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Introduction

Decision making in Foreign Policy has been highly debated in the past decade. Since 9/11, decision makers across the globe were faced with difficult decisions, decisions that had the potential of changing the decision makers' legacy, and furthermore change the geopolitical dynamics. In the decision making process the individual, I shall argue during this thesis, plays a crucial role in determining outcomes. Personal beliefs and convictions are key in understanding decision makers' inclination to decide between specific options available. When a decision maker is faced with a decision, beliefs serve as a way of channeling information, and furthermore enables the decision maker to perceive and relate the gathered information in order to implement policy concerning the intentions and behavior of other states. (Shapiro, 1973, p. 161)

The purpose of this thesis is to, through a case study, with application of relevant theoretical frameworks; exemplify how decision-making affects foreign policy and thereby international relations. To understand decision-making, we need to understand how information processing and various biases affect decision-making.

One of the most crucial foreign policy decisions made since 9/11 was the decision to engage Iraq militarily in 2003. This decision divided the international community and illuminated differences in policy and beliefs between states that historically have been allies. A minority of western world leaders decided to invade Iraq despite international disagreement and public opinion being rather negative on the subject. The US led 'coalition of the willing' was following the plans and decisions of the Bush administration. A close circle of decision makers played an integral role in designing and planning which course of action to take against Iraq. In Europe, only two countries chose to support the US coalition with armed forces, Denmark and the UK. Other European nations supported the coalition, but not with military forces.

Prime minister of Denmark from 2001-2009 Anders Fogh Rasmussen describes President Bush as a "Straight Shooter, a man who likes when people speak their mind and are direct in their message, Fogh is the same type of man, according to himself (Rasmussen, 2010) Fogh describes Bush as a man who, when conducting foreign policy and making

decisions, relies heavily on the personal angle. (Rasmussen, 2010) These similarities in personalities have influenced the bilateral relationship between Denmark and The US greatly, and Denmark, according to Fogh, are perceived as a close ally that Washington listens to. This is another possible reason behind why the Danish government acted as it did during the buildup for the war on Iraq. There are certainly many more but the interpersonal relationships between the global decision-makers is a key aspect in understanding decision-making processes.

As Fogh describes Bush: "*He detests when someone says one thing, then does another(...) on the other hand he gives special treatment to those whom he feels he can trust(my emphasis)*" (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 15)

Decision-making processes are a complex term to explain and analyze. Decisions are being made every day, all the time. Some decisions are more important than others are. Through this thesis, I will examine one of the most crucial decisions in Danish foreign policy history. The decision to go to war in Iraq. This I will do by applying new theoretical angles to the case. Theoretical approaches tailored specifically towards explaining the complex concept of decision-making in foreign policy.

Problem formulation

My problem formulation and research questions are as follows:

“How was the decision making process within the Danish government during the buildup for the Iraq war, and how did the role of the individual decision makers in the Danish government affect the decision on the Iraq war”

The following questions will serve as guidelines for the thesis

- How does Mechanistic Realism & FPA explain the role of the decision maker in foreign policy, and how is these explanatory factors applicable to this specific case?
- What motives did the decision makers have for entering Iraq, and how did these motives influence their judgment of current events?
- Why did the government change positions on importance of following UN?

Relevance of the problem formulation

By choosing decision-making as an analytical focal point in my thesis, I set out to explore the reasons for the actions and decisions made by individuals in a political context. I intend to apply two theoretical frameworks to this term decision-making. This I will operationalize by conducting a case study of the Danish government's decision to engage Iraq militarily, as outlined in the problem formulation. The two theoretical approaches will be Mechanistic Realism (MR) on the one hand and Foreign Policy Framework (FPF) on the other. As I will elaborate on in depth in the theory part of this thesis, the reasoning behind combining these theoretical approaches are to examine how individual factors affect the decision-making process.

The Iraq war remains a highly debated topic in international relations. However, most of the academic research and debate focus on US actions and thereby is one-

dimensional in its outlook. (Garrison, et al., 2003) By combining two middle range theories and applying them in a Danish decision maker context, it is my aspiration to develop new angles to the debate on decision making within this case.

To summarize, the relevance lies in explaining the phenomenon decision-making from a new angle by examining a case that have been studied intensely. Therefore, the relevance lies in applying two middle range theories and test their explanatory power on decision-making in foreign policy, something that is often done by applying grand theories, which are not capable at explaining decision-making accurately as it is not a focal point of the grand IR theories. (Mearsheimer, 2001) My assumption is that the theories I have chosen will prove more valuable and offer new explanatory power to my case study.

Methodology

Research Strategy

The research strategy I have chosen is to conduct a single case study. Conducting a case study requires that the researcher commits to a strict set of methodological guidelines. By being aware of avoiding threats to the validity by keeping a chain of evidence, the case study is a tool for testing and investigating rival explanations to specific problems. (Yin, 2009, p. 3) Using a case study as my method allows me as a researcher to uphold a holistic approach in terms of maintaining a meaningful explanatory model for real life events, (Yin, 2009, p. 4) in my case a decision. Case studies can take many shapes and forms but the core of all cases are the unit of analysis. Often case studies will have individuals as the units of analysis, but events such as a decision or a decision making process can also be the focal point and thereby the unit of analysis. (de Vaus, 2006) Yin actually defines the case study as a research method in the following way *"The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that It tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result."* (Yin, 2009, p. 17) Another reason behind my choice of conducting a case study is the fact that case studies rely on multiple sources of evidence which need to converge and thereby also

benefit from prior developments in theory to guide the data and analysis forward in the desired direction. (Yin, 2009, p. 18)

The main research strategy I intend to use to process my collected data will be Document Analysis and Source Criticism. Documents are chosen as the primary data because it allows the researcher to gain insight in otherwise unattainable information, given that the researcher are able to retrieve those documents, which if not done are one of the pitfalls of using documents. (Yin, 2009) However, I have been granted legal access to 10.000 classified and declassified internal government documents in the relevant timespan. This poses both a great strength to my thesis, but also a great challenge. A researcher has to be aware of the potential bias when analyzing documents. (Yin, 2009, p. 103) Especially government documents, which are inclined only to portray attitudes shared by those decision makers within the government. To avoid this pitfall I will use my background as a bachelor student of history and apply my knowledge and tools I have gathered, for interpreting and analyzing documents from a critical perspective. It is also important to acknowledge that sometimes bias in documents are not necessarily a weakness, but a strength because of the biases they reveal. (Bryman, 2012, p. 550) This argument applies to my case where I aim at illuminating a decision making process, therefore the potential bias will only support the full image of this decision making process. Source criticism is therefore an integral part as to why I am confident that I am able to collect the right data, using data collection plans combined with my tools for analyzing and interpreting documents I argue that this is the optimal source of data to base my thesis on. To take further steps to avoid the pitfalls of using documents I intend to apply media articles with statements from the decision makers in question, this in order to test their internal communication with their external communication in order to discover differences or similarities in the way the decision makers interact when operating on different arenas. Finally, I intend to apply theory as a central element to my data, this in order to strengthen the academic character of the thesis and to base my conclusion on academic valid frameworks incorporated in the thesis. More on theory in a later section.

Research Design

At the most basic level, a research design is a plan which connects the initial research question to the empirical data and finally to the conclusion. (Yin, 2006) The aim for the research design is to guide the researcher in the process of collecting and interpreting data, which then enables the researcher to analyze and interpret the findings into conclusions, which are relevant to the research question posed. (Yin, 2006) In my design figure (see below), I have chosen to illuminate the different steps needed to take in order to conduct my research. A research design however is much more than just a work plan, the primary focus of a research design is to ensure that the research question collaborates with the collected data and the conclusions. (Yin, 2006) Yin outlines five components, which are crucial for a research design. A) Study question, b) propositions, if any, c) units of analysis, d) the logic linking the data to the propositions, e) the criteria for interpreting the findings. (Yin, 2006) As I have accounted for in the previous section, my thesis includes these phases, with the exception that I have chosen to pose structured research questions instead of propositions in order to guide the thesis writing process and to ensure the structure of the process of answering my problem formulation. Yin describes the propositions as "*something that should be examined within the scope of the study*" (Yin, 2006, p. 7) It is in this way I intend to put my research question to use. They are written with the purpose of guiding me in the direction needed to answer the problem formulation. Thereby one can see the research questions as identifying specific goals in the research that needs to be examined for the problem formulation to be analyzed satisfactorily.

To summarize, on a general level my research design consists of the five already mentioned parameters. By designing my case study in this manner I aim to include the reader in the process of how to approach this thesis and furthermore to in detail show my methodological dispositions in regards to problem formulation, study questions, units of analysis, linking data with study questions and finally criteria for analysis and interpreting data.

Research Process & Design Figure

My research process began with identifying my topic of interest. As I have always had a special interest in foreign policy after 9/11 and especially Iraq after 9/11, it was naturally to include these themes in my thesis. Thereafter I began to research the problem area, which meant to acquaint myself with the literature on the topic as well as the academic debate. Finally, in my initial research I gained access via a journalist to 10.000 documents about the Danish governments actions in the months before and after the decision to invade Iraq. From that point on, I started to elaborate on my research question and incorporating decision makers and decision-making processes into the equation, as this field has been a focal point in my studies so far. During the process, I also applied for further legal access to documents that had been left out of the access granted to the Journalist Bo Elkjær, years before. This access was granted in early March and consisted of documents that illuminated the negotiation process leading up to the proposal b118. This proposal was adopted on March 21 2003, and authorized Danish military engagement in Iraq.

Specifically the design of the thesis is a case study that revolves around decision-making and the case - the Danish government's decision to invade Iraq. The analysis will be actor driven, which means that the decision-maker will be the parameter that controls the flow of the analysis. Hereafter chronology and theory follows as secondary parameters. The purpose of designing the analysis this way is in order to explain differences in explanatory power of the theoretical approaches and furthermore to gain a broad perspective on the decision making process by analyzing it from several angles. Finally, the findings of my inquiry is presented in a conclusion, which will collaborate with the rest of the sections in the thesis in order to tie up loose ends and display the essential findings of the thesis.

Choice of Theory

The theoretical framework for this thesis consists of two theoretical branches within IR theory. First is Mechanistic Realism (MR), a middle range theoretical approach to foreign policy developed in 2013 by Johannes Gullestad Rø. (Rø, 2013) The second approach is what I shall call Foreign Policy Framework (FPF) This theoretical approach I have extracted from FPA and Negotiation Theory. By extracting concrete analytical tools, it is my aim to operationalize the concepts of these theories on specific cases. It will also strengthen the explanatory power, because each tool can be applied separately or in collaboration with others. It will be interesting to apply the theories side by side in order to discover differences in explanatory power and ideology. Finally, as I will argue, negotiation theory is applicable to FPA and falls within the framework of FPA. Therefore, I find it natural to include negotiation theory and FPA under the same umbrella that I shall call FPF.

Briefly put FPA consist of three levels of analysis. 1. Individual level, 2. State level, 3. Systemic level. These levels of analysis are somewhat the same sphere as Kenneth Waltz three-image theory. For my thesis, I have chosen to delimit the thesis from applying the state and systemic level as this is not a point of focus for my research. A possible weakness occurs when eliminating state and systemic level analysis, namely the fact that FPA in its purpose outlines the three levels of analysis as being the analytical tools for obtaining a more thorough analysis of foreign policy, this by taking all factors into account. By applying all three levels, FPA aims at being able to illuminate differences in the way foreign policy is conducted on different arenas. Whether it be an individual level, within a state or in an international arena. I recognize the fact that in my tampering with the theoretical framework of FPA, I run the risk of removing some of its explanatory power. However by focusing on the individual level and with the incorporation of negotiation theory in my FPF framework it is my objective to create a framework for analysis, which explains how the individual affects all three levels, and how the individual may be seen to be at the core of all foreign policy decision-making processes. Negotiation theory offers nuances to the individual level analysis within FPA, and because of the fact that negotiation theory is not a fully developed theory in itself; it is strengthened greatly by leaning against the structural foundation that FPA offers, because it is more developed structurally. By incorporating negotiation theory into FPA

it is my aim to strengthen the validity of the explanations offered when conducting an individual level of analysis in the FPA frameworks.

Mechanistic Realism offers a micro level analytical framework within the realist tradition. Rø developed this framework because of the dissatisfactory explanatory power realism offered to US policies after 9/11. (Rø, 2013) Rø aims at utilizing causal mechanisms as an explanation for these policies. A mechanism centered research strategy is an alternative to the instrumental ideal where theories are aimed at understanding, rather than “aspiring to provide a truthful rendering of the phenomenon of one’s interest”. (Rø, 2013, p. 7) Rø further argues that mechanism-based explanations in social sciences enable the theory to focus on the individual decision maker instead of the state, as is the case with realism. Rø argues that while his theory rests on the foundation of John Mearsheimers Offensive Realism, it differs from this in many ways. While realist in its outlook, MR focuses primarily on the individual decision-maker and the cognitive implications of decisions made by an individual. Offensive Realism on the other hand assumes that the structure of the international system, and factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power are what determine international politics. (Mearsheimer, 2001) Mearsheimer himself argues that Offensive Realism pays little attention to individuals and recognizes this as a weakness in Offensive Realism, however he points out that: “...under these circumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short, there is a price to pay for simplifying reality. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 11) MR is my choice of theory exactly because it is focused on the individual level, by breaking Realism and Offensive Realism into small fragments, called mechanisms MR enables me to apply each mechanism separately to my data in order to explain the decision making process more precisely.

For my research, I have chosen to pair FPF with MR. These two theoretical branches interact in a more collaborative way when FPF is focused on one level of analysis. By combining these theories I wish to illuminate decision-making processes, decisions made by individuals and my theory are therefore chosen to underpin this objective while remaining true to the core foundation of IR theory. By applying these theories to my case study, they guide the thesis as to what observations to make, thereby testing the explanatory power of the theories. (de Vaus, 2001) This makes my reasoning

deductive, meaning I wish to test an abstract theoretical proposition against a real life event; in this case, the decision by the Danish government to participate in the American led military action on Iraq. By developing a problem formulation and elaborate with research questions, the theory testing will enable me as a researcher to assess if the theory is supported, and if so it should account for certain evolving themes in international relations theory. By testing the theory on empirical case studies, either the theories validity are confirmed, or the need for further development or even dismissal of the theory will become evident. (de Vaus, 2001) When testing the theories on empirical data it is important to be skeptical regarding the research, as when searching through data it is always possible to find evidence that is consistent with the theory, however it is more interesting and relevant to seek evidence that provides a compelling test of the theory. (de Vaus, 2001)

International relations theory is a broad field of highly developed theoretical approaches. I have chosen the theories mentioned from a perspective of relevance to the case, and from a careful deliberation as to what frameworks explain the term "decision-making" more thoroughly. Based on the above I have chosen not to include Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, at least not in their pure form. These grand theories seek to explain the international community, the globalized world and international relations. They tend to have less focus on foreign policy specifically and are more state-orientated than focused on individual decision makers.

Literature Review

The literature review serves multiple purposes in an academic research paper. Primarily the literature review illuminates the context of the study while also identifying the boundaries and limitations of the inquiry. On top of that, the literature review situates existing literature in a broad historical context, pinpointing what has been learned and what has not. (Beile, 2005 vol. 34) A thorough literature review will also increase the theoretical and methodological usefulness of the study and the results obtained on the foundation the literature review offers. (Beile, 2005 vol. 34)

Early Decision-Making Literature

The study of decision making in foreign policy is rather new. One of the first scholars to introduce the individual mental factors such as cognition and information processing was Michael J. Shapiro in 1973. (Shapiro, 1973) Shapiro's work about cognitive process and foreign policy decision-making aims at explaining decision-making through new methods and assumptions. First, Shapiro argues that decision makers receive information, process it through their personal belief systems and then reach conclusions on how to act on the gathered information. This cognitive explanation model he operationalized by creating a computer model in which participants were to participate in a research where their cognitive patterns were identified and then dilemmas were presented to them. (Shapiro, 1973) Conclusions from Shapiro's research were that the beliefs and convictions within a decision maker is the crucial parameter that determines how information is processed, how the decision making process unfolds and finally how the decision maker will act. Shapiro found that decision makers tend to believe that international conflicts are causally related and therefore they try to understand the actions from other states based on relationships and underlying events. (Shapiro, 1973) Shapiro's research was one of the first to acknowledge that personal belief systems among decision makers are a crucial parameter for foreign policy conduct.

Four years after Shapiro's work, Bertram Spector published an article called "Negotiation as a Psychological Process" (Spector, 1977) Spector further introduced the individual factor in decision making to the theoretical field. Spector explains negotiation as a psychological process, and the factors that are important in this process are highly dependable on the actors that act within the negotiation process. Spector in 1977 developed a micro level analytical framework, which explains the main factors in analyzing negotiation processes from a psychological point of view. By illuminating the actual step by step process of a negotiation, where negotiators are required to make their positions clear, negotiate deals with concessions and demands, and arrive at outcomes, Spector says negotiation can be viewed as interpersonal dynamics, and that these dynamics result in outcomes that are either more or less satisfactory for the participants in the negotiation. Spector outlines four indicators, which the resolution of conflicting interests are motivated by.

1. The individual personality needs of negotiators
2. The personality compatibility among negotiators representing opposing parties.
3. Negotiator perceptions and expectations of the opponent – his strengths and weaknesses, his intentions and goals, and his commitments to positions
4. Persuasive mechanisms employed to modify the bargaining positions and values of the opponent to achieve a more favorable convergence of interests. (Spector, 1977)

Spector concluded that this model of analyzing negotiation processes - and thereby decision-making process - offers researchers a structured framework that apply to various cases with different levels of complexity. (Spector, 1977) Spector's work elaborated on the implementation of psychological factors such as belief systems and cognitive tendencies when analyzing foreign policy decision making. However, the field of international relations theory at this point in history still to some extent negated the fact that these parameters were important to analyze thoroughly.

The International Relations Perspective

Classical Realism on the most basic level assumes that human lust for power is the primary motivation for conflicts to arise. On top of that, the focus in Realism lies on the nation state, the centrality of the nation state and the image of the nation state as a unitary rational actor dominates classical Realist literature. (Folker, 2013) In 1979, Kenneth Waltz rejected the assumption about human nature as a source of conflict. (Waltz, 1979) Instead, Waltz created "structural realism after the cold war" which rests mainly on scientific expectations. (Waltz, 2000) Classical realism alongside with Waltz' Neorealism are the ground pillars in the literature of Realism. I mention these brief overviews of Realism, as it is on this foundation that John Mearsheimer in 2001 with his acclaimed work "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (Mearsheimer, 2001) brought Realism into the new century. Mearsheimer's work introduced a new branch of Realism called Offensive Realism. With this new perspective of Realism, Mearsheimer suggest that the struggle for security and power and the way the international system is constructed makes it prone to war. (Mearsheimer, 2001) Mearsheimer, as his predecessors, however, fails to acknowledge the importance of individuals as part of the equation in explaining foreign policy. Mearsheimer himself admits that this is one of

the limitations for Offensive Realism when he says; "*The theory pays little attention to individuals*" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 11) One of the fundamental problems with grand IR theories are their lack of explanatory power in regard to foreign policy in general and decision making specifically. To account for decisions that are more specific within the framework of foreign policy one has to apply more "fine-grained theories" which are adaptable to explain specific cases within their field of study, (Mearsheimer, 2001) this could for example be FPA, MR, Negotiation Theory or Role Theory.

Where grand theories such as Liberalism, Constructivism or Realism explain general tendencies and developments in International Relations, they lack explanatory power on the individual level analysis and the importance of this aspect is often neglected. Therefore, it is relevant to examine the theoretical literature on this matter and evaluate the progress within the field. It is important to understand that recent literature on decision-making is often inspired by previous work about International Relations. One example is the rational actor model. This model is key in determining the individual decision making process today, however, the rational actor model is realist in its roots. Both Waltz & Mearsheimer developed the rational actor model from a state point of view. The rational actor model suggests that states seeks to maximize power and minimize losses while operating in an anarchical system. (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010) This way of thinking is the foundation for much of Rø's work with Mechanistic Realism where security, anarchy and power maximization play important roles. The difference is that the actors in middle range theories such as MR or FPA, are the individual decision makers, where in grand theories, states are the actors. This difference in emphasis calls for explanatory propositions, which grand theories do not include. This calls for a revisit to the concept of cognition and personal belief systems that Spector & Shapiro introduced in the 1970's. Cognitive models often oppose the assumption of the rational actor model. Because the focus now has shifted to the individual, one has to take into account the mental processes such as the mind's inability to "*carry out the complicated calculus of the rational model*" (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 8) Robert Jervis in 1976 published "*Perception and Misperception in International Politics*", where he elaborated on the cognitive model. Jervis argues that the role of decision makers in both psychology and in International Relations theory is not adequately discussed.

Scholars of international relations have a tendency to think of actors as perceiving the world correctly, and fail to recognize the margin for errors that individual decision makers cause. (Jervis, 1976) Psychology is important in understanding the individuals' role in foreign policy; however, Jervis criticizes the existing literature for focusing on emotional factors instead of cognitive factors. Jervis, like Shapiro, developed a model for understanding foreign policy decision making without relying on emotional factors that will vary from individual to individual. Jervis argues that through cognition models he is able to detect and synthesize patterns of decisions made by individuals in order to gain insight into how decisions are formed and how information is processed and perceived by different kind of decision makers. (Jervis, 1976) Based on these academic contributions from IR scholars such as Waltz, Mearsheimer and Jervis, alongside with the work of Spector and Shapiro, there has in recent years been produced more and more literature which focuses on the individual decision-making process in foreign policy.

Contemporary Decision-Making Literature

In 2007, Valerie Hudson published the book "Foreign Policy Analysis" where she accounts for the view that the human decision maker is the ground of IR theory in general and that it applies to FPA. These decision makers are not strictly rational actors, but instead they are subject to many different types of influences that affect their perception and thereby their decision making process. (Hudson, 2007) Generally, Hudson's book elaborates all of the factors that influence decision makers in a foreign policy context. She accounts for the political psychology of world leaders alongside with groupthink and group decision making. Her contribution to the field of decision-making are valuable when put in relation to the book "Negotiation Theory and Research" edited by Leigh L. Thompson. (Thompson, 2006) Because Hudson's work to some extent lacks the theoretical backing for her propositions, Thompsons work is essential for understanding the foreign policy aspect of decision making from a theoretical point of view. While aimed primarily at business negotiations and organizational dilemmas, Thompson's book proves valuable in introducing concepts and theories that on an abstract level conceptualize decision-making. (Thompson, 2006) When this is done, Hudson's work is more applicable to various cases as the theoretical backing from Thompsons work will actually underpin points made by Hudson. Negotiation Theory and Research offers models of how to identify which

parameters are important when analyzing why negotiations fail. Here it presents the argument that decision-making is actually one of the cornerstones in why negotiations often fail. The factors that Hudson in FPA writes about, such as Cognition, Psychology, Emotion and Belief systems are surprisingly the exact reason for why negotiations fail, according to several contributions in Negotiation theory and research. This is a testimony to those who propose that individual decision makers do not act from a rational model perspective, but instead are influenced by the circumstances in the specific situation.

It becomes apparent that there are two different streams within the literature of decision-making. There is the IR branch, which in large part does not acknowledge the individual decision maker as an actor, but instead views the state as the rational actor. However, many of the concepts of Realism are important going forward and therefore the literature on this matter is relevant. The other branch consists of those concerned with the cognitive and psychological aspects of decision-making. These theories or propositions lack the general foundation that IR theory has. FPA, MR, Negotiation Theory and Role Theory, however, offer different explanations than the common theoretical approaches. Therefore, it is relevant to expand on the existing theoretical work within this field and furthermore to find new combinations and levels of application to real foreign policy issues in order to test these new explanatory models of foreign policy decision making.

Theory

Mechanistic Realism

Mechanistic Realism is grounded in Realist values. John Mearsheimers work "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (Mearsheimer, 2001) is a point of reference, on top of which MR is developed. Rø argues his choice of Mearsheimers work as a starting point this way: "...Mearsheimers...book...was immediately hailed as a classic that deserved to supersede the works of Morgenthau and Waltz. ... Clearly, since the book is considered a major theoretical advance with striking operational clarity, any attempt to invigorate realism would have to engage Mearsheimers rendition" (Rø, 2013, p. 39) Rø further explains that Offensive Realism as Mearsheimer calls his take on Realism is

more concerned with foreign policy and that it explains state action and how decision-makers think and act. (Rø, 2013) Mearsheimers work is less abstract than previous attempts made to account for Realisms explanatory power, (Rø, 2013) and this fits hand in glove with Rø's ambition of taking Realism to the lowest level of abstraction in order to extract the mechanisms, which shall explain foreign policy in a mechanism driven analysis of foreign policy. This is also the aim of MR as a whole. Rø explains that the purpose of his work is to invigorate realist analysis of IR, and doing it by utilizing the idea of explanations by mechanisms. (Rø, 2013) Furthermore, Rø outlines that he aims at demonstrating MR's explanatory power by applying the mechanisms to the Bush administration's foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11. (Rø, 2013) Hereby both the theoretical purpose and the practical way of achieving this purpose is outlined alongside with Rø's theoretical stance.

Rø has fragmented Realism and created what he calls a black box of mechanisms, which individually enables him to analyze concrete foreign policy events and thereby strengthen the understanding of decision-making processes. As mentioned Rø is testing his theory on the case of the Bush administration's foreign policy decisions after 9/11. My aim is to test further, the explanatory power of MR by applying it to my case study. To clarify I do not wish to repeat Rø's work. He has already tested MR on the US perspective. By testing MR to the Danish government's decision process of entering Iraq I am further testing the explanatory power of MR. If MR proves valuable in explaining this case, it would strengthen the validity of the theory as a whole. This because multiple cases carefully selected, can identify the specific conditions under which a theory may or may not hold. (de Vaus, 2001)

The motivation behind developing a new explanatory framework within the Realist paradigm is to enable individual level analysis of political psychology, something that existing realist theories lack because of their focus on state behavior and the international system. (Rø, 2013) On top of this, Rø's book builds on the assumption that psychological and behavioral regularities continue to influence decision making in foreign policy under shifting and evolving circumstances.

Mechanistic Realism - The twelve Mechanisms

In order to utilize MR as an analytical framework in this thesis, it is necessary to present the twelve-standalone mechanisms. By presenting each mechanism, it will allow me to apply each mechanism separately on my data without explaining the reasoning behind each mechanism each time.

The first mechanism is "**The primacy of security**". This mechanism argues that national security is the number one priority of a state in an anarchic world. This suggests that the security of a state is the highest-ranking goal among decision-makers and that they are inclined to make decisions that will ensure this: "it is generally accepted that it is uncontroversial to suggest that states aim to survive." (Rø, 2013, p. 49) This mechanism is in its outlook a pure repetition of core realist assumptions about the structure of international relations. However, Rø argues that this mechanism holds sway on a psychological level when analyzing decision makers' actions. Because it is a fundamental human motivation to be secure and therefore it is rooted in, basic human needs to aspire and act in a way that will provide security. (Rø, 2013) This mechanism is the foundation on which the other mechanisms rest. Hence, this assumption about the primacy of security must be accepted if the rest of the theory is to make sense.

According to Rø this assumption is uncontested and is "trivially true" (Rø, 2013, p. 49)

The second mechanism is "**Observation and fear**". This mechanism explain how states observe and interpret the actions of other states. Decision makers will draw conclusions based on factors such as increased military spending, new technology, forming of alliances, political statements and economic success. (Rø, 2013) These conclusions will often be negative and interpreted in a way that will make decision-makers act based on fear and emotion, and use cognition, which directly links to emotion. (Rø, 2013) This assumption is one of the core themes in realist thinking. Mearsheimer argues that fear among states is the main reason for war, but also recognizes that there among decision makers is a distinguished difference between the actual perceived power of a state and the potential power of a state. (Mearsheimer, 2001) This is important when dealing with the case of Iraq, as it was exactly the potential of power Iraq possessed, which drove the coalition of the willing to war. (Fogh, 2002) (Cheney, 2002) One pitfall for both decision makers, but also for researches analyzing decision makers is to be aware of the

fact that fear induced by observations, as is the case in this mechanism, has to be accurate. If the beliefs are inaccurate because of lack of information gathering or lack of trustworthiness of the gathered information, then the beliefs, and thereby the foundation on which actions are taken are unwarranted. Thereby Mechanism 2 is highly dependent on proper rational belief formations based on the information available to the decision makers. (Rø, 2013)

The third mechanism is “**Uncertainty and fear**”. This mechanism is rooted in the anarchical structure of the international system as well as in the focus on the individual decision maker. Because of the structure of the international system, decision makers are uncertain of the intentions of other political leaders, which fosters fear because of the human inclination to be suspicious of the unknown. (Rø, 2013) When decision-makers interact with each other, they have no real assurance about whether or not their counterpart has the motivations and intentions that he/she expresses. Inconclusive evidence will cause fear because decision-makers cannot conclude that they are not under threat, and therefore they are inclined to conclude the opposite. When decision makers are faced with actions from opposing leaders that can neither be interpreted negatively or positively, they will react with fear because decision makers in an anarchic structure will be notoriously pessimistic. (Rø, 2013) Fear comes along not only because of cognitive evaluation of an opponent's capabilities but also as a; “*cognitive by-product of imperfect epistemological circumstances*”. (Rø, 2013, p. 51) This means that in psychology uncertainty is a permissive condition for fear to arise. Other examples would be that certainty of a secure desired future would foster the feeling of content and the certainty of an undesired future would foster the feeling of despair. In this case, uncertainty is the key word in the mechanism, and uncertainty fosters fear within the decision maker and thereby inclines him/her to react negatively to uncertain perceptions. This mechanism assumes that decision makers will be suspicious even though they are not suspicious by nature, because of the imperfect epistemological circumstances which according to Rø is a common feature of foreign policy decision making (Rø, 2013)

The fourth mechanism is “**Counter-wishful thinking and fear**”. When observing acts of generosity, cooperation or friendliness from opposing states, decision makers will

sometimes, due to the anarchical structure (mechanism 1), perceive these actions in a negative light. This pattern of reactions seems unlikely on the surface. Nevertheless, because of anarchy in the international system, suspicion against even friendly acts is nurtured. (Rø, 2013) The fear of acting complacent and thereby increasing the vulnerability causes the decision makers to act against logic and interpret gathered information with suspicion. Rø does not offer deep explanations to the underlying factors for the roots of this mechanism. He acknowledges that this mechanism is somewhat weak with respect to psychological plausibility. He highlights old sayings and quotes such as; “We easily believe what we fear” & “beware of Greeks bearing gifts”. (Rø, 2013, p. 52) These arguments about distrust among opposing parties in general I find rather weak in explaining the mechanism. The argument about the anarchical structure is viable, however if anarchy explains this mechanism how can it also explain the previous mechanism which to some extent contradicts the purpose of this mechanism. That being said, it is hard to deny the existence of counter wishful thinking in foreign policy. With regard to the case of Iraq, it is obvious that counter wishful thinking was within the behavioral pattern of decision makers. Shortly after the adoption of UN resolution 1441, demanding full cooperation from Iraq, Iraq actually met these requirements. According to Chief of the UN inspectors Hans Blix, Iraq cooperated eagerly and even proactively with the UN. However, decision makers in the US, UK and Danish government interpreted these signs of cooperation and compliance in a negative way, stating that Iraq had toyed with the west before, and now they were doing it again. (Powell, 2003) Therefore, this mechanism must be taken into account when analyzing decision makers' actions. However, the foundation on which this mechanism rests is rather weak in my assessment.

The fifth mechanism is “**(a) Power maximizing, (b) Power preservation and (c) Power amassment within reasonable limits**”. This mechanism is concerned with three different branches of how decision makers obtain, preserve and develop power in different circumstances. 5a argues that: “*Based on situational awareness, decision makers seize any opportunity to maximize the power of their state*”. (Rø, 2013, p. 53) State leaders seek to maximize the power of their own state through distribution of power. This is done by disrupting the existent status of power among states if there is a positive outcome for

the decision maker in the pipeline. Security still remains the overall objective for the decision maker but when under the influence of mechanism 5a decision makers are compelled to design their external behavior in a way that will increase the likelihood of increased power. Mearsheimer talks about how the quest for security can transform into “a goal of unlimited self-extension” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 43) meaning that the means for increasing power and security can be so ambitious that it can be interpreted as a considered decision to act in a manner that will ensure that the objective of increased power is met. Rø argues that even though a state has a relatively large amount of power it will not make the decision makers of that state inclined to be content with that situation. On the contrary, he argues that the satisfaction of power distribution pales in comparison with the satisfaction of supremacy. (Rø, 2013)

Mechanism 5b is concerned with power preservation and is defined by Rø as follows: “Based on situational awareness, decision makers seize opportunities to preserve the power of their state when the marginal returns of power amassment are either insignificant or fail to outweigh the costs.” (Rø, 2013, p. 55) While mechanism 5a is clearly in line with Mearsheimers Offensive Realism. Mechanism 5b are affiliated with Kenneth Waltz structural Realism. 5b contends that decision makers are not focused solely on security but that they also seek to balance the power distribution and are content with maintaining and preserving the existing balance of power, given that this balance in general is satisfactory for the state the decision maker represents. (Rø, 2013) Decision makers under such conditions are inclined to operate with the goal of status quo. The triggers for what motivates decision makers to act from the perspective of mechanism 5a or 5b are according to Rø something that has yet to be identified in international relations theory. (Rø, 2013) However, after events play out, the mechanisms have explanatory power in determining the reasoning behind why decision makers acted as they did. Furthermore, it is not a case of one or the other. Jack Snyder has articulated that the two theories (offensive & defensive realism) could explain decision makers' actions in various circumstances. (Rø, 2013, p. Snyder in rø 55) Offensive Realism or mechanism 5a explains the actions of revisionist states, whereas defensive realism explains the actions of status quo states. More precisely, different circumstances account for actions taken by decision makers that are making decisions

and therefore are inclined to go with either mechanism 5a or 5b. The point is that the same decision maker can shift from 5a to 5b if circumstances change.

Mechanism 5c applies to calculated decision makers that want to gain the advantages from both mechanism 5a and 5b, without having to utilize all of the aspects of each mechanism. Rø defines 5c as; *“Based on situational awareness and mindfulness of the likely signals of policies consonant with mechanisms 5a and 5b, decision makers seize opportunities to show resolve, advance forcefully and display strength within reasonable limits hoping to deter conflict without sparking any”*. (Rø, 2013, p. 57) This mechanism explains decision maker action from a point of reason. When operating under this mechanism, the decision maker evaluates options and while having the goal of security and power as outlined in 5a, the decision maker is also aware of the risk of conflict and the advantages of status quo as outlined in 5b. From this perspective, the decision maker will act after calculating pros and cons in each situational circumstance. Thereby the role of the decision maker in this mechanism is to amass power within reasonable limits. (Rø, 2013)

The sixth mechanism is **“The primacy of military means”**. For this mechanism, it is important to distinguish between soft power and hard power. When states and their decision makers react to threats, conflict or other situations, which requires action, they have different options; different tools available in their arsenal. Tools such as economic sanctions, cultural developments and diplomatic negotiations carve out the soft power tools a decision maker can utilize. Hard power tools are mainly characterized by military means. Given these available options, decision makers - when operating under the influence of this mechanism - are inclined to believe that military power in all effects will prove superior to other tools in the toolbox. (Rø, 2013) However, it has to be noted that Mearsheimer introduces the concept of calculated aggression. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 37) Here he argues that while leaders tend to operate offensively, they are constrained by their capacity to achieve the desired results. Because of this constraint, the decision maker will make a calculated analysis of the cost and benefit of the mission at hand. This implies that the decision maker will only use military means as the primary tool if they believe that the goal can be achieved rather easily. (Mearsheimer, 2001) Rø, however, argues that because of the uncertainty of other leaders' motivations and actions as

accounted for in mechanism 2 and 3, the decision makers are inclined to trust only the use of military means, as soft power tools makes the decision maker vulnerable to exploitation from deceiving motives by its opposing leaders. (Rø, 2013) Even though the cost of applying soft power tools are generally lower than the use of military power, the decision maker sees the conflict as a matter of life and death. (Mechanism 1) He thereby decides that the only way to be secure in answering the perceived threat with sufficient means is to trust the military actions that through history have proven reliable in obtaining and preserving power. One final thing to be aware of is that the inclination for the decision maker to use military means is higher when opposing a weaker enemy than if opposing an equal in terms of power distribution. This applies heavily to the case of this thesis.

The seventh mechanism is “**Self-help thinking**”. States cannot depend on others for their own survival, and therefore policymakers choose not to deposit their aim of security in the hands of other states or supranational organizations. Exactly because there is no global government or a supranational authority, anarchy rules and this inclines decision makers to act based on their own interests and thus utilizing self-help thinking. When operating under this mechanism, decision makers are unwilling to let other states or the international community influence their policies on the issue of security politics. (Rø, 2013) Self-help thinking is an obstacle when dealing with international cooperation, because the interests of the decision maker’s own state will always trump the need for multilateral cooperation. Only in a case where the cooperation is beneficial and in large part risk free for the decision maker, will they support cooperation between competing nations. It is on the individual level that factors such as fear and egoism are most plausible, (Rø, 2013) and therefore the role of the decision maker in a negotiation climate is highly relevant to the outcome of the negotiations. Again, this mechanism rests on the foundation of the first three mechanisms. The assumption that survival, anarchy and fear dominate the interaction between state leaders is once again illuminated in this mechanism. The psychological plausibility within the individual to act based on own interests is strong because of the fact that humans’ strongest desire is to survive. (Rø, 2013)

The eighth mechanism is “**Precautionary action**”. The concepts of fear and survival also affect decision makers when operating under the influence of mechanism eight. Because the stakes are high when dealing with security politics, the cognitive inclination to be on the safe side are strong, meaning that it is preferable to overdo policies of security rather than underestimating them. The uncertainty of the motives held by opposing leaders causes the decision maker to act with precaution. Rø argues that: *“the way to cope with existential uncertainty at the level of interpretation is to impose operational certainty at the level of response”*. (Rø, 2013, p. 60) To lower the level of abstraction let me clarify that this argument means that decision makers cannot control or resist their urge or predisposed dispositions of fear and uncertainty. Therefore they seek to control what they can control, namely their response tactic. Even though the decision maker often does not know the nature of the threat, they would rather prepare for a threat that later proves harmless than not preparing for a threat that proves dangerous for the security of the state the decision maker represent. This mechanism suggests that under uncertain circumstances, decision makers will tend to pay special attention to the worst-case scenario and act accordingly. In doing this, factors such as economy and scarce resources are underlying but not dominant. The possibility of conflict causes a high degree of caution within the decision maker, this because the consequences of conflict and not having prepared sufficiently for a conflict are potentially damaging for the security politics – the number one objective. (Rø, 2013) Therefore the worst-case scenarios come to play a dominant role, even though it might not be the most logical course of action for the decision maker. This mechanism is highly useful in explaining the actions of the US in the aftermath of 9/11. The US National Security Strategy from 2002 brought back the preemptive war as a tool for obtaining national interests, and this marked a shift in international politics. How this mechanism will apply to the Danish negotiations in 2002/2003 I will test and explain further in the analysis.

The ninth mechanism is “**Timing**”. This mechanism links with mechanism 5, since timing is essential when evaluating what time is the best to power maximize or to power preserve. Decision-makers will especially try to time their actions right, if they believe that circumstances are likely to change in their favor in the future. There are different

types of situations in which timing is important. If a dictator is about to die or resign, counterparts might wait using offensive capabilities, or if the climate is very warm or cold at particular times of year, a decision maker might decide to arrange the use of military means around these extreme conditions. (Rø, 2013) This was the case with the Iraq war. The US did not want to fight a war with the Iraqi army in the midst of the summer and therefore pushed for a war in the early spring of 2003. (Woodward, 2004) This mechanism, while important, is not a crucial factor for decision makers if there are other agendas at play. If the security is objectively threatened, the decision maker will not hesitate to use offensive capabilities even though the timing might not be perfect. However, in the decision-making process, timing is a factor, and if the threat faced is not regarded as imminent then timing will have sway over *when* to use offensive capabilities, more than it influences *if* to use them.

The tenth mechanism is “**Geography**”. This mechanism is - like the previous one - a factor for the decision maker when conducting a cost/benefit analysis of whether to deploy military resources into a conflict. If there is water between states in conflict, the decision maker might be tempted to hold off aggression. This of course mainly applies if the objective is to concur territory across vast oceans. (Rø, 2013) When oceans can deter decision makers from attacking another state, it is also a source of complacency within the decision maker, following the logic that if the decision maker cannot succeed in attacking its opposition because of the stopping power of water, then this goes both ways, making the decision maker more secure. This mechanism speaks against power maximizing and against precautionary action. All a part of the cost/benefit analysis. It is not known which of these mechanisms holds sway in a given situation. (Rø, 2013)

The eleventh mechanism is “**Power distribution and deterrence.**” This mechanism rests on the assumption that decision makers are aware of the power balance in the world society and that this effects the decisions from a cost/benefit point of view. They will consider the possibility of retribution and the cost of the operation itself given the strength of the opponent. In light of these considerations, the use of offensive capabilities might seem less appealing than at first glance. This is a cause for situational awareness and does not speak in favor of power maximizing in distinct circumstances.

Rø argues that the overall power distribution system will make decision makers hold off on offensive measures, given that the relative power of the state the decision maker represent will not be promoted by offensive engagement. (Rø, 2013) Rø sees this mechanism as having strong plausibility in a psychological context, because fear of retribution is a strong disadvantage in the mind of the decision maker, which inclines the individual to hold back and be complacent. (Rø, 2013)

The twelfth and final mechanism is “**Regional hegemony**”. Simply put, this mechanism explains that if a state reaches the status of regional hegemon it has succeeded and will feel relatively secure. This mechanism suggests that regional hegemony encourages decision makers to be complacent and not seek to power maximize as suggested in mechanism 5a. These two mechanisms are in conflict with each other on a general level. When a state has regional hegemony, there is no imminent threat, there is no state nearby that can cause unstable circumstances for the regional hegemon. This lies in the definition of the word. Thereby, decision makers have no cause for fear of their survival, security or success. Fear being one of the driving arguments for using offensive capabilities, the absence of fear will incline decision makers to act differently and with more considerations to the costs than to the benefits. This mechanism only applies to regional hegemony (Rø, 2013) and thereby it is for regional hegemons only that it applies that the tendency to amass power will diminish. The sole objective for regional hegemons is to ensure that no other states achieve this status. It is important to be the only regional hegemon in the world. Measheimer explains: “*The ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the existing distribution of power.*” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 42) Mearsheimer further argues that USA has held this position for some time as the “offshore balancer” (Mearsheimer, 2001) meaning that if regional powers, not hegemons, cannot solve their conflicts by themselves, the US will intervene in order to uphold the distribution of power, and thereby ensuring the continuation of the US as a lone regional hegemon in the world.

Conclusion on the presentation of Mechanistic Realism

With the presentation of the twelve mechanisms concluded, it is obvious that the mechanisms have individual applicability. (Rø, 2013) They can each be applied separately and they can be interpreted differently depending on the case onto which they are applied. However, while described as standalone tools for analysis, MR standardizes the decision-making process under anarchical structures. This is done by accounting for mental patterns that occur and recur under certain circumstances. (Rø, 2013) Thereby, MR offers analytical frameworks for how to interpret the decision-making process and the logical reasoning, as well as mental inclinations that are the base of the decision making process. As mentioned, anarchy is the primary logic of MR. Rø describes the influence of anarchy this way: *“the derived mechanisms account for how anarchy extinguishes diverging idiosyncratic temperamental or philosophical predispositions on the part of decision-makers.”* (Rø, 2013, p. 64) This assumption suggests that the decision makers' thinking is related to the mechanisms, which systemically arrange the action patterns of decision makers. As Rø himself notes, this is a bold assumption which needs further empirical testing. (Rø, 2013) However, it needs to be noted that by opening the so-called black box of realism and thereby illuminating its analytical tools, this increases the transparency of the theory and thereby makes the establishment of the theory's explanatory power easier to see. To summarize, MR offers new perspectives to the interpretation of foreign policy while remaining clearly under the umbrella of IR theory.

Foreign Policy Framework

The purpose of this section is to identify clear analytical tools within FPF. First, the aim is to present the theories on a general level, while still allude to some of the analytical tools that are evident in the theories. In the section “Bringing them together”, I wish to systematize the tools and explain them as individual standalone tools. To some extent, the same framework as Rø has with Mechanistic Realism. I have chosen to do this to give the theoretical part more cohesiveness and to have analytical tools in both MR and in FPF. By using this method, I aim at illuminating explanatory mechanisms in the

theories involved, and putting them into the context of explaining decision-making in foreign policy.

FPA

One of the main arguments for developing FPA as a theoretical branch of IR is that FPA tries to look below the nation state as an actor in order to discover the individual decision-maker as an actor. (Hudson, 2007) The emphasis of FPA has since its departure in 1954 been on decision-making. Richard Snyder formulated this focus, in order to provide a systematized tool for determining the actions of the individual decision-makers. (Snyder, in Hudson, 2007) The motivation behind FPA is to understand foreign policy choice through a cross level analysis where both the individual, the state, and the systemic level are incorporated. However, Hudson acknowledges that this has yet to become reality and therefore she characterizes FPA as a middle-range theory as it stands now. (Hudson, 2007) Jervis argues that if all states and organizations behaved the same, then it would be fruitless to discuss the impact of the decision-maker. (Jervis, 1976) However, states do not act the same way, therefore part of the explanation lies in examining the decision-maker. Jervis outlines four levels of analysis. Hudson has three. What is important is that in FPA literature the first level of analysis is the individual level or the decision-maker level. This level is crucial for understanding general assumptions about state behavior in international relations. According to Jervis, one cannot ask an empirical "why" question about an event, without examining the decision-making level. (Jervis, 1976) This applies because by examining the decision-making level, it is clarified what individual factors affect the decision-making process and thereby state action

FPA acknowledges that it is not always an advantage to examine the decision-makers motivations for actions taken. Therefore FPA asks the question – *When* do leaders matter? (Hudson, 2007) There are different circumstances in which the leader or decision-maker are relevant to examine. One parameter important to examine is the leaders interest in foreign policy. If the leader lacks interest in foreign policy, much of the decision making power will be delegated to lower ranking members of the government. (Hudson, 2007) If such delegation of power turns out to be undesirable for the leader, he/she can then become interested in foreign policy if the context is important for the leader. In crises, problems will be handled at the top of the power

structure. This means that the leader will be involved and the lack of interest of foreign policy in general will be important because the general knowledge of foreign policy within the decision maker will not be adequate in order to ensure a calculated decision making process. Therefore, the leaders' interest in foreign policy and crisis situations will collaborate in determining the possible process of decision-making and thereby affecting the outcome.

Another parameter in FPA science about the decision maker is "Cognition and Information Processing". (Hudson, 2007) The human mind receives a vast amount of information each day. This information is processed through filters in the mind. Filters that decide what information are important and need to be remembered, and what information is needless to storage and therefore are quickly discarded from the mind. These filters consist of stereotypes, biases and personal experiences within the decision-maker. The filters are shortcuts for the decision maker to identify important information, and to simplify the reasoning behind choices that are later made. Hudson calls this cognition. (Hudson, 2007) Information Processing is another term for the way the decision-maker interprets the information gathered. This information will again go through the cognitive filters of the individuals and because of this, Information Processing and Cognition are intertwined.

"Perception" is another key parameter in FPA literature. Jervis work "Perception & Misperception in International Politics was a key contributor to this aspect of FPA literature. The term perception in the context of decision-making processes, Jervis explains as; *"Rather than trying to explain foreign policies as the direct consequence of variables at the three levels of analysis (...) we will examine the actors' perceptions as one of the immediate causes of his behavior"*. (Jervis, 1976, p. 30) Perception of information is crucial to the following actions taken by a decision-maker. What makes an individual feel threatened? When gathering information, uncertainty about the validity of the information inclines the decision-maker to perceive threat. There are both external and internal information that can cause the decision-maker to perceive threat. If internal communication are negative, it can influence the decision-making process. For example if the decision-makers advisors themselves have predisposed attitudes towards a conflict issue, their advice can affect the decision-maker. External

information can be the actions of a counter decision-maker. If the actions and words of the opposing decision-maker are unclear, threatening or hostile, they will plant the seed of fear in the decision-maker because of his perception of the information, which again are determined by cognitive parameters.

This leads us to the next concept of analyzing foreign policy; "Misperception" is to see the behavior of adversaries as more detailed and planned than it actually is. (Jervis, 1976) This is according to Jervis because human nature inclines the decision-maker to put the information gathered in to a desired box (Jervis, 1976), where the decision-maker is familiar with the action patterns that then follows. In order to simplify information and reaction patterns the decision-maker will interpret information in accordance with his own belief systems that enable him to act based on previously stored patterns. This is often undesirable and can be the cause for conflict and war. This because the misperception of actions by a counter-part can enhance the risk of the decision-maker turning to offensive capabilities in order to avoid a threat to security. Thereby the learning curve for the decision maker also play a part in the decision-making process.

The learning curve is interesting as Jervis also identifies the fact that decision-makers learn from history as a parameter for analyzing the decision making process. (Jervis, 1976) I shall call this "Learning from history". Decision-makers will look at history to answer questions about how to deal with current issues. By accessing information gathered by the experience of past events will provide a shortcut to rationality for the decision-maker. (Jervis, 1976) However, this also presents a problem for the decision-maker. The events transpired in the past on which the decision-maker can prove undesirable because the decision-maker are inclined to rely too heavily on experiences. This will cause premature conclusions drawn, as current events obviously will have different variables than past ones. Therefore, learning from history is only profitable if the decision-maker are able to use past experience in correspondence with current information and process the two in a well-balanced manner. Jervis argues that the inclination for the decision-maker to apply the lessons learned from a past event that resembles the current dilemma the decision-maker are faced with, are so strong that he might succumb to the pressure of relying on past events, even though he

is aware of the pitfalls in doing this. (Jervis, 1976) An example of this can be seen with President Bush's arguments about entering Iraq in 2003. He relied heavily on past experiences in the first gulf war, where the common assumption was that the US made a mistake by not overthrowing Saddam Hussein from power. Bush was determined not to repeat this mistake, which affected his decision-making process in a negative way because he did not have evidence to support the fact that the actions in the first gulf war was a mistake. (Woodward, 2004)

Negotiation Theory

Negotiation theory applies to several fields of study, International Relations is just one of these areas of interest. The process of negotiations can be approached from various angles. For the purpose of applying this theoretical branch of theory to my case, I have chosen to focus on the aspect of negotiation theory that Bazerman & Chugh calls "The Decision Perspective". (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006) The decision perspective operates with the term "bounded awareness" which can be explained as; *"an individual's failure to "see" and use accessible and perceivable information while "seeing" and using other equally accessible and perceivable information."* (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006, p. 7) Bounded awareness is therefore the ability of the human mind to focus on specific information while ignoring other information that are relevant and available to the decision-maker. The decision perspective consists of a few key elements. One is that negotiators operate under bounded awareness, another is the ability to identify the conditions under which bounded awareness occurs and finally to observe which kind of information is often ignored by negotiators. (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006) On a general level, one can argue that the concept of bounded awareness goes against the principle of the rational actor model. Negotiators are influenced by personal and ethical restraints when undergoing a decision-making process. Therefore, they are likely to see some available information but not all of it. Humans are inclined to process the information that supports their predisposed expectations to a decision process. We all know the feeling of "how could I miss that?" This occurs when we have the needed information available to us, but have failed to incorporate the information into our reasoning behind making the decision. Psychologists have suggested that this lack of ability to use all available information stems from neural regions in our brain, which causes "inattentional blindness." (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006) This assumption suggests

that decision-makers tries to react from a rational point of view but because they are bounded by their awareness to information they fail to act rational, merely as a result of not processing information that they fail to obtain even though it is readily available to them.

Bringing Them Together – FPF Tools

In the following, I will briefly outline the mechanisms I have extracted from various branches of FPA and from Negotiation theory. These mechanisms or tools will be a focal point in my analysis in order to shed light on the decision-making process in the Danish government leading up to the war against Iraq in March 2003. I have chosen not to have one analytical tool to rule them all, as the case is with Mechanistic Realism. The first mechanism of MR about anarchy as the societal structure of IR, in my opinion confines the rest of the mechanisms in order to live up to this rule of anarchy.

The analytical tools I have chosen to extract from theory are chosen because of their initial appeal to explaining decision-making in a foreign policy context. Furthermore, the tools represent different branches of research about individual decision-makers, how they act and think when they are faced with dilemmas about foreign policy.

The first MFA tool is *“Leaders Level of Interest”*

The second MFA tool is *“Cognition & Information Processing”*

The third MFA tool is *“Perception”*

The fourth MFA tool is *“Misperception”*

The fifth MFA tool is *“Learning from History”*

The Sixth MFA tool is *“Bounded Awareness”*

The seventh MFA tool is *“Wishful Thinking”*

Analysis

The structure of the analytical part of this thesis will be driven by three factors. First of the sections are actor driven with chronological order. This is done in order to ensure the flow of the analysis but more importantly to be able to identify and analyze the development in beliefs, perceptions and so forth, within the decision-makers involved. Finally, I will throughout the analysis use the theories as analytical tools, and possible explanatory powers. The mechanisms and tools will be applied to different empirical material continuously. By structuring the analysis this way, it is the aim to increase the transparency of the results achieved. (de Vaus, 2006)

Fogh as a Decision-Maker

Summer of 2002 – Possibility of War with Iraq Arises

In the summer of 2002, Denmark held the chairmanship of the EU. This gave the opportunity for Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller to meet with Colin Powell during an informal lunch, where they discussed the outlook of political themes in the period Denmark held the chairmanship. During this meeting, Møller asked Powell of the Bush administration's view on Iraq, and on Saddam Hussein. He asked because there were still uncertainty about the policies of the US with regard to Iraq. Powell removed this doubt. He told Møller that one should not question Bush's will to remove Saddam and that it could be done either with diplomacy or with military force. Møller stated after the meeting that Powell had ensured that the US would go through proceedings in the framework of the UN. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012)

It was also in July of 2002 that the British government was made aware of the desires and aspirations of the Bush administration. In a classified transcript of a Prime Minister meeting held on 23 of July 2002, the leading members of the British government discussed Iraq. From the transcript, it is evident that the UK had talked with the Bush administration about Iraq and how to deal with it going forward. An individual called "C" in the transcript outlines what he has been told in Washington about the American position on the matter;

“There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action”. (Rycroft, 2005)

This quote tells us that the British government in July 2002 was of the belief that military action was “inevitable” and that “facts were being fixed” This is interesting as standalone information for how this affected the British decision making process. However, in the context of this thesis the interesting thing here is that Møller apparently was told the opposite of what the Brits had gathered from their talks with US officials. That Bush was willing to go to war with Saddam is coherent in the message to both the UK and DK. Nevertheless, the terms under which the US would go about this military intervention could not be farther apart. The arguments in the British transcript are harsh, and if true a scandal on its own. What matters, however, is that it was the perception within the British decision-making group at this time, and it was the perception of Møller that the US would go through the UN. Here it is more important what the perceptions of US policy were for the actors, more so than what it in reality was.

Now we have established that the primary alliance collaborates in Europe: UK and DK, because of its chairmanship of the EU, were informed in the summer of 2002. The UK had even been told that the optimal timeframe for the US would be if military action started in January 2003. (Rycroft, 2005) Later in 2002, on the 26th of August, the justification of possible military action began to appear in public. Vice President Dick Cheney spoke before the national congress of American veterans. Here Cheney said; *“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us”.* (Cheney, 2002) This statement shows that already in the late

summer of 2002 the US articulated the belief that Iraq had WMD's. Cheney has no doubt about it, so it is to be considered as a fact then?

Two weeks after Cheney's quote, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, after a meeting in the Danish foreign policy council on September 6, said; *"I have no doubts in my mind that he (Saddam) has weapons of mass destruction and wish to manufacture them"* (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012, p. 158) Fogh is the key decision-maker within the Danish government. Therefore, it is interesting to note that on this early state he had no doubt about the presence of WMD's in Iraq. When asked if he had proof of this, he only repeated that he had no doubt about it. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012) On the same day General Tommy Franks, who was in charge of war planning for the Bush Administration, told Bush that while the UN and the US had been searching for WMD's in Iraq for the past decade. His conclusions were that he could not conclude whether or not there was any special weapons at any special place in Iraq. (Woodward, 2004) This, alongside with the advice of Colin Powell meant that Bush decided to pursue the UN trail in order to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein. On this matter, Bush called Fogh two days after the briefing he received by General Franks. The day after the call, Fogh stated in a press release that he supported the US ambition of seeking UN approval to make Saddam disarm unconditionally. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012)

On this initial stage of the period leading to the attack in March 2003, I wish to apply MR. More specifically I will apply Mechanism 2, six & eight. Mechanism 2 "Observation & Fear" is in effect in this period. Both when talking about international decision makers, but also in the statements we see from Fogh. Møller, who had a meeting with Powell about Iraq, briefed Fogh. This briefing we cannot know the nature of, but it is obvious that the US believe, at this point, that they had observed activity in Iraq, that should be a cause for fear. Mechanism 2 distinguishes between the actual power of a state, and the perceived potential power of a state. When Fogh on September 6 said that there was no doubt in his mind that Saddam was looking to manufacture WMD's he perceived the information he gathered from his subordinates in the most negative way possible. He fully operates under the assumptions of Mechanism 2, because he had not been able to verify information, and therefore he concluded the worst possible

scenario. In saying that there is no doubt in his mind, he removes the information gathering and the testing of the validity of the information, from the equation. Within this reaction pattern, Fogh relied heavily on personal beliefs and cognition. He spoke based on fear, he had observed activity that was troubling to him, but failed to verify the information, but choose to act on it anyway, by publicly supporting the US strategy towards Iraq. This leads me to Mechanism 8 – precautionary action. I established that Fogh observed information and perceived it with fear. Now how does he act on this information, given the way he has processed it? Assuming he operates under the influence of mechanism eight he would be inclined to overdo policies and go far to ensure that he was not deceived by his counterpart, in this case Iraq. How did Fogh react in this initial stage? He on September 9 supported the American strategy of seeking UN approval for putting pressure on Saddam Hussein to let UN weapons inspectors re-enter Iraq. Objectively this is within the reasonable limit of what one could expect, given that this has been something the UN has desired since being kicked out of Iraq in 1998. So far Fogh does not seem to operate under the structure that mechanism eight suggest. Three days after however, on September 12 at the UN general assembly, Fogh issued another statement. On the issue of what could be done about Iraq, given they did not meet the requirements of UN resolutions, he said; *"It undermines the authority of the UN, if he can just ignore the resolutions of the UNSC, without it activating a response one way or the other."* (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012, p. 160) Fogh opens the door for a response without UN mandate, thereby going further in his rhetoric than other European leaders. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012) It is arguably a possibility that Fogh are willing to set normal practice aside on this matter because he acts so strongly under mechanism two, and because of this he is actually adapting some of the features in mechanism eight. This is an interesting reaction pattern for the decision-maker because it illuminates a spiral of events caused by initial perception of fear within the decision-maker. To underline how strongly Fogh relies on his own perception, and thereby ignoring the factual information at hand, let me highlight this quote from the same day, September 12, 2002; *"In my opinion it would be an advantage to have clear evidence about what I think everyone knows is going on in Iraq."* (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012, p. 160) Fogh here acknowledges that evidence would be desirable in the given situation, however implicit in the quote is that since the

evidence is not present, we must act on what we “think” is going on. He relies on his personal beliefs, which are derived from perceptions of information gathering that he cannot verify and therefore jumps to conclusions that are negative, and then furthermore he speaks about acting on it outside of the established supranational organization – the UN. Therefore, the foundation for further escalation of the conflict is established because of the initial perception made by the individual decision-maker. Not to say that the basis for war is created here, but merely a possible escalation of the conflict.

Late 2002 – UN or US

From September 2002 and the following months, the UN worked on a resolution that would ensure that Saddam could be deterred. On the 8th of November 2002, the UNSC unanimously passed resolution 1441. (UN, 2002) Resolution 1441 contained several requirements for Iraq to meet in order to avoid “facing serious consequences”. (UN, 2002) The requirements for Iraq was to cooperate fully and immediately with the UN weapons inspectors, led by Hans Blix. Furthermore, to account for all WMD’s they possessed or had destroyed. The council in the resolution made it clear that this was a “final opportunity” for Iraq to comply with the demands of the international community. (UN, 2002) If the council or the weapons inspectors discovered that Iraq did not cooperate fully with the UN, the resolution stated what the immediate consequence would be. In paragraph 4 of the 1441 resolution it reads; “... *failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment*”. (UN, 2002) In paragraph 12 it reads; “*(The UN) decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant council resolutions*”. (UN, 2002) Nations such as Russia, Germany and France had done extensive lobbying in order to ensure that the resolution was not a *carte blanche* for military action to be taken. After the passing of the resolution US ambassador John Negroponte stated that the resolution contained no “automaticity” or “any hidden triggers” (Shiner & Williams, 2008)

The Danish parliament supported the adoption of resolution 1441 as well. For the opposition it was important that the further proceedings against Iraq was anchored in the UN construction. Fogh echoed this view when he on November 15 said; *"We are convinced that Iraq possesses WMD's and therefore we must keep all options open. For the government however, it is important that there is no automaticity in breaching the UN resolution. If that happens, the Security Council must convene and in that way the Council is in control of the further developments. (My emphasis)"*. (Politiken, 2002) On an internal meeting held in "udenrigspolitisk nævn" & "forsvarsudvalget" on November 7 Fogh debated the threat Iraq posed and what stance the Danish government held in this regard. Attending the meeting was various experts on the field. Former Chief of the UN weapons inspectors, Rolk Ekeus, alongside with Professor in human rights and international law, Inge Østerdahl and former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. (Udenrigspolitisk nævn, 2002) Ekeus declared that when the UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998, they did not have any significant capacity of WMD's left. (Udenrigspolitisk nævn, 2002) Ekeus further stated that one of course, could not determine what Iraq had or had not done on this front in the last four years, as the UN weapons inspectors was denied access to Iraq in this period. Inge Østerdahl said that a unilateral American attack on Iraq could have serious consequences, and proceeded to say that this solution would not be desirable or legal. Scott Ritter stated that in 1998 Iraq had no WMD's and that war should only be used as a last resort if the international community had proof of the existence of WMD's in Iraq. (Udenrigspolitisk nævn, 2002)

With this information at hand Fogh answered questions on a meeting on November 14 2002 (Fogh, 2002) Fogh repeated what he said in September, namely that; *"we are convinced that the regime in Iraq today possesses WMD's and missiles"*. (Fogh, 2002) It is interesting that despite being briefed less than a week before, by experts who is of the opinion that it is unlikely that Iraq possesses WMD's, Fogh still is convinced about the fact. From a linguistic point of view, one could argue that 'convinced' is a slightly weaker rhetorical approach than 'no doubt in my mind'. This because 'convinced' suggests that others has influenced ones thinking and conclusions, while 'no doubt in my mind' relies more on one's own conviction on the matter. Thereby the responsibility for the actions that follows can be distributed elsewhere by using 'convinced'. More

importantly, Fogh argues that since the terrorist attack on 9/11, the international community has different views on various subjects, including Iraq. Fogh argues: *"There has not been established a connection between the events on 9/11 and the regime in Iraq, but there is no guarantee that Saddam Hussein would not be tempted to use terror as a measure for achieving his goals. We cannot ignore a possible threat like that. (My emphasis)"* (Fogh, 2002)

This period in November 2002 are crucial because the UN adopted the resolution 1441, which also helped spark the debate in Denmark. I will analyze the statements above alongside with additional ones made by Fogh in the period. I intend to apply MFA tools number two about Cognition & Information Processing, and number six about "Bounded Awareness". Thereafter I intend to apply MR mechanism three about uncertainty & fear, and mechanism four about Counter-wishful thinking.

Denmark was not a part of the UNSC in 2002, therefore Fogh and the rest of the Danish government followed the proceedings in the Council from the sideline. Fogh expressed support when the UN adopted resolution 1441. In addition, as stated above he clarified that the resolution held no hidden triggers. The briefing from various experts on the meeting November 7 raised some important questions about the foundation for the conflict with Iraq. However the conclusions from this meeting, are not apparent in the later statements made by Fogh in the following weeks. On the meeting it was concluded that it was unlikely that Iraq had WMD's, Iraq had no WMD's when the UN left in 1998, it would be a violation of international law to start a unilateral military action against Iraq without the backing of the UNSC. I have researched through vast material, articles as well as internal government documents and transcripts of debates in the Danish parliament. I have not been able to find quotes from Fogh that acknowledges these conclusions. I have the resume from the meeting held in "udenrigspolitisk nævn" (Udenrigspolitisk nævn, 2002), at this meeting, Foreign Minister Møller was present, as he was a member of the council. If Fogh was at the meeting or not has not been able to verify. It is however hard to imagine that the government would arrange a meeting with leading global experts on the field, without Fogh getting at least briefed on the outcome of the meeting. The government as a whole was represented at the meeting and therefore it must be assumed that the top-level decision-makers including Fogh

had knowledge of the conclusions. Assuming this is the case, Fogh is a victim of the sixth MFA tool "Bounded Awareness". Bounded awareness describes the decision-makers ability to see and process some available information, while ignoring other, equally available and relevant information. If in fact, Fogh has failed to recognize the issues raised at the expert briefing meeting it would seem like he is blind to the information. This according to the concept of bounded awareness is unintentional, but is caused by neural inclinations within the decision-makers brain. Whether this is the case, is of course impossible to test without performing extensive research on Fogh. It is entirely possible that Fogh deliberately chose to ignore the information either because he did not find it relevant or because it did not support his agenda. The only thing that can be said for sure is that he had access to the information but did not use it in his external communication nor did he use it in the internal communication I had access to. If we are not able to determine conclusively that MFA tool six is sufficient in describing Fogh's communication in this period, let me turn to tool number two "Cognition & Information Processing". This tool rests on the assumption that biases, stereotypes and personal beliefs plays a role when a decision maker is processing gathered information. Fogh had in the summer of 2002 received information from the Bush administration, which suggested that they would go to war with Saddam; it was possibly easier for him to fail to recognize the importance of information that suggested that this was not the optimal plan going forward. On top of this, Fogh was in a war on terror with the US, which meant that Denmark was engaged militarily in Afghanistan. Now, late in 2002, Afghanistan was seen as a success, as the UN led coalition had won over the Taliban relatively easy. Fogh has never hidden the fact that he saw the US as a close ally. In Bush's autobiography "*Decision Points*" Fogh wrote the foreword where he stated; "*It is no secret that I for the most part agrees with President Bush (...) I shared his so called agenda of freedom*". (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 11) I have now lined up three situations where Fogh have information that supports the notion that it is in his best interest to support the US. 1. Fogh agrees with the agenda for Foreign Policy that Bush has laid out. 2. Denmark was already militarily engaged in Afghanistan alongside the US. Something that Fogh believes is important for Bush; "*He [Bush] was strongly focused on the fight against terrorism and was overwhelming in his praise to Denmark for the military contribution in Afghanistan*". (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 10) Finally 3. Fogh know that the US

administration is looking at all options with regard to Iraq, including military options. By invoking MFA tool two here, Fogh has established the cognition to support his statements about that he believes Iraq has WMD's and that the western world cannot ignore this threat. His personal beliefs are in line with Bush, his previous decision to participate in the Afghanistan operation rooted the new close alliance with the US in Fogh's mind, and it seems from his statements that it would be best for Denmark to continue down this path. The filters of beliefs, biases and stereotypes are in play here as we see. Tool number two however, also warns that these filters can trip decision-makers up. (Hudson, 2007) If the filters are very strong they can prevent the decision-maker from perceiving information correctly and instead assimilate the gathered information into existing belief systems held by the decision-maker. (Hudson, 2007) Whether Fogh at this stage in the decision-making process is assimilating information that does not fit in his belief systems are unclear. Mainly because he at this stage in the process continuously supports the UN and resolution 1441. On the meeting, I referred to before on November 14 where he answered questions from the parliament he said; *"The Security Council is best suited to handle the Iraq situation"* and *"President Bush Made it clear that the US would cooperate closely with the UN Security Council in relation to Iraq"*. (Fogh, 2002) I would not argue that Fogh assimilates the information from the experts meeting into his existing belief systems. What I find is that the strongest affect to Fogh's decision-making process is the actions and words of the US, and President Bush in particular. On several occasions in this period here in late 2002, he has echoed the beliefs and the policy intentions of Bush as outlined above. To summarize, I argue that to some extent Bounded Awareness and Cognition & Information Processing can account for Fogh's communication in this period. It lacks explanatory power in determining why Fogh relies so heavily on the DK-US alliance and his relationship with Bush. I see clear links between what transpired since 9/11 and late 2002, and I acknowledge that the MFA tools here outlined, pinpoints that this has caused an altered belief system within Fogh, which to some extent changes his decision-making process. However, it fails to fully explain why Fogh did not incorporate the advice given on the experts meeting into his decision-making process. The argumentation that because of neural regions in the brain it causes him to be intentional blind to some available information, (Hudson, 2007) is in my point of view extremely vague, as it does

not consider other factors. As mentioned before there can be several explanations for Fogh not using this information. I acknowledge that this is highly interesting especially because in the aftermath the conclusions made on that meeting turned out to be true in large part. I argue that the motivation for Fogh to follow the US line so closely is rooted in his personal relation to Bush, and his desire to have a proactive foreign policy instead of the classic more reluctant approach to foreign policy that Denmark has previously held; *"I will not just sit back quietly and not risk anything. I want Denmark to play a role, to set an agenda (My emphasis)"*. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012, p. 178) This quote from Fogh underpins his perception of himself as prime minister having aspirations on the behalf of Denmark. And this way of perceiving his role is interesting in regards to his decision-making process, which is something I will get back to later in this chapter.

End of 2002 & beginning of 2003 – The Path Towards War

In this section, I will briefly clarify what happened in the period from the end of 2002 and until March 2003 where the decision to go to war with Iraq was eventually made. The motivation for doing this section is that it is important to be aware of the proceedings in the UN and furthermore how the US acted in this period. However, I have chosen not to specifically analyze Fogh as a decision-maker here. Denmark was as mentioned not a member of the UNSC at this time, and because the events that transpired in these months are located in the body of the UN, Denmark did not play a large role in this period. Moreover, Fogh mainly in this period restated his support for both the UN work and for the US line. This is not to say that this section is not important. The events that transpired in this period are highly important for the decision-making process, which is also, why I have chosen to include them here.

US intelligence

On January 3, 2003, the US embassy in Copenhagen sent a classified report to the Danish government. The title was "Background on U.S. Position re Iraq". (Lawton, 2003) The report was distributed to allies to account for how the US had analyzed the 12.000 long page report that Iraq had handed to the UNSC, a report that should document that Iraq was cooperating completely and disarming totally. The US found the report anything but these things. They, the US believe that the report is inaccurate and untrue. (Lawton, 2003) In the report, there is an interesting sentence; *"Most brazenly of all, the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all"*.

(Lawton, 2003, p. 2) By using the term "brazenly", it is obvious that this denial by Iraq is neither recognized, nor believed by the US. Later they also state; "*We are disappointed, but we are not deceived*". (Lawton, 2003) Further; "*Saddam Hussein has so far responded to his 'final opportunity' with a lie*". (Lawton, 2003, p. 3) The plan ahead for the US is hereafter declared. They will ensure that resolution 1441 will be; "*carried out in full*" (Lawton, 2003, p. 3) and that Saddam Hussein will soon face the serious consequences that the resolutions language suggest. What these serious consequences consist of are however, not made clear.

Resolution 1441 was adopted on November 8 2002, as we know. Shortly after the UN inspectors, led by Hans Blix entered Iraq and started to inspect Iraq's military capabilities. His reports and findings turned out to be crucial in the buildup period for the eventual war on Iraq. Blix received the Iraqi report first, he acknowledges that the report did not hold much new information, but he also contends that giving Iraq, or any nation for that matter, 30 days to produce a full report of all chemical, military and technological activities is preposterous. (Blix, 2004) Blix did not find any smoking guns in Iraq in the first 60 days he was there. He noted that the international approach had changed since 9/11 and that especially US policies towards Iraq was much more intolerant and more focused on military solutions if Iraq did not abide the resolutions from the UN. On the change in how the international community dealt with Iraq, Blix noted; "*Containment and carrots were out, sticks were everywhere*". (Blix, 2004, p. 114)

On January 28, 2003, Bush gave his annual "state of the union" speech. Here he for the first time articulated the famous 'evidence', which claimed that Iraq had actively tried to buy uranium from Niger. This was an important argument, as it caused uncertainty and suspicions about the Iraqi regimes desires. Blix describes this turn of events as evidence that Bush increased the military pressure on Iraq. Blix further underpins this conclusion with the notion that Bush and Blair met on January 31 where they characterized the inspection process in Iraq as meaningless and Bush called the whole thing a charade. (Blix, 2004) Later it was revealed that the contract the UK obtained that supposedly proved Iraq's attempt to buy uranium, was forged. (Blix, 2004) This hurt the case of a unilateral war against Iraq because in order to act under article 51 in the UN charter, a nation must act in self-defense and respond to an immediate threat.

Without proof that Iraq had WMD's, article 51 could not be activated. (Blix, 2004) Therefore Bush and Blair sought a new resolution that would declare Iraq in further material breach of the UN sanctions, and thereby the UNSC would authorize armed action as part of the serious consequences articulated in resolution 1441. Bob Woodward in his work argues that this was a scheme by Bush. Woodward states that on January 13, 2003. Bush made the decision to go to war, because he had been informed by General Tommy Franks that the military buildup could not last forever, and that late March was the absolute last time to engage Iraq militarily. On this date he, according to Woodward told Rice that they had to go to war, and later that day he told Powell that he needed his support in order to proceed with the war planning. Bush supposedly told Powell to take on his war uniform, said as a metaphor. (Woodward, 2004) I write supposedly because the information from the meetings have yet to be confirmed by the individuals themselves. Woodward relies on different sources, such as Powell's chief of staff and other internal government sources. However, I find it important to take this precaution while still acknowledging that this information exist, given that it is extremely interesting if Bush in early January told his most trusted employees that they should prepare for war.

After only a few months in Iraq, the inspectors work was continuously evaluated by the member states in the UNSC. The US and UK believed that Iraq did not comply fully with the requirements of resolution 1441 and that they therefore had wasted their final opportunity to avoid serious consequences. The UK drafted a proposal for a new resolution in early 2003, where Iraq would have to show immediate cooperation and if the Council evaluated that they did not, armed conflict would be the result. (Faure, 2012) Blix notes that one of the great fears he observed when interviewing Iraqi personnel, as part of the inspections, was how to document that they did not have WMD's. They reckoned that if they could not present such documents, the world would not believe them. (Blix, 2004)

On February 5, on a meeting in the UNSC, Colin Powell presented the case of Iraq not complying with resolution 1441. During the 70 minute long presentation (Powell, 2003) the US administration displayed several new pieces of evidence, that had not been public before. After viewing the entire presentation, several key observations are to be

made. First, Powell says that his conclusions and statements are based on facts and intelligence that are solid. (Powell, 2003) Second, he plays conversations between Iraqi military personnel where they talk about evacuating a truck. Powell then shows satellite images of trucks in Iraq, saying they are mobile storage facilities for WMD's. This is according to 'sources', sources that are not specified further. Powell continues to display evidence of Iraq's alleged deception to the international community. It would be tiresome here to evaluate all the evidence presented during Powell's presentation. What remains the fact is, most of the evidence was later, after the war started, deemed false. In 2007 in a TV interview, Powell himself acknowledged that the evidence was false, and claims that he was misled in the preparations for the presentation. He explains that some of the evidence had so called 'burn notices' which means that one should not trust the source of the evidence. Powell claims that these burn notices never rose to the right level. (Powell, 2007) Powell says he was never informed about this and neither was the head of the CIA – George Tenet. Professor David Zarefsky has written a complete analysis of the presentation that Powell made to the UN. (Zarefsky, 2007) He argues that Powell in the preparations for the presentation was very critical of evidence presented to him, and that he discarded the evidence he did not find credible. (Zarefsky, 2007) It is however, not mentioned in Zarefsky's article if Powell was misled or not. Zarefsky concludes that the rhetoric approach to the presentation was in large part successful, and that if the evidence had turned out to be more correct than it was, then the speech would have had a lasting effect to how these kinds of presentations should be approached. The choice of Powell as the presenter was strategic, Zarefsky argues. Mainly because Powell was known as a skeptic of using armed action against Iraq. If the conclusion that Iraq had misled the world, and was in further material breach of resolution 1441, came from Powell it would bear more weight with the nations which were skeptical of a new resolution advocating military action. (Zarefsky, 2007) The fact of the matter is, at that time in history the presentation was very convincing. After watching it myself, I can understand why one could be swayed towards the US approach after listening to the presentation. The linguistic approach is direct and leaves little room for interpretation. The inclusion of audio and satellite images was at the time a new and exiting way of presenting a case. However, from seeing the presentation it remains clear that some evidence was not as clear-cut as the Bush

administration made it look. Powell many times said 'according to sources, and 'intelligence tells us' without going into further detail. On the accusation of Saddam Hussein's link to the terror organization – Al-Qaeda – Powell, at the meeting, even admitted that the evidence was dubious at best. (Powell, 2003) In the aftermath of the meeting, the presentation did not move the marker considerably in the UNSC. Russia, Germany, France and others still opposed a new resolution. They were more focused on giving the UN inspectors more time to finish the work. The US/UK alliance would no longer put up with what they called Iraq's deception, and therefore they pressed hard for further consequences for Iraq. The much talked about 'serious consequences' that are mentioned in resolution 1441 (UN, 2002) was described by Powell at the presentation this way; *"No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply"*. (Powell, 2003) Allow me to refer back to a previous section in this thesis where US ambassador John. D. Negroponte said, after the resolution had passed on November 8, that it contained no hidden triggers, and to Anders Fogh who said that the resolution had no automaticity build into it. So does Powell here supports this perception of the resolution? Of course not, quite the opposite actually. He argues that everyone knew that serious consequences is an analogy for armed conflict, as Blix in his work also points out is the fact. (Blix, 2004) However, this opens up for an interesting observation. Powell said that no council member held illusions about the meaning of the term 'serious consequences', apparently his own nation, the US held illusions about this if we are to take Ambassador Negropontes word to heart. It is hard to believe that this is the case; therefore, the responses by government leaders, ambassadors and so forth, after the adoption of resolution 1441 must be characterized as political spin. The real issue at hand is that the opposing nations led by France, Russia and Germany believed that armed conflict would require a new resolution – therefore they were not that concerned with the term 'serious consequences'. The US and UK did not believe at the time that a new resolution would be required and therefore the term was important to them. The UNSC was divided on the issue on Iraq, and all eagerly awaited Blix' quarterly UNMOVIC report to the UNSC on March. 7.

Blix gave reports to the UNSC on January 27 and on March 7. The meeting in March in the UNSC proved to be very important. Here Blix, for that last time it turned out, reported the proceedings of the inspections in Iraq. On the meeting, Blix presented the report on how inspections and the disarmament of Iraq went along. Blix reported that Iraq was cooperating actively and even proactively. (Blix, 2004) He furthermore stated that a full disarmament of Iraq would not take weeks, nor years, but months. (Blix, 2004) Finally, Blix concluded that the inspectors had not found any proof that Iraq had WMD's or an active WMD program. However, he also said that this was not to say that such weapons were not present in Iraq, just that they had yet to find any. These conclusions by Blix declared that within a year, he believed the UN inspectors would be able to determine whether Iraq possessed WMD's or not.

After the meeting in the UNSC on March 7. Negotiations of a second resolution continued. The UK proposal of a new resolution authorizing military action if Iraq did not cooperate fully within a very short timeframe was negotiated between member states. When French President Chirac told international media that France would veto such a resolution, negotiations stopped. The US/UK alliance did not want to put a resolution to a vote, one that they knew would be vetoed. Therefore, Bush on the 18 of March went on national TV and gave Saddam an ultimatum. Leave Iraq within 48 hours or war would be a reality.

Decision Time – Fogh's final decision-making process

Now that we have established the timeline for the international negotiation process in the immediate buildup for the Iraq war, allow me to reverse the chronology in order to examine the Danish decision-making process in general and Fogh's ditto specifically.

On January 30. 2003, Fogh together with leaders from UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic published an article in international media. The article supported the US approach and was a clear endorsement of US policies on the matter of Iraq. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012) (Champion, 2003) In Denmark, there throughout the process had been a unanimous perception across the parliament that Denmark supported the UN route more than anything else. This we see in quotes from various Danish politicians, including those key decision-makers within the government. Møller said to Berlingske in late 2002: *"If the UN route fails (...) fundamentalist regimes will*

rise and there will be terrorist actions (...) therefore the UN route is still the condition" (my emphasis) (Bjerre, et al., 2008) Fogh on January 28 2003 said: "I believe the political reality is that the five permanent members of the UNSC would have to reach agreement, if they want to pursue further steps in relation to Iraq. That would mean that the five permanent member shall negotiate a common position on the matter (my emphasis)". (Fogh, 2003) Fogh's various statements here combined with the article only two days later, where he expresses full support of the US line are puzzling. As earlier pointed out Fogh supported the UN route, but kept all options open. Fogh expresses different views, which also was noted by the leading opposition party – Socialdemokraterne. Jeppe Kofod said after the publication of the article in international media: "I thought we had established clarity on Denmark's policy towards Iraq (...) but with today's article Anders Fogh Rasmussen returns to being unclear about what the consequences might be if the consensus in Europe are destroyed. (My emphasis)" (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012, p. 178)

Because Fogh lingers between two different approaches to the policy on Iraq, it is hard to identify consistently under which theoretical influence he might be operating. Therefore, the analytical approach must be rooted in the eventual decision Fogh made, which was to lead Denmark into war with Iraq outside the UN. From this perspective, Fogh before the war spoke of two main reasons for engaging Iraq militarily. 1. The threat of WMD's was real and imminent and had to be dealt with. 2. Saddam Hussein regime had to be removed in order to create security in the region and in the world. Fogh in large part deterred from mentioning the promotion of democracy, which was one of President Bush's main arguments alongside the WMD angle.

Somewhere between November 2002 and March 18. 2003, Fogh and the Danish government switched positions on whether or not military action required a UN mandate. On the 14 of November 2002 Fogh said in the Danish parliament; *"The government believes the UNSC is crucial in international conflict resolution. Throughout the process, had the objective that a decision must be made in the UNSC"* (Fogh, 2002) And; *"... the Americans has listened (...) it wasn't exactly two resolutions we expected in September when the Americans started the debate in the UNSC. It was the because of encouragement from the EU which stated that it should happen within the body of*

the UNSC. It was the French demand of two resolutions, if it was to end in armed conflict. So the Americans has listened" (Fogh, 2002) Here Fogh speaks about the need for two resolutions before armed conflict can become a reality. This is shortly after the adoption of resolution 1441 on November 8. According to Powell, Fogh must be delusional here, as we recall Powell at his presentation in February 2003 said that no one had any illusions at the time of the adoption of 1441 about what 'serious consequences' meant. On March 17, 2003 a few days before the invasion of Iraq. These supposed illusions of Fogh and his government were gone. Speaking in the Danish parliament, Møller said; ... *we have not had a conclusion from the UNSC – the government have never asked for a second resolution"* (Møller, 19 marts 2003)

In Denmark there is a tradition going back several decades, that if Denmark is to participate in war, it must be decided by a vast majority in the parliament, this is not a law, but a tradition. Therefore, it is expected that the parties negotiate until they reach common ground across the political spectrum. On the morning of the 18 of March, Fogh and Møller met with the leaders of the opposition – Mogens Lykketoft and Marianne Jelved. (Bjerre, et al., 2008) In the light of Bush's speech, the evening before a decision had to be made. At this point, it was clear that the UN would play no role in the initial attack, something that had been a cornerstone in the political debate in Denmark. Fogh presented the facts, namely that the UN was out, the US would proceed and that Fogh believed Denmark should follow. After the presentation Jelved asked "*Is this a decision to be made, or has the government already decided"*". (Bjerre, et al., 2008, p. 78) Fogh replied, confirming that the decision had already been made. Thereby a decision to break the long tradition of cooperation across the parliament had been made and Denmark was headed for war.

Theory Applied

I will now proceed to argue which mechanisms from MR, and which tools from FPF I consider plausible explanations for Fogh's decision-making process. I will also identify those that contradicts the facts of the case, and therefore in this regard must be discarded as explanatory tools. There is no black and white with this kind of theoretical approach. When lining up several tools for analysis it is plausible that some will fail to explain the specific case. This however, does not mean that the theoretical approach

should be discarded entirely, as one of the strengths of this approach is to be able to apply them separately. Still I feel the need to point out both the strength and weaknesses of theories during this process. I will argue that Mechanism 1 "The Primacy of Security, Mechanism 2 "Observation & Fear", Mechanism 3 "Perception & Fear" and Mechanism 8 "Precautionary Action" are all applicable to this case. I will further argue that Mechanism 4 "Counter-Wishful thinking & Fear" and Mechanism 7 "Self-Help Thinking" fail to explain Fogh's actions as a decision-maker, and in some respects contradicts the facts. The rest of the Mechanisms in MR I will not use because I have assessed them as unimportant when analyzing Fogh. Keep in mind that Rø developed MR by analyzing the Bush administrations decision-making process. Therefore, I have found that some of the mechanisms only apply to what you would call a great power, to use Mearsheimers term (Mearsheimer, 2001), from which Rø developed the theoretical approach.

The tools from FPF that I argue, though analytical work, are evident here are Tool 2 "Cognition & Information Processing", Tool 3 and 4 "Perception" & "Misperception", Tool 6 "Bounded Awareness", and finally Tool 7 "Wishful Thinking". The tools that fails to explain this case are Tool 1 "Leaders level of Interest" and Tool 5 "Learning from History". Now let me show why.

MR mechanism 1 argues that the primary objective of a state is to feel secure and furthermore that it lies within human nature to feel secure. This mechanism explains down to the core Fogh's motivations on why he and his government choose to follow the US instead of supporting the European stance led by France and Germany. In an article in Danish newspaper Berlingske, he on March 26 2003 wrote; *"We must ask ourselves; who is better suited for guaranteeing Denmark's security? My answer is very clear. A North American Superpower better guarantees the safety of Denmark, than the fragile balance of power between Germany, France & the UK (My Emphasis)"*. (Fogh, 2003) As we see in this quote, Fogh's motivation behind deciding to follow the US into Iraq is the security of Denmark. Mechanism 1 outlines that this mechanism is the cornerstone for the rest of the mechanisms. Likewise, I argue that Fogh's explanation of the primacy of security is the cornerstone on which his other arguments on this matter rests.

Mechanism 2 & 3 regarding fear also played a role in the Danish government's decision-making process. The two mechanisms are intertwined because they both deal with the concept of fear. To refresh, the two mechanisms argue that when decision-makers observe actions from counterparts they get *uncertain* because they are not able to determine how these actions affect themselves or their state. The mechanisms then suggest that when operating under the concept of fear, decision-makers will base their decisions more on cognition and personal beliefs, more so than facts. Furthermore, that they will act negatively and based on the perceived potential future power of a counterpart, more so than the actual current power this counterpart holds. Early in the process, the Danish governments expressed concerns about Iraq military capabilities. On November 14 2002 in front of the Danish parliament, Møller spoke on this; *if we do not intervene, the country (Iraq) will probably develop their own nuclear weapon within this decade. What worse is, if they can get their hands on enriched uranium, they will probably have a nuclear bomb within a year"* (Møller, 14 november 2002) There are endless of quotes that underline this stance and also the position that Fogh believed that the Iraqi regime already possessed other kinds of WMD's as outlined in previous sections of this thesis. The fear of Saddam's alleged WMD's played a huge role in the justification of war, both internationally and domestically in Denmark. As we, all know there were no WMD's in Iraq, so this cause for such immense fear was unwarranted. This makes me think of a quote from former US President Roosevelt in 1932 said; *"the only thing we have to fear, is fear itself"*. (Roosevelt, 1932) This quote actually describes the situation with the missing WMD's in Iraq accurately. Fear is, according to Mearsheimer the number one reason for war. (Mearsheimer, 2001) One could therefore argue that it was the fear of Saddam and his military capabilities that was the problem if one wanted to avoid war, more so than the 'deception' and 'uncooperative' approach by Iraq, as Powell put it, in his presentation to the UN. I established earlier that Fogh saw Bush as a friend and that he supported the quest for freedom that Bush had launched. Because Fogh and the Danish government acted under fear, it can be argued that he relied more on the personal relationships he had internationally. He had before noted that he did not think highly of the German and French leaders. (Bjerre, et al., 2008) This argument comes apparent under Mechanism 2 and 3 because fear, according to the mechanisms enables certain behavioral patterns within the decision-maker, which

inclines him to rely more on cognition and personal beliefs. We know that Fogh believed in the Bush approach and this affected his decision-making process.

Mechanism 8 about precautionary action, as I see it, is actually an explanation of what follows if fear as a concept is a parameter in the decision-making process. As I established before the fear of Saddam Hussein's WMD's was an integral part of the debate and the justification for war. Mechanism 8 suggests that when leaders are faced with fear, they are inclined to act precautionary because they are afraid that if they do not, the consequences will be harsh. Decision-makers will then look to control what they *can* control – their response tactic. This mechanism's explanatory power is double-sided. Mainly because it is logic that a superpower such as the US, have complete control over their response tactic. This is not entirely the case for a state such as Denmark. Therefore, Fogh had to choose under which umbrella he wanted to operate – the UN or the US. For a long time he supported both branches and kept his options open. Fogh in fact took precautionary action, eventually. As he chose to follow the US, he prepared for the worst possible scenario, namely that Saddam had WMD's and was willing to use them, then he acted accordingly, just as mechanism 8 suggests he would. From the government's proposal set forth in the parliament, authorizing military action it reads; *“Disarmament of Iraq is necessary in order to eliminate the threat to international peace and security in the region”*. (Møller, 2003) The key here is to understand that Iraq did not attack anyone. They had before, agreed, but the international pressure and eventual war did not come as a response to an attack. This is unusual in international politics and therefore important to keep in mind. When Bush in 2002 launched his National Security Strategy, he also implemented preemptive strikes as a possible weapon the US would use. (Bush, 2002) Fogh and the Danish government was concerned that Saddam would pose a threat and therefore they chose to follow the US and thereby striking preemptively. Translated into the language that MR uses this would be characterized as precautionary action based on fear.

There are two mechanisms I find problematic when testing the explanatory power of MR on this case. The first one is mechanism 4 about counter-wishful thinking. It suggests that when observing acts of cooperation and kindness from opposing leaders, the

decision-maker because of anarchy and general mistrust will interpret such actions negatively. As we know, Iraq cooperated on some parameters, and was vigilant in other areas. I will argue that the acts of cooperation from Iraq was not a cause for the war. Granted, the US called Iraq's report to the UN a 'deception' but that was based on false evidence they had obtained as I presented in the section about Powell and the US evidence. The false evidence is important. Fogh believed that Iraq had WMD's and because he did, he would not be able to recognize Iraqi cooperation without it leading to destruction of such weapons. Søren Søndergaard of Enhedslisten asked Fogh about what sources he based his statements, about Iraq having nuclear weapons, on. Fogh answered; "... *the risk of Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons expresses the political point of view (My Emphasis)*" (Statsministeriet, 2003) Fogh here acknowledges that he has a political view, which suggests that Iraq could obtain nuclear weapons. That eliminates the essence of counter-wishful thinking because Fogh has a political view implicit it is his personal belief. In that light the actions of Iraq becomes less important in the decision-making process, apparently.

The other mechanism I find problematic and lacking explanatory power is mechanism 7 about self-help thinking. This mechanism suggests that the decision-maker only cares about the motives of the state he/she represents. From this point on, the decision-maker are unwilling to deposit the security of the state in the hands of other nations or supranational organizations. This flat out contradicts the actions of the Danish decision-makers in general and Fogh specifically. Throughout this thesis I have, through quotes, shown how Fogh supported the UN, and supported the US. In the article in Berlingske, I referred to when analyzing mechanism 1, Fogh wholeheartedly deposited the security of Denmark in the hands of the US. Here is another quote from the same article; "*The small countries in Europe, both those from the east and central Europe, knows, from history, that their security is best placed in the hands of the Americans*". (Fogh, 2003) From this, alongside with the earlier quote, I gather that Fogh believes that all small European countries including Denmark should deposit their security in the hands of the US. The mechanism also suggests that decision-makers are unwilling to let other nations influence their policies. However, one of the most intriguing processes I have accounted for during this thesis is the fact that the Danish government switched

positions on whether a UN resolution was needed for military action to happen. During this switch of positions, the Danish government was in large part affected by the British and US government and the intelligence those governments made available.

(Svendsen & Halskov, 2012) I will argue that this mechanism holds no explanatory power to my case; in fact, it describes the opposite of what happened. I acknowledge that this mechanism could potentially have explanatory power when operationalized on the Bush administration. One could argue that the US would not let the UN dictate their policy or be responsible for their security and therefore they choose to go to war unilaterally. For the purpose it had to serve in this case though, it failed to explain any of the actions taken by the Danish decision-makers.

Now let us turn to FPF and the tools for analysis it offers. The first tool I will assess the explanatory power of is tool number 2 about cognition and information processing. This tool suggests that decision-makers have filters into which information is processed. These filters consist of personal experiences, biases and stereotypes. Through these filters the decision-maker will then interpret the gathered information and process it accordingly. (Hudson, 2007) It is apparent that Fogh had several filters incorporated into his decision-making process. First, he had personal experience with sending troops into war because of the conflict in Afghanistan. Second, he had biases that favored Bush, whom he thought of as a friend; *"Bush does not like when people are unclear. I feel the same way and I think that was one of the reasons of why we got along as good as we did. (...) Washington listened to Denmark (...) criticism among friends has weight (My emphasis).* (Rasmussen, 2010, p. 15) This explicates the personal bias, which favors the relationship between Fogh and Bush. Since Fogh choose to support the US, one explanation could be offered from this tool. Namely that because Fogh and Bush had previously fought together, politically, in Afghanistan, Fogh was inclined to rely on this past experience and the personal trust and friendship he had with Bush. This can, in my assessment, only be a sub explanation of why events played out as they did. The stronger argument, on which this also rests, is that Fogh believed the security of Denmark was best placed in the hands of the Americans.

Tool 3 and 4 about perception and misperception are important for understanding the information processing from the previous tool. Tool 3 argues that uncertainty about the

validity of the gathered information will incline the decision-maker to perceive threat. As I have accounted for the chief of the UN inspectors, Hans Blix was unable to determine whether Iraq possessed WMD's. He only accounted for the level of cooperation from Iraq. This leads to uncertainty among decision-makers. As I quoted Fogh on earlier, he thought it would be nice to have evidence about those things that 'everyone' thinks is going on in Iraq. The US administration presented dubious evidence that Iraq violated UN protocol, and in the lack of solid evidence from the UN inspectors, this image of threat, presented by the US administration, was in large part accepted by the decision-makers in the Danish government. Tool 4 about misperception argues that when the decision-maker misperceives actions of a counterpart it is a cause for an escalation of conflict. (Jervis, 1976) This is because when misperception occurs, it means that the decision-maker will simplify the information into boxes of well-known reaction patterns. Let me exemplify by using the argument about Afghanistan. The US, and the western world was exposed to a threat with the attack on 9/11. This threat was answered by engaging Afghanistan militarily. In the initial aftermath of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, it was perceived as a success. Therefore when western leaders misperceives Iraq's level of cooperation and their factual military capabilities, it can be argued that this rests on the assumption that if they deal with this misperceived threat in the same way as they did in Afghanistan, it will prove successful once again. What I find is being overlooked, is the regional power balance. From my perspective, Saddam was unwilling to prove that he had disarmed completely concerning WMD's for one crucial reason. If he proved to the UN that he did in fact not have any WMD's, his position, as the dominant power in the region would weaken. Saddam had many regional enemies. Israel, Iran, Kuwait and so forth. The broadly accepted perception of Saddam having WMD's was important to him in order to keep the power distribution in the region consistent. Therefore, I concur that misperception was a crucial argument for why the conflict escalated into actual war. Iraq would never admit that this was the case; therefore, there are no documents from Iraqi channels to confirm this argument. I however, see it as a logical analysis of the case, that regional political battles was crucial to understand, in order to perceive the actions and statements from Iraq in that period correctly. The western leaders, especially those that choose to go to war based on, what turned out to be, false evidence, failed to understand these regional power

battles. Therefore, they misperceived the information and simplified it into well-known reaction patterns, which in this case turned out to have serious consequences.

The next tool about bounded awareness I have analyzed on previously in the analysis. Let me therefore be brief here. Bounded awareness suggest that decision-makers process some information while ignoring other equally available information. As I stated earlier, this applied in at least one specific instance in Fogh's decision-making process. He ignored conclusions about Iraq's military capabilities that were presented to him by experts on the field. The experts did not offer evidence that supported their conclusions, which might have affected Fogh's decision to ignore them. Generally speaking, it becomes apparent that the lack of evidence was a problem, not just for the justification process, but also the decision-making process.

Before, in the MR section I argued why counter-wishful thinking did not apply to this case. From a logical point of view, wishful thinking then must apply. This tool contends that decision-makers always think negatively about their counterparts. Instead this tool offers explanations of why decision-makers often are over optimistic on their own behalf. (Jervis, 1976) Different sources account for the fact that the Bush administration did not think much about the planning for Iraq – post war. (Woodward, 2004) (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003) The Bush administration believed that a military victory could be achieved rather easily and therefore they were not afraid to fight the war unilaterally. (Woodward, 2004) Fogh followed this train of thought. However, the Danish government did in fact underline the need for humanitarian assistance to Iraq because of the war. (Møller, 2003) Extensive state rebuilding however was not one parameters that any member of the 'coalition of the willing' had planned for. The purpose of engaging Iraq militarily was, according to the government to disarm Iraq, and to stabilize the region. (Møller, 2003) The argument about wishful-thinking rests on the assumption that the decision-makers believed that military victory was possible, but they failed to take into account the massive need for state rebuilding that followed in the years following the invasion.

The two tools I find inadequate in explanatory power for this case are tool 1 about leaders' level of interest and tool 5 about learning from history. First the level of interest. This tool argues that leaders, who lack interest in foreign policy, distribute the decision

making to lower level staff in the government. Only when very serious issues are on the agenda, these leaders are forced to handle the situation. First, Fogh does not lack interest in foreign policy. Actually, he had a vision of reforming Danish foreign policy from passive to active. (Fogh, 2003) Secondly the premise about a lack of interest should somehow constitute a degradation of the decision-making process is hard to follow. Matters of security of the state will always be handled at the top-level of a government. Almost all of the mechanisms in MR and many of the tools in FPF suggest that the security of the state is the number one objective of a decision-maker. This argument is viable because the facts of this case supports it. Fogh underlined on many occasions that Saddam Hussein posed a threat, a threat that needed to be resolved. Lack of interest in foreign policy, had it existed in Fogh, would not have played a role in the decision-making process. The tool even recognizes that if the situation is serious enough it will be dealt with at the top-level. In addition, I find it hard to argue for a leader of a state that is not interested in the security of the state he/she is in charge of.

Tool 5 about learning from history suggests that decision-makers rely too heavily on past experiences and history in general. In addition it supports the argument that other tools and mechanisms has incorporated, namely that decision-makers simplify facts and information, in this case of historical character. Through my analysis I have found no real evidence to suggest that Fogh relied *too* heavily on history. As I mentioned before, he actually sought to reform Danish foreign policy. (Fogh, 2003) The part where this tool has some explanatory power is with regard to Afghanistan. As part of the 'war on terror', Afghanistan and the initial success there played a role in justifying why it would be possible to do the same in Iraq. The government used this argument several times. (Møller, 19 marts 2003) To say that because of this, it is feasible to say that Fogh, as a decision-maker, relied too heavily on history is a stretch in my opinion. On the contrary, I would argue that he did not rely on history very much. Since the first gulf war in 1991, the west had deterred Saddam through various programs and sanctions. Mearsheimer and Walt argues that the wisest thing to do, given the lack of evidence for WMD's being present, was to continue this course of action. (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2003) Learning from history implies that one learns from past mistakes and experiences. Since Denmark has not had a long history of aggressive foreign policy operations, there was

not much to lean on. This alongside with the other arguments presented here makes the tool to some, but little use in this case.

Conclusion

Writing a conclusion can be difficult because it is here results need to be presented, conclusions must be drawn and decisions must be taken. A conclusion must be attractive to read while still sticking to academic formula. (Sharpling, 2015) I have chosen to divide my conclusion into three main parts. While keeping it concise and brief I wish to elaborate on several parts of the thesis. The first part of the conclusion will be the conclusion on theory. Here I will assess the explanatory power of the theories and how they have applied to my specific case. The second part will be the general conclusion on the case study. Here I will focus on a one to one conclusion – from problem formulation to analytical results. This is where my problem formulation will be answered. The third section of the conclusion will entail further perspectives on the theoretical implications of this thesis. Finally, the thesis will end with a brief process review in order to illuminate to the reader how the process of writing this thesis has progressed.

Conclusion on theory

This thesis sought to approach foreign policy from new theoretical angles. Decision-making was my chosen concept, and the individual was the chosen actor. Within this framework, I applied a new take on realism, developed by Johannes Gullestad Rø – Mechanistic Realism. On top of this, I researched different branches of foreign policy theory. I read several theoretical approaches such as Role Theory, Two-level game theory and various psychological advancements in social sciences. What I ended up with was FPA and Negotiation theory. These two branches of foreign policy both put the decision-maker in the spotlight and examined foreign policy from this perspective. From these two theoretical approaches, I extracted analytical tools, which could be applied to a case regarding foreign policy. Rø inspired this process with how he developed the framework for MR and therefore the outline of FPF are somewhat similar. I did not choose the tools for this specific case, I chooses them because I would argue they all respectively holds explanatory power in some regards. Whether they would help explain this case, I would have to examine in the analysis.

The explanatory power of each mechanism and tool are evaluated in the final section for analysis. To avoid repetition, I will draw general conclusions about the applicability of the theories. Mechanistic Realism is derived from Realism as the name suggests. When applying the different mechanisms the core values of Realism often become apparent. Because mechanism 1 about the primacy of security are the cornerstone for all the other mechanisms, the general image of MR will be that it is realist. The strengths I found in using MR is that the mechanisms can each be applied separately. Each mechanisms serves as a little explanatory tool that can explain very specific situations. The concept of fear in foreign policy decision-making I found highly useful in explaining Fogh's actions in the decision-making process. What MR lacks is the power to rise up above the specific quote and see the broader image of how the interpersonal dynamics affect the process of international politics. I found that when applying a mechanism it often accurately described one aspect of Fogh's decision-making, but I felt it was inadequate when trying to grasp the bigger picture. Furthermore, it is very noticeable that MR was developed for analyzing individual leaders in superpower states. Many of the mechanisms was clearly defined by their expected explanatory power to the policies of the Bush administration. Rø' describes in his book that there is a need for further testing of MR, as he has only tested it on the policies of the Bush administration in the buildup for the Iraq war. I have now tried to elaborate on this testing of MR. My findings are, that the core assumptions of the theory are very solid in explaining the individual level of foreign policy. Here it distinguishes itself from Realism. Nevertheless, I also found that applied to a small state, and the decision-makers herein, MR has difficulty in explaining some of the logics behind the actions of those leaders. Most noteworthy is the assumption from MR that decision-makers under no circumstances will deposit the security of their state in the hands of others. This was the exact opposite of what Fogh believed, and how he acted. However, I acknowledge that this assumption applies well to Bush and a US president in general. That underlines the argument about MR being better fitted for analyzing superpower decision-making behavior.

Foreign Policy Framework, the second theoretical approach have some of the same strengths as MR. FPF offers the same kind of analytical tools that each can explain

specific processes of decision-making. The FPF tools are however, not extracted with the purpose of analyzing superpower behavior. This was a focal point for me when I chose the concepts to include. Therefore, the pitfall of only being able to explain one type of decision-maker, FPF offers more broad explanations. With that said, the level of abstraction in such a tool-orientated approach is too low in order to grasp the complex developments fully. I would argue that a mechanism or tool-orientated approach cannot stand alone if one aims at obtaining all possible explanations of an event.

Finally, I argue that new explanations has been offered here. Fogh's motivations behind making the decision he did, has been illuminated. We have moved beyond merely stating the common conclusions. Namely that Iraq was invaded because of WMD's, because of the spread of democracy and because of the threat Saddam Hussein's regime posted. Instead, I have analyzed one level beneath these common assumptions and through the use of data and theory tried to bring the possible underlying reasons up to the surface. The theoretical approaches has been fruitful in helping this elevation of underlying factors. However, it is also clear that the approaches needs to be developed in order to explain foreign policy behavior from more angles.

One To One Conclusion

Many have described Fogh as a headstrong leader. One that rarely accepted advice that contradicted his personal beliefs. Author Søren Mørch argues that Foreign Minister Møller was threatened to obey Fogh's wishes of going to war with Bush outside the UN. (Mørch, 2013) Møllers fellow conservative member of the parliament at the time, Gitte Seeberg supports this. (Ritzau, 2012) Whether this is an expression of Fogh's style as a leader, I shall not say. What is clear is that Fogh relied heavily on himself when conducting foreign policy on the behalf of Denmark. The problem formulation asks how the decision-making process was in the Danish government. Mørch and Seeberg argues that Fogh decided on how to proceed and then everyone else had to fall in line. This argument is supported by a situation I analyzed upon in the analysis. When Fogh called in the opposition leaders, Lykketoff and Jelved, they expected to deliberate on the forthcoming decision about whether or not to participate in the US led coalition against Iraq. When the meeting started, Fogh declared that the decision had already been made and that they could back him up, or he would go to war with

a small majority anyway. (Svendsen & Halskov, 2012) Another argument that I have analyzed extensively in the analysis, is the fact that Fogh ignored crucial advice, given from leading experts on foreign policy. The theories explain this rather well. Fogh's cognitive filters does not allow him to process all information and he has a tendency to assimilate contradicting evidence into his existing filters. This can explain why the decision-making process in the Danish government, relied so heavily on Fogh's beliefs, and less so on the advice and arguments posed by others in the government and parliament.

The second part of the problem formulation asks what role the decision-maker, Fogh, played in the process leading up to the war. With the previous conclusion in mind it is obvious that Fogh's role as a decision-maker was crucial to the outcome. As proven in the analysis, his personal relationship with Bush was important for how Fogh chose to shape the foreign policy of Denmark and thereby the approach towards Iraq. Fogh in large part followed the timeline of Bush concerning what he said and the timing of it. When Bush in September 2002 expressed hope for a UN resolution, Fogh did the same a couple of days after. When Cheney expressed that the US government had no doubt about Iraq having WMD's, Fogh followed with the same 'analysis' shortly after. When Negroponte applauded the adoption of resolution 1441, Fogh and Møller expressed the same joy shortly after. Finally, when it became apparent that a solution in the UN was not possible, Fogh in a matter of hours chose to follow Bush into war. He got a call from Bush on Friday night the 17 of March 2003. On the morning of the 18. He said to the opposition leaders that the decision had been made. One that supposedly was disagreements about within the government. About the disagreement between Fogh and Møller, Seeberg says; *"I had the perception that he (Møller) had a gun pointed to his head and then he chose to fall in line"*. (Ritzau, 2012) All this sums up an image of a leader who relied on himself more than anyone else. Fogh acted based on fear and uncertain information. Nevertheless, he also had a vision of how Denmark's foreign policy had to be developed, and in this regard, the war against Iraq was an important stepping-stone to reach this ambition.

Further Perspectives

Through my work with this thesis, it has come apparent to me that there is a significant need for further developments in theory on this matter. The individual level analysis are an integral part of understanding international politics as a whole. There are countless steps taken in developing new theoretical frameworks for Foreign Policy analysis. Yet none of them is willing to proclaim that it is a grand theoretical school such as Realism, Liberalism or Constructivism. Most of these new approaches characterizes themselves as middle range theories. That gets them off the hook in explaining grand and complex cases in international relations. The aspirations for scholars who are interested in this topic, must therefore be, to advance the theoretical frameworks into more stable and viable approaches that can be submitted for extensive testing and thereby reach a higher status in IR theory, than the field holds today.

Reflections on Process

In writing this thesis, I have gone through several processes that have changed and nuanced the outlook of the final thesis. Initially I had limited the thesis to consist of an analysis of four decision makers. Fogh, Møller, Lykketoft and Søvndal. From the beginning, I had abstained from including the Bush administration because I was afraid of repeating the work of Rø. Quickly I realized that it would be far too much to analyze four decision-makers. In addition, the only sources I had for analyzing Lykketoft and Søvndal was the documents I had gained access to via application to the legal department of the parliament. The common literature on the field focuses mainly on the decision-makers in the government. In the end, I chose to focus on Fogh with Møller as a supporting role. Møller expressed many of the official views of the government, and therefore he is not analyzed individually as Fogh is. I would have liked to have more focus on the differences in opinion about the Iraq war that existed between Fogh and Møller. However, due to time constraints and a lack of credible sources I chose only to feature this disagreement as a minor factor in the decision-making process.

On a general level the working and writing process have been productive. I had enormous amounts of data and the four months given for this thesis proved to be insufficient if I were to analyze each and every document. However, I still argue that I

reached a deep and nuanced understanding of how and why events played out, and the theories helped me put the facts in a context where they could be analyzed fruitfully. In structuring my report, my supervisor has helped tremendously and the feedback I have gotten, especially on the initial segments of the thesis has been invaluable. The communication between my supervisor and I has been optimal and overall this part of the process has been good.

On the matter of theory, I am pleased with the general outcome of this part of the thesis. I have spent much time and effort on understanding the theories and putting them into perspective. The toughest part of my work with the theories has been extracting 'my own' tools for analysis. I used the framework Rø had developed, but the fact that I had to research several theoretical approaches and single out the most important arguments was difficult but exiting. Overall, I am pleased with the process of working with the theories, but in hindsight it might have been more desirable to only focus on FPF and explain the tools and the logic behind them, more extensively.

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