

## Abstract

This thesis seeks to explain how the mental health organisations in the world's second largest refugee camp, Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, are affected by the environment they work in.

The analysis consists of three case studies, each displaying the conditions and frames the organisation works with at different levels. Each case constitutes an analytical chapter where organisational theory is able to explain how the mental health organisations are affected by the environment they work in.

In the first case study, the Middle Eastern phenomenon of *wasta*, and the influence it has on the environment in Zaatari, is explored, analysed and explained via the organisational theories of Dependency and Power & Politics. The theories can explain the power structures of *wasta* both socially, culturally and professionally.

The second case study is based on a mental health meeting I attended in Zaatari, where competition theories are used to explain the complex competition between the organisations in Zaatari. The focus is both the density of the organisations in Zaatari as well as on resource partitioning between the specialised and the generalised organisation.

Lastly, the third case is a donor-government's review of an INGO, where the organisational theory of organisations & environments is used to explain the donor scheme and the constraints accountability can cause. The donor's demand for reports, log frames etc. are heavy burdens on the smaller locale partner organisations, who do not have the resources to employ grant managers.

In the discussion, the three cases are combined into one abstract critical case, where I argue for the case to serve as a general example of how humanitarian organisations are affected and restrained by the environment in which they operate. The three cases all constitute the environment of humanitarian organisations and all are influential on the survival rate of organisations in such an environment.

I agree that in order to comprehend the measures, strategies and behaviour of the mental health organisations in Zaatari refugee camp, one must fully comprehend the environment, context and conditions of the humanitarian field.

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*There is an idealistic side to humanitarian aid –  
and there is a pragmatic side to it...*

*Anonymous informant*



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## Abbreviations

CVT – Center for Victims of Torture

IMC – International Medical Corps

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

LFA – Logical Framework Approach

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation



# Part 1: Introduction

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## 1. Introduction

Defined as the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the second world war, the Syrian civil war has claimed over 220,000 casualties to date, half of whom are believed to be civilians (Hummer, Mercy Corps, 2015), including over 8,000 documented killings of children under eighteen years of age. In a country of approximately 22 million people the bloody and prolonged conflict has resulted in 8 million internally displaced, 3.2 million refugees and approximately 12.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 700,000 Syrians have registered as refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2014 alone, with an average of approximately 70,000 Syrians fleeing their country every month. Even though the number of refugees has steadily declined since 2013, the regional crisis is by no means subsiding, especially as it becomes clear that returning to Syria will not be a viable option in the short or medium term (Berti, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications*, 2015, p. 41).

The increasingly disastrous impact of the Syrian conflict is overwhelming for neighbouring countries, which are hosting the majority of the Syrian refugees. In Jordan, the influx of a reported 600,000 refugees has, amongst other things, resulted in the world's second largest refugee camp: Zaatari. The world's largest refugee camp is the Dadaab camp, which consists of five camps and is located in Kenya. The Dadaab camps holds all together 332,455 registered Somali refugees, and has been existing for almost three decades now in comparison to Zaatari, which became the world's second largest refugee camp in only four years (UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency).

By now, Zaatari refugee camp is the fourth largest city in Jordan. The desert area in northern Jordan became home to approximately 100,000 people, and throughout a one-year period between 2012- and 2013, an influx of 3000-4000 refugees entered Zaatari per night. Between March and June 2013 up to 31,000 refugees entered.

As a result of the high influx, the Jordanian authorities closed the unofficial border crossings between the southern parts of Syria and the north of Jordan in April 2014 (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, s. 16).

As the Syrian crisis continues, more refugees flee their country, creating restraints for the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries. Zaatari refugee camp has been closed for newcomers, and a new camp, Azraq, was opened to accommodate the new refugees. However, a lack of funding has also taken its toll on the humanitarian assistance in Zaatari. In fact, only 39% of the funding needed is completed for 2015, that means an astonishing \$724,957,954 is still lacking (UNHCR, 2015)

The closing of the border, and the establishment of Azraq refugee camp where most newly arrived refugees are now located, became very significant, in particular for the mental health organisations in Zaatari refugee camp.

I initially set out to uncover the variation of perception in the need for a holistic torture rehabilitation clinic, but I soon encountered what lies behind the variation in perception instead. During my fieldwork my focus therefore took a turn to the conditions and framework humanitarian organisations work within, and how these are displayed on different levels.

The dependency school argues that the strategies and behaviour of an organisation cannot be fully understood unless the context in which the organisation operates is fully understood (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 478). So, in order to understand the behaviour and strategies of the mental health organisations in Zaatari, one must first understand the environment in which they operate and the conditions for their existence and survival.

Therefore, this thesis will explore the environment and the frames the mental health organisations in Zaatari operate within by conducting a comprehensive stakeholder analysis that includes individual interviews with a cross-section of people and institutions working in and around Zaatari refugee camp.

## 1.2 Research Question and Hypothesis

The intention of the research question is to guide the process of data collection and analysis based on the theoretical framework outlined below. The overall theoretical question is framed by organisational theory, which seeks to explain the nature of relationships between organisations and their staff as well as beneficiaries and donors. This thesis will explore which obstacles organisations in Zaatari refugee camp face due to the environment, and how these obstacles are overcome. Considering the complex and volatile environment in Zaatari, institutions and organisations struggle to provide the adequate assistance, while at the same time competing for survival in an underfunded, complex and continuous humanitarian disaster. Consequently, the guiding question is:

*How are the mental health organisations in Zaatari affected by the environment they operate in?*

- *How is this unfolded on the different levels?*
- *How can their behaviour be explained by adopting an organisational theory approach?*

Furthermore, it is important to note that this thesis seeks to explain the impact the environment has on the organisation through organisational theory in contrast to an analysis of the organisations in question.

*Hypothesis:*

The working hypothesis is that *humanitarian actors in Jordan are highly affected by the environment they work in*. The scope and nature of these relationships will be explained with reference to the overall conceptual framework presented below.

## 1.3 Conceptual Framework

This subchapter provides a brief overview of the concepts used in the case studies. The specific concepts from the different theories, and the findings when used on the empirical data, are summarised and presented. Moreover, this subchapter presents the conceptual foundation for the analysis by breaking down the components that affects the environment in Zaatari.

### 1.3.1 Loosely-Coupled

“Loosely-coupled” derives from the concept of Dependency Theory and is useful when combined with power relation from the theory of power and politics. The concepts are combined and can then explain the Middle Eastern phenomenon of *wasta*, which is the case study that forms the base of the first analytical chapter.

Jeffrey Pfeffer is a Professor of Organisational Behaviour at Stanford University, and the late Gerald R. Salancik was a Professor of Organisations at Carnegie Mellon University. Together they developed the concept of “loosely-coupled”, meaning that changes in the environment will affect the organisation not in a direct causal relationship but in tenuous ways. That is, in order to explain why not every single change in an environment not to have effect on the organisations, the occurrence must be loosely-coupled with the organisation for it to matter (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). It is important to note that in this thesis, environment is to be understood as the social field in Jordan.

### 1.3.2 Power Relations

The concept of power relations from the school of Power and Politics, combined with the concept of loosely-coupled, serves to explain not only the phenomenon of *wasta* in the first analytical chapter, but also how it functions, why it is continuously used and the effect it has on the environment in Zaatari.

It is essential to note that power in this context is not synonymous with authority, dominance, oppression or control. Instead, power is to be understood as the latent ability to influence others, maintain control over scarce resources, connection and access to individuals who are perceived as having power and a central seat in a strong coalition (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 284). Most coalitions are vigorous and ever changing. They can easily be modified depending on the situation and frequently work across organisations margins both horizontally and vertically (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 283). Additionally, power is dependent on the particular affiliation, or a certain context, because a person cannot be powerless or powerful in him or herself, but is fully dependent on others to recognise his or her power (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, pp. 283-284).

Pfeffer's concept of loosely-coupled from Dependency theory, together with the power relations from the school of Power & Politics, can explain the phenomenon of *wasta*, and the power granted to those in possession of most *wasta*. The environment, or the social field, is loosely coupled with the power relations and coalitions that distort the environment in Zaatari.

### 1.3.3 Density Dependence

Density Dependence serves to explain why the competition I witnessed at the mental health meeting, which is the second case study, has arisen and which dynamics lie behind it.

Michal T. Hannan, Professor of Sociology at Stanford University, argued for a theory of density dependence in 1989. He argued that in the occurrence of increasing numbers of organisations providing the same services, e.g. mental health organisations in Zaatari, they can initially assist each other in establishing the legitimacy of their organisations before competition between them transpires. Hence, in the event of low density of similar organisations, it is assumed that the failure rate is rather high, and likewise the establishment rate of organisations is rather low all this due to the organisation's fear of investing in new forms, which the new organisations depend on for their survival. However, when the amount of similar organisations on a market increases, the legitimacy will increase proportionally to a certain limit. At some point the density will have reached its max and the density dependence curve will break. (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 208).

Consequently, the legitimacy an organisation gained will decrease again in case of a too high increase of similar organisations, as that provokes competition and causes the density curve to disrupt. Whereas at low density, competition between similar organisation does not play a major role, however, at high density, the competition between organisation will be much stronger and of greater importance (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 209).

Nevertheless, in my case I found that an adjustment to the concept was required in order to fully explain the condition in Zaatari. As elaborated above, the density curve should, according to the theory, break when too many similar organisations enter the same market and no longer serves as a helping hand for each other. However, that is

not exactly the case with Zaatari. Two very important external factors caused the density curve to break: the restriction of the Syrian-Jordanian border and the closing of Zaatari for newcomers. Those two events caused the market to shrink, meaning that it was not too many similar organisations that caused the density curve to break; it was the decrease in clients that caused it, because the mental health organisations are especially dependent on newcomers to treat.

Therefore, the density does not increase in absolute terms, nevertheless, with this adjustment the theory still serves to explain the increase in relative terms, due to the reduction in the quantity of clients as opposed to an increase in organisations. The theory of Density Dependence can thereby explain the competition I witnessed unfold at the mental health meeting, which forms the second of my case studies.

#### **1.3.4 Resource Partitioning**

Resource partitioning serves to explain the competition I saw unfolding at the mental health meeting between several of the large international organisations and the smaller organisations, or to say: between a generalist and a specialist organisation.

Resource partitioning is a concept developed in 1983 by Michal T. Hannan, Professor in Sociology at Stanford University and the late John H. Freeman, Professor at Sociology at the University of California.

In contrast to the density dependence concept, which explains the competition between similar organisations, such as mental health organisations in general, the resource partitioning attempts to explain the competition between different organisations within the same field, that being between generalists and specialists. Freeman and Hannan (1983) define generalists as organisations that compete by drawing on a wide range of resources, such as an organisation like International Medical Corps (IMC) offering a widespread portfolio of services, whereas the specialists are organisations that survive by possessing a smaller niche such as DIGNITY, who specialises in holistic treatment of torture survivors. (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 210).

In addition to this, in the case of a market with numerous generalists, it is fundamental for the generalist organisations to separate themselves from each other in order to



compete. Conversely, this can result in the generalist organisations providing more specialised assistance, effectively touching the market of the specialising organisations. In this sense, the generalists and the specialised are still competing with each other over the same resources, because the resources available for these two types of organisations become more blurred as the influx of clients decrease and the competition increase (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 211).

The Density Dependence and Resource Partitioning can, when combined, explain the complexity of the competition in Zaatari. While regular market competition and regulation is not the case here, alternative concepts are needed in order to explain the complex situation of competition as a result of a decrease in beneficiaries due to the closed camp and restricted borders as opposed to a year ago where the organisations gained legitimacy and funding by assisting each other. In addition, the competition that occurs between specialist and generalist, such as a general mental health organisation and a smaller organisation specialising in one form of treatment or targeting a very specific group, adds to the dynamic and complexity of the competition.

### **1.3.5 Environments**

The theory of Organisations and Environments are used particularly in the third and final analytical chapter, where it serves to explain the restrictions, obstacles and pressure the organisations that work in Zaatari are under due to the reports, log frames and results that constitutes the accountability required by donors.

The environment can be viewed as social constructions that tolerate people within the organisation to build options of action in order to try and affect the environment in which they operate. The environment, in this case, is to be understood as the social Jordanian field in which the employees of the organisations navigate (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 205)

Even though adaption and change is a must in an ever-tenuous environment such as Zaatari, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that there are numerous obstacles, both externally and internally, in an organisation in order for it to change and adapt in a competitive environment. These obstacles are for example prior investments in

specific services and specialised workforces, the already established concepts and values of the organisations and donors, not to mention legal and fiscal obligations, already on-going projects, earmarked donor funding, log frames, long procedures and bureaucracy. In fact, organisations are strongly constrained in their options (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206).

Theories of Organisations and Environments explain the environment and the conditions the organisations exist under and to a certain degree how the ever-changing environment, the competition and the bureaucratic restraints cause them to use alternative methods when seeking to secure funding.

## **2. Methodology**

This chapter covers my methodological reflections on the type of case study I am using, along with the methods I used to produce empirical data in the field, as well as the research design and strategy. In addition to this, the chapter furthermore presents reflection, informants, obstacles in obtaining interviews, restraints and a presentation of the produced empirical material, which is the core of the analysis and the foundation of this thesis viewed from an organisational perspective. Lastly, I reflect on my own position in the fieldwork and how it has affected the outcome.

### **2.1 Methodological Reflections on Case Studies**

This section serves to account for my epistemological and ontological stance in addition to my choice of case study, which set the frame for the method used to produce the empirical data and selecting the theoretical framework that later constitutes my analysis.

The epistemological approach is constructivist, as knowledge is produced in the interaction between researcher and object, meaning that knowledge is interactive and relational. The constructivist approach is furthermore visible throughout my thesis, in the sense that the method used to produce data accounts for the researchers pre-understanding, own values and perspective, and the significance for the data produced. Additionally, the empirical data was produced via interviews, while

simultaneously focusing on the unspoken that took place during an interview along with the interest and relations among the stakeholders (Sonne-Ragans, 2013, p. 190). The empirical data resulted in three concrete cases chosen to be the basis of my analytical chapters. The reason for choosing case studies to be the fundament of my thesis is connected to my epistemological stance and will be elaborated further on in this subchapter. Choosing three case studies, that are later to be combined in the discussion arguing for a combined abstract case study, seems a good way to capture the different events I experienced during my fieldwork and analyse on it, because, as Lund claims: “A case is an edited chunk of empirical reality where certain features are marked out, emphasized, and privileged while others recede in the background. As such, a case is not “natural,” but a mental, or analytical, construct aimed at organizing knowledge about reality in a manageable way” (Lund, *Of What is This a Case?*, 2014, p. 224). As I have chosen a case study to be the basis of my dissertation, I will elaborate on which types of cases I am using as well as for my choice hereof.

I chose three concrete cases that combined results in one abstract case. Christian Lund distinguishes between concrete cases and abstract cases (Lund, *Of What is This a Case?*, 2014, p. 224). Concrete cases are events or issues that the observer is able to detect as relatively distinct series of actions and events, whereas abstract cases are being established via concepts, *inter alia* the economy of Denmark or corruption in Jordan, and are not easily discernible (Lund, *Of What is This a Case?*, 2014, p. 224).

When analysing a case study, it has the potential to be a case of many things depending on the conformations and emphasis that is put on the observations, patterns, concepts and theories. Lund utilizes an analytical matrix to explain the connection between the specific, the general, the concrete and the abstract. He continues by arguing for most cases being a combination of all four dimensions, and that it is the movement between observations, patterns, concepts and theories that makes it a case (Lund, *Of What is This a Case?*, 2014, p. 225). It is exactly this dance between the four dimensions that constitutes my case study and results in a discussion of the findings. Several things can be the outcome of a case, depending on the analytical instruments that are being used as well as the perspective.

### Lund's Matrix<sup>1</sup>.

	<b>Concrete</b>	<b>Abstract</b>
<b>Specific</b>	Observations	Concepts
<b>General</b>	Patterns	Theories

In addition to Lund, Flyvbjerg (1991) defines a critical case as a case that carries a strategic importance in regards to the overall issue (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 149). The three concrete cases when combined are therefore also classified as a critical case. The critical case is often used to either verify or falsify an issue with the use of probability in general. In that case it is essential to use a case that is either most-likely or least-likely, where the most-likely is especially suited for use in falsify cases and least-likely best suited to verify critical cases. For example, it is possible to generalise and use the verification of a case as “if the outcome is X in this case, then the outcome must be X for all or most of these cases” or the falsifying would equally be “if the outcome is not X, then that would go for all or most cases” (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 151).

I strategically chose a critical case where I hold an a priori assumption of a high level of influence from the environment. A critical case study serves to demonstrate a case where the point is strategically important in relation to a certain issue, in my case my research question. Relief organisations primary goal is to provide aid to those in need, however their work is highly influenced and restricted by the environment they work in, and therefore this serves as a critical example of how the conditions and the environment affect the organisations.

In order to fully comprehend the cases in relation to each other, I let myself be inspired by hermeneutics, even though hermeneutic is usually used in the field of liberal arts to analyse texts as opposed to analysing case studies in the field of social science. I use inspiration from the circle of hermeneutics to analyse and understand each case individually, as well as each informant and their background, but also to see the bigger picture, when all cases are coming together to produce an abstract unity. As

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<sup>1</sup> (Lund, Of What is This a Case?, 2014, p. 225)

a case is not limited to be merely one thing, it is essential to circulate between observations, patterns, concepts and theories, while focusing on parts but also taking a step back to see it all in its unity as a whole (Sonne-Ragans, 2013, p. 150).

In continuation, the relation between subject and object in social science is often concerned with understanding the construction of the social world, which is often expressed in the interaction between individuals and actions on an institutional, social, national and international level. In this thesis, the perspective is universal, as the chosen organisational theory combined with the nature of the case study focuses on general tendencies and phenomenon; meaning that the subject serves as a representative and an example of its kind in a case study which thus can be generalised in a universal perspective (Sonne-Ragans, 2013, p. 144). The ontological perspective of the chosen theories, as according to Wilber's Four Quadrants Model (AQAL) is an inter-objective perspective providing explanations for social systems and the mechanisms that incite social actions and interactions, here in organisational case studies (Sonne-Ragans, 2013, p. 216).

## 2.2 Reflections

This section serves to explain the journey and the events that caused my master thesis to take a turn during my fieldwork. It has been a long journey from my initial idea to the final product.

My initial idea was to do a stakeholder analysis of the mental health organisations working in Zaatari, while trying to uncover the perceived need for a torture rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari. Nonetheless, it turned out not to be possible due to *inter alia*, my own role in conducting the stakeholder analysis. I was met by a wall of silence from my informants and the restraints, which were so significant that they have become part of my analysis as evidence on competition, were too great for me to overcome. In addition to this, I initially had difficulties entering the camp and never obtained an official permit to enter or conduct research in Zaatari. Instead of uncovering the perceived need for a torture rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari, I uncovered competition between the mental health organisation and analysed the competition I witnessed, along with the elements affecting the environment and the organisations.

The obstacles and the stir my mere presence made became the base of my empirical data. I expected people to be willing to speak with me, but they were not willing to say anything at all. In fact, none of the informants I was able to interview would let me record the interview. The constraints and obstacles I experienced, along with overcoming them, while trying to conduct fieldwork, is a vital part of my analysis. My mere presence and the question I was asking set the competition in play and added valuable information to my fieldwork. What should initially have been a stakeholder analysis turned out to become an analysis of a stakeholder analysis.

## **2.3 Fieldwork**

This section accounts for my choice of ethnographic and qualitative research, as that is the main data source in my thesis. In continuation of that is a description of the application process and the obstacles I met when trying to obtain research permission. Additionally, I account for how I managed to get access to the refugee camp without the permission from UNHCR or the Jordanian ministry of Interior; lastly I present the informants and interview guide I created for this thesis.

### **2.3.1 Ethnographic Interviews**

This section accounts for the method used when producing empirical data and the pre-conditions which allowed me to establish contact and a hands-on knowledge of Zaatari refugee camp.

In order to collect empirical material, I used an ethnographic qualitative approach with semi-structured interviews. As my ethnographic area was constrained to a closed area, namely Zaatari refugee camp and the organisations that work there, I conducted my fieldwork in Amman and Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan on two occasions. The first one being in connection with an internship with DIGNITY – Danish Institute Against Torture in Amman ending December 12<sup>th</sup>, allowing me to conduct fieldwork from December 12<sup>th</sup> 2014 – January 30<sup>th</sup> 2015, and again from 12<sup>th</sup> of April – 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2015. Since my focus was on the mental health organisations and not the refugees, I limited my research to the organisations working in Zaatari refugee camp.

### 2.3.2 Application process

The following section serves to explain some of the obstacles I met when conducting my research, especially the process of obtain permission and getting access to Zaatari is important for my case study.

After my internship ended with DIGNITY, I obtained a Master Thesis workplace with DIGNITY in Denmark and could therefore use their partner organisations as contacts. Before leaving Denmark, I had established contact with a local partner organisation of DIGNITY, whom I had been in close contact with during my internship in Jordan as well, and they had agreed to let me accompany them on their regular missions to Zaatari.

Arriving at the partner organisation's premises in Amman, I was only then informed that I had to obtain an official permit from UNHCR in order to conduct fieldwork in the camp. Getting information on how to apply for a fieldwork permit turned out to be quite a time consuming challenge. There is an application process to be followed in order to obtain permission to do fieldwork or a needs assessment in Zaatari. It was very difficult achieving knowledge of the application process and many organisations and forums such as the INGO Forum did not know how to obtain such permission, and furthermore did not believe UNHCR to be helpful on such matters. Eventually I did manage to access the application guide of 10 pages, with 11 steps that must be followed for organisations already operating in Zaatari. However, if you were not representing an organisation that already had a permit to operate inside the camp, the guide and the 11 steps would still have to be followed after obtaining an additional permit for external researches from Mr. Kaleem ur Rehman. I was informed that UNHCR has a committee that must discuss and accept the proposal in order for the fieldwork to begin.

In addition to the very demanding application process, I contacted Mr. Kaleem ur Rehman as required to begin the process on the 13<sup>th</sup> of May. I was asked to send various documents verifying my identity and purpose from the university, alongside with my dissertation proposal. A time consuming e-mail exchange began and I was constantly referred to a new staff member of UNHCR until I, in the end, stopped receiving mails. By that time, I had been in contact with 12 different staff members

very willing to assist me, but unfortunately nothing fruitful came out of our correspondence.

### **2.3.3 Access**

This section serves to explain how I managed to enter Zaatari refugee camp, even though I never obtained the necessary permissions. Likewise, the access to Zaatari is a vital part of my first analytical chapter.

Without permit and with only limited time to conduct fieldwork, I became desperate and turned to my gatekeeper, whom I knew to have a way of handling things. He gladly agreed to let me accompany him irrespectively of permissions, as that did not seem to bother him or to be of any concern. When we reached the gate of Zaatari, he greeted the police officers standing guard, said I was a consultant, they never even asked to see my permission as they waved us in. And so I managed to get access to the camp without the permit, as my gatekeeper was willing to take me. He turned out to be very well connected, which allowed me to conduct my interviews with the different stakeholders.

With illegal entrance to the camp my field research began. Majhoul knew many of the other NGOs and assisted in introducing me to many, which gave me the opportunity to conduct interviews besides the ones I had already scheduled.

Although I attempted to introduce myself as a student, Majhoul kept mentioning that I was affiliated with DIGNITY, which in some cases gave me the credibility to enter the premises and ask questions, and in other cases had a negative affect causing suspicion as to why I was asking so many questions.

### **2.3.4 Qualitative Research**

This section accounts for my choice of method when producing the empirical data in the field.

Various approaches could have been used to build information on the effect the environment has on the mental health organisations in Zaatari. However, due to the nature of the data I wished to build, I chose a qualitative method over a quantitative or mixed methods approach. I decided quite early in the process to conduct qualitative



interviews, because I believed that qualitative interviews would give me more information than a quantitative approach could provide me with. The personal interviews allowed me to win some of my informants trust and obtain information that they would otherwise not have been willing to share with me due to the sensitivity of the subject. Moreover, it was not only the information I managed to obtain, but also what they were reluctant and unwilling to share with me that constructs the basis of the analysis. I would have missed out on this type of information had I used other methods than the qualitative approach.

The first part of my research question, namely: *“How are the mental health organisations in Zaatari affected by the environment they operate in?”*, as well as the first sub-research question: *“How is this unfolded on the different levels?”* indicate targeting a specific group who I, based on a previous visit, identified to have different interpretations on that matter. The group who I was targeting was representatives of various mental health organisations operating in Zaatari whom I had encountered at a previous mental health meeting in the camp.

Furthermore, I use a deductive method by allowing the observations in my case study to select the appropriate theories for explaining and developing the cases, as opposed to an inductive method testing the theories. The second sub-research question: *“How can their behaviour be explained by adopting an organisational theory approach?”* was based on the assumption that the analysis based on Organisational Theory would be able to provide an explanation to the paradox of organisations working for the best interest of the refugees and at the same time be fighting for their own survival.

Lastly, the working hypothesis: *“The working hypothesis is that humanitarian actors in Jordan are highly affected by the environment they work in”*. This level of divergence will be explained with reference to the Organisational Theories, making especially the Power and Politic, the Dependency Theory and the Theories of Organisations and Environments evident.

### **2.3.5 Informants**

This subchapter provides a description of the selection criteria's for informants, along with a description of the interview guide and the obstacles I met while conducting qualitative research.

With such a short time period for fieldwork the second time, it was essential to have informants who were willing to be interviewed by me beforehand. This was manageable due to my internship with DIGNITY – Danish Institute Against Torture, where I was placed at their Jordan office from the period of 1<sup>st</sup> of September- 12<sup>th</sup> of December 2014. During my internship I had familiarized myself with organisations that had their daily time in the camp and it was during a meeting on mental health in Zaatari with IMC, Handicap International, UNHCR, IFH and CVT, that I noticed the difference in the perception of the need for a torture rehabilitation clinic between the stakeholders. It was initially the variation in the perception for the need of torture rehabilitation I was interested in examining. However, as I was attempting to produce data on that subject, it became clear to me that the variation of the perceived need was grounded in something else: competition.

When selecting the interviewees, I put emphasis on the informants being health professionals with a special knowledge of working in Zaatari. Furthermore, I was interested in interviewing the individuals I had come to experience compete with each other at a previous meeting I was attending. As I initially focused on the perceived need for a torture rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari, my focus was on the mental health organisations. Even though my case took a turn in another direction, towards uncovering the competition and the environment creating a competitive milieu, my focus remains on the mental health organisations working in Zaatari.

Once I was at the camp and began the interviews, I was faced with a new hindrance: a wall of rejection and silence. Several of my informants changed their mind and were unreachable when I tried honouring our appointment.

During my fieldwork I interviewed ten stakeholders representing local partner organisations and international organisations working in Zaatari, however all anonymous. I divided my informants into two groups: Those representing international organisations and those representing smaller local partner organisations, as these two types of organisations do not have the same capacity, however, nor do they possess the same prerequisite for understanding and navigating in the social field in Jordan.

All interviews were carried out on locations of their choice, nevertheless, none of the informants allowed me to record the interviews and two demanded to be anonymous

due to their job position. Furthermore, my field notes hold important observations and are also part of the analysis.

### **2.3.6 Interview guide**

This section serves to explain the strategy for the interviews I conducted, along with the design of the interview questions.

Beforehand I had composed a proposal (annex 1) explaining the nature of my research and with an interview guide incorporated. The interview guide (annex 2) was divided into three parts, the first one testing the interviewee's knowledge on the difference between trauma and torture, as my initial mission was to uncover the variation on the perceived need for a torture rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari, which I later abolished. The second part was designed to map the perceived need and how the different stakeholders vary in their answer. Thirdly, the last part was concerned with the competition between the organisations for beneficiaries reaching the minimum quota and funding.

Initially I hoped that I, via interviews, would be able to uncover the internal competition for beneficiaries and donor funding that I had a presumption occurred in a camp like Zaatari. However, during my fieldwork things took a turn, the reluctance of sharing information, let alone in the interviews I made, became apparent and evident to me. When conducting the initial interviews I rapidly discovered that covering up the questions concerning the internal competition between the organisations in Zaatari was a must. When the interviewees were asked directly, they denied it instantly and the interview took an uncomfortable turn. The competition was something only a very few informants spoke of, otherwise it was to be sensed in the interviews and observed between stakeholders at meetings.

### **2.4 My own position**

This sub-chapter describes my own position in the field along with the effect my presence had on the data produced.

I believe that I would not have gotten access to the camp, nor to the organisations I interviewed, if I had not had the internships and master thesis workplace with

DIGNITY, allowing me to make connections with their partners in Jordan. However, it was also obvious that I could not avoid suspicion from the other organisations in the camp. They knew I was affiliated with DIGNITY, and it is possible that they saw me as competition. However, I introduced myself as a student in my attempt to distance myself from DIGNITY, in order to seem merely interested in their work and not as competition. I have doubts as to how successful I was in distancing myself and the interviews are most likely coloured by the fact that they saw me as being part of an INGO and maybe even believed that I was asking on behalf of DIGNITY. In addition to this, I had my presumptions before conducting fieldwork, as I was familiar with the country, the camp and the environment in which NGOs work.

Furthermore, as I only travelled to Zaatari with my gatekeeper, I was inevitably also seen as being affiliated with him. By being associated with him, I was also perceived as being connected to individuals with his power relations. As I was often introduced as DIGNITY staff, the donors of this particular partner organisation, and the interviews I conducted were in a formal way with questions regarding a specific topic and technical questions, it is likely that I was seen as a donor conducting a needs assessment and possibly contemplating entering Zaatari either directly or indirectly via a partner organisation (Lund, *The Ethics of Fruitful Misunderstanding*, 2014, p. 3).

As none of my interviewees allowed me to record the interviews, my field notes are the basis of my data along with the observations I made. The observations, my field notes and the atmosphere I experienced at the camp are inevitable interpreted by me when written down, and again when analysed (Hastrup & Ovesen, 1990, p. 66). According to Flyvbjerg (1991), a case study is not more biased than other studies, just because a large part of the case study depends on the observer's subjective interpretation. On the contrary, a case study is best understood by someone who has observed and studied the case closely (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 156).

When conducting the interviews, my informants were often quite stiff, formal and professional, however after ending the interview and closing my notebook, the informants often relaxed a bit more and engaged in an informal conversation concerning the subject. It was often in this informal conversation that the more interesting information came out and what they had been unwilling to share before

was brought out in the light. I could sense that had I opened my notebook again to take further notes, I would have missed out on this information and so I kept the conversation going and wrote it down after my informant had left. This form of interviewing is also described by Lund (Lund, *The Ethics of Fruitful Misunderstanding*, 2014, p. 3) and similar to him, I took the confidential conversation at the end as my informants wanting me to know the reality of it, but not have their name on it and so all of my informants are anonymous in respect of the ones who confided in me.

## 2.5 Structure of the Analysis

This section serves to outline the structure of the analytical chapters, beginning with a contextual framework in order to enhance the comprehension of the analytical chapters.

The contextual framework entails a brief outlining of Jordan and the history of refugees residing in Jordan. Furthermore, the background information serves to provide an understanding of not only the pressure Jordan is facing with refugees, but also the hierarchy that has arisen between Jordanians, Palestinians and Syrian refugees. Likewise, a historical overview of Zaatari refugee camp and the mental health organisations working there is provided to better understand how the world's second largest refugee camp came to be in only four years.

A concrete case constitutes the base of each analytical chapter. In the discussion, the three concrete cases and the findings hereof will be discussed as one collective abstract case.

The first analytical chapter presents the case of *wasta*. The case where *wasta* became not only a useful tool for me, but also a secret weapon influencing the environment is presented. *Wasta* is then examined in literature and later analysed in regards to my own experience of *wasta* during my fieldwork. The concept of “loosely coupled” from Dependency theory combined with the concept of power derived from the theory of Power & Politics are used to analyse and explain the power relations in the form of *wasta*, and the significance of the coalitions across organisations it creates in regards to the environment in Zaatari.

The second analytical chapter entails the mental health meeting. At the mental health meeting, competition unfolded. Albeit on a smaller scale, it served as an indicator for the overall competition taking place between the mental health organisations in Zaatari. The competition as it unfolded is explained and analysed with two theories, which each explain a different part of the complex competition. The first theory is Density dependence, which explains why there is a competition between these mental health organisations now in contrast to last year. Furthermore, the theory of resource partitioning explains the competition between the smaller organisations and the larger organisation by dividing them into specialist and generalist organisations.

The third and final analytical chapter focuses on the case of a review between an INGO and their donor. The Logical Framework Approach is a procedure often used to receive funds which require extensive reporting, evaluation and has become an administrative burden, especially to the small partner organisations that do not have the resources to specialise staff in grants management. The chapter furthermore explains and analyses the funding scheme and accountability, both from the perspective of a partner organisation and an INGO

Lastly, a discussion gathering the three concrete cases into one abstract case which then serves as a critical case generalising and verifying the hypothesis as a result of the research question.

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

This chapter outlines the organisational theories I found most suitable to constitute the theoretical framework and apply on the produced empirical material. The theories are the instruments used to break down the case studies and analyse the pieces that together constitute my master thesis.

In organisational theory it is assumed that organisations have rules, hierarchies, goals and clear definitions of memberships. Moreover, organisational theory deals with both the internal structure of organisations and how it motivates its employees to match the goals set by the managers, as well as external factors that might affect the structure and survival rate of an organisation. Lastly, it is also concerned with how

external factors together with internal structure can affect the survival rate of an organisation (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 476).

In order to develop and analyse my case I will be using the theoretical approach of organisational theories; the concepts of power, dependency, competition and environments.

According to organisational theory, the “open system models” replaced the “closed system models” in the 60s and allowed for a shift in research from focussing on the internal characteristics of an organisation to focussing on external dynamics of an organisation as well; resource dependence, competition and interaction with the local environment in which they operate (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 476).

The shift in perspective means that organisations are viewed as independent organisations embedded and dependent on the environment surrounding them. The organisations acquire not only financial, material and human resources from their milieu, but legitimacy and social support as well (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 476).

The present chapter will outline the theories, which constitutes the theoretical instruments of my analysis.

### **3.1 Dependency Theory**

The Dependency theory is essential in the first case study: *Wasta*. Because it can explain both the dependence of the environment, in this case environment is to be understood as the social field in Jordan. It also provides the vital concept of “loosely-coupled”, that combined with power relation from the theory of power and politics can provide not only an explanation for what *wasta* is, but also how far the power of *wasta* reaches and under which circumstances it has and does not have power.

The Dependency Theory arose in the 70s with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) stressing that every organisation exchanges resources with their environment as a necessity for their survival. Furthermore, the school of dependence argues, that the structure and behaviour of an organisation cannot be fully comprehended unless the context in which the organisation operates is understood. As the school of Environments expresses, an organisation cannot be self-sufficient and therefore the school of

dependence agrees that an organisation must engage with their milieu in order to survive (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 478).

Additionally, organisations depend on their environment in the form of resources. It is the scarcity and importance of these resources that determine the degree of the organisations dependency, the resources being anything of importance to the organisations survival. Information is a significant resource in the settings of NGOs in order to survive. Scholars such as Carroll and Hannan (2000) argue from a Darwinian perspective, viewing organisation's milieus as the centrum of selection, competition and survival of the fittest (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 479).

Pfeffer argues that organisations are inevitably connected with the conditions of their environment and that their existence is constantly dubious, their survival is at best problematic and that organisations only survive to the extent that they are effective. However, Pfeffer claims that not only are organisations dependent on their environment, the actual problem is the environment not being dependent of the organisation. Settings can change and new organisations can enter or exit and the demand and supply of resources becomes more scarce.

Additionally, an organisation is faced with two options when their settings are changing; either not surviving or altering their activities to match to new acquisitions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Furthermore Pfeffer notes that the concept of environments is tenuous. On one hand, the environment can include every change that occurs in the world and can have an effect on the organisation or its activities or outcome. Contrary to this elusive concept is the concept of "loosely coupled", stressed by Pfeffer. "Loosely coupled" determines the relationship between the elements in an environment, such as the ones between organisations. In order for every occurrence in the world not to have an impact on organisations, the change must be loosely connected to the organisation for it to have impact (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

With excessive focus and emphasis on external factors, the schools of organisational ecology seem to leave out internal factors within the organisation that may just as well be affecting the organisations survival rate. The school fails to explain why some organisations survive while others fail, in the same environment settings, simply



because they are ignoring the importance of the firm strategy and leader abilities within the organisation. The four factors determining the chances of success according to the school of organisational ecology are all solely focusing on external factors and completely leave out any internal factors that could serve as explanatory for failure and survival strategies. With this in mind, the external factors are compelled to be very extreme in order to stand alone. Most likely a failure and defeat of competition will be a mixture of internal and external factors.

All though organisational ecology lacks an internal perspective, they serve as useful in my analysis since my empirical data is focused on the external factors of the market and do not shed light on internal factors within the organisations.

### **3.2. Power and Politics Organisation Theory**

The theory of power and politics is especially useful in the first case study of *wasta*, where it serves to explain the power granted to those in possession of *wasta* as well as what power is when expressed as *wasta*. Furthermore the power relations of this theory combined with the concept of loosely-coupled from dependency theory can explain why *wasta* has such a big effect on the competition in Zaatari.

Through the lenses of the Power and Politics school, organisations are seen as complex and intertwined systems of individuals and coalitions. They each have their own values, beliefs, perspectives, perceptions, preferences and interests. Conflict is inevitable, because the coalitions will compete with each other for scarce resources and especially influence. Influence is viewed as the primary weapon, which is achieved via power and political activities (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 283).

Moreover, according to the Power and Politics school, organisation's goals are only infrequently established by the formal authorities of the organisation. More often the goals are founded by constant on-going negotiation and bargaining among the individuals and coalitions. Most coalitions are dynamic and ever changing. They change depending on the issue and can often work across organisation boundaries both horizontally and vertically (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 283).

According to the Power and Politics school, it is important to notice that power is not synonymous with authority, nor should power be synonymous with dominance,

oppression or control. In fact, there are several different sources of power; the latent ability to influence others in order to get things done the way one wants them, control over scarce resources, connection and access to individuals who are perceived as having power, a central seat in a strong coalition, the ability to know the rules and the knowledge of getting around them “working the rules to one’s own advantage” and credibility (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 284).

On the note of power, Pfeffer also argues that power depends on the specific relationship or a particular context, because a person cannot be powerless or powerful in general, but is fully dependent on other actors recognising his or her power in a certain social relationship. According to this school, power is socially constructed and can therefore be undone again. If there is no one to give them power, they will in fact become powerless (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005). Additionally, power must be intentional, and organisational politics involves intentional acts of influence in order to either enhance or protect self-interests.

Jeffrey Pfeffer (1981) argues for “the Law of Political Entropy”, which in his opinion can explain why power and politics is a characteristic of so many organisations. It essentially means that once an organisation has incorporated a political agenda in a situation, it is very challenging restoring rationality again. Once the consensus concerning principles, ideology and philosophy is gone, it is challenging restoring the solidarity and perspective, which is indispensable when operating under a rational model.

### **3.3 Organisational Ecology and its Theories of Competition**

Especially the theories of competition from organisational ecology serve well to analyse and explain the second case study: the mental health meeting. It is a case study where competition unfolded at a mental health meeting in Zaatari. The complex situation is best explained when combining the theories of Density Dependence and Resource Partitioning, as elaborated below.

The concept of Organisational Ecology focuses mainly on market formation and competition between the organisations, and the impact of alterations in the alignment of competitors and resources. A fundamental emphasis of the organisational ecology

school is that other organisations form a part in affecting the probabilities of failure or success for an organisation. Moreover, four factors are vital for the chances of success according to organisational ecology school, namely: organisational age and the liability of newness, which causes most organisations to die young; organisational size, meaning that larger organisations have better chances of survival in contrast to smaller organisations; industry life cycle which emphasises an organisation's failure as natural and part of a life cycle (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 208).

Originally, organisational ecology draws on the work of Emile Durkheim (1933) and Amos Hawley (1950), arguing for a Darwinian approach, where organisations with similar purposes will naturally compete with each other and the competition among them will increase proportionally with the degree of similarity between them. Subsequently, organisations are either compelled to rivalry with other organisations in their struggle for survival, which will either lead to extinction of the inferior organisation, or transformation to different services or extinction (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 203).

This concept has received criticism for its Darwinian and overly simplistic biological approach, arguing that the market competition is a lot more complicated and sociological than the biological "survival of the fittest". However, two sub concepts emerged arguing that the market competition is the core of organisational ecology as opposed to the biological aspect of evolution.

The two sub concepts that emerged from organisational ecology, which are vital in the analysis of competition in Zaatari, are Density Dependence (Hannan 1989) and Resource Partitioning (Carroll 1985). The two concepts are elaborated below.

### **3.3.1 Density Dependence**


Density Dependence is especially useful in explaining why there is competition at the mental health meeting in the first place, as all the organisations present are mental health organisations serving to assist refugees in need of mental health services.

In contrast to the traditional hypothesis, that says "with an increasing amount of competitors in a particular milieu, the selection pressure will increase and consequently make the organisation's failure an accumulative possibility" (Ebner &

Beck, 2008, p. 208), Hannan (1989) developed a concept where the increasing amount of competitors does not necessarily result in the abovementioned very simplistic linear consequence of competition.

On the contrary, Hannan argues that in the event of increasing numbers of organisations offering the same services, they can initially assist each other in establishing the legitimacy of their organisations before competition between them arises. Accordingly, in the event of low density of similar organisations, it is assumed that the failure rate is rather high and, moreover, that the founding rate of organisations is rather low due to the organisation's fear of investing in new forms, which the new organisations depend on for their survival. However, when the amount of similar organisations on a market increases, the legitimacy will increase as well (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 208).

However, the legitimacy an organisation gained will decrease again in case of an increase of similar organisations, as the forces of competition will get even stronger. Whereas at low density, competition between similar organisations does not play a major role, at high density the competition between organisation will be much stronger and of greater importance (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 209).



To sum up, in a situation with only a few similar organisations, the legitimacy effect will benefit the organisation and the competition will be low. Competition will only dominate at a higher density level. At lower density, the amount of similar organisations will lead to a reduction of the failure rate and an increase of the founding rate due to the legitimacy gains. However, this will lead to more similar organisations entering the same market causing the density to rise, which effectively

will pressure the competition. Once the density of similar organisations exceeds the point where competition becomes stronger than the legitimacy gains, an addition in similar organisations entering the same market will consequently lead to escalation in failure rate and a de-escalation of the founding rate (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 209).

It is important to notice that when speaking of the density of similar organisations, it is not necessarily the number of organisation but the mass of the organisation as well. Meaning that larger organisations have a larger mass and may cause more competition than several small ones (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 210).

As the concept of density dependence serves to explain one side of the complexity of the competition in the humanitarian field, the complexity is best explained when density dependence is combined with another concept of the ecological theories of competition, namely the resource partitioning.

### **3.3.2 Resource Partitioning**

Resource partitioning serves to explain why the competition in the first case unfolded between the IMC and CVT, as CVT are only interested in a small niche, whereas IMC covers a whole range of mental health services.

In contrast to the density dependence concept, which explains the competition between similar organisations, the resource partitioning explains the competition between different organisations within the same field, that being between generalists and specialists. Freeman and Hannan (1983) define generalists as organisations that compete by drawing on a wide range of resources, whereas the specialists are organisations that survive by possessing a smaller niche (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 210).

According to Carroll (1985), at any given time in any given market there are certain resources available for generalists, while other resources are available for specialists. He stresses that consumers provide the resources. Furthermore, the resources available for either organisation differ from time to time, depending on the overall changes in the market for both generalists and specialists (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 211).

In addition to this, in case of a market with various generalists, it is vital for the generalist organisations to differentiate themselves from each other in order to compete. However, this can result in the generalist organisations offering more specialised services, effectively touching on the market of the specialising organisations, making it more difficult for the specialist to compete in an even narrower market (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 211).

### **3.4 Theory of Organisations and Environments**

The theory of organisations and environments is especially used in the third and final case study, where the theories are used to explain how the organisations are not just dependent on the environment, but also restricted by the environment in which they operate.

Organisations and Environmental school tend to be complex and multidimensional in their suppositions about an organisations cost-and-effect relationship. Whereas the classic organisation theorist, who dominated the field from the 1770s, beginning with the work of Adam Smith and up until WWII, viewed organisations as static, the Environmental theorists view them as ever changing processes constantly shifting to adapt. Their survival strategy in an ever changing world is to constantly adjust to the changes; however, their decisions affect the environment in which they operate in return (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 477).

It's a given that all organisations need to retrieve resources in order to survive, however, the relationship to the environment can have a significant effect on the chances of survival. Some organisational theories view the environment as social constructions, allowing people within the organisation to construct options of action in order to try and affect the environment in which they operate. Other theories argue that the environments are given facts that produce high restraints for organisations and a great amount of competition (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 477).

Organisational change is seen as not only a virtue, but also an important means to survival. Furthermore, adaption to new environments and changing competitive pressures over resources can be achieved in most cases; insofar as a rational

management uses the correct techniques of change management (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206).

However, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue, that there exists several barriers, both internally and externally, for the organisations ability to change and adapt in a competitive environment. Among these barriers are, inter alia, prior investments in specific services and specialised workforces, the already established concepts and values of the organisations, not to mention legal and fiscal obligations.

Especially if an organisation receives earmarked donor funding, it can be challenging to change the path. In fact, Hannan and Freeman claims that organisations are strongly constrained in their options. It can be questioned that if adaption is so unproblematic, why are organisations failing at all? (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206)

### **3.5 Concluding Remarks**

To sum up, the different theories described above will serve to explain different factors affecting the environment the organisations work in.

The approach of Power and Politics Organisation Theory, combined with the concept of loosely-coupled from the theory of Dependency, serves to explain and analyse the importance of the power given to certain individuals via *wasta*. Furthermore, it can explain the importance and limits of its perceived power and how it affects the competition and the environment inside the refugee camp.

The above outlined theories will be utilised in different sections of the analysis. The concepts of Density Dependence and Resource Partitioning will particularly be applied in the chapter explaining the competition between the organisations, similar as well as generalists and specialised. The theories will be used to analyse and explain what took place at the mental health meeting I attended in Zaatari refugee camp. These concepts will be used to analyse the data collected in regards to the competition aspect where International Medical Corps (IMC) are presented as the generalists due to not only their magnitude but also the general medical health services they provide. CVT will represent the specialists threatening the position of the generalists due to their holistic specialised treatment of torture survivors who usually would fall under the service of IMC.

The Theory of Organisations and Environments is able to explain the donor scheme and the dependency for donor funding, along with the importance and struggle of reaching the targets of the Logical Framework Approach. It will explain how the survival of especially the smaller partner organisations depends on reaching the target and how the larger INGOs control the market, due to staff specialised in grants.



# Part 2: Analysis

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The analysis consists of three main chapters and a discussion. Each chapter begins with a concrete case study which is elaborated, analysed and explained in the chapter.

The first analytical chapter concerns the case of *wasta*. *Wasta* is first reviewed in literature and then explained via dependency theory and power & politics theory resulting in an analysis of the *wasta* I experienced while conducting fieldwork along with the consequences of it in regards to the environment in Zaatari.

The second analytical chapter is founded on the case concerning the mental health meeting and the competition between the mental health organisations I witnessed. The competition is analysed using two competition theories, namely the density dependence and the resource partitioning, and together they serve to explain the very complex milieu the organisations exist under.

The final analytical chapter presents the case of a donor's review of an INGO. In addition to this, an introduction to the funding scheme. In this, the logical framework approach is presented in order to fully understand the restrictions some organisations face in the field and at the office using the theory of organisations and environments.

Lastly, the discussion of the three concrete cases in unity, resulting in an abstract case concerning the environment and the effect the environment has on the organisations working in Zaatari, explained from an organisational approach.

However, the analytical chapters begin with a short contextual framework in order to better comprehend the settings.

## 4. Contextual Framework

In order to comprehend the settings in which the case study takes place, I have composed a brief contextual framework. The framework begins with a short introduction to Jordan in regards to refugees. Next an introduction to Zaatari refugee camp in Northern Jordan, which is the ethnographic area of my dissertation. Lastly an overview of the mental health organisations working in Zaatari is provided.

## 4.1 Jordan

In order to understand the pre-existing conditions for refugees in Jordan, a brief factual overview of Jordan is provided.

Jordan is inhabited by approximately 6.5 million and is currently hosting 629,266 Syrian refugees, which makes it roughly 10% of the population<sup>2</sup>. Besides hosting a large portion of the Syrian refugees, Jordan also hosts Iraqi and Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian refugee influx has amounted to 2,097,338 registered Palestine refugees as a consequence of the 1948 war and later hostilities between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, there are ten official and three unofficial Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. Jordan is the country that hosts the largest amount of Palestinian refugees of all of the UNRWA fields (UNRWA). There is an aversion towards Palestinians in Jordan and they are considered *de facto* second rank citizens and do not have the same options as Jordanians, even though they are full citizens (Research Directorate, 2007).

Additionally, the country is struggling to handle the influx of Syrian refugees, even with the assistance of several donor countries, INGOs and NGOs present. In fact, only 39% of the funding requirements for 2015 are met. That means that 61% or \$724,957,954 is still needed in order to cover the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan (UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Respons, 2015).

Most of the refugees are living in urban settings outside refugee camps; however, Zaatari refugee camp is the largest refugee camp in the country and the second largest in the world (Berti, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications, 2015, pp. 42-43). According to UN estimates, 18-20% of Syrian refugees live in camps, predominantly Zaatari and Azraq (Berti, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications, 2015, p. 44). The regions second smallest country, namely Jordan, is suffering from a weak infrastructure and now very limited resources; especially the water supply is nearing its breaking point. Moreover, Jordan being the fourth water-poorest country in the world, and the fact that the aging

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<sup>2</sup> The data is the official numbers as of September 6<sup>th</sup> 2015 retrieved from the UNHCR.

water system leaks 76 billion litres pr. year, puts an even larger strain on the will to host so many refugees and tension is now also rising due to the competition over jobs and housing, even though Jordan has historically been known for welcoming refugees (Hummer, Mercy Corps, 2015).

In reality, the number of Syrians present in Jordan is higher than the official numbers from UNHCR indicates, due to a number of Syrians who choose not to register with officials, for reasons that vary from dreading the consequences of having their names listed on official records, to missing proper information and/or access to the registration points (Berti, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications*, 2015, pp. 42-43).

To locate an exact credible number for the unregistered Syrian refugees would be interesting but very difficult. However, my focus will be on the refugees registered and living in Zaatari refugee camp, and the former is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.

#### **4.2 Al Zaatari Refugee Camp**

In order to comprehend the ethnographic settings of my case studies, a short introduction to Zaatari is provided.

Al Zaatari Refugee Camp was opened on July 28, 2012 in collaboration with UNHCR, and is located in the Mafraq Governorate in the northern part of Jordan (Ledwith, *Zaatari: The Instant City*, 2014, p. 14). The refugee camps in Jordan are hosting approximately 18-20% of the Syrian refugees living in Jordan (Berti, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications*, 2015, p. 44)

As described in the introduction, the otherwise empty desert area just four years ago has now been turned into the home of approximately 100,000 Syrian refugees. The population of the camp peaked in April 2014 when it, according to Ledwith, reached roughly 200,000 refugees, mainly from the southern province of Daara in Syria. During 2012 and 2013, the camp received between 3000-4000 refugees per night, and during March and June 2013 the increase was approximately between 15,500 and

31,000 newly arrived refugees per month (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, p. 16).

This makes Zaatari the second largest refugee camp in the world in just four years and the fourth largest city in Jordan. As a result of the high refugee influx from Syria, the Jordanian government restricted the border crossings in Daraa in April 2014 (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, p. 16). In addition to this, Zaatari is closed to new arrivals. All newcomers are sent to Azraq refugee camp, unless the person in questions has family in Zaatari to be reunited with.

As mentioned, Zaatari is a collaboration between UNHCR and the kingdom of Jordan, and therefore the various implementing, operational and programming partners include both government agencies, more than 50 UN agencies and NGOs. The official list of organisations working in Zaatari by UNHCR reached 70 in 2014; however exact numbers are difficult to retrieve (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, p. 42).

In the beginning, the provision of services was generally unregulated, resulting in each organisation determining its own agenda and therefore overlapped with other organisations. However, by June 2013, most NGOs began to report their activities (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, p. 42).

### **4.3 The Mental health Organisations in Zaatari.**

Since the focus of my thesis is on the mental health organisations in Zaatari, a brief overview of the organisations and the services they provide is given.

Predictably, the mental health of the refugees in Zaatari is a major concern, since Zaatari houses many war refugees who are brutally affected physically and psychologically by the impact of the war. This is due to the very common occurrence of psychological war trauma in adults and children who are operating in survival mode when arriving from a live conflict zone. Moreover, reports have shown that the human rights violations of the Syrian war are especially severe and include examples such as the public rape of children, men and woman (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014, pp. 58-60).

In the 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan Strategic from UNHCR, it is argued that the concern for mental health problems remain a significant component for refugees in Jordan, and that there is a lack of emphasis on providing comprehensive, integrated services that support natural coping strategies and family/community resilience. The Response Plan also indicates that the need for mental health care is growing, and that service providers are not catering to the refugees in need of psychosocial treatment for torture survivors, violence and PTSD (UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan Strategic Overview Mid-Year Update, 2014, p. 30).

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Zaatari contain<sup>3</sup>:

International Medical Corps (IMC): Provides psychosocial services and mental health services. Their mental health team consists of psychiatrist, psychologist, case manager and mental health nurse.

Handicap International: offers psychosocial support for persons with injuries and their family, both group sessions and individual sessions.

Action Aid: offers psychosocial group sessions for youth.

International Relief and Development (IRD) & War Child: implements a psychosocial support program.

Moroccan field hospital: offers consultations with a psychiatrist.

French field hospital: Offers mental health consultations.

Lutheran World Federation (LWF): offers psychosocial support for youth

Medecins du Monde (MdM): covers mental health in their clinic.

Noor Al-Hussein Foundation & UNHCR: offers psychosocial support.

Noor Al-Hussein Foundation & United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): Offers psychosocial support, individual or group sessions.

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<sup>3</sup> Retrieved the 28<sup>th</sup> of September from:  
[https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents\\_search.php?Page=1&Country=107&Region=&Settlement=0&Category=2](https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents_search.php?Page=1&Country=107&Region=&Settlement=0&Category=2)

As described above, Jordan is a small country with a great amount of refugees from neighbouring countries, and even though the international community has set up several camps only about 20% percent of the refugees lives in camps. Nevertheless, the funding for these camps are nowhere near the target and refugees settles in urban areas looking for job opportunities which put a restraint on the relationship between refugee and Jordanian. The lack of funding for the refugees is of major concern to the refugees, UNHCR and the organisations working in the best interest of the refugees.

## 5. Wasta

In this present chapter the focus is on the Middle Eastern phenomenon of *wasta* and how it affects the environment in Zaatari and the Jordanian social field. Even though *wasta* is a longstanding Middle Eastern phenomenon thriving in Jordan, this chapter explains and analyses the phenomenon of *wasta* through organisational theories, mainly Dependency theory and the theory of Power and Politics. Furthermore, the significance and the impact *wasta* has on the competition between the organisations in Zaatari is illuminated.

### 5.1 *Wasta* in literature

This sub-chapter serves to explore the phenomenon of *wasta* in literature, as it is a widely accepted and well-known phenomenon in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it has only been described, researched and published in a dozen releases since the 1990s. Therefore this subchapter aims at providing a brief literature overview of *Wasta* and the significance it has been given in the academic world so far.

*Wasta*, translated to “going in between” (Smith, Huang, Harb, & Torres, 2012, p. 137) is a common and salient practice in the Arab world. According to Cunningham & Sarayrah (1993) *wasta* is to be defined as a process where an individual can achieve goals via connections with key persons in power. The connections are personal and often originate from family ties or close friendships.

When seeking to explain *wasta*, it is useful to differentiate between the two types, namely: intermediary and intercessory (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 59). The former has a long and honourable history, and the main purpose was to seek peace and resolve conflicts between families during a tribal era in a hostile environment (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1994, p. 1), intermediary *wasta* is still valued as a device to mediate between family members. The latter is most often used in advocacy, or as currency to exchange favours, benefits or speed up a transaction aside regular business norms (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 59). The focus throughout this thesis is on the intercessory form of *wasta*.

According to Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994), family is the primary *wasta* passage, and in addition to this, benefits and favours given via *wasta* reinforces family ties, as they demonstrate loyalty to the family and work for the collective good of the family, as opposed to the state, in the case of public employees, which is seen as a distant and vague concept. Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994) provide an example of a young Arab man who believes it to be irrational to be a loyal public employee, because success and rewards do not depend on efficiency and hard work, success and rewards are based on the power of one's *wasta* (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1994, p. 4). Smith, Torres, Leong, Budhwar, Achoui & Lebedeva (2012) suggests that due to the strong family ties, and many enterprises being family based in the Arab world, the Arab culture aids to preserve the use of *wasta* (Smith, Torres, Leong, Budhwar, Achoui, & Lebedeva, 2012, p. 336).

In addition to this, Smith et. al. found that Jordanians links *wasta* with both solidarity and loyalty, and they also found that Jordanians rely on *wasta* due to the necessity of it in order to overcome bureaucratic hindrances (Smith, Torres, Leong, Budhwar, Achoui, & Lebedeva, 2012, p. 335) which corresponds very well with my own experiences during my fieldwork. When I arrived ready to leave for Zaatari and my gatekeeper had forgotten to do the paper work in order to satisfy both UNHCR and the ministry of interior, he did not seem bothered or worried, he merely used his *wasta* to bypass the police officers standing guard. In a survey completed by Gold and Naufal (2012), many of the responders defined *wasta* as a good way to avoid complicated and time consuming bureaucratic transactions (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 64).

However, a decent business climate should be characterised by low competition few obstacles, low risk when doing business and low costs. That means that all companies and organisations should have equal access to government services, and that costs and uncertainties when dealing with the government should be at a minimum. In other words: state business ought to be effective and just (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 260). However, present day international business is constantly faced with the challenges of globalisation and localisation. Within the area of organisational theory in the Arab world, the challenges revolve around the subject of the employees and their relations and loyalty to the organisations, and their relations and loyalty to each other. Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994) argue that *wasta* is often used to achieve job



positions for relatives causing unqualified employees. However, from an organisational and economic perspective, it is not the *wasta*-based hiring of possibly unqualified individuals that is a threat to the productivity of an organisation; it is the lack of performance once a person possesses the job. If no professional efforts are necessary in order to obtain and retain a job position, and it all depends on personal connections, it will affect the organisations economy and ultimately the nations. The main financial effect of *wasta* lies in the failure and obstruction, due to social norms, to motivate, reprove, criticise, monitor and ultimately if necessary; to terminate (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1994).

Gold and Naufal (2012) view *wasta* as a major component in business in the Middle East and argue that *wasta* is a phenomenon that restricts financial growth and can have the potential to alienate foreign investment. Nevertheless, in contrast to the above argument, Gold and Naufal (2012) also highlight the positive potential *wasta* can have (for individuals with strong *wasta*) under certain circumstances, and that the use of *wasta* can in fact be useful in business relations, when not the source of potential conflict and financial inefficiency. *Wasta* can be used to lower transaction costs by aiding an organisation in circumnavigating the process or otherwise overcoming hindrances or cutting long bureaucratic processes (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 60). It is exactly the ability to avoid long bureaucratic processes that causes most Jordanians to use *wasta*, according to an investigation made by Gold and Naufal (2012) where most answered that they most often use *wasta* in connection with lowering transaction costs in order to avoid long bureaucratic systems (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 64). Smith, Huang, Harb & Torres (2012) and Smith, Torres, Leong, Budhwar, Achoui & Lebedeva (2012) both describe and compare *wasta* to other ethnical personal influence phenomena in various countries, where personal ties are also applied in business connotations. *Wasta* is by no means a foreign phenomenon to other regions of the world, it is merely known under its synonyms of networking, favouritism, influence and nepotism. *Wasta* differentiates itself from nepotism and the likes by appearing to be socially accepted and tolerated in the Arab world, even when *wasta* is used in endeavours that are viewed as immoral, unlawful and reprehensible (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 59). Nonetheless, the majority of

Arabs see it as social capital and as an asset in their society (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 261).

*Wasta* also has the ability to extend in order to cover many disciplines. A survey conducted by Gold and Naufal (2012) indicated that most respondents selected the government to be the sector where *wasta* is most widespread, and as a second came the business sector (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, pp. 66-67). Furthermore, Gold and Naufal (2012) argue that *wasta* has evolved into a more controversial intercessory instrument, causing it to be seen as a means to corruption almost worldwide (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, p. 61).

## 5.2 Case II: *Wasta*

This case study serves to describe my own personal experience of *wasta* during my fieldwork. Majhoul's use of *wasta* was quite unexpected to me, as it was his way of handling an unforeseen obstacle, and it was therefore not a planned event I was there to observe, such as the previous mental health meeting.

I arrived at the premises of the organisation where my gatekeeper, who was willing to take me to Zaatari, works. Upon my arrival I was only then informed that I was to make an official application in order to obtain permission from UNHCR to do fieldwork in Zaatari. Many were apparently aware of this demand, but nobody knew how to apply or where to find guidelines. Following weeks of work, I discovered that there are in fact eleven specific steps to follow for agencies that are already working in the camp when preparing to do needs assessment. For external researchers, the same eleven steps apply, but so does additional guidelines, and a specific application process must be followed, ending with an UNHCR committee deliberating whether or not a permit can be granted. After I obtained the right contact within UNHCR, I went through a lengthy mail correspondence which referred me to a variety of different people within UNHCR, including the Associate Inter-Sector Coordination Officer, which enabled me to submit an application for a permit to do field work in the camp. The application was submitted in May, although I still have not gotten any closer to a permit. In addition to this, permission from the ministry of interior is needed for associates of organisations already working in Zaatari in order for them to enter. This is usually conducted by Majhoul, however, on this occasion he had forgotten it.

Nevertheless, my gatekeeper Majhoul did not seem too bothered about this and assured me that getting me into the camp would not be a problem as long as I was with him. *Wasta* is often used to lower transaction cost and circumvent long bureaucratic waiting (Gold & Naufal, *Wasta: The other invisible hand*, 2012, s. 64), like waiting for permission from UNHCR and the ministry of interior.

When entering the refugee camp, there is a check point guarded by the military police. As we approached the check point, Majhoul greeted the officers, they seemed to recognize him, they did not look twice at me, nor did they ask me anything, they merely waved us in. Majhoul explained to me that he used his *wasta* to get me in. As soon as the officers saw who he was they did not question him or his guests. *Wasta* is in your bloodline, it is your heritage. It is to be understood as something that is connected to your family name, which enables you to have certain advantages in certain areas. For example, Majhoul is a family name that indicates a long line of military men. Families who are close to the government or the security forces have the most powerful *wasta* (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 266). That gives him advantage in relation to the military and the police. In addition to this it also specifies that he is trans-Jordanian. Being trans-Jordanian is an important thing in Jordan and Jordanian are considered to be higher up in the hierarchy than other Arabs in Jordan. That means *wasta* derives from tribal era, which explains why it is the trans-Jordanian with long family ties deriving from tribes whom are in possession of *wasta* in Jordan.

Majhoul gave me an example of how powerful his *wasta* is by telling me a story about an argument he recently had with his superior. His superior had been rude to him in front of others, causing him embarrassment; Majhoul went to the director, who he had helped before via *wasta*. It all resulted in Majhoul's superior apologising to him and Majhoul ending his story with: "fuck with me and you will be a Palestinian by the end of the day!" This exact phrase says a lot, both about the general hierarchy that rules among the people in Jordan, and it also says a lot about Majhoul's own position in the social hierarchy. Palestinians in Jordan are considered to be second rank citizens and they do not have the same opportunities and rights as Jordanians. For example, Palestinians are not allowed to join the military or police force, and they are generally considered by Jordanians to be lower in the social hierarchy than Jordanians. Furthermore, families with close ties to the government or the security

forces are considered to have the most and strongest *wasta* (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 266), which very well can explain the behaviour of Majhoul.

### **5.3 *Wasta* explained via Power & Politics and Dependency theory**

In order to analyse what *wasta* is from an organisational perspective, and explain the significance of it in the social field and furthermore on a professional level in Zaatari, I apply the theory of power & politics combined with the phenomenon of loosely-coupled from dependency theory to the produced data.

The school of power and politics stresses that organisations are complex and intertwined with coalitions between individuals and groups, each with their own interests, perceptions and goals. According to this school, conflict is inevitable and so is competition over resource and influence. Especially influence is viewed as a vital weapon, which is obtained via power and alliances (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 283).

To clarify, in this case study power is not synonymous with authority, dominance, oppression or control. There are numerous different sources of power, which also serve to explain the essence of *wasta*. The sources of power are, amongst others, inspired by Foucault in the ability to influence others, along with Marx's idea of control over scarce resources. Furthermore, Weber argues for power lying with connections and access to individuals who are perceived as having power, as well as a central seat in a strong coalition, and lastly power is also credibility and the ability to know the rules and how to bypass them (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 284).

Moreover, the school of power and politics also stresses that power is conditioned by the specific relationship or a certain context since a person is not powerful in him-or herself, but is completely dependent on others acknowledging his or her power for it to matter (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005).

In this present chapter, the part of dependency theory that is especially suited for explaining *wasta* is Pfeffer's (1978) concept of "loosely-coupled". According to Pfeffer, the concept of loosely coupled is vital due to the tenuous environment. The school of dependency stresses that the environment effects the organisation, however, not every change in the world will affect the organisation and there must be a

connection between the organisation and the occurrence. The concept of loosely coupled ensures that there is a connection between the change in the environment and the organisation before it can be said to have an impact (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

Furthermore, the change in environment can be both globally as well as locally. For instance, the earthquake in Nepal changed the work environment for the organisations in Zaatari due to donor funding changing direction towards the earthquake instead of next year's funding. However, locally, the political and social relations can have great importance for the work environment in the camp. In this case study, environment is the social field in Jordan and emphasis is placed on the local ties that are loosely coupled combined with the theory of Power and Politics in order to explain the phenomenon of *wasta*.

The concepts of "loosely coupled" and power relations combined from the above mentioned schools are able to explain not only the phenomenon of *wasta*, but also its significance for the work environment and the social field in the camp.

#### **5.4 How *wasta* affects the environment in the camp**

Understanding *wasta* gives a better comprehension on how Majhoul succeeded in bypassing both the rules of the ministry of interior and the rules set by UNHCR when getting me into Zaatari. In addition to this, it also provides a deeper understanding of the field the organisations in Zaatari are working in and what challenges they meet that would otherwise not normally be seen in a conventional commercial market.

The power relations as described by the school of power and politics, such as influence, control over resources, connections and a central seat in a strong coalition are all important features in the phenomenon of *wasta*. As described above, Majhoul has the influence to bypass the rules set by UNHCR and the ministry of interior. His *wasta* lies in the ability to influence others due to his family name and their *wasta* within the ranks of the military and police force (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 266) (Cunningham & Sarayrah, 1994, p. 1). Furthermore, his connection and access to powerful persons is the core of his power. If his family had not been so well connected within these areas, he himself would not have power. This corresponds well with a person or a family only being powerful as long as there is an audience

granting them the power and believing in their power. Moreover, Majhoul spoke of *wasta* as something he has, almost as if it was a material thing, as opposed to the theory of power & politics where it is believed to be granted to one in the relation and only matters insofar as someone believes in the power and acknowledge it. If the police officers guarding the gate had not believed in his *wasta*, or been unfamiliar with the phenomenon, they surely would not have let us in. Moreover, the school of power and politics stresses that particularly influence is an essential weapon, which is acquired via power and alliances (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 283). *Wasta* gives Majhoul the ability to influence others, both at the gate but also inside the camp.

However, that only explains Majhoul's power in relation to the military and police force; it does not explain his power in bypassing UNHCR. Nevertheless, combined with Pfeffer's term of "loosely coupled" it will. While coalitions are made within the camp with Majhoul due to his *wasta*, which might not be valuable in this setting, it is valuable in other settings, making him a strong ally in a good coalition.

Clearly, Majhoul did not think much of the regulations set by UNHCR, and he knew that he could get me into the camp and that he could easily get me around the camp, making it possible to do my interviews. Moreover, at basecamp, where the organisations have their offices, he introduced me to a variety of people, including UNHCR staff, without any concern. Perhaps he knew that none of the individuals I met would reveal him or me, or that he had enough power to make sure they did not want to get in trouble.

When Majhoul's power relations within the military are loosely coupled with the environment in the camp, it automatically affects the environment and the power positions the superiors possess. As he, an employee from a local organisation, can bypass both UNHCR and the ministry of interior, people will automatically grant him more power when they become an audience, acknowledging his power and adhering to it. Moreover, the power relations that are made across organisations as well as inside organisations create strong coalitions and alter the competition to certain individual's advantage. These power relations and the influence they have on the competition, especially the referrals, will be elaborated in the next chapter concerning competition.

Majhoul used his *wasta* on more than one occasion when I was in Zaatari with him, inter alia to help me get interviews, as explained in my field notes:

In Zaatari refugee camp Majhoul suggested we made a round to all the relevant organisations asking them for an interview. I informed him that I only made appointments with certain organisations and that it was not all I had been able to establish contact with. He assured me that they would take the time to be interviewed by me, even though they were unaware of my visit, let alone my questions and the purpose hereof (Majhuoul, annex 3).

When knocking on doors in Zaatari, we were met by surprised staff members, however, we were not refused one single time and every one of them seemed to know Majhoul. What did strike me was that all the staff members we were met by were Jordanians, and Majhoul could give me a small briefing of who the person and his/her family was and their heritage. It is difficult to say whether the interviewees agreed to an interview to help me or because I was in the company of Majhoul. I do find it most likely that it was due to Majhoul and the power that comes from his *wasta*. According to an article written by Loewe, Blume and Speer (2008), during their comprehensive research on *wasta*, they found two interesting things when a person uses *wasta*: Reciprocity and pandering. Reciprocity is important in regards to *wasta*, because when *wasta* is used to get a favour, the person who did the favour, or the person's family, can expect the favour to be reciprocated at a later time. In addition to this, they also found that several of the respondents cater to individuals with strong *wasta*, either by presenting them with small gifts or by networking with them and offering them their service, hoping it will be returned one day (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, pp. 261, 271).

Moreover, *Wasta* distorts the competition in the camp, as individuals who are not set to be in a superior position become more powerful due to relations and *wasta*, as one informant notes in an interview:

She suggested that the competition in the camp might also be a reflection of internal power structures and intrigues that is to be found in many of the organisations she is familiar with. She acknowledges the

power of *wasta*, saying that's how she entered the camp for the first time (Maria, annex 4).

This exemplifies that individuals make coalitions across the organisations to their own advantages, which makes *wasta* a large problem within the organisations as well as across organisations. Her statement concerning competition being a reflection of internal power structures is also seen at the mental health meeting with the argument between the UNHCR doctor and Majhoul. The argument was an example of several things: competition for referrals, which will be elaborated in the next chapter, and internal power hierarchy that was settled.

However, establishing what *wasta* is how it is used and what it does to the environment in Zaatari does not explain why Majhoul helped me, as I am a foreigner without any *wasta*. I contemplated several solutions, for example mere kindness or the fact that DIGNITY is the donor of the partner organisation where he is employed. However, on the last day of the fieldwork he told me he was looking for a new job, preferably at an INGO. It is well known that INGOs pay higher salaries than local organisations in Jordan; however, it is more difficult obtaining a job at the international organisations. Majhoul asked if I would pass on his CV and recommend him, as he knew I was friendly with several of the international staff from various INGOs. Even though I do not possess *wasta*, Majhoul believed me to possess some kind of power that he could make use of. He traded his *wasta* for a favour of mine, he exchanged his local *wasta* with my international relations with expats, and it can be argued I used "my *wasta*" to get his help. During my fieldwork, I also learned that everyone has *wasta* to a higher or lesser degree and in different areas depending on the area of expertise your family is engaged in or where your connections extend to.

*Wasta* affects the environment in Zaatari on several levels. First off, it enables well connected individuals with *wasta* to speed up administrative procedures, such as accessing permissions that would otherwise be time consuming. Secondly, powerful individuals can use their *wasta* to get favours from colleagues, or influence other people in power positions to set up effective barriers for competition. The survey conducted by Loewe, Blume and Speer (2008) showed that 64% of the public sector personnel in the surveys responded that administrative procedures such as licensing, registration, obtaining work permits for foreign workers or permissions can in fact be



done more effectively and easier with the use of *wasta* (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 266). This effectually means that individuals without *wasta*, or simply foreign workers without the knowledge of *wasta*, will have difficulties achieving the same results and advantages as Jordanians. In this setting, the Jordanians or the local partner organisations have a clear advantage over the expats or the international organisations, if they have not employed Jordanians with a sound knowledge of the social environment.

However, the perception of *wasta* among young Jordanians is ambiguous. According to the research by Loewe, Blume and Speer (2008), one group of students found *wasta* to be completely unfair and seen as corruption. Another group of students endorsed the use of *wasta* and argued that it is not corruption because money is not exchanged for favours. A third group argued that *wasta* is a sort of corruption when used to bypass the law, but not if only used to speed up an otherwise bureaucratic process. All the respondents condemned bribery and corruption, and a fair share of the respondents argued that *wasta* is connected to social norms and traditional values, and therefore a fundamental part of the Jordanian culture (Loewe, Blume, & Speer, 2008, p. 265). This is an indicator that the younger generations might not accept *wasta* as bluntly as the older generation.

## 5.5 Concluding Remarks

Comprehending what *wasta* is and what it can do provides a better understanding of the field the organisations in Zaatari are working in.

The theories of dependency and power & politics complement each other with two specific concepts when explaining the phenomenon of *wasta* in regards to the environment in Zaatari. The school of power and politics argue that power relations are inevitable in organisations whether it is internally or externally. Power is to be understood as the means to influence others, control resources, or a seat in a strong coalition. From dependency theory comes the term of loosely coupled; meaning that an organisation is dependent on the environment, the environment here being the social field in Jordan, but not every event in the world will affect the organisation. In order for it to have an impact, the organisation must be loosely coupled with the event, whether it is locally or globally.

*Wasta* is grounded in your heritage and it follows your blood line, automatically providing you with a seat in a strong coalition, in so far as you are Jordanian and come from a powerful family. Furthermore, *wasta* gives you the means to influence other, as goodwill is a good thing to have with someone in possession of *wasta* and feared to be the enemy of. Majhoul is a native Jordanian and comes from a long line of military men, giving him advantages within the military and police force. Since Jordan is a police state, this is a powerful coalition to be part of.

Together with the term of loosely coupled; the power relations explain the use of *wasta* in connection to the refugee camp. At first glance, power relations within the military and police force should not grant Majhoul power in terms of the organisations competition in Zaatari. However, when traded or used to grant goodwill or favours, it becomes a powerful means altering the overall power structure in Zaatari, as coalitions are made across organisations as well.

*Wasta* distorts the environment in Zaatari as it is liable to be affected by the surroundings, resources and power relations. *Wasta* is a powerful weapon in the fight for power and influence, and coalitions among employees from different organisations can easily arise. The individual with *wasta* has advantages that exceed other power relations. Moreover, the local partner organisations will inevitably have a deeper comprehension of the social field and thereby an advantage over the international organisations in Zaatari.

Moreover, the widespread acceptance of *wasta* affects the business climate in Zaatari as well, by making the competition unfair to those not in possessions of a lot of *wasta*. Furthermore, organisations trying to compete and survive in Zaatari must put a lot of time and effort into social relations if they want a fair chance. Lastly, government procedures are prolonged and made unnecessarily complex and lengthy to those lacking *wasta*.

Lastly, *wasta* also serves to explain the distortion of the competition among the organisations and how they use their coalitions across organisations to achieve more referrals. *Wasta* is an especially powerful weapon in the fight for referrals. In the following chapter examples of *wasta* in connection with referrals and competition is given.

## **6. The Competition in Zaatari Refugee Camp**

The second part of the analysis is the case study of the mental health meeting in Zaatari refugee camp. It was at this meeting I first witnessed the competition between the different stakeholders which will be elaborated and analysed below. The case study is analysed using the ecology theories of competition, namely the density dependence and resource partitioning, in order to explain the competition at the meeting.

### **6.1 Competition**

This section serves to describe and differentiate between a regular commercial market with competition and the “market” in Zaatari along with the competition that exist in a humanitarian field.

A regular economic market is usually characterised by an economic system where prices are determined by supply and demand. Likewise, the competition usually serves to regulate the supply and demand, which again regulates the prices (Dictionaries); this is best achieved with only a certain degree of government regulation.

The fact that Zaatari is a closed environment regulated by UNHCR and not open to all organisations, as seen when I tried to obtain permission to enter to conduct research makes the competition uneven. There is no doubt concerning the competition in Zaatari. However, it is important to understand the “market”, the competition in Zaatari and how and why it thrives.

The competition that takes place in Zaatari is not like a conventional commercial market, quite the contrary; it is a confined area not open to all organisations, the consumers are not the costumers, the paying customers are donors who do not benefit directly from the services the organisations provide. In addition to this, the terms the organisations are working with are very different from a commercial market. They are dependent on the state of the surroundings and the changes that can happen in the world, if loosely coupled, and have great impact on the competition. Moreover, the competition is coloured by employee burn outs, donor fatigue and internal power

relations such as *wasta* distorting the competition between the organisations and making it a different set of rules to play by.

Likewise, as this is not a free market, the organisations are not free to regulate or compete in conventional ways and therefore conventional competition theories cannot explain the second case study. Often the partner organisations working in the field have accepted donor funds. Most funding is either earmarked or shaped according to the Log frame approach, meaning that there is a minimum quota to be reached, e.g. in the shape of referrals, when evaluating and furthermore, the spectrum in which the organisations can be flexible is very small and so competition is a side-effect to the very strict accountability mechanism.

As the school of Organisations and Environments expresses, an organisation cannot be self-sufficient, and therefore the school of dependency agrees that an organisation must engage with their milieu in order to survive (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 478). As the Dependency Theory stresses, every organisation exchanges resources with their environment as a necessity for survival. In this context that is to be translated into the necessity to engage in the environment in order for the organisation to survive. The measures taken into use to secure next year's funding are strange to the conventional commercial market, methods such as double referrals, *wasta*, gifts for the refugees etc. However, they can be side-lined with measures taken in the commercial market to gain power relations, to optimise sales, to reach budget and so on.

## **6.2 Case II: The Mental Health Meeting**

This case study serves as an example of the complexities of competition as these unfolded during a meeting in Zaatari. This will be analysed and explained by the density dependence and resource partitioning. The two theories serve to explain the competition from two different aspects, which when combined provide a better comprehension of why the competition in Zaatari is so complex.

After arriving at Zaatari, as described in the first case study, I had a full day with Majhoul and he showed me around the camp and introduced me to a variety of people.

Later that day in Zaatari, I also attended a Mental Health meeting where the following were present: 3 staff members from International Medical Corps (IMC), 1 from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1 one from Handicap International, one from Institute for Family Health (IFH) and 3 from Centre for Victims of Torture (CVT) and myself.

The meeting was held at IMC's premises in Zaatari. Driving in with Majhoul, I noticed the area was gated with barbwire surrounding the location and a guard at the entrance gate. At the meeting we sat around a round table, cramped together in this small place with the door open allowing some fresh air to get in. The individuals attending the meeting seemed reluctant and unenthusiastic. The atmosphere was heavy even though Jaran from IMC did his best to appear cheerful while greeting the attendees.

Jaran began the meeting by thanking everyone for coming and said he hoped for a good and productive meeting. Jaran had composed a short agenda with a few points on it. As he began with the first point, I noticed that especially the agents from UNHCR and IMC had a slack posture and were sitting sprawled on their chairs. The agent from Handicap International was the only one displaying excitement.

Jaran initiated the meeting with internal orientation on care for "caregivers". The first subject Jaran presented was a training called "Stress management for staff" that staff members of IMC had attended. The staff member who had attended said it was better than the seminar last year, and that she was glad that steps had been taking to cope with the issues of handling stress when working with traumatised refugees. According to her there was still room for improvement on the seminar. The next point on the agenda was the subject of "burn-out". Jaran argued that it was something everybody working in the camp would be familiarized with at some point. Before continuing to the next point on the agenda, the agent from UNHCR had a special case he would like to discuss.

The agent from UNHCR brought up a case concerning a child that was referred to special education. The atmosphere at the meeting immediately changed and became very intense and the tension was thick. The agent representing UNHCR, who is a medical doctor, questioned the professionalism of the teachers who were in charge of referring children to special education. Majhoul, who is the manager of the teacher,

reacted very strongly to this accusation and a discussion arose between the two. Later Majhoul told me that such incidents are not unusual at these meetings. Jaran from IMC tried to calm them down, but they kept arguing about the specific case, where the agent from UNHCR believed a doctor should have diagnosed the child with ADHD. While the agent from UNHCR argued that the teacher was not qualified to do this, Majhoul disagreed and argued that that was exactly her job. The different parties questioned each other's professional abilities and they seemed aggressive/defensive. This went on for a while. Majhoul was very defensive and raised his voice.

The last point on the agenda was CVT. They were at the meeting because they were contemplating entering Zaatari with a torture rehabilitation clinic. CVT already has several facilities in Amman where traumatised refugees and torture survivors can receive a specialised treatment and rehabilitation. When questions such as the quantity of torture survivors in Zaatari were asked nobody dared to estimate and everybody went silent. The staff members from IMC claimed not to know anything concerning torture survivors in the camp. Majhoul asked what torture was, he asked if a father regularly beating his son was considered torture, CVT informed him that that was not considered torture. However, he asked for a definition of torture, but CVT answered that the definition was not so important, because they also treat war traumas in general. I speculated that the staffs attending the meeting were unaware of what torture is, or they were unhappy with the prospect of another organisation entering, and so their strategy was to keep silent or turn the conversation in another direction. There was a general consensus that none of the staff members from any of these mental health organisations dared to estimate the quantity of torture survivors and that there generally speaking wasn't a need for a torture rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari. Only CVT disagreed and estimated the number to be around 20%.

Once the meeting was finished, the attendees packed up quickly and left. Only Majhoul, stayed and chatted to Jaran, IMC in a friendly matter. Those two were part of the first organisations to enter the camp when it was first build.

This particular case is a case of many things, however, in this chapter the focus is on the competition between the organisations as displayed at the meeting.

### 6.3 Density Dependence in Zaatari

What arises from the description above are the issues of territorial behaviour and suspicion of new organisations contemplating entering the camp. In fact, the above description is a display of the competition in Zaatari, here unfolded on a smaller scale. This can be explained by the density dependence curve, as elaborated in the theory chapter, where organisations gain legitimacy and assist each other at low density rate, however as the density increases, the competition increases as well, causing the organisations to compete for their survival.

At the mental health meeting I attended, it was clear that the curve had begun to break. As stressed by the school of Organisational Ecology, the theory of density dependence explains the legitimacy the NGOs give each other at the beginning at a low density, resulting in a camp being built with all the sectors cared for and filled by relief organisations, all collected by the UNHCR. However, the density dependence theory also explains how the situation and the competition turn when the density turns too high. With ten organisations offering mental health services in Zaatari, the density of organisations is extremely high in comparison to the request for their services, whereas the amount of organisations was not high in comparison to the high influx of refugees last year. (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 209). Furthermore, whether the density is too high also depends on the resources available and the request for their services. In the case of Zaatari, the decrease in clients has caused the request for their services to decline, which ultimately has the effect that the market is shrinking, not because of too many organisations entering the market, but due to the halt in clients causing the density to become too high.

Initially, first generation NGOs<sup>4</sup> operating alone in a field will have difficulties surviving; in order to build and establish a refugee camp with NGOs, the organisations need other similar relief organisations to get legitimacy and attention. Legitimacy and attention is needed due to donor funding, amongst other things, and it is well known that the more media attention a catastrophe receives, the more relief organisations enter to assist because media coverage often results in more donor funding, one of the most known examples of this being the Rwandan crisis. Simply put, if a conflict, drought etc. does not receive media attention or donor funding, then

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<sup>4</sup> Korten (1987) argues that first generation NGO is concerned with relief and welfare and is the NGO who respond in an emergency setting.

it is very difficult for a first generation NGO to stay and assist, as most first generation NGOs rely on donor funding. When Zaatari first opened in 2011, many NGOs came to set up an office at base camp and opened programs. The Syrian conflict had just erupted and the world's eyes were on the Syrian refugees. This caused a lot of donor funding, and initially the NGOs assisted each other in legitimacy and it was obvious that the help was needed. The density dependence curve was still going up and the density was still low enough for the organisations to benefit from each other.

However, at some point the clients and the resources available in Zaatari became too scarce in comparison to the amount of relief organisations and the density curve began to go down. When the curve turns, the organisations do not give each other legitimacy, but become mere competition. Jane, Protection Coordinator for an INGO in Jordan, substantiates the territorial behaviour in Zaatari. As I have noted in my field notes, during the interview Jane told me that she had:

Several times experienced organisations within this field being very territorial and possessive when it comes to sharing information, however everybody would like to receive them. The organisations are guarding their territories afraid others will take over or specialise in their area (Jane, annex 5).

Furthermore, a very important factor in understanding the break in the density curve is the restriction of the border between Syria and Jordan and the closing of Zaatari for new arrivals. All new refugees are sent to Azraq, meaning that some organisations, such as the mental health, do not receive new cases or at best very few cases, as Maria states in her interview, noted in my fieldnotes:

Now the competition is much more intense in comparison to last year, when the camps was still open and new refugees, potential beneficiaries, were coming in in large numbers, hundreds a day. However, it all changed when the border got restricted and Zaatari closed, referring all new refugees to Azraq. Especially in the case of the NGOs who treats torture survivors, because if the refugees who needed rehabilitation has been treated by now and there is no newcomers, the gap the NGO was supposed to fulfil is no longer there. The issue with torture rehabilitation in Zaatari is, that the high profile refugees has received resettlement, many have by now been treated and the remaining has



maybe learned to live with it or developed some degree of resilience. This effectively means, that the mental health NGOs needs new customers. She recons that it must be very difficult to reach their quota in these circumstances and so the fight for beneficiaries begin in order to secure the next years funding (Maria, annex 4).

Equally, in this specific case of Zaatari refugee camp, it is not only the increase in density among the organisations that leads to competition. The humanitarian field is a confined field, not open to all organisations; this effectively means that there is another factor causing the curve to break; the decrease in clients. The decrease in new clients causes the break in the density curve, which ultimately has the same effect on the curve.

To sum up, the theory of density dependence can explain the initial success of the organisations in Zaatari refugee camp. However, in theory the density curve should break as too many organisations enter the same market, which is not the case in Zaatari. As described earlier, organisations face many obstacles when trying to enter Zaatari, exemplified by the amount of difficulties I was met by when conducting research, and so it is not only the quantity of organisations that causes the high density and competition. Another important factor is to be taken into consideration as well, namely the restriction of the Syrian-Jordanian border and the restriction of new arrivals into Zaatari. It is in fact the decrease in clients and not the increase in organisations that causes the density dependence curve to break. Therefore, the density in absolute terms does not increase as the theory argues, however with this modification the theory can explain how density increases in relative terms due to the quantity of clients being reduced.

#### **6.4 Resource Partitioning in Zaatari**

In addition to density dependence, the mental health meeting is also the evidence of another concept of organisational ecology, namely the resource partitioning. This present sub-chapter analyses the competition between IMC and CVT, as it was played out at the meeting, using resource partitioning theory.

Especially two incidents from the mental health meeting serve as proof of the above mentioned competition and resource partitioning, primarily the argument between the doctor from UNHCR and Majhoul. The doctor believes that the teacher was not qualified to make the referral and that it should have been a doctor who made the decision. On the surface this could look like a simple argument about professions and qualifications, but relations are much more complex. In fact this is an argument about the right to referral and which professional groups should get the referral in order to reach minimum target. The referrals and the importance of it will be analysed in the following sub-chapter. Likewise, it is an argument between a representative of a UN agency, or generalist, and a representative of a local partner organisation, or a specialised, smaller organisation.

The second incident is CVT contemplating entering Zaatari. The representatives from the other organisations went quiet when CVT asked about the need for a torture rehabilitation clinic. Either the other contestants simply have no knowledge of this field, or they are reluctant to share their information with CVT, in case they actually enter and create even more competition. If CVT were to enter with a rehabilitation clinic they would thereby threaten the position of the other organisations who are also covering the same field, however not as specialised as CVT. The threat of specialisation will be elaborated and analysed in this present chapter.

CVT reveals their intent of using the meeting as a chance to get a better comprehension of the need for a torture rehabilitation clinic. The reactions of the other organisations as described above, especially IMC are very revealing. This is a case of competition between a generalist organisation, that offers a wide spectrum of services to individuals in need of psychosocial treatment, and a specialised organisation that threatens the generalist by offering specialised treatment on an area that IMC covers, but is not specialised in. IMC and the other organisations are threatened by the position of CVT due to their specialised form of treatment for torture survivors.

As described in the theory chapter, Carroll (1985) argues, that there are particular resources available for generalist organisations and other certain resources available for specialists, however, he stresses that the resources available for the organisations differ from time to time depending on the overall market, situation and the

surroundings, not to mention that it is the consumers who provide the resources. In this case we should translate this to the amount of traumatised refugees, the amount of torture survivors and on the closing of borders and camps. Which has resulted in restriction in new arrivals of refugees in need of their services (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 211) causing the generalists to fear the specialists entering their territory and offering more specialised treatment by reacting territorial. Additionally, Carroll (1985) argues that a generalist can take over the territory of a specialised organisation but vice versa as well depending on the dynamic and conditions of the situation at that particular time, as the conditions and the dynamic in the camp can change rapidly for the organisations, depending on various matters such as the crisis, the host governments goodwill, the border restriction and the camp.

Moreover, in this situation it is a generalist organisation being threatened by a specialised organisation both in the form of CVT at the meeting and by me representing DIGNITY during interviews as well. This territorial and competitive behaviour became noticeable during several interviews with the representatives of IMC, where they displayed how threatened they were of a specialised organisation entering their territory. As described in the chapter “Methodology”, I tried distancing myself from DIGNITY in order to appear as a student interested in their work. Nevertheless, my attempt failed and my appearance only made the staff of mental health organisation feel threatened and suspicious of me as a part of DIGNITY. When I asked questions concerning the torture survivors and their need for specialised treatment (by a specialised organisation) they purely denied it, assuring me of there not being a need for a holistic torture treatment as this part from my field notes following an interview with Aisha, Program officer for a large international organisation, indicates.

The INGO do not have a specific torture rehabilitation program or a holistic approach, but they treat the different psychosocial symptoms that the patients might have such as PTSD, depression, suicidal, etc. Nevertheless, Aisha reckons that it is sufficient and no specific treatments of torture survivors are necessary.

Furthermore, Aisha points out how well the referral system works making sure everybody receives the right assistance. She says there is plenty of work and

that they can easily reach their target of minimum clients, in fact the refugees want to be helped and so they come to the organisation themselves asking for assistance. She seems reluctant when I address the issue of the minimum quotas (Aisha, annex 6).

Even though there are plenty of cases for the INGO as explained by Aisha, there is not so much work that other organisations should enter this field. My notes from an interview with her colleague, Fatima, Clinical Case Manager for the same INGO, further explain:

Fatima guesses 20% of the refugees in the camp has previously been exposed to torture, the waiting time is roughly 2 weeks and the treatment can last as long as one year. She also believes that there is no need for specific treatment of torture survivors. There is a support groups for refugees with basic war trauma, which is almost all of the camp, according to her.

This INGO is best suited to treat mental health issues because they are the only mental health INGO who also have psychiatrist, according to Fatima. MDM, MSF and the Moroccan hospital all have psychologists as well and can treat torture survivors. Additionally, this INGO keeps developing the staff via trainings, she informs me. (Fatima, annex 7).

It is obvious to me that they are trying to give me the impression that there is not a need for a specialised organisation in torture rehabilitation, nor do they have trouble reaching their minimum target. Nevertheless, as I have noted in my field notes while reflecting on the two above mentioned interviews, there is a contradiction in their statements and facts.

It became paradoxically to me when I asked if they could feel any difference in the number of clients, referrals and competition for beneficiaries or difficulties fulfilling the quota from last year when the border was open and the camp was still receiving refugees from Syria, and now, where the boarder is restricted and all new refugees are send to Azraq, closing Zaatari for new arrivals. It seems logical that a decrease in the need for their services would appear, however that was not the case according to the INGO representatives I interviewed (Observations, annex 11).

The representatives of the INGO continued to deny any competition, decrease in clients or difficulties in reaching their minimum target each month. Nonetheless, that does not correspond with the actual facts and the information concerning the decrease in clients, and as proved in the previous sub-chapter Density Dependence, the competition has increased since the arrivals of new refugees to Zaatari seized. Especially the area of mental health is affected by the halt in newcomers. The mental health organisations work in areas such as traumas, torture survivors etc., and when a client is treated they depend on new clients with traumas to treat. As the INGO is a large organisation offering a wide range of mental health services, they are not interested in an organisation that is specialised in one of their areas entering. An organisation specialised in torture rehabilitation and/or traumas would inevitably coast them clients and thereby donor funding<sup>5</sup>.

To sum up, the dynamic the competition creates, and the framework the organisations work within, can change along with the tasks as a result of the competition and the milieu they work in. In the case of Zaatari it is a specialised organisation threatening the position of a generalist organisation which causes them to act territorial and be opaque in the interviews concerning the quantity of clients and the request for services. As described by Carroll, there are resources available for both the specialised and the generalists but in a closed environment such as Zaatari, the resources or clients are not necessarily divided and the lines become blurry as the generalist can treat the same clients as the specialised, however not with the same specialised expertise, whereas the specialised organisation is able to treat a percentage of the INGOs clients but not all of them.

## 6.5 Referrals

This section serves to elaborate on the argument between the UNHCR doctor and Majhoul concerning referrals, as described in the case study. Besides elaborating on the argument, this subchapter also illuminates other methods used to ensure the referrals and thereby reaching minimum target, which adds to the competition and serves as a proof of how the density has increased and how the resources available for generalist and specialist have become more merged.

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<sup>5</sup> I am not making any claims about the need or lack thereof for specialized treatment. Positions on the subject diverges.

In order for the refugees to receive the right treatment the referral system ensures that the organisations refer the refugee to the right organisation that provide the services required. The referral is of great importance, as the organisation who receives the referrals is also one step closer to reaching the minimum target, as set by the Logical framework approach (LFA). However, issues arise when several mental health organisations provide the same services and, as explained by the density curve, there are more organisations providing the same services than needed. This causes competition among the mental health organisations who are obligated to fulfil a minimum quota set by their donors in order for the donor to ensure that their services are needed.

According to the school of Organisations and Environments, all organisations must achieve resources from the surroundings in order to survive. The relationship between the organisation and the environment is therefore essential for the survival of the organisation (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 477). Scholars of the school of Organisations and Environments, view the environment as social constructions permitting individuals within the organisations to construct options in order to affect the environment they are operating in. An organisations ability to change according to the competition and the market is seen as an important means to survival (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206). In addition to this, an organisations existence is constantly dubious, their survival is at best problematic and organisations only survive to the extent that they are effective. This subchapter explores how the individuals at certain organisations construct options in order to optimise the survival changes of the organisation.

As described in the case study, the argument between Majhoul and the UNHCR agent was concerning referrals, as referrals are an important means for reaching minimum target and the source of much competition. Achieving enough referrals to reach the target optimises the chances for funding and thereby the survival of the organisation. The more organisations providing the same services, there more competition for referrals. As one key informant noted in an interview: “(...) on paper the referral system seems to be in order and working, but in reality it does not. It is full of internal competition and infighting.” (Maria, annex 4)

In addition to that, as several other informant informed me, the competition for referrals is intense and the means to it many. There are several ways to obtain referrals; during my fieldwork I discovered several alternative tricks, as noted in my field notes from an interview with a key informant:

UN Woman and the NGO he is working for, both work with GBV. In his caravan they had put snacks and small presents worth of 3jd (approximately 30 kr.) for each refugee who comes to them. UN Women who were situated right next to them were very dissatisfied with their method and asked them to stop it right away, as they are not allowed to distribute things. He reckons they were unsatisfied because the refugees went to them instead of UN Women (Majhoul, annex 3).

Attracting refugees with goods in order to lure them into seeking their services instead of other organisations' indicates that alternative tricks are being used deliberately. He continued to explain:

The NGO he is representing works in protection, where there are three subcategories which he is all in charge of. He was called out to a tent to refer a refugee in need of protection. He deliberately referred the woman to the wrong subcategory but still under protection. Thereafter the employee, who works for the same organisation as him, came and evaluated the refugee and thereafter referred her to the correct subcategory. (Majhoul, annex 3)

My informant told me this after we had known each other for a while and while telling me he had lowered his voice. He was well aware of the double referrals fiddling with the numbers. However, even though these tricks helped him get more referrals, he educated me of, according to him, the best way to achieve referrals, as noted in my field notes:

One of the best weapons in the fight for beneficiaries is personal connection. He has a very good relationship with many of the staff of the different NGOs. And he explains to me, how he made sure to be very good friends with the case manager from XXX, who are in charge of referring the cases correctly. He gave me an example of GBV. At

least 6 different NGOs handles cases of GBV victims, when XXX receives a referral they can refer them to any of these NGOs. However, his good relation to the XXX case managers secures him of referrals. In return, he helps them when needed. His phone rings during the interview, he speaks Arabic and when finished with the conversation, he winks at me and says that it was a good friend with a referral (Majhoul, annex3).

Majhoul's personal relations with the case manager, along with him returning the favour when needed, are the concept of *wasta* being used. This is an example of how *wasta* with its coalitions across organisations can affect and distort the competition for referrals and donor funding in Zaatari. Majhoul's *wasta*, even though his power is not directly connected with the competition in Zaatari, becomes useful because it is loosely coupled with the other power holder with *wasta* in Zaatari. Majhoul owes the case manager a favour, meaning that his favour is valuable enough to make a coalition between the two, which gives him an advantage in the fight for referrals.

When asked about the refugees stand to these tricks, he says that they are very much well aware of the competition and that they speculate in these kinds of thing, well knowingly how to get the most of what and where. He reassures me that he is a good guy with the heart in the right place and that he genuinely cares for these people: "the work is pure, but the game is dirty" he ends the interview with these words (Majhoul, annex 3)

As stated previously, scholars from the school of organisations and environments view the environment as social constructions permitting individuals within the organisations to construct options in order to affect the environment they are operating in. Other scholars argue that the environment is set and thereby produces limits for the organisations (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206). It can be argued, that the individuals I interviewed are creating options for themselves in order to gain more referrals. However, there are limits set by the environment, as the density curve indicates. If there are no new refugees for the mental health organisations to treat, then that would be a limit. However, tricks such as the double referrals create an option that was not there to begin with whereas the other tricks are still within the



limits set by the environment; however, they are exploiting every change to achieve the referrals that are available with tricks such as goodies and the use of *wasta*. Especially *wasta* is a powerful means due to the case manager keeping a consistent flow of referrals coming to Majhoul insofar as their coalition is beneficial to them both.

Furthermore, an organisations ability to change to match the competition is seen as a vital means to survival. In addition to this, the dependency school argues that an organisations existence is constantly dubious, their survival is at best problematic and organisations only survive to the extent that they are effective (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206). This perception matches well with the actions taken by several staff members at various organisations in Zaatari. They are constantly changing their tricks and competing for survival. They are creating options for themselves in order to survive, not only as organisations but their jobs as well. The employees have an interest in keeping the organisation running, it is quite normal only to hire staff on short term contracts, and only renewing such contracts insofar as there is funding for the position, thereby creating incentives for the employees to reach minimum target.

## 6.6 Concluding Remarks

The meeting on mental health I attended in Zaatari provided an ethnographic window<sup>6</sup> into the competition between the organisations. In this present chapter the focus was on the competition, explained via the theory of density dependence and the theory of resource partitioning.

The theory of density dependence explains the initial success of organisations working in Zaatari, where the organisations assisted each other in building a camp via legitimacy and awareness. However, when too many relief organisations enter the same field the density dependence curve would break according to the theory. The theory can via the density curve explain the competition between the organisations in Zaatari, however with a modification; due to the density dependence curve breaking, not because too many organisations entered, but because the influx of refugees seized and thereby caused a halt in newcomers in need of mental health services. The density

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<sup>6</sup> I realise that my material have certain limitations. However, the ethnographic encounter is to the best of my knowledge representative.

dependence theory explains the initial success and later the competition in the confined area of Zaatari with a modification of a decrease in clients instead of an increase in organisations. Moreover, it explains much better the dynamics in a complex field such as the humanitarian field as opposed to market allocation needs.

During my fieldwork it became apparent that when applying the theory of the density dependence to the data collected, the density curve was downwards-going as the border between Syria and Jordan was restricted and Zaatari was closed for newcomers, opposed to last year where hundreds were crossing the border every day. This means that organisations such as the generalist INGO did not have difficulties reaching their minimum target last year, but as they depend on treating traumas and torture survivors, they also need resources in the shape of new clients.

Furthermore, the theory of resource partitioning explains the territorial behaviour displayed by IMC at the mental health meeting. The theory distinguishes between specialised and generalist organisations, however, the resources available for these two types of organisations became more blurred as the influx of clients decreased and the competition increased. The INGOs denial of the need for a torture rehabilitation clinic along with the denial of the quantity of clients decreasing and the fact that they did not feel any difference after the camp was closed for newcomers indicates that they are territorial and very reluctant to share any information with me who represented a specialized organization to them.

The referrals are a means to reaching the minimum quota set by the donors, and the staff members uses different methods to achieve the referrals in order to reach minimum target and ensure next year's funding and possibly their own jobs. The methods used are double referrals, offering small gifts to the refugees in the waiting room and the use of *wasta* to create powerful coalitions across the organisations. The school of organisations and environments substantiates these methods with seeing the environment as social constructions, allowing individuals within the organisations to construct opportunities in order to affect the environment they are operating in. Others argue that the environment is fixed and thereby produces restrictions for the organisations. The methods used to gain referrals can be seen as the employees creating possibilities within their environment and that the environment is therefore not set but allows for creative methods.

## 7. The Ayatollahs

This present chapter is based on a case study concerning a review of an INGO by their donor. Furthermore, it explores the funding scheme, including the organisations, the logical framework approach and the consequences of the LFA for the INGOs and the local partner organisations. Lastly, the theories of organisations and environments along with the dependency theory are used in order to analyse the restrictions and obstacles of the organisations.

Firstly, it is important to establish the situation in regards to funding for the Syrian refugees, because as the Syrian crisis soon enters its fifth year, the situation for the Syrian refugees is getting worse. Jordan houses approximately half a million Syrian refugees, of whom only approximately 20 % live in camps. The funding for the camps has only reached 39 % in 2015, that means 61 % of the funding is lacking in order to care for the refugees inside the camps (UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Respos, 2015). As Jack, regional director of an INGO, informed me in an interview, when we discussed the funding for the Syrian refugees:

It is correct, that there has never been given so much money to the Syrian crisis as now, however, the problem is that the need has increased as well. The issue is that the money fund has increased 1:3, but the need has increased 1:12, so the gab is bigger than ever even with the increase in funding (Jack, annex 8).

### 7.1 Logical Framework Approach

This section serves to explain the widely and often used log frame. Most relief organisations depend on donor funding. However, as most use the Logical framework approach, I focus on that approach in this thesis. There must be evidence for the amount of refugees assisted to guarantee that the funding is spent accordingly, and that the services are needed, in order to secure next year's funding. That can pose a challenge when there is donor fatigue; the organisations have difficulties reaching the minimum quota, or the organisations simply do not possess the expertise that is required when using the LFA. This subchapter explores and explains the LFA, the importance of reaching minimum target and the consequences if targets are not met.

The logical framework was originally a tool used by the management in military and business contexts in the 1960s and was later adopted by USAID for development projects. Later the European development organisations followed and by the 1990s it was a widely used approach required by donors for funding applications (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 1). The LFA derives from a military and business context which is reflected in the demand for accurately and structured calculable objectives and on the delivery of outputs and achievements, assuming that the actors are operating in a rather stable environment (Hummelbrunner, 2010, p. 2).

It is useful to differ between the logical framework and the logical framework approach, where the first is the matrix used to summarise the main elements from the logical framework approach. The logical framework approach is the process where the problem is analysed and the objectives and indicators are developed, along with the identification of risks and assumptions, which is ultimately put into the logical framework matrix (Hummelbrunner, 2010, p. 2).

The LFA has been widely criticised but remains the most used among development agencies. Bekewell and Garbutt (2005) argue that the LFA is mainly used in three categories: as a formal system, as a way of thinking and lastly as a brand or a method to satisfy donors (Hummelbrunner, 2010, pp. 2-3), (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 2).

As a formal system the LFA functions as a proper procedure for scheduling projects and in many cases as a system to create the base for monitoring and evaluation. Using the LFA as a formal system is most predominant among donors, regardless of it being governments or grant giving NGOs. The LFA ensures a common ground to work from and compare interventions – whether it is to compare progress or for grant approval (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 4).

The LFA as a way of thinking is to be understood as a set of ideas or as a tool to organise ones thoughts. The value of using the LFA as a way of thinking lies in systematically working your way through the hierarchy of objectives, while ensuring that the right indicators, the risks and assumptions are taken into account. When using the LFA this way, the process is very flexible, as it is the process that is in focus and not the matrix (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 5).

Lastly, the LFA is also used as a way of branding projects in order to satisfy donors. According to Bakewell & Garbutt (2005), a fair share construct a matrix just because the donors specifically asked for it, or because using the LFA will help them achieve donor funding when applying for funds. This way, the LFA is merely a way of covering up the actual way of business (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 5).

A lot of critique has been given to the LFA, but despite the critique it remains the most common used form of project and intervention planning tool. Some of the critiques are, inter alia, the LFA being imposed externally by donors and therefore causing a top-down approach, which has the tendency of making it rigid and steadfast; causing an imbalance in power and trust between partners, due to fear of losing accountability and control if the receiving partner is allowed to modify the LFA. Moreover, often there are cross-cultural obstacles in the shape of local manager's skills, and traditions being neglected due to the domination of an externally imposed LFA. This can effectually lead to undermining the local partners and hinder sustainable learning and capacity building. Finally, the LFA is often unsuccessful in reflecting the realities that face development workers and thereby causing more confusion than clarity. Furthermore, context contingent and non-universally applicable terminology and lingo often worsen the situation (Hummelbrunner, 2010, pp. 4-5).

This process is used to achieve and/or ensure next year's funding, as well as in evaluation, often with a minimum quota to be reached to prove to the donor that there is a need for the project and that funds are spend correct and accordingly to the LFA.

## **7.2 Case III: The Donors**

This section entails a description of the third and last case study. The case takes place at the office of an INGO where their donor, the ministry of foreign affairs, is there to conduct a review of the programmes they fund.

I was attending a meeting with an INGO and their donor, which is a government donor. This meeting was a review as a part of a regular monitoring of the collaboration between the INGO and the ministry of foreign affairs.

My role during the meeting was passive and I only observed throughout the meeting from behind my desk in the background. I had on several occasions in the INGO environment in Jordan heard this particular donor government referred to as the “ayatollahs”, as they have a reputation for being quite rigid.

At the meeting the representatives of the donor wore suits and appeared very professional and business like. The three male representatives were situated next to each other on the long side of the oval table and the female representative was sitting at the end of the table. Sophie, the representative from the INGO, who was there to submit and present the projects the MFA had funded, was sitting opposite the men alone on the other side of the table. The setup reminded me of an exam situation.

During the review, which lasted several hours, the donors required seeing the log frames, results and quarterly reports the INGO had received from their local partner organisations in order to review the progress in the programmes. Furthermore, Sophie informed me that in order to receive funds from the MFA, the programmes have to correspond with the development strategies and civil society strategies set by the MFA (Sophie, annex 9)

The meeting lasted several hours and as the meeting went on, the tension grew thicker. Especially the female representative displayed an aggressive behaviour and what I interpreted as a somewhat mistrust-or rude comment. Sophie, who is a barrister, became, to some extent, defensive in situations where the female representative would reply “I sure hope so” when presented the results for capacity building for the local partners. The INGO representative had to defend the projects increasingly and the questions were tough.

After the meeting had ended they all said their polite farewell and we discussed the meeting and especially the female representative. What I had experienced as an exam-like situation with a heavy atmosphere, where I thought to myself “good thing Sophie is a lawyer who can defend these things”, Sophie had experienced the female MFS representative as harsh but otherwise saw the meeting as a good, constructive dialogue (Sophie, annex 9).

### 7.3 Funding

This section explains how the funding scheme, including accountability, log frames and bureaucracy, affects the organisations working with humanitarian assistance. The theory of Organisations and Environment serves to explain the inflexibility of the organisations due to the demands of accountability when receiving donor funding.

As described in the theoretical framework, Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue that an organisations ability to change and adapt according to the tenuous environment, in order to compete for survival, is not as straightforward, because most relief organisations rely on donor funding. There are several obstacles, both internally and externally that prevent an organisation from changing and adapting. These obstacles are, among others, prior investments in specific services, specialised workforce, long term projects, already established concepts and values of the organisation and the donor (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206).

Two main obstacles depriving organisations of flexibility are earmarked donor funding and overly excessive evaluation reports as a result of a too rigid LFA log frames. Hannan and Freeman (1977) ask the question, if changing and adapting is so unproblematic, why are organisations failing at all then? They claim that most organisations are in fact strongly constrained in their options (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206).

It varies from organisation to organisation whether they are most depended on earmarked funding or on log frame funding. As I have noted in my field notes during the interview with Jack: “Earmarked funding is everything (...) they have approximately 3 billion kr. in funds, out of those are 50 million not earmarked funding – the rest is” (Jack, annex 8). Whereas Jessica largely relies on the LFA in her work: “log frames are 95 % of the funding” (Jessica, annex11).

The case described above demonstrates how the partner organisations are held accountable by their donor organisation, who are then held accountable by their donor government, who ultimately are held accountable by the citizens of the country, as it is the tax payers money that fund this organisation amongst others.

What did strike me as surprising was that after the meeting between the INGO and the donor ended, I had a conversation with Sophie where she described the meeting as: “a

constructive dialogue to optimise the collaboration” (Sophie, annex 9). We clearly had different perceptions of the meeting. This may be contributed to this being the first donor meeting I ever attended, whereas she was used to this. Nevertheless, Sophie has full comprehension for the need of accountability, as it is the taxpayer’s money that contributes financially to the programmes, as noted in my field notes:

According to her, the MFA has a good understanding for the contextual framework. That in the log frames, there are risk incorporated which allows for flexibility as a result of the rapid changing environment they operate in (Sophie, annex 9).

She furthermore explained to me that this particular donor government was actually very flexible in comparison to others. However, as noted in my field notes, another informant, Jack, from a large INGO informed me on how they work around the administrative challenge when applying and receiving grants:

We have grants managers who only work with funding. It is becoming more normal to have staff who are specialised in grant seeking who know the different donors specific demands, such as the EU, UK or US. It is very rewarding having specialist in this field to make sure this is done correct. If the restrictions and guidelines are not followed precisely you risk not receiving the funds. It is very complicated. The whole documenting, reporting especially in finance is very complicated (Jack, annex 8)

Jack continues:

Technically speaking, budgets can be enormously tiring, due to different donors having different threshold on what they accept and what they do not accept. That can be very difficult coz we operate with a patchwork of donors who all contribute to our fund. They have different templates and restrictions, which makes it a big challenge to handle (Jack, annex 8).

The demanding administrative work is there to ensure accountability; however, the downside to the technical challenging administrative work is that the smaller local organisations do not have the opportunity to apply for funds if not trained in the western way with log frames etc. Jack expresses his concern for this in the interview, as I have noted in my field notes:



There is a lot of bureaucracy and technical restrictions when handling and taking into consideration for funding. That means that there are some of the smaller NGOs that cannot compete or apply for funds because they cannot handle the process that is sad coz they often have a lot of capacity in the field (Jack, annex 8).

It is not unusual for smaller local organisations to partner up with the larger international organisations, which allocate some of the funds for partners. However, that imposes problems as well, as the partners also have to comply with the log frame approach, as Jack notes in the interview:

Partner organisations have to report to us when funded by us. They demands stretch all the way to the local partners. The local partners have very different levels. Often they have difficulties meeting the demands set by the donors, they do not have the staff or expertise. That is worrying coz here in Middle East it is most often the local partners we use, coz they have the field knowledge and the ground expertise that is needed. We as NGOs have to be better at assisting them in the documentations, support and capacity building so that they can meet the demands (Jack, annex 8).

If the log frames are not properly performed, or the projects do not match the actual need in the field, it can affect the organisations chances of reaching minimum target, which can ultimately have a negative effect on the organisations credibility and reliability. Credibility and reliability are very important as the beneficiaries are not the consumers; the funding comes from donors who rely on the organisations to provide help to the refugees, as Jane explained in an interview noted in my field notes:

Organisations credibility decreases if targets are not met; reliability is tied to future funding. The implementing organisation must present a very good reason for not meeting their target and balance that with proof of them meeting another need (Jane, annex 5).

In addition to this, competition is not limited to the field workers or the organisation on the ground, it is also seen when applying for donor funding. Competition is seen on all the levels in humanitarian aid, as Jack notes in the interview:

A lot of competition for donor funding, even though we all claim to be humanitarian assistance, there is a lot of competition. We specialise in different areas and if you are unique you'll be taken into consideration. However in the more generic areas there is a lot of competition. It can be both good and bad. It can be very destructive it can also enhance the achievements and competition often makes sure the best is provided (Jack, annex 8).

This refers back to the second case study where the focus was on resource partitioning and competition in regards to the specialised and generalised organisations. However, this indicates that competition is also seen on all levels.

As described earlier in this chapter, donor funding and the requirements set by the donor, such as the logical framework approach, makes it difficult for the field staff to navigate and extend the appropriate assistance if not logged into a matrix. Some of the critique that the LFA has seen has, amongst other things, been that it causes a top-down approach which has a tendency of making it rigid and steadfast. It causes an imbalance in power and trust between partner and donors, due to fear of losing accountability and control if the receiving partner is allowed to modify the LFA. In addition to this, there are cultural and language barriers with terminologies that often worsen the situation, along with the neglect of and trust in local manager's skills and traditions due to the domination of an externally imposed LFA. And lastly, what is also reflected in the data produced during my fieldwork: the LFA does not necessarily reflect the realities that field workers experience every day and thereby it causes more misunderstandings than clarity (Hummelbrunner, 2010, pp. 4-5).

When the demand for log frames and evaluation schemes are so rigid, they leave little manoeuvre room for flexibility or trust in the field for staff to do what's best in the situation without the organisation being incorporated into a matrix first. As Hannan and Freeman (1977) stated, organisations do not have the option to merely change and adopt with the environment, they are rather locked in bureaucracy and documentation by their donors. As Jane explained to me in an interview "There is an idealistic side to humanitarian aid and there is a pragmatic side to it" (Jane, annex 5).

## 7.4 Concluding Remarks

To sum up, this chapter explained the difficulties partner organisations can have when applying for funds, as they, as opposed to the large INGOs, do not have the capacity to have grant managers employed. However, even if funds are granted, the administrative burden can be excessively large in the form of reports, LFA and minimum targets.

The logical framework approach is the most widespread form of log frames used by humanitarian organisations. Even though various others exist, I chose to focus on the best known one in this thesis. The LFA is mainly used as three things: as a formal system, as a way of thinking and as a brand.

The formal system entails the proper use of the log frame, scheduling projects and monitoring and evaluation. This is the way it is intended to be used by the donors. Difficulties arise as it can be complex and administratively difficult for some organisations whose staffs are not trained in how to use the log frame (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 4).

The LFA as a way of thinking is to be understood as a set of guidelines. The process is often used due to it being a systematic process to ensure that all objectives, indicators, risks and assumptions are incorporated. When the LFA is used this way, the process is very flexible as it is the process that is in focus and not the matrix (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 5).

The third way of using the log frame is as a brand. This way is mainly used to satisfy donors with a matrix or as a way to “brand” a project in order to receive funding (Bakewell & Garbutt, 2005, p. 5).

However, in the case study, which is a review of an INGO by their donor, it became clear that documentation and reporting is essential and the demand for it is real. The INGO also had to make sure that their partner organisations had met the demands set by their donor, as the demands extend all the way from the donor to the field worker.

The demand for log frames, reports and evaluations are all based on accountability, as the government donors have to be able to document to the public how the taxpayer’s money has been spent. There is a general understanding of accountability among my informants; however, there is also a general consensus amongst the informants that

the small local organisations cannot compete with the large INGOs for funding, as they do not have the capacity to hold special trained staff, which is a loss as the local organisations often possess a better comprehension of the local environments.

The school of dependency has argued that it is essential to be able to change and adapt according to the environments (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 479). However, Hannan and Freeman (1977) disputed, that is it far from that simplistic and that organisations are often quite locked in their options. This chapter served to demonstrate how locked the organisations really are, and that they therefore do not possess the opportunity to change and adapt (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206).

## 8. Discussion

After analysing the three concrete case studies, I find it relevant to reflect on how the methodological approach and especially the ethnographic qualitative methods have shaped the produced data. Thereafter, I will focus on the mental health organisations' behaviour and the environment, and whether it can be explained by adopting an organisational approach. Lastly, I return to Lund's matrix regarding the case study and discuss the three concrete cases as one abstract case, while moving between observations, patterns, concepts and theories.

As the knowledge is produced in the relation between researcher and object, I want to reflect upon my own role when conducting the research. My presence at the first case studies expedited the use of *wasta*. Had I not been there, Majhoul would not have used his *wasta* in this particular event on this particular day, which constitutes my first case study. It was only in the relation between him and me that he exercised his *wasta*, while hoping I would return the favour, and so my presence accumulated the first case study entirely. I was not only an observer; I was an active part of the first case study.

In the second case study, my part was only partial. My presence at the mental health meeting caused the representative from the generalised organisations to act defensive due to their perception of me as representative of DIGNITY. However, this defensive behaviour would most likely have occurred without my presence, since CVT was

present and introducing their plan of entering as a specialised organisation, threatening the other organisations on resources. Furthermore, the argument between the representative of UNHCR and the local partner organisation is a clear example of resource partitioning, and that was unaffected by my presence, in my estimate, although it can never be stated for certain.

In the third and last case study my role was strictly observing, as I was sitting in the back and not participating in the discussions. It is my strong belief that this event would have occurred regardless of my presence, as I was merely a fly on the wall.

To return to the research question: *How are the mental health organisations in Zaatari affected by the environment they operate in?*

- *How is this unfolded on the different levels?*
- *How can their behaviour be explained by adopting an organisational theory approach?*

My presence at these case studies enhanced the behaviour on the different levels and allowed me to analyse them. As mentioned in regards to the first case study concerning *wasta*, had I not conducted ethnographic research I might not have known about this and therefore lacked a fundamental phenomenon affecting all levels in the Jordanian society, and in this case in the social and professional field of Zaatari. In this case, organisational theory was able to explain what *wasta* is, as well as how and why it flourishes in the Jordanian society, and the consequences hereof. Dependency theory argues for the virtue of changing and adapting to the environment in order to survive. It is evidence of the power relations used in the social field and when loosely-coupled with the environment, it is very powerful insofar as others believe it to be. The theory of Power & Politics describes power as something that only exists when others recognise the person's power, and it is only real in the relation between them. To have power is something that is given to the person, whereas Majhoul describes it as something he possesses, as if it was a material object that he owned. Nevertheless, as *wasta* is a well-known and widely spread phenomenon in the Middle East, it is a powerful thing to grant to others.

In the second case study the competition between the generalists and the specialised organisations was set in play, as they no longer assisted each other in legitimacy

building. As the humanitarian field is far from an ordinary commercial market with free competition, the competition displayed at the mental health meeting required some specific theories in order to analyse and to explain why and how the competition between the mental health organisations at that particular meeting had arisen and why it exists. Had Zaatari refugee camp functioned as a regular market with free competition, the organisations with the cheapest and best offer might have won and the remaining had either exited the market or changed their product. However, UNHCR controls which organisations enter, and the donors of the organisations often determine which projects are put in play by either approving the LFA or by earmarked donor funding.

That leads us to the last case with the review of the INGO by the government donor. At this meeting it becomes clear that every penny spent must be accounted for. Accountability is essential and therefore the review was long and thorough. As the theory of Organisations and Environments explains, adapting and changing accordingly with the environment in order for organisations to survive is only an option to a small degree, as most funding is either earmarked or needs to be accounted for in the shape of LFA or similar. This poses a hindrance to the small local organisations that do not have the resources to hire staff specialised in grants and evaluation.

Organisational theory explained each case study and the issues I decided to focus on. However, returning to Lund's matrix, will allow us to see the three cases in unity and focus on the cases in unity.

I will take a step back and see the three cases in unison, as this is a case of many things. Data produced from the three concrete cases constructs a corpus, which then enables me to make statements concerning the typicality of my observations, and thereby make a generalisation of the findings of the case (Lund, *Of What is This a Case?*, 2014, p. 227). Additionally, due to the case's ability to make generalisations of its findings, it can be classified as a critical case study (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 149). Referring to Lund's matrix allows us to visualise the components that the cases moves between.

Lund's Matrix<sup>7</sup>.

	<b>Concrete</b>	<b>Abstract</b>
<b>Specific</b>	Observations	Concepts
<b>General</b>	Patterns	Theories

This is a case consisting of three concrete cases. The cases all took place at a certain time and place making them concrete and specific, which is a good point of departure (Lund, Of What is This a Case?, 2014, p. 227). I have made observations during each of the cases. The observations I chose to focus on include: the means to influence others in the first case study, territorial behaviour in the second case study and restrictions in the third case study.

Next during my fieldwork certain patterns became obvious to me. Patterns are the product of reoccurring things that can be said to have importance for the general aspect, such as the use of *wasta*, antagonism among the mental health organisations and inflexibility due to accountability demands from donors.

When analysing the cases, the choice of concepts in order to explain the empirical data is my responsibility entirely and by applying concepts to the data it becomes abstract and edited and new relations and connections are the output. Therefore, the cases are concepts of the power relations and competition that occurs when working in a tenuous environment.

When theorising a case study, one must, as Lund (2014) puts it: "Theorization, finally, is about moving from observation of empirical events, *through* concepts, to be able to say something about the inherent qualities and dynamics in contexts *other* than the ones studied" (Lund, Of What is This a Case?, 2014, p. 229). Lastly, this is a case of the organisational competition that inevitably occurs when non-profit organisations work in an ever-changing environment that lacks funding and encounters obstacles such as the closing of borders and camps - events that the organisations cannot have an impact on whatsoever, and by no means the ability to change. They must simply adapt within this very narrow range of possibilities that they are given by their donors.

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<sup>7</sup> (Lund, Of What is This a Case?, 2014, p. 225)

To fill out the matrix, it would look like this:

	<b>Concrete</b>	<b>Abstract</b>
<b>Specific</b>	The ability to Influence others Territorial behaviour Restrictions	Power Competition Environment
<b>General</b>	Wasta Antagonism Inflexibility	Competition between organisations in a tenuous and closed environment due to the environment they work in

In the “Methodology” chapter, I classified this as a critical case, as it carries a strategic importance for the overall issue, which is my research question (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 149). It furthermore serves as a critical case in the sense that it can be used to generalise and verify my hypothesis (Flyvbjerg, 1991, p. 151) “*humanitarian actors in Jordan are highly affected by the environment they work in*”. The case study can be used to verify and generalise that; if the outcome in the case study, concerning the world’s second largest refugee camp, is that the humanitarian organisations working in Zaatari are highly affected and restrained by the environment they work in. Then that can be used to verify the hypothesis, and furthermore to generalise and say that if the outcome is as mentioned above, then it is most likely that the humanitarian organisations are highly affected and restrained by the environment in most humanitarian fields everywhere.

To sum up, when combined the cases can explain how the mental health organisations are affected by the environment by adopting an organisational approach. The organisational theories are able to account for and explain the environment and how the organisations are affected by the social field in Jordan, along with the constantly changing settings, including lack of funding or closing of camps and borders. Furthermore, organisational theory is able to explain the constraints and obstacles humanitarian organisations face in a complex environment such as a refugee camp. Moreover, the cases are, via organisational theory, able to explain how the organisations are more or less locked in their ability to adapt and change due to the administrative burden/accountability. However, they will struggle to survive by



competing within the narrow frames set and ultimately use alternative methods to reach minimum quota, as set by the LFA, in order to survive.

## 9. Conclusion

In conclusion, the school of dependency argues that the structure and behaviour of an organisation cannot be fully comprehended unless the context in which the organisation operates is understood (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 478). That is very much the case in regards to the mental health organisations in Zaatari and my research question:

*How are the mental health organisations in Zaatari affected by the environment they operate in?*

- *How is this unfolded on the different levels?*
- *How can their behaviour be explained by adopting an organisational theory approach?*

In order to fully comprehend the whole scale, it is necessary to break down the different components and analyse at the different levels, such as the fieldworkers in the camp, the partner organisations working alongside with NGOs and INGOs in the camp and the donors. Each action taken at any level affects the other levels, and the different levels must be seen in unity to fully comprehend how the mental health organisations in Zaatari are affected by the environment they operate in.

In order to answer the research question, the analysis consists of three case studies, each displaying the conditions and frames the organisations work within from a different level. When these cases were analysed and explained, only to be combined later, organisational theory is able to explain how the mental health organisations are affected by the environment they work in and how it affects them by adopting an organisational approach.

The first case study displays how the Middle Eastern phenomenon of *wasta* is widely accepted, used and believed in. The theory of Power & Politics describes power as the means to influence others, a seat in a strong coalition and as something that is granted

to others in a relation. Furthermore, it displays how the local fieldworker on the ground in Zaatari uses his connections in order to reach the minimum quota set by the donors by creating coalitions across organisations, and by doing so distorts the power relations. It is an example of how affected the humanitarian assistance is by the environment, the environment being the social field in Jordan. Furthermore, the rules and regulations set by the authorities are easily bypassed for individuals in possession of *wasta*, which is usually local Jordanians, meaning that foreign workforces are never extended the same possibilities as Jordanians. Furthermore, it can be difficult for the foreign workforce to navigate in the social field In Jordan if they are not familiar with *wasta*. Numerous things affect the operations on the ground; however, a significant one of them is *wasta*.

The second case study takes place at a mental health meeting I attended in Zaatari where various representatives of many mental health organisations were present. The ecological theories of competition are able to explain the dynamics in a complex field such as the humanitarian field. The density dependence could explain how the mental health organisations in Zaatari initially assisted each other in gaining legitimacy and at the same time benefitted from a low competition rate. However, as the border was restricted and Zaatari was closed for newcomers, the market for the mental health organisations decreased and they began to compete with each other as the resources that were usually available to specialised and generalist organisations became scarcer and the line blurred. The organisations are very affected by the competition between the mental health organisations due to a too high density among the mental health organisations in comparison to the amount of beneficiaries after the restriction of the border and the closing of Zataari for newcomers. This effectually meant that all mental health organisations, specialists as generalist, now compete over the same resource in a camp that is greatly underfunded. The competition is seen in the referral system, where various alternative ways are being used in order to secure the referrals and ultimately reaching the minimum target.

The third and last case study entails a review meeting between an INGO and the donor government. The demand for accountability requires extensive documentation and furthermore solid arguments for the projects. This case study clarifies how the donors and their requirements for accountability limit the survival opportunities for the organisations and fieldworkers in Zaatari. As the theory of Organisations and

environment argues, there are several obstacles for an organisation's capability to adapt and change in tune with the environment in order to survive (Ebner & Beck, 2008, p. 206). The demand for proof in the shape of LFA, earmarked funding and project scope are all components that contribute to the obstacles facing the organisations in the field. In fact, most relief organisations that depend on donor funding are heavily constrained in their options.

The conditions and the environment the mental health organisations in Zaatari work under create a base for competition between the organisations. However, the competition that flourishes in Zaatari refugee camp is not of a conventional sort such as a commercial market.

Via the cases studies and the theory it has become evident that the mental health organisations in Zaatari are restricted in their possibilities. The competition is seen on all levels as the resource become scarcer and the partner organisations are especially hindered if they do not have the resources to employ staff specialised in grants. However, the partner organisations know the social field in Jordan best and have therefore an advantage in the shape of *wasta*.

As Zaatari is not a conventional commercial market and the competition is far from conventional either, the competition and the fight for survival is to be different, other means are to be taken into use in order to survive. In order to comprehend the measures, strategies and behaviour of the organisations in Zaatari for donor funding, one must fully comprehend the environment, context and conditions the relief organisations are working under.

An important aspect of the organisations working within the humanitarian field, that was not included in my thesis but nevertheless a vital part to the competition as well, is the personality of the staff at all levels. During my fieldwork I often encountered people who so fiercely believed in the cause of helping refugees and producing the best projects, that it alone would cause them to fight for their project, causing internal as well as external disputes and competition between such enthusiastic individuals. It would be useful to analyse on the internal factors of organisations working in Zaatari and necessary to understand the full picture. Unfortunately, I was limited by time to conduct such research and additionally theories would also have been necessary as those of my choice focus on external factors.

I am well aware that this thesis does not completely cover all the aspects and components that affect the environment the relief organisations work under, however that was never the purpose of this thesis. It is, as Lund (2014) argues, to be resonance and be seen in context with other research projects, which combined will be able to explain the field via constructive dialogue (Lund, Of What is This a Case?, 2014, p. 227).

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## **Annex 1: Proposal**

# **Dissertation proposal**

**For the**

**Master of Social Science**

**In**

**International Relations & Development**

**Global Refugee Studies**

**Aalborg University, Copenhagen**

**University Supervisor: Katrine Borg Albertsen, PhD**

**By**

**Nanna Lykke Larsen**

## *Introduction*

Defined as the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the second world war, the Syrian civil war has claimed over 220,000 casualties to date, half of whom are believed to be civilians (Hummer, Mercy Corps, 2015), including over 8,000 documented killings of children under eighteen years of age. In a country of approximately 22 million people pre war, the bloody and prolonged conflict has resulted in 7.6 million internally displaced persons, 3.2 million refugees and approximately 12.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 700,000 Syrians have registered as refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2014 alone, with an average of approximately 70,000 Syrians fleeing their country every month. Even though the number of refugees has steadily declined since 2013, the regional crisis is by no means subsiding, especially as it becomes clear that returning to Syria will not be a viable option in the short or medium term (Berti, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications*, 2015, s. 41).

Furthermore, the human rights violations and war crimes in Syria are voluminous. A Human Rights Watch report from 2012 entitled “Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011” claims to have located 27 torture chambers in Syria, confirmed by more than 200 individuals who either witnessed torture or were subjected to torture themselves. Altogether, Human Rights Watch documented more than 20 different methods of torture used in Syria’s archipelago of torture centres as reports estimate that there are far more torture chambers scattered around Syria (Solvang & Neistat, 2012). These human rights violations have, among other war crimes, resulted in a huge refugee influx into the neighbouring countries surrounding Syria.

Predictably, the mental health of the refugees in Zaatari is a major concern since the camp houses many war refugees who have been physically and psychologically affected by the Syrian conflict. There is a very common occurrence of psychological war trauma in adults as well as children, who are operating in survival mode when arriving from a live conflict zone. Moreover, reports have shown that the human rights violations from the Syrian war are especially severe and include instances of public rape experienced by children, men and women (Ledwith, *Zaatari: The Instant*

City, 2014, s. 58-60).

In its 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP), UNHCR argued that mental health problems remain a significant issue for refugees in Jordan and that there is a lack of emphasis on providing comprehensive and integrated services supporting natural coping strategies and family/community resilience. The RRP also indicated that needs for mental health care are growing and that service providers are not catering for refugees requiring psychosocial treatment for torture survivors, violence and PTSD (UNHCR, 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan Strategic Overview Mid-Year Update, 2014, s. 30).

However, there are currently no rehabilitation facilities specifically targeting torture survivors in Zaatari refugee camp. Moreover, it has been made clear<sup>8</sup> that perceptions regarding the need for a rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari, as well as the extent of those needs, vary greatly depending on the perspectives and priorities of different stakeholders and organisations. Therefore, this thesis will explore these different viewpoints by conducting a comprehensive stakeholder analysis that includes individual interviews with a cross-section of people and institutions working in and around Zaatari refugee camp.

### Research Question and Hypothesis

The intention of the research question is to guide the process of data collection and analysis based on the theoretical framework outlined below. The overall theoretical question is framed by organizational theory, which seeks to explain the nature of relationships between organizations and their staff as well as beneficiaries and donors. This thesis will explore how organizations assess rehabilitation needs in Zaatari refugee camp and how these assessments are circulated and used. Considering the complex and volatile situation in Jordan, institutions and organizations struggle to possess an adequate or complete assessment of the nature of the humanitarian disaster in general, let alone examine the need for specific forms of torture rehabilitation. Consequently, the guiding question is:

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<sup>8</sup> On a previous visit to Zaatari refugee camp in December 2014, I attended a managerial and technical meeting with different stakeholders representing various mental health organizations, who disagreed greatly on the need for a rehabilitation clinic in Zaatari.

*According to the different stakeholders, what is the perceived need for a rehabilitation clinic for torture survivors in Zaatari refugee camp?*

- *How does perception differ depending on the stakeholder?*
- *How can the variation in perception be explained by adopting an organizational theory approach?*

Furthermore, it is important to note that this thesis seeks to explain the variations in perception through organisational theory in contrast to an analysis of the organisations in question.

### *Hypothesis*

The working hypothesis is that humanitarian actors in Jordan display a high level of divergence in their assessments regarding the current needs for torture rehabilitation. This level of divergence will be explained with reference to the overall conceptual framework presented below.

### Conceptual Framework

Organizational theory explains assessment differences and divergences through three key lenses:

- Viewing an organization as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and interconnected elements, including the environment in which it operates both in a global and local context of development cooperation and with which it continually interacts. Subsequently, a change in any element of the system causes changes in other elements. Not only do the conflict, resources and conditions change depending on the different refugee camps, but circumstances in specific refugee camps can change and vary depending on funding as well as the current state of the conflict from which refugees are fleeing. Organizations are not static but are in constantly shifting states of dynamic balance. They are adaptive systems that are integral parts of their

environments. The dynamic scenery becomes part of the organisations' navigation to constant adaptation as this approach views an organisation as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and interconnected elements. Organizations must adjust to changes in their environment if they are to survive; in turn, virtually all of their decisions and actions affect their environment. This approach attempts to account for internal and external environments as well as addresses interwoven variables.

- Organizations are viewed as complex systems of individuals and coalitions, each having their own interests, beliefs, values, preferences, perspectives and perceptions. The partners continuously compete with each other for scarce organizational resources and influence. Therefore, the occurrence of dilemmas regarding relationships with partners is not unusual. The power and political activities through which influence is acquired and maintained is the primary 'weapon' for use in competition and conflicts. This is especially the case in the Middle East region where personal relations and influence can have a big significance in shaping the landscape for NGOs in a refugee camp. This approach adds a lens of power and politics to organizational function and behaviour.
- Resource dependence theory has implications regarding the optimal structure of organizations, production strategies, contract structure as well as managing complexity and uncertainty with external organizational links and many other aspects of organizational strategy. Furthermore, Resource dependence theory is one of the main reasons NGOs have become more commercialized in recent times. With less government grants and resources being used for social services, contract competition between the private and NGO sectors has increased and led to NGOs using marketization techniques that are used mainly in the private sector to compete for resources for the purpose of maintaining their organizations' livelihood. This could explain why some stakeholders representing NGOs would try to keep competition from other NGOs away from the field in which they operate. Scholars have argued that

the marketization of the NGO sector will lead to a decrease in the quality of services provided by non-profit organizations.

Each of these theories ascribes a different status to an organisation. Some see it as porous while others interpret it as an entity. However, each theory ascribes a different importance to resources in relation to ideology/politics. Based on the collected material, different theories will be discoursed in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the difficulties in undertaking stakeholder analyses.

## Methodology

In order to collect empirical material, I will be using an ethnographic qualitative approach. This entails collecting, if possible, the following forms of material: individual interviews with professionals, case documentation, shadow reports from organizations and documentation published by international human rights organizations. Additionally, the objective is also to attend conferences, meetings or other events where the needs for rehabilitation in refugee camps are discussed more generally.

## Fieldwork

Fieldwork will be conducted in Jordan 12<sup>th</sup> April - 6<sup>th</sup> May 2015.

During the field process, I will visit relevant institutions, centres and organizations with the purpose of collecting relevant reports and information regarding past and current assessments of the situation in Zaatari refugee camp.

I will identify key informants to shed light not only on the current situation, but also on perceived needs in the camp. I will conduct interviews with staff working for mental health organizations in Zaatari including. Special attention will be paid to exploring stakeholder's personal views as to the need for a rehabilitation clinic.

## Annex A: Interview guide

<b>Theme:</b>	<b>Interview questions</b>	<b>Quantitative probing</b>	<b>Qualitative probing</b>
The perceived need	Could you explain the nature of traumatized refugees?	Are there many?	Of which nature is the traumas?
	Are there torture survivors in Zaatari refugee camp?	Many? How big is the problem with <u>torture survivors</u> ?	Which groups could one divide them into?
	Where can torture survivors seek treatment in the camp?	How many clinics?	What is the nature of service these clinics provide?
	Are there any treatment clinics for torture survivors in Zaatari?	Is there a need for a more specialised treatment?	What is the need? And who has it? How do you see the need?
Trauma/torture	Which refugee groups are most vulnerable?	How big is this group?	Why this group?
	What are the three most important psychosocial problems in the camp and why?		What is the nature of their problem
	How big is the problem with <u>traumatised refugees</u> ?	Many?	Who are they?

	How are needs currently met by formal or informal institutions and networks?	Better with natural healing and resilience?	Who are they?
NGO competition	In your opinion, is there a specific need for treatment of torture victims in Zaatari?	Should a new NGO or a NGO already on the ground in Zaatari fulfil this position?	
	How would you feel about another NGO entering Zaatari?		
	Do you feel there is a competition among the NGOs?	How does it affect the work?	How do you feel it?

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## Annex 2: Interview guide

<b>Theme:</b>	<b>Interview questions</b>	<b>Quantitative probing</b>	<b>Qualitative probing</b>
The perceived need	Could you explain the nature of traumatized refugees?	Are there many?	Of which nature is the traumas?
	Are there torture survivors in Zaatari refugee camp?	Many? How big is the problem with <u>torture survivors</u> ?	Which groups could one divide them into?
	Where can torture survivors seek treatment in the camp?	How many clinics?	What is the nature of service these clinics provide?
	Are there any treatment clinics for torture survivors in Zaatari?	Is there a need for a more specialised treatment?	What is the need? And who has it? How do you see the need?
Trauma/torture	Which refugee groups are most vulnerable?	How big is this group?	Why this group?
	What are the three most important psychosocial problems in the camp and why?		What is the nature of their problem
	How big is the problem with	Many?	Who are they?

	<u>traumatised</u> <u>refugees?</u>		
	How are needs currently met by formal or informal institutions and networks?	Better with natural healing and resilience?	Who are they?
NGO competition	In your opinion, is there a specific need for treatment of torture victims in Zaatari?	Should a new NGO or a NGO already on the ground in Zaatari fulfil this position?	
	How would you feel about another NGO entering Zaatari?		
	Do you feel there is a competition among the NGOs?	How does it affect the work?	How do you feel it?

### Annex 3: Majhoul

According to him, there is a lot of competition for beneficiaries among the NGOs in Zaatari. A year ago, when refugees were still coming to the camp, there was plenty of beneficiaries and donor money for all the NGOs, however, since the border between Syria and Jordan is restricted and all new refugees are sent to Azraq, the NGOs are struggling. The closing of the camp means that it is the same refugees, and with the large amount of NGOs, they need new arrivals with new issues to meet.

He tells me, that all organisations have a minimum quota they must reach every month. As mentioned, this was not a problem one year ago, but after closing the camp for new refugees, it has become more difficult to reach the minimum quota. However, there are ways around it, according to him.

He supplied me with several examples:

UN Women and the NGO he is working for, both work with GBV. In his caravan they had put snacks and small presents worth of 3jd (approximately 30 kr.) for each refugee who comes to them. UN Women who were situated right next to them were very dissatisfied with their method and asked them to stop it right away, as they are not allowed to distribute things. He recons they were unsatisfied because the refugees went to them instead of UN Women.

Another example is the double reference. The NGO he is representing works in protection, where there are three subcategories which he is all in charge of. He was called out to a tent to refer a refugee in need of protection. He deliberately referred the woman to the wrong subcategory but still under protection. Thereafter the employee, who works for the same organisation as him, came and evaluated the refugee and thereafter referred her to the correct subcategory.

He furthermore tells me, one of the best weapons in the fight for beneficiaries is personal connection.

He has a very good relationship with many of the staff of the different NGOs. And he explains to me, how he made sure to be very good friends with the case manager from IRD, who are in charge of referring the cases correctly. He gave me an example of GBV. At least 6 different NGOs handle cases of GBV victims, when XXX receives a referral they can refer them to any of these NGOs. However, his good relation to

the XXX case managers secures him of referrals. In return, he helps them when needed.

His phone rings during the interview, he speaks Arabic and when finished with the conversation, he winks at me and says that it was a good friend with a referral.

Furthermore, he uses marketing to brand the organisation in the camp. He makes flyers and makes sure the religious imam's at the mosques mention the organisations as well.

When asked about the refugees stand to these tricks, he says that they are very much well aware of the competition and that they speculate in these kinds of thing, well knowingly how to get the most of what and where.

He reassures me that he is a good guy with the heart in the right place and that he genuinely cares for these people: "the work is pure, but the game is dirty" he ends the interview with these words.

#### **Annex 4: Maria**

She is quick to acknowledge the competition between organisations, even between the big UN organisations, giving me an example of UN Woman and UNFPA. There is generally speaking a lot of competition between organisations on the market, but even more so when it is in a closed environment such as Zaatari.

Now the competition is much more intense in comparison to last year, when the camps was still open and new refugees, potential beneficiaries, where coming in in large numbers, hundreds a day. However, it all changed when the border got restricted and Zaatari closed, referring all new refugees to Azraq. Especially in the case of the NGOs who treats torture survivors, because if the refugees who needed rehabilitation has been treated by now and there is no newcomers, the gap the NGO was suppose to fulfil is no longer there. The issue with torture rehabilitation in Zaatari is, that the high profile refugees has received resettlement, many have by now been treated and the remaining has maybe learned to live with it or developed some degree of resilience. This effectively means, that the mental health NGOs need new customers. She recons



that it must be very difficult to reach their quota in these circumstances and so the fight for beneficiaries begin in order to secure the next years funding.

She suggested that the competition in the camp might also be a reflection of internal power structures and intrigues that is to be found in many of the organisations she is familiar with. She acknowledges the power of wasta, saying that's how she entered the camp for the first time.

Moreover, she disagrees with XXX, telling me that there is still a huge stigma when it comes to psychosocial support and gives me examples of how her organisations disguises their treatment allowing others to think the beneficiaries enters for other purposes.

She informs me, that on paper the referral system seems to be in order and working, but in reality it does not. It is full of internal competition and infighting.

#### **Annex 5: Jane**

Jane informed me about bilateral discussions that are currently taken place in Jordan. Donors want to be sure that there is a gap or a need for their specific services and the implementing organisation has to demonstrate the need and that they are not overlapping with other organisations.

Furthermore, organisations credibility decreases if targets are not met; reliability is tied to future funding. The implementing organisation must present a very good reason for not meeting their target and balance that with proof of them meeting another need.

Generally, there is donor fatigue with most donors by now in regards to the Syrian crisis. Jane sees this with several of her friends as well. There are frustrations among the field staff due to policies not always matching the challenges they meet in the field.

In addition to this, Jane has several times experienced organisations within this field being very territorial and possessive when it comes to sharing information, however everybody would like to receive them. The organisations are guarding their territories afraid others will take over or specialise in their area.

Ideally, an organisation should make an exit strategy when there is no longer a need for their services or the targets cannot be met. However, some organisations will either change their target or make extra efforts in reaching their target. “There is an idealistic side to humanitarian aid and there is a pragmatic side to it.”

Jane continues with explaining how XXX operates in the South of Jordan, because most NGOs are operating in the North. This way they cater to a small refugee population, but have less competition from other organisations.

### **Annex 6: Aisha**

When a staff member of any organisation in Zaatari encounter a torture survivor, the staff member will refer the person to XXX for further assessment. At XXX a case manager will conduct the initial assessment, thereafter mental health staff will make a further assessment and a treatment plan. A mental health nurse will provide the client and family with psychosocial treatment. XXX’s psychiatrists will prescribe medicine if necessary and do monthly follow ups. Moreover, the patient’s recovery plan gets updated every 3 months.

XXX do not have a specific torture rehabilitation program or a holistic approach, but they treat the different psychosocial symptoms that the patients might have such as PTSD, depression, suicidal, etc. Nevertheless, Aisha recons that it is sufficient and no specific treatment of torture survivors are necessary.

Furthermore, Aisha points out how well the referral system works making sure everybody receives the right assistance. She says there is plenty of work and that they can easily reach their target of minimum clients, in fact the refugees want to be helped and so they come to XXX themselves asking for assistance. She seems reluctant when I address the issue of the minimum quotas.

When asked about the quantity of torture survivors in the camp, she guesses the number to be large.

Aisha received an important call and stepped out leaving her colleague to take over.

## Annex 7: Fatima

Fatima informs me that UNCHR contacts them in case of the encounter of a torture survivor during the screening process in Rabba Sarhem. Previously they experienced a lot of stigma when seeking help, but now it is more common and socially accepted.

Fatima guesses 20% of the refugees in the camp has previously been exposed to torture, the waiting time is roughly 2 weeks and the treatment can last as long as one year. She also believes that there is no need for specific treatment of torture survivors. There is a support groups for refugees with basic war trauma, which is almost all of the camp, according to her.

XXX is best suited to treat mental health issues because they are the only mental health INGO who also have psychiatrist, according to Fatima. MDM, MSF and the Moroccan hospital all have psychologists as well and can treat torture survivors. Additionally, XXX keeps developing the staff via trainings, she informs me.

When asked about the NGO competition in Zaatari, she initially explains how it's fine with so many organisations in one place and that they all fulfil a role. When I dig deeper into this subject and ask her if she really doesn't think 62 organisations are too many, giving her examples of several organisations overlapping especially on the youth and CBV areas, she lowers her voice and admits that on some areas there are too many organisations covering the same ground. She seems frustrated, nervous and defensive when I ask more questions on this subject. However, she is very reluctant to elaborate on the subject of competition inside the camp.

Majhoul interrupts Fatima and begin to answer on her behave. He is clearly nervous due to my questions about the relationship between the organisations in the camp and tries to smooth things out by saying that all the organisations have a good relationship and that the only problem might be that most of the organisations are located in district 1,2,3 because that was the original geographic area of the whole camp, it has since developed into 12 districts.

It became paradoxically to me when I asked if they could feel any difference in the number of clients, referrals and competition for beneficiaries or difficulties fulfilling the quota from last year when the border was open and the camp was still receiving refugees from Syria, and now, where the boarder is restricted and all new refugees are

send to Azraq, closing Zaatari for new arrivals. It seems logical that a decrease in the need for their services would appear, however that was not the case according to XXX.

### **Annex 8: Jack**

The demands of the donors for documentation, both when applying and evaluation, has increased through the years. Is that bureaucracy or is it justified demands, probably both.

Large institution who handled billions of crowns and tax payers money, then it is what is and probably necessary. In the old days, there were not this demand for documentation, they just handed you some money and then you spend it. However, it is larger sums that are being granted now a day. When operation with funding in these sums it must bet his way. It must be accepted that there is control when operating with funds of this seize.

Technical speaking concerning budgets can be enormously tiring, due to different donors having different threshold on what they accept and what they do not accept. That can be very difficult coz we operate with a patchwork of donors who all contribute to our fund. They have different templates and restrictions, which makes it a big challenge to handle.

A very big challenge now a day is the anti-terror restrictions. We have to live up to many restrictions and mechanisms while proving that the donor funding does not end up in the wrong hands. That is very difficult when operating in the Middle East. But it is different from donor to donor how they handle these restrictions. There is a lot of bureaucracy and technical restrictions when handling and taking into consideration for funding. That means that there are some of the smaller NGOs that cannot compete or apply for funds coz they cannot handle the process that is sad coz they often have a lot of capacity in the field.

Often they make partnerships or consortium with various organisations to centralise the process of applying. Furthermore, the donors are having difficulties handling all the organisations, so they tend to have few partners, but large funds and so they can

distribute to their partners. It is becoming more often to make a consortium with a secretariat who handles funds, this causes a lot of internally bureaucracy, it is very complex.

We have grants managers who only works with funding. It is becoming more normal to have staff who are specialised in grant seeking who know the different donors specific demands, such as the eu, us or uk. It is very rewarding having specialist in this field to make sure this is done correct. If the restrictions and guidelines are not followed you risk not receiving the funds. It is very complicated. The whole documenting, reporting especially in finance is very complicated.

Partner organisations have to report to us when funded from us. They demands stretch all the way to the local partners. The local partners have very different levels. Often they have difficulties meeting the demands set by the donors, they do not have the staff or expertise. That is worrying coz here in ME it is most often the local partners we use, coz they have the field knowledge and the ground expertise that is needed. We as NGOs have to be better at assisting them in the documentations, support and capacity building so that they can meet the demands.

A lot of competition for donor funding even though we all claim to be humanitarian assistance, there is a lot of competition. We specialise in different areas and if you are unique you'll be taking into consideration. However in the more generic areas there is a lot of competition. It can be both good and bad. It can be very destructive it can also enhance the achievements and competition often makes sure the best is provided.

LFA: we must acknowledge accountability. We must document what we do in quantity but also the impact of our projects. The large amount of funding must be accounted for by a general oversight. It reflects on the resources on the manpower, if you have staff specialised in it then good. But usually the people in the field are very good at their job, but not necessarily at frameworks. It's conflicting both being good at documenting and good at implementing, so we are starting to separate those two.

Earmarked funding: is everything for XXX. For some organisations they depend mostly on log frame funding. In XXX they have approximately 3 billion crowns in funds, out of those 50 million crowns are not earmarked funding – the rest is.

Msf: privately financed, a greater liberty and free funds.

Country collection as the one seen in dk on the 20<sup>th</sup> of September: 86 million are not a lot of money in comparison to other funds. It is a lot of money but a drop in the ocean. What is important is the value of symbol. The Danes got engaged and that important. However, not earmarked – can be used on new project which potential donors would not finance that gives them more value than the actual money, coz they have freedom to spend them on new project.

Decrease in governments fund for developing countries: it is best to assist refugees where they are. But Denmark has decreased the funds for u-lands bistand. It will affect the Danish humanitarian organisations operating everywhere. He took his own example. 25-30 % of funds are from the XXX government, if that were to be cut it would have great impact.

It is a huge problem if the governments are cutting the u-lands bistand. Even though a lot of the money still goes to Syria, then another area will need money.

It is correct, that there has never been given so much money to the Syrian crisis as now, however, the problem is that the need has increased as well. The issue is, that the money fund has increased 1:3, but the need has increased 1:12, so the gap is bigger than ever even with the increase in funding. So if the Danish government is to cut it would be disastrous. It is the whole global bistand, when talking about humanitarian ass. And relieg org. is so small in comparison to foreign aid to governments all over, 1% is to humanitarian aid, the rest to development all over the world, imagines if that number was increased by just 1 %...

### **Annex 9: Sophie**

External review as described in the review. A collaboration between XXX and MFA, control on three countries.

She thinks it was a constructive dialogue to optimise the collaboration.

Good tools for evaluation: LFA log frames for evaluating and ensuring that the program is progressing accordingly. Quarterly evaluations of the whole programme in order to ensure the right progresses.

She says they have a good dialog with the partners and that she sees herself as their equal. Furthermore, XXX is only donors in an administrative sense. XXX has a responsibility to their donors who have a responsibility to the public, as it is the tax payers money that are used for these programmes.

According to her, XXX has a good understanding for the contextual framework. That in the log frames, there are risk incorporated which allows for flexibility as a result of the rapid changing environment they operate in.

The donor funding they receive from the MFA has to correspond with their own development strategies and civil society strategies.

She informs me of other government donors and especially the the EU where there is a large administrative and resource burden in accountability log frames. The issue with other donors tend to be that they are very project oriented and do not think long term. Additionally they are very result oriented and lack ambition.

### **Annex 10: Jessica**

The logical framework approach is used in 95 % of the cases. The pool of free funds is very small and is used in very particular way it is designed to be used along the way for emergency cases, e.g. inside Syria. It can be different at other organisations. The new partner organisations do not know how to make the LFA yet, but they are working on capacity building and training for the partners, so they can make the LFA and they can evaluate better.

I work with evaluation, so I do think the LFA is a good approach due to its structure and accountability and monitoring. I do not know if there are other approaches that would be better or easier, but we need it for accountability and evaluation. We cannot just hand out money.

There is no flexibility in the LFA ones it is in the matrix, you have to make a good LFA from the beginning. Bureaucracy depends on the donor, but it takes quite a lot.

Some donors are more demanding and requires more than others. However, it is a matter of responsibility and accountability.

### **Annex 11: Observations**

During my fieldwork, I encountered several paradoxes and contradictory statements.

Every time I asked for an interview or questions relating to the atmosphere between the organisations in the camp, the organisation refuses to answer and refereed me to UNHCR.

Contradictory statements of no internal competition in the camp among the NGOs, and there is still plenty of gaps to be filled out by donors. However, there is no need for a new psychosocial NGO.

Organisations accountability to their beneficiaries and a common target to do what is best for the refugees should always be their highest interest. In order to facilitate the best possible services, sharing information should be a priority.

I am contemplating that there could be a fear of sharing info due to government interest, donor funding, donor cutting, competition over funding, programmes not good enough, higher expectation for value of funding. Disagreements about to how to handle the situation. It's a highly volatile situation, strict Jordanian government. Illegal cross border activities.