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# Introduction

In the last few years, following the civil war in Syria, Europe, as well as the surrounding regions, have been experiencing what has popularly been dubbed a refugee crisis. Historically there are precedents that have put pressure on the EU countries regarding the reception and integration of refugees. Most notably are the Kosovo crisis and the aftermath of the 2nd World War. In fact, it was the aftermath of the 2nd World War that prompted the current legislation on recognition of refugees including the criteria for what constitutes a refugee (Goodwin-Gill & McAdams 2007).

In current developments, the EU has emphasized securing the borders of the respective countries with the commencement of various projects such as the Triton project that replaced the previous Mare Nostrum project (AIDA 2014). This represents an increased effort in repelling boat asylum seekers entering the EU via the Mediterranean. It can also be seen as a general tendency among the EU countries as wanting to limit the amount of migrants entering the EU countries. Another important aspect of the recent changes to the crisis is the deal that EU has struck with Turkey. In this agreement Turkey has agreed to take the Syrian refugees that enter Greece through Turkey, if the EU take a Syrian refugee for every migrant that Turkey received from Greece (Collet 2016). This represents the closing of one of the most popular routes that migrants used to enter the EU. It also has implications for the distribution of refugees that was previously included in the Dublin accord. According to the legislation in the Dublin accord refugees should be processed in the first EU country that they entered. This led to a few countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain receiving a disproportionate amount of refugees in relation to the rest of the EU (UNHCR 2016). However, following the deal with Turkey and recent focus on the aforementioned amount of refugees that some countries received, the EU has enacted legislation and proposals to distribute the refugees among the other EU countries so that the so-called burden is shared equally.

It appears that almost all the countries within the EU agree upon the burden, that receiving asylum seekers represent, and that it should be shared equally. However, what has stirred numerous discussions and has in fact yet to lead to an agreement, is the question of what a fair distribution should entail. In other words, what elements should the distribution model, if such a thing were to be enacted in the EU, entail for it to represent fairness for all the nations involved. It is the redistribution of refugees already within the EU and the refugees that Turkey has sent back into the EU as part of the agreement, which represents the inspiration for this thesis.

The most prevalent elements that have been included in the proposals state that a fair distribution model should take into account the number of citizens, the BNP of the country, the number of asylum seekers currently in the country and the rate of unemployment (Politikken 2015). This proposal has met resistance from many countries including Denmark, because they argue that the elements taken into account, does not in fact reflect a fair distribution. Especially the Eastern-European countries have opposed this quota system because they point at the lack of established institutional response options as well as the relatively low amount of asylum seekers present, meaning that they would receive a high proportionate amount. They especially point at the costs for receiving and handling asylum seekers as being higher per asylum seeker in their countries as oppose to countries such as Germany that has a history of receiving refugees (Bovens & Bartsch 2015). Other critics of the quota system has pointed at the varying reception protocols and refugee recognition rates as something that counteracts the intentionality of fairness in a redistribution among the EU states. As a result, the current redistribution functions on a voluntary basis, and as of yet, fewer than 200 asylum seekers have been re-distributed to EU from Turkey (The Guardian 2016). Thusly, it appears that re-location or re-distribution within the EU has failed to some extent at the international level due to varying interest in the reception and responsibility. Some would argue that this is due to the element of choice inherent in decisions made between states (Thieleman 2003). Therefore, the next logical step when examining distribution of asylum seekers or refugees, is to look at it from a national perspective to see if the distribution at this level is more effective. The following section describes how distribution is legislatively described within a national setting being that of Denmark.

## Reception Numbers in Denmark

It is relevant for the importance of studying the distribution mechanisms to show the growing burden that Danish municipalities are situated in as a result of the growing number of refugees. As a result, the following statistic is introduced:

\* *number for 2016 are an estimation.*

*Source: Ministry for Foreigners, Integration & Housing (2016)*

As shown above, the numbers of refugee status’ granted in Denmark has increased almost exponentially over the last 10 years. This makes the relevance of describing and critically examining the mechanism of distribution in relation to integration all the more important as the subsequent burden can be expected to have increased as well. In terms of numbers, it should be noted that the 2016 numbers are based on the Danish Immigration Services’, or DIS for short, estimate of how many are expected to be granted refugee status. As of May 2016 the Danish municipalities have received a total of 3584 refugees (Ministry for Foreigners, Integration & Housing 2016). In 2015 DIS’ estimate was 15.000 and as it can be seen in the model above, the actual number was closer to 11.000 (Ibid.). The numbers for 2016 is therefore expected to be lower than 17.000. Another aspect that is relevant is that this statistic only shows individual refugee status’ and following the gathering of empirical data it was indicated that family re-unifications represent a significant increase in the number of refugees that a given municipality receive. Thus the actual numbers that Danish municipalities receive should be considered higher than the numbers shown in the model. The problem with showing statistics concerning the re-unifications is that they fall into the same category as ex. a Danish citizen being re-unified with a wife/husband from a country outside of the EU. Thus, the actual numbers that Danish municipalities are receiving cannot be shown but it does show that in the most recent years there has been a substantial increase in the amount of people that enter the distribution regime of Denmark. The next step is to describe the distribution system of Denmark to show how the refugees that enter it are distributed within the Danish State.

## Distribution in Denmark

This section seeks to describe the current legislation that directly influences the distribution of refugees in Denmark. Given that the field of relevant legislation, that has an impact on the actual distribution, is diverse and overlaps into a substantial part of the entirety of the Danish legislation, not all legislation will be covered. Rather the parts that has a bearing on the gathering of empirical data as well as the analysis later on will be described. Along with a description of the legislation this section will also show how the legislation has changed over a number of years and point to implications from this.

Following the refugee crisis across Europe, Denmark has taken in a number of refugees as per the Dublin II treaty that states that any asylum seeker should be processed in the first country that they enter. As a result, any asylum seeker not processed in another EU country that enters Danish territory is the responsibility of the Danish state. However, when they enter it is not a given that they will be granted refugee status and through that reside within Denmark. This is a process that is determined by various procedures. The procedures are according to the 1951 refugee conventions as well as the 1967 protocols (Goodwin-Gill & Adams 2007). Accordingly, since their status is not that of refugee at the point of entering Denmark the physical distribution of asylum seekers will be disregarded in favor of focusing on refugee relocation.

The Danish distribution of refugees, at this point in time, is based on legislation that was first developed in 1999 and was dubbed the Integration Act (Ministry for Refugees, Migrants and Integration 2000). This is the foundation for any distribution as well as other relevant integration accords that DIS and other relevant agents are obliged to follow in the integration as well as reception of refugees.

According to the legislation the distribution is performed thusly: DIS calculates a national number based on an estimate about how many asylum seekers DIS expect to process and, receive refugee status. Following the result, the national quota is sent to KKR[[1]](#footnote-1) for them to facilitate negotiations between the municipalities concerning how many refugees each region should/can receive (Integration Act §7). If no agreement can be reached it defaults back to DIS to calculate how many refugees each region is to receive. The calculation is based on the regions collective number of citizens compared to the national total. DIS also takes into account the total number of non-western foreigners in the region along with the number of people that have been reunified through family ties (New in Denmark 2014). Following this mathematical calculated distribution model, the results are once again sent to the municipalities for them to negotiate between themselves i.e. meaning the municipalities within a region about how the regional quota is to be distributed among them (Integration Act § 7). If no agreement can be reached the decision again defaults back to DIS in the same manner as with the regional quota. The calculation that determines the municipal quota is the same as with regional quota but with the municipalities calculated as separate entities.

The process shown below is a visualizing how the process of distributing refugees among the Danish municipalities work. Each step in the process is more complicated then shown below, however for the purposes of showing the chain of interaction it is functional.

This shows that legally DIS relies upon the municipalities to facilitate an efficient distribution. The legislative framework for how each refugee is physically distributed is based on various factors. In the Integration Act it is stated that DIS are required to take these aspects into account when allocating a municipality for reception:

* Geographical location and size,
* Workforce composition and educational options,
* Population composition and-
* Treatment and institutional opportunities

Source: Integration Act § 14, section 2.

Through these elements it would appear that the legislation is constructed so that the resources available are utilized with efficiency in mind. However, with any legislation it is within the actual implementation where discrepancies can occur. As the literature of the topic of refugee dispersal will show it is paramount that any distribution of refugees is done in a manner that the refugees themselves are empowered to become integrated (Wren 2003; Boswell 2003; Myrberg 2015). Furthermore, this is also the mandate provided to DIS, specified in the Integration Act (Integration Act 2014).

Following the arguments that Karen Wren put forth in her analysis of the Danish refugee dispersal regime in 2003, another legislative measure that has significant bearing on the effectiveness of any refugee dispersal, in terms of resource utilization, is the placement of refugees inside of municipalities. At its present state there are limitations to how much money municipalities in Denmark can request from refugees for their housing (Ministry for Children, Equality, Integration and Social Conditions 2015). However, there are no limits to the actual cost for the municipality, and there is a legislative requirement that refugees are housed (Ibid.). As a result, many municipalities find themselves in a problematic situation and because this is recognized by the government, relatively new legislation has been passed that allows for municipalities to house refugees in temporary housing such as pavilions etc. This also has implications for pre-existing legislation that is superseded by current need for housing of refugees (Integration Act § 12, section 6). According to Jens Ejsing and Pernille Dreyer, this legislative requirement for housing of refugees means that they are in fact being put ahead of citizens in the municipalities for housing (Ejsing & Dreyer 2015). Furthermore, the amount that each refugee receives as a monthly amount are expected to be lowered this year of 2016 by October which may further cause difficulties for municipalities to find housing for refugees (Refugees.dk 2016).

An important aspect of the legislation, concerning the distributions as well as the integration, is that it changes rapidly, and is based on ad hoc decisions (Bræmer 2010; Christensen 2010). This point is based on at least 14 numbers of change and revision to the integration legislation from 2001 to 2009 (Ibid.). Furthermore, each change often dealt with more than one element. An example can be rules for family reunifications as well as the rules for receiving permanent residence. All together the field of policy changes leaves the impression that this legislative area is one characterized by uncertainty as to the implications of change and thusly, this has consequences for the people and institutions affected. The analytical aspects from this, which is considered to have an impact on the effective reception options of municipalities, will be covered in the analysis.

The abovementioned legislation are the prevalent parts of the legislation that has a bearing on this thesis. Furthermore, it also provides a superficial picture of the situation that the municipalities find themselves in: placed within a set of legislative requirements that has socio-economic and monetary costs that they are required to figure out in a practical setting.

In the following section various analytical studies revolving around distribution of refugees at a national level will be described and it will be shown how their methodology and approaches will be used as a means of framing the theory, methodology and overall approach to the field utilized further on in this thesis.

## Relevance to the field

As mentioned in the previous section, the inspiration for this thesis came from the current EU distribution system and the problems inherent in it. Within the system there are many aspects that are interesting and worthy of study. This section seeks to describe various relevant studies that are utilized through this thesis as well as some that served as sources of inspiration in the field of theory, analytical approach as well as methodological choices. It should be noted that the majority are situated at the national level. This represents a disregard of the international field of research where the majority of the studies are situated. However, since this thesis focusses on a municipal level the national level studies were deemed more relevant.

One of the most prominently applied secondary literatures within this thesis is an analysis conducted by Karen Wren in 2003. In it she analyses the distribution of refugees in Demark from 1998 – 2003. Her approach is one of mixed methods, meaning that she applies both quantitative and qualitative methodological tools in her analysis. Her goal is to evaluate the dispersal in terms of effectiveness and effect on the integration process of refugees (Wren 2003). Her ideas of what effectiveness means when distributing refugees was instrumental in the process of designing the approach to this thesis. Another rather surprising contribution that her analysis added to this thesis is the fact that her findings although more than 10 years old, are still relatively viable in the current distribution today. This has a series of analytical aspects concerning legislation and implementation that will be unfolded in the analysis. Her findings and even choice of words, meaning that of dispersal rather than distributing, points at another aspect of this thesis because of the inherent negativity in the word dispersal over distribution. Her research also points at the implications of diluting refugees rather than allowing them to live together. She states this is happening because of the prevalent fear of parallel societies emerging. According to her this has led to overall legislative view of refugees being a burden as oppose to the potential benefits from having more working people (Ibid.). A number of reports and journals dubbing the term of receiving refugees as burdensharing have added layers of understanding of the entire phenomena to this thesis.

Christina Boswell (2003) is the author of a comparative journal concerning the distribution of refugees in Germany and the UK. There are certain telling similarities in the way that the distribution is conducted as well as the challenges that each country faced. One of the similarities is that distribution was done from an ideological standpoint that receiving refugees posed a cultural threat and that distribution, as a result, was a means to countering this. Therefore, seeing as this is also part of the intentionality behind the current Danish distribution model, some of the elements that she highlights as being of importance in analyzing the distribution are incorporated in the interview guide utilized to gather the necessary data to describe the Danish municipalities and their position in the distribution model.

Some of the findings from her analysis along with those of Wren are telling in the sense that they correlate with those of the current distribution model in Denmark, suggesting that the problems found within the current distribution model despite the recent changes in policies are enduring ones. Yet another article that was helpful in placing this thesis within the field was one written by Gunnar Myrberg (2015). It revolves around how national interest shapes dispersal policies as well as integration efforts. His analysis is a comparative case study between a Swedish and a Danish major city. Myrberg was concerned with the interaction between national legislation and the implantation effects at the municipal level. His findings led to the conclusion that because of a lack of communication between the governmental institutions and municipal regimes, the implementation of integration and housing efforts at the municipal level would more than often become decoupled from the intentionality of the distribution (Ibid.). He also points to the fact that in the last 10 or more years, Danish municipalities have gone from passive receivers of refugees to now being active in the process of distributing refugees, a point that still hold today. He points to the deciding factor being that the policies in Sweden are generally more unobtrusive then the Danish ones. According to Myrberg this has led to a more incentivizing environment for the Danish municipalities to actively enter the integration arena.

These three authors are the ones that have complimented the content of this thesis the most. Their main contributions can be found in shaping the approach of this thesis as well as pointing at relevant areas of measurement in the field of an efficient and equitable refugee distribution. As mentioned in the previous section the legislation concerning this field is one that changes according to the needs of the government as well as the municipalities, therefore secondary literature in the shape of news articles have necessarily also affected the approach introduced in this thesis. The implications of this potential bias will be covered in the methodological chapter.

In the next section the knowledge gap between the aforementioned studies and this thesis will be described further and the problem formulation that this thesis seeks to answer will be introduced.

## Problem Formulation

With the aforementioned analytical inspiration as well as the legislative framework surrounding the distribution of refugees in Denmark it becomes possible to frame the subject that this thesis will revolve around.

The distribution mechanisms in Denmark are more than 15 years old, and has been subject to relatively high amount of change in the period since its inception. Following the analysis by Karen Wren in 2003 the aim of this thesis becomes to evaluate and analyze the aspects of equity and efficiency within the distribution model that is being employed to disperse refugees in Danish municipalities. Given that any thesis should seek to generate new knowledge, the placement of this thesis within the aforementioned field of research is therefore the distribution model itself rather than the effects the distribution has on the refugees. This is the point where this thesis diverges from the previously mentioned studies and is therefore considered a knowledge gap. Another reasoning behind the conception of this thesis is that it is also considered an important discussion to be had following the apparent failure of the EU-Turkey refugee relocation system. The problem formulation written below can be considered as being derived from reading the studies mentioned in the previous sections as well as the information gained from reading articles revolving around distribution in the months before the beginning of this thesis writing. Furthermore, as part of the master’s study in Global Refugee Studies practical, methodological and theoretical knowledge has been gained that is considered part of the pre-existing knowledge found in this thesis.

The following problem formulation encompasses the aforementioned elements through a theory of burdensharing and public goods distribution.

*What are the issues with equity and efficiency in the current Danish distribution model for refugees, and how can the distribution be improved from looking at the difference between the intentionality and the implementation at the municipal levels?*

Within the problem formulation are inherent assumptions that, while being qualified assumptions based on the knowledge present in their conception, are nonetheless assumptions. An example of this is the usage of the concepts of equity and efficiency. These are derived from the chosen theory to analyze the findings later on in the analysis, the assumption is that the theory has beneficial properties that complement the data. Another assumption is that while articles in Danish newspapers highlight the distribution as being problematic for the municipalities, the assumption is that there are alternative practical steps to better the distribution. These are some of the assumptions that are included within the question that the analysis seeks to explore. In the next section the chosen methodology of this thesis will be described as a means of framing the research strategy and design.

# Methodology

This section seeks to explain the reasoning behind the chosen methodology being employed in the pursuit of answering the problem formulation. The following section describes how the abductive methodology was used to guide the process of conducting research.

## Adaptive Methodology

The adaptive methodology came into being as a response to the more rigid inductive and deductive methods (Rescher 1978). It is by many considered as being derived from pragmatism as a philosophy of science and as such was considered as a hybrid methodology/philosophy of science (Ibid.). Since then it has become a methodology unto itself. It contains elements of both the inductive as well as the deductive methodology without being either.

The name “adaptive”, as is so aptly stated, means that the researcher is prompted to adapt the scope of the research as facts become known. This means that it requires adaptation throughout the process of the research. This is similar to a concept such as the hermeneutic circle. The difference being that the researcher does not necessarily have to approach data in a circular fashion. An example of this can be found in the approach to the data in this thesis where occasionally it was approached in a circular manner, but prevalently it is more linear. This would not necessarily be possible if the use of deductive or inductive methodology was applied (Ibid.). Another aspect that the adaptive methodology approximates is that of the Empirical Realism(Ibid.). This is so because of the almost pragmatic approach to a given field, but also because of the inherent views concerning the research design (Bryman 2004:14). An example of this is that with the adaptive method the beginning of the research can originate with observation of a given field yet retain deductive elements. This would imply an inductive approach; however, it still allows for the researcher to obtain insight into the implications of the observations through theory testing. Furthermore, it still retains the option for the creation of hypothesis based on the observations. This borders on the deductive approach while still retaining the inductive elements.

This “play of methods” is primarily done to avoid what is dubbed by Wright Mills as a methodological hindrance (Jacobsen 2007:253). By this he refers to the fact that because of the rigid nature of pure inductive and deductive research strategies, elements of the field being researched can be left out and ignored in its entirety because it does not fit with either a theoretical or empirical approach (Ibid.). Because of this implication the theory and the empirical data will be utilized in equal measure within this thesis.

The adaptive method allows for an open methodology, and contains a concept that is known as Method Triangulation. This is a method where the aim is to ensure that the data gathered can more easily be validated (Ibid). It does so by stating that if more than one method provides corresponding data the likeliness that the data reflect reality is approximated. The way it is being employed within this thesis is the application of data from observations, interviews as well as secondary literature.

Critics of the adaptive methodology have said that because there is no formula as to how a researcher should apply the adaptive method it can often become a blurry or muddy way of conducting research (Jacobsen 2007). Because of this critique this thesis will also apply the abductive approach which adds elements of a more defined way of conducting research. While the two are different aspect of methodology, they are often used in unison, and are recommended by Alan Bryman (2004) as something that compliments each other.

## The Abductive Approach

The abductive approach synergizes well with the adaptive methodology because of its inherent break with the paradigm of a strict inductive or deductive approach (Kristiansen 2002:332). The abductive approach also seeks to employ previously accepted knowledge in new and different ways with the explicit goal of adding new frames of understanding. According to Kristiansen there are three types of abductive approaches. The one that is utilized in this thesis is what he refers to as the creative abduction (ibid.). The scope of the creative abduction is to view a commonplace phenomenon with a different framework so as to provide new knowledge in a given field. This allows for the re-defining of elements within the theoretical contribution to the empirical data. It also prompts viewing the empirical data in an uncommon and potentially new way. Utilizing the abductive approach means that while the intention of the theory within this thesis is geared towards a more international setting, its application will be on that of a national setting instead. That being said this thesis does lean more towards the deductive in terms of how the analysis is structured and how much the empirical findings and the theory are utilized.

Another reasoning behind applying the abductive approach is that it bridges the philosophical differences between an individualistic and a structural approach (Kristiansen 2002:252). This allows for the analytical point of viewing the different agents from the empirical data as well as the structures outside of the agents. As a result, they are viewed together as they affect each other throughout the analysis. In more practical terms, the implications for the research strategy means that it allows for the utilization of subjective data from interviewing municipalities as well as the relatively more objective data such as statistics and institutional observations. Through this way of conducting research and by viewing the refugees allocated by the distribution model through an adapted version of the burdensharing theory it is the aim of this thesis to provide an in-depth insight into the implications of the current distribution model used by DIS in terms of equity and efficiency as well as the consequences for the receiving municipalities.

## Empirical Data

The empirical contributions in this thesis are part observations and part data from interviewing agents that are involved in the system of the distribution model. As mentioned in the introduction the idea behind this thesis originated in observations of the distribution of refugees in the EU, therefore in a chronological sense the gathering of empirical data began with observations. Throughout the analysis, part of the logic is supported by secondary literature and observations that are gained by following the topic in the media as well as in academic writings. Because of the potential biases within any observation, being that of the researcher, the observations are never applied without the support of other sources of literature. This way of supporting observations can be considered as strength as well as a weakness. It can be considered a strength because it adds a level of validation to the gathered data from observations. This means that the linkage between the observed and reality are considered more likely to correspond. It can also be a potential weakness because of the expectancy of the researcher. For this reason, some researchers dub this approach to ontology as the naive realism (Bryman 2004:14). It is for this reason that secondary literature in the form of articles and other observations are utilized to support in the aforementioned manor.

There a limits to any researcher’s knowledge about a given field, and therefore it was necessary to complement the existing knowledge. This was done by interviewing individuals who are employed in the areas that deal with the effects of the distribution model on a daily basis. This led to the interviewing of employees from municipalities as well as other organizations. The contact between the researcher and the interviewees are based on an initial contact with e-mails being the main tool utilized to establish contact. Afterwards if the knowledge gained from the initial contact was deemed to be a potential contributing factor an actual face-to-face interview was conducted.

The interviewing of these employees are conducted from a semi-structured interview guide that focused greatly on the fact that the knowledge of the interviewer was incomplete and therefore left a wide margin of room for follow-up questions to be asked of the employees. The interview guide is therefore considered to be an amalgam of the open and structured interview guide. The actual guide that was used to gain data can be found in the appendix (Appendix – Interview Guide). An important aspect of the guide is that it was developed from interview to interview meaning that the questions in the current version are not necessarily the ones that the first interview contained. This means that while the questions were not entirely the same throughout, they were adapted to the gain of knowledge from each interview according to the adaptive methodology. The fact that the need was even there also point to the fact that the answers were so diverse, in terms of the practices that each municipality and other agents informed of. This indicated that the field of reception and perceptions were dynamic and not homogenous. This was an important point and it will be taken up in the analysis.

As a result of resources as well as willingness to participate among municipalities there were limitations as to how many municipalities were interviewed. The next section will describe how the sample size is utilized as well as the analytical implications this has on its inclusion in the analysis.

## Sample Size

It is the nature of qualitative research to have a relatively small sample size, compared to quantitative research, and this thesis is no different. Because the field being researched spans institutional practices as well as individuals it is possible to conduct a descriptive mapping research over the relevant institutions imbedded in the distribution model. There are few, if any, limitations to what can be said from the empirical data gained throughout interviews and other sources of data in relation to what the relevant institutional regimes of the distribution model constituted. The main hindrance to the size of the empirical data is the fact that DIS had no wish to participate in this thesis and therefore their subjective experiences of the distribution model are not present. However, because all the other agents or institutional representatives are present in the data it is the viewpoint of this thesis that the institutional sections of the analysis to come, is still viable where knowledge gaps that DIS could have filled are replaced with secondary literature supporting the points.

In the data concerning the municipalities there are a total of 3 municipalities. Because of this there are issues of generalizing present in the data. It is the aim as well as scope of this thesis to approximate an analysis representing the totality of the field revolving around the distribution model. Since the sample is composed of municipalities in the Capital Area of Denmark it is also excluding the remaining regions. This means that because of the size of the sample, along with the lack of diversity in the sample size, it cannot be generalized. This is because of the differences between the municipalities from the different regions of Denmark. For example, the closer you get to the Capitol Area, population density increases, which means that the land available for building new residences lowers. This has an impact on the placement of refugees as will be shown later on. Because of this lack of generalizability any points that appears generalizing will be supported by chosen secondary literature in the form of articles and other researchers findings.

There are notable differences in between municipalities across regions and therefore generalizing from the sample size available is not possible. What is done instead is that this thesis points at general issues within the distribution as well as trends that can be approximated to represent the entirety of the field. An aspect that does provide some measure of generalization is the fact that the field of this thesis is largely policy influenced. Because the affected municipalities are bound by the same legislation, this would indicate that problems inherent within the distribution model can be said to affect every municipality. So although only the specific points from municipalities interviewed are presented, they can at times be generalized. In the following section the application of the data in terms of ethics will be described to ensure a correctness in their application.

## Reflections on Applying Data

Any application of empirical data requires that the researcher reflects on the ethical usage of the data. This is no less true in the case of the specific empirical data that was gathered in this thesis. While secondary literature in the shape of articles are generally not an ethical issue, it is always important that the way they are utilized reflect what the author was in fact saying. Especially when applying the secondary literature in the form of quotes is it important to “frame” the quote in a way that shows the context of the quote from the perspective of the author. According to Bryman (2004) this necessitates a recognition by the researcher that any interpretation of data is the subjective interpretation of the researcher.

“*The social researcher is always providing his or her own spin on the texts that are analyzed. The same is true of all social science data”* (Bryman 2004:526).

Therefore, any quote rendered previously or further on in this thesis will have a short rudimentary description of the context of the quote that shows how it was said or written. This is also true with the data gathered from interviewing employees at the municipalities as well as other agents of interest. Another ethical issue is that all of the interviews were conducted in Danish. The reason for this is that it is the native language of both the interviewer as well and the interviewee. Therefore, to avoid misunderstandings the interviews were conducted in this language. This naturally has a bearing on their application, since any quote is rendered in English. Thus, every quote is not only taken from a context but is also translated. This puts further pressure on the importance of an ethical approach to applying data. With the qualitative interviews there was another ethical issue that has bearing on the shape of the analysis. Because of the political nature of the field in this thesis many of the interviewees requested that their statements were used in a generalizing manor thus rendering them anonymous. This has certain implications which will be described and reflected upon in the following section.

## The Importance of Anonymity

Interviewing individuals sometimes require the need for anonymity because of the nature of the data being gathered. There can be many reasons why an individual should wish for anonymity. The main issue is that there can exist the potential for reprisals from other individuals who feel that the statements are putting them or something they care about in a negative light (O’Riley & Kiyimba 2015:53). In this thesis this was also the case. Because municipalities are largely political structures the need for anonymity was critical. In speculating terms, it can be considered that if there were no anonymity it would potentially limit the data gathered. This is because of the potential that information would be provided along a particular political line rather than a more honest and perhaps more realistic one. Therefore because of the anonymity granted to the interviewees at the municipality level the potential for bias through a specific version of the truth being told is lessened. Anonymity also adds a layer of security for the interviewees in the sense that if they somehow made the municipality look bad or said something that reflected poorly on their superiors within the municipality it could potentially threaten their job position or perhaps personal standing in the eyes of other municipal employees.

Anonymity has certain implications on the ways in which the data gained from these interviews can be utilized. Every interviewee represents a specific municipality, but with anonymity applied to the data the implication is that even though the interviewees represent a single municipality the data cannot be linked with that any specific municipality. Thus, instead of representing any specific municipality the interviewees represent a pool of municipalities from the Capitol Area that the analysis will draw on. This requires discipline on the side of the researcher because it would be easy to take data from one municipality and apply it with the data from another municipality out of context. Applying data from more than one anonymous source therefore becomes a matter of ethically utilizing them correct.

Because two out of the three municipalities that were interviewed as part of the data gathering did not want their interviews utilized as quotes these will be referred to without an appendix. This request for a more extensive degree of anonymity was slightly unusual and certain analytical points can be drawn directly from it. It could for example represent a wish that the practices of their municipalities remain disclosed and withheld from other agents such as the remaining pool of municipalities or higher up the political chain. This would mean that the communication as well as cooperation between some of the Capitol Area municipalities is limited and even perhaps non-existent. The implications of the anonymity will be further explored in the discussive section of the analysis.

## Empirical Choices

Throughout the last sections the various empirical choices that have been made as a result of the problem formulation and the focus of this thesis has been described. This section seeks to explain how this thesis could have otherwise benefitted from alternate empirical choices.

One of the major empirical choices was choosing to utilize qualitative data as a means of conducting research. The alternative of applying quantitative data is one that has been employed in a number of similar studies, some of them mentioned in the relevance to the field section describing the field of similar studies. One of the benefits from using quantitative data is that the findings also become quantifiable and thus more tangible. An example is that Karen Wren shows the relationship between housing tenure and placement of refugees (Wren 2003). This ability to point at significant relations in data could have been beneficial if the wish was to describe a static and objective field.

It also has drawbacks that are prevalent in the chosen aspect of the distribution model. Firstly, to conduct quantitative research it requires substantial amounts of data, something that is almost impossible within the time-frame of this thesis. Another way of appropriating the data would be through a relevant institution that has already gathered the data required. However, in the specific field of this thesis it was not possible to obtain or for that matter to locate such a data set. Another reason why quantitative data was deemed less appropriate over qualitative is because it is possible to make analytical points and show trends in municipal trends through the application of superficial quantitative data when paired with qualitative findings. Therefore, the role of quantitative data is that of supportive rather than guiding where an example is the statistic in the first section showing the influx of refugees over the last years. This choice of applying mainly qualitative data does have the implications that the findings cannot be either generalized as mentioned in the sample size section and also that statements claiming certain findings to have an impact is harder to prove and it can therefore be situational. For research to function under these condition an ethical approach is required so that no findings are misinterpreted of overstated (Bryman 2004:526).

Following the description of the methodological approach applied within this thesis, the next step is to describe the theoretical framework.

# Theory

The following section seeks to explain and operationalize the theory that is utilized in analyzing the distribution model for refugees in Denmark. Because of the inherent differences in the original theory of the burdensharing model the theory will be operationalized so as to provide an optimal usability in relation to the empirical data.

## Burdensharing

Burdensharing theories and collective goods theories as they have been dubbed by some originate more than 100 years ago and are founded by Adam Smith (1776). The author of the specific part of the theory being applied in this thesis is written by Eiko R. Thieleman (2006). The theory of burdensharing deals with the important question of how to distribute a collective good so that it contributes evenly across a number of states or regions. This poses the question of how states or nations distribute refugees so that the public benefits or suffer equally. In other words, how is the burden shared in a way that no single state or municipality suffer more than the others?

It is the mandate of governments to provide a large portion of the public goods that citizens and individuals residing in any specific country enjoy (Thieleman 2006). On an international level this distribution is considered more difficult because it requires the coordination of international or supranational institutions such as the EU. Furthermore, any distribution has to take into account the sovereignty of nations when enforcing distribution. In the scope of this thesis the focus is on the national public goods sections of the theory. However, for the sake of the applicability of the theory, international elements will be introduced and operationalized.

In essence, the theory of burdensharing is one of equity and effectiveness (Thieleman 2006). Each of the concepts are defined separately, but they both refer to the various resources involved in a distribution. When referring to resources this can mean anything from monetary to cultural homogeneity and as such is a diverse concept. It should also be noted that there is a difference between equity and equality. Equality refers to a distribution where each agent receives the same amount, whereas equity refers to an optimal distribution where the agents receive the amount they require to achieve optimal results. As a result, the main question that the theory allows a researcher to answer is: how does one distribute a resource or a good so that the publics’ benefits are optimized through equity and the ensured efficiency? An enlightening example used by Thieleman is that of the traditional traffic light. The usage of a traffic light for one individual does not exempt others from benefitting equally from it at the same time (Thieleman 2006). I.e. the consumption of the positive security and behavioral effects are used by all who cross the given intersection. With this example the definition of a public good become:

 “*a public good is characterized by the fact that no other country can be excluded from benefiting from this contribution (i.e. it is ‘non-excludable’) nor does consumption of the public good reduce the amount available for consumption by others*” (Thieleman 2006:4).

The concept of excludability is something that will be used extensively in the analysis as excludability is something that the current distribution model is considered to contain. An important aspect of public goods theory is to take into account the fact that while the theory of public goods describes *positive* goods, it can equally describe *negative* public goods. Given the view of refugees as being a burden in terms of economic costs and of threatening cultural homogeneity the theory also adapts aspects from burdensharing (Thieleman 2006). According to Thieleman, the burden from refugees is lessened in other countries by having one country take a relative large amount, or as Thieleman dubs it a *negative externality*. This variation of the concept arises when a non-contributor in burdensharing receives benefits from another’s actions. However, as the quote above states this would indicate that it is not all countries that benefit equally from one country taking larger amounts of refugees, in fact all other countries except from the actual taker of refugees benefit in terms of monetary costs. Thereby making the public good a negative externality to the contributor (Ibid.). Taking the example of one country taking a relative large portion of refugees, the common good received by other countries could be considered as security and/or stability because the received refugees are less likely to spill into other countries that may not be as capable of handling the amount of refugees. Receiving refugees also assist in adding stability to an inflamed refugee situation where every country benefits. With the example of the traffic light, if one country receives refugees, which then subsequently adds stability to an inflamed region, other countries in that region benefit including the receiving state. This is an important aspect of most public goods: the fact that they contain both excludable as well as non-excludable elements depending on what characteristics you look at (Ibid.). As a result, the concept of public goods should be considered differentiate depending on the measurements utilized. If all countries receive the beneficial aspects from a public good, regardless of the level of participation in taking in refugees, then it would make the action a public good by the aforementioned definition, but also what Thieleman calls a *non-rival* public good. By saying that it is non-rival Thieleman argues that the receiving of the public goods by one state does not detract from some amounts of the effect that the public goods have on other states. The concept of non-rival, in terms of who the benefactors are among the municipalities, is a concept that can to some extent show how effectively the burden from refugees is shared among the municipalities.

Thieleman states that there is an inherent expectancy in refugee burdensharing that states share burdens unevenly amongst the affected states (Thieleman 2006). The wealthier the state, the larger the absolute load of the burden it is expected to bear. This would mean that although the absolute amount of refugees received in one state, is larger than the other states the relative amount is expected to be equal. This is an important point in assessing the effectiveness of applying the theory to the Danish distribution model, and something that will be touched upon in the analysis. For example, In the case of the EU, the costs for receiving refugees in one country is directly affected by the costs spent in the other countries making the costs excludable. Because of this Thieleman argues that states can be expected to provide inefficient contributions to the international public goods (Thieleman 2006:8). He further argues, that a result of this is that states recognize the effects of public goods that are viewed as burdening are therefore shirks the distribution as something to be avoided if possible. This leads to the concept of *free-riding*. Free-riding exists because states recognize the benefits to be had according to the non-rival parts of public goods, and therefore sees this as something to be achieved. An example of this are the earlier days of what is called the refugee crisis in Europe. As mentioned in the introduction, before the crisis spread to the inner parts of Europe, the outer-most countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain received a disproportionate amount of refugees with the rest of the EU countries receiving far less. However, by having these countries receiving many and other receiving few, the non-contributing countries were in fact enjoying the same public good in terms of security and stability that the border countries provided. They also benefitted from a public good with regards to the economic burden of having refugees in their countries. The aforementioned public good was excludable in the sense that the benefits were received unequally and thus is conceded as a negative public good. According to Thieleman another important characteristic of burdensharing, in the reception of public goods, is the fact that the more public attention the distribution gets, the less free-riding will be present because of repercussions (Ibid.). As a result, in the previous example the *spill-over* of the distribution of the refugee public goods from the border countries to others, changed the more public the issue became (Thieleman 2006:9-10). This section has sought to describe various aspects of the theory in terms of how agents view public goods as well as some of the effects that an unequable distribution can lead to. The next section seeks to operationalize the theory so that it can be applied in a national setting rather than an international one.

## Operationalization of the Theory

So far the theory has mainly focused on the how refugees can be viewed within an international setting. According to Thieleman the theory can also be applied within states as long as some adjustments are made. Because of the political decision powers that a government has, it is more likely that the contribution of agents within a country will have elements of what Thieleman refers to as the *pure public good* (Thieleman 2006:11). Pure public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable with only positive spill-overs (Ibid.). It is the coercive potential that governments possess, that means that it is more likely to have the ability to produce the pure good. The reason for the likeliness of the pure public goods can be found within the fact that the incentive for governments to distribute is not clouded by varying interests that can occur between states (Ibid.). This also means that the public good can be achieved more efficiently because of the coherency that exists within a state rather than in the relationship between states (Thieleman 2006:13). Another reason for why it is easier within states when talking about receiving refugees is, that this distribution is often what Thieleman refers to as *one-dimensional* regime. The one-dimensional way of provided public goods with refugees means that there is often an equalizing effect in play through common rules and quotas. This means that the inequity of burdensharing can be offset by set conditions through which each agent in the nation receive goods. Another way that states can provide a pure public goods in the field of refugees is through what Thieleman refers to as the *multi-dimensional* regime. A multi-dimensional regime is one where the distribution is based on the willingness of the recipients by providing reimbursement mechanisms with the explicit goal of prompting agents to want to receive the public good (Ibid.). As a result of the inherent willingness factor a multi-dimensional regime is considered as a tool through which a cost/benefit relationship is accepted. This multi-dimensional model is also the one that is employed in the EU, with member states being reimbursed in relation to the amount of refugees and asylum seekers that they receive. It should be noted that the model utilized by the EU has so far failed to instill the desired outcome as mentioned in the introduction. This poses the question whether or not a multi-dimensional distribution regime in itself can function in a national setting when burdensharing is involved.

Equity and EfficiencyThe aim of the theory is to highlight and explore how a distribution has positive and negative effects on equity and efficiency. Positive and negative effects are polar opposites, and this is reflected within the aforementioned concepts such as excludability and non-excludability. It is therefore inherent within the concept, that if a component or element of a distribution is non-excludable that this represents either equity or efficiency and vice versa. Thus in the analysis elements that are excludable or rival are considered to have a negative effect of either equity or efficiency. However, it should be noted that any distribution has two aspects. The two aspects are those of the distributor and the receiver. When applying the theoretical tool within an international setting there are no single distributing agent as such. The EU has attempted at fulfilling this role, but this has inherent issues because the EU is comprised of states and it therefore is both the distributor and in part the receiver. This would mean that any analysis of the equity and efficiency factors would overlap, and the analysis of effects would become blurred. In the case of distribution within a state there is a clear line between the distributor and the receiver. Therefore, a distinction between who is the object of the analysis is more easily achieved. This distinction has analytical implications in the sense that while the distributor in this thesis, DIS, has to take into account the situation that the municipalities are situated in, they are not directly affected by the distribution in terms of efficiency. In fact, one of the points derived from reading Wren and subsequently conducting the analysis is that the distribution, while being subject to change multiple times over the last 10 years, has in fact changed very little in terms of the fundamental distribution. In the analysis the distribution will therefore be considered, from the viewpoint of DIS, as representation of efficiency and equity.

## Assumptions in Burdensharing

There are certain issues within the theory of burdensharing when coupled with public goods theory. Various critics point at the fact that there are certain assumptions for a pure public good to be achieved. These assumptions will be described to show what they are and how they are reflected in the Danish distribution model for refugees.

The main contribution of criticism is from Boyer (1993). He puts forth three main assumptions that make any analysis utilizing burdensharing in a public goods theory as problematic.

1. The reception of the public good is conducted with an expected equal economic cost among receivers
2. The cost to the receiver is only economic or monetary
3. Reception practices are conducted without consulting other receivers (not taking into account the reception practices of other agents)

The first assumption refers to the fact that the theory does not take into account that the recipients of the public goods have varying skills at utilizing the good. In fact, Boyer states that public goods being distributed are generally more complex than in the pre-assumed effects. An example of this can be the generated stability that a refugee dispersal generates. It does not add general stability but rather stability on more than one level, such as political, economic etc. (Thieleman 2006). Boyer therefore poses an alternative interpretation, one where any distribution should be met by either multi-dimensional reflections of the un-equal costs that the distribution imposes in each dimension or by mutually beneficial trading among the receivers to approximate equity in different dimensions affected by the distribution.

Secondly the assumption that the costs within a burdensharing regime are solely economic or monetary is challenged by Boyer by making the argument that this not a precise description of the cost/benefit viewing of receivers (Boyer 1993). As a classic example he argues that the political environment of the receivers directly affects actions. Therefore, in terms of reception, analysis’ of a specific distribution must also reflect the political environment. He continues by stating that a result of this is that some receivers will dedicate a great amount of recourses to pro-active reception strategies.

Lastly the assumption that receivers do not consult other receivers in terms of common practices is inherent within the theory (Boyer 1993:39). Because of the cost/benefit view, agents will act selfishly, and as such will disregard the effect of their actions on others. His critique is that rational agents cannot be expected to ignore suboptimal conditions and that they would necessarily react to the actions of others. An example could be creating institutions that would encompass the pool of receivers and through that platform it would be possible to determine the best course of action and thusly lower the economic costs and achieve a greater level of efficiency (Ibid.).

It has been shown throughout the theoretical section how there are multiple parallels between the superficial legislative distribution model for refugees in Denmark and the theory of burdensharing and public goods. Therefore, the analysis will seek to explore if the same base assumption present in the burdensharing are also present in the distribution model, and if they are being recognized by DIS and the municipalities.

In the next section two supportive concepts from another theory will be described as well as the reasoning behind their inclusion into the analysis.

## Secondary Theoretical Concepts

The theory of public goods in a burdensharing regime contains various concepts and effects that have been described in the last few sections. One of the things that it lacks are some explanatory elements. This means that while it can be shown with the theory that aspects of a distribution have elements that are excludable or rival and that this affects the options for equity and efficiency, it does not offer up explanations as to why this is or indeed, what effects this has on the receiver. Therefore, this next section seeks to include some useful concepts that potentially fills this gap.

One of the main areas where burdensharing theory fails is at explicitly understanding the actions of the receiver. The theory does to some extent recognize that there are inherent rationales behind the decision making process but fails at explaining them. As a result, two concepts that originate within political sociology will be included to fill this gap in the scope of burdensharing. The concepts are that of logic based actions. The first is the *logic of expected consequences*, representing the cost/benefit reasoning behind actions and the *logic of appropriateness* representing a normative approach to action (Boyer 1989). The logic of expected consequences represent action driven by calculated and strategic behavior, where agents choose from a set of alternatives but always choosing the one with the most favorable outcome for themselves. This means that any agent acting from this logic will be deciding on actions based on internal factors and independently of relevant institutional expectation. Therefore, to affect the decision making of agents that follow this logic, institutions are required to lower the amount of alternative actions of the agent to incentivize specific action (Ibid.). On the other hand, the logic of appropriateness is guided by notions of identity and are expected to follow more along the lines of the institutional desired outcome. Therefore, any action is expected to be based on norms, rules and practices (Ibid.). Actions are therefore also based on the anticipated reaction from institutions, and through that any strategic thinking will fall within the range of the institutional context. It should be noted that the behavior is often directed by what is considered appropriate within specific socio-cultural contexts (Ibid.). Both of these aspects are included because of their analytical scope of describing the reasoning behind actions taken by the various agents involved in the distribution of refugees in Denmark. The goal of utilizing both of them is to point at places in the interaction chain where the institutional expectations and the reality of actions are derived from different logics and therefore cause a lessening in equity and/or efficiency. Both of the concepts will be applied in no specific place but rather in an ad hoc manner. Besides the two aforementioned concepts a few other concepts will be utilized, but since their definition and application are less prominent they will be described within the analysis as they are applied. Following the description and operationalization of the theory and concepts, the following section seeks to describe what the design and strategy in the analysis is.

## Analytical Design

Within this section the research design that the analysis is structured around will be described. This is done so that there is a clear cohesion in the way that the various arguments and analytical points are placed in relation to each other. Besides this it will also show how the abductive methodology along with the chosen theoretical scope is applied in answering the problem formulation.

The first section of the analysis deals with describing the distribution model in a more descriptive manner. The reasoning behind this is that each agent was surprised at the reception regime on other agent’s municipalities. This indicated that there were certain variances that needed to be described. Therefore, the first section of the analysis deals with describing the variance as well as consequences of reception in the municipalities. This is considered the empirical part of the analysis because of its dominant content of empirical data application. As such it contains more inductive elements then deductive.

After the empirical section of the analysis, the findings will be more rigorously viewed in a theoretical perspective. As a part of this the applicability of the theory will also be included so as to show the shortcomings as well as the strengths in its ability to analyze the given field. This is done accordingly with the adaptive methodology in mind, as this is more similar to the theory testing elements of the deductive methodology. The findings from each of these section will subsequently be taken up in a discussion so that the findings that either fall outside of the theory or the empirical data can be discussed. Another reasoning behind utilizing this analytical design is that some of the points being brought up are speculative in nature because of the inherent lack of quantifiable data.

The analytical design is as follows:

As shown above, this analytical design utilized the approach mentioned in the methodology as well as the chosen theories. It should be noted that the first two sections, the descriptive and the theoretical analysis, are somewhat incorporated and as such there is no visible distinctions between the two. Rather it should be viewed as the structural design so that the first parts of the analysis will be more focused on empirical data and that later on it will lean more towards the theory.

# Analysis

The analysis represents the empirical data and the chosen theoretical components being used in unison. There is no chronological order to the empirical data being introduced, rather it is structured in a logical sense so that each section leads into the next.

## The Distribution Model

As mentioned in the introduction chapter there appears to be a straightforward order to the steps of the distribution model and the agents involved in it. Therefore, the goal of the first section is to describe and analyze the motivation as well as the relations between relevant agents that play a role in the distribution of refugees in Denmark.

When looking at the legislation that dictates how the distribution functions and is implemented (Integration Act), it appears at first glance that there are really only three agents involved. That being the Danish Immigration Service, KL being referred to at their webpage as the “Local Government Denmark” and the municipalities themselves. The refugee quota is sent to KL from DIS which then delivers these quotas to the municipalities. The interesting point here is that while the national quota, that comes before the regional one, is a set number, which cannot be changed by the municipalities since it is based on an estimate of how many asylum seekers will be granted refugee status a given year, the regional quota has the potential to change. This refers not to the absolute amount of people for the region but rather the composition of refugees that each municipality are to receive. Before DIS calculates how many refugees a given municipality are to receive each year, there is in fact the option for the municipalities to negotiate in-between themselves to see if they can reach a better distribution from the pool of the regional quota (Integration Act). This would indicate that there is in fact some leeway to influence the one-dimensional distribution regime of refugees before DIS are required to dictate how the distribution is to take place. While this might appear as a sensible idea so that “weaker” municipalities can ask for help among the more resource capable municipalities, this has historically not occurred (Transcript 3:1). This is reflected upon by an employee in a municipality by saying:

“[…] *there is a regional quota published, and if the municipalities can work it out after that ... but nobody ever offers anything after this because the interest is not there* […]” (Transcript 1:4)

This quote points at an issue with the leeway opportunities available in the legislation. For any municipality to desire to actively participate in an alternate distribution there has to be the opinion that a better distribution can be achieved. It corresponds with the inherent notion in the burdensharing theory that states that when a “better” option is available this is the action that will be taken (Thieleman 2003). Furthermore, it points towards the logic of action as being that of consequences. However, from this single quote it cannot be confirmed, and therefore it is something that will be touched upon in other relevant places later on.

When the employee was asked afterwards about why the interest was not there, the employee defaulted back to the answer that reflections such as that was beyond her scope as an employee. This has ties into the methodology section about anonymity but this will be touched upon in the discussion section of the analysis.

Rather the reason behind the lack of municipal interest in negotiating an alternate distribution is the fact that if they do nothing, an agent higher up in the political hierarchy will make the decision for them. An employee working in KL or more specifically the subsection of KL known as KKR specified this. He said that for an alternate distribution to become relevant, one or more municipalities would have to agree to take in more refugees then they would otherwise receive in the distribution based on DIS’ calculations. This is another supportive claim that the municipalities are acting from a logic of consequences rather than the normative. If they were in fact acting from the logic of appropriateness it would imply that their actions were taken along the lines of what the institutional expectations are. Since they are not reaching any municipal agreement this is considered opposing the institutional wish, being the expectations found in the Integration Act. The employee at KKR continued to say that the political and economic incentives were simply not enough for any municipality to want to take more than they are strictly required to receive (Transcript 3:2). This would imply that the elements of the multi-dimensional public goods regime, where the equity elements are provided through incentives, does not equate a wish among municipalities to assist others in lessening the burden. So while this does not actually address the non-excludable elements inherent in the current distribution model, it does point at a problem being that the institutional expected logic leads to an alternate distribution that would potentially be excludable since one or more municipalities would have to bear a larger share of the refugee burden. This alternate distribution would be disproportionate and the lack of equity would not be offset by incentives at the current level.

According to a questionnaire that the Danish newspaper Politikken sent out to the Mayors in the Danish municipalities, 8 out of 10 answered that they are unable, within the current set of reimbursement levels, to effectively house and integrate the refugees that they are set to receive (Politikken 2016). Thus, if they are unable to even care for their allocated quota it is unreasonable to expect them to take in additional refugees under the current conditions that are set by the multi-dimensional regime. It should be noted here that the municipalities interviewed for this thesis are from the Capitol Area and cannot be said to represent all the municipalities in Denmark. However, since the regional quota has gone through the aforementioned negotiating phase in all regions this would imply that the tendency to default back to the DIS’ model for distribution is a tendency that applies nationwide rather than just region-wide.

An additional reason in relation to why the negotiating has not happened, aside from the multi-dimensional argument, is the fact that while the forum through which an alternate distribution exists in the form of KKR, this agent is not being utilized to facilitate this discussion. Interviewing the employee from KKR also led to the conclusion that KKR does not wish to do so either. In theory the options that the municipalities are granted within the legislation to negotiate an alternate distribution that could lead to an optimization of equity, however when discussing the negotiating phase with the employee at KKR he had this to say:

“*There are no meetings to discuss an alternative [*distribution*] as such. It is very broadly agreed upon how to do it. We, at KKR do not have a wish to push the municipalities into a discussion either*.” (Transcript 2:2).

This, coupled with the aforementioned lacking in incentives to take in more refugees means that while it appears as a legislative option for an alternate distribution, in practical terms, it is not an option that either agent considers. A potential implication is that the current distribution is in fact representative of a pure public good as seen from the municipalities, and as such there would be no wish to change the way refugees are being distributed. This however, is an un-plausible element as the majority of recent literature points at municipalities struggling to cope with their quota, and thus the quota cannot be considered to represent a pure distribution. Another reason could also be that the current distribution is more akin to the lesser of two evils. According to the interviews with employees at municipalities, the later would be the case. This is an interesting element of the distribution model since it has multi-dimensional implications and ways of making the public good of refugees pure, or perhaps approximate a lessening of the burdening aspect of it. Because the answer falls outside of the scope of the empirical data it will be raised again in the discussion because of the speculative nature. There it will be supported be secondary literature to show how an alternate distribution could potentially provide more equity and efficiency in the distribution.

## Requesting Refugees

In the previous section it was shown that municipalities receive refugees exclusively through the distribution model from DIS. To further delve into the field of the public good, this would mean that the next logical step, is to look at the public good being distributed as refugees rather than a theoretical concept. One of the assumptions of the theory is that it views the public good as a homogeneous good, whereas the refugees cannot be said to be homogeneous. In fact, there are wildly varying rates at which certain groups of refugees can find work, and housing (Danmarks Statistik 2015:48-59). While this fact is not recognized in a legislative sense within the distribution model, DIS has set up a system where they ask of the municipalities to send them a form in which they can specify the relationship status, nationality or competences of the refugees that they wish to receive. One of the propositions that Boyer (1993) provided is, that equity could be procured by having agents specialize within receiving particular types of refugees so that the costs for receiving these specific types are lowered. This wish list could potentially represent the expectation that some degree of specialization to be present already. Furthermore, it could also be seen as an incentivizing element for municipalities to become specialized in integration specific types of refugees. This would in turn make the likelihood of providing equity more likely. The aforementioned form was affectionately called “*their refugee wish list*” by an employee at a municipality and he further explained their rationale for requesting refugees:

“*We call it our refugee wish list. We do this from a thought of what kind of municipality we are. There are some municipalities that are equipped to deal with a lot of very young refugees because they may have historically many institutions to deal with these groups. They would have other options. Because of this it is possible to request*” (Transcript 1:2).

This is also an interesting quote in the way that it shows that municipalities view refugees as the differentiated human beings they are. Furthermore, it shows that there is in fact some extent of specialization present in this municipalities. This indicated that the existence of the wish list represents an approximation of equity in the distribution.

The wish list also shows a consideration as to the municipalities ability to deal with specific types of refugees, something that is neglected in the quota part of the distribution model. Taking the argument of the quote, that some municipalities are better equipped to deal with young refugees, if the distribution did not take into account the specializing elements, this would imply that the current distribution from a legislative side would inevitably be excludable since some municipalities are better equipped to deal with elements of the spectrum of refugees. However, with the current distribution, where DIS takes the wishes of the municipalities into account based on existing institutions or abilities to care or integrate refugees of a specific type, they approximate equity. As such, the elements of equity would potentially create a distribution with a tang of non-excludability.

The issue with this is that there are different requirements and costs for refugees based on ex. age and marital status. Disregarding existing institutions and their potential to lower monetary costs, unaccompanied minors still represent a larger expense for a municipality then for example a university educated single man. Because of this, a distribution where the existing institutions were taken into account would still result in the cost for the entirety of the integration process to differ from one municipality to another. Therefore, to provide the pure distribution it would have to include distributing based on the monetary costs each municipality bears for refugees. Thus, it would imply that the current distribution model is not only excludable in the sense that each municipality bears varying costs for having refugees regardless of existing institutions, it also implies that the burden is a rival in the sense municipalities with pre-existing institutions are better equipped financially to deal with receiving specific types of refugees. The matter of the value or cost that is associated with refugees is a delicate subject because of the inherent ethical issues with categorizing human being in such a way. The physical distribution of refugees based on their cost was also discussed in the negotiating phases of the EU quota discussion. One of the arguments based on ethics as well as legislation is that re-location based on the cost potentially has human rights issues (Human Rights Watch 2015). While this specific aspect is hardly present in the Danish distribution model, it does point at the inherent ethics in distribution based on the characteristic of costs. However, it is one of the speculations that take place before municipalities send in their wish list and as such it is an aspect of the distribution.

There is another aspect of the wish list that had a slightly controversial aspect. Interviewing municipalities, they all had specific wishes for specific nationalities because of currently residing groups, but more specifically they requested specific refugees based on available jobs within their municipality. For distribution based on job availability to be accomplished it would require DIS to know what job skills each refugee possess.

Each refugee has competence evaluations in the asylum seeking phase of their stay in Denmark (Transcript 3). Because of this it was necessary to interview people who work with this competence evaluation. The Red Cross in Denmark handle approximately 35-40% of the asylum centers in Denmark (Transcript 3:1). It is therefore deemed reasonable to also assume that they handle the same percentage-wise handovers of refugees to the municipalities and therefore to assume that before taking into account the wish lists from municipalities, DIS communicate with The Red Cross to inquire as to the competences each refugee. However, this would appear not to be the case. When asked about the communication between DIS and the Red Cross, concerning the competences of refugees, The Red Cross employee had this to say:

“[…] *it’s not something that DIS are interested in - meaning that DIS and The Red Cross have a contract that specify in broad terms what we are to evaluate and offer our asylum seekers. We are required to offer a number of hours of education and an internship to the asylum seekers in our care. As long as we provide these two things DIS are not that interested in what we do*” (Transcript 3:3).

While the employee from The Red Cross is not representative for all the asylum centers in Denmark he still represents the aforementioned 35-40%. Therefore, this statement indicates that in the cases of refugees coming from Red Cross asylum centers DIS has no pre-requisite knowledge about the actual competences that each refugee has. This would make distributing them, according to their job skills, appear as if it is done at random. The implications are that there is a consequently lowering of equity if the distribution fails to take into account specialization among the receiving municipalities.

As mentioned previously in this section the distribution based on competences is slightly controversial. This is because of the potential gains from the different layers of education that some refugees possess. The aspect mentioned so far is the costs that is borne by the municipalities, but there are also potential gains in terms of taxes received from having working refugees. When talking to municipal staff about their experience with receiving along the lines of their requests the answer was not surprisingly in accordance with the expectation derived from the Red Cross statement.

“[…] *its very much about request and demand. Because everybody* [municipalities] *want the ones that have a higher education, but reality is that not everyone* [refugee] *has one. We get asked openly about our request and we answer*.” (Transcript 1:3).

This quote would indicate that DIS are not capable of distributing according to the requests of the municipalities. However, if every municipality requests academics that would not be a reasonable expectation. When sifting through “the wish list” that are published, it is prevalent that not every municipality requests academics (Appendix – Wish List). In fact, many do not even request based on competences but rather language, religion and nationality, which again points at degrees of specialization to be present. Withholding the notion that DIS are not aware of the actual job skills that a refugee possesses, the distribution based on job availability would indicate that the distribution could potentially be non-excludable since there would be a number of municipalities with a need for a specific types of refugees and that this specific refugee would end up in the corresponding municipality. Through distribution based on equity it would therefore represent efficiency in the sense of an optimization of costs. The lack of equity and non-excludability can in this case be directly linked to the lack of information that DIS possess and that this determines where a given refugee end up. To support this, the employee at The Red Cross gave this example:

“*We* [Red Cross] *experience many many times that for example Ballerup received a blacksmith when what they really needed was an engineer, but the engineer has been transferred to Nord-Djurs. It’s crazy”* (Transcript 3:3).

According to him this is a classic example of how DIS distributes without the proper knowledge concerning the competences of the refugees. This indicates that the current distribution model has the potential for approximating a pure public good, but because of practical issues it fails at distributing according to the intended outcome.

## Intentionality of the Distribution

As mentioned in the introduction the current distribution model seeks to relocate foreigners in a manor so that they are not clustered with the assumption of various negative outcomes. This section will deal with the matter of whether or not the intention behind the distribution model is successful and critically analyze the aforementioned assumption.

As it has been shown in the introduction sections, the national as well as the regional quota does in fact distribute widely across Denmark (Damm 2006). A municipal employee had this to say concerning the placement of refugees within their municipality:

“*In our region every municipality face the same difficulties being that of residences. Some municipalities may be lucky to have space to build more residences. But then again it will not be ready for another 5 or so years”* (Transcript 1:8).

While this quote does not say anything about the practical distribution, it does point to an aspect that makes the distribution more likely to be non-rival. The problem, being equated by the employee to cover the municipalities in the capitol region, would indicate that this problem and the monetary burden is born equally among the municipalities. When costs are mentioned here it is because of the data indicating that the placement of refugees within municipalities is derived from the economic costs that the municipalities have to bear for the housing (Wren 2003). Wren showed in her analysis of the distribution regime that residence availability counteracted the intentionality. Interviewing a municipal employee this is to some extent still true today.

 “*When we house a refugee there are very strict amounts of money we can demand in return from the government to house these. These expenses are regardless of the cost to the municipality for housing the refugee. This cost is almost always higher then what we receive*” (Transcript 1:6).

This quote shows that the placement of refugees within municipalities is in fact a question of resources. After taking this point in the conversation and discussing it in a sense of placement due to economics, the employee further explained that the focus of the municipality was indeed to avoid having clusters of foreigners in their municipality. However, this desire was offset by the economic costs:

“*One of the things that we are very focused on here is what we call a balanced composition. Which means that we do our best not to send refugees out to live in communities that already have a high percentage of foreigners. We have unfortunately not been very successful”* (Transcript 1:8).

According to Wren, the costs led the municipalities to allocate refugees in the cheapest housing available so that the economic burden was lessened (Wren 2003:8). Supported by the quote above, this is still the case today. This in unfortunate in the sense that refugees are placed in already burdened areas where there is also a majority of foreigners living. It is also unfortunate in the sense that this is the opposite outcome then the one that is expressed in the current distribution model. By saying it is unfortunate this refers to the intentionality and inherent assumption mentioned at the start of this section. Therefore, the dispersal within municipalities appears counterproductive to the integration desired outcome of the distribution model. However, a number of studies have shown that placing foreigners in areas where there are other foreigners mean that they can more easily build a social network and that this in fact assists in furthering integration (Musterd et al. 1997). The basis for this conclusion can be further outlined in the words of a municipal employee:

*“*[Refugees from a specific country*] They all have similar experiences and share a common past, meaning that they have a very strong network here. That means that receiving more than we would have to if they were from nationalities that have a strong network here could be beneficial”* (Transcript 1:8)

This view challenges the assumption in the distribution model that a widespread dilution of refugees account for better integration. So while the postulated assumption in the distribution model can to some extent reflect a political view on refugees, rather than one of optimizing integration, it is still the basis for distribution and as such cannot be disregarded.

Another aspect is that this multi-dimensional attempt at proving a pure good fails based on the lack of incentivizing policies, which makes municipalities place refugees among other refugees. Therefore, in terms of integration effectiveness, the model disperses refugees widely among the regions of Denmark, while at the same time allowing for municipalities to utilize their already placed foreigners in the integration process. Whether this is intentional cannot be said because of the lack of data from DIS.

Returning to the effects of placement within the municipality there is still the matter of the economic burden that the municipality bears for housing refugees. As mentioned previously, the costs for housing is unequal to the amount received from the government as compensation. Therefore, the cost is dependent on the resources available to the municipality, an element that is not the same across municipalities.

“[…]*in our municipality, where we own a large part of the residences the cost is very high. So I can speculate that in municipalities where they don’t own as much as us, the cost is even higher. I have heard that some other municipalities have to accommodate refugees in hotels etc. that is very expensive*” (transcript 1:7).

What this employee is in fact saying is, that the cost is a negative externality. The costs for housing is “cheaper” for the municipalities that own residences as oppose to those that are forced to rent them with the prospect of suffering costs as a consequence. Through this it is apparent that there are very different kinds of housing available to the municipalities. Ability to place refugees in social housing, empty buildings, municipally owned buildings, private owned housing all vary significantly. As a result, the government has actually legislatively opened up for the possibility of temporary housing. This temporary housing has lower standard requirements and as such can be viewed as an attempt at higher degrees of equity in the reception of refugees. In one municipality the statement was not that housing refugees was a direct cost but rather a loss in income from the occupied residences:

*“In our case it’s not necessarily an expense in the common sense but more in the sense that we cannot charge the usual amount from our residences so we are experiencing expenses due to lost income from these residences”* (Transcript 1:7)

This partnered with the fact that the distribution model does not differentiate income levels among the citizens being utilized in the calculation of the distribution, means that it in effect does not take into account the varying degrees of costs that each municipality bears for having refugees. Furthermore, it points at the integration benefits that refugees receive as also being a deciding factor in residence placement. As mentioned previously, the integration benefits are expected to be lowered by October 2016 which will inevitably result in a negative effect of the placement of refugees according to the intentionality in the distribution. It points at the distribution at the national and regional level as being determined by national policies while at the municipal level, placement is decided by the municipality itself with governmental regulating in the shape of money available to refugees. Thusly to distribute equitable, available housing, burden bearing capacity of the municipalities, and the resources available to the refugees should be considered.

## Communication

The negotiating between municipalities was shown previously to be non-existent, however there are levels of communication between the various agents in the distribution regime that has a bearing on the actual distribution. One of the examples is the aforementioned wish list, where the attempt is at achieving a pure public good through circumventing the static and un-differentiated distribution model. What this circumvention constitutes is an example of how communication between the agents leads to a more equitable and efficient distribution then would otherwise have taken place without the communication.

There are other examples of how communication between agents involved in the distribution has influenced the distribution. The previously mentioned example involved communication between a municipality and DIS. An employee at a municipality said that they have other ways of influencing DIS’ to affect the distribution of refugees.

“*We have certain "strings" into DIS. Meaning they cannot promise anything but if we were to be in a situation like we were in last year where our municipality was saturated with refugees in a period - I can call them and tell them that we cannot take any more for a period of time*” (Transcript 1:4).

This quote shows that it is possible to offset costs in a period by reaching out to DIS. While only one municipality referred to this option, it would still imply that the option is available to municipalities regardless of whether they take advantage of it. It also points to an interesting point: that the municipal level is not necessarily the “lowest” level where distribution is affected, the employees working in the municipality can also affect the distribution through what appears as personal connections. However, these connections are considered invisible to other agents which would explain why no other municipality spoke of having such connections.

The implication is that it becomes possible to lower the costs for housing if a request for not receiving refugees in a period when the residences market owned by the municipality was saturated. Because of the chronological way the interviewing was conducted it was not possible to ask the other municipalities about utilizing this communicative tool, but assuming that the option is available, it would mean that the option is part of the multi-dimensional regime in effect. This points at somewhat of a paradox. While it has been shown that the municipalities act from a logic of consequences and that they receive and integrate based on a cost/benefit relationship, the actual distribution appears to be based on an assumption that the municipalities receive refugees based on the logic of appropriateness. This is further supported by a study conducted in 2013 by Lemberg-Pedersen. He states that:

” *The municipalities reject informal reception and housing offers […] it appears that the wellbeing of the refugees is being weighed according to their costs and is being found to light in relation to the municipalities wish to avoid expenses”* (Lemberg-Pedersen 2013:4).

Again, this indicates that cost/benefit is the logic of consequences that municipalities base action upon. However, there are aspects such as the “strings” into DIS that would indicate that there is a certain degree of recognition from DIS’ side that the municipalities act from a logic of consequences. It also means that while the finite number of refugees that each municipality are calculated to receive, in a given year, is final and not changed through any of the potential tools available. However, the monthly amount that each municipality receives can be adjusted according to the needs of the municipality, if the employees have the right connections. This means that DIS are actually adjusting their distribution for at least one municipality so as to provide a more equitable distribution at this level. Since it appears that it is only done in some cases the distribution is consequently rival.

Another way that this periodic amount can be adjusted was brought up by an employee at KKR. He stated that certain municipalities with strong ties and good political relationships would at times take on the burden of the other municipalities’ refugees. This was done by taking in the amount that the other municipality were to receive in certain periods in return for help in other months of the year. Again, making this a general tendency is an impossible feat since not all municipalities can be said to have the aforementioned connection. However, since the possibility exists within the distribution and it is legally allowed means that the potential to procure an equitable and efficient public good, not necessarily originating from the distribution from DIS, but rather through communication and negotiating between municipalities themselves, exists. With the previous point it is not surprising that, while there is no wish to negotiate over the finite amount of refugees that each municipality receive, some are willing to help out periodically by taking on the burden of refugees from another municipality. This is a point that will be taken up in a discussion to attempt at explaining why the solidarity and the normative logic can be found at this level.

On a side note another finding, in relation to communication, that was surprising when interviewing the various agents involved in the distribution, was that almost everyone exclaimed surprise when results from previous interviews were brought up as examples of municipal regimes. This would indicate that the distribution model and ways of housing, integrating and caring for refugees within municipalities is not something that is widely discussed among municipalities, and in fact there were no agents that mentioned a medium through which such a feat could be accomplished. It was also surprising that almost every municipality relayed satisfaction in relation to the current model for distribution. While this thesis does not contain the statistical data to confirm this as a statistical significant finding, the results do at an empirical level seem to correlate. If there are no talks about other regimes and through that also no talks about problems faced, then it makes logical sense that there would be no opinions or wish to distribute in a better way.

As mentioned in the methodological section about anonymity another reason for this satisfaction with the current model can also originate in the politically implications or ramifications that could occur if an employee was seen to criticize the distribution model. Yet another explanation for the varying ways of municipalities taking care of refugees can be situated in the fact that legislation in this area changes rapidly in an almost ad hoc sense. Taking into account the part of the legislative section where the development of the integration, housing and financial legislation described the rapid development, it indicates that employees in municipalities are not able to keep up with changes being made in all the legislative areas and therefore are not aware of the various options available to them. This characteristic of short-sightedness meaning that the range of sight seemingly does not extend beyond the municipalities’ own borders means that the efficiency of the reception is consequently lowered.

The last section of the analysis can be considered borderline discussive because they raised more questions than they answered. In the following part of the analysis the questions raised throughout the first section of the analysis will be answered through a more speculative and discussive type of analysis.

# Discussion

In this section some of the questions derived from the results from the previous section of the analysis will be explored. Because they are derived from the empirical findings but are placed outside of the empirical scope they are introduced in a discussive and more theoretical manor rather than the empirical one. Furthermore, this section contains a relative high amount of secondary data to support points.

## Lack of Communication

One of the points from the previous analytical section was that almost every interviewed individual was somewhat surprised at some of the elements from previous interviews. This would indicate that the employees were to some extent not aware of what other agents involved in the distribution model were employing. This section will try to explain why this is the case and furthermore what implications it has on their ability to provide an effective integration effort.

It was shown in the previous section of the analysis that there were certain lines of communication and negotiations present within the legislative and practical setting of the distribution model. Below is a representation of the field of potential communication and its effect.

Figure 3 Municipal Ways of Affection Distribution in the Danish Distribution Model

The model shows how municipalities that neither negotiates the reception rates with another municipalities or with DIS, are self-inflicting a lowering of equity in terms of the efficient reception. However, it also shows that because of this lack of communication, distribution is conducted with excludable and rival results.

As mentioned in previous sections, the distribution model and the legislation, surrounding the expectations of the municipalities, expect them to act based on the logic of appropriateness but it is more akin to the logic of consequences. However, the types that provides equity within the model above points at communication being the factor that approximates equity among the municipalities. This could be an attempt at what Myrberg (2015) calls ‘*vertical venue shopping’.* This concept is defined by Myrberg as being:

“*strategic interaction between government levels in an effort to achieve policy opportunities that cannot be realized on another level”* (Myrberg 2015:3).

The implication is that there is a potential recognition by DIS that they are unable to provide equity from a one-dimensional distribution and that one-dimensional *trading* among municipalities can offset this lack of equity. As a result, it becomes all the more worrying that there is an evident lack in the range of vision some municipalities appear to possess. This raises the question concerning why there are some municipalities that are not utilizing these options despite it appearing as an intentional vertical venue in the distribution legislation.

A point that raised some questions from the empirical analysis was the matter of the potential for differentiating the refugees being distributed. This element is simultaneously also one of the critical elements of the theory and therefore the goal of the following section is to provide suggestions for theoretical changes that would make it more applicable in the pursuit of describing the Danish distribution model.

## A better distribution model?

Throughout the process of writing this thesis one question in particular arose: is it even possible to achieve a pure public good with the conditions in Denmark? DIS provides a static and objective mathematical distribution formula where a differentiating model might offset some of the rival and excludable factors. At the same time, it appears that the need for differentiating is recognized, but rather then add the workload of implementing it to DIS’, the differentiating is left to the municipalities to request based on their needs through the wish list. This wish list, in effect, provides a level of equity by distributing refugees to each municipality based on their needs and existing competences in dealing with specific types of refugees. This is despite the fact that it is stated in the legislation, that DIS are responsible for this (Integration Act).

As it was showed earlier in the analysis, DIS distributes based on the wish list, but cannot be said to do so with 20/20 vision in regards to the competences of the refugees. This is the basis for a rival and excludable distribution where the basis for pure equity becomes an impossibility. Although this is the current situation, it is possible to imagine that if the current system worked as desired, it would indeed become the pure public good that was imagined as the desired outcome. However, the inequity is also enforced by the municipalities themselves. The reception standards as well as the housing options that municipalities can offer vary wildly. A fact that is also supported by Wren in her analysis of the distribution regime back in 2003. By having the leeway for each municipality to adapt their actual reception, in terms of economics and housing, they are also creating the basis for a system that will never reach distribution in the pure form. This means that by not having any form of standardization in the reception process, the pure public good can never be achieved through the one-dimensional means in the Danish distribution model. This indicates that distribution, where objectiveness and differentiating are in constant flux, cannot provide the equity or effectiveness needed for a pure distribution. This also has a theoretical implication since the same issues with differentiating and objectiveness that Danish municipalities are faced with, can be found within the theory of burdensharing. Therefore, the next section discusses what conditions has to be met, both in a theoretical perspective as well as in an empirical sense, to achieve the pure public distribution of refugees.

To achieve a pure public good, the good received should be non-rival (Thieleman 2006). This of course refers to the fact that the good should be provided in a way so that one receiver does not accumulate more benefits then another as a result of the distribution. In terms of refugees, a one-dimensional regime with a quota does not in effect take into account the various factors involved in a non-rival distribution of refugees. Therefore, a multi-dimensional regime where each municipality was reimbursed based on the actual cost of receiving refugees would be necessary. To provide a pure public good in terms of refugees the reimbursement would need to reflect the costs of each municipality rather than each un-differentiated refugee as it is now. This is further supported by the recent reimbursement changes(L189). In 2015 changes were added so that municipalities receive a bonus if they find work for refugees. This reimbursement is provided regardless of the income and following taxation opportunities that the municipality possess, and the municipalities receive a standardized amount (Ibid.). In terms of equity, for the distribution to be non-rival the reimbursement needs to reflect any disproportionate costs some municipalities bear for refugees as well as the expected income from the integration. Because of the standardized amount that does not reflect the variance in the job position filled there are rival elements.

Another way that this could be done in the case of Danish municipalities with the current distribution model is, if the municipalities were in fact willing to negotiate between them as to how the distribution should be conducted. This would necessarily require that they were aware of who and what the refugees’ competences are, but if DIS cannot achieve this, then it is considered even more difficult for the municipalities to do so. Even so, assuming that the municipalities could for every refugee assess their skills and needs etc. some extent of solidarity would have to exist where there appears to be none today. Furthermore, for any negotiations to take place, each municipality would be required to have a certain knowledge concerning the situation or predicament of the other municipalities, which would require them to communicate among themselves. It would also be paramount for DIS or the government to instill a common sense of responsibility and change the logic to the of appropriateness among the municipalities, for them to enter into this burdensharing regime in this specific manner. In its current state the municipalities that receive a relative high amount of refugees would be considered more likely to want to engage in inter-municipal negotiations, which can be directly linked to the excludability of the current distribution model. It requires the aforementioned shared sense of responsibility among the receiving municipalities and as one municipality said:

“*We only take the ones that we are legally bound to take through our quota*” (Transcript 1:5).

A sense of shared responsibility would be required for municipalities to create a situation where the distribution could be considered pure. It appears that current distribution is viewed by the municipalities as a cost/benefit relationship where the costs are considered higher than the benefits for receiving refugees. What this sense of shared responsibility would require to become a reality is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, as mentioned previously municipalities with strong political ties have been known to work together. This would point at the need for a political homogenous landscape among the receiving municipalities to be a possible criterion. This is unrealistic in a multi political party system and therefore the regulating of this aspect would need to be enforced top-down from a legislative standpoint. One way this could be achieved is with intrusive regulations from the government.

Another aspect that to some extent has been disregarded until now is the fact that the refugees themselves also occasionally request to be placed in specific municipalities. This is mainly allowed if they have family ties or if there is a job waiting for them in the specific municipality. However, in terms of effectiveness it also has implications on the non-rival aspects. In the current distribution model there are assumptions that each refugee can work. In fact, it is stated clearly in the recent changes to the Integration Legislation that any refugee is considered workforce ready quickly after entering into the integration process (Integration Act 2014). There are various assumptions within this expectation that are problematic. First of all, it is assumed that every refugee can work relatively quickly after beginning their integration process. This being said it is well known that not every refugee can in fact work. There are multiple reasons why this is the case, whether caused by mental disorders caused by a previous occurrence of period in their asylum process or for other reasons. In Denmark, The Danish Refugee Aid presented a study from 2016 that showed that upwards of 34 % of refugees in Denmark show signs that met the requirements for a PTSD[[2]](#footnote-2) diagnosis (Danish Refugee Aid 2016). Therefore, the fact that the current distribution model considers every refugee as job ready after a relatively short period of time appears to be based on an almost naive wish or hope that working refugees equals an integrated refugee. Furthermore, there is an expectation that there are jobs available. This has certain implications in terms of distributing along the lines of the pure public good. Accordingly, if the distribution was to be pure, it would require a homogenous group being distributed in terms of job willingness. Therefore, another criterion in a pure distribution of refugees requires that it takes into account the required willingness and/or ability of the refugee to participate in the integration process related to work.

To provide a pure distribution of refugees DIS, as well as the government, need to recognize that municipalities act based upon a logic of consequences or a cost/benefit logic. Therefore, to approximate equity they need to recognize:

* To achieve a non-rival public good, the incentives or reimbursements need to reflect the actual cost on a dynamic level rather than a static, where every refugee regardless of occupation is considered homogenous.
* The reception legislation needs to have a firm framework to ensure that receptions and integration procedures are standardized, thereby ensuring that the costs of receiving refugees are equal for receiving municipalities.
* In the case of the Danish distribution model, where it contains both un-differentiated as well as differentiated elements that affect the distribution, the one and multi-dimensional regimes need to work in synergy.
* Between the municipalities involved there needs to be a feeling of shared responsibility, so that the likeliness for corroboration can occur more frequently.
* One-dimensional distribution such as it is in the current model must take more aspect into account when distributing. Examples of this could be the average income of the residents within the municipality.
* DIS and municipalities should recognize the potential for positive spill-overs between municipalities as a means to utilize and efficiently integrate refugees.

Even if all of these elements were implemented in the current distribution model, the model would still contain rival and excludable elements. This can in part be accredited to limitations within the theory. It cannot take into account some elements within the distribution of the specific good in question. However, since the links between problems with the distribution and the theory correspond closely, any critique of the theory can potentially be applied to the distribution. The next section will explore the theoretical implications derived from the short-comings of the theory and link it to the actual distribution.

## Theoretical Reflections

In the process of applying the theory of burdensharing to the empirical data concerning the Danish distribution model, it has become prominent that the pure public good, within a nation, cannot in reality be achieved. This can in part be accredited to the good being distributed constituting complex human beings. Even if all the more realistic analytical points, from the previous sections, were to happen tomorrow there would still be inequity as well as inefficiency in the distribution This can be attributed to the differentiated nature of human beings. As a result, any attempt at a pure distribution will never fulfill the strict conditions required for a pure public good and should therefore be considered as an approximation of the pure distribution. In truth a one-dimensional regime will always lack the subtlety and shades, necessary to describe something as complex as humans. The one-dimensional regime can however to some extent seek to come as close as possible to the pure level by accepting that the goods being distributed are not homogenous, but rather incredibly differentiated, and for any distribution to approximate the pure level this should be reflected in the distribution model. By doing so it would not only add some degree of equity to the distribution but the efficiency at which the refugees can be integrated would necessarily increase as well.

As for a distribution based solely on a multi-dimensional regime, it would be possible to get close to the pure distribution. However, this way of distribution would need to be enforced top-down from the national or regional level. If such a scheme was to be achieved it would necessitate the closing of options for vertical venue shopping among the municipalities. It corresponds well with what is expected within the current distribution model in terms of some of the calculation models that DIS and KL have put forward. For example, in an appendix from a meeting between DIS and KL. In it they showed various calculations for how the multi-dimensional reimbursement could work in a practical way (Appendix – KL 2015). The most interesting element is that their calculations are solely based on examples where municipalities take in more refugees then they would otherwise be required to do through the one-dimensional quota inherent in the distribution model. Through this it becomes possible to imagine a distribution where you remove the one-dimensional elements and raise the reimbursement levels so that there would be economical benefits from taking in a lot of refugees. The problem with this type of distribution is that there are no guarantees that the entirety of the amount of refugees is taken in by the pool of municipalities. A very close example is the voluntary based EU refugee reception system where less than 200 have been accepted from Turkey. This example shows how having a voluntary system with the receiver’s actions being based of a logic of consequences, and where the multi-dimensional regimes do not reflect the actual costs versus the reimbursement is bound to fail. A pure multi-dimensional regime also does not take into account the actual housing capacity of each municipality. Therefore, in the hypothetical multi-dimensional distribution, it would have to be assumed that before all housing is saturated the entirety of the refugees are distributed. Through the point described above this conclusion is reached: A multi-dimensional regime in itself, while having the potential for greater components of equity, would eventually fall to grasp some of the efficiency problems already faced.

So if neither the one- and multi-dimensional regime works alone and as have been shown throughout the analysis does not provide the pure public good through a collaboration of the two dimensions, it poses the question: what does this mean in theoretical terms for the distribution model? It means that the concept of the pure public good becomes more of an ideal type concept, meaning something that agents can strive for and seek to emulate, but in the end it is a practical impossibility to achieve the fullness of the what the concept entails.

## Proposed Distribution

Following the logic of the entire analysis it is possible to provide suggestions for an improved distribution model in terms of what DIS can do to distribute more fairly and with a higher degree of equity and the following efficiency seen from a municipal point of view. Therefore, this section will discuss what characteristics such a model should contain and why. The suggestion will be based off the current distribution so that it retains as many realistic elements as possible.

Part of the reason that the current distribution model is inefficient is because of the lack of knowledge concerning the individual refugee that is being distributed. As part of a suggestion for a better distribution model, it would involve applying changes to the contract that the Red Cross and municipal asylum centers have with the government. It would have to include that it is compulsory to evaluate the competences of the asylum seekers and also that this data is to be sent to DIS so that it can be taken into account before any distribution takes place. Furthermore, the information concerning jobs available in the municipalities should be made available to DIS so that jobs can be matched prior to any distribution. It can be argued that this is to some extent already present in the distribution model, but the extent to which it is utilized would have to be better. Within this part of the suggestion there is a natural barrier in the shape of time. It is common knowledge that job openings are not open indefinably. As a result, there need to be a level of cooperation with companies. For example, companies could reserve jobs if a match has been found with a refugee.

DIS would also need to possess information regarding any specialization within the municipality so that equity can be achieved. The information is also to some extent already in place through the wish list, but by looking at the variance within the answers there are simply too many different types of requests for it to be realistic for DIS to distribute based on every single one (Appendix – Wish List). Therefore, the wish list should be included in the integration legislation and the form should also be more standardized and contain the specific information that DIS would require to distribute equitable. It should be noted that there will necessarily be refugees with qualifications that do not have a corresponding job opening within a municipality. However, as mentioned the pure distribution is an ideal type concept and therefore an approximation of the request in the wish list would still heighten efficiency. If these two aspects are fulfilled, then getting refugees into work should become more efficient.

Next is the actual distribution calculations. In the current distribution model there are very few differentiating aspects being taken into account. There are also multiple assumptions that does not reflect reality. An aspect that would be beneficial is a consideration as to the costs borne by each municipality. Bovens & Bartsch (2015) propose this with a concept called *the principle of equal proportionate sacrifice*. Within it they propose that any distribution where there is a monetary cost, the capacity of the receiver should be taken into account so that the distribution is based on what the receiver can shoulder (Ibid.). The capacity of the receiver can be represented by the average income of the receiver. It is therefore suggested that adding the relative income level of the municipality along with the current factors being the amount of non-western foreigners, family reunifications, and number of citizens would represent a more differentiated distribution. In fact, the more complexity there is added to the one-dimensional distribution, the closer it will come to a pure distribution as long as the characteristics of the distribution is based on describing the public good being distributed and the receiver’s ability to receive it.

An issue that is also put forth by Bovens & Bartch (2015) is the matter of how much weight is put into each characteristic of the model, i.e. how much bearing should the average income, relative to the amount of citizens, have on the distribution. In their article concerning the quota distribution that was suggested in the EU, they state that each characteristic has varying degrees of importance in terms of equitable distribution. Therefore, taking into account the previously suggested factors, the amount of weight or importance that each should have is unclear. Thus, rather than suggesting an actual numerical percentage of importance that should be put to each of the characteristics it is merely suggested that each element is taken into account with specific emphasis om the reception capacity of the municipality. This would undoubtedly mean more work for DIS but according to the legislation some of the aspects that are currently asked of the municipalities are in fact DIS’ responsibility. As such, the burden could to some extent be borne by DIS.

Another important aspect that could become more equitable with a slight change, is the current amount that each refugee receives in integration benefits. In its current state the amount has been gradually lowered to make way for lower top level taxes (Redder 2016). As it was shown that the residence availability and costs for housing had a significant impact on the placement of refugees and through that, their successful integration. It appears counterproductive to lower the integration benefits in the hopes of higher growth as a result of lowering top end taxation. Thusly an increase in the relative amount of reimbursement for receiving refugees would also add more equity for the municipalities. Redder (2016) furthermore states that lowers the top end taxation to increase the amount of qualified workforce is merely guessing. Funneling the money towards better integration efforts would create more tangible result in terms of utilizing the existing workforce in the form of refugees. This area is one of political prioritization and as such it should be recognized that part of the reasoning behind lowered the integration benefits is the so-called “scare tactic” where it is being made unattractive for asylum seekers to want to come to Denmark. As such it becomes a matter of weighing the two against each other and seeing what is more important: getting a lowering in the quantifiable number of asylum seekers or a betterment of integration amongst refugees.

# Conclusion

It has become apparent throughout the analysis that the conditions required for a pure distribution cannot occur when the good being distributed is something as differentiated as human beings. While this is true there are steps that can be taken to strive to get as close as possible to a pure public good. In the following section the problem formulation will be answered and the findings of this thesis will be highlighted.

The current distribution model contains both one- and multi-dimensional regimes with the explicit goal of achieving efficiency and equity in the fields of integration and lowering cultural costs as well as economic costs. However, to further the current efficiency and equity, by adding differentiating elements, in the one-dimensional part of the distribution model, it would approximate the aforementioned goals. By not differentiating elements such as the capacity to receive, the distribution becomes rival in terms of the economic costs that each municipality suffers. Refugees being distributed are not differentiated at the governmental level, but rather through the wish list that DIS requires each municipality to send them. This represents an actual acknowledgement of refugees being differentiated. However, the wish list is flawed in the way that DIS does not gather or possess all the relevant information to distribute in a non-rival manner. For the one-dimensional distribution to be effective there are also issues with the expectation that are put unto the refugees themselves. This means that the distribution is based on an assumption, that every refugee can begin working shortly upon arriving. This is not the case. Furthermore, it is assumed that refugees are willing to participate in the legislative integration scheme. Within the legislation surrounding the distribution is also an expectancy that there are jobs waiting for the refugees when they enter the integration program. As shown earlier very few refugees are able to begin working within the time period set by DIS and this adds to the already existent rival issues with the distribution.

The multi-dimensional regimes designed to compensate for these rival burdens, are also an acknowledgement that there are issues with excludability inherent in the one-dimensional distribution. But because of the static nature of the reimbursement system it fails to makes the distribution non-rival as well as non-excludable. The limited reimbursement and the loose legislation with regards to reception requirements means that refugees are more than often provided housing within areas that have an existing community of foreigners. This means that the multi-dimensional regime is a part of countering the intentionality of diluting the cultural burden that clusters of refugees/foreigners are expected to represent.

As to the actual physical distribution of refugees, the national and the regional quota are set and there is no wish present to change this, even though a change to the parameters that the refugees are distributed from, could lead to higher levels of equity. In its present state the distribution model is unequitable. There is an apparent view of municipalities as potentially having a shared feeling of responsibility or solidarity present in the distribution. However, this was only in rare cases, despite the offered efficiency and optimal usage of resources this led to. As such, part of the reason for this can be found within the logic behind actions and the expected logic behind actions. There is a discrepancy in how the legislation expects municipalities to act and the pragmatic approach of action based on a cost/benefit view among municipalities. The reasoning behind this concluding point is found in the options possessed by the municipalities. There is a wish among municipalities to offset their costs for receiving refugees. Some did this through what appeared to be unofficial and personal networking strings into DIS, while other did nothing to achieve a lowering of monetary costs. Another way that some municipalities offset these costs were by utilizing the legislative leeway for inter-municipal negotiating related to reception of refugees. This meant that only some municipalities were able to offset the costs of reception by having more regular receiving rates of refugees.

In the end it is prevalent that the municipalities find themselves in a distribution regime based on what is considered an ideal type wish to lessen cultural costs at the expense of more tangible costs such as monetary. As a result, the municipalities are placed in more realistic settings and are therefore forced to make do with the resources available to them. Therefore, the part of the current distribution model where a higher degree of efficiency and equity can be achieved, is at the municipal level rather than the theoretically expected government level. This fact is recognized by DIS and the question therefore becomes: why is this recognition not incorporated into changing the parameters for distribution?

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# Appendix

Because of the considerable size of the content within the appendix it can be located on the CD attached to the back page of this thesis.

The content is as follows:

* Transcripts
	1. Municipality (only one is attached as per the wishes of the remaining 2 interviewees)
	2. The Red Cross Employee
	3. The KKR Employee
* Wish-List
* Act L89
* Interview Guide
* KL 2015 -Finansiering af integrationsområdet
1. Municipal Contact Council [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [↑](#footnote-ref-2)