who all are key speakers on US foreign policy. George P. Shultz was Secretary of State from 1982 to 1989, and Caspar W. Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987. Both Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger were key appointees in the Reagan-administration (Miller Center of Public Affairs, n.d.). The analysis of the pieces of communication by the Reagan-administration below is arranged in chronological sequence, starting with President Reagan's speech on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks from November 1981.

President Ronald Reagan, November 18, 1981

Speech on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks delivered to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., USA

As president, Reagan wanted to redefine the American policy towards the Soviet Union. Not long after Reagan took office, he advocated for an American military buildup. A massive increase of the Pentagon's budget was necessary in order to realize Reagan's strategy on how to deal with the Soviet Union (Miller Center of Public Affairs, n.d.).

In his speech on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, President Reagan quotes a letter he sent to the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in April 1981. In the letter, Reagan asks the question: **“Will the average Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan?”** (Reagan, 1981). Here Reagan refers to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan two years prior, where the Soviet Union intervened in support of the communist Afghan government against anticommunist Muslim guerrillas. With the question, Reagan insinuates that the average

Soviet person might not even be aware that the Soviet Union have imposed a government on the Afghan people, and he also questions if the Soviet people will be better off with this action. Thereby, Reagan implies that the Soviet Union is not necessarily acting in the Soviet people's interest, and that it is not transparent in its actions – not even to its own people. Later on in the speech, Reagan reminds Brezhnev that they both represent their respective population, and should therefore act in their populations' interests and not in their own, which he previously implied that Brezhnev was doing with the invasion in Afghanistan.

In the speech, Reagan consistently talks of the Soviet military buildup as a threat to the Western world, whereas it could be possible that the Soviet Union is building up its military for defensive purposes, and not with the intention of attacking the West. Reagan says, **“the momentum of the continuing Soviet buildup threatens both the conventional and the nuclear balance”** (Reagan, 1981). Reagan uses the Soviet buildup to argue for an American military buildup in order to respond to the increasing Soviet threat. The way Reagan argues for an American buildup, as a response to the Soviet buildup and the perceived Soviet threat to the West, can be perceived as rhetorical expression of two characteristics of the Cold War, namely competition and suspicion or distrust of the counterpart's intentions. The competition is present in the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union and the suspicion or distrust is evident in that the Soviet buildup is perceived as a threat to both the conventional and nuclear balance.

Throughout the speech, Reagan portrays the US positively. For example, he says **“[...] the United States followed a different course, one unique in all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravished economies of the world, including those of the nations who had been our enemies [...] there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries, by use of force”** (Reagan, 1981). While praising the US for its actions after the Second World War, Reagan also takes a 'jab' at the Soviet Union with the words “attempts to impose its will on other countries”, because he previously insinuated that the Soviet Union imposed its will on the Afghan people with a Soviet chosen government. He thereby covertly uses contrast in describing the US and the Soviet Union, both because he says the US followed a unique course in all history of mankind, meaning no other country have ever taken that path, but also because he previously in the speech spoke of the Soviet Union as imperialistic and imposing Soviet will on another country.

Near the end of the speech, Reagan says, **“I believe that the time has come for all nations to act in a responsible spirit that doesn't threaten other states”** (Reagan, 1981). Here, Reagan possibly yet again refers to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, but he could also allude to the Soviet military buildup, which Reagan perceives as a threat to the West. Nonetheless, he is implying that the Soviet Union should start to act responsible, because it is not acting responsible at the time, due to the Soviet threat to other states.

In this speech, Reagan portrays the Soviet Union as a threat to other states, partly because of its military buildup, but also because it imposes its will on other countries, such as Afghanistan. By implying that the Soviet imposed a government of its own choice on the Afghan people, he also imply that the Soviet is not democratic. The Cold War mentality is evident in the negative portrayal of the Soviet Union, as well as the distrust and suspicion of the Soviet intentions with the buildup, where Reagan straight out denies that it could be for defensive purposes. The bipolar thinking is expressed with the contrasting attributes between the US, which is portrayed as good, and the Soviet Union, which is portrayed negatively, as mentioned above.

President Ronald Reagan, March 8, 1983

“Evil Empire”-speech delivered to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, USA

President Reagan’s “Evil Empire”-speech is one of the more famous speeches from the Cold War. Reagan entered the White House with strong convictions regarding the Soviet Union, such as his believe that the Soviet Union sought world domination and that Communism was an immoral and destructive ideology (Miller Center of Public Affairs, n.d.). These views of the Soviet Union were apparent in his “Evil Empire”-speech.

In the beginning of his speech, Reagan speaks about the relationship between the US and God. He points out that the American democracy is built on values such as freedom, which **“prosper when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged”** (Reagan, 1983). He later on in the speech, then speak about, how the US **“has kept the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world”** (Reagan, 1983), especially in the 20th century. This image of the US as a selfless, global freedom fighter is a stark contrast to how Reagan portrays the Soviet Union and its leadership. He says, **“the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution.[...] Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas – that’s their name for religion – or ideas that are outside class conceptions”** (Reagan, 1983). Reagan portrays the Soviet Union and Communism as having questionable morals, because they repudiate all morality that proceeds from religion, which is where many of the American morals proceeds from – from God. Basically, Reagan says that the Soviet Union lack religious faith. He also states that the Soviet Union’s cause is global revolution, meaning the territory of the Soviet Union is not enough they aim for the world. With this saying, Reagan could insinuate to the Soviet Union having expansionist intentions.

In his speech, Reagan speaks about the proposed nuclear freeze solutions. He states that a freeze would be a very dangerous fraud and merely an illusion of peace. He says, **“I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desire”** (Reagan, 1983). Here, Reagan once again hints to the Soviet Union’s imperialistic desires, and implying that he does not view a freeze as a solution as long as the

imperialistic nature of the Soviet is not frozen as well. When people are to discuss the freeze solutions, Reagan urges people not to **“ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire”** and not **“to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil”** (Reagan, 1983). It is apparent from the context that by ‘evil empire’, Reagan refers to the Soviet Union. This is a very aggressive word choice, and it is severely negative. By refereeing to the Soviet Union as an empire, Reagan might covertly imply, that the Soviet Union eventually will fall, just like other empires before it, such as the Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire. Reagan also imply that the history of the Soviet Union and its aggressive impulses makes a nuclear freeze dangerous, because the Soviet Union cannot be trusted, due to ‘facts of history’ and ‘aggressive impulses’. Reagan also confirms that there is an arms race going on between the US and the Soviet Union, and imply that this arms race is not happening because of misunderstandings – it is fully intentional. Lastly, Reagan clearly distinguish between the two sides of the Cold War. From the context it is evident that Reagan refers to the US with ‘right’ and ‘good’, and the Soviet Union with ‘wrong’ and ‘evil’. This highlights the binary- and the ‘black and white’-thinking of the Cold War, and is a clear expression of Cold War mentality. Reagan’s metaphor of the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’, along with the overall aggressive rhetoric, is what made this speech one of the most famous speeches from the Cold War period.

By the end of the speech, Reagan makes his opinion on communism obvious – should anyone have missed his dislike for the ideology expressed throughout the speech. He says, **“I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. [...] it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man”** (Reagan, 1983).

Reagan portrays the Soviet Union as ‘totalitarian’, an ‘evil empire’, lack of religious faith, with imperialistic desire and questionable morals. Furthermore, he also denigrates communism, saying it is a sad, bizarre chapter in human history, which is about to be over. To say that Reagan portrays the Soviet Union negatively is almost an understatement.

The Cold War mentality is clearly evident through the aggressive rhetoric of Reagan’s speech, but also in the way Reagan refers to the Soviet Union, such as an ‘evil empire’. Cold War mentality is also apparent through Reagan’s bipolar thinking, which is evident through his use of pronouns, where the US and the West is referred to as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’, whereas the Soviet Union is referred to as ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their’. He also uses clear contrasts in portraying respectively the US and the Soviet Union, such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, which highlights the “black and white” thinking, where there are no shades of grey.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, June 15, 1983

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., USA

As mentioned, Secretary Shultz was a key appointee in the Reagan-administration. When Shultz took over as Secretary of State in 1982, he proclaimed that he would follow Reagan's agenda for American foreign policy. Therefore, as Secretary of State, Shultz prioritized the US-Soviet relations, just as Reagan did (Miller Center of Public Affairs, n.d.). On June 15, 1983, Secretary Shultz gave a statement on the US-Soviet relations in the context of American foreign policy, before the Senate of Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has ever since its establishment in 1816 been instrumental in developing as well as influencing American foreign policy (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, n.d.). It should be noted, that Secretary Shultz' statement contains many remarks, where the expression of Cold War mentality and the negative image of the Soviet Union is abundantly clear. Therefore, the analysis below will only select some of these remarks.

In the very beginning of his statement, Secretary Shultz states that he is not only speaking for himself in this statement but also for the President (Reagan). Shultz also states that management of US-Soviet relations is very important, because this relationship **"touches virtually every aspect of our international concerns and objectives – political, economic, and military – and every part of the world"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 1). He also states that the US must defend its values and interests against the Soviet Union, because it threatens both.

Shultz states that the Soviet Union has aspirations for greater international influence, for example with Soviet expansionism and the Soviet quest for military superiority. He observes, the **"disturbing development of the unconstructive Soviet involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 2).

Shultz states that the Soviet Union has **"made the task of managing the Soviet-American relationship considerably harder and have needlessly drawn more and more international problems into the East-West rivalry"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 2). It is evident that Shultz believes that the blame for the poor relationship between the US and the Soviet Union lies with the Soviet Union.

Shultz states that the US and the Soviet Union have **"divergent goals and philosophies of political and moral order"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 1). He also lists several goals the US pursues in world affairs as **"peace, human rights, economic progress, national independence"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 2). By saying that the US and Soviet Union have divergent goals, implies that the US goals listed above are not goals of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union must not want neither peace nor national independence. Shultz also does say that the Soviet Union is **"unwilling to countenance meaningful national autonomy for its satellites, let alone real independence"** (Shultz, 1983, p. 2). This is in accordance with his implication that the Soviet Union does not value national independence.

By the end of his statement, Shultz speaks about the prospects of the US-Soviet Union relationship, and he mentions that there at the time is no certainty that the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union will lead to an acceptable agreement. However, Shultz hope for a more constructive relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, but he says that the history of the Soviet Union - and Russia prior to it becoming the Soviet Union – does not provide any basis for expectations for dramatic change (Shultz, 1983, p. 7).

Shultz calls the US the leader of democratic nations (p. 3), whereas the Soviet Union is portrayed as a predatory expansionist power that is controlling of its satellites.

Cold War mentality is apparent in Shultz' statement through obvious bipolar thinking with the geographical distinctions between the East and the West. It is also evident in the obviously negative portrayal of the Soviet Union and the antagonism expressed towards the Soviet Union.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, November 28, 1984

“The Uses of Military Power”-speech delivered to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., USA

Secretary Weinberger shared President Reagan's conviction that “the Soviet Union posed a serious threat and that the defense establishment needed to be modernized and strengthened” (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, n.d.). In his speech “The Uses of Military Power”, Weinberger outlines how he believes American combat force should be used and how it should not be used. Since the Soviet Union was the biggest threat to American national security at the time, Weinberger naturally talks about the US approach to the Soviet threat.

Weinberger states that the US has responsibilities as the leader of the free world. He says that the US must fulfill these responsibilities **“unless we (the US, red.) desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked throughout the world”** (Weinberger, 1984). Here, Weinberger portrays the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that will continue to expand throughout the world, unless the US stops it. Later on, Weinberger speaks about the new challenges the US met after the First – and Second World War, and that the US faced a new type of warfare with the Cold War against the Soviet Union. He says, **“the face of the enemy was masked. Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of “national liberation”, but far more frequently ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder”** (Weinberger, 1984). Here Weinberger refers to the way the Soviet Union and the US were fighting during the Cold War, through proxy wars, where neither of the two directly engaged the other. He yet again alludes to the expansionist desire of the Soviet Union, and he elaborates that a way this Soviet expansionism could be carried out was through proxy wars. Weinberger points out that the threat of further Soviet expansion still

exists and that it will seek territories closer to the US. He says, **“The possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize”** (Weinberger, 1984). This speech was given at a time, where Central America very much was the battleground for US-Soviet proxy wars.

Weinberger finishes his speech with **“I believe we can contribute to deter the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries from pursuing their design around the world. We can enable our friends in Central America to defeat aggression and gain breathing room to nurture democratic reforms”** (Weinberger, 1984).

In his speech, Weinberger portrays the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that will keep expanding its influence throughout the world, unless the US stops it. Besides the portrayal of an expansionist Soviet Union, Weinberger also mentions that US adversaries do not allow freedom of speech in their own countries, and that they try to achieve their ends through simultaneous military and propaganda campaigns. He uses contrast by mentioning that the US does have an open society with freedom of speech.

Weinberger’s use of pronouns clearly distinct between the US and its allies and the enemies of the US, where the Soviet Union is the “main character”. He does say that the US have adversaries (in plural), but the Soviet Union is the only adversary he mentions by name. Furthermore, while Weinberger is not portraying the Soviet Union positively, he is not as openly portraying a negative image as President Reagan, who outright called the Soviet Union evil.

Part Two: The Obama-Administration (2015-2016)

Part two of the analysis regards communication related to US-Russian conflicts of interest by the current American government, namely the Obama-administration. The pieces of communication analyzed below is by three key figures of the Obama-administration, namely President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. Just as part one of the analysis, the analysis of communication by the Obama-administration below is also arranged in chronological sequence.

President Barack Obama, October 2, 2015

Press Conference in State Dining Room, Washington, D.C., USA

The text analyzed here is a transcription of a press conference in the State Dining Room, where President Obama answers to questions from the press.

Before President Obama took questions from the journalists he addressed a few additional topics of domestic American politics, such as the unemployment rate in the US and the Republican-Democrat infight in Congress. When the floor is open for questions from the journalists, President Obama is asked

about the Russian involvement in Syria. To this, Obama answers, **“the reason Assad is still in power is because Russia and Iran have supported him throughout this process. And in that sense, what Russia is doing now is not particularly different from what they had been doing in the past – they’re just more overt about it”** (Obama, 2015). Here, Obama seems to imply that what Russia is currently doing is similar to what it did in the past. He is possibly drawing a parallel between Russia now and the Soviet Union of the Cold War, where the Soviet Union supported head-of-states, who were not supported by the majority of their populations. Obama continues, **“They’ve (Russia and Iran, red.) been propping up a regime that is rejected by an overwhelming majority of the Syrian population because they’ve seen that he (Assad, red.) has been willing to drop barrel bombs on children and on villages indiscriminately, and has been more concerned about clinging to power than the state of his country”** (Obama, 2015). Obama indirectly implies that Russia is supporting undemocratic values by supporting a regime, which the majority of the Syrian population have rejected. Furthermore, Obama also implies that the reasons for supporting Assad is unethical, because Assad bombs children and villages indiscriminately, which could be considered a crime against humanity.

Obama strongly questions the Russian explanation for entering the Syrian conflict, namely to fight ISIL. Obama says, **“the United States and Russia and the entire world have a common interest in destroying ISIL. But what was very clear – and regardless of what Mr. Putin said – was that he doesn’t distinguish between ISIL and a moderate Sunni opposition that wants to see Mr. Assad go”** (Obama, 2015). Obama implies that Putin has lied about entering the Syrian conflict to fight ISIL, since he does not distinguish between ISIL and people in opposition to Assad. Later on in his remarks, Obama also states that Russian involvement in Syria might even strengthen ISIL, because the Assad-opposition, who is also fighting ISIL have to hide underground from the Russian bombings.

Obama clearly dissociates himself and the US from the Russian involvement in Syria by stating, **“we are not going to cooperate with a Russian campaign to simply try to destroy anybody who is disgusted and fed up with Mr. Assad’s behavior”** (Obama, 2015). That Russia is willing to destroy ‘just anybody’ in opposition to Assad, when Obama has stated that this opposition to Assad includes the vast majority of Syrians, again implies that Russia is undermining democratic values. Whereas Obama by dissociating himself and the US from this Russian ‘campaign’, indirectly says that the US values and respects democracy.

Later on, Obama speaks on Russian allies compared to the US’ allies. He says, **“Iran and Assad make up Mr. Putin’s coalition at the moment. The rest of the world makes up ours”** (Obama, 2015). This comparison could indicate competition between the US and Russia, in the sense that the US have more support internationally than Russia. This also legitimizes the US and delegitimizes the Russian actions in Syria.

When answering one of the journalists’ last questions, Obama says, **““This is not a contest between the United States and Russia. It is in our interest for Russia to be a responsible, effective actor on**

the international stage that can share burdens with us [...]. We're not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and Russia [...] This is not some superpower chessboard contest" (Obama, 2015). Obama here expresses that he hopes that Russia and the US can cooperate in solving international issues. Though he expresses that he wants to cooperate with Russia, he also implies that Russia is not yet this 'responsible, effective actor on the international stage' that the US wants it to be. He also alludes that he does not want the current tensions between the US and Russia to turn in to a new Cold War, where the superpowers are going against each other through proxy wars.

There is use of contrast in the way Obama portrays the US and Russia. About the US he mentions that it is the **"strongest large advanced economy in the world"** and that the US **"approval ratings have gone up. We are more active on more international issues and forge international responses to everything from Ebola to countering ISIL. Meanwhile [...] their (Russia, red.) economy is contracting 4 percent this year. They are isolated in the world community, subject to sanctions that are not just applied by us but by what used to be some of their closest trading partners. Their main allies in the Middle East were Libya and Syria – Mr. Gaddafi and Mr. Assad – and those countries are falling apart. [...] So Mr. Putin's actions have been successful only insofar as it's boosted his poll ratings inside of Russia"** (Obama, 2015). Obama solely lists positive facts about the US, whereas he lists negative aspect about Russia. Thereby he portrays an image of the US that is far superior to the one he portrays of Russia. Though the portrayal of Russia is not positive, it is not as negative and aggressive as the one the Reagan-administration portrayed of the Soviet Union. There are however similarities in the way that the US still is portrayed as the 'good guy', but Russia is not directly portrayed as 'the bad guy', this role belongs to Assad in this speech, but Russia is mentioned as an ally of Assad, and thereby associated with the 'bad guy'. Obama does see shades of grey, and does thereby not comply with the 'black and white'-thinking of the Cold War.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, November 7, 2015

Remarks on "Strategic and Operational Innovation at a Time of Transition and Turbulence" at the Reagan National Defense Forum, Simi Valley, California, USA

The remarks were given at the Reagan National Defense Forum - an annual event, where leaders and key stakeholders in the defense community address the state of the US national defense, arranged by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute (Ronald Regan Presidential Foundation & Institute, n.d.).

In his remarks, Secretary Carter focus on a kind of innovation for future US defense, namely how the US will respond **"to Russia, one source of today's turbulence, and China's rise, which is driving a transition in the Asia-Pacific"** (Carter, 2015). Here, Secretary Carter directly names Russia as a source of

today's turbulence, and from the context in which the speech is given, the kind of 'turbulence' Russia is causing, it is so serious that the future US defense must be prepared to respond to this.

It is not long into his remarks, when Secretary Carter mentions the Cold War, Ronald Reagan and Carter's predecessor Caspar Weinberger, whom Carter mentions he worked for beginning in 1981. Secretary Carter praises Reagan's foreign policy and approach to the Soviet Union, which Carter states helped the US win the Cold War. Given the venue and the topic of the speech, it is not odd for Carter to mention this, but praising Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union could be an indication that Carter believe that the US should take a similar approach to Russia.

Carter speaks about recent Russian actions that he finds troubling. He says, **"In Europe, Russia has been violating sovereignty in Ukraine and Georgia and actively trying to intimidate the Baltic states. Meanwhile, in Syria, Russia is throwing gasoline on an already dangerous fire, prolonging a civil war that fuels the very extremism Russia claims to oppose"** (Carter, 2015). Here, Carter states that Russia is intimidating its neighbors and even violating sovereignty. He could be implying that Russia is trying to recreate a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. Secondly, he states that Russia is making the conflict in Syria even worse and prolonging the civil war, which only benefits ISIL – the extremist group Russia claims to oppose. With this, Carter questions the Russian motives for entering the Syrian conflict, since their actions in Syria do not align with their reason for entering the conflict.

In his speech, Secretary Carter makes it obvious that the US do not seek a New Cold War or any war with Russia. He says, **"We do not seek a cold, let alone hot war with Russia. We do not seek to make Russia an enemy. But make no mistake; the United States will defend our interests, our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords us all"** (Carter, 2015). Even though Carter says that the US do not seek to make an enemy of Russia, he also clearly states that they will, should US interests, allies etc. be threatened. He thereby implies that if a war with Russia arises, it will be because Russia has made the US go to war, since the US did not seek either a cold nor hot war with Russia. Carter also states that the US will take **"a strong and balanced approach to deter Russia's aggression"** (Carter, 2015). He further elaborates that the US is **"investing in the technologies that are most relevant to Russia's provocations. [...] We're updating and advancing our operational plans for deterrence and defense given Russia's changed behavior"** (Carter, 2015). Carter then lists specific improvements of the American defense that will be able to respond to Russian aggression, should it come to that. Nevertheless, Carter also makes it clear that the US will, just like Reagan, take a balanced approach to Russia, and continue to cooperate, when American and Russian interests align. The many improvements Carter wish for the US defense in order to meet the future Russian threat, does sound somewhat similar to the military buildup the Reagan-administration did during the Cold War. Carter also proclaims that the US **"will continue to hold out the**

possibility that Russia will assume the role of responsible power in the international order, a direction they seemed headed for much of the post-Cold War era” (Carter, 2015). With this, Carter implies that Russia is not assuming the role of responsible power yet, and thereby alluding that Russia in this aspect have not changed much since the end of the Cold War, meaning it is still similar to the Soviet Union in this aspect.

By the end of his remarks Carter uses a quote from Reagan’s “Tear Down this Wall”-speech from 1987, when Carter speaks on the reasons behind US service members’ motivation. Carter says, **“They do so, as Reagan said, to “break down barriers that separate people, to create a safer, freer world””** (Carter, 2015). Carter finish with the note that the US’ fight for creating a safer, freer world is not over yet, he says, **“We didn’t stop when the Berlin Wall came down. And, at a time of transition and turbulence, we still have work to do, to realize a more peaceful tomorrow”** (Carter, 2015)

Secretary Carter portrays Russia as behaving aggressively, violating sovereignty and possibly aspiring to create a new sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The portrayal of Russia is not as evidently negative, as the Reagan-administrations portrayal of the Soviet Union, but Carter’s portrayal of Russia is nonetheless still somewhat negative. It can be discussed if Carter is expressing Cold War mentality through his rhetoric, but his many references to the Cold War does allude to him comparing current Russian actions to the actions of the Soviet Union, which could be perceived as Cold War mentality. Also, bipolar thinking is not necessarily evident in the speech, unless one considers China as part of “the East”. Carter mentions both Russia and China as threats and since China also was a communist country, it could be considered to be part of the “Cold War-‘East’”. Several other countries are mentioned, but as allies of the US, whereas Russia and China are the only countries that are mentioned as threats to US interests and to the international order.

Secretary of State John Kerry, October 15, 2015

Remarks at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, Bloomington, Indiana, USA

Secretary Kerry spoke at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies on the topic of US foreign policy in a changing world and he highlighted why American leadership abroad remains vital. He talks about areas of foreign policy such as international trade and globalization, global environment and climate change, the Iran nuclear deal and the fight against international terror organizations.

Kerry emphasizes that we are living in complicated times that are **“witnessing forces that for years were tapered down by dictators and by the Cold War itself”** (Kerry 2015) and that these forces have been released into a clash with modernity. With this, Kerry seems to distance current events from those of the Cold War. Later on Kerry mentions that the US with support from Russia among others, have reached the Iran Nuclear Deal in June 2015. This of course indicates that Cold War mentality is not present in Kerry’s

speech, since Kerry both have distanced current events from the events of the Cold War and applauding American-Russian cooperation in solving an issue with the Iran Nuclear Deal. However, when Kerry goes in to details about the fight against ISIL and specifically mentions the fight in Syria, he does seem to be vary about the Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict. He says, **“The point we have made to the Russians, however, is that it would be totally self-defeating to the point of farce to try at the same time to prop up Bashar al-Assad and his murderous regime, which seems to be precisely what Moscow wants to do”** (Kerry, 2015). Here, Kerry does state that Russia seems to be supportive of Assad, and that their reason for entering Syria to fight ISIL is just a cover up of their true intentions: to prop up Bashar al-Assad and his murderous regime. That Russia is covertly supporting Assad, and thereby lying about their reason for entering the Syrian conflict is of course not a positively representation of Syria, but it is neither blatantly negative.

Kerry continues, **“For Russian leaders, the choice is clear. They can join in supporting a plan to drive Daesh back and create room for a more unifying set of Syrian leaders, or they can invest their arms and prestige on behalf of a dictator who is despised by the vast majority of his countrymen and hated throughout much of the region. Whatever Russia does, the United States will continue to support a future for Syria that rejects both terror and tyranny and that seeks instead to end the killing and build a more stable and inclusive future”** (Kerry, 2015). Kerry makes it clear that Russia has a choice to either support Assad, and thereby support tyranny, or Russia can choose to join the US in fighting Daesh (ISIL) and the Syrian people, where the vast majority resents Assad and wants a regime change. The underlying tone of the choice Kerry present to Russia is clear though – there is a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong’, and backing Assad would be the wrong choice.

There is seemingly no overtly expressions of Cold War mentality in Kerry’s remarks. He shows wariness about the Russian involvement in Syria, in that Russia seemingly is backing Bashar al-Assad, but that is the only somewhat negative comment he attaches to Russia. This is very different from the Russian portrayal Secretary Carter made in the previous speech. President Obama was also more outspoken about how he questioned the Russian presence in Syria and he painted a portrayal of the US that was far superior to the one he painted of Russia. Kerry’s remarks therefore appear to deviate from the remarks made by President Obama and Secretary Carter in terms of the negative portrayal of Russia and the seemingly, though covert, expressions of Cold War mentality. It is possible that Kerry could be more careful in his remarks and statements, because he, as the Secretary of State, is the top diplomat of the US, and have to sit down with his Russian counterpart face to face several times a year to discuss the US-Russian relations. A second piece of communication by Kerry will be analyzed below, so it will be interesting if the analyze there will have similar results to this one.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, February 2, 2016

Remarks Previewing the FY 2017 Defense Budget, Washington, D.C., USA

Secretary Carter is speaking before the Economic Club of Washington, D.C., about the budget of the Department of Defense. Carter intends to preview some of the overarching themes of this budget as well as future investments for the 2017 budget.

Carter states that strategic thinking drove the budget decisions, and that the resurgence of Russia have affected the American defense strategy. Carter says, **“Today’s security environment is dramatically different than the one we’ve been engaged in for the last 25 years”** (Carter, 2016). It is quite interesting that Carter uses this 25-year period as a reference, since it was 25 years ago, the Cold War ended. He could have said that the security environment today is different from ever before, but that he references to the post-Cold War period, implies that the security environment today may have similarities to that of the Cold War. In addition, that Carter prior to this quote stated that Russia had resurged – not emerged for the first time – does support the parallel drawn between the security environment today and that of the Cold War.

Carter lists the evolving challenges that have affected the Department of Defense’s budget planning for the upcoming year. He says, **“Two of these challenges reflect a return to great power of competition. First is in Europe, where we’re taking a strong and balanced approach to deter Russian aggression, and we haven’t had to worry about this for 25 years; while I wish it were otherwise, now we do”** (Carter, 2016). This quote supports the observation above that Carter seems to draw parallels between Russia now and the Soviet Union. He implies that the US and Russia are yet again in a competitive relationship, just as the US was with the Soviet Union. He specifically mentions Russian aggressions in Europe that the US have not had to worry about in 25 years i.e. since the Cold War. He further states that he wish it was not so, but that this is the reality – or at least the US’ version of reality. The second challenge Carter refers to is China. Afterwards, Carter lists North Korea, Iran and lastly the fight against terrorism and especially ISIL as the evolving challenges that have driven the focus of the Department of Defense’s planning and budgeting for 2017. It is interesting that Carter lists Russia first in the evolving challenges affecting next year’s Department of Defense budget. It could be perceived to be an indication that the US views Russia as currently being the biggest threat to national security. This is interesting, because Russia have not directly threatened the US, whereas both North Korea and ISIL have (The Guardian, 2016; Bacon & Dorell, 2015).

Carter further also lists Russia and China as the most stressing competitors of the US. Carter says, **“They (Russia and China, red.) have developed and are continuing to advance military systems that seek to threaten our advantages in specific areas”** (Carter, 2016).

Carter portrays Russia as aggressive, a competitor to the US and as a threat to Europe. That he describe Russia as a threat to Europe is a stark contrast to how he describe the US, namely as the **“underwriter of stability and security in every region across the globe”** (Carter, 2016), which includes Europe. This contrast between Russia and the US is not apparent, but nonetheless it is there. Carter also implies that Russia is currently the biggest threat to American national security. Furthermore, he does draw many parallels between Russia and the Soviet Union, of course not blatantly, but that he specifically says Russia has ‘resurged’ and he more than once mentions these 25 years, which is the number of years since the end of the Cold War, does strongly imply that he sees similarities between the Cold War and now. This could be perceived as Cold War mentality, since he covertly compares Russia now to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Secretary of State John Kerry, February 13, 2016

Remarks at Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany

The following is the analysis of excerpts from the remarks Secretary Kerry delivered at the annual Munich Security Conference. The conference is a major global forum, where security policy is discussed. Heads-of-state, ministers and leading personalities of international and non-governmental organizations, as well as representatives of industry, academia, civil society and media attend the conference (Munich Security Conference, n.d.).

In the beginning of his remarks, Secretary Kerry mentions the Cold War, by thinking back to the first year of the Munich Security Conference in 1963, where the Cold War was hot. He then continues with, **“While the Cold War is long over, the need for the same qualities that brought people through that – for the courage and the resolve in defending liberty and in pursuing peace is absolutely as vital today as it was half a century ago”** (Kerry, 2016). Kerry possibly alludes that the current situation calls for the same qualities that brought people through the Cold War and that defending liberty and pursuing peace is vital today, as it was during the Cold War. He thereby draws parallels from what we see happening today to the Cold War.

When speaking about US allies and NATO, Kerry says, **“the ties that binds us are [...] rugged, time-tested cords of democratic values – liberty, decency, justice, rule of law”** (Kerry, 2016). He clearly states what the values of the US and its allies are, namely democracy, liberty, decency, justice and rule of law. It is interesting that Kerry lists decency as one of the values; it could be a covert implication that he does not view Russia as having decent values, since Russia is hindering democracy in Ukraine and possibly in Syria as well.

Afterwards Kerry goes on to speak about the support for a democratic Ukraine, and to stand up to the repeating Russian aggressions. Both Europe and the US continue to stand united in their support of the Ukrainians. Kerry furthermore states that **“in addition to our joint focus on Ukraine, the United States has significantly upgraded our commitment to European security with a planned fourfold increase in our spending on the European Reassurance Initiative”** (Kerry, 2016). With this, Kerry seemingly implies that Russia is not only a threat to Ukraine, but other parts of Europe as well. By upgrading the commitment and spending to European security, Kerry implies that the Russian threat is considerable enough to make precautions. Thereby Kerry covertly expresses suspicion and distrust about Russian intentions.

Kerry briefly makes a few remarks on the Syrian conflict. He says, **“Assad and his allies, including Russia, might believe that by defying the will of the international community, they can win the war”** (Kerry, 2016). Kerry clearly states that the international community is not siding with Russia in the matters of the Syrian conflict, and thereby implies that they cannot win the war in Syria.

Kerry portrays Russia as behaving aggressively. He also implies that Russia is hindering a democratic Ukraine and covertly implies that Russia is becoming such a considerable threat to European security that precautionary measures are needed. This could be a covert expression of Cold War mentality, since Kerry is implying that he does not trust Russian intentions.

Kerry is seemingly more upfront in addressing Russia and how he perceives Russian actions, in comparison to his remarks at Indiana University. Above, it was speculated whether Kerry possibly was more careful in his remarks and statements, because he as the Secretary of State has to sit down with his Russian counterpart face to face several times a year to discuss the US-Russian relations. Interestingly though, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, was present at the conference, so one would think that Kerry was even more careful at this venue, than at Indiana University. A possible explanation as to why Kerry is not as careful in rhetoric here, compared to the remarks at Indiana University could be due to the presence of US allies at the conference. Therefore, even though Kerry needs to be aware of his language in front of his Russian counterpart to maintain a “good” relationship to Russia, he also needs to reassure the US’ European allies in the American support to the possible Russian security threat to Europe. Nonetheless, Kerry is still far more careful in his rhetoric compared to Secretary Carter.

President Barack Obama, April 25, 2016

Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of Europe, Hannover, Germany

Obama’s address to the people of Europe was delivered in relation to his travels to Europe, where he prior to visiting Germany were in the UK. Present at Obama’s speech was German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.

Obama starts his address by mentioning progress made in the world and after this, he speaks about the challenges that threatens both Europe and the transatlantic community. He says, “[...] **dangerous forces do threaten to pull the world backward**” (Obama, 2016). Here, Obama possibly alludes to Russia being one of the forces that threatens to pull the world backward. Thereby, Russia maybe wants to go ‘back to’ similar conditions as during the Cold War. It is not certain that Obama is implying this, but from what he says not long after, it is definitely plausible. A short while later, Obama says, **“Russian aggression has flagrantly violated the sovereignty and territory of an independent European nation, Ukraine, and that unnerves our allies in Eastern Europe, threatening our vision of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. And it seems to threaten the progress that’s been made since the end of the Cold War”** (Obama, 2016). Obama highlights that Russia is not only a threat to Ukraine, but to other Eastern European countries as well. The phrase ‘a Europe that is whole, free and at peace’ alludes to a similar phrase from a speech by former American president, George Bush Sr., also delivered in Germany in 1989, near the end of the Cold War (Bush, 1989). The phrase refers to Western perspective that Europe should not be divided, like it was during the Cold War with the ‘iron curtain’ - it should be governed by liberal democracy. With the last sentence in the quote, Obama implies that the Russian aggression threatens the progress made in Europe since the Cold War: a Europe that is whole and free. This last phrase of the quote also support the statement above, that Obama is talking about Russia being one of the forces that threaten to pull the world backward.

Later on, Obama states that **“NATO’s central mission is, and always will be, our solemn duty -- our Article 5 commitment to our common defense. That’s why we’ll continue to bolster the defense of our frontline allies in Poland and Romania and the Baltic states”** (Obama, 2016). Obama obviously perceive Russia to be a threat, not only to Ukraine, but also to other Eastern European countries such as the abovementioned. Obama could be implying that he thinks Russia is trying to recreate the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’ in the post-Soviet space.

In a last remark about Russia, Obama says, **“it is my fervent hope that Russia recognizes that true greatness comes not from bullying neighbors, but by working with the world, which is the only way to deliver lasting economic growth and progress to the Russian people”** (Obama, 2016). Here, Obama calls Russia a bully and he implies that Russia is currently working against the world. However, if Russia changed its behavior it could work with the world, which in terms would benefit Russia and its people.

Obama portrays Russia as aggressive, violating other nations’ sovereignty and a bully. He states that Russia is a threat to a ‘whole and free’ Europe, especially a threat in the post-Soviet space: the Baltics, Poland and Romania.

Obama does not necessarily express Cold War mentality, but his suspicions about Russian intentions with Eastern Europe, the portrayal he makes of Russia and his references to the Cold War could be perceived to be expressions of Cold War mentality.

Reflection

This section will briefly reflect on the findings of the analysis. The Cold War mentality was obviously present in the communication by the Reagan-administration. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was clearly portrayed negatively by all three representatives of the Reagan-administration. However, the same could not be said for the Obama-administration. Here, the presence of Cold War mentality was more questionable. A reason, as to why the Obama-administration appeared more careful in its language, could be that politicians today have a bigger audience, than the one actually present in the room, when they are delivering their speeches. With modern technologies such as newspapers and the internet, they have more reach today than 30 years ago. Therefore American politicians today are possibly more careful in their wording and rhetoric than American politicians during the Cold War was.

The US and Russia are arguably more interconnected today than they were during the Cold War. In order not to risk losing the 'decent' communication existing between the US and Russia today, American politicians – at least in the American government - have to be more considerate in not worsening the relations to Russia, because that will not be beneficial to the US – on the contrary. In the analysis of the remarks by Secretary Kerry, it was obvious that he was very careful in his rhetoric and how he spoke about Russia and Russian actions. As the Secretary of State, the top diplomat of the US, he often meets with Russian representatives. As several of the of speakers mention: the US wants to cooperate with Russia on several international issues, and a good relationship to Russia is perceived to be mutually beneficial.

The difference in the extent the Obama-administration expresses Cold War mentality could possibly be due to the different roles the three key representatives of the government have. That the Secretary of State may be somewhat restricted in how his use of language and rhetoric, does indicate that one's position in government may impose certain restrictions in what one can say. The President is the head-of-state and highest ranking in the government, and therefore will have a lot of attention. The Secretary of Defense however does, despite his powerful position, rank lower in the hierarchy in government than the President and Secretary of State. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense can be 'more frank' in his statements than the other two, which could explain why Secretary Carter was more "direct" and harsh in rhetoric than President Obama and Secretary Kerry.

A final factor addressed in this reflection is the possibility that the negative views of Russia, portrayed by the Obama-administration were in fact not indications of Cold War mentality, but possibly expressions of "Russophobia". In his article '*Western Negative Perceptions of Russia: "The Cold War Mentality" over Five Hundred Years*' Paul argued that the negative views of Russia existed long before the Cold War, where Russia also was perceived, for instance an imperialistic state (Paul, 2001, p. 112). Therefore,

the negative image of Russia today may not be caused by Cold War mentality, but by a general Western negative perception of Russia, which have existed hundreds of years prior to the Cold War.

Conclusion

This thesis have investigated Cold War mentality, or more specifically 'American' Cold War mentality. Firstly, the concept of Cold War mentality have been examined in order to understand, what it is and what could be indicators of its presence. By examining existing literature and articles mentioning Cold War mentality, this thesis has reach the following understanding of the concept: *Cold War mentality was formed during the Cold War, but it is not limited to the Cold War; it could appear post-Cold War. It is not limited to solely one party of the Cold War – “both sides” are capable of it. Cold War mentality can be expressed both verbally and in writing through communication, and physically by actions. Characteristics of the Cold War such as enmity or antagonism, distrust and suspicion, bipolar thinking including geographical distinctions, and competition are reflected in Cold War mentality, though not every listed characteristic may be present, when Cold War mentality is expressed. Similarly, actions committed, as a response to the counterpart's actions, due to the suspicion or distrust of the counterpart's intentions, can also be perceived as expressions of Cold War mentality.* Regarding American Cold War mentality, this thesis found that it *could entail actions abroad, which were conducted with strategic purpose to combat or contain the perceived Russian 'threat'. American Cold War mentality could include negative views about the Soviet Union and Russia, and not simply negative views on communism as an ideology. Just like Cold War mentality in general, American Cold War also rests on binary thinking, where the West and the US are portrayed positively, contrasting to the East or Russia, who is portrayed negatively. According to Paul, “double-standards” towards Russia also exists, where if Western nations behave in similar fashion to Russian behavior, it is not considered as for example imperialistic behavior, but as acts carried out in the name of freedom. In other words, the Soviet Union or Russia is portrayed as having imperialistic intentions or as a predatory expansionist power, whereas the West is portrayed as the “defender” of freedom.*

Through the analysis of four pieces of communication by the American government from 1981 to 1986 of the Cold War, the Reagan-administration, it was found that the Soviet Union was portrayed very negatively. All three representatives of the Reagan administration, namely President Reagan, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, portray the Soviet Union as a threat to other states, as having aggressive behavior and not respecting other states' sovereignty, by imposing its will on other states. All three also describe the Soviet Union as having imperialistic desires and trying to expand the Soviet sphere of influence, and call for the Soviet Union to start acting responsible. Reagan's famous 'Evil empire'-speech portrays the Soviet Union severely negative compared to the other speeches, but every representative from the Reagan-administration portrays the Soviet Union negatively. The Cold War mentality is evident in the obvious bipolar thinking, with stark distinctions between the US (the West) and the Soviet Union (the East). In addition, the 'black and white'-thinking is evident in the way the US is portrayed as 'good' and the Soviet Union as 'evil',

which complies with the use of contrast when describing the US and Soviet Union. Furthermore, the distrust and suspicion of Soviet actions and intentions is apparent in the rhetoric by the Reagan-administration, and used as an argument for an American buildup.

Through the analysis of six pieces of communication by the current American government, the Obama-administration, specifically regarding the Syrian conflict and the growing threat Russia pose to European security, this thesis found that Russia was portrayed somewhat differently by the three representatives of the Obama-administration, namely President Obama, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Carter. All three question or disbelieve the Russian motives for entering the Syrian conflict – they are all clear that Russia's main motive for entering the Syrian conflict is not to fight ISIL, but to assist Assad. All three also describes Russian behavior as aggressive and all three express concern about the threat Russia seemingly poses to Europe. Secretary Carter uses this threat to argue for an American military buildup.

Compared to how the Reagan-administration portrayed Russia through its communication, the Obama-administration is portraying Russia in a less aggressive manner, and though there appears to be similarities between how the Soviet Union and Russia is portrayed, the Obama-administration is more covert in its expression.

Though all three representatives from the Obama administration appear to share the common view on Russia, they are to various degrees covert about it. Secretary Kerry is very careful in his language and the abovementioned image of Russia is mostly covertly expressed and not very obvious in his communication. On the contrary, Secretary Carter is very evident in his portrayal of Russia, whereas President Obama appears to be somewhere in between Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry.

It can certainly be argued that the Obama-administration to some extent expresses Cold War mentality in its communication regarding the Syrian conflict and the growing threat Russia pose to European security, though it is hardly evident in the case of Secretary Kerry. With Secretary Carter on the other, it can more easily be argued that he to some extent appears to be expressing Cold War mentality towards Russia, because he uses many references to the Cold War and seeming draws parallels between Russia today and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Obama does also use some references to the Cold War and appear to be drawing parallels similarly to Secretary Carter. But it can definitely be questioned, whether the negative portrayal of Russia is an expression of Cold War mentality, because other indicators of Cold War mentality such as the bipolar thinking is not evident in the Obama-administration's communication.

There will be a change in government in the US next year, when President Obama has finished his second term as US Commander in Chief, and it will be interesting to see how the new administration in Washington, D.C. will address the troubling and seemingly further tensions between the US and Russia. There

is a possibility that the new administration will take a different approach to Russia, than the one the Obama-administration have led, so there is definitely prospects for further research on American Cold War mentality.

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