

AALBORG UNIVERSITY
Development and International Relations
Master Thesis

Action for Climate Empowerment under the UNFCCC:
Implications for Global Climate Governance



United Nations
Framework Convention on
Climate Change



Susanne Leidescher

Table of Contents

Abstract	3
Abbreviations	5
1 Introduction	6
2 Methodology	9
2.1 Methodological approach	9
2.2 Theory selection	10
2.3 Qualitative Research	11
2.4 Expert interviews.....	12
3 Theories	16
3.1 Liberal institutionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism	16
3.2 The English School.....	20
3.3 Constructivism	24
4 The UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance	27
4.1 Development process from Rio to Paris.....	27
4.2 UNFCCC’s role in Global Climate Governance.....	29
5 Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)	33
5.1 Mandate.....	33
5.2 ACE Activities.....	35
5.3 ACE Stakeholders	36
5.3.1 Parties	36
5.3.2. Non-state actors.....	39
5.3.3. Youth.....	41
5.3.4 International alliances on ACE	44
5.4 Communication structure.....	47
5.5 Assessing ACE’s role under the UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance	50
6 Challenges in implementing ACE elements	53
6.1 Financial constraints.....	53
6.2 Technology gaps	56
6.3 Economic, political and social differences.....	58
6.4 Remarks on challenges and outlook on ACE	60
7 Conclusion	64
Bibliography	67
Appendix	76

Abstract

International cooperation on effective responses to climate change has increased in urgency during the last years and has gained even more attention after the adoption of the Paris Climate Change Agreement in December 2015. The United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) has been the negotiating institution behind last years' climate talks and has triggered negotiations during parties of the convention and other stakeholders. Part of its treaty includes Article 6 of the convention, named Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) highlighting the elements education, training, public awareness, public access to information, public participation and international cooperation.

The thesis aims to analyze the role of ACE under the UNFCCC and its implications on Global Climate Governance. The continuous fragmentation of Global Climate Governance calls for strong guidance to unite all stakeholders of the UNFCCC and on ACE in order to implement multi-level climate solutions. Seeking to highlight past developments, current circumstances and future recommendations on ACE, the different roles of stakeholders, activities and structures are being illustrated in this study. So far, International Relation scholars have only conducted studies on the role of the UNFCCC on Global Climate Governance and only certain elements of ACE have been part of scientific research, which does not stand in relation to the evaluation of current processes after the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

Therefore qualitative research methods have been applied, including primary as well as secondary sources. Besides relevant books, academic journals, reviews and the website of the UNFCCC, also legislative documents such as the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the convention or reports conducted by the UNFCCC secretariat and the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of parties have been consulted. Additionally, semi-structured individual face-to-face interviews have been conducted to reinforce research results and to strengthen the practical validity on the matter. Five interviews have been prepared, conducted and the information gained evaluated to draw conclusions. Further constraints on ACE have been identified through evaluation of the INDCs and outlined gaps and barriers to consider recommendations on the programme's international implementation. Although ACE has enjoyed increasing attention, it is still not appropriately considered on the national and sub-national scale of some countries. Barriers and challenges still exist which hamper a successful implementation of ACE elements on community level. Especially developing countries sometimes still lack sufficient funding and technology, educated citizenry, a stable political system, peace and cooperation within the countries' ministries.

The thesis comes to the conclusion that the secretariat working on ACE still needs to pursue a strengthened effort on both a top-down and a bottom-up approach as well as efficient facilitation and implementation of technical and financial strategies regarding the exchange between developed with developing countries.

Abbreviations

ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
COP	Conference of the Parties
DSA	Daily Substance Allowance
ESD	Education for Sustainable Development
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
NAZCA	Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UN CC:Learn	The One UN Climate Change Learning Partnership
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
YOUNGO	UNFCCC observer constituency of youth non-governmental organizations

1 Introduction

Climate change has become one of the main political, economic and institutional challenges of our time where political science as a discipline has reacted in a really slow process. Gradually, governments have decided to act, but effective action of the international community is still required internationally, nationally and locally (Keohane 2015: 19, 20, 22, 25). With a look into history, the first global environmental conference, namely the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), took place in 1972 (Vogler 2014: 343) following many more climate conferences during the last decades. Today, Climate Action is one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) among other things calling on “education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early reduction” (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015) with the help of different stakeholders including also women, youth and indigenous groups (Ibid.). Since 1992 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate (UNFCCC) has been a constant part and initiator within Climate Governance, after its founding at the Rio Earth Summit (UNFCCC 2014b).

As a framework convention it tries to achieve international common frameworks, research cooperation, norms and principles as well as common aims among parties and consensus with other stakeholders (Turnheim and Tezcan 2010: 531). Conferences of the Parties (COPs) from Montreal over Copenhagen to Paris have adopted climate agreements seeking to bring all Parties together (UNFCCC 2014b). However, the Kyoto Protocol as first binding climate agreement has not been able to unite all Parties and also the Copenhagen Accords have added to further discrepancies among key actors regarding a legally binding agreement (Falkner et al. 2011). The in December 2015 adopted Paris Climate Change Agreement awakes the hope of a legally binding treaty that unites parties and currently waits to be ratified by 177 countries to become implemented (UNFCCC 2014c).

Under the UNFCCC, Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) has been established in order to implement programmes on education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation under Article 6 of the convention together with parties in the fight against climate change (UNFCCC 2014a). ACE encourages the international community to foster implementation of these elements on national and international scale with different activities and incentives within Global Climate Governance. Since June 2015, all activities related to the implementation of Article 6 of the convention have been incorporated into the ACE brand and the two terms, Article 6 and ACE, can therefore be used interchangeably (UNFCCC 2016b: 1). However, a distinction has to be

made within the UNFCCC and the UNFCCC secretariat, because the first includes a bigger variety of stakeholders than the secretariat.

Many authors have described the development of Global Climate Governance as a fragmentation process from a centralized to a polycentric policy structure (Asselt, van and Zelli 2014; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013). Hereby over 190 sovereign states engage in inter-state relations and environmental negotiations of international organizations a central guiding global government is absent (Vogler 2014: 342, 343). Deere-Birkbeck interprets the concept of global governance as “processes, traditions, institutional arrangements and legal regimes” (Deere-Birkbeck 2009: 1173) where global decisions are taken and implemented through national governments and other stakeholders (Ibid.). One needs to distinguish between global environmental governance and Global Climate Governance depicting only a part of the environmental spectrum. Therefore it needs to be emphasized that the thesis will focus on the field of Climate Governance and name the UNFCCC as international institution in Global Climate Governance.¹

The master thesis’ aim is the analysis of ACE’s activities, strategies and stakeholders to imply results on the role of ACE under the UNFCCC and its meaning in Global Climate Governance. With the consideration of past developments of the UNFCCC and ACE negotiations, the author draws a connection to present activities of the UNFCCC, of parties and other stakeholders. Who is empowering ACE? How is Action for Climate Empowerment designed and how do individual stakeholders contribute to the programme and its goals? What role does ACE play in a continuing fragmentation of Global Climate Governance? The thesis further tries to give a detailed evaluation of past and present developments, also in terms of gaps and barriers. It tries to outline challenges that hinder ACE on implementing its mandate. From this point, comments are pointed out for its future possibilities and considerations. In this context, legislative documents of ACE, perceptions of experts of the UNFCCC on ACE, broad literature as well as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of selected parties of the UNFCCC are combined to achieve a valid result.

The content is presented in seven chapters. While the introduction offers a general overview and background information to understand the problem formulation, the theoretical framework and methodology contains an elaboration to the methodological approach of the thesis. It considers why certain theories have been applied while others have not and

¹ By International Relations scholars also named as climate regime since it agrees with actors on explicit norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Krasner in Little 2014: 293).

continues with highlighting the qualitative research method and the conduct of expert interviews in detail. The third chapter highlights the theoretical approach to the thesis, and elaborates on the three chosen theories liberal institutionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism, the English School and constructivism.

The analysis part of the thesis starts with the fourth chapter that assesses Global Climate Governance and outlines the UNFCCC's role in the framework and how it has contributed to the development of climate change negotiations. It further investigates whether the role of the convention has changed. Section five moves on to ACE and characterizes its mandate and activities to include various stakeholders. These stakeholders and their importance for ACE are emphasized in various sub-chapters in chapter five including parties, non-state actors, youth and other international partnering entities on ACE. The chapter continues with outlining the communication strategy on ACE as well as with assessing the role of ACE in Global Climate Governance. Followed by this, section six provides a critical assessment of the ACE elements' implementation on sub-national, national and international levels on funding, technology as well as in political, economic and social areas. It terminates with comments on these challenges and tries to apply future recommendations.

The thesis concludes in chapter seven with a summary of results of an analysis on the topic.

2 Methodology

2.1 Methodological approach

The thesis takes a fundamental and cohesive analysis to outline the role of ACE under the UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance. Through a qualitative approach, different sources of information have been implemented into the research. Besides books and edited books, academic journals, research papers, media publications such as articles and essays, also legal documents of the UNFCCC such as the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the convention as well as internet websites of the UNFCCC have been used to gather valuable data. To assess the aims of parties and possible needs and gaps within ACE, some INDCs have been part of the analysis. However this is not comparable to country case studies due to its limited consideration in the thesis. Five semi-structured research interviews with diplomatic experts of the UNFCCC, including the former Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres, have moreover been conducted in order to generate a practical influence to the theoretical thematic. Hence, reliable primary as well as secondary sources have been included into the analysis.

Due to an internship at the department of Communication and Outreach of the UNFCCC an insight perception of the thematic was possible. Therefore the thesis has been developed within six months; the detailed compilation of information has been conducted during two months after the internship.

The thesis takes on an inductive view where the theory is produced out of the conducted research. An epistemological position does not focus on a natural scientific model but instead tries to incorporate social aspects by data interpretation of participants. It further applies an ontological approach including a constructivist way to analyze interactions between individuals and ongoing processes (Bryman 2012: 380). Although an interdisciplinary approach has been taken and international law has been part of a lot of many research sources and further there exists a strong connection to international organizations, especially in terms of compliance and verification of agreements, the thematic is not part of this analysis. Instead, an elaboration of ACE and components of stakeholder inclusion, achievements and challenges to the programme have been outlined and evolved to a future outlook. Moreover it does not focus on the detailed analysis of international climate politics but only gives an impression on developments within the UNFCCC and the Global Climate Governance spectrum. Neither does the thesis assess the broad area of climate finance due to constraints in length.

However also limitations have been developed: During the conduct of the interviews, neither publicly available documents nor legislative documents except for the Paris Agreement have been used to support the content of interview questions. Through the inclusion of these sources, a more valid and in-depth discussion would have evolved and more precise conversation techniques would have been able to be applied during the interview (Beyers et al. 2014: 176). Lack of time of expert interviewees due to working priorities could have furthermore influenced the answers and blur results. Further, the differences between environmental and climate governance has not been analyzed in-depth because the focus has been on ACE and a more detailed approach would have demanded more space.

Theories that support the analysis of the problem formulation on different levels have been used in a reflective context and its selection will be further described in chapter 2.2 and chapter three.

2.2 Theory selection

Nicholson defines a theory as a “set of generalizations about the world (...) [with which] a set of postulates that are regarded as true for the purpose of the exercise” (Nicholson 2005: 29) is applied. Theory is supposed to be tested in a holistic manner and integrated into the thematic (Ibid.).

Due to the focus of the thesis on institutional work of the UNFCCC and its sub-programme Action for Climate Empowerment, institutionalism has been selected as one of the research theories. Liberal institutionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism examines processes and the role of institutions and its stakeholders in the international community and tries to explain international cooperation on the climate issue (Woods 2014: 251). The inclusion of this theory is therefore essential for the analysis. Within the framework of neo-liberal and liberal institutionalism, the model of the game known as Prisoner’s Dilemma has been considered as valuable for the analysis. In contrast to a theory, a model only depicts a “simplified picture of reality” (Nicholson 2005: 29). Although it possesses the same structure as a theory and the boundaries between the two entities sometimes are vague, it enables the author to explain a circumstance that is not directly applicable to the world but features some direct correspondence to realistic situations (Ibid.). The model of Prisoner’s Dilemma highlights constraints of states in terms of insecurity (Little 2014: 296) in the anarchic system and seeks to provide an explanation for irrational decisions by states in climate negotiations.

While the theory of institutionalism has been chosen to evaluate on the process and construct of international cooperations (Woods 2014: 251), constructivism implicates an

agent-structure problem and describes how the framework of agency in the international structure correlates with other social phenomena (Nicholson 2005: 50). Constructivism further considers the evolving process of knowledge, ideas and historical circumstances that influences states and therefore the international political and economic spectrum (Woods 2014: 252). For the author it was important to also consider social constructs besides factors of rational choice and factors that form soft preferences. The aim that has been prioritized is how values, traditions and identities of states and other stakeholders influence the process and climate negotiations (Woods 2014: 251) and how the UNFCCC secretariat and ACE need to respond to actions in climate governance.

The schools of realism and neo-realism have not been considered because the theories' founder Hans J. Morgenthau already highlighted the environment as a "fixed contextual factor or a constituent of national power" (Vogler 2014: 353). Environmental issues, including climate issues, are not examined appropriately within the realist theory. Climate regimes are understood as entities in which states are able to coordinate their self-interests and preserve their powers for security and survival (Little 2014: 290). Here arise open questions in the connection of power struggles and climate change politics (Pfefferle 2014: 2) because environmental problems are shared by all states of the international community.

The focus of realists on conflict and competition (Lamy 2014: 132) has been mitigated within the English School. Hedley Bull, as the main scholar of the English School, combines both realist aspects of balance of power between sovereign states, morality and law and soft arguments such as the existence of shared values, international institutions and international law in one theory. However he also highlights the insufficiency to approach norms, rules and shared values in the international society by neo-realists and realists and therefore considers more appropriate aspects beside material aspects (power, security) in terms of current international environmental politics (Hurrell 2002).

2.3 Qualitative Research

Qualitative research strategy "emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data" (Bryman 2012: 380). It enables more flexibility to the researcher and to its research process as well as to the possibility of incorporating the researcher's own ideas and perceptions formed on qualitative research methods (Bryman 2012: 470). Critics accuse researchers to work too subjective, impressionistic, unstructured and not transparent. Since qualitative research allows the researcher to begin in an open-ended way and only gradually

adds data to its process, readers cannot in all cases understand the researchers way of thinking and prioritization of particular research data. Due to this individualism, missing standard conduct and the personal character of the study, it is difficult to replicate qualitative studies and to understand how researcher reached a conclusion. Qualitative data is unstructured by nature but also allows the author the biggest flexibilities (Bryman 2012: 405, 406).

Literature review depicts one of the essential instruments in qualitative research. On this study, the grounded theory on qualitative research has been picked which has continuously influenced and nourished the analysis of the topic and provided guidance for the study (Bryman 2012: 385). Literature review is further considered an aspect, supporting the reliability and validity of research of the study (Bryman 2012: 389).

Foster describes seven main steps how qualitative research leads to the ideal conclusion which have also been pursued in this study: Firstly, it is necessary to choose a general research questions to depict the focus of the study. Secondly, research is narrowed down by deciding for relevant research participants and literature, which in the third step is being collected. Following this, the data is interpreted and, in the next step, leading to the specification of the research question and to a more specialized collection of data. In the last step, results are clearly outlined, findings are written down and important aspects are narrowed down to the conclusion (Foster in Bryman 2016: 384, 386). Qualitative research explains argumentations of research subjects as a way to give details about social behavior and values of the given context which have also been introduced during the research (Bryman 2012: 401).

The next chapter highlights interviews, and especially expert interviews, as part of qualitative research in this study due to its flexibility in process (Bryman 2012: 469).

2.4 Expert interviews

Interviews give the researcher a better inclusion into their working structure and their anticipations of theory and at the same time concentrate on the anticipations of the interviewee(s) (Bryman 2012: 469). Interviewing interest groups or policy experts enables important collection of data in order to analyze their strategies and their influence on policy structures (Beyers et al. 2014: 174). Regarding the data collection of this thesis, five individual and personal expert interviews with the UNFCCC secretariat have been conducted during an internship and used as a research tool (Beyers et al. 2014: 175). Hereby experienced interviewees have been chosen who are directly engaged with the tasks and structure of the UNFCCC and ACE for years to provide expertise and knowledge on the topic. For every hour

of an interview, around five to six hours have been invested for transcription. On average, interviews have taken 30 minutes to one hour each.

Qualitative interviewing provides the advantage that researchers are able to adjust their way of thinking to the outcomes of interviews and stimuli they get from the detailed answers of their interviewee(s). The interviews of the study have been implemented on a semi-structured basis taking an interview guide as foundation for thematic guidance. Providing the advantage that spontaneous questions can be asked following the interviewee's answer, picking up opinions of the person on certain structures of events and issues. The semi-structured approach has been chosen so that interviewees can be guided to a certain extent through a different range of topics, which have been of interest for the author (Bryman 2012: 469, 470, 471).

Expert interviews contribute to the compilation of informal information on processes and strategies (Beyers et al. 2014: 176). Moreover detailed information about concepts, stakeholders, events and argumentations from diplomatic experts directly involved in the process could be gathered. The in-depth insight on the topic is not achievable only through an official portfolio of materials (Ibid.).

The process of conducting interviews can be divided into three stages for the existing study: pre, during and post stage (Breyers et al. 2014). To ensure an optimal outcome of the research, groundwork on the preparation of interviews with the design of the interview guide needs to be conducted. This involves well-designed and thematically relevant questions that minimize an error on outcomes. At the same time, complexity can have an impact on the validity of results. Questions can be designed by theme and in a particular order but should be asked in an appropriate open and reflective manner to ensure effectiveness. Regarding this study, the topic has been explored with public data on a small basis prior to the interview conduct (Breyers et al. 2014: 179-185). Fewer preconceptions have enabled the researcher to adjust to experienced impulses of interviewees and continuously evolve order and structure of the topic, namely following the concept of the grounded theory of qualitative research (Bryman 2012: 473).

During the interview, the understanding of answers, including a psychological effective response, are necessary to enable a successful dialogue (Breyers et al. 2014: 186). Interviews have been recorded and the transcriptions have been implemented in the annex of this thesis. On this study, interviewees have been questioned in a particular manner that ensured that they feel comfortable and being asked without pressure but still being challenged

during the conduct to achieve the most possible result. Different sorts of questions have been addressed towards interview partners such as specifying questions, direct questions, structuring and interpreting questions in order to listen but also to contribute to the conversation and control the focus of the interview (Bryman 2012: 478, 479). Due to the flexibility in qualitative research, questions have sometimes been spontaneously directed to the interviewee. The questions' design has been aligned to the function and the thematic expert area of the interviewee within the UNFCCC and the course of the conversation. Ms. Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary, for instance, has primarily asked regarding the involvement of the Paris Agreement and the role of the UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance. Hence an error in collection of data could be prohibited.

Following the interview, results have been validated, transcribed and sampled with data from other public sources until a representative sample could be composed (Bryman 2012: 427). Purposive sampling has been conducted that intentionally prioritizes the samples or interviews that are relevant for the study. As part of the purposive sampling process, data has been selected to add information through a theoretical sampling concept (Bryman 2012: 418, 419). Public materials, legislative programmes, academic articles and books have been used to support results of the expert interviews and to add information through theoretical sampling but also to enrich interviews with more detailed data (Beyers et al. 2014: 175; Bryman 2012: 419). As Beyers et al. highlighted, "only a restricted amount of evidence is publicly available" (Beyers et al. 2014: 175) and lacks completeness and reliability. Therefore interviews are sometimes necessary or even crucial to complement a research on a particular topic (Ibid.).

However expert interviews also bring some challenges to the data collection process. Firstly, the interviewee reports his subjective perception of experiences that could also lacking memories regarding particular facts and the procedure of events. Hereby a depiction of facts in favor for the interviewee can have an impact on results. At the same time, the interviewer could also be biased due to uncertainty during the conversation or lacking knowledge about the topic. Secondly, interviewees can lengthen the interview due to a detailed response and could influence its conduct (Breyers et al. 2014: 177, 178).

Nonetheless of all these constraints, the advantages outnumber the disadvantages. Without a conduct of expert interviews, stimuli on the topic and institutional processes would not have been given and a developed perception of the author on the study would not have evolved.

Thus expert interviews are seen as a valuable contribution of crucial data that has otherwise not been available to the extent through official sources. Further it enabled to substantiate facts and data which has been collected through other information resources emphasizing the author's results and conclusion (Breyers et al. 2014: 177).

3 Theories

3.1 Liberal institutionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalism analyzes the states' interaction in an international environment since the first theoretical works from the 1950s up to the 1980s.

International institutions are displayed as mediators, to help govern an anarchic international system and to foster effective cooperation among states and other actors (Lamy 2014: 132, 133). States are anticipated as “rational egoists” (Keohane and Martin 1995: 39) who only agree to common aims if they are in their own interest (Ibid.).

The liberalist institutionalism scholar Keohane considers cooperation between states as an instrument to avoid conflicts and to limit discords in a world of growing interdependence. To achieve “mutual policy adjustment” (Keohane 1984: 430) one option is the guidance through a hegemonic power which tries to achieve widely acceptable political measures for others in a cooperative construct or in a nonhegemonic construct where independent states join forces and where self-interest is leading (Keohane 1984: 117, 430, 431). In general cooperation is only possible when partner-states consider the policies followed in their own self-interest (Keohane 1984: 97).

Regimes are defined as “intervening variables” (Keohane 1984: 118) between certain characteristics such as power and states' behavior in a global concept reaching beyond the sovereignty of states (Keohane 1984: 116, 118). However the state sovereignty will always prevail above the rules of international institutions since the regimes have been established out of the states' pursuits (Keohane 1984: 107, 114). Keohane describes international institutions as possibilities to pursue common interests and to unite egoistic and rational states based on their own conceptions. He even defines regimes as necessary to “achieve state purposes” (Keohane 1984: 433) but as a challenge to organize (Keohane 1984: 94).

Neo-liberal institutionalists further consider global regimes as bodies that enable unified and multilateral responses of the international community to mutual interests and threats which could not be solved unilaterally. Hereby the theory of international relations admits the sovereignty and independence of states. In light of urging global challenges in economy, human rights and the environment, neo-liberal institutionalists see the role of institutions and the necessity to maintain and further empower them as inevitable future development. The purpose of cooperation however is being considered as a rational one in order to intensify maximum national and international gain through a coalition with other states. In case the interaction is mutually beneficial, neo-liberal institutionalists expect states to become loyal

and invest resources into the cooperation (Lamy 2014: 132-135).

Neo-liberal institutionalism further anticipates that states will enhance influence on the institution when the willingly constructed norms and regulations would enhance their individual and long-term interest (Barnett 2014: 157). States are willingly to be more loyal to the regime when their self-interest or empathy is the reason for joining the institution rather than rational egoism (Keohane 1984: 234).

Neo-liberal institutionalism is build upon the theories of liberalism, neo-liberalism and institutionalism. While liberalism represents the theoretical governmental study within and between states and people worldwide on principles such as justice, liberty and toleration, neo-liberalism tends to analyze also more recent issues such as human right, the environment or commercial ideas in the international context (Dunne 2014: 115; Lamy 2014: 126, 128).

Institutionalism further describes reasons and functions for the existence of international institutions. It argues that states in their rational choice approach utilize cooperation in order to solve collective-action problems where world markets and world economics cannot assist.

One example constitutes the environment because the states' actions interrelate and every individual action contributes to a joint outcome. The institutional framework therefore secures that the collective aim is achieved without free-riding countries (Woods 2014: 251). Hereby states are able to accept norms of regime even if it does not fully coincide with their self-interest but they see the rationality in solving an issue (Keohane 1984: 193).

Liberal institutionalism even has similar characteristics to the international relations theory of realism and neo-realism in regards to its pattern on security. In contrast to realists who develop military cooperation to protect themselves in an anarchic system and the unimportance of international institutions on this term, liberal institutionalists relate to international cooperations in order to help achieving international security and stability.

Hereby not the prevention of war is meant but the successful expansion of economic and political cooperation to limit likelihood of safety disputes (Baylis 2014: 233, 234). It further seeks to both address security and political economy in its framework and anticipates that institutions are able to provide information and concepts to both subjects (Keohane and Martin 1995: 43). Keohane even honors the attempt of realism because it provides a fundamental understanding of global issues and politics (Keohane 1984: 434).

Keohane and Martin emphasizes that institutions must exist to enable influence on individual interests and power but depending on the matter, institutions may have an influence or not

(Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). Institutions can however take influence on settling conflicts by providing information on personal gains and an equal distribution to all stakeholders (Keohane and Martin 1995: 45, 46).

Liberal institutionalists further investigate how international regimes can overcome the anarchical structure of the international system and the states' doubts on the system can be minimized (Little 2014: 291). Keohane describes the sense in international regimes and institutions as bodies which "can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity" (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). Moreover Keohane outlines the facilitation of cooperation between participating governments and facilitating the agreement with each other. Here he does not see the urgency of a centralized body within the regime or a universal approach of it to function effectively (Keohane 1984: 435). Although regimes are not able to address authority above states, agreements within institutions support the organization and are constantly adjusted to the current environment (Keohane 1984: 162-164). Their evolvement depends on the "mutual desire to increase the efficiency of the exchanges in which they engage" (Keohane 1984: 145).

As a constellation build on trust, the biggest challenge of neo-liberal institutionalism is non-compliance by states (Lamy 2014: 133). Due to the absence of a primary power aligning to the function of a state, sovereign nations tend to not comply with a policy introduction when the collaboration is not beneficial for them (Little 2014: 296; Keohane and Martin 1995: 39).

Notably the Prisoner's Dilemma prohibits consensus because of uncertainty in the anarchic system. Originally a story of two guilty personas who are challenged by a district attorney and can choose between different levels of punishment according to their confesses.

Although none of them wants to confess, they cannot estimate the partners' reaction to the proposal of the attorney and choose to confess in their best self-interest no matter how the partner decides. The model explains irrationality although states should act rational in situations which should be of mutual consent to enable the market to react. Instead states consider other states to act competitive instead of pursuing a cooperative system and decide in the same manner. To prohibit the sub-optimal outcome in international institutions, a compliance system needs to be implemented to showcase other agents the defection of agreements. Liberal institutionalists are convinced that international regimes are already able to provide these mechanisms due to prior successes although it is missing a hegemon and centralized control (Keohane 1984: 125, 126; Little 2014: 296, 297). Less actors in a regime

are able to apply a compliance mechanism more effectively and replace a hegemonic power.

However the “principle of reciprocity” (Little 2014: 298) suggests that states are persuaded to take the risk to collaborate in order to save the system from failure because others would follow the same strategy. Reliable sources of information and a monitoring and verification mechanism have to be built within an international regime in order to allow the concept of reciprocity and trust on distributional issues to develop (Keohane 1984: 437; Keohane and Martin 1995: 46). In case of non-compliance, sanctions could only be imposed by parties themselves (Keohane 1984: 178).

Keohane further enhances provision of information within institutions as central to governments and human beings’ behavior and as necessary to enable a successful cooperation among states. *Visa versa*, even with states’ interests, regimes with less information distribution will experience less cooperation and will fail in future challenges. Uncertainty from states can develop through asymmetrical information, moral hazard which is based in less incentive for a agreement of the regime and irresponsibility of a state. Although Keohane applies examples of industrialized states, the distribution of information within regimes should not be limited to certain agents (Keohane 1984: 170-175, 434, 436, 437).

Consequently scientific progress and increase of scientific knowledge will reduce uncertainty and will contribute to further regime building in the eyes of liberal institutionalists (Little 2014: 298). It is considered to be difficult to obtain global governance and to build regimes on common interests when there is continued fragmentation in global governance (Keohane: 1984: 436; Vogler 2014: 353). Yet Keohane highlights the urgency to maintain international institutions since the effort to develop new ones is higher than to continue started cooperation (Keohane 1984: 436).

Institutions are able to be influenced by human action and changing conditions but at the same time human beings are able to achieve changes in state’s behavior (Keohane and Martin 1995: 46, 47). Changed interests, values and perceptions of actors can lead to a changing behavior which however also implies a learning effect that can have influence on both the agent and the institution (Haas in Keohane 1984: 235). Keohane defines that “each act of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules, and practices that form the context for future actions” (Keohane 1984: 104). Therefore developments and agreements must be realized through a chain of acts (Keohane 1984: 104).

3.2 The English School

The following chapter seeks to explain the English School according to the historical findings of the scholar Hedley Bull and explores the theory in regards to the state's position in the international system as well as the structure of the international society as well as the basic pillars of his theory. Due to its extend, this chapter does not explain contents of his work that do not relate to the thesis' aim.

The English School has been part of the international relations theory throughout political history. It had first been developed during the colonial order. Its term of an "international society" (Armstrong 2014: 36) it has primarily been connected with a common culture and the history of colonialism. However the term seeks to explain the overall construction of terms, norms, rules and institutions by parties in the international system (Armstrong 2014: 36).

Hereby an international society means a society of states which are bound together by their anticipation, "common interests or values (...) [and] by a common set of rules" (Bull 2002: 13) through cooperation on national or international scale (Bull 1977: 13).

Hedley Bull describes the international order as a "pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society" (Bull 1977: 8). He further defines states in the international system as "independent political communities" (Bull 1977: 8) and therefore understands states as entities in an anarchic international system.

On the one hand, states are internally sovereign in the international community and can therefore exercise their sovereignty and authority on their part of territory and population.

On the other hand, it can also assert its sovereignty externally but still seeks to maintain its supremacy in the within the international system independently. To Bull, states cannot be considered as such when their authority and independence is not secured in the external of their own territory (Ibid.).

States build an international system as soon as they cooperate regularly and influence each other so that a state can calculate the characteristics in its own responses. They are moreover linked through either cooperation, conflict or indifferent actions in different thematic aspects such as economy, policy and sociology and define common aims and common interests while they align to the same set of rules (Bull 1977: 10, 13). Bull argues that only international societies share common civilization, culture, language or values and are therefore in advantage due to easier understanding and communication and can consequently establish a set of common rules and institutions easier than in other agreements (Bull 1977: 14, 15). Bull emphasizes a number of goals which shall prevail the society of

states: Firstly, the society of states and the system itself needs to be preserved to prevent a transformation in chaotic systems. Secondly, the external sovereignty and independence of states as well as its internal supremacy jurisdiction over country and territory need to be maintained in international society. Moreover permanent peace is one of the major goals and is only to be breached in general acknowledgement. However the goal of peace is seen as subordinate to state sovereignty by the theoretical approach of the English School. The states' wish of independence and the continuation of the state system in the international society depicts their highest aim and is also preferable to the threat of war. Other goals are the limitation of violence are the multiple things of "limitation of violence (...), the keeping of promises and the stabilization of possession by rules of property" (Bull 1977: 18). Further the compliance to an agreement that has been assessed to be an important goal and to follow the latin term "pacta sunt servanda" (Ibid.) - that agreements and contracts are binding and will be upheld. The overall aim that prevails is the international acceptance of sovereignty and to accept the state's terms of their internal jurisdiction (Bull 1977: 16-19).

In an international system, Bull also defines the world order as order that exists among states. In contrast to the single political systems that have been present in the first half of the 19th century in various global regions, the second half of that century developed patterns of only one global political system or world political system, "a states system of global dimension" (Bull 1977: 20) that has expanded from Europe to other world regions. He further considers the development of other forms of universal political organizations in the future.

Most importantly, world order is not to be considered in an equal sense as international order since world order is bigger than international order, also entailing human beings as mirrors of society. Therefore his conclusion in this matter is that "order among mankind which we must treat as being of primary value, not order within the society of states" (Bull 1977: 21) and that the aims of international order is influential to the orders of society (Bull 1977: 20-21).

In the international society the sovereign states are not bound to an overall government or to overall rules due to its case of anarchy (Bull 1977: 44). The foundation of international societies are common interests sustained by rules that sustain a certain behavior and institutions who implement rules and make them effective (Bull 1977: 63). Institutions are formed out of states for states that also form the decisive institution. In an anarchic environment of the international society, an institution is reporting to the independent parties.

When states take decisions in the international societies they maintain them according

to their legal consultants and national interests and the interpretation of rules belongs to themselves. In case states disagree with common rules and their implementation, they tend to violate or ignore them for their own cause of self-determination. Moreover states can only pursue the rules of the international society if they are still in the common interests of all states. Institutions enable states to ensure the consistency of rules and substance to the collaboration of states in the political spectrum and at the same time seek to carry out political activities and to maintain the common interest in the international society (Bull 1977: 64-71).

Hereby diplomacy in international relations is considered to be a peaceful action of agents that are authorized to fulfill commands in the name of states or other political entities to support states in overcoming their uncertainties (Bull 1977: 157). As facilitators of communication, diplomats secure the exchange of communication which is essential to the existence of international societies, act as messengers and assist to negotiate agreements.

Notably agreements can only be negotiated when parties agree on common interests and aims at some point. The diplomats' aim is the persuasion of states to outline the overlapping interests between parties. Another task is gathering of information and intelligence of parties for other states and to "minimi[z]e frictions" (Bull 1977: 165) to end up in a framework where common interests meet in agreements (Bull 1977: 163-166). Bull highlights the UN as another political structure in the international society which could describe a new phase of the global system. Based on the Grotian doctrine of international order parties thus seek to cooperate on mutual interests in the framework of a substitute of a world government although they are strictly against the formal establishment of an authorized world government. Still, the approach argues that states perceive solidarity and "upholding [of] the collective will of the society of states against challenges to it" (Bull 1977: 230) as highly valuable. As well as the United Nations Charter is suggesting, single states would relinquish threat or other forceful actions that jeopardizes the territorial integrity of another state and act in the name of collective international security. This implies states are working as agents and accept a "superior form of maintaining order" (Bull 1977: 231) on the basis of solidarity. Although Bull does not acknowledge that the outlined concept has already occurred in the past, he at the same time does not exclude that force can be used subordinately to common interests in international society (Bull 1977: 230-232).

The English School therefore suggests that it is unlikely that states will give up parts of their sovereignty, security and other interests and anticipates their tendency to use force to dissolve disputes being more paramount although it is noticed that the possibility of a world government by conquest by one state decreases in the late twentieth century (Bull 1977: 252-

254).

In regards to the challenges that humanity faces with the environment, Bull concludes that social and economic factors such as population growth, over-consumption of natural resources and economic development contributing to it, cannot be solved without a solid system of states. To tackle environmental problems it is necessary for states to act, especially on national scale. Reason for a missing global action plan is not a dysfunction of the system of states but instead human disagreement. A state system makes actions possible because of the provision of order. To also establish global order in the environmental field not a constraint of the state system but a preservation or extension must be pursued to keep a viable global structure and enable states to follow their common interests in common institutions and bring consensus (Bull 1977: 282-285). The English School further admits that the state system is only one part within the global political system and besides other agents such as political groups or international organizations. Businesses, trade unions, churches and political parties have always influenced both national and international politics of a state. However the English School sees the state system still as superior to other entities (Bull 1977: 266-271).

To sum it all up, although international society is in decline an attempt to keep the world order must lie in the counteraction of its decline. The anticipation that the state system is unable to solve challenges of world order cannot be proved but needs to be assessed on a continuing basis (Bull 1977: 307, 308). The above outlined theory of liberal institutionalism and neo-institutionalism emphasizes the question about regimes and institutions' influence on norms and rules that are generated to encourage a certain topic. However, due to its focus on institutions, regimes and cooperation (Lamy 2014:138) it leaves out questions about agency and rules of society that might matter in environmental developments and which will be further explained with the theory of constructivism.

3.3 Constructivism

As much as liberal institutionalism and the English School share certain characteristics such as the construction of international institutions that assist states in their roles (Barnett 2014: 157; Bull 1977), also the English School and the theory of constructivism both share their anticipation of the international community not only as a system but also as a society (Barnett 2012: 156). The following chapter is highlighting the theory of constructivism and important aspects for this thesis.

Constructivism as a relatively modern International Relations theory has evolved from social and philosophical theory during the 1980s (Hansen 2014: 170). It cannot be considered as a theory of international politics (Wendt 1999: 193). In contrast to other international theories such as liberalism and realism that takes the approach of rational choice to understand fixed structures and how actors behave underneath them to maximize their gains, constructivism analyses the patterns of world politics and how it transforms with its actors (Barnett 2014: 157, 166). While rationalist theories mainly give prioritization to material aspects such as power, interest and military intervention, constructivism addresses both material and ideational approaches and analyzes the relation of agents (states) and structure (the international system) in a dynamic focus and how interests can change due to interactions between agents (Barnett 2014: 166, 167; Pfefferle 2014: 3,4; Wendt 1999: 12). Wendt defines states as agents due to their own argumentation to deal with interests, responsibilities and needs in the international system (Wendt 1999: 10). He criticizes that scholars have not “let the nature of their problems and questions dictate their methods” (Wendt 1999: 48).

He further highlights idealism and holism as important pillars of constructivism and challenges the materialist view of scholars which anticipate institutions, interests and power as “idea-free baselines” (Wendt 1999: 93). However, Wendt outlines that the material patterns are shaped through ideas such as language, rules and that it is dependent on its interpretation (Barnett 2014: 158; Wendt 1999: 92-94). With holism he describes that structures cannot be seen as individual parts, but are social entities which influence actors and also get designed by them (Barnett 2014: 158, 166; Wendt 1999: 138).

Constructivism devotes itself to social and historical aligning to climate change politics and party negotiations as an evolving process (Pfefferle 2014: 4). Therefore it is able to “enrich our understandings of the world” (Barnett 2014: 167) and explain evolution of climate change relations.

It challenges the classical approaches of International Relations theory, asks how alternative approaches can evolve and suggests new approaches of analysis and world politics including agents of the spectrum (Barnett 2014: 167). In the opinion of constructivists “institutions arise as a reflection of the identities and interests of states and groups that are themselves forged through interaction” (Woods 2014: 254). Therefore, institutions are able to bring different agents together but can also encourage them for further developments and new patterns in the same environment (Ibid.).

Culture enables actors to shape their activities and explains them, make them meaningful and show what the society understands as important. Various concepts in politics such as security, human rights and development all have different meanings which are interpreted differently by states and non-state actors. Therefore consent always describes the acceptance of these meanings (Barnett 2014: 161). Moreover ideas, knowledge and historical actions are central to the constructivist idea. They shape identity, interests, actors and their behavior in the political and economic system (Woods 2014: 251, 252). Through ideas, institutions and ideologies, hegemonic powers try persuading other actors (Woods 2014: 251).

The international structure forms social relationships and the interests of states. Therefore the security dilemma is only a reaction to the international structure because individual states feel insecure about other actions which leads to the announcement of self-interests. It is an interplay where social structures are developed through shared knowledge, understandings and expectations. The result is that constructivists anticipate social structures and political structures as changeable which can also be seen by historical events such as the end of the Cold War when both powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, accepted the idea of an end of Cold War (Baylis 2014: 234, 235). The states system, as well as the English School scholar Hedley Bull has explained, is not seen as equal with the international system. Instead, it is autonomous and only part of its other structures (Wendt 1999: 193, 194).

Constructivists perceive entities such as terrorism, human rights, sovereignty and money as social facts which can be influenced by the agreement and anticipation of human beings which again is having an effect on the interpretation of the world (Barnett 2014: 159). They define rules as institutionalized norms which have reached a threshold and are also present in international organizations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 900). These are continuously developed by actors through experiences, reflections and argumentations (Barnett 2014: 159). States can also follow norms and internationally determined values when they only pursue themselves and other agents to think positively of its actions and want to achieve legitimacy

on the international stage. In case of violation feelings of embarrassment or guilt can evolve.

Legitimacy is also used to persuade national and international actors, including the own citizenry, that a state is capable of an action and to produce trust and to illustrate the governments' compliance to rules of the state (Barnett 2014: 161; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 903, 904). The more legitimate a state appeals, the easier it will be to convince other agents to cooperate with it and vice versa. This perception of legitimacy adds up to the definition of power introduced by other theories. Besides the material aspect, power can therefore also function ideationally to persuade actors to operate in another way than it usually would (Barnett 2014: 161).

Another argument how agents are influenced find constructivists in the concept of socialization: Through their participation in international institutions and organizations, states tend to become influenced if they are uncertain themselves, they are sensitive to other opinions or when they have seen the practice been effective for others or when they are convinced of an innovative approach (Barnett 2014: 164).

Likewise realists and the English School, Waltz admits that anarchy exists, still he interprets the characteristics differently: Anarchy does not entail a structure, it is a permanently evolving process without logic where states decide what they develop out of it.

He argues that self-help and power politics are criteria that states decide to introduce themselves and sees no direct connection of these criteria with an anarchical order but only with their social construction (Waltz 1992: 394, 395).

These social and historical frameworks show that agents and its structure are being affected by various factors in Global Climate Governance which are not solely based on rationality (Pfefferle 2014).

4 The UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance

4.1 Development process from Rio to Paris

This subchapter gives a short introduction to the most important climate negotiations in the past to be able in order to analyze the UNFCCC's role in the climate regime of Global Climate Governance and its role under Article 6 of the convention. As the UNFCCC is an institution, liberal and neo-liberal institutionalism could therefore be applied on all areas concerning the UNFCCC and role for parties.

Although the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit together with its sister conventions, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification, it entered into force 1994. Ratified by 197 Parties to the convention, it sets its ultimate goal “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations” (UNFCCC 2014h) and to foster sustainable mitigation and adaptation activities combating climate change. Industrialized countries, named Annex I Countries, have especially taken responsibility for their historical emissions through the provision of financial and technical assistance for developing countries (Non-Annex I Parties) (UNFCCC 2014h, UNFCCC 2014b).

The first international legally binding treaty to reduce emissions was adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 (UNFCCC 2014b). Primarily aimed primarily at industrialized countries, the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol entered into force from 2008 to 2012, followed by its second commitment period from January 2013 to December 2020 (UNFCCC 2014i). It adopted a strong enforcement approach on developed parties but legal obligations of the Protocol could not be accomplished by parties (Duyck 2015: 2, 11). According to the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, the Kyoto Protocol clearly divided the world into two groups of countries, the developed and the developing ones (Figueres 2016). The Protocol did not achieve a binding reduction target on emissions for both groups, additionally it was not able to achieve obligations from the United States nor from emerging developing countries whose emissions rose significantly during the past years (Lagos et al. 2011: 7). Moreover Canada has retreated from its commitment during the Kyoto Protocol's implementation phase and Japan and Australia have withdrawn from their obligations and reduced efforts (Keohane 2015: 21). Scholars of the English School would have found these actions as disconcerting because in their understand, everyone should feel responsible to stay in binding agreement.

The Copenhagen Accord was therefore held under a premise which hope to achieve a

shift away from sanctions in case of non-compliance towards a mechanism based on trust and transparency which secured the participation of the worlds biggest polluters in the process (Duyck 2015: 11; Lagos et al. 2011: 7). For many people and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the Copenhagen COP is considered a disappointment because a globally binding agreement seemed far away (Lagos et al. 2011: 8). Interests of parties seemed to far away from each other and the willingness to cooperate in important topics had been limited (Little 2014: 294).

The UNFCCC consequently changed its strategy and focused on a transparent process and tried to achieve “tangible results on smaller scale issues” (Lagos et al. 2011: 8). The sixteenth COP in Cancun in 2010 set the foundation for individual country contributions and introduced a “new definition of consensus” (Lagos et al. 2011: 8). New financial and technological mechanisms enabled small progress (Lagos et al. 2011: 8; UNFCCC 2014b). This lead to the commitment of governments for a universal climate change agreement to be agreed on by 2015 and beyond 2020 (UNFCCC 2014b). At the same time governments slowly realized their individual responsibility and started implementing other forms of agreements and national mitigation and adaptation strategies (Lagos et al. 2011: 9).

The Paris Climate Change Agreement, adopted in December 2015, considers past experiences in climate negotiations. The legally binding global agreement supposed to last at least for several decades, does not separate developing and industrial countries into two groups. Rather, it fosters international cooperation through working groups and common goals. While the Kyoto Protocol was a “static construct” (Figueres 2016), the Paris Agreement thrives in flexibility and in a dynamic development due to parties’ increase of emission reductions every five years (Figueres 2016). This attempt demonstrates that the UNFCCC secretariat and parties have learned from past mistakes in shaping an agreement and instead applied a view where climate politics transforms with the actors and is therefore comparable with a constructivist view. The “top-down” approach that has been enforced on developed countries by the Kyoto Protocol has been transformed into a “bottom-up” approach whereby parties can act accordingly in line with, national capacities, and include differentiation among countries’ varying abilities. The call for parties to submit their individual “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs), transforming into national pledges for 2020, ensured broad participation and combined “top-down flexibility (...) with top-down rules, to promote accountability and ambition” (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2016). The agreement also reflects a link to the English School because

with the acceptance of the Paris Agreement, states have accepted a superior form of maintaining the order. Also liberal and neo-liberalists would understand the meaning of the agreement which for them would have been evolved out of human action which influenced state's behavior. The agreement would further be facilitated by all parties which supports the institutionalists' view.

The Paris Agreement itself will enter into force when parties that have signed cover at least an accumulation of 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, which could be realized earlier than 2020 (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2016).

4.2 UNFCCC's role in Global Climate Governance

This chapter aims to outline the UNFCCC's, and the climate secretariats role in the spectrum of Global Climate Governance, the UNFCCC's importance and presents activities in climate negotiations in order to understand its function for ACE.

Gehring defines the UNFCCC as a treaty organization accelerating Global Climate Governance by binding constituent members for collectively mandatory outcomes growing out of desired behavior and aims under the provision of an area of cooperation and interaction (Gehring 2012: 51). Through the Conference of the Parties, environmental treaty organizations, such as the UNFCCC could invite constituent member countries to become part of the organization and indirectly link them to the institutional system as well as its rules in order to ensure an efficient decision process (Gehring 2012: 54). Hereby the cooperation among parties through the COP replaces an authorized constituted power (Turnheim and Tezcan 2010: 529). In an institutional system such as the UNFCCC, states are furthermore confronted with pressure from other countries to make commitments and to negotiate accordingly to the institutions' terms and rules of participation (Gehring 2012: 55).

Both the UNFCCC and the secretariat working under the convention are lead by the legal frameworks and the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (UNFCCC 1992:1) that parties' have ratified (Valenzuela 2016). The UNFCCC's equitable approach highlights the way it tries to help countries to fulfill their climate actions without limiting their economic progress and their sovereignty (UNFCCC 2014h; UNFCCC 1992: 1; Davila 2016). During the last years, although the UNFCCC is a political institution, it has integrated scientific aspects due to its link to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its subsidiary body Subsidiary Body for Scientific and

Technological Advice (SBSTA). It could therefore develop technical expertise and consider them in its diplomatic decisions (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013: 63; Turnheim and Tezcan 2010: 527, 528).

The secretariat is requested by the convention to support countries in their goal to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions and is guided by the parties who have signed the convention and the Kyoto Protocol. Firstly, it has only been parties who have enjoyed the secretariat's assistance, which has then expanded with the inclusion of other stakeholders into multilateral climate negotiations. Over the years, its role has changed with evolving demands: The Kyoto Protocol claimed technical expertise of the secretariat. Yet, with increasing participation of developing negotiations in the Paris Agreement, analytical aspects have been requested from the secretariat. As a climate conference organizer and managerial body, the secretariat brings together stakeholders at the COP and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) at the end of every year as well as at consultations in May/June sessions, workshops and other events (UNFCCC 2014m). This does also secure a yearly process where in annual and inter-sessional conferences progresses and commitments of parties can be checked and adequate responses can be developed (Vogler 2014: 350). This is dedication from parties and is pressuring sovereign states to report their results to others.

It further triggers conversation between parties and other stakeholders and mobilizes them to partner in climate change actions on all levels. The UNFCCC works as a facilitator and networker worldwide who pairs up contributors with the same goal and potential and is considered as a coordinating body in enforcing climate responses (Lagos et al. 2011: 10). In the future it might assist in tracking the progress on INDCs, or could be an implementing force for the Paris Agreement (Nuttall 2016). However, since it is not an UN organization its capability is limited (Nuttall 2016).

The UNFCCC's role has evolved during the last decades as part of the "multilateral process" (Gildart 2016). Hereby, it adjusted to the non-static process of global governance that is responding to changed influences, structures and priorities (Deere-Birkbeck 2009: 1173). As global governance, climate governance has revealed new forms of governance efforts, an increasing fragmentation, complexity and decentralization (Abbott 2012; Deere-Birkbeck 2009: 1189-1191; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013). The absence of a central coordinating body and the missing authorized orchestration have triggered the inclusion of

other stakeholders into the governance prism and the evolvement of a bottom-up process conducting concrete actions (Abbott 2012; Deere-Birkbeck 2009: 1189-1191).

The convention has developed itself as a stage and a showcase, where parties are negotiating to achieve the adaptation to the world's changes and an arena to put them into politics (Gildart 2016). Apart from parties, other stakeholders such as religious groups, cities and civil societies have become involved by the actions of the Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres during the last years (Figueres 2016) which shows changes in the secretariat's own perception of tasks. It further demonstrates the secretariat's capability to bring in different stakeholders, parties and party groupings together on a long-term perspective and to have an impact on easing the fragmentation of Global Climate Governance. The anticipation of a broader range of stakeholders can trigger negotiation processes from bottom-up.

Already in 2008 Christiana Figueres stated that a future agreement will not force any country to contribute with measurements that are not reachable but instead an equitable yet more complex structure, which offers parties a more individualized concept of appropriate commitments would follow (Bodansky et al. 2008: 32). This emphasizes the leading diplomatic position the UNFCCC had within parties' negotiations to enable another approach, which tolerates each countries' capabilities.

After Durban, the UNFCCC secretariat's purpose has changed to accompanying the parties in their process to develop an agreement in 2015. This has been an evolution, through a step-by-step process with every agreement that has been made up to Paris.

With the dynamically structured Paris Agreement, the secretariat will need its institutional knowledge for future tasks such as monitoring, verification and reporting mechanisms, such as the trade emission market. During the next decades the secretariat will keep accompanying parties in their process to adjust parties' own actions in line with their international commitments in order to ensure the Paris Agreement's progress mechanism (Figueres 2016; Gildart 2016). The UNFCCC has managed the diplomatic challenge to enable developed countries to understand their historical responsibility and to have all countries accept that they have a shared future responsibility (Figueres 2016).

The Agreement only portrays a foundation for ground rules which still have to be negotiated in order to implement the long-term process under the convention with the support of the secretariat (Davila 2016). However, it also shows the UNFCCC's shift away from sanctions in case of non-compliance towards a transparent process in the Paris Agreement (Duyck 2015: 11; Gildart 2016). The UNFCCC and its stakeholders will further have to find

an “impartial judge (...) that can count each country against the science” (Gildart 2016). Most importantly, the convention has realized that it is “part of the building block of the whole sustainable development agenda (...), it has become more advocacy” (Nuttall 2016). The functions of the UNFCCC secretariat however seem limited and aligned to the UN secretariats’ tasks of administrative, bureaucratic and managerial work lacking power to initiate and the right to influence the political agenda (Taylor and Curtis 2014: 308). This definition of a secretariat’s task is limiting the UNFCCC secretariat’s direct influence on outcomes in the negotiations process. Still, the UNFCCC is considered as an important framework to thrive actions on climate change forward (Taylor and Curtis: 316). This view also corresponds with liberal institutionalists and neo-liberal institutionalists who see one task of the institution in facilitation of parties and mediating.

5 Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

5.1 Mandate

Article 6 of the Convention addresses different issues on climate change. Its areas of work have been defined and mandated as the six elements education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation as a cross-cutting element (Davila 2016). Parties have committed themselves among other things to “promote and facilitate at the national (...), subregional and regional levels (...) the development and implementation of educational and public awareness programmes on climate change and its effects” (UNFCCC 1992: 10). Article 6 of the Convention, as well as Article 10 (e) of the Kyoto Protocol, encourage parties to implement appropriate measures through the assistance of bodies of the convention (United Nations 1992; United Nations 1998). Moreover the Paris Agreement repeatedly restates the “importance of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels” (UNFCCC 2015: 1) and emphasizes the necessity to increase implementation and cooperation on these matters (Ibid.).

In 1992, when the UNFCCC has been agreed upon, parties adopted ACE’s mandate at the Rio Earth Summit (UNFCCC 1992: 10).

During the history of negotiations on Article 6 of the Convention, in cooperation with other stakeholders, parties have adopted various work programs to set ACE’s aim and request parties’ cooperation on the elements in Article 6 of the Convention.

In 2002, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) proposed the establishment of Article 6’s first work programme, the New Delhi work programme, which was adopted for a five-year period at the COP 8 in New Delhi. Here, parties agreed on the diverse areas of work on Article 6 including guidelines for actions in accordance with an outline of activities from the mandate to successfully include Article 6 elements into existing climate change programs. Challenges regarding funding structures of Small Island Developing States and developing countries are taken into account and different stakeholder groups in their activities are considered (UNFCCC 2003: 16, 23).

As the first work programme on Article 6, the New Delhi work programme offered specific declarations on the areas of Article 6. Accepting differences in capacities of parties, the programme encouraged parties to “promote, facilitate, develop and implement education and training programmes” (UNFCCC 2003: 26), in addition to the efforts on training to “implement training programmes (...) for scientific, technical and managerial personnel at the

national (...), subregional, regional and international levels” (Ibid.). Public awareness, public participation and public access to information further suggested the implementation on diverse country levels and the promotion of actions regarding these matters to meet “climate change and its effects and [to promote] (...) adequate responses.” (UNFCCC 2003: 26). All these areas of work would require collective international cooperation to “enhance synergies between conventions and improve the effectiveness of all sustainable development efforts” (Ibid.). The UNFCCC secretariat has been requested to facilitate activities and data on Article 6 as well as compile national communications and other information sources in order to review progress on the work programme (UNFCCC 2003: 29).

In 2007 at COP 13/CMP 3 in Bali, parties agreed on the adoption of the Amended New Delhi work programme highlighting the need to improve synergies and exchanges of good practices between parties, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders in order to enhance effectiveness of processes and avoiding the duplication of efforts (UNFCCC 2014d; UNFCCC 2008: 37, 38). The programme further requested the secretariat to promote partnerships with other intergovernmental organizations or the private sector to deliver financial or technical support on the work programme’s implementation during the following five years (UNFCCC 2008: 37).

The Amended New Delhi work programme’s successor, the Doha work programme was adopted for an eight-year period until 2020 at COP 18/CMP 8 in Doha (UNFCCC 2014d). In contrast to prior work programmes, major advancement has been noticed through the inclusion of a wider range of vulnerable stakeholder groups, children, women and elderly. In contrary to previous work programmes, the guidance notes on Article 6, clearly emphasize the “importance of taking into account gender aspects and the need to promote the effective engagement of children, youth, the elderly, women, persons with disabilities, indigenous” (UNFCCC 2013: 17) (UNFCCC 2013: 21). Parties have permanently requested the UNFCCC secretariat to review progress on the work programmes as well as to compile data and results in regular reports such as “the intermediate review of progress of the amended New Delhi work programme” or the “intermediate review of progress” of the Doha work programme in 2016 (UNFCCC 2013: 26; UNFCCC 2014d). Further details clarifying the the secretariat’s role in the negotiation process and on Global Climate Governance will be outlined in chapter 5.5.

5.2 ACE Activities

To facilitate efforts in the intergovernmental negotiation process, the secretariat has been requested by parties to implement various actions beside the climate conferences twice a year, these are outlined in the work programmes on Article 6 of the convention. This chapter will introduce some detailed tasks of the secretariat on ACE before the contributions of other stakeholders will be outlined in the upcoming chapters.

While the New Delhi Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention did not include any of such requests, its successor includes a request to the secretariat to organize methodological, regional and subregional workshops as well as training programmes in order to exchange good practices in cooperation with other stakeholders to ensure the implementation of the ACE elements (UNFCCC 2008: 9, 17, 43). In the Doha Work Programme, the secretariat is even encouraged to contribute through the realization of regular activities such as videoconferences and workshops to strengthen skills and networking of the national focal points of the national governments (UNFCCC 2013: 27). The secretariat has already conducted multiple regional workshops to assist least developed countries in order to enable information exchange on good practices and lessons learned that could also be implemented by other countries of the region or for countries that are situated in similar economic conditions (UNFCCC 2014e). This years' Workshop to Support the Intermediate Review of the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention should enable the national focal points on Article 6 of the Convention, the representative of each country, to create a platform of direct cooperation and direct organization of activities (Valenzuela 2016). Funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), the workshop enabled the creation of a forum for national focal points of different countries, experts of the UN Alliance on Education, Training and Public Awareness and delegates from each constituency including representations and working group discussions for an effective debate (UNFCCC 2014f). The workshop offered a platform for parties and their national focal points to strengthen their network, including other stakeholders, and to take back practices to implement them in their home communities (Davila 2016).

Another activity of the secretariat which has been requested by parties involves the conduct of an annual in-session dialogue on Article 6 which separates the elements of article 6 of the convention in two areas; the first being education and training, the second including all elements on public engagement and international cooperation as a cross-cutting element of both. Each area is to be discussed every second year (UNFCCC 2013: 18). This action is supposed to enable the information exchange of good practices, lessons learned, needs and

recommendations as well as support the clearing house CC:iNet. CC:iNet is supposed to strengthen the intergovernmental awareness of multiple practices which can be conducted on a national basis and may help developing countries in particular (UNFCCC 2013: 27).

With its diverse international partners, the secretariat is able to conduct different kind of events during the COPs each year. The Education Day at COP 21/ CMP 11 in December 2015 in Paris suggested different methods on education such as social media, music and other forms of media. Organized and hosted by the UN Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness, this event showcased the importance of non-formal education for youth and the effects it can have in the following years. The UN Alliance enabled ACE as a facilitator to highlight its message (UNFCCC 2014g).

Due to the significance of youth for ACE, the secretariat fosters the implementation of a variety of events on youth's inclusion to combat climate change. Chapter 5.3.3. explains which activities the secretariat, parties and youth work together on to enhance young people's influence on the topic throughout the year and during the COPs.

However, the secretariat's ability to fulfill the parties' request to organize different activities and events is dependent on the availability of supplementary funding (UNFCCC 2009: 9). Their conduct is dependent on the funding and from the secretariats supplementary budget (Valenzuela 2016) which puts additional constraints on the implementation of the work programmes. Chapter six elaborates on constraints within ACE emphasizing the difficulty of implementing all activities and anticipated actions by the its stakeholders.

5.3 ACE Stakeholders

5.3.1 Parties

The ACE mandate implicates different stakeholders trying to implement the work programmes on Article 6 of the Convention whose roles on ACE will be outlined in the upcoming sub-chapters. Constructivists analyze the relation of stakeholders and international regimes in a dynamic focus. Therefore the sub-chapters highlight how interests can change due to interaction between agents and how this can influence their role in the international structure.

The 197 Parties of the convention form a single irreplaceable group of stakeholders within the convention whom have adopted it and established it as a party-driven process which it has remained ever since (UNFCCC 2014h; Gildart 2016). The parties' delegations have the most

influential voice on climate negotiation outcomes and also the biggest responsibility to sustain constant development and to take action. In addition to the convention itself, their joint commitment includes different tasks to ensure the multi-level implementation of addressing climate change and its consequences (UN1992: 5-9). In regards to ACE, parties are obliged to take into account the already previously mentioned “common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities and capacities” (UNFCCC 2003: 27). Hereby parties consider each other’s capacities as individual and according to national circumstances that leads into tolerance of different abilities of political, economic, financial or social inclusion into the negotiation process on ACE. The Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention indicates the parties’ support for the programme’s implementation at an international, national, regional and local level. Parties are encouraged to develop technical and institutional capacities, and promote them through their national strategies through communication and partnership. The creation of national and international networks with other parties or NGOs are suggested in order to support the enhancement of the implementation of the Article 6 elements. It is expected that parties themselves take action on fostering all of the ACE topics, such as to “encourage the public as part of public awareness programmes to contribute to mitigation and adaptation actions” (UNFCCC 2013: 24), to “support climate change training and skills development” (UNFCCC 2013: 24) and to “seek input and public participation, including participation by youth, women, civil society organizations and other groups” (UNFCCC 2013: 24). The aims shall be realized through activities and tools and will be monitored and reviewed through surveys, national research strategies and finding partners for material and information exchange (UNFCCC 2013: 22-25). Especially for developing countries with less financial and technical resources, the ambitious agenda seems burdensome. Therefore, parties suggest the establishment of partnerships with other regional or international parties, in a South-South, North-South, South-North or North-North constellation and to consider the “most efficient and cost-effective way” (UNFCCC 2013: 26). An example for such a grouping depicts the cooperation of the Nordic Council for Ministers who founded this years’ Workshop to Support the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention. Their cooperation also enabled the personal information exchange between national focal points regarding Article 6 as well as important discussions on the future of the subject (UNFCCC 2014f).

To support the strategy of parties, national focal points have been designated by most parties to increase the efficiency of communication between parties and with the secretariat.

Hereby parties are encouraged to “provide support, including technical and financial support, and access to information and materials to a national focal point for Article 6 activities” (UNFCCC 2013: 22). Ideally, one or two national focal points per party are nominated in order to avoid misunderstandings and inefficiency in the process (UNFCCC 2014i). It is the secretariat’s task to coordinate the network of national focal points and to enable a regular exchange on good practices, lessons learned and recommendations through their website or via partnerships (UNFCCC 2013: 27).

Parties have furthermore committed themselves to continuing to share of their national communications to enable a permanent exchange of good practices and lessons learned with each other which the secretariat uses as a fundament for regular reviews in the form of reports (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2013). A recent example of parties reporting is the fact that many countries already submitted INDCs. Also important information on progresses and the needs of ACE have been reported on. These have been compiled in the report on the Intermediate Review of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention, and they have been made accessible on the UNFCCC website to share the results in a transparent way (UNFCCC 2014a; UNFCCC 2014j). In the most recent draft decision proposed by the Chair at the forty-fourth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation in May 2016 in Bonn, parties agreed on further enhancing the “cross-sectoral coordination among all ministries dealing with climate change to foster the implementation of ACE” on the national level (UNFCCC 2016c: 2). Although 134 parties have already mentioned at least one of the six ACE elements in their INDCs, these have not always been embedded in national mitigation and adaptation activities. Furthermore, barriers still exist to implementing the elements from parties such as inadequate education and funding as well as human resources (UNFCCC 2016a: 13, 14). These challenges will be explained more closely in chapter six.

However, through the exchange of good practices, and lessons learned, as well as through the communication of less effective approaches, parties have been able to learn from each other as well as to improve their individual national strategies and processes (Valenzuela 2016).

In 2020, parties will review the effectiveness of the Doha Work Programme and then decide if the work on it will be continued or another work programme will be designed (Davila 2016). In the past, negotiations on ACE have been less “politicized” (Davila 2016) by parties than on other topics in climate talks. Instead “it was always perceived as a global, universal effort” (Davila 2016). ACE negotiations between parties have always been constructive, due to their understanding of a necessary implementation of the ACE elements

on a national scale as part of “the larger commons” (Davila 2016). Noticeable division between the Southern and the Northern hemisphere at ACE negotiations has strongly been dissolved during the last years to a point of almost non-existence (Davila 2016). Although states are still the directing force, they increasingly depend on each others’ assistance and other stakeholders such as civil society, science and industry to achieve their goals (Turnheim and Tezcan 2010: 531).

Nick Nuttall sees a few ACE champions such as Europe and Latin America who could advise other countries in collaboration with the UNFCCC Secretariat regarding implementation measures to increase the programme’s success (Nuttall 2016).

5.3.2. Non-state actors

This chapter focuses on stakeholders involved in ACE activities as non-state actors meaning all stakeholder groupings except for parties. Considering that upcoming chapters already emphasize youth and international alliances with other UN entities, this chapter primarily examines the role of civil societies and constituencies on ACE.

One global platform enabling the exchange of information and data between all stakeholders is the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA). Launched at COP 20 in Lima, it records commitments of civil society organizations, companies, cities, regions, and investors regarding climate action and collects data on projects on climate action working transparent for everyone to access good practice examples (Climate Action 2016). The NAZCA data collecting platform offers stakeholders an opportunity to look for partners and gain an overview of already existing climate action projects and as well encourages constituencies to take actions themselves.

The variety and number of non-state actors has been increasing in climate governance over the last decades, and multiple scholars conduct research on these actor’s influence in climate governance negotiations (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004: 54; Thew 2015: 6). Gulbrandsen and Andresen outline the early accreditation of NGOs as observers from the first climate negotiations. These scholars also emphasize restrictions on NGOs during the last few decades such as access to information material and access to negotiations (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004: 59). Indeed, the Business and Industry Non-Governmental Organizations (BINGO) and the Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGO) were the first constituencies which gained observer status for UNFCCC negotiations (UNFCCC 2011). Although these two constituencies are large, homogeneous and well resourced (Hanegraff

2015; Thew 2015: 10), all of the constituencies only get granted three minutes at the end of each session at the COP each (Figueres 2016). The secretariat maintains close interaction in climate negotiations with the constituencies' focal points who directly correspond with the secretariat, and with parties representing their constituency. Within the UNFCCC they further function as observers in events and coordinate constituency meetings during conferences. Constituencies within the climate negotiation process are composed of different political and economic fields such as business and industry, environment, research, women and gender, farming and youth. Each of these entail multiple small observer organizations. The original number of two constituencies has been extended over the years to nine recognized constituencies in the UNFCCC process (UNFCCC 2011).

Gulbrandsen and Andresen suggest that long-term successes in inclusion of constituencies can only be realized when NGOs work in cooperation with national governments and key negotiators (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004: 72, 73). As parties rely increasingly on other stakeholders, the non-state actors are the beneficial actors and can strengthen their voice in decision-making (Turnheim and Tezcan 2010: 531).

Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres knows about the importance of non-state actors on ACE as influence power to the climate negotiation process. She divides the stakeholders in the UNFCCC process into three concentric circles: the parties, the constituencies and the people in the third circle who are working on ground level. Although only parties and constituencies are welcomed to speak at climate negotiation conferences, the outer circle is where, according to her, the impact is really made. These not only involve civil society but also corporations, insurance companies, fossil fuel companies and religious communities. Under Christiana Figueres' lead, the outreach above the first circle has been extended due to its significance of implementing the results (Figueres 2016). Highlighting the approach of constructivism, patterns of world politics transform with actors and that has brought the effect of inclusion into the negotiation politics.

The work programmes on Article 6 underline the relevant inclusion of all stakeholders and of non-state actors to implement climate policies, to provide access to information to the secretariat through the involvement of the constituencies' national focal points and to develop appropriate responses as part of climate negotiations (UNFCCC 2003: 23, 29). The inclusion of non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders seeks to support parties in their implementation of the Work Programmes on ACE on international, national and subregional levels (UNFCCC 2003: 26). The work programme encourages non-state actors to become actively involved on ACE activities and to share responses of their constituencies through the

clearing house CC:iNet and other media devices. Parties' request to the secretariat to provide technical and financial support for intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and to build partnerships with the private sector (UNFCCC 2008: 37; UNFCCC 2013: 18) show the significant role parties assign non-state actors as observers in the UNFCCC process. At the same time ACE also calls on non-governmental organizations to strengthen their efforts, increase cooperation and to continue activities on Article 6 not only among themselves but also to other stakeholders, especially to those from non-Annex I countries, in order to raise awareness of media, other civil society organizations, women and youth on climate change actions (UNFCCC 2008: 42; UNFCCC 2013: 26). Accordingly the mission for the secretariat is not only to increase its efforts on ACE during time, the ACE mandate is moreover calling on all stakeholders to strengthen its attempts similarly and to enhance awareness.

ACE profits from the observer status of various constituencies whose participation in workshops enables a direct dialogue between parties and constituencies (UNFCCC 2014f). The mandate puts high expectations on its stakeholders and should therefore try to encourage parties to include as diverse stakeholder groups as possible in its conferences to ensure a maximum of public awareness on climate change.

5.3.3. Youth

Youth play a significant role as an observer group and a constituency during the climate negotiations as well as in the climate change movement. Over the years their importance as civil society group has increased, therefore given more space and a stronger voice in the political climate negotiations. Their role as a particular target group of ACE has already been implemented in the working programmes (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2013).

Within the UN system, youth is considered as the group of young people between the age of 15 and 24 years old. However youth representatives shall be at least 18 years of age to be able to participate independently without any form of company in the intergovernmental process which limits the opportunities of participation in climate conferences (United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change 2010: 6).

The consideration of the UNFCCC observer constituency of youth non-governmental organizations (YOUNGO) prior to COP 15/CMP 5 has enabled youth participation within constituency meetings and the assistance of the secretariat in technical and logistical matters as well as an increased recognition within intergovernmental plenaries. As a connector between the secretariat and young people two national focal points ensure a structured and efficient exchange of information (United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children,

Youth and Climate Change 2010: 10). YOUNGO has a compartmentalized structure out of over 2000 individuals forming over forty accredited groups coming from over twenty countries (Thew 2015: 5,6).

Today, the secretariat understands the youth's importance as a main stakeholder in negotiations. Being affected of climate change as the main age group during the next decades, they depict beneficiaries of ACE projects on education and public awareness (Davila, L. 2016). Adriana Valenzuela, UNFCCC National Focal Point Education, Training and Public Awareness, values the participation of youth in the UNFCCC process as "fundamental for the implementation at local and national level" (Valenzuela 2016) and defines them as "keyplayers" (Valenzuela 2016) to take and implement climate action (Ibid.).

ACE promotes the actions of youth by building its capacity and using the opportunity to train them as multipliers through networking during climate negotiations in order to strengthen its influence on national level and help implementing the national contributions of governments (Valenzuela 2016). One key outreach element for youth and YOUNGO is the UNFCCC website where ACE presents youth as one of its key areas (UNFCCC 2016d). The significant role of youth as an age group is furthermore being highly supported through their inclusion in events and ACE activities (Gildart 2016). Not only fosters the secretariat its participation during workshops but also gives them a platform for sharing opinions with parties and national focal points of member states at ACE dialogues. Besides side events such as the Young and Future Generations Day at COPs and exhibitions realized in cooperation with the secretariat, YOUNGO representatives can communicate recommendations and needs for the future partnership in informal meetings with the UNFCCC Executive Secretary as well as through different activities prior and during the UNFCCC Conferences such as the Conference of Youth (COY) (United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change 2010: 10-13; UNFCCC 2016e). COY is being organized annually by YOUNGO particularly to liaise youth for sharing experiences, needs and recommendations and to transport a joint concept to world leaders (UNFCCC 2016e). While COY triggers especially the influence of youth on policy stage, campaigns such as the Global Youth Video Competition on Climate Change conducted by the secretariat showcase ideas of young individuals on combating climate change and could enhance an easier entry point to youth (UNFCCC 2016a: 9).

Cody Gildart, Communication Officer in the Strategic Communication Unit in the UNFCCC Secretariat describes ACE's role in terms of youth by providing outreach within the process to "make(...) sure that their views are taken seriously and the governments are

working within the process are acknowledging the civil society as a whole” (Gildart 2016). He highlights the relevance of COP presidencies over the past few years who have raised the public awareness level on climate change and on youth participation strongly (Gildart 2016).

Besides the progress in participation realized through ACE and the technical and logistical assistance of the secretariat, the necessity to involve the activist understanding of youth again into the UN model to promote firstly youth participation in the negotiations and secondly to involve more action and progress in some areas of the climate talks is necessary (Nuttall 2016).

All together, youth inclusion at climate conferences has only increased slightly. “Kept at a certain distance of the process” (Nuttall 2016) YOUNGO remains dependent on the support of governments due to the guidance by parties in the political landscape. In order to strengthen YOUNGO’s influence, an effective option for its members includes the strengthening of partnership with individual governments and the option for additional participation in each national youth delegation (Nuttall, N. 2016).

Harriet Thew who has conducted research on the participation of youth in the UNFCCC process, outlines as well the importance of the recognition from the national governments. She indicates that “decision-makers, struggling with time and resource constraints“ (Thew 2015: 30) need to clearly perceive the value of their interaction with youth. Thew suggests that without the approval of youth involvement, the “UNFCCC Secretariat facilitates to increase NSA agency are ultimately unhelpful unless recognition has already been secured” (Thew 2016: 30). Following from this, the secretariat should strengthen its negotiating efforts between youth, and especially YOUNGO, and the governments. The primary role lies therefore with young people to take the lead to combat their recognition “expressed constructively through direct conversation with decision-makers” (Thew 2016: 30) of each single country.

However, a severe constraint for youth involves sufficient sponsoring by governments and host countries of COPs for side events as well as for particular summits (United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change 2010: 6). In February 2016 youth has indicated its constraints for activists of developing countries in provision of financial support to attend climate conferences at the UN Youth Forum. Further it forwarded its claim of serious inclusion into the intergovernmental climate change action agenda with Youth Delegates as part of national delegations of all countries (UNFCCC 2016f). As Thew highlights, these constraints may be solved most easily through direct and bilateral dialogues between national governments and youth.

5.3.4 International alliances on ACE

International cooperation for ACE implicates the exchange with different stakeholders such as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parties, civil society, youth and others (Valenzuela 2016). This chapter takes a closer look at ACE's international alliances to fulfill its role within the UNFCCC.

For ACE, international cooperation helps increasing the attention on Article 6 elements and topics. Therefore it would be necessary to link closer to the other UN organizations who could include the climate action agenda more thoroughly into their programmes (Nuttall 2016). To enable an implementation of ACE on the ground level, UN agencies build support through their worldwide network on the local, national and international level (Valenzuela 2016) which ACE can make use of.

Cody Gildart sees alliances with UN agencies as an opportunity to strengthen the inclusion of ACE into their work. He underlines that some UN agencies already work in one area of ACE specifically. Hereby he mentions the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which examines climate change education as one particular field of interest. As a positive evolvement of ACE, UNESCO could directly include its results on climate change education in the UNFCCC's database to enable parties and other stakeholders a holistic approach and overview on the topic at one place (Gildart 2016).

One of the most representative examples in terms of international cooperation among UN organizations depicts the United Nations Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness which was launched at COP 18 / CMP 8 the year 2012 in Doha in order to "promote meaningful, result-oriented and effective international cooperation" (UN 2013: 2) on matters of Article 6 of the Convention. Through a stronger network accumulated research shall be utilized more effectively through activities. In this sense, the UN Alliance is considered to contribute to awareness rising and implementation of the Article 6 elements as well as to "maximize synergies" (UN 2013: 2) by creating "a clear link" (UN 2013: 5) between the UNFCCC and UN member organizations. Consisting of UN entities ranging from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) over UNICEF, UNESCO to United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), it supports the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention. It is a joint collaboration between UN organizations which oblige themselves to foster the multi-stakeholder, multi-generational and multi-level cooperation as well as to provide funding and technical support

(UN 2013: 1-6). With the UN Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness ACE finds an important supporter and outreach on climate change.

While the UN Alliance covers all ACE elements, other international alliances focus on certain elements. The UNESCO Global Action Programme on Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) for instance takes on a role in generating concrete actions for implementation in the ACE element education. Education for Sustainable Development is not only covering climate education and therefore an ACE element; it is also one of the SDGs (UNESCO 2016).

Another important example on international cooperation among UN entities that offers free access to climate change education is the collaborative initiative One UN Climate Change Learning Partnership (UN CC:Learn). Launched in 2009, the cooperation of 34 multilateral organizations provides learning resources and country projects on different themes on climate change to increase education and public awareness, also for developing countries and contributes to the implementation of Article 6 elements and the Doha Work Programme (UN, n.d.).

Taking climate action on the European policy level on some matters of ACE is to be mentioned the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, shortly named the Aarhus Convention (European Commission 2016). It has been adopted by European parties on 25 June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark, with the aim to ensure the right for the public to “receive environmental information” (Ibid.) and to “participate in environmental decision-making” (European Commission 2016) as well as to provide “access to justice” (Ibid.) to them (European Commission 2016). Therefore it engages on the ACE elements of public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation and also conducts outreach in the name of ACE.

As well as youth is promoted through ACE, its participation is also being ensured through various programmes in the UN such as the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) which provides a high-quality roundtable forum enabling an exchange between civil societies and governments (United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change 2010: 17). Apart from other established organizations promoting youth participation outside of the UN system, the United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change is covering topics such as the empowerment of young people and children and assists in promoting information sharing among its members and implementing

activities since its establishment in September 2008. It draws guidance from the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention as well as from other policy instruments enhancing the role of youth. The alliance not only contains UN agencies as members but also other organizations and voluntary movements prioritizing youth matters such as the children development organization Plan International (UNFCCC n.d.).

ACE's collaboration with UN agencies and other partners increases its influence on governments which have not participated in the UNFCCC negotiations so far (Nuttall 2016). In other words, networks that already exist between countries and UN agencies on ACE might be strengthened and others shall be developed to spread awareness.

The importance of international cooperation has been highlighted in all of the three work programmes on Article 6 of the Convention. While the New Delhi Work Programme already refers to a more efficient implementation of the work programme by intergovernmental and non-governmental cooperation which is able to “enhance synergies between conventions and improve the effectiveness of all sustainable development efforts” (UNFCCC 2003:26), also the Amended New Delhi Work Programme and the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 highlight the inclusion of different stakeholders. As such the private sector as well as international organizations are considered (UNFCCC 2008:14,15). The exchange of information and of experiences to ensure a multi-level implementation of the Article 6 elements are embedded in the two latter work programmes, leading to a concrete request of tasks for the UN Alliance in the Doha Work Programme to further contribute to an informational, technical and financial support to implement the elements of Article 6 (UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2013: 25).

Especially after the intermediate review of the Doha Work Programme in 2016, “the importance of international cooperation to scale up action” (Valenzuela 2016) has been highlighted even more explicitly through examples of international cooperation contributing to measures of implementation on Article 6 of the Convention (Valenzuela 2016; UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2016a). The inclusion of international cooperation and in particular the networking within UN entities and the UNFCCC seems to have a positive impact on local, national and international education, training and awareness structures.

ACE's goal is to become fully integrated into the programme of UN entities, that it is normal to have ACE on the global agenda. However the challenge is the inclusion of ACE when the partners' priorities lie somewhere else (Nuttall 2016).

5.4 Communication structure

Action for Climate Empowerment's communication structure can be divided into two parts. The first being the internal communication between stakeholders, the secretariat and the public and on the second being the secretariat's outreach communication and corporate strategy in the name of parties on Article 6 of the Convention (Davila 2016).

The communication on ACE is one of its most basic elements and is already outlined in the United Nations Framework Convention since 1992 where parties are requested to “cooperate in and promote (...) the development and exchange of educational and public awareness material on climate change and its effects” (UNFCCC 1992: 10) by “using existing bodies” (UNFCCC 1992: 10). During the work programmes on Article 6 of the Convention guidance for parties and other stakeholders have been clarified in a holistic approach. Requests and aims to all stakeholders on the six elements of Article 6 have been formulated more clearly and in more detail over the years (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2008: 37, 40-43; UNFCCC 2013). Therefore the Doha work programme gives more outlined advice to parties and stakeholders on outreach strategies, such as with the use of social media to promote public awareness and public participation on climate topics, as well as activities to enable a holistic implementation of the work programme (UNFCCC 2013: 22, 23-27). The element of international cooperation has been an element of ACE ever since and shall further foster the exchange of information and synergies to scale-up action on the implementation of ACE and the Convention (UNFCCC 2013: 22). To contribute to information exchange and communication between stakeholders of the programme, parties have been invited through the Doha work programme to submit their national communications to showcase steps taken to implement the elements on Article 6 of the Convention (UNFCCC 2013: 18). This enables an exchange of experiences and good practices within the programme but also gives the opportunity to the secretariat to reflect on parties' efforts and contributions.

The secretariat has, among other tasks, been requested through the Doha work programme to foster the exchange of national focal points of Article 6 and to promote the exchange of lessons learned, good practices and barriers of the implementation of the Doha Work Programme (UNFCCC 2013: 27). Requests from the COP and parties to the secretariat have also been further clarified during the last years of Article 6's development (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2013). Hereby requests of regular reports and progress reviews asked by parties facilitate and compile actions of different stakeholders. COP21 for instance requested the secretariat to review the progress of the Doha work programme with

information of advancement and efforts that have been taken by parties on the implementation of the Doha work programme the previous four years. The report containing on the one hand information on progress made, lessons learned and good practices and on the other hand on needs, gaps and barriers have been presented to the SBI 44 for the clarification of further steps (UNFCCC 2013: 17, 18; UNFCCC 2016a). The requests of conducting different reports compiling progresses on lessons learned, gaps and barriers by the secretariat during the last years provide parties with an overview on current developments regarding the elements on Article 6. With the secretariat's outreach materials such as the Intermediate review of the Doha work programme, gaps and barriers that still need to be assessed are being illustrated for all parties.

Following ACE's rebranding in 2015, the secretariat is currently aiming to implement a corporate strategy on ACE in order to display a more tangible, clearer communication to all stakeholders including public and to better share information, engage with them and get them involved (Davila 2016; Gildart 2016). During the last years, ACE has been able to intensify its communication with stakeholders through increased communication channels including outreach through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and its rebranded website under the UNFCCC including all valuable information on ACE activities and decisions of negotiations (Davila 2016; UNFCCC 2014a). The ACE newsletter which is released on the website moreover informs about current developments and processes, news and on the six elements on Article 6 (UNFCCC 2014a) and celebrities could use their voice as messenger for ACE on the international scale in the future (Davila 2016). Another instrument portrays the CC:iNet portal. Appointed by parties to set up an "information clearing house" (UNFCCC 2002: 29) in 2002, the secretariat should further "enhance the usefulness and relevance of CC:iNet, in line with the evaluation report of the clearing house " (UNFCCC 2007: 43) in 2007 (UNFCCC 2002: 29; UNFCCC 2007: 43). This requests on the functionality of the CC:iNet has further been supported at COP21 in order to be presented for consideration at SBI 44 in 2016 (UNFCCC 2016b: 3). As a web portal for information sharing on the six elements of ACE since its launch in October 2010, CC:iNet has accumulated multi-stakeholder information from different countries on adaptation and mitigation in form of an organization database, a calendar, a search function and other multiple links to external information. Managed by the secretariat, CC:iNet could however only register 791 users. The CC:iNet user survey 2015 showed clear results that the online platform needs significant improvement in regards to visibility and design, user-friendliness, updated content and translation into other languages. This has lead the secretariat to the decision to cease CC:iNet,

to stop updating the portal but still using it as an archive on information on Article 6 for the different stakeholders (UNFCCC 2016b). The distribution of CC:iNet publications and information to other UNFCCC outreach platforms, named the UNFCCC website, the UNFCCC Newsroom pages or the various UNFCCC Social Media platforms, has further been requested by parties with the recommended decision of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-fourth session in May 2016 (UNFCCC 2016c). Still ensuring an information exchange within different groups of stakeholders, the discontinuance of updating CC:inet highlights another of the secretariats tasks on ACE: Drawing attention of parties and other stakeholders to dysfunctional procedures in the ACE process. The case of CC:iNet moreover shows partly independent activities of the secretariat working on ACE which actions however always have to be undermined by the parties' requests and decisions.

The secretariats' tasks have further been developed over the years to the mobilization of other partner organizations and the management of CC:iNet to the provision of technical assistance and the establishment of a network of national focal points for Article 6 of the Convention (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2013). The other UN organizations as ACE partners can moreover use their capacities and influence to raise awareness on local, national and international level (Valenzuela 2016).

With the supporting activities of the secretariat which have already been outlined, ACE increasingly tries to enable a personal interaction within parties, constituencies and other organizations at least two times a year during the climate conferences. It notes the necessity to not only offer materials in a way online but also tries to implement direct events which allow stakeholders to share lessons learned, gaps and barriers and recommendations for future implementation of ACE elements and should aim to give guidance to parties on the implementation of ACE in their national communication structures but also to develop its strategies adjusted to the different target groups on local, national and international level (Davila 2016; Gildart 2016; Valenzuela 2016).

5.5 Assessing ACE's role under the UNFCCC in Global Climate Governance

Chapter 4.2 has already highlighted that the UNFCCC can be considered as a facilitator and networker providing a stage on climate negotiations for parties and other stakeholders. This chapter analyzes the role of ACE in Global Climate Governance. Hereby the role of the convention will not be highlighted any more. The chapter rather aims at reflecting the secretariats role on ACE as well as highlighting the significance of Article 6 on climate change.

ACE includes significant areas such as education, training and public engagement which fosters the capacity building on the community level. Knowledge and science can decrease uncertainty in politics and the community and moreover strengthen international cooperation through the declaration of common goals and interests (Williams 2012: 446). ACE is a very important programme (Nuttall 2016). Especially because of its influence on community and sub-national level, it includes significant aspects of future climate responses. Notably, the elements of ACE are important for future progresses on climate change on community-level. Climate education for instance enhances the knowledge on daily challenges and appropriate measures to respond to climate change in vulnerable countries and enhances the consciousness of citizenry (Journal of Education for Sustainable Development 2012: 238).

Christiana Figueres outlines the long-term transformation process that ACE requires to register considerable achievements. The systemic change ACE pursues is not immediately achievable but has a slow impact for long-term investments (Figueres 2016). ACE's role is the assistance of the national focal points and parties and to strengthen knowledge and capacities in their work (Davila 2016; UNFCCC 2013: 27). The secretariat hereby especially engages with the international community and tries to include a broad range of stakeholders through constituencies at the Article 6 events such as the Dialogue on Article 6 of the convention or different workshops (Davila 2016). Through its rebranding, Article 6 of the convention has become more comprehensible for all stakeholders. This is essential because the programme is designed to make a long-term change in behavior and values. It aims to reach people on the community level to achieve a social transformation in terms of climate change education, training and public engagement (Valenzuela 2016).

The staff of ACE within the secretariat is acquainted with similar tasks as the overall UNFCCC secretariat and fostering negotiations on Article 6 of the Convention between governments and constituencies through different activities (UNFCCC 2014a). The

appointment of one or two national focal points per party or constituency (UNFCCC 2014i) accelerate and personalize the communication between the parties and the secretariat and enhance the effectiveness. Among its activities, it unites parties and constituencies but also other groups with each other and provides a stage for personal exchange during climate conferences (UNFCCC 2014f). Moreover, as already outlined, it acts as a facilitator and voice to include less established stakeholder groups such as women, elderly and youth and achieves more awareness for these groups also through activities during the COP and short-term projects (UNFCCC 2013; UNFCCC 2016e).

The secretariat negotiates between stakeholders and monitors progresses by parties and constituencies on the implementation of ACE elements. With the review of progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention it has assessed INDCs and national communications of stakeholder groups and enabled a perspective on good practices, gaps and recommendations for the future accessible on its website (UNFCCC 2016a). Through its website, social media, reports and activities on youth the secretariat reaches out to public, increases awareness on the matters of ACE and further addresses individuals around the world. Moreover through the cooperation with UN and other international organizations such as UNITAR other instruments to reach stakeholders and to promote the implementation of element on ACE such as education can be realized. The One UN Climate Learning Partnership (UNCC:Learn) has been launched in 16 countries and with 34 international organizations to provide materials regarding climate education for every individual. Courses in different UN languages and other programmes scale up implementation measures on ground-level and create awareness on climate change education and training as well promoting capacity-building (UNITAR 2014). The UNESCO climate change initiative puts emphasis on climate change education for sustainable development and outlines diverse approaches for pledges parties for an increased inclusion of climate education in worldwide classrooms (Journal of Education for Sustainable Development 2012; UNESCO 2010). It urges to foster triangular and South-South cooperation among parties and NGOs to exchange financial and technical expertise (UNFCCC 2013).

ACE hopes for bigger influence in national politics of member countries so that national focal points on Article 6 can scale-up action together with the other ministries and raise awareness (Nuttall 2016). Most parties included at least one of the ACE elements in their INDCs which could foster a broad implementation of the elements in the future (Nuttall 2016). Moving forward, the public participation in countries will increase and with it the awareness on ACE

elements (Gildart 2016). In order to foster the implementation of ACE elements, it takes both a top-down approach in intergovernmental negotiations at climate conferences but also a bottom-up approach because its topics rely on community actions in each member country (Gildart 2016). ACE is a program that needs the community to be empowered (Gildart 2016) which ensures acceleration both ways (Gildart 2016). During the last six years it has been able to increase its support and received more recognition (Valenzuela 2016).

However ACE still has potential which has so far not been fully realized by all member states. Some parties have so far “overlooked” (Gildart 2016) the topic and have not or could not introduce measures to effectively embrace the public engagement and increase decision-making processes (Gildart 2016). In order to promote implementation measures on international, national and sub-national scale, ACE already offers parties to upload their good practices on the CC:iNet platform or to register with NAZCA and to exchange experiences at the ACE conferences twice a year (Climate Action 2016; UNFCCC 2016b). To enhance ACE on community level, the secretariat could provide a toolkit and outreach materials enabling communities an easier introduction of measures and provide guidance in their first implementation steps, especially when they are lacking financial or technical resources to provide them themselves (Gildart 2016).

6 Challenges in implementing ACE elements

6.1 Financial constraints

Chapter six will outline challenges that occur with the implementation of ACE on all levels. Especially the most vulnerable and poorest parties of the convention suffer from insufficient financial and technical resources. However, with the high number of different cultures and nationalities, the UNFCCC also faces other difficulties which will be outlined in chapter 6.3.

The UN takes its financial resources from three different pillars: the UN's regular budget which is a contribution from dues payments of member states and which assessment rate by the gross national income of the particular country, the Peacekeeping Budget and Voluntary Contributions of individual member states that finance UN humanitarian relief and development agencies (Better World Campaign 2012; Congressional Digest 1997). Within the UNFCCC the financial resources of the Financial Mechanism are allocated to policy strategies and priorities by the decision of the COP (UNFCCC 2014k). Parties donate the core contributions as well as voluntary contributions through which supplementary projects are being funded. With regards to ACE, these supplementary contributions enable the financing of the dialogues on Article 6, workshops and the production of outreach materials (Davila 2016; Valenzuela 2016). This years' ACE Workshop to Support the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention has been funded through the support of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) (UNFCCC 2014f). Although this voluntary contribution has enabled the realization of the workshop, the irregular and inconsistent funding structure is not able to support a regular conduct of these activities for personal exchange. Parties of the African Group, the Less Developed Countries, the Small Island Developed States have been highlighting the stress of financial resources regarding the implementation of ACE elements on a national and local scale (Valenzuela 2016). Although funds could be raised for short-term projects such as campaigns, the preparations of videos or publications, long-term funding for strategic implementation processes on national level is still one of the most fundamental gaps (Valenzuela 2016). India, as one developing country with great economic potential being highly vulnerable to climate change, indicates in its INDC the increased budget that is necessary for the implementation of early warning systems and other disaster risk reduction measures due to a rising frequency of extreme weather events. In terms of capacity-building, India expects international financial support to implement among others "more intensive state centric knowledge (...) and training of professionals in different aspects of renewable energy" (Indian Government 2015: 32) (Indian

Government 2015: 24, 33, 34; Indian Government 2015). Various countries from the Asia-Pacific-Group, the African Group and the Latin American Group face financial constraints. While Columbia highlights the need for additional funding for implementing mitigation and adaptation actions (Government of Colombia 2015: 7), St. Kitts and Nevis highlight that its contributions are “based on the availability of financing and technological support” (The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis 2015: 3) (Republic of Namibia 2015: 15; Government of Nepal 2016: 9, 11; Republic of Peru 2015: 11; Republic of the Philippines 2015: 6).²

One solution to these gaps could be financial contributions through national cooperation between different ministries. A more efficient allocation of national fundings between ministries and different stakeholders and a mobilization through partnership could achieve new incentives on this constraint within countries (Valenzuela 2016).

As recognized in the Kyoto Protocol of the Convention, to ensure a mixture of delegates from developing and developed countries at climate conferences, countries which cannot afford their travel to climate change conferences receive Daily Substance Allowance (DSA) from the UNFCCC (Davila 2016; UNFCCC 2014k). This core budget including travel, expenses of a hotel and fare, allows the UNFCCC and ACE to invite various delegates to their events and secures the awareness and inclusion on ACE (Davila 2016). Several funds and measures such as the Least Developed Countries Fund have been created to ensure sufficient funding of the least developed country Parties and the small island developing States by parties who see themselves in position to deliver financial support (UNFCCC 2003: 16, 19, 20). Countries have also been recognizing the necessity for adequate financial resources to guarantee the most efficient implementation of the ACE activities from ACE’s first work programme (UNFCCC 2003: 23). The more detailed the aims within the work programmes have been outlined, the clearer have requests for enhanced financial support and approaches of funding mobilization and initiatives have become (UNFCCC 2008: 5, 26, 27; UNFCCC 2013). Among other measures, North-South and South-South cooperation, technology and joint research, parties are supposed to increase financial resources for meeting the parties’ obligations internationally but especially nationally (UNFCCC 2008: 26, 27; UNFCCC 2013). Grasped in the Paris Agreement, the international community expects an improvement on previous financial support, especially from developed countries to support the most vulnerable developing countries in their implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures (UNFCCC 2014k). On that account, the COP invited moreover bilateral,

² These examples of INDCs are chosen by the author to picture the general case. The analysis of more INDCs is not seen as contributively to the topic.

multilateral and other organizations such as the Global Environment Facility as an operating body of the UNFCCC financial mechanism to provide funding and requested all stakeholders, including parties and the secretariat to provide information on finances in a transparent way (UNFCCC 2013: 18). Parties have furthermore been encouraged to implement their national policies on ACE in a cost-effective and most efficient way (UNFCCC 2003: 28).

However, not only parties are affected of financial constraints, it is also constituencies and NGOs who suffer from underfunding of travels and other expenses. Thew mentions YOUNGO as the constituency with the youngest members who suffer from inequalities in representations of countries during international conferences. Due to constraints on self-funding there arises an inequality of representatives from developed and developing countries within the constituency (Thew 2015: 6). The lack of “financial support for youth to attend UNFCCC events” (UNFCCC 2016a: 15) is also being restated by one party in one observer organization’s submission on the progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention in 2016 (UNFCCC 2016a: 15). Despite the secretariat’s effort to keep balance between delegates from developed and developing countries and provides DSA for delegates from economically not well positioned countries, provision on DSA or other financial coverage is missing in order to ensure a just balance of country representatives within constituencies.

With regards to the scope of financial assistance the Secretariat is able to provide Nick Nuttall highlights the UNFCCC as a treaty organization only. He emphasizes that it is not one of the big UN organizations with sufficient resources and therefore needs partners in terms of funding. The UN Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness could also be a chance for ACE and another option far from the old funding structures (Nuttall 2016). Indeed, the Secretariat is requested to form partnerships with potential sponsors on technical or financial support and to involve other intergovernmental organizations for assistance on the ACE programme (UNFCCC 2008: 37; UNFCCC 2013: 18). The UN Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness is invited to support the implementation of the Doha Work Programme “through the provision of financial and technical support” (UNFCCC 2013: 25). Therefore the Secretariat could enhance the partnership through a higher frequency of joint activities including financial and technical assistance on projects and therefore more effectively foster ACE’s implementation into other UN entities.

In light of ACE’s development over the last years, the funding still remains one of the main constraints. The work programmes outline that “the lack of adequate financial (...)

resources could inhibit some Parties' efforts to implement (...) activities, in particular developing country Parties" (UNFCCC 2008: 37). The capability of the secretariat's actions requested by the COP still remains subject to "the availability of financial resources" (UNFCCC 2013: 19) and the sufficiency of financial resources "continues to be a challenge" (UNFCCC 2013: 17). Additionally the compiled report of the secretariat on the Progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention suggests a limited progression on providing sufficient financial resources. Although there exist notable successes on international and multi-stakeholder cooperation such as climate projects on training funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) or the Government of Austria (UNFCCC 2016a: 7, 8, 12), "some Parties stated that more financial resources could allow further action on implementing Article 6 of the Convention" (UNFCCC 2016a: 14).

6.2 Technology gaps

Besides financial constraints, parties have drawn attention to technical problems in within the UNFCCC process and the ACE implementation. One example depicts the development of technical constraints during the preparation of national communications such as data availability, quality of measurements and availability to methodology in order to assess the effects of climate change. (UNFCCC 2003: 7). Especially least developed countries faced challenges in scientific and technical capacities and capacity-building during the last years. Therefore the COP encouraged parties to provide least developed countries and countries in need technological support to "facilitate the transfer of technology to improve (...) data collection, (...) monitoring and reporting" (UNFCCC 2008: 8) and also international and intergovernmental organizations to provide assistance on this topic (UNFCCC 2003: 7-11; UNFCCC 2008: 8, 16, 19, 28; UNFCCC 2013: 5). The secretariat has been requested to facilitate the technology-transfer process between expert groups, international organizations and initiatives (UNFCCC 2008: 28).

Regarding ACE, the COP has been recognizing that the availability of sufficient technical resources continues to be a challenge for all parties in light of implementing national policies on ACE, especially for "African countries, the least developed countries and small island developing States" (UNFCCC 2013: 17). Hereby the secretariat is also asked to encourage the provision of technical assistance by intergovernmental organizations to parties and therefore acts as a bridge between them and parties (UNFCCC 2008: 37; UNFCCC 2013: 18). The Doha Work Programme itself states "technical skills and knowledge [as] an

opportunity to adequately address and respond to climate change issues (UNFCCC 2013: 22) and therefore knows about the importance of the ACE element ‘training’ to introduce national programmes on climate change. To ensure the implementation of these prerequisites, parties and intergovernmental organizations have strengthened their technical support to a national focal point for Article 6 of the Convention (UNFCCC 2013: 22, 23) and for the activities in implementing ACE (UNFCCC 2013: 25).

Notably, the technical support that has been requested by parties through the Doha Work Programme has been realized. Especially international cooperation has contributed to the success of implementation of ACE through national programmes (UNFCCC 2016a). To effectively pool expertise and experience within countries, parties have installed cooperation with NGOs, IGOs and other stakeholders as well as triggered activities through cooperation within North and South hemispheres (UNFCCC 2016a: 12). Nevertheless, there remain barriers and gaps within the technological assistance framework such as the need for technical resources to scale up “education at the regional, national and local levels” (UNFCCC 2016a: 6), the need for methodological resources and training of certain groups within the community in order “to acquire or enhance technical knowledge and skills” (UNFCCC 2016a: 8). The need for technical support and lack of “relevant technologies” (UNFCCC 2016a: 9) still restricts improvement on awareness-raising measures in some member countries (UNFCCC 2016a: 9). Namibia for instance considers itself not able to access the latest technologies needed to be able to implement its INDCs and ACE elements (Republic of Namibia 2015: 15). Other examples to be named are Eritrea and India who urge “international support for the development of (...) own technologies” (The State of Eritrea 2015: 14) and the transfer of technologies by the developed countries (The State of Eritrea 2015: 14; Indian Government 2015: 33).

Regarding these constraints, parties may find measuring and quantifying activities undertaken on ACE challenging (UNFCCC 2003: 25; UNFCCC 2008: 38). Therefore the COP encourages developed countries to support reporting in order for international analysis (UNFCCC 2013: 32).

In terms of financing technology transfer, the Amended New Delhi Work Programme proposed the mobilization of “the vast resources of the private sector to supplement public finance sources where appropriate” (UNFCCC 2008: 26). Due to the UNFCCC’s facilitating role between parties and between parties and constituencies, Lagos, Bleviss and Xu argue that the secretariat might be the right body to build a closer partnership between the parties and the private sector. Hereby they argue that private sector institutions such as the World Business

Council for Sustainable Development or trade associations could assist inexperienced countries with their expertise in business development and help them to create a business network. Moreover they propose the leading role that the UNFCCC could take as a matchmaker between countries with technology needs and countries with technical expertise and experience. They suggest the advanced communication with the private sector to inform also businesses in developing countries about current technology development and the inclusion of multilateral development banks and the Global Environmental Facility as partners for funding of this technology exchange). Constructivists also emphasize the importance of social structures and its development through shared knowledge.

These options might also be useful for fostering the implementation of ACE elements in developing countries in terms of environmental science, technology production and technology solutions and to enable an appropriate reaction to mitigation and adaptation challenges.

6.3 Economic, political and social differences

Parties have accepted their “common but differentiated responsibilities” to combat climate change (Figueres 2016). Despite the North-South divide which according to the UNFCCC Executive Secretary still exists, parties have accepted their responsibility and contribution in future climate negotiations (Figueres 2016). Although some developing countries “kept Action for Climate Empowerment at arms length” (Nuttall 2016) because it is connected to democratic values and human rights fragments such as education and public engagement which would involve an interference in their political system. Therefore there has occurred some discord on the full national and local implementation of the elements on Article 6 of the Convention in the past. Nevertheless, during the last years there have partly been changes in countries’ implementation on ACE, for instance in Latin America (Nuttall 2016).

In its report on progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention the secretariat identified some remaining barriers such as the “lack of public awareness and knowledge, absence of institutional arrangements (...) and insufficient coordination and cooperation among a country’s authorities (UNFCCC 2016a: 14). These constraints occur although the COP has advised parties in the Doha Work Programme 2012 to seek the inclusion of other stakeholder groups in the national implementation process and encourage the involvement of “children, youth, the elderly, women, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, local communities and non-governmental organizations” (UNFCCC 2013: 17) It has been the first inclusion of the gender question in a work programme on ACE

being a cross-cutting topic in all elements (UNFCCC 2003; UNFCCC 2008; UNFCCC 2013: 17, 20, 24).

However national political systems, state structures still show barriers which limit the inclusion of more vulnerable stakeholder groups and the successful integration of ACE into certain communities. While the Central African Republic outlines in its INDC the high illiteracy rate of 67 percent in 2008 restricting the possibility of the public on access to information and public engagement (Central African Republic 2015: 14), Chad highlights the missing involvement of women on climate change action, illiteracy and a “poor understanding of the concept of climate change by the vast majority of society” (Republic of Chad 2015: 6). Primarily developing countries of the African Group as well as some Asian-Pacific small island states such as the Solomon Islands mention in their INDCs the institutional and literacy constraints that hinder an effective address to climate change. For the Solomon Islands, gaps still lay in a successful “collaboration among ministries” (Solomon Islands Government 2015: 13) and the inclusion of the private sector and other stakeholders (Solomon Islands Government 2015: 13). Others indicate poverty, low awareness for the problem in the population, low levels of education and knowledge, instability in political institutions and jurisdictional conflicts as reasons for restriction on climate action (Central African Republic 2015: 14; Republic of Namibia 2015: 15; Republic of Niger 2015: 14; UNFCCC 2016a: 6). A secure national infrastructure seems necessary in light of the amount of challenges developing countries still face before climate policies can meet the attendance of the communities.

On the one hand, especially developing countries lack stable political and economic surroundings to take climate action and it seems as if the Global North still dominates the climate governance field. On the other hand successful examples for the implementation on the elements covered by Article 6 of the Convention as well as chosen developing countries serve as role models for others and weaken the former argumentation (UNFCCC 2016a: 14): The Dominican Republic, Thailand, Uganda and the Seychelles showcased local and national solutions on the implementation of the ACE elements in their countries at the Workshop to Support the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention in May 2016 in Bonn (UNFCCC 2014f). Let alone country examples such as Nepal who describes detailed mitigation and adaptation measures in their INDC (Government of Nepal 2016).

The Doha Work Programme suggests that all parties are responsible for the implementation of the ACE elements and highlights flexibility in the implementation to

address their particular needs (UNFCCC 2013: 21). At the same time it also suggests the involvement of women as a group of stakeholders to combat climate change (UNFCCC 2013: 17). So far, gender displays a sensitive topic which only some developing countries have fully integrated into reality. Although women are both one of the most vulnerable stakeholder groups and on the other hand important agents of change in implementing mitigation and adaptation measures, they are still often excluded from decision-making and mostly occupied with agricultural work in developing countries. Due to their daily responsibilities in water management, agricultural and family work, developing parties should seek to include them as stakeholders in climate change initiatives as soon as possible (UN Women Watch 2009).

Certainly, individual circumstances among the parties and different development stages of each country need to be taken into account in negotiations on ACE. This is the reason the varying national capacities on all levels and cultural diversities on the prioritization have been recognized by the work programmes on Article 6 of the Convention during the past years (UNFCCC 2003: 26; UNFCCC 2008: 38; UNFCCC 2013: 20). This enables parties to work on Article 6 in their own pace, according to national possibilities of implementation. Nevertheless women are one of the stakeholder groups whose full potential has not been transferred into education, training and awareness rising measures by all national governments. ACE requests parties not only for a change that is applicable only through legal frameworks or technologies but also through a social change that has to happen over time. Due to the country-driven process every party has different needs and realities leading to its own development of strategies and activities on ACE (Valenzuela 2016).

As stated by the above-outlined constraints, to ensure a collective and successful international implementation of social change through ACE additional development policies and international aid in some developing countries still might be inevitable.

6.4 Remarks on challenges and outlook on ACE

Chapter six has so far outlined challenges on ACE's implementation on international, national and local levels in terms of funding, technology and knowledge and political, economic and social differences. This chapter is considering these challenges and is trying to evolve them to an accumulation of recommendations that could be considered for and by the multiple stakeholders of ACE.

As already illustrated in the former sub-chapters, for Small Island Developing States and other developing countries of the African, Asia-Pacific and Latin American and Carribean Group, especially financial and technological constraints hamper the

comprehensive implementation of the areas covered by Article 6 of the Convention. Parties ask in their INDCs for international financial support and technological assistance that needs to be mobilized (Government of Columbia; Government of Nepal 2016; Indian Government 2015; Republic of Namibia 2015; Republic of Peru 2015; Republic of the Philippines 2015; The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis 2015; The State of Eritrea 2015). Keohane sees financial resources in the future being mainly controlled by donors and funds being only a small contribution for developing countries (Keohane 2015: 22).

Apart from parties themselves also the secretariat as a facilitator between different stakeholders has indicated certain barriers such as a “lack of human resources and insufficient coordination and cooperation among a country’s authorities” (UNFCCC 2016a: 14). As the secretariat highlights in its report on the “Progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention”, parties have with increasing interest reported about the topics covered by ACE (UNFCCC 2016a: 14). To advance the intergovernmental implementation of ACE the secretariat recommends on behalf of the parties’ INDCs that Article 6 of the Convention incorporate gender-sensitive principles to guide the party-driven process, to empower youth also as youth delegates and to enhance the role and capacity for national focal points on Article 6 of the Convention. Moreover the establishment of a fund with voluntary contributions from foundations, other organizations and parties specifically for the activities of Article 6 shall be added to support the implementation on international and national levels and secure financial support (UNFCCC 2016a: 14, 15). It is suggested that countries furthermore scale-up action on ACE through the “cross-sectoral coordination among ministries” (UNFCCC 2016a: 15) and through enhanced “international cooperation (...) with relevant stakeholders at all levels” (UNFCCC 2016a: 14).

As well as the report on “Progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention” outlines recommendations from parties for parties, the authors Lagos, Bleviss and Xu emphasized the role that the UNFCCC secretariat could play in negotiations on Article 6 of the Convention.

As outlined, the authors Lagos, Bleviss and Xu define the secretariat as matchmaker of Global Climate Governance. Hereby they highlight it as facilitative body connecting different stakeholder groups with each other and bringing them on one table. They advise the UNFCCC to become more active and extend its role as a facilitator in assisting parties and other stakeholders with different measures. One measure is the provision of training to teach developing countries on how to design effective programs and to outline mitigation strategies in their countries such as OECD countries are already conducting them. The UNFCCC could

use its facilitating function and pursue a “methodological matchmaking procedure” (Lagos et al. 2011: 17) (Lagos et al. 2011: 16, 17). Transferring this suggestion to ACE, the secretariat could enhance its practical assistance on education and training programmes or help to build capacities for the policy makers, national focal points of Article 6, the private sector or broad public in collaboration with certain donors and UN organizations for the most vulnerable countries (Gildart 2016). UNITAR highlights possible measures to scale-up action on climate education through UNCC:Learn for instance through promotion of youth engagement and programmes to foster south-south learning (UNITAR 2014).

Secondly, the UNFCCC could foster its role as networker and either through its own human resources or a working group of endorsed countries to build relationships between a developing with a developed country or a donor to provide assistance in mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries. Developed countries could bring their expertise and technical knowledge into the partnership; donors could support the particular country financially. Stakeholders could work together either if they are interested in future partnerships or if they made successful experiences in the past with each other. The UNFCCC could construct “a comprehensive roadmap” (Lagos et al. 2011: 17) to support capacity building and more intensively than before work as a bridge between parties and other stakeholders (Lagos et al. 2011: 17, 18). In regards to ACE, this proposal would ensure support for developing and vulnerable countries which request financial and technical support and expertise through their INDCs and could moreover forward knowledge in order to develop methodological concepts in education, training and public engagement.

The authors suggest that progress in these areas is only possible when a development of new bureaucracies in the climate governance process is being prevented (Lagos et al. 2011: 29). Moreover they seek the establishment of a monitoring-system within the climate regime that ensures “accountability and non-exclusion of countries” (Lagos et al. 2011: 29) and further evaluates the suggested metrics and effectiveness of the networking structure (Lagos et al. 2011: 30). Parties’ diverse implementation of Article 6 elements due to abilities, capacities and motivation to change the status quo on national and local level, the secretariat could “ensure that the harmonization efforts yield tangible results” (Lagos et al. 2011: 24; Gildart 2016).

Duyck points out the significant role of civil society and NGO’s in the climate regime and during climate negotiations to ensure compliance and an effective measurement, reporting and verification process which the UNFCCC is able to foster through increasing involvement of constituencies (Duyck 2015). ACE has implemented public participation in the Doha Work

Programme as well as its implementation in the formulation of national communications of parties in order to involve public in the monitoring and verification process (UNFCCC 2013: 24). Moreover the Paris Agreement fosters the facilitation of implementation and seeks to promote compliance at the same time (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2016). Therefore parties are already invited to use monitoring measures through the Article 6 element public participation and the Paris Agreement in their procedures.

To realize most of the above-outlined goals, effective collaboration and sufficient financing are inevitable. To multiply the outcomes of activities on Article 6 of the Convention, Lagos, Bleviss and Xu argue that the UNFCCC secretariat should strengthen its role as a matchmaker between parties and other stakeholders. In arranging networks between parties and the private sector, different industries, sustainable business councils, other intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and foundations. Hereby the UNFCCC could ensure the determination of specific goals between pairs of partnerships and monitor its developments over time. Through established relations, businesses in developed countries could moreover profit from learning about market opportunities in developing countries and providing their expertise. In its facilitative function the secretariat could moreover enhance cooperations between regional groups in a leading function and assist in organizing the implementation on elements of Article 6 according to its regional features (Lagos et al. 2011: 11, 14, 15, 24, 29).

7 Conclusion

The study on ACE under the UNFCCC and its implications on Global Climate Governance has demonstrated the interwoven structure of ACE in terms of tasks and interests of stakeholders and the secretariat. In light of the pressing issue of climate change and its destructive consequences to all countries but especially to the most vulnerable and poorest countries, ACE and its elements become more important than one would first expect. Education, training and public engagement in an international cooperative environment can promote important steps on constructing climate change responses and enabling different stakeholder groups such as women and contribute.

The UNFCCC has been able to involve all kind of countries, both developing and industrial countries, in a climate change agreement. Optimists expect the Paris Climate Change Agreement to be a turning point to the past years. Pessimists do not want to speculate before it has been ratified and its terms have been successfully implemented on international, national and sub-national stage. No matter the outcome in the following years, the UNFCCC has proved to be able to unite various stakeholders after disappointments of outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol under the principle “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 1992:1). As a stage for climate negotiations its managerial function triggers conversation between. With the Paris Agreement, it now needs to ensure the implementation of the treaty and monitor the progress mechanism of countries every five years to reach global climate goals.

An interwoven analysis of ACE through the International Relations theory of liberal and neo-liberal institutionalism has demonstrated that ACE as part of an intergovernmental convention can promote cooperation between parties and other stakeholders. The establishment of the UNFCCC by parties enables the facilitation of processes on ACE. The Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention and its predecessors have demonstrated that ACE fosters implementation of its elements through different activities and events for its stakeholders but also requests parties to take the lead in the party-driven process as well as to engage in partnerships with other agents. Non-state actors and stakeholders such as youth and women have further been involved into the process of climate governance. Through the engagement of NGOs, businesses and youth, awareness can be raised not only on political but also on ground level within communities. The secretariat seeks to accelerate the implementation of ACE elements on international, national and sub-national levels through its communication structure and invites stakeholders to exchange good practices through its CC:iNet portal and the climate secretariat’s website. National Focal Points of Article 6 enable

a direct coordination with parties and a more personalized relation. ACE's aim to produce long-term and social change on ground level yet could not be reached due to particular constraints ACE as a programme as well as its parties face. All developing regions such as the Asia-Pacific Group, the African and the Latin American Group face financial and technical constraints that prohibit the effective implementation of ACE elements in an appropriate manner to encourage change. Although developing countries receive financial support by the secretariat and by developed parties, it seems the outlined concepts are not sufficient. Hereby the secretariat is challenged to fulfill its assisting function and role as a matchmaker in Global Climate Governance.

Global Climate Governance remains a party-driven process of sovereign agents without a centralized intergovernmental force. However states seem to realize, with the help of growing knowledge, scientific progresses but also through personal experience, that climate governance is an area where cooperation with other stakeholders is of the highest self-interest. The Paris Agreement demonstrates that states are willing to cooperate on the basis of a common interest named the containment and the deceleration of climate change. Nonetheless, the attention that parties have developed during the last years for climate change is still to be implemented in the work on ACE and National Focal Points of Article 6 of the Convention need to receive the same attention by their national government.

The suggested extensions of tasks for the secretariat certainly need to be tested in light of financial and working capacities, willingness of stakeholders and legal aspects. Due to its diplomatic mission and behavior, the secretariat might not be able to strengthen its role towards a matchmaker. Although parties request the secretariat to occupy a certain function as facilitator in Global Climate Governance, it does not seem definite that parties would agree to a stronger role of the secretariat in the climate regime. By outlining the theory of the English School, the thesis has emphasized that parties as sovereign organs in the international society and the world order are not willing to give up their supremacy and independence. A stronger mandate for the secretariat could threaten parties to lose their sovereignty and voice in the process and to hand over too much power to an intergovernmental body as the UNFCCC. On the other hand this could also enable parties to strengthen their voice in negotiations due to achieved successes and closer cooperations. Constructivists argue that structures within the international system influence actors but at the same time actors can also exercise influence on structures due to dynamism in the process. Therefore tasks of the secretariat could also evolve with changing interests between agents and structures.

During the last years, ACE could not utilize its full potential and has long been overlooked by

national governments. With its rebranding, ACE tried to achieve a better understanding and attention from stakeholders and the public (Gildart 2016; Nuttall 2016). However parties themselves must decide how strong their desire is to include their citizens in the process, if they only inform or empower them and how much importance they want to grant ACE on local, national and international level. Due to its elements, ACE is able to become involved on local level to provide toolkits for communities and to implement the elements both from top-down through intergovernmental conversations and from bottom-up through community measures (Gildart 2016). The challenge is to achieve “behavioral change and action” (Nuttall 2016). However this is only achievable when enhanced international cooperation, also among UN entities and partners and in other areas of humanitarian aid and financial support, fosters reduction of national barriers such as illiteracy and lack of empowerment of women. Still, it must also be considered that every nation as a sovereign power contributes to the decision if a long-term transformation with ACE is achievable. The UNFCCC itself is only able to utilize the instruments given: To foster multi-level international cooperation with UN organizations and other non-state actors and to secure sponsoring of the programme through supplementary funding in order to drive the implementation of the ACE elements forward.

Bibliography

- Abbott, K. W. (2012) “The transnational regime complex for climate change” *Government and Policy*, vol. 30: 571-590.
- Armstrong, D. (2014) “The evolution of international society” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 35-49, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Asselt, H. van and Zelli, F. (2014) “Connect the dots: managing the fragmentation of global climate governance”, in *Environmental Economics and Policy Studies* [Online database] 16(2): 137-155. Available from <<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10018-013-0060-z>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].
- Barnett, M. (2014) “Social constructivism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 155-168, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baylis, J. (2014) “International and global security” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 229-242, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Better World Campaign (2012) “UN Budget Process” [Online database] Available from <<https://betterworldcampaign.org/us-un-partnership/importance-of-funding-the-un/un-budget-process/>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].
- Beyers, J., Braun, C., Marshall, D. and De Bruycker, I. (2014) “Let’s talk! On the practice and method of interviewing policy experts” *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, vol. 3(2): 174-187.
- Bodansky, D., Haites, E., Figueres, C. and Hunter, D. (2008) “Beyond Kyoto: Dilemmas of Climate Regulation and Equity” *American Society of International Law*, vol. 102: 23-36.
- Bryman, A. (2012) *Social Research Method*, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bull, H. (1977) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2016) “Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Paris” [Online database] Available from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions’ web site <<http://www.c2es.org/international/negotiations/cop21-paris/summary>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].
- Central African Republic (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)” [Online database] Available from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s web site <http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submitted%20Documents/Central%20African%20Republic/1/CPDN_R%C3%A9publique%20Centrafricaine_EN.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].
- Climate Action (2016) “About NAZCA” [Online database] Available from <<http://climateaction.unfccc.int/about>> [Accessed 28 June 2016].

Davila, L. (2016). Interview by Susanne Leidescher. Tape recording. UN Campus, Bonn, 02/06/2016.

Deere-Birkbeck, C. (2009) “Global governance in the context of climate change: the challenges of increasingly complex risk parameters” *International Affairs*, vol. 85(6): 1173-1194.

Dunne, T. (2014) “Liberalism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 113-125, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duyck, S. (2015) “MRV in the 2015 climate agreement: Promoting Compliance through Transparency and the Participation of NGOs” [Online database] Available from Social Science Electronic Publishing’s *web site*
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2557175> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

European Commission (2016) “The Aarhus Convention. What is the Aarhus Convention?” [Online database] Available from the European Commission’s *web site*
<<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Falkner, R.; Stephan, H.; Vogler, J. (2011) “International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Toward a ‘Building Blocks’ Approach” in David Held; Angus Hervey; Marika Theros (eds.) *The Governance of Climate Change. Science, Economics, Politics & Ethics*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Figueres, Christiana (2016). Interview by Susanne Leidescher. Tape recording. UN Campus, Bonn, 04/05/2016.

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) “International Norm Dynamicity and Political Change” *International Organization*, vol. 52(4): 887-917.

Gehring, T. (2012) “International environmental regimes as decision machines” in Peter Dauvergne (ed.) *Handbook of Global Environmental Politics*, 2nd ed., 51-63, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Gildart, Cody (2016). Interview by Susanne Leidescher. Tape recording. UN Campus. Bonn, 31/05/2016.

Government of Colombia (2015) “Gobierno de Colombia: Todos por un Nuevo país” [Online database] Available from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s *web site*
<<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Colombia/1/Colombia%20iNDC%20Unofficial%20translation%20Eng.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Government of Nepal (2016) “Ministry of Population and Environment. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). Communicated to the UNFCCC Secretariat in February 2016” [Online database] Available from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s *web site*
<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Nepal/1/Nepal_INDC_08Feb_2016.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Gulbrandsen, L. and Andresen, S. (2004) “NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks” *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 4(4): 54-75.

Hanegraaff, M. (2015) “Transnational Advocacy over Time: Business and NGO Mobilization at UN Climate Summits” *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 15(1): 83-104.

Hansen, L. (2014) “Poststructuralism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 169-183, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurrell, A. (2002) “Foreword to the Third Edition: The Anarchical Society 25 Years On” in Hedley Bull *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed., vii-xxiii, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.

Indian Government “India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Journal of Education for Sustainable Development (2012) “Climate Change Education as an Integral Part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” *Journal of Education for Sustainable Development*, vol. 6(2): 237-239.

Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S. I. and McGee, J. (2013) “Legitimacy in an Era of Fragmentation: The Case of Global Climate Governance” in *Global Environmental Politics* [Online database] 13(3) Available from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265841992_Legitimacy_in_an_Era_of_Fragmentation_The_Case_of_Global_Climate_Governance> [Accessed 26 May 2016].

Keohane, R. O. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, R. O. and Martin, L. L. (1995) “The Promise of Institutional Theory” *International Security*, vol. 20(1): 39-51.

Keohane, R. O. (2015) “The Global Politics of Climate Change: Challenge for Political Science” *Political Science & Politics*, vol. 48(1): 19-26.

Lagos, R., Bleviss, D. and Xu, T. (2011) “A New Role for UNFCCC: The Matchmaker of Global Climate Governance” [Online database] Available from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s *web site* <https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/GP_A_new_role_for_UNFCCC.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Lamy, S. L. (2014) “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 126-140, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Little, R. (2014) “International Regimes” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 289-303, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nicholson, M. (2005) “The United Nations” in Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher (eds.) *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, 4th ed., 23-42, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Nuttall, Nick (2016). Interview by Susanne Leidescher. Tape recording. UN Campus. Bonn, 01/06/2016.

Pfefferle, T. (2014) “Climate Change Politics Through a Constructivist Prism” [Online database] Available from the E-International Relations’ *web site* <<http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/18/climate-change-politics-through-a-constructivist-prism/>> [Accessed 23 July 2016].

Republic of Chad (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) for the Republic of Chad” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Chad/1/INDC%20 Chad_Official%20version_English.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Republic of Namibia (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of The Republic of Namibia to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Namibia/1/INDC%20 of%20Namibia%20Final%20pdf.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Republic of Niger (2015) “<<Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)>> of Niger” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Niger/1/Niger-INDC-final_Eng_20151020162516_65260.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Republic of Peru (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (iNDC) from the Republic of Peru” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Peru/1/iNDC%20Per ú%20english.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Republic of the Philippines (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Communicated to the UNFCCC on October 2015” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Philippines/1/Philippines%20-%20Final%20INDC%20submission.pdf>> [Accessed 1 July 2016].

Solomon Islands Government (2015) “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Solomon%20Islands/1/SOLOMON%20ISLANDS%20INDC.pdf>> [Accessed 6 July 2016].

Taylor, P. and Curtis, D. (2014) “The United Nations” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 304-319, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis (2015) “The Intended National Determined Contributions for the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis” [Online database] Available from the

UNFCCC's *web site*

<<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Saint%20Kitts%20and%20Nevis/1/St.%20Kitts%20and%20Nevis%20INDC.pdf>> [Accessed 1 July 2016].

The Congressional Digest (1997) “United Nations Funding: Financial Burden-Sharing by Member States” *The Congressional Digest*, vol. 76(1): 9-10, 32.

The State of Eritrea (2015) “Eritrea’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) Report” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Eritrea/1/ERITREA'S%20INDC%20REPORT%20SEP2015.pdf>> [Accessed 1 July 2016].

Thew, H. (2015) “Youth Participation and Agency in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” Available from the University of Leeds’ *web site* <https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/youth/application/pdf/youth_participation_in_the_unfccc_negotiations.pdf> [Accessed 21 June 2016].

Turnheim, B. and Tezcan, M. Y. (2010) “Complex Governance to Cope with Global Environmental Risk: An Assessment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” *Science and Engineering Ethics*, vol. 16(3): 517-533.

UN (n.d.) “UN CC:Learn. The One UN Climate Change Learning Partnership” [Online database] Available from the UN CC:Learn’s *web site* <<http://www.uncclearn.org/about-uncclearn>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UN (1992) “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf> [Accessed 7 June 2016].

UN (1998) “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf#page=11>> [Accessed 7 June 2016].

UN (2013) “United Nations Alliance on Climate Change Education, Training and Public Awareness” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/application/pdf/a6dialogs5p03.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNESCO (2010) “Climate Change Education for Sustainable Development” [Online database] Available from UNESCO’s *web site* <<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001901/190101E.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNITAR (2014) “Submission relating to the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_non-party_stakeholders/application/pdf/586.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015) “Sustainable Development Goals” [Online database] Available from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ *web site*

<<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2016) “Global Action Programme on ESD” [Online database] Available from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations’ *web site* <<http://en.unesco.org/gap>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (n.d.) “United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <https://unfccc.int/cc_inet/cc_inet/youth_portal/items/6519.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2003) “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighth session, held at New Delhi from 23 October to 1 November 2002” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop8/07a01.pdf#page=23>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2008) “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=37>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2011) “Non-governmental organization constituencies. What are constituencies?” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* [Online database] <https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_2011_english.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2013) “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a02.pdf#page=17>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014a) “Education, Training and Public Awareness under Article 6 of the Convention” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/education_outreach/overview/items/8946.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014b) “UNFCCC - 20 Years of Effort and Achievement. Key Milestones in the Evolution of International Climate Policy” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/timeline/>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014c) “Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014d) “Negotiations on Article 6 of the Convention” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/negotiations/items/8951.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014e) “Education and Outreach (Article 6 of the Convention)” [Online database]

Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/items/3143.php>
[Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014f) "Workshop to Support the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/education_outreach/overview/items/9471.php>
[Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014g) "UN Alliance Side Event on Non-Formal Climate Change Education" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/education_outreach/overview/items/9226.php>
[Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014h) "First step to a safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014i) "National Focal Points for Article 6 of the Convention" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/national_focal_points/items/8942.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014j) "Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014k) "Climate Finance" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site* <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2807.php>
[Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014l) "Kyoto Protocol" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site* <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> [Accessed 10 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2014m) "The Secretariat" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/secretariat/items/1629.php>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2015) "Paris Agreement" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf> [Accessed 8 June 2016].

UNFCCC (2016a) "Progress made in implementing the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention" [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC's *web site*
<<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbi/eng/06.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2016b) "Functionality and accessibility of the climate change information network clearing house CC:iNet" [Online database] Available from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's *web site*
<<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbi/eng/05.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2016c) “Review of the Doha work programme on Article 6 of the Convention. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair. Addendum. Recommendation of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation“ [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/sbi/eng/115a01.pdf>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2016d) “Youth for Climate Action“ [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/youth/items/8945.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2016e) “Youth for Climate Action: Conference of Youth“ [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/youth/items/8966.php> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UNFCCC (2016f) “Youth Looking to Be Empowered for Climate Action. Results of UN Youth Forum“ [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/youth-demand-stronger-voice-in-shaping-international-climate-action/>> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

United Nations Joint Framework Initiative on Children, Youth and Climate Change (2010) “Youth Participation in the UNFCCC Negotiation Process: The United Nations, Young People, and Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the UNFCCC’s *web site* <https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/education_and_outreach/youth/application/pdf/youth_participation_in_the_unfccc_negotiations.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

UN Women Watch (2009) “Fact Sheet: Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change” [Online database] Available from the WomenWatch’s *web site* <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Climate_Change_Factsheet.pdf> [Accessed 26 July 2016].

Valenzuela, A. (2016). Interview by Susanne Leidescher. Tape recording. UN Campus. Bonn, 26/05/2016.

Vogler, J. (2014) “Environmental Issues” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 341-356, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wendt, A. (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” *International Organization*, vol. 46(2): 391-425.

Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Williams, M. (2012) “Knowledge, power and global environmental policy” in Peter Dauvergne (ed.) *Handbook of Global Environmental Politics*, 2nd ed., 443-455, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Woods, N. (2014) “International political economy in an age of globalization” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations*, 6th ed., 244-257, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix

Individual interview: Mr. Luis Davila, Team Leader at UNFCCC, UN Campus. Bonn, 02/06/2016

Why did the UNFCCC establish Action for Climate Empowerment? What are the implications of ACE for Global Climate Governance? How is it included in the global political spectrum?

The work of Action for Climate Empowerment comes from the inception of the convention. From the very beginning national governments have discussed the need to have an emphasis on education, public awareness, public participation. That came all the way back to discussions at the first environmental conference in Stockholm in the 70s and went through the meeting of Rio and it was eventually personalized in the UNFCCC Article 6. The acknowledgement that it heavily requires citizens to promote awareness and to promote climate education has been key component of all negotiations on sustainability at large and environmental governance, climate governance since the beginning. What has recently happened is just a name change or a branding change for discussing this topic as Article 6 or in the context of the implementation of an agreement and more into how do we brand this and make it more accessible to non-policy expert but the work itself is not new it just didn't start. It has been around ever, with ever meaning the whole existence of this course of policy and climate governance.

The first negotiations on the environment on the global commons started in the 70s, the first environmental conference. It was the first global environmental conference and that went into serious discussions and that created so the current international architecture around the environment and brought UN agencies, the United Nations Environmental Programme, it has brought conventions, the Rio Convention, the one biodiversity CTB and then a big conference in Johannesburg in 2002 and then in the follow-up Rio Summit very recently. And that included all sorts of environmental issues from chemicals to consumption, to oceans. So it is part of the larger topic. The acknowledgement that public participation, public access to information, all the elements, are important, have been around since the beginning.

Why is ACE addressing educational topics, youth and public engagement together?

I think governments have been discussing this within one sort of bucket because it is one way to make the conversation easier, same reason why topics on mitigation to climate change happen in one bucket and topics related to adaptation happen in one bucket. But at the end,

they are part of the same larger umbrella that is the implementation of the convention and implementing long-term high-resilient low-impact environmental plans. It is all the same plan, the same goal just to really address climate change. So I wouldn't try to question why it has been discussed on one plate, it just has been discussed on one plate because it is sometimes easier to program or create an agenda that has different items. And that is why one component is being discussed in that context. But all the work on education and awareness is cross-cutting and affects all issues being implemented under the Convention and young people are one of the main stakeholders that are important to that. They are also the beneficiaries of education policies and policies on public awareness policies but the ones who are gonna have to inherit the leftovers of our planet so that is why perhaps they are so interested in that. I'm sure and convinced that you are interested in all of the other topics which are part of the larger picture or implementing the convention.

Could you elaborate on the ACE communication strategy, its goals and its audience?

I think we have to step back and ask what ACE really is. ACE is a larger effort of parties to the Convention of national governments and all the relevant stakeholders to implement policies, programs, activities that raise awareness and climate education, that involve citizenry, that is about public access to information. That is what ACE is really about. Our discussions on the communication strategy yesterday and the past few weeks is really more about how does the Secretariat to the larger Convention better serve its beneficiaries and stakeholders. It is more of a corporate strategy not a mandated strategy that will dictate how governments themselves will communicate to their citizens or create education policies. It is just about how corporate identity like the secretariats intervention tells stories or better share information or better engage with different stakeholders. ACE is a larger topic and theme that encompasses many things that governments have agreed to do and they themselves have decided on a national level how to best engage with their own citizens. Whether it is on education, whether it is formal, informal through informal channels about education and at what level and how intensive, how multi-stakeholders that implementation takes place and whether it is public awareness or governments themselves or potential foreign partnerships or civil societies or the private sector and all these stakeholders who get involved. [The topic] itself is larger than what the Secretariat of the Convention does.

What are the key stakeholders of ACE and the main audience?

That is nothing I define but according to what have governments decided it includes civil society, it includes young people, it includes women, it includes indigenous people, it includes the private sector, it includes researchers and academia and it also includes trade unions. So a whole range of constituencies that have been recognized under the UNFCCC process and beyond as key stakeholders to engage in implementation on climate action.

Have you seen a development of the inclusion of constituencies during the last years within the UNFCCC and ACE?

I think constituencies are getting involved in the work of the UNFCCC in most specifically in the topics that relate to ACE from the very beginning. I think that it is gonna increase awareness and what it means and how it is implemented and sort of global discussions on ACE can link to the national and local realities and activities taken place. A lot of that has to do with better channels of education, that it is much easier to follow what is going on in this international level, be it a webcast or social media and trying to digest that and feed it back to what really matters on international level. So I think of that especially, of the increased level of communication channels and the ability of communication, of knowledge there has been an increased engagement of civil society and the other stakeholders of course.

We just had a workshop where the National Focal Points on ACE came together to discuss best practices and show experiences on what has worked for them as they worked together with their many departments back home on implementing ACE programs, activities etc. and I think the stakeholders were very useful in sharing how they are working on these topics but also how they can potentially work with all these Focal Points at home. Again, what is really most important is how all of this work really gets implemented on national and local level.

How do you consider ACE's role regarding the NFP of Art. 6?

ACE's and the Secretariat's role has been mandated by governments so governments have given us clear directions on what we have to do. We have to support the work of national focal points, we have engage in outreach activities, we engage the international community stakeholders, we have to do things at the COPs.

Governments have themselves agreed to integrating topics on public engagement, on public awareness, adaptation and mitigation activities whether it is doing a better job at collaborating internally within ministries, whether it is doing better jobs at doing something in international cooperation working with different UN agencies or other countries, provide technical support

and exchange information. The governments themselves have agreed to do a lot of things. (...) It is not only the work of the team that the secretariat does, it is not it at all. It is just a larger umbrella of themes and areas of work that maybe get defined one way but it is not only the work of the secretariat, that is just a small thing in support of mandates that governments have agreed to implement.

How does the UNFCCC fund itself? Are there different regulations than to other UN agencies?

My understanding is that it is very similar to other membership based UN organizations so governments or members or parties to the Convention have to pay dues essentially that pay for the core budget of the UNFCCC and then there is a series of activities and calls for supplementary projects and activities and those get covered by voluntary contributions from governments that are interested and willing to support that. There is some support from non-party stakeholders for some activities, a tiny bit from foundations, a tiny bit from companies but for the most part the Secretariat is being supported by contributions from core contributions from governments and support to supplementary products. And that is just the way I think all international organizations work.

ACE is a larger topic but there is a team in the UNFCCC that works on inventories and then it is a large effort by governments in the world. The team within the secretariat working on topics related on ACE is gets covered like everything else in the secretariat, as core contributions or supplementary contributions and this supplementary contributions come from governments and increasingly from other stakeholders.

Also this years' workshop has been funded the way it normally activities get funded by the UNFCCC secretariat. There are several activities that is mandated by governments that the secretariat does that gets presented to the governments, because especially because it is a supplementary thing, so additionally, and then some governments choose to support it or not in this case some governments did and that is how it was covered.

What support does the UNFCCC and ACE provide to Non-Annex I countries?

In general anytime that the UN organizes a meeting, it likely finances the participants' involvement in it unless it is stated that they are not financing this activity. For example the UNDP is financing a conference and they want participants from a developing country to go, then the usual praxis is that they would normally finance their travel and the Daily Substance Allowance, the DSA, so the person can go and pay for a hotel, can go and pay for the

transportation, to be able to attend the conference. So that is what it is about. It should not be considered as support to developing countries because it is not what it is. It is just allowing someone to attend an event and not starve and pay it out of their pocket. It is the ability to make the event function and to be able to get participants who don't have the financial needs to attend.

How to you consider ACE to develop during the next years also in line with the UN Alliance and other partners?

Governments have already agreed to work under the framework of the Doha Work Programme. That is gonna go through 2020 and talks about linkages to the international community such as the Alliance, I think there is some references to the larger work of the ESD, so I think there is gonna be a lot of synergies during the work. Some of the UN agencies are going to implement some activities that can fulfill mandates and activities under both umbrellas, the Doha Work Programme and other ESD. So I think they're gonna go hand in hand. After the Doha Work Programme is done in 2020, governments will have to review how it went and then have to decide whether there is more work to be done and that is just the general practice work programmes are arranged in the UNFCCC process. Governments say they will work on this a certain amount of years, then review the effectiveness of it. If work still needs to happen on that work programme then we say "maybe we need to do something else", then we do a different work programme or we improve on that work programme. And that is what has happened with ACE: Years back there was a work programme called the New Delhi Work Programme which was the first time where we decided to work for this and this year, under this and this objectives and that sort of activities we commit them. Then they reviewed that, then they said "well, we know we need to continue to do this" so they amended the programme and then it became the Amended New Delhi Work Programme implemented for a few years. And then they launched a Work Programme in Doha, I believe it was in 2012. It is an eight-year programme from 2012 to 2020 and was supposed to be reviewed at midpoint in 2016, it just happened and now they have four more years to implement what they agreed to. The New Delhi Work Programme has been the first of its sort on Article 6.

What have been the lessons learned of this year's Dialogue and Workshop?

There are going to be two pretty different reports on the events that could give more of an exhaustive picture on all of this.

In general, I think the Dialogue helped governments link to stakeholders and learn about the many things that are happening. Especially in the field of public awareness. And I think it helped them sort of being inspired and to pick some lessons to take back home because they got to see what they can use for instance big mega events to create awareness about climate change. We could use celebrities who could let their voice as an amplifier or messenger about climate change. Or we could use graphics and moving images to have an emotional link to people and to also encourage them to learn more about climate change and ways on how to address it. And many more examples. We could learn about private sector companies taken action as well and producing more sustainable products. So there is a range of things.

And on the second day there were also good practices, not only from stakeholders but from governments themselves of that I am fairly sure other governments are gonna take back and say “well, this is an interesting thing and we should try to think about it, see if there is a way to implement this back home”.

Also the workshop, it was the first opportunity to share how they work, what does work, how they can work together, how they can work better at home.

One of main things that came out of it was that for the first time they were able to come together and learn from each other and hopefully they will bring that back home and improve what they are doing in their communities.

Has the role of UNFCCC changed during the last years and with the development of even more bilateral and regional climate agreements?

Why would the international community still need the UNFCCC after the success of the Paris Agreement?

The UNFCCC is the big tent, it is what allows big countries, small countries, island states, industrialized countries to come together in one place and have equal footing and discuss topics that affect their ability to address climate change together. It is the one place where Kiribati can have the same voice as the EU and all these other theme-specific or region-specific or working groups or others are doing good work but they won't have that. So the UNFCCC remains the only place where that holistic and universal type of discussion can take place. So that is unique.

I think it has become more relevant and I think it got a bit lost of what happened in Copenhagen 2009 but I think quickly enough governments saw that they need to come together as a global community and come up with a global solution for climate and thankfully

they were able to come together after some work in Paris and decide that the way forward would be the Paris Agreement.

The Paris Agreement is only the foundation for all works to come. And governments are now ready what the rules are gonna be, what the famous rule book is gonna be to be able to operationalize what the Paris Agreement says and so until that happens there are still things to figure out before the Paris Agreement gets implemented.

One forgets that originally the Paris Agreement was ambitioned to start in 2020 and there is no a great emphasis to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and get into force earlier than that, maybe by 2018. And that is great, it demonstrates sort of the willingness of governments to get to work and move beyond rule making or arrangements and about who does what and all these sorts of things but to get to work. But it will take time. That is what they original thought that it would take until 2020 to figure all that. So I think we think we need to take that into perspective that it is not straight forward to set the ground rules how this very macro, long-term vision gets actually implemented throughout the world.

Has the Paris Climate Change Agreement contributed to new dynamics in the North-South negotiation process and among National Focal Points? Can you see any change to the prior time?

I think there has been less polarity, less conflict in this sort of North versus South construct for a while now. I think Paris cemented that governments can come together of rich and poor, islands and others saying “we want to increase ambition and get closer to 1.5 degrees”. It is possible and that happened in Paris. But that process has happened for a while, one of the things that happened after CPH that was called the Henna group that includes a group of governments from around the world looking for ambition and intersects developing and developed countries. There is also new regional groups like IELAC in Latin America.

The work of National Focal Points is national. The work on Article 6 or to implement Article 6 has for the most part been less politicized then other work than other work because there wasn't that huge conflict between North and South. It was always perceived as a global, universal effort to increase education, public awareness, public engagement because all these issues and all these topics have nothing to do with some of the articles of the Convention, like article 4 who talk about. Everybody needs to do education, everybody needs to raise awareness, everybody needs to include their citizens into the decisions of climate action, it is across the board. That has potentially helped and has always helped to create positive and constructive environment in all the negotiations on ACE because everyone comes into that

discussions as sort of being part of the larger commons. Even with that disparity exist which I think now becomes less and less of this North and South divide. Of course it still exists. It would be naïve and to deny that but I think it is less strong than before.

Individual interview: Ms. Christiana Figueres, Former Executive Secretary UNFCCC. UN Campus, Bonn, 04/05/2016

How does UNFCCC ensure multidirectional governance processes in the climate regime negotiations which can also be implemented locally?

When I think about multidirectional I think about truly in many different directions whereas the way I think about the involvement of different stakeholders in the UNFCCC I think about as three concentric circles. Here the formal process is at the center of the process are the Parties and they have a very clear mandate with each other and they are the ones that sit and negotiate the mandate for many years. Then there are everybody who are observers and constituencies, the youth the BINGOs, those nine constituencies. They always had some participation, also physically. They have always had a their three minutes at the end of each session of a COP. If you want to speak in the COP you need to belong to one of these nine constituencies. This is sort of the formal process and up until 6 years ago this was the boundary of this constellation. And when I came I identified this is not enough and we have to go to the completely informal which is every one else under the ground swell, which is not only the constituency but actually the people who make a difference on the ground. The constituencies focus on the negotiating text and that is all they focus on, every comma, every paragraph. In the real world, people are not necessarily focused on the legal text, they are focused on the making a difference in the economy, they are focused on shifting 93 trillion dollars from high carbon to low carbon, they are focused on producing low carbon products. The insurance companies are focused on developing new insurance mechanisms which are gonna help us deal with impacts. This 'real world' as not really paid that much attention to this or very little. By bringing all of that in or basically we reaching out to them. Working on the ground includes basically also the fossil fuels companies, this basically includes also finance institutions, corporations, insurance companies and many more. The middle circle is really at the center because this is very very formal, the middle circle is formal/informal because it is still focused on the formal process. The outer circle is where, I think, the impact is really made.

I decided that this outreach is way too small, so I invited them and also went out to talk to all of these and continued to talk to them to say much more support from them, e.g. religious communities.

During the time of your mandate, how have different stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, corporations, states, supranational bodies, international organizations, civil societies, women) been included in the Global Climate Governance process? Has there occurred a change during the last years?

When I got here it was a really narrow band here, it was only these who were formally being recognized as the 9 constituencies, that was it. I just broke this open and started to talk to everybody else. Now the outer circle is known as Non-State Actors or Non-Party-Actors.

(See answer to question 1.)

How has the Paris Climate Change Agreement contributed to new dynamics in the North-South negotiation process?

Well, I think the North-South divide, the core of it is the common but differentiated responsibilities and that has not changed because there has always been and will always be a recognition of the fact that it is the industrialized countries that have the historical responsibility here because they are the ones who have put the emissions historically up in the air through the industrial revolutions. Therefore this recognition of the historical responsibility has not changed. What has changed is the awareness that historical responsibility is front and center and has to lead but that there are also future responsibilities. In addition to, not instead of but in addition to. And that has brought then, that's why we have a global agreement, because they recognize while industrialized countries have their historical responsibility, they have also recognized that everyone now and also certainly in the future shares their responsibility of what we will do for future generations in different ways. Obviously the responsibility of a small state is very very different from the responsibility of China. But that differentiation is taken account of in the Paris Agreement work through the fact that every nation has been invited to bring in their national climate change plans that is nationally determined. Therefore it is based on their national realities and based to their national capabilities and national capacities and it is based obviously to the size of their economy.

It is not that one principle has substituted the other it is that the core golden rule of CBDR remains and in addition there is a shared responsibility to it in the future.

There are two responsibilities: One is the responsibility and therefore the need and the responsibility the countries have to reduce their emissions to take the lead and reduce their emissions dramatically but also because of CBR there is a responsibility to help finance and the adaptation that needs to occur in developing countries.

So it's both, it's both, reduce your own emissions and finance what developing countries have to do.

What differences do you see in the outline of the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol and to its future prospects?

They both have very little to do with each other aside from the fact that they are both legal instruments of the Convention. The Kyoto Protocol divided the world very clearly into two sets of countries, the industrialized and the none. The reduction obligations and the pouring obligations were certainly only on developed countries/industrialized countries. As the Paris Agreement includes all countries but gives every country the possibility to decide for themselves how they want to participate in that global effort. So that dividing the world into two sets doesn't exist in the Paris Agreement, at least not in the way it is in the Kyoto Protocol. There still is a woven throughout the Paris Agreement, there still is a recognition of industrialized and developing countries but it is woven into the different aspects of the Paris Agreement, it is not a division of the world into two sub-sets. First.

Secondly the Kyoto Protocol establishes very clear periods, the first period and the second period for emission reductions and everything is measured into those time periods. Whereas the Paris Agreement is meant to be a long-term agreement that will go for several decades. The end of the Paris Agreement is not established, it is actually meant to go for a longer period of time, perhaps several decades, during which there is going to be every five years an incremental effort. That is not there in the Kyoto Protocol. In the Kyoto Protocol everybody undertook a certain level of emission reductions and that is what they are going to do. So it is a static construct. Whereas in the Paris Agreement it is a dynamic construct because every five years there will be an increase in emissions reduction.

What influences and effects do bilateral climate agreements (e.g. USA-China) bring regarding UNFCCC's role in Global Climate Governance?

Absolutely: We now have three agreements between the US-China, we have US Brazil, we have a Brazil-France, we have a US-EU, a whole host of agreements that are very helpful and they will continue.

In your opinion and experience, what role does ACE play in Global Climate Governance and in current negotiation processes?

I think it's the core of a long-term transformation. Educating and raising awareness is very very important, needs to be strengthened and we need to realize that the impact of it is by definition a long-term and a slow impact. It doesn't have the same impact in time as does the shift of capital for example, so you know if you shift capital the whole divest-invest moving is then up to 3 trillion dollars. Shifting capital out of low carbon into high carbon really does have an immediate impact on global greenhouse gas emissions. Immediate impact because you shut down some plants and you create other generational plants that don't have greenhouse gases. The shift of greenhouse gases therefore has an immediate impact on greenhouse gases. Investing into education and awareness raising is just as important as shifting capital but the impact is very different. It doesn't impact immediately the level of greenhouse gas emissions, it actually prepares the ground for perhaps much more systemic change that needs to occur over time so that as generations come to occupy decision making roles. When your generation is sitting here making decisions then presumably and hopefully everything that we are investing in education and awareness raising will make it easier for you to make those decisions. But it is a long-term investment it is not the immediate. And you have to have both because the urgency is here. You cannot choose between one thing and the other. You have to have those factors, the change emission profile, immediately right now but also you have to invest in the future.

Individual interview: Mr. Cody Gildart, Communication Officer, Strategic Communication Unit. UN Campus, Bonn, 31/05/2016

Has the role of the UNFCCC changed during the last years and with the development of even more bilateral and regional climate agreements?

Why would the international community still need the UNFCCC after the success of the Paris Agreement?

I think that the role of the UNFCCC is always evolving as the multilateral process moves forward because we live in a world where things are changing constantly. And so the climate talks are really the place where governments come together and recognize these changes in the world and then sort of put their heads together and figure out how to move forward on this problem in relation to what's changing in the world. So if you look back, when I joined the secretariat in 2012 they had just gotten the COP in 2011. Durban was when they agreed to have an agreement in 2015 and so that triggered a change in the role of the secretariat because

it relocated its purpose. And then incrementally every year after that steps were taken that advanced the negotiations towards the agreement and the role of the secretariat evolved with those incremental steps. So with the loss and damage mechanism was agreed in Warsaw, the secretariat became - I don't want to say prewire of the insurance - but they stepped into that role of being able to compensate communities and cities for the damage that climate change costs which is typically something that is about insurance. And when in Lima there was this agreement to have the NAZCA Portal showcase non-state actor and commitments on climate change, then the UNFCCC role became this showcase of the wider world of action, that was not the role before. So with each small agreement that was made before Paris it changed the role of the secretariat slightly. And so I think that this will continue as we move forward past Paris because there are a lot of details that are left to be worked out. And the secretariat has this institutional knowledge of what works and what doesn't in terms of - not used to mean acronyms - monitoring, reporting and verification, so the counting of emissions and this nebulous thing that mechanisms intends to work everywhere in different ways. The markets in China are different than the carbon tax than they have in British Columbia for example. But there is this mean for sort of standardization so that we make sure that one tone of carbon here counts as one part of carbon there. And then markets can grow together, link up or now it seems like in the regional greenhouse gas initiative in the North-Eastern US they are looking to allow trading with people who are not in the initiative, who haven't even signed on. So allowing outside people to buy credits and you've got these sort of things that are happening, the world is evolving. But the secretariat the role is evolving with it and as we move forward we got the global stock take in the agreement itself so every five years the secretariat where governments come together governments will still be coming together under this banner to make sure that the progress that they're making on course with the goals that have been made within the next process. And I do think that it will be necessary but I think that the UNFCCC that we will see in maybe 10 years might look very different than the UNFCCC that we see now which looks a lot different than the UNFCCC that we was 10 years ago.

The UNFCCC always brought the governments together it is just now, now instead of being at this place like what kind of agreement that we're gonna have, that was our role since 2011 since we have agreed to have an agreement. But instead of that the role is gonna be how do the developing world get the support what they need to meet their goals and climate action plans. How does the developed world enable the developing world and make sure that the money and other types of support that they're giving is actually going where it is intended and having the results that they wanted to have. And then who is counting what, how are we

checking everything to get transparency. It gives an international body to check this. Then you have this kind of example like Volkswagen. If there is not some sort of entity in place to make sure that things are actually going as, the emissions reductions are as stated then they might not be as stated. Then would all be sitting here scratching our heads in 2030 when we have three degrees of warming and 10 meters of sea level rise and its like: “But everybody said their emissions would be reduced”. It has to be an impartial judge. You have to have somebody out there that can count every country against the science as supposed to being in sort of a political game where you can see in certain regions of the world.

How do you consider YOUNGO’s role within the UNFCCC? Have you seen a development of the inclusion of constituencies during the last years?

All the constituencies want a seat at the table and their role maybe has not really increased in the past but it is a constant, especially for example the ENGOS (the environmental non-governmental organizations). Those are always the ones who say, “we have to save the planet”. It’s always there. It is a constant reminder. I think why the role of them hasn’t really increased during the last years is because it is a party-driven process. Governments are the ones that have to take the action, that have to set the policies, that have to set the goals and targets and point the direction of growth. Because there are all of these interests out there, it is not just the environmental interests you know. “We do have to have economic growth, people will have to be brought out of poverty which requires economic growth and development at global scale so you have to have that. But in our process, parties have to make the decisions. Now they’ve done a lot to include the voices of all of the constituencies. They have seats in plenaries, they are invited to the COP, we make a lot of outreach to them and we’re making sure that their views are taken seriously and the governments are working within the process are acknowledging the civil society as a whole.

The YOUNGO represent a very interesting challenge. Because we are talking about a group of people that isn’t quite as homogenous as some of the other NGO’s. (...) Some portion of their constituency is not yet old enough to vote, they are still minors, they still have guardians. And then, at one point they are not as YOUNG anymore and they become not a person of YOUNGO anymore. To bring them into the process is a little bit trickier for the UNFCCC. They are minors, they have to be accompanied and so it is a logistical challenge, it is security concerns and then what actually happens with a 14, 15, 16 year old at a climate change conference where governments make decisions. It is a valuable experience to be sure but it might not be an experience that the UNFCCC can facilitate for every young, interested

person. And I think that the secretariat working with the COP presidencies over the past few years has done a good job with accommodating the YOUNGO's and there is a lot of other outlets where they can participate. They can participate in this conference of youth that happens before the COP. So there is a lot of inroads to have their voices heard even if not quite as many minor members of the constituency are brought into the conference, as maybe the constituency would like. It's a shame because these young people will be handed this planet when they are in a voting age, or when they do graduate from college or they become politically active but political leaders. You know these people will be engineers and doctor's and mayors of cities and towns in their community and they will have to deal with all the resilience issues, health issues and government issues that climate change is already impacting. But can you bring somebody in that is 15 to make the voice be heard into this process. It is difficult. I don't know if the secretariat has been able to increase their participation over the past few years but I know that they really tried. I know that the people down there in CAS and the Executive Secretary have made sure that their voice is brought into the process.

ACE is doing a lot of good work. And I think that we did one day where YOUNGO, you know it's like a youth day at the COP. You have that day and it does raise the awareness levels. The Executive Secretary and the ACE team really making a push to bring it in, it is mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, it is mentioned in the Paris Agreement and I think that public participation will increase as we move forward. Because now you have a 189/190 countries that have their own action plans and the citizens have voice in a lot of those countries. You will have a lot more citizens being brought in. And it is difficult, I realize, when you are 16 it is difficult to be patient. (...)

Why did the UNFCCC establish Action for Climate Empowerment and what role does it play?

I can only speculate that it is a product of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. In Rio governments agreed the Convention and there is Article 6 in the Convention. But I understand why we rebranded it as ACE and that is because Article 6 of the Convention doesn't really speak to what is actually happening within Article 6 of the Convention. Now you weren't there when Christiana gave her speech at the ACE opening at the SBs, not this year but in the year before Paris. Because back then we just called it Article 6 of the Convention and her message was "what is Article 7 of the Convention?" and I think it is like establishment of the secretariat or something. It is like each of these articles has a name that reflects what they are and ACE

needed that name because people have to be empowered to take action on climate change and I would hope that is why governments put Article 6 in the Convention in the first place is recognizing that the public needs to know about climate change, they need to participate in the policy decisions to address climate change, it should be part of the educational curricula. Climate change is likely to effect the way we generate electricity and grow food and manage our water resources and so, people that are working in those sectors need to be trained on how to move towards lower emission solutions for energy agriculture and land management and so on. And so I think that in rebranding ACE in what it actually should do perhaps we now have an opportunity with the Paris Agreement and with the 190 Nationally Determined Action Plans. There is this opportunity to fulfill what have maybe has been the original intend which is to get people really involved in shaping their own future. The same way they are involved in shaping their own future any city council meeting in the United States. I mean you got citizen German processes here in Germany. I see it here and even in the Parliament. It seems like the Parliament is really representative it is not just a two party system. It is like you have those things and you hope that like with the “Energiewende” here. So you may have a policy and then people know about it and then understand how it could benefit them and you got solar panels on every roof. (...) I think that people do need to be brought in and I hope that is what they intended that with Paris in place is what happens is moving forward.

What are the implications of ACE for Global Climate Governance? How is it included in the global political spectrum?

This is an interesting question and I don't know if you know this, my background is in public involvement. What I was doing before in the climate secretariat is I worked on bringing the public in the environmental process in cities across Arizona in the United States. And the benefits of bringing the public into the environmental governance process is numerous. For example, if you have people involved in policy decisions not necessarily making these decisions not necessarily empowered to make the decision but public input considered by decision makers. Then the policy that results is often the best used to public funds. It stands to do the most for the most people in a community. The decision makers are confident in what they are doing is fulfilling their commitment. I know that it is not like this everywhere but in places where people can let their local officials especially. You know the local official is elected based on a commitment to fulfill some sort of platform to improve the community and I see where if ACE can proliferate public involvement and public participation in policy making related to climate change then we know there is gonna be some costs associated with

transitioning to a low emission growth model (...). But if we make the decisions on how to spend money on high degrees on public participation then we ensure that the money is well spend on things that will actually help people.

And the implications for Global Governance: There is a lot of talking in this process about ‘bottom-up, top-down’ all these sort of things. Ultimately, even if you have top-down direction from a multilateral process, national governments contributing into that process, then the national policy should align with that. Ultimately it’s a network of people. Each country is a network of people determining what happens in their community, which feeds into their region, or their state or their province or whatever you call it. (...) What happens at a national scale relies on each community and sort of purement sort of thing. That is what I think the impact of ACE could have on Global Governance is empowering each little community to take the action and make sense on that. Just like every country has its own circumstance (...) and so when each community becomes empowered to make the decisions that point them into a sort of direction that Germany has agreed to because the entire world has agreed to that direction then we actually have the chance to meet our global goals. Because it is great if every country organizes this and we do this but if nothing changes on community level then...you can say you want to change something at the head of state but nothing changes at community level, then you won’t change it.

I think that the full potential of ACE really yet has to be realized. In my opinion right now ACE seems to be, I don’t want to say ‘overlooked’ by governments but I don’t think that governments give ACE its due in terms of setting policy and evolving and meeting goals. When we did the INDC analysis I noticed that there was really nothing saying “we’re gonna go out there and talk to citizens and we’re gonna develop a toolkit for each community that gives them options and feed into our national goals that we can then feed in the global spottake of progress. I think that ACE would work best if governments would work it more. If they use that they really embrace the public participation and decision making and really make information available to the public. (...) I went home after the Paris Agreement was adopted in Paris and there is no uptake on this on the community level in the US. And that is fine because people in the US might not be connected as globally and to global geopolitics. The Paris Agreement needs to be socialized and it needs to have these resources to put climate change into curriculums. (...) It should really be like a big push to create the resources to bring the community on board with meeting the national goals. But it is a party driven process and if parties decide “that is our priority” then it is what it is.

Do you think the five steps to increase the level of public impact and to increase public participation ‘inform, consult, involve, collaborate, empower’ outlined by the International Association for Public Participation are being implemented in the process of ACE and of the UNFCCC? If yes, how?

On the spectrum of public participation you have inform on the one side and I can't speak for every country but I know that some countries do make an effort to inform people about climate change. (...) Obviously there are people out there understanding what is happening with energy policy and stuff like this and what the impacts are. So there is inform, there is certainly not the other element “empower” where people are on the spectrum of public participation. Inform is the basic level, empower is the most. And at that level decision makers to give the community the power of decision-making. It is not that easy for decision makers to give the public that level of decision-making. (...) You can't just turn it to the people in every instance like that. The trick for climate change and maybe for ACE is figuring out where on the spectrum governments of the world be comfortable bringing their citizens in and hopefully it is more than just inform. Because inform is more a one way dialogue: “Here is what we know about climate change, we'll tell you about it.” Maybe more like consult/collaborate: “Here is the goal we set about climate change. What do you think, the public, think we should do to achieve that goal. Here are some options. (...) Then that sort of two-way dialogue as long as its done transparently and fed into the decision making process that could really be something of value there. And it's difficult. Especially on national scale to do something like this. To create that sort of national outreach and national dialogue. It is a big effort and not a lot of countries have the resources or the even really the desire to do this which is understandable. But certainly communities can do it and I think that's why ACE would be probably most effective if there were toolkits and resources at the community level to empower the communities to actually then have that sort of level on self-governance that it then gets fit into the system and works its way up. National decision makers will decide but it won't just be that they will have fossil fuels lobbies over here or other monied-interests be fed in it would also have the voice of the citizens. (...) If you'd had that certain lobby interest over here and on the other hand you had 89 to 95 percent of communities, a critical mass of communities, all ready doing certain things self-governance wise, there might be more balance there in what we currently see in money in politics, at least in the western industrialized world.

How do you perceive the implementation of the ACE elements in practice and in theory?

Do you think ACE should be separated in education and training and public engagement?

I think that the implementation of the ACE elements, each of the elements, should be guided by an outreach plan/communication plan because there is a very good reason why ACE is sitting in the communication and outreach and that is because essentially, if you look at education, it is communication between a teacher and students. But then processes the national governments needing to have the resources to bring climate change into that communication structure. And I think that each of the elements of ACE could be, not all of them separated from each other because there are sort of like you got training and very much jobs in the industry and private sector and then you have education which is in most cases is public sector depending on the model and then the other one is public awareness, public access to information, these are a little bit more of a package together. So I think that if you broke out the public part and education and training and had guiding documents for each one and then you were really feeding resources in. But ACE at this point is not about, I don't think it is that much focused on giving resources. We don't have a climate change curriculum that we give to countries that they can use as the education component, turn around and then say "In our INDC we included climate agreement and now we got it there and check"

That would be really nice. But as I say ACE doesn't work unless you work it. And so I think in the implementation of ACE I think there is a lot of room for improvement but I think there has to be the desire to improve it. It could evolve. I think that ACE could really evolve into a programme that is pushing out resources, not only best practices and hoping that other countries are inspired to uptake these practices. But there is larger political and budgetary and governments issues with all of this. The world is more connected now then ever before but maybe it is now not so connected that they were ready for a global standard curriculum on climate change based on IPCC Science. And training through the UN is a huge opportunity for the private sector. Some sectors are gonna grow especially after the Paris Agreement. (...) There is these concerns. Maybe for certain parts of ACE maybe the climate secretariat doesn't feel like it is their role to step in. There is a whole UN agency on education. The UNESCO is the education agency, so what is our role? Is it to say "UNESCO has got that kind of resources...".

The implementation of ACE is maybe not as connected or mature as it could be but that could change. I would like to see governments realize that empowering communities is the critical path to meeting their climate goals and putting more funding into that so that the connections there could be strengthened. UNESCO stuff could be brought in through ACE and fed

through the process so that the UN Alliance could even be stronger so that there is more public involvement, public participation and decision-making.

Individual interview: Mr. Nick Nuttall, UNFCCC Spokesperson. UN Campus, Bonn, 01/06/2016

How do you consider YOUNGO's role within the UNFCCC and ACE? Have you seen a development of the inclusion of constituencies during the last years?

There is a massive direct and indirect engagement of many groups in this very broad topic of Action for Climate Empowerment and one thing about the governance structure and the governance relationship in for example in the UNFCCC is that many many desperate interests have evolved over the last years to be engaged in the UNFCCC and to be engaged in this broad area of Action for Climate Empowerment such as Climate Justice to women issues to youth. It is quite a complicate landscape and it is getting quite fragmented inside in some ways because they all have their own bit on the agenda what they feel is very important and again that is what you prioritize. Many hopes and dreams over the last twenty years for a better world have been in the sense of the UNFCCC. On one level this UNFCCC is fundamentally a treaty to stabilize and reduce the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. But it has become linked with all sorts of senses of fairness and equity and justice and develop versus developing etc. In part there was a time, and it is certainly true, that there was a lot of money in climate change. There was a lot of money put in to carbon markets and other things, industries etc. So a lot of people thought the problems would be saved through the lenses of climate change. We solved the problem of lost of forest, we solved the problem of loss of soils, we solved the problem of water supply through the convention on climate change. At the exclusion of many other multilateral environmental agreements. So it has created its own huge universe of different interests in this kind of governance structure.

Young people have always felt that they wish to be involved in this kind of process. I don't know how many young people in reality are certainly involved in the issue of climate change but we certainly have the YOUNGO groups and they are very active and want to be part of the change. I think there are two ways, to be honest, to look at their engagement: One is the 'necessary evil'. In other words that the adults you might say of this world feel that they must involve youth somehow in this. Some do it because they feel politically good to have youth around cause it makes them look good. Others because they see it is a genial issue that affects generations to come. And then there are others who wish to have the youth there because they

feel it gives them some kind of legitimacy. Now what the youth get out of it, is a platform but to this day I am unclear what - apart from being there as witness to the actions of governments and other stakeholders - what the youth are 'actually contributing to change'? I don't know. And maybe it is because they are kept at a certain distance of the process. Perhaps if some governments included them in their delegation. As we heard at the 4th Dialogue, some governments are including youth delegations. Perhaps that would give them more influence and more experience which they could then translate back in their communities and countries. So I think the governance structure of youth, they are more included than they have been before. In Paris for sure, we got assistance from our Executive Secretary to lower the age slightly because the youth is a very big age group. Some are also from developing countries so I think for them, their exposure to the process and what goes on is quite useful because there is nowhere else where they could get it. I think for youth of the developing, they could have more influence than their own governments. They would actually have the ability to do so and would have access to all sorts of power and could probably bring bigger change at home in their own governments.

So yes, there is more inclusion of youth in the governance structure, they are more outgoing than before. I still don't think that we or they have actually found the best mechanism for empowering them and creating influence and change. And I think this is an evolving situation and I think it needs a bit of serious thinking. Having people just to turn up and speak, I am not sure what that does when this process is full of people speaking.

I am also very conscious that either through the model UN's or being engaged in the process, that there is a danger of taking young people who are generally have an activist view on the world and basically converting and massaging them into little bureaucrats. That find I very worrisome because I'd rather wish there would be more action in this world and campaigning in this world and standing up and sometimes seeing young people in the UN system makes me wonder, should they really be concerned and now subsections of Article 6. And you hear some of them walking around for a while and speaking the same jargon as the delegates from the governments. Again, maybe it is good for them to understand the complexities of the UN negotiation but again, is it the right age to be engaged in that. Could there not be other things for instance campaigning at home? Or could one not be engaged at the supermarket to stop food waste or could one be fighting some power station schemes. Lobbying or organizing youth shareholder actions, companies that are still a bit sluggish in trying to move themselves into the sustainability space. We need some kind of action when some people are speaking at the UN Conferences and engaging in processes.

Why did the UNFCCC establish Action for Climate Empowerment and what role does it play?

Well that goes back a long time. As you know it was called Article 6 of the original convention on climate change. It was in 1992 as part of the original convention on climate change. It was very absolutely brilliant that actually the issue of communication of access to information, justice, training, public awareness etc. I think it was great that it was recognized as being important because it is very important. I think when it comes to any environmental issue including climate change and sustainability generally that we have not got to the point in this world where it is normal, where the behavior and the lens of society or any party of the world sees being sustainable as just that what we do. Cause I mean you would only have to pick up your newspapers to see the fights that go on between the governments or whether you go this way any you go that way on a certain term. In terms of economy or terms of management to that economy. I think in all that issues are very important. Access to information is really important and it has been a big and complex issue for many years because in some countries for instance the Aarhus Convention on Climate Change and it has been for a long time a European experience and for a long time some developing countries kept Action for Climate Empowerment at arms length because it got linked with lots of other issues as human rights and whether the public wanted their government to be fully informed about what was going on. So it got modeled up with other issues of other countries. So that has always been a little difficult to implement in developing countries. I see a mood of change right now for instance in Latin America where they now embracing their own version of that Aarhus Convention. But these are very important issues. And I think when it comes to education I think education is not just a youth, I think education is for every citizen on the planet that has to be renewed and renewed and renewed. Because people learn one thing at a time and actually from doing other things in their lives and they're still living in that bubble from what they learned when they are at school or university but things change. They may have a few of renewable energies from 15 years ago because that is when they've learned something about it. Education should be a life-long journey and suddenly there is this complexity in this very fast moving areas of the environment. New scientific research, new risk assessment, new understandings of what is happening to our world. I think that is so important. And the other thing I think is so important is there is informal education because most people leave formal education and there have to be other ways of educating them. Public awareness is also pretty vibal but that doesn't necessarily have to sit under that article of the convention. That is just a giving. We all have to create awareness.

But the issue with Article 6 is and the issue of ACE is: How do you actually take all that stuff in there and turn it into behavioral change and action. Because if it is just a process of awareness and information that leads nowhere then it won't work. At the moment it is a half or three-quarter backed Alaska and more has to be done.

How do you consider the ACE elements of education and public engagement being in one article?

On one level it means everybody can take a slice of the cake but they need to know it's part of a cake. But like everything to do with the environment and sustainability we haven't quite got there in terms of connecting all the dots in terms of interconnectivity. But what is training? Is it training for climate change, is it training for the jobs that are needed for climate action so is it things like jobs for renewable energy or fixing solar panels or is it a whole other area.

The fact is that human beings in the last 15 years. We need nature now more than we ever needed nature before. So is it jobs in natural resources management we need? Or maybe it is about clean energies, energy efficiency and these things and less about environmental law and less about ecosystems. That might change because the Paris Agreement opens the door to the people that are involved in climate change to understand much more it is about boosting the planet to help us absorb emissions and adapt. And so the training aspect might get broader. But again I think we didn't get to the point where we joined this all up. Better speak about a lot of different topics and somehow we have to learn to bring it all a bit better together.

What are the implications of ACE for Global Climate Governance? How is it included in the global political spectrum?

I think it is very much on the margins right now as an article of a convention. I expect there is a lot more going on but people don't link it with Article 6 of the convention and don't link it with Action for Climate Empowerment. Things happen well beyond the corridors the United Framework Convention on Climate Change and Action for Climate Empowerment. An example is the game Angry Birds make that game on climate change that we had last launched last year. That is climate education and that is public awareness and we managed to link it with Article 6 of the convention because we were aware of it. I think there is a lot more going on but it is not in specific linked it up with that. But we are not here to look after ACE. We are here to take on the issues that are in ACE and if they're not connected with ACE I don't think it's a problem. Because in the end what you want to do is to shut it down because there is nothing to do anymore.

It is trying really hard to make governments and others connected with the process. Aware of the power and the importance of various issues under ACE so that they can bring these issues back home and their governments can actually bring them into national action plans. So I think it is worth showcasing somebody's doing this and somebody's doing that. To say 'Is there something in there that could help implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change back home?'

So I think it is good if when those people return home they don't forget about it and do something better. Actually the best thing that the delegates can do for Action for Climate Empowerment is start taking their mates and all their other ministries out for a cup of coffee and talk about it so other ministries can start raising more awareness. That would be interesting. I would love to hear back from those people that came to our workshop with the Nordics asking what did you do when you got home? Did you actually start taking what you learned here and transmitted it to the civil society that you link up with?

How does the funding of the UNDP changes from the one of UNFCCC? What problems do there exist regarding funding also for ACE ?

I think it links some of the general picture of what is the role of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change versus the role of the rest of the UN system. Because in the end we are a treaty organization. We are not a big organization. There are far bigger UN organizations out there which have far bigger responsibility for taking action for climate empowerment into their daily agenda. And so we have this Alliance which you know which brings in other UN agencies. But again, I am not sure that the issues of ACE are particularly well integrated into these other UN agencies either. I think there are certain people and certain units within these UN agencies that deal with ACE and try and promote the underlying challenges, opportunities and topics linked to ACE. But again it is like the broad picture of climate change. Is it really linked and integrated in the rest of the UN system? It might somehow disappear because their priorities change and so there are natural allies in the UN system, United Nations Environmental Programme, UNDP which is huge and also operates at the country level. Because also, remember, we have only one office and it's here in Bonn. So how do we get the things of ACE out into the countries and the cities? So you need multiple and multiple powers? The UN system are being our natural allies but then there are also other stakeholders which could be allies. For instance, cities and mayors and others. So I think we are just on the edge, just on the fringe of this. Because I don't think that if you were the Secretary General of the UN or you were a funder of the UN system or government or

something... I don't think you would say 'Ok I'm gonna put billions of dollars into the UN Framework Conventions' ACE program'. So if that's not gonna happen who is gonna be the delivery system of this and arguably on one level ACE should now be at the point where we don't do it any more, where it is fully integrated in the other UN systems, where it is the new normal. But its not and there's nobody who is going to give us billions of dollars to do that so there is a bit of a chicken and egg situation here. And with the other traditional UN powers the UN is convening and that is why we try to convene the flag and carry the action into nations and that is why we also encourage Article 6 Focal Points to carry their flab back to their countries. And this is quite a slow process. I think in terms of funding we could benefit from a relatively modest amount of funding that would allow us to actually seed money to catalyze things in different countries by matching funding and things like that. And we could say to countries such as Burkina Faso for instance 'We are gonna bring a project into your country and then we could get the funding somewhere else then we could bring in climate change or environmental funding further into their school system for example working with UNESCO who can also chip in some money. Cause at the moment we don't really have a way saying to ourselves let's pilot some target projects over here that could be bigger and become national blueprints for action on ACE and countries. So that is a very long and roundabout way of saying it is a very challenging point in time when governments are basically signaling that they may be understanding better the role of access to information and public participation under this convention through this Article 6 and ACE. It suffers from not having any real resources to actually drive it further and find that wonderful nirvana where we shut ACE down because it is just a norm across the world.

How do you consider ACE to develop during the next years also in line with the UN Alliance and other partners?

I hope, seeing the fact that so many countries have put elements of Action for Climate Empowerment in their climate national action plans, in their INDCs/NDCs. I hope that is maybe a signal that they want to run a bit further and faster with this topic. And if that's the case and if the goodwill of Paris and the goodwill of - so far of this year - governments towards the Paris Agreement continues, it may be that we could be at a tipping point where people start to integrate some of these topics much more in their national activities and that would be a very positive development. I just think we have to watch the space.

In terms of the other UN partners. The UN operates on the basis in two ways: One is the government requests the UN system to do things for them. So hopefully through the INDCs or

the NDCs maybe some or more governments request the overall UN system on some of their issues on ACE in their national economies or regional economies. So that would be a positive development. Somehow we would have to watch the space. Also what the governments and the UN system sometimes also does is try to think what the governments might want. So I hope the Alliance will also start punching a bit higher punching a bit above its weight to try to bring on some more countries. Because it's gonna be a domino effect. You cannot get all the nations, all the world act on everything right now at the same time. So you need a few champions and you need a few leaders. We have a couple, so we have the Dominican Republic and the Carribean doing a lot on formal education. And there are some islands as well doing quite well. Some countries are doing quite well on public access to information, particularly the European countries and Latin America is starting to move forward on that as well. So we do have some champions out there but we need more. So maybe the UN system could now help just identify a few champions and see how we can trigger this domino effect and maybe governments will start to request themselves more action if they follow their INDCs and climate action plan. So it could be an interesting moment in time, let's see.

Has the role of the UNFCCC changed during the last years and with the development of even more bilateral and regional climate agreements?

Why does the international community would still need the UNFCCC after the Paris Agreement?

I have only been here two and a half years but I have covered the UNFCCC when I was a journalist and (...) and now I am actually inside the UNFCCC. I think it has changed quite a lot in the second half of Christiana Figueres' time because she started doing something which didn't really happen in the same way before which was a sense of advocacy on the topics. Because the UNFCCC was always about the process, the negotiations. In the simple sense the UNFCCC is a conference organizer, an event management company. It sets up the rooms and they share this water bottles there and make sure everything is happening in six languages (...). On one level, it is a conference company, creating the space in which governments can decide what they want to do. But I think under Christiana it has become a bit more than that. And it has become slightly a bit more the conscious on the climate change agenda. It certainly brought in more voices so cities and business and others in a rather more integrated way then it was before when it was more ad-hoc. I think with the Paris Agreement very much reflecting an understanding that its now about acting rather than negotiating a treaty that it's opened the eyes to the world outside in many ways to for example what UNEP does, assessments to the

values of carbon forests and also this issue on behavioral change and all the other things that in a sense are hinted at in issues on behavioral production. The convention has moved from a relatively narrow world of its role to glimpsing that it is part of the building block of the whole sustainable development agenda. And I think that's a good thing. So it has changed, it has become more advocacy. The question is what is its role now. Should it be that the rest of the UN system picks up the issues of the Paris Agreement and the UN Framework Convention focuses on its more data based activities. So for example taken the greenhouse gases of governments and logging them, tracking maybe the implementation of the INDCs or is it more an implementer of the Paris Agreement? Now what does that mean? Again only having one headquarters in Bonn whereas the UNDP has country offices across Africa and Asia and Latin America whereas UNEP has regional offices in Bangkok and Panama. So what does all of this mean? And I still think that there is a debate we had about the role of the UNFCCC in the coming years. The only thing I would say is that ideally you might say job done, shut the thing up and the implementation arms of the rest of the UN system do the job. The only problem is that the rest of the UN system has other priorities too. Will they really carry the climate change flag and would put it really high on their agenda, UNHCR, UNDP, UN women, International Labor Organization. Where does climate change fit in in their agendas? Ideally they would just be doing everything on climate change. It is a bit like an environment ministry. In an ideal world, you would not have environment ministries any more because it all would be fully integrated in the other ministries. I mean the dream would be really to shut down the environment industry because the environment and sustainability is just normal in the other ministries. But we haven't arrived there yet. So equally we haven't arrived at climate change yet. So you probably still need this treaty to carry the flag cause climate change causes all the issues. For a little while longer until we reach that happy moment where everything is fully included in the UN system, in systems and cities and the system is the new normal cause the job is done, fully done.

Individual interview: Ms. Adriana Valenzuela, UNFCCC Focal Point, Education, Training and Public Awareness. UN Campus, Bonn, 26/05/2016

When, how and why has ACE been founded? Why did the UNFCCC establish Action for Climate Empowerment? What is it based on?

ACE is the new name for Article 6 of the convention. Back then when parties were already negotiating the climate change convention they realized how important training, public

awareness and the participation of different stakeholders and access to cooperation and international cooperation is. All these elements were together and part of Article 6 of the convention. Last year in 2015 in one of the events that have been organized on Article 6 by the secretariat of the UNFCCC parties and also other stakeholders were invited to rethink a name for Article 6. Why? Because if we talk about education, training and public awareness we need to communicate in a very simple and understandable manner. The change has been done and the new name for Article 6 of the convention has been done and the new name is ACE, Action for Climate Empowerment. But it is only the new name because from the beginning of the convention these elements have been part of the convention.

Is there a possibility for National Focal Points to be in contact among themselves without the assistance of the secretariat?

From the beginning the different work programs that Article 6 of the has, the New Delhi Work Programme, the Amended New Delhi Work Programme and the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the convention highlight the importance of South-South cooperation, triangular cooperation and then they invite parties to cooperation among themselves. In secretariat has organized different workshops. Regional workshops where many National Focal Points participate but as well different stakeholders. And they have established cooperation among themselves. Then it is possible and they are doing and implementing it. Of course now in 2016 with the review of the Doha Work Programme the main focus in on the implementation. For instance this workshop to Support the Intermediate Review of the Implementation of the Doha Work Programme and to create this platform where they can cooperate directly and exchange experiences. They can establish technical cooperation, they can organize exchange and cooperation, they can organize themselves to support their own activities.

In the future, will there be again regional workshops?

That is up to parties. With the review of the Doha Work Programme Parties agreed and requested the secretariat to organize workshops. But all these activities are depending on funding. Regional workshops or international events, all the activities of the National Focal Points and as well to enhance implementation of the Doha Work Programme could be organized according to the funding available.

In your opinion and experience, what role does ACE play in Global Climate Governance and in current negotiation processes?

I think now with the Review of the Doha Work Programme Parties agreed that the focus from now on is no more the negotiations. Why? Because we already have legal frameworks. We have the UNFCCC, the climate change convention. Parties agreed the Paris Agreement last year that gave the legal framework, we have the Kyoto Protocol. Regarding the elements of Article 6 of the convention we have the Doha Work Programme. There is already legal framework for each of this areas. Now the main focus is how we advance on the implementation of this legal frameworks. In the case of ACE we have the Doha Work Programme that invite Parties to implement multiple activities including climate change to the curriculum, promote participatory processes, develop a national strategy on ACE, provide access to information using different platforms, enhance the participation knowledge of different parties but also of other stakeholders. This is the main focus. Parties agreed with the Doha Work Programme that the intermediate review will be undertaken in 2016 and the final review will be undertaken in 2020. Until this the focus will be on the implementation on all levels: local, national and regional levels.

How has ACE or Article 6 of the convention changed over time?

I think currently with the new name, Action for Climate Empowerment also shows a different focus. These six elements of Article 6 are fundamental because we are talking about transformation. A long-term transformation we need to change. It is a cultural change. We need to change behavior, we need to change values. And it is not possible only with legal frameworks or technologies, we also need a social change. And these six elements of Article 6 of the convention allow this transformation. If people are not only aware about what is happening but also how they can contribute as part of the solution it can make a big transformation. And over the time; I think in the last years we have seen that these elements of Article 6, the new name ACE, now have a bigger acknowledgement and then also a political will. We have for instance the Ministerial Declaration that was adopted by Ministers at the COP in Lima. Also we have in the last years COP decisions. Last year at the COP in Paris parties agreed that the reference for the decision was a COP decision as well. Then just now Parties agreed what decision will be forwarded to COP22 to be adopted. Then over the last, I guess, five or six years, ACE has received more recognition and hopefully with this agreement for the intermediate review more support to enhance implementation at local and national level.

How is ACE being funded?

Funding for ACE currently is up to the supplementary budget. It means voluntary contributions from countries. It is up to countries if these activities are also part of their priorities to provide voluntary funding. Parties and especially developing countries, the G77, the African Group, less Developed Countries, Small Island Developed States have been highlighting and stressing the need to receive funds to implement ACE activities. Why? Because they during the negotiations mentioned and stressed the need to implement adaptation and mitigation projects and that these projects for instance have a component on ACE but in some opportunities it is not enough. Why? Because you can get funds for instance to produce or prepare video or to prepare a publication or to do a workshop but there is not this funding for a long-term and strategic process. For instance to develop the national strategies. It has been highlighted during the negotiations. It has also been a request and I think it is important to also mobilize national funding. An example in the Dominican Republic is the Climate Change Council didn't have resources but they established a partnership with the Ministry of Education. And the Ministry of Education allocated one US Dollar for training teachers. Then international funding is fundamental but also in the long-term it is fundamental that there are also location from the national budget. And also how it could be done to partnerships. Because there are already mandates and budget at national level for instance with the Minister for Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Energy. The important is also how this national budget resources can be allocated and for that it is the inter-sectoral coordination is important among the different ministries but also among the different stakeholders because funding can be mobilized through partnership as well.

How could ACE develop itself during the next years? Are there any suggestions you would like to mention? Do you see an ongoing development of ACE, a positive development of ACE?

Yes, I think some of the recommendations of the intermediate review highlight the importance of international cooperation to scale up action. Secondly, the importance of establishing partnerships, multi-stakeholder partnerships. Means, Parties working together with civil society, with NGOs, with local communities, with youth, with universities. The third one is, the exchange of good practices and experiences could help a lot because parties and others can learn about the process, can learn about the good practices but also from projects or activities that didn't work well and can then also replicate. I think a point that has been highlighted is the importance to work with young people and to empower them as agents

of change. The same with women. And that all the process will be country driven. It means that every country according to their own realities and circumstances and needs need to develop their own activities and strategies because from country to country and even within a country there are different needs and different realities. And when we are also talking about ACE it is very important to define the target audience. When we are talking about access to information, the decision a decision maker needs to receive is very different than that from rather a local person or a farmer. For that it is important to develop these strategies and actions according to the circumstances of each country but as well to the target group. I think that the final point is: There are also multiple UN agencies and also other international organizations who are working on the implementation. The idea is that they can support the implementation at local, national and international level.

What role does YOUNGO and the COY play for ACE? Do you intend to strengthen the role of YOUNGO?

YOUNGO is the constituency of youth organizations as part of the UNFCCC process. YOUNGO is a platform with individual members like youth from different countries but as well youth organizations, a network of networks. YOUNGO participates in the intergovernmental process. They for instance have the possibility to deliver statements during the plenaries, organize side events, organize as well exhibitions and contribute to the negotiations. They have for instance worked together with parties during negotiations bringing new ideas. But I think that also another point for YOUNGO is, they participate at the intergovernmental process but also their activities are fundamental for the implementation at local and national level. Why? Because now the message is when we pass on the implementation and they are keyplayers. How many parties are planning to continue working with youth? Parties up to the decision that they forward to the COP highlight the key role that youth people play in climate action.

We annually organize during the conference of the UNFCCC different events and activities for young people. For instance at COP22 we will organize the Young Future Generations Day that is one day at the COP just dedicated and to showcase youth climate action and we will have multiple experiences shared there but also it has been highlighted how important it is to build the capacities of young people and how they can be trained as well as multipliers. And I think young people, and especially YOUNGO are already implementing multiple activities and I think they are also looking forward to work with parties at national level, especially in the implementation of the national determined contributions. Then at national level they play

a role, and in the intergovernmental process. But the key will be in the implementation of the NDCs.

Is the YOUNGO Future Generations Day already funded? If not, how is it funded?

In general it depends on the partnership and the different actors that will be there. For instance one activity that will be showcased is the Global Youth Video Competition, the Award Ceremony of the Global Youth Video Competition. The two winners of the Global Youth Video Competition will receive an award and will be funded to participate there. And for the Young Future Generations Day in several opportunities we organize it through partnerships. Other UN agencies, other agencies that want to contribute directly. UN for instance or others. For instance we establish partnerships for the materials and for the activities that are organized. But we don't have an amount of resources for the Young Future Generations Day. We always try to organize it through partnerships. There is no general funding available, it is part of the main constraints.