

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND US HEGEMONY: A CASE STUDY OF IRAQ

THESIS

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29th May, 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For God, Family and Country

A lot of appreciation and gratitude to my family especially, my friends and everyone who in one way or the other helped me through this process. A big thank you to my former and current tutors as well as fellow students in both VIA University, Horsens and Aalborg University, it has been a great experience and pleasure knowing and working with you all.

A big thank you to my academic supervisors, Julia Klausen and Pauline Stoltz who selflessly helped guide me through the process of completing this thesis and also to M-D, Nanayaa, Una, Levi, Dwumfour, Jenny, Kevin and granny for the prayers, inspiration and support. Muchos Gracias

Deux Lux Scientiae, Dum Spiro Spero

ABSTRACT

Democracy export and promotion has always been part US foreign policy because the country upholds the ideals and values of freedom and human rights since its inception. After World War II, the USA helped develop and supported different political systems all around the world in its role as the sole super power and this included also supporting autocratic governments as a means to promote stability and protect its interests and values.

However, in the late 1970s to early 1980s, democracy advancement efforts became integral to US foreign policy due to popular movements against autocratic regimes, the need to promote stability due to the cold war and lastly the influence of globalization on how international relations was handled.

Due to this, successive US governments promoted democracy all around the globe in countries like Panama, Nicaragua and the Philippines in order to ensure order and stability protect its interests and help fight the communist ideology of the Soviet Union.

However, the country still supported some authoritarian regimes around the world and also in the Middle East as a means of protecting or advancing its interests especially concerning oil and military superiority.

After 9/11 however the USA shifted its support for autocracies in the Middle East in favour of advancing democracy in accordance with the recommendations of the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents of 2002 and 2006 which urged America to promote democracy all over the world through any means necessary to protect its interests and also due to the notion that democracy in the region will better help in ensuring stability and help rid the territory of terrorists.

Therefore after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, advocating for democracy in that country became an increasingly important justification for the invasion, more so after the other factors given for the invasion like Saddam Hussein's links to terrorist and the accumulation of nuclear and biological weapons were largely debunked and discredited and the Bush Administration therefore undertook a number of steps and initiatives to promote and strengthen democracy in Iraq.

The thesis however contends that this democracy promotion effort in Iraq by the USA was a quest to strengthen their hegemony as per Antonio Gramsci's hegemony concept or theory and subsequently goes on to argue and answer the questions as to why and how democracy promotion in Iraq by the USA after 9/11 was a quest for hegemony the view of Gramsci's hegemony theory.

The thesis will therefore focus on the motivations and history of US democracy promotion efforts around the world from after the Second World War until 9/11, how the country advanced democracy in the Middle East in general after 9/11 and important of all how the USA promoted democracy in Iraq after 9/11 and why this was a quest for hegemony from the viewpoint of Gramsci's hegemony theory.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

US/USA – United States of America

WMDs – Weapons of Mass Destruction

NSS – National Security Strategy

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

WWII – World War II

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

NED – National Endowment for Democracy

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

UN – United Nations

GMEI – Greater Middle East Initiative

FFF – Foundation for the Future

UAE – United Arab Emirates

CPA – Coalition Provision Authority

IGC – Iraqi Governing Council

OSP – Office of Special Plans

RRMT – Rapid Reaction Media Team

ORHA – Office of Reconstruction and Human Aid

IMN – Iraq Media Network

SOCU – Southern Oil Company Union

GUOE - General Union of Oil Employees

GFIW - General Federation of Iraqi Workers

OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

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CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The following section is a presentation of the research area and the relevance of conducting research into this area. The problem formulation will be presented as well as the research questions followed by critical reflections on theory and problem formulation. The section ends with the delimitations for this research.

Democracy promotion is a key part of US Foreign Policy because ever since the country was founded, the founding fathers had the notion that the country was exceptional and based on the ideals and values of human rights which are inalienable. (Muavi & Heydari, 2011, p. 111)

As the USA emerged as a superpower, this notion has been integrated into the foreign policies of many Presidents from President Woodrow Wilson during World War I who asserted that America's entry into the war will make the world a safer place (Muavi & Heydari, 2011, p. 111) through President Reagan's democracy policies to counter the soviet union during the cold war, President Clinton's democratic enlargement activities to President George Bush's 'Middle East Initiative' which intended to promote democracy in the Middle East after 9/11 (Muavi & Heydari, 2011, p. 112).

Fukuyama (1989) Larry Diamond (1992) Linz & Lipset (1991) and Huntington (1993) among other scholars have all exalted in one way or the other democracy and by extension its promotion as positive and progressive and as such the final form of human government.

This notwithstanding, America's past democracy efforts has caused many to doubt that indeed promoting democracy is their genuine objective. Chomsky (1992) and Robinson (1996) both argue that the USA's democracy promotion effort is a smoke screen to promote and achieve national interests, especially, economic ones which bolster its hegemonic status. For example, Anastasio Somoza, President of Nicaragua, created a dictatorship regime and violently ruled for 43 years with support of the USA as a way to fend off communism in the region which suggests that American democracy promotion efforts is not intended to create democracies around the world for the benefit of the people in those countries, but for America's benefits. (Muavi & Heydari, 2011, p. 113)

Furthermore, Wittes (2008) argues that democracy promotion has been one of the main explanations of successive US governments for their interventions in other countries and an integral part of American foreign policy strategy since World War I to ensure their continuous hegemony as evidenced in countries like Philippines, Chile and Panama.

The US has also been selective of where and how they implement or advance democracy further casting doubts about their genuine goals. For example, in the 1980s the country gave support to repressive regimes like that of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Saddam Hussein during the Iran/Iraq war despite their respective repressive rule and bad human rights records in return for pursuing its interests (oil, trade deals, market share etc) in these countries or fighting the communist ideology. (Wittes, 2008)

After the Cold War and before 9/11, repressive governments in the Middle East were seen as the most efficient way to keep stability in the region just as it was in Latin America in the 80s and US supported a range of dictators including Saddam Hussein as long as they conformed to US foreign policy needs. (Fuller, 2001)

After the events of 9/11, implementing democracy, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the harbouring of terrorists were the justifications given by the Bush Administration for its invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003. However, when the last two factors (WMDs and accommodating terrorists) were generally discredited, the promotion of freedom and promotion of democracy in Iraq increasingly became the main explanation or rationale given by the Bush administration for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath government and replacing it with an elite-based democratic government as it had done previously in other countries. (Hobson C. , March 2005, p. 40)

Muavi & Heydari (2011) however argues that Washington supported Saddam and his repressive regime during Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) but withdrew this support when Saddam decided to invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which were both US allies and key oil suppliers, in order to pursue and protect their own interests.

As such the US was not looking to promote democracy but rather protect their interests just as it did in Panama in 1989 when US forces invaded the country and overthrew an repressive government they had previously supported and replaced it with an elite-based democratic government to gain control of the Panama Canal and the surrounding areas (Sanchez, 2007, p. 51) or in the Philippines in 1986 when they pressured their former repressive ally Ferdinand Marcos to hold elections and then supported the opposition to win, which installed an elite-based government which the USA heavily supported with aid and other incentives engaging the civil society institutions in that country in order to protect US interests in that region like large military presence and preferential economic agreements. (Robinson W. , 1996, p. 128)

In retrospect, the United States has and continue to support repressive regimes all over the world as long as it suits their interests but seem to always withdraw their support once they become unreliable allies or do not conform to the status quo and replace them with democratic governments loyal to US values all in the bid to continue protecting their interests albeit through a more subtle means (Feldman, 2004). Furthermore, America's recent past history of exporting and implementing democracy in areas like Latin America, parts of Europe and the globe goes a long way to prove the country only supports a form of democracy that is compatible and subservient to neoliberal economics and by extension overt or covert control/dominance which immensely casts doubts on the genuine goals of the democracy promotion strategy. (Hobson C. , March 2005, p. 43)

In view of these arguments and antecedents especially as to the genuine goals of America implementing democracy in other countries like the examples given above, the thesis makes an assumption that the Bush Administration's promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 constituted a strategic quest to strengthen their hegemony just like it was in Panama, Nicaragua etc and will therefore prove this assumption by addressing the question 'Why was

the US promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 a quest to strengthen their hegemony?. The thesis will then formulate an analytical framework from Gramsci's theory of hegemony and apply this theory to the US's democracy promotion efforts in Iraq to support the assumption and draw conclusions.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the general historical background and motivations for exporting and implementing democracy in general around the world by the USA after World War II until before 9/11?
2. How did the US relate to the Middle East in general after 9/11?
3. How did the US advance and implement democracy in Iraq after 9/11?
4. What does Gramsci's theory of hegemony entails and how does it apply to the US promotion of democracy in Iraq?
5. Why is this promotion of democracy a quest to strengthen US hegemony?

These questions will help answer the main problem formulation in combination with the chosen theory and literature.

1.3 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROBLEM FORMULATION

The thesis is intended to prove why US democracy efforts in Iraq constitutes a quest to strengthen their hegemony. The research question and research area is relevant because the United States has had much impact on global democratization, than any other country during the past century and spends a lot of resources in pursuing this all over the world. However, U.S involvement in implementing or exporting democracy has attracted much attention as well as skepticism and suspicion from academia and the general public alike and as such makes the problem area and question relevant in the field of International Relations and Global Order studies.

Furthermore, the US in exporting or implementing democracy around the world has determined to a compelling extent the shape and nature of the modern international political system as shown by the various democratic movements or uprisings which has taken place in the last century thereby making this subject an important one.

Therefore by analyzing the history of US democracy promotion efforts around the world after World War II, how the country promoted democracy in the Middle East in general after 9/11 as well as how it promoted and implemented democracy in Iraq after 9/11 and combining it with the analytical framework of Gramsci's theory of hegemony, the thesis will support the assumption that the Bush Administration's promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 constituted a strategic quest to strengthen their hegemony by answering the problem formulation and research questions and drawing conclusions.

This will provide an in-depth understanding of US foreign policy as a whole, the promotion of the democratic strategy in the Middle East in general and specifically Iraq thereby

contributing to the understanding of the political, cultural, economic and social processes in Iraq in particular and the region as a whole.

1.4 DELIMITATION

The thesis will be focused on US promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 and why it amounted to a quest for hegemony. The emphasis will be on President Bush's administration and its foreign policy on exporting democracy because Iraq will serve as the case study and it was during President Bush's era that the US decided to implement democracy in Iraq. There will however be a historical account of US democracy promotion efforts around the world and after World War II (WWII) and what motivates this strategy and an analysis of how the US implemented democracy in the Middle East region after 9/11. The aim of this delimitation is to provide a representative foundation on which the research questions and problem formulation can be researched and answered.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This section will explain the methodology used in this research as well as the reasons for the use and choice of methods to include the reader in the basic processes behind the research.

2.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

An epistemological consideration invites researchers to reflect upon and questions how the social world should be studied or how we go about to get a better understanding of events around us (Bryman, 2012, p. 6).

This thesis seeks to obtain a better understanding of the history, motivations and strategies behind US democracy promotion efforts around the world with a special focus on Iraq and why this democracy promotion effort in Iraq constitutes a quest to strengthen their hegemony. Therefore, an interpretivist approach will be most suited to be used in this research because it helps with the interpretation and understanding of social phenomena.

Interpretivism or an interpretivist approach requires researchers to understand the subjective meaning of social events because people and institutions are distinctive and as such their actions are relative and socially constructed (Bryman, 2012, p. 28). This is in contrast to the epistemological position of positivism which uses the methods of natural science to study or obtain knowledge about the social world and beyond (Bryman, 2012, p. 28).

Ontological considerations deal with the nature of reality or social entities and encompass how things are and how they work in reality (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 201). Two positions are in play in ontological considerations; Objectivism which implies that social phenomena are external to or exist independent to humans and as such beyond or influence and constructionism which argues that social phenomena and their meaning are produced through social interaction and are constantly revised (Bryman, 2012, p. 33) Constructionism asserts that knowledge is not independent of actors but is constructed and it influence the way humans perceive and interpret the world (Vrasidas, 2000, p. 345).

This thesis will be guided by the constructivist position because the thesis will deal with the motivations and strategies of US democracy promotion efforts, a reality or phenomena which is not constant but changes in accordance with the interests and foreign policy of the USA at that particular time and this position also follows naturally from the interpretivist position adopted for this thesis which is also based getting a subjective meaning of socially constructed phenomena.

2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research will be conducted through a single case study (US democracy promotion in Iraq) and the research strategy of content analysis. A literature search will be done to identify similar work done within this research area and to highlight and explore any knowledge gaps that may exist after which content analysis will be done on the selected literature or sources to identify and extract the important information in them needed to answer the problem formulation and research questions raised in this research.

The literature search was important in order to identify existing research and gather information about the chosen topic, that is, US democracy promotion strategy in general and its promotion in the Middle East and Iraq in particular after 9/11. The search also helped

provide an academic basis for this thesis, helped identify existing works or sources that can be used in this thesis and also to identify potential issue relating to the research topic.

In doing this search, a more targeted approach was used to focus on only literature pertaining to the subject area and dealing with US democracy efforts around the world after World War II until 9/11 and also how US implemented democracy in the Middle East and Iraq after 9/11 from multiple sources including academic journals and articles, books, National Security Strategy (NSS) reports, speeches and website publications.

The academic journals and articles were obtained from databases like historical abstract (<https://www.ebscohost.com/academic/historical-abstracts>) and web of science (<http://wokinfo.com/>). In selecting the journals, keywords and phrases like US democracy promotion, Hegemony, liberal democracy, US policy in the Middle East and US democracy strategy were used to search for the journals and articles. The search results were then revised to certain time periods like during the cold war and after 9/11 as well as key authors in international relations like Robert Cox, Thomas Hobson, Antonio Gramsci, Noam Chomsky, William Robinson and John Ikenberry.

The articles and journals selected after this revision were then reviewed using the abstracts provided in them to select the ones which covered the areas relating to my problem formulation and research questions.

The National Security Reports which provide the strategy behind US democracy promotion efforts was obtained from the National Security Strategy Archives (<http://nssarchive.us/>) and was only restricted to the ones published during President George Bush's era (NSS 2002 and 2006) since this is the period of much focus in this thesis.

Speeches of President Bush and members of his government were obtained from the Presidential rhetoric archives (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/bushpresidency.html>) and were limited to only speeches given about advancing democracy in the Middle East after 9/11. The relevant books and other reports were sourced from Google books and the Aalborg University Library by using the same strategy of relevant keywords and authors on the subject. Website publications including articles and reports as well as news items were obtained from websites such as *foreignpolicy.com*, *sourcewatch.com* (published by the Center for Media and Democracy), *CNN.com*, Organizational websites like that of the USAID and the Iraq Foundation among others and they are restricted to only publications or information which deals with the themes mentioned above.

After the search, some of the important publications that were selected to be used in this thesis include: The National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 (2001) (2006), Peter Burnell 'Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization' (2000), Thomas Carothers 'US Democracy Promotion during and after Bush' (2007), William Robinson 'What to Expect from US Democracy Promotion in Iraq' (2004), Noam Chomsky 'Deterring Democracy' (1992) Toby Dodge 'The Sardinian, the Texan and the Tikriti' (2006), Robert Cox 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations' (1983), Christopher Hobson 'A Forward Strategy Of Freedom in the Middle East' (March 2005), William Robinson 'Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US intervention and Hegemony' (1996),

Antonio Gramsci ‘Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci’ (1971), Robert Cox ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’ (1983)etc.

The academic journals and articles, speeches, books, internet publications etc will serve as the secondary data whilst the National Security Strategies (NSS) 2002&2006 of the USA which will serve as the empirical data for this research. The data gathered from both empirical and primary data sources using qualitative content analysis will be used in the analysis in this research after which conclusions will be drawn to establish that indeed US promotion of democracy in Iraq is a quest for hegemony.

The research design figure below demonstrates the different aspects of the research and illustrates how the research will be conducted from the problem area to the conclusions.




Figure 1: Research Design

2.3 RESEARCH PROCESS

The validity and reliability of the research design (single case study) will have to be established in order to arrive at sound conclusions to the research questions and main problem formulation and to lessen bias in the project.

Case study is concerned with understanding the dynamics pertaining to a particular situation and can involve single or multiple cases (Eisenhart, 1989, p. 534). Case study can also be

described as an in-depth or comprehensive analysis of a case (Bryman, 2012, p. 66) and involves selecting a case or a limited number of cases, studying it in context and collecting information about the case or cases to gain a thorough knowledge about the situation (Robson, 2002, p. 89).

To ensure the integrity of the research, the validity and reliability of the case study must be established in the course of the project.

Validity in a single case study deals with how well the results obtained from analysing the case study fits with the theories around which the case is designed or built, that is, how close to the truth, accurate or correct the report is (Sekaran, 1992, p. 173) This can be achieved by doing a literature review, using multiple sources in the project (triangulation of sources) and using external informants to review draft reports (Christie, Rowe, Perry, & John, 2000, p. 16).

A literature search was done for this thesis by searching for important articles and books concerning democracy in Iraq after 9/11, Gramsci's Hegemony theory etc on databases like EBSCO and Historical Abstract, libraries as well as the internet after which they were critically appraised and the areas where controversies present themselves identified which helped in the formulation of the research questions and main problem formulation.

Furthermore, the literature search provided multiple sources including academic articles, books and documents which were analysed by content analysis to provide the secondary data and the NSS documents of 2002 & 2006 which served as the empirical data, the results of which were used throughout the thesis.

Reliability in a case study research deals with how trustworthy the research is as a good qualitative research is suppose to help us understand a confusing situation by generating an understanding through the steps or procedures taken to explain the situation (Golafshani, 2003, p. 5). The researcher therefore has to show diligence and be honest and demonstrate to his readers how diligent he has been in doing the research so that the reader or others can be satisfied with the conclusions generated (Robson, 2002, p. 176).

In view of this, the thesis begins with an introduction section which introduces the problem area, states the research questions as well as the main problem formulation and the limitations of the thesis to show why and how the problem formulation was developed and why it is important to research the problem.

The next section is the methodology which explains the structure of the thesis, how the research will be done, the data analysis strategy, how to reduce bias in the research and the rationale for choosing or selecting the theory, the empirical data and the research strategy.

The thesis will employ a single case study, that of Iraq, in analysing why US democracy promotion efforts in that country is a quest for hegemony. This will help study the case intensively and exhaustively to help answer the problem formulation and research questions. Therefore by framing US promotion of democracy in Iraq as a single case study, the different contexts surrounding why this promotion of democracy in Iraq is a quest for hegemony will be analysed intensely.

The thesis will then move on to explain what hegemony is in general terms, how the USA became a hegemon and why the country has an interest in strengthening or expanding its hegemony. This will help give an insight into why the USA has a vested interest in strengthening their hegemony through any opportunity they can, democracy promotion or imposition included. Gramsci's theory of Hegemony will follow and will provide the theoretical framework of this research and as such it will be explained and in the theory section and used in-depth in the analysis to establish why and how the US promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 is a quest to strengthen their hegemony.

The next section will focus on the historical background of US democracy promotion activities in other countries, how the country implemented the strategy, the motivations behind promoting democracy and how it also supported repressive governments in some regions instead of promoting democracy all in a bid to further its interests. This will help establish the historical foundations and underlying reasons why the US is interested in promoting democracy. It will at the same time give an insight into why and how the US chose to support repressive governments in some regions even when democracy promotion became their favoured foreign policy tool.

The thesis will then take a critical look at why democracy promotion should not be encouraged or supported by any country for any reason or motivation. This is to help explore why promoting or exporting democracy to any country by the USA or any other country should not be encouraged as a rule in the first place.

The analysis section will be focused on US democracy promotion strategies in the Middle East after 9/11, how the US democracy promotion strategy after 9/11 is set out in the NSS 2002 & 2006 and how it was implemented in Iraq and the Middle East in general. This will be combined with Gramsci's hegemonic theory and supported by references from the chosen academic literature, books, speeches, website publications and the NSS 2002/2006 documents to help answer the research questions and the problem formulation after which critical discussions about research findings, limitations and future recommendations will be made followed by conclusions on the problem formulation and research questions.

2.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY

Qualitative Content Analysis involves 'a set of actions or processes to help make conjectures or presumptions from text' (Weber, 1990, p. 19); it is a method 'capable of explaining the ways to use or manipulate symbols to make communication more meaningful' (Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987, p. 20). It is a refinement of the ways in which researchers and the general public can depict and clarify different parts of the world around them from available documents (Robson, 2002, p. 352).

Content Analysis involves organising information into categories related to the central research questions and entails a document review in which meaningful and relevant passages of the text or data are identified and analysed to extract the pertinent information. (Bowen, 2009, p. 32)

A series of steps need to be followed or considered when doing content analysis and this includes starting with a research question, deciding on the sampling strategy, defining the recording unit, constructing categories for analysis and then carrying out the analysis to gather the data. (Robson, 2002, p. 354)

The research question must involve extracting meaning from academic journals and articles, books, documents and communication of public figures, governments, institutions etc. relating to the research area because content analysis gets answers to the questions to which it is applied (Hermann, 2008, p. 152). The problem formulation and research questions posed in this thesis involves studying and making meaning of documents ranging from the US government's NSS reports of 2002&2006 to academic journals and articles, books, speeches, website documents and reports concerning the subject of US democracy promotion in Iraq after 9/11.

The sampling strategy must be decided to reduce the task to manageable proportions due to the wide range of material available for the research (Hermann, 2008, p. 155). Therefore, in this thesis, since the interest is in why and how the promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 constitutes a quest for hegemony, the content analysis will be focused on the NSS 2002/2006 documents which provide the strategy for democracy promotion in Iraq after 9/11(primary data), academic journals and articles, books, documents/reports from websites, speeches (secondary data) etc pertaining to the subject of US democracy promotion and hegemony with emphasis on but not limited to the period after 9/11 and in Iraq and the Middle East.

The recording unit determines what it is about these sources the researcher plans to examine and they can range from phrases, sentences, paragraphs, themes to whole documents (Hermann, 2008, p. 157). Since the thesis' interest area is US democracy promotion strategy in general and its promotion in the Middle East and Iraq in particular after 9/11, the focus was on sources relating to this area which were selected during the literature search.

The sources were then at this stage narrowed down to the ones with some critical themes relevant to the research questions and problem formulation like motivations and strategies for US democracy promotion, democracy promotion critique, US changes in Iraq after the invasion, President Bush's speeches on Middle Eastern democracy, the US & democracy in the Middle East after 9/11 etc (democracy & hegemony, Middle East & Iraq, US Foreign Policy in Iraq etc) and the content analysis is therefore focused on finding these themes in the literature or sources.

The next step was to categorize these themes found in the various sources based on how they relate to or explore the problem formulation and research questions (Robson, 2002, p. 355). Some of the categories include; Hegemony and the USA, Gramsci's (1971) Theory of Hegemony, motivations for US democracy promotion or export efforts, US Policy in the Middle East after 9/11, US democracy promotion strategy after 9/11 (NSS documents) then US promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11.

The information gathered based on the above categories were therefore examined in detail using an interpretivist approach and guided by the problem formulation and research questions to extract the necessary parts relevant to the research by evaluating the arguments or viewpoints expressed in them to determine if they are consistent with the conclusions and also what questions they raise and how they fit with my problem formulation and research questions. The information gathered based on the different categories were also compared to each other to highlight any similarities and differences in order to put them into context.

The information extracted was then organized to reflect which part of the thesis they deal with, for example, historical account, theory, analysis etc so that it will be easier to use them in the analysis to answer the research questions and problem formulation.

Content Analysis has the advantages of being unobtrusive when done on existing documents, that is, one can 'observe' without being observed. The data is also in a permanent form thus allowing for re-analysis to improve reliability and it is also a low cost technique when the documents needed are readily available. However, the documents available should be diverse and selected carefully to reduce partiality. (Robson, 2002, p. 358)

2.5 CHOICE OF EMPIRICAL DATA AND THEORY

The NSS 2002 and NSS 2006 documents were chosen to provide the empirical data since these two documents provided the framework for US foreign policy towards Iraq after 9/11, of which democracy promotion was an integral part. The theoretical framework provided by Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony is the most appropriate theory which can be used to analyse and come to a conclusion on the research questions which are about the quest of hegemony in Iraq by the US. This theory was also chosen since it deals with the subtle form of hegemonic domination in the form of manipulating other countries to accept a particular ideology or worldview to gain control of its social institutions and values, not like in the realist sense, where hegemonic domination is seen as using military force and other superiority factors to dominate another country or the world system.

The other hegemony theories in International Relations including the conventional, neo-liberal and radical hegemonic theories do not really do justice to or suit the purposes, intent as well as the nature of this project. This is because they deal with among other things the situation where one state achieves dominance over others through factors like geography, military strength, population, the need to have a dominant power to sustain equilibrium in the world economy and how the subject of hegemony is directly related to our social bios or individuals themselves and not the state.

The Gramscian approach (1971) is the most suited for this project because it deals with dominant countries using the promotion of an ideology to establish and maintain hegemony of other countries in the international system and this project intends to show how the USA used democracy promotion in Iraq to strengthen their hegemony.

CHAPTER 3

3.1 THE USA & HEGEMONY

This section seeks to explain what hegemony is in general terms, how the USA became a hegemon and why the country explores every opportunity to strengthen its hegemony

Hegemony generally can be defined as the influence or authority one country exerts over others or the cultural, economic or ideological influence one powerful country exerts over other less powerful countries (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2015). Hegemony can also be the huge ability and capacity to exert coercion, control or a high degree of influence over the countries and structures in the international system (Antoniades, 2008, p. 2).

The sources of hegemony or the factors which can help a country achieve hegemony include the capacity to influence other states through threats, defence or the threat of violence, control over systems of production, economic influence and the ability to influence the spread of ideologies, knowledge or power. Other sources like leadership in technology, military power and the ability to use a country's powers of coercion can serve as sources of hegemon for countries (Yilmaz, 2010, pp. 195-196).

The USA began increasing its sphere of influence after World War II, when other states like France and Germany were weak due to the war, and this made the USA and Russia the strongest countries in the international system. This led to the creation of the dual power dynamic, or the cold war which was both an ideological conflict between capitalism and communism as well as a geopolitical one, between America and its allies and the Soviet States (Hildebrandt, 2009, p. 14). This situation also meant two dominant powers; America and the USSR competed against each other through proxy wars in other places like Latin America and Africa as well as using the arms race to ensure that the balance of power was on their side in order to exert influence over other states in the international system (Hildebrandt, 2009, p. 14) .

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the USA became the only hegemonic power and has arguably being the only country in this position to date. This position in 2011 alone brought America more than \$7billion in benefits from the global system due to the country's economic influence in the international system (Ning, 2013) and the USA maintains this position through the use or threat of military force, economic might, democracy promotion among others (Meernik, 2004).

Furthermore, this position enjoyed by the USA over the years means the USA has won over other members of the international communities, if even these members side with the USA reluctantly. This has led to the USA maintaining the position as the sole hegemon in the world and therefore has a lot of influence, power and persuasion unrivalled by other states meaning they can do things like helping forge international laws, discount these laws as well as showing no accountability to international institutions like the UN (White, 2013).

Therefore America's global hegemony is arguably undisputed and beneficial to the country but in view of the current and rapid rise of other countries like China and the BRIC countries (Odom, 2005, p. 1), and due to the fact that a hegemon has to adapt and respond to changing situations in order to maintain its position in the global system (Jones T. , 2006), the USA is always on the move to seize every opportunity to strengthen its hegemony or position of

influence in the world from which it benefits immensely so as to prevent other states from reaching that position of influence.

3.2 THEORY

The following section explains Gramsci's theory of hegemony which forms the theoretical framework for this thesis which will give an insight into how dominant countries use the promotion or impositions of ideologies like democracy to attain or consolidate hegemony

Gramsci defined hegemony as “when the majority of the population gives their consent as to which way their social life should head as directed by the dominant group in the society” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12) and this consent and its resulting confidence is motivated by “the prominence of the dominant group in the international political and economic system” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12) or the ways in which a dominant group institutes and preserve or manage their rule (Robinson W. , 2005, p. 2). The ruling or dominant group directs the way social life should head or go usually using an ideology and the dominated group is influenced or lured to accept and become part of this prevalent position. (Jackson, 1985, p. 568).

Strinati (1995, p. 165) further explains Gramsci's view of hegemony as when “the prevalent or dominating class in society, like the ruling class among others, hold on to their control or pre-eminence by acquiring the 'spontaneous consent' of the lower classes, through the development of a political and ideological consensus which includes both the ruling or prevalent class and the lower or subjugated class.”

Hegemony at a universal level therefore, is built on spreading a particular way of how a society organises to produce goods and services as well as its worldview around the world coupled with the development or appearance of a peculiar transnational class or elite who gains an advantage from this powerful and prevalent mode of production. (Cox R. , 1983, p. 58)

Gramsci makes a distinction between consent and force (coercion) as means of social control to explain hegemony or domination. These two mechanisms according to Gramsci almost always coexist but one or the other predominates at a given time (Jackson, 1985, p. 568) Consent is about how a particular dominant social group is able to determine the ‘political and moral direction’ in the society where this predominant group is widely acknowledged as having a dominant role as well as the support of a wide political consensus for their policies and this help shape the ‘ideal’ aspirations and interests of that society. (Augelli & Murphy, 1993, p. 130)

Force or coercive means of social control is widely illustrated by the various repressive regimes around the world who rule by force or through fear whilst consensual social control happens when a dominant class succeeds in persuading the other classes to accept its own worldview (moral, political and cultural beliefs/principles) based on the consent given by the people to a certain direction recommended or advocated by the dominant class. (Stillo, 1999)

According to Gramsci however, consent may combine physical force or coercion with intellectual, moral and cultural bait and can lead to a scenario where the prevalent ideology is seen as the ‘common sense’ or best thing to do in the view of the rank and file. (Stillo, 1999) Real power therefore according to Gramsci, is only achieved through persuading the world to

see things the way the dominant group wants them to, and this creates or lead to this shared “common sense” (Collins, Jensen, Kanev, & Mathew, 2004, p. 23)

Consensual social control therefore affects behaviour internally in the society by shaping personal beliefs and principles into a model of prevalent norms or the norms of the dominant class and this becomes hegemonic because one concept is dominant and shapes all thoughts and behaviour in the society. (Femia, 1981, p. 24) Hegemony is therefore secured by the means in which elements of civil and political society work to mould the way people regard and assess reality and this is what Antonio Gramsci called ideological leadership. (Femia, 1981, p. 24)

Therefore, consensual forms of social control lead to hegemony when individuals incorporates the worldview of the ruling or dominant group or when dominant classes present the way they define the world and reality, so that it is accepted by other classes in the society as 'common sense' thereby making this ‘common sense’ the only sensible way of seeing the world leading to the marginalization of any group with an alternative opinion or reality. (Goldberg, 2001)

Gramsci argues that the dominant class organizes and centralises certain elements within the political and civil society to assume control over society and spread their definition of reality on the masses thereby leading to the acceptance of this concept and its acceptance as the common sense or the natural thing which leads to hegemony (Gorski, 2009). Simply put, these are the areas or factors where hegemony operates and through which the hegemon or dominant class implement and spread its hegemonic ideology to gain control of the society. These areas are the political society, civil society institutions including the media, education systems, trade unions, political parties etc, the use of intellectuals to spread the ideology and the economic structure (Gramsci, 1971, p. 160).

According to Gramsci, the state is made up of a political and civil society. Political society includes the political and legal institutions like the government, police, army or legal system Civil society according to Gramsci is the most important tool through which the dominant class spread its ideology due to the fact that it is made up of institutions through which society organises and represents itself independently from the state and therefore it was necessary to transform civil society in order to ensure the acceptance and legitimacy of a promoted ideology (Shaw, 2015).

These two levels of society identified by Gramsci together with the economic structure are the arenas through which the dominant classes exercise its hegemony but civil society especially is very important due to the fact that it is made up of relationships which are based on consent like trade unions, the mass media, civic associations etc. (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 629)

According to Gramsci, civil society is therefore made up of those institutions which are not part of the government like political parties, civic organizations, the media, educational institutions, trade and labour unions, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) etc (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263). This civil society according to Gramsci is used by the state to initiate unpopular action and policies and manipulate public opinion and is therefore the central point of the hegemonic process where the values of the promoted ideology are debated and accepted (Germain & Kenny, 1998, p. 16).

The role of intellectuals is described by Gramsci as representing the interests of the dominant class and this is central to his theory of hegemony because such intellectuals provide legitimacy and the theory behind the policies used by the dominant class to promote their ideology. These intellectuals including academics, professionals, think tanks, educational institutions etc also convey and help give legitimacy to the ideology being promoted by the dominant class in the wider society through their activities (Gramsci, 1971, p. 265).

The Political society in Gramsci's view is managed by the elite or intellectual classes comprised of individuals, groups and organisations that have the same interests as the ruling or dominant class also play a role in the hegemonic process because of their presence and influence in important areas like business, government and civil society, they are able to align these structures to their interests and that of the dominant class, thereby using these structures as means to spread the promoted ideology in an expedient way. (Cox R. , 1983, p. 171)

The kind of democracies which America has been promoting in countries like Iraq and other parts of the world are based on consensual forms of government in the Gramscian sense because a limited minority, made up of members of the economic elite and policy planning networks (civil society, the elite classes, intellectuals), holds the most power and exert this power over policy making decisions among other things through the use of civil society, intellectuals, the media and educational systems to promote an ideology (liberal democracy) which was imposed by the USA on the country after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the best for the country (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 623) .

In conclusion, Gramsci sums up that to attain hegemony, the consent of the people who are being governed must be achieved and the governed must incorporate the ideology which the elite or dominant party is promoting through the cultivation of civil societies, political institutions and use of organic intellectuals, as only logical or the natural thing to do and this ideology is spread through the educational and media institutions which are also cultivated and controlled by the dominant party. Robinson (1996) contends that "Gramscian hegemony involves the dominated class integrating the worldview, moral and cultural principles of the ruling class which in itself is the integration of what the system of domination means".

This it can be argued occurs when the elite group puts forward a social vision backed by an ideology which purports to serve the interest of all and use elements in civil and political society as well as the intellectuals to garner support from the dominated groups as well as to isolate any opposition and this vision is achieved when the ideology being promoted is taken up by society itself. (Rupert, 2007, p. 157) This leads to the dominated classes seeing things the way the hegemon wants them to which Gramsci calls shared 'common sense' and this in time leads to the achievement of hegemon because the hegemon takes control of all aspects of the dominated society through this ideology. It is this sort of shared common sense which leads most developing nations to follow the USA's advice and direction in many areas especially the economy, thereby leading to the power the USA has been enjoying over the past years. (Collins, Jensen, Kanev, & Mathew, 2004, p. 23)

Gramsci's (1971) conceptualization of hegemony will help explain why America's democracy promotion efforts in Iraq after 9/11 is a quest to strengthen their hegemony because the theory explains how a country imposes and spreads an ideology, in this case liberal democracy, through changes planned and implemented by intellectuals and

organizations loyal to that ideology in the political and civil society institutions of another country (in this case Iraq), thereby gaining total control of that country and its resources and determining the direction that country should head.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 HISTORICAL SUMMARY

This section presents a historical summary and the motivations for US Democracy promotion efforts around the world after World War II until before the events of 9/11. This is to establish the historical foundations of the research from which inferences will be made in the analysis and conclusions later.

After the World War II (WWII) in 1945, when the USA took up a leadership position following the vacuum of power left by the war and the collapse of countries and their economies, the country initiated a lot of military and political interventions in Europe, South America, Africa and other parts of the world (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 619).

The USA therefore assumed a vital role in the development of political systems in other countries after WWII upwards. Historically, the USA supported repressive governments which were as a result of their intervention in those countries to help promote order and stability. Therefore the USA promoted its dominance or hegemony in this time period through coercive force or the use of repressive regimes. Some examples are the regimes of Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and President Somoza of Nicaragua, Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 619).

The driving force behind these interventions was to expand and protect the then fledgling capitalist system through gaining uninterrupted access to raw materials, markets and human labour to help perpetuate a stable international political environment. This stable environment will then help the American system to survive and grow as the sole superpower and also to be in a position to counter the rising Soviet Communist threat at that time. (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 621)

The use of democracy promotion in US foreign policy however, became necessary after WWII due to the increase in democratic aspirations of other nations which was as a result of the defeat of fascism, the decline of the old colonial system and leadership status the USA, a democratic nation, had assumed at that time. (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 621)

The export and promotion of democracy or America's preferred type, liberal democracy, was found in the foreign policies of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Eisenhower and Johnson during the 50s and 60s. However, the USA still supported repressive regimes during this time (National Security Council, 1950, pp. 252-272). President Jimmy Carter reintroduced the democratic theme in his human rights policies but like previous administrations continued to support repressive governments like that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mohammed Reza in Iran and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to protect its interests especially in the oil industry but the reintroduction of democracy support helped open the way for a critical foreign policy change at that time. (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 622)

The crucial change in US foreign policy from supporting repressive governments to advancing or promoting democracy in the 1980s was facilitated by three interlaced factors (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 622). First of all, popular movements sprang up in the poor parts of the world against suppressive regimes and exploitation leading to unpopular support of repressive governments. The second factor was that as a result of these uprisings, policy

makers in the USA decided to 'promote democracy' instead of supporting repressive regimes to promote stability and last of all globalization had started taking effect at that time and changed the way international relations was conducted by creating new transnational actors who created new pressures for political changes. (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 622)

These factors came together to help facilitate and represent an official shift from repressive support to democracy export and promotion by the USA as the best means of social control and stability but still representing a process where the capitalist system operates its dominance over the semi-periphery and the periphery regions in the world but through a consensual mechanism like democracy and its institutions in the 20th century (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 623).

The export of democracy has therefore been an essential characteristic of US foreign policy for a bigger part of the 20th century and into the 21st century (Cox, Ikenberry, & Inoguchi, 2000, p. 10), and has been supported by academics like Francis Fukuyama (1989) Larry Diamond (1992) Linz & Lipset (1991) and Sedaca & Bouchet (2014) among others who have all exalted in one way or the other democracy and by extension its export and promotion as positive and progressive and as such suitable for every country and culture in their various works.

This position has however been challenged by other scholars like Karsten Struhl (2007, p. 20) who states that "If Liberal Democracy is to be legitimate or credible, it must echo the character of the particular culture or society within which it emerges and shouldn't be consolidated as a universal value" and that liberal democracy is "a peculiar kind of democracy that emerged at a particular point in history within societies in the western hemisphere as a combination of liberalism and democracy where the liberal component is predominant and often constricts the democratic component and therefore cannot be a universal value" (Struhl, 2007, p. 20) so , to try and impose a peculiar model of democracy (liberal democracy) on other countries and cultures is, actually to deny the universality of democracy (Struhl, 2007, p. 20).

Jorg Faust (2013), also contends that the universality of democracy is under growing and intense pressure due to the fact that the western concepts or interpretation of democracy do not flourish well in other cultures because it is the fruit of an experience specific to the culture of the west and as such its promotion or export into other cultures is seriously restricted and as such not suitable to be universal or applicable everywhere.

Furthermore, Robinson (1996, p. 624) argues that what the USA and its allies describe as 'democracy promotion' is actually the practice of polyarchy where a small group rules and the masses only get to participate in decision making during elections which are also meticulously managed by this small group. Therefore, this 'democracy promotion' only takes the form of democracy without its attendant content or outcome.

So, the United States in seeking to export or institute its version of democracy and free market principles on another country is very incompatible with the very essence of democracy itself and only helps to further the power of the hegemon state because for liberal democracy to work universally, it has to conform to the culture and history of the particular people who want to practice it, that is, each society must be allowed to practice its own unique form of democracy and shouldn't be forced to accept and practice the western form of

liberal democracy which is championed by the United States because that form of liberal democracy is an ideology peculiar western societies and not universal as presumed and therefore shouldn't be advanced or exported to other countries but nonetheless the USA made democracy export and promotion one of its key foreign policy strategies especially from the 1980s upwards.

The export or promotion of democracy by the USA in general is motivated by five different motivations according to Peter Burnell (2000, pp. 45-47) and these are promoting democracy because it furthers American values, advancing the democratic peace notion, continuing western hegemony and dominance, maintaining useful foreign allies under the cover of democracy and making the world stable to facilitate free market ideals.

The USA according to Burnell (2000, p. 45), promotes democracy in part because it wants to promote its own idealist agenda motivated by the notion that the USA was 'born to lead' and that America is exceptional or different from other countries in every sense of the word. Secondly, the USA promotes democracy because of its belief in the notion that democracies do not fight each other (democratic peace notion) and that democracy helps spread peace, security and stability in the international system. An example is the 'community of democracies' established in 2000 by President Clinton aimed at spreading democracy to boost America's security (Whitehead, 2010, p. 32).

Burnell (2000, p. 46) further argues that the spread of democracy by the USA is a way to extend US domination or imperialism through other means than the use of force. This is due to the fact that peace and stability are not universal values and the US has an interest in promoting them to consolidate their primacy (Schweller, 2000, p. 44). The USA also uses democracy promotion to promote its interests by applying it selectively when it suits their interests as well as using democracy promotion to promote neo-liberal principles like free market economies to pursue their interests when it favours them. (Burnell, 2000, p. 3) These strategies help explain why the USA pursue democracy promotion at different times and places in the world.

US democracy export and promotion efforts started gaining more momentum during the tenure of President Ronald Reagan when the two biggest institutions for exporting or promoting democracy in other countries, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) were established (McGlinchy, 2011, p. 4).

The NED started its own democracy assistance programs to other countries in 1984 and the USAID promoted democracy by working together with the Department of State with most of its funding spent on democracy and governance in other regions (Burnell, 2008, p. 634).

These two institutions were used to promote democracy to fight the ideology war with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The NED sent support in the form of millions of dollars to countries like Poland in the Soviet Union to help destabilise the Union. It also did the same thing in South Africa during the apartheid era when it helped groom moderate young black leaders and develop organisations to strengthen the civil society in apartheid South Africa in order to integrate the African economy into the global market economy to help fight communism (Robinson W. , 1996, pp. 327-331).

President Reagan advocated for the effective use of propaganda to enhance America's security through the planning and promotion of activities which serve the interests of the USA. (Nelson, 1996, pp. 232-3) These activities included technical training, financial aid and supporting governments and civil groups to inspire the spread of democracy around the world and Reagan's foreign policy on democracy requested clearly for deeper engagement with civil society groups like political parties, universities and the press in order to spread and implement democracy around the world (US National Security Council, 1983).

President Reagan and his administration carried out democracy promotion in the Philippines in 1984 to evolve their political system from a repressive government to democracy to further American interests like the construction of key military bases in the country and new markets for American goods. Prior to this, the Reagan administration had supported the repressive regime of President Marcos because he was part of small elite of Filipinos who were fused into the colonial administration after independence and he helped promote support for the US and its interests in the country in regards to maintaining stability and fending off communism (Schirmer & Shalom, 1987, p. 35).

The decision to transition the Philippines from repressive rule to democracy was taken by the USA due to growing popular unrests, strikes, assassinations and demonstrations which made President Marcos unpopular and as such a threat to the stability of the country and the region, a goal which the USA was bent on achieving in order to protect its military bases, investments and predominance in South East Asia (Schirmer & Shalom, 1987, p. 36).

The USA therefore transitioned the Philippines into democratic rule in 1986 by forcing President Marcos to hold elections which was won by Corazon Aquino, who was accommodating of the USA and therefore had a lot of military and economic support from America during his term of office. The American strategy in the transition process focused on funding political parties, labour unions (key civil society elements) etc through the NED to counter the influence of other parties or individuals who wanted to run for the election (Robinson W. , 1996, p. 128).

The USA also focused on supporting and influencing key individuals or intellectuals in the military and other influential segments of the Filipino society like Fidel Ramos, who was later also elected to the presidency and together with engaging elements in the civil society, the USA was able to ensure that the election's outcome was the best possible for their interests in the country and region. The election of Fidel Ramos to the Presidency after Corazon Aquino in 1992 also confirmed the promotion of elite based democracy in the Philippines (Robinson W. , 1996, p. 128).

President George H W Bush also followed this democracy export and promotion strategy due to its benefits in the Philippines, by adopting it and spreading or promoting it in South American countries like Chile, Nicaragua and Panama.

President George H Bush invaded Panama in 1989 after being involved in the domestic happenings of that country for decades due to the interest in constructing and managing the Panama Canal which had led to successive elitist governments which were largely sympathetic to the USA and its interests (Sanchez, 2007, p. 51).

The invasion was prompted by the desire to overthrow the government of Manuel Noriega, whom the USA had previously supported but who had become repressive and was also insisting on the need for Panama to control the Panama Canal as well as giving his support to a different candidate to the one preferred by America in an upcoming election, thereby leading to a decline in his relations with the USA. This declined coupled with domestic pressure from civil society and labour organisations led yet again by other elites, led to a transition from the repressive government of Noriega to an elite based democracy largely facilitated by the USA in 1989 (Sanchez, 2007, p. 166).

The transition process culminated in elections which were held in 1989 and the NED provided a lot of financial and logistic support to the opposition candidate Guillermo Endara leading to his victory. This support led to Manuel Noriega nullifying the election results and increasing his suppression of the people (Marshall, 2011).

In order to stabilize Panama and protect their interests especially in the Panama Canal and restoring their military bases after the elections had led to violence and more suppression, (Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, 1991, pp. 18-21) the USA intervened militarily in 1989 by invading Panama and overseeing the transition which installed the government of Endara, which was more supportive or subservient to American interests.

After the transition, the USA in a bid to fortify and spread their control to stabilize the country and make the transition to democracy even stronger, focused on political parties, labour coalitions and the business society, which forms the core of civil society just as in the Philippines, by making available to them economic and financial packages to mobilise these core groups to support the Endara led government (Sanchez, 2007, p. 175).

The USA also provided military and aid assistance to the Endara government to help boost the Panamanian economy in order to make the country more stable so as to perpetuate the democracy it had helped installed to protect its interests. This election in 1994 of Ernesto Balladares, a man who even sought closer ties to the USA to succeed President Endara was widely regarded as a move which helped cement elite-based democracy in Panama (Harding, 2006, p. 127).

President Bill Clinton, the 42nd President of the United States who succeeded President George H Bush assumed office in 1993 and in his inaugural address declared that “the best strategy to secure the security of the United States and long lasting peace was to support the export and promotion of democracy in other parts of the world because democracies do not attack each other but rather form partnerships” (Clinton, 1994).

President Clinton and his government therefore made the enlargement or expansion of democracy a major part of its foreign policy because it was the best way to maintain peace and security, a necessary precursor to protecting America interests all over the world (Douglas, 1997, p. 115).

To this end, the administration increased democracy assistance and advocated for the infusion of democratic principles into the policy making of countries in Sub Saharan Africa, the Balkans, Latin America and Central Europe (Carothers T. , 2007, p. 17).

However, these democratic expansion efforts were in many ways influenced by America's need to secure its economic and security concerns like trade and access to oil. This thereby led the Clinton Administration to still maintain cordial relations with repressive governments in places like China, the Middle East and parts of Asia despite the call for democracy expansion (Carothers T. , 2004, p. 17). For example, the Clinton Administration maintained cordial relationships with President Alberto Fujimori of Peru in the 1990s because of his cooperation with the US on many policies despite him being anti-democratic and repressive.

President Clinton's administration in a move to 'restore democracy' invaded Haiti in September 1994, much reminiscent of the invasions of Panama and Iraq, to bring back into power the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown by a military coup in 1991. The military coup was motivated by Aristide's human rights violations, his neglect of the judiciary, the cabinet and the General Assembly which led to bad relations as well as other substantial changes which were rejected by both the military and business elite (Collins & Cole, 1996, p. 219).

President Aristide before coming into office was a socialist and a staunch critic of western liberal policies and a favourite of the peasants and masses but once he came into office, he cut deals with America after meetings with the Clinton administration which for example led to an American company called Fusion going into a controversial partnership with Haiti Teleco, invited liberals into his government and accepted and implemented a structural adjustment program from the World Bank as well as other repressive policies which the masses saw as a betrayal thereby leading to the coup (Smith, 2004).

However, the Clinton Administration invaded Haiti and restored Aristide back into power in 1994 and the US persuaded civic organizations not to challenge US policies in the country and absorbed much of the old military guard into a new police force to serve as a loyal force base for Aristide (Smith, 2004).

President Aristide was again in 2004 overthrown by a coup largely regarded as the handiwork of America who had imposed economic embargoes and funded an opposition coalition led by American born intellectual Andre Apaté because Aristide had demanded that France pay restitutions for the debt it bestowed upon Haiti when it achieved independence from the colonial master as well as for slavery, thereby irritating the imperial powers who oppose slavery reparations (Smith, 2004).

After this coup, an interim government led by President Boniface Alexander and Prime Minister Gerard Latortue was appointed by a council set up by international powers led by the USA thereby securing elite-democracy practices in Haiti just as it happened in Philippines and Panama (Buss & Gardner, 2008, p. 40).

Successive US administrations from the 1950s upwards related well with some repressive governments in some regions like in the Middle East and Latin America in spite of the official shift to democracy promotion as the favoured foreign policy tool, by working to make the ones who were friendly to the USA more secure and weakening the unfriendly ones to protect their interests in the oil industry due to the rise in popularity of Islamic movements (Forest, 2007, p. 69). Some of the repressive regimes the USA supported included Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Augusto Pinochet of Chile, the Saudi, Kuwaiti and Jordanian absolute

monarchies among others in order to help stabilize the region to ensure the protection of America's interests especially the oil fields in the Middle East (Jones T. C., 2012, p. 208).

For example, Saddam Hussein came into power in 1979 and was running a suppressive government which repressed minority Shi'a and Kurds, nationalized oil production and revenue, acquired chemical weapons capacity and exhibited general brutality towards the Iraqi people and due to this, the Saddam Hussein government was initially placed on the terrorist watch list by the Carter administration in 1979 (Gagnon, 2002).

However, when the Iran/Iraq war which was brought on by the Iranian Revolution started in 1980, the USA in a bid to halt the revolution before it de-stabilized the region and therefore US interests especially oil supply from the region tilted its support to Iraq (Gagnon, 2002).

The Reagan administration therefore enacted a covert National Security Decision Directive in 1982 which stipulated that the United States will do whatever needs to be done including providing military and financial support as well as economic aid to help Iraq win the war over Iran. Iraq was also removed from the terrorist list by this same directive thereby forming the beginnings of a very special relationship between Saddam Hussein, the despot, and the Reagan and subsequent Bush administrations (Gagnon, 2002). The US subsequently over the ensuing years heavily supported Iraq through the provision of billions of dollars in aid and assistance, military aid and intelligence as well as the supply of vital weapons (Gagnon, 2002).

The George H Bush administration continued relating to Iraq the same way that the Reagan administration did. The administration approved the export of sophisticated weapons technology to Iraq, facilitated large loan guarantees and helped restore Iraq's oil infrastructure which was damaged during the war among others (Gagnon, 2002). All these ended only when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait thereby sparking a global outcry for action against his regime which led to the first Gulf war and the subsequent deteriorating of relations between Saddam and the USA which led to his ultimate overthrow in the 2001 invasion by President George W Bush.

Therefore, the US supported and in some instances still supports the repressive absolute monarchies in countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where the basic human rights of the citizens are repressed, basic freedoms of speech and association are denied, women are treated as second class citizens and where political detentions and abuse are rampant, by providing these countries with military aid and weapons as well as maintaining close ties to them to protect their interests like the US bases in Saudi Arabia or the flow of oil (Everest, 2011).

This support was influenced by the need to suppress the potential spread of Arab nationalism which was seen as a threat to US interests in the region because of the power of the movements and the notion that the movements might nationalize oil production and refuse to bend to US interests. The US government and companies working in the region therefore preferred working with the repressive governments to ensure stability and maintain the status quo since these governments were brutal in using suppression to rule (Jones T. C., 2012, p. 212).

The USA in order to protect its interests in some regions like the Middle East and parts of Latin America used repressive governments and regimes instead of democratic ones to maintain stability and protect its interests. This was because the repressive regimes were efficient in helping secure US interests in those regions and maintaining stability to protect US investments. This clearly goes on to show that the USA is not particularly concerned about which political system a nation uses, as long as it helps serve their interests, they will support it, and if doesn't, they will help dismantle it and install one that will help serve their interests better, be it an repressive or democratic governments.

To conclude, the USA after the Second World War used democracy promotion to ensure stability and peace in the international system. However, the country still supported some repressive regimes in a bid to protect and further their interest especially concerning fighting communism and oil interests in Latin America and the Middle East.

This democracy export and promotion efforts were motivated by among other factors the need to further its interests to consolidate their primacy in the international system and this position has been supported by some academics as a good foreign policy strategy. However, the universality of liberal democracy and therefore its promotion or promotion in other countries has also been challenged and criticised by some scholars as a flawed foreign policy strategy but the USA continues to use it.

Nonetheless, various administrations from President Reagan, through to President George H Bush to President Bill Clinton have encouraged democracy export and promotion with the help of organizations loyal to the US government and through institutions like political parties, civil society, trade unions and the media in countries like the Philippines, Panama and Haiti as a means to ensure stability in order to protect American interests including Military bases, fighting the communists' ideology and their economic interests in the Panama Canal in order to consolidate its primacy or hegemonic position in the world but in the case of the Middle East from the period up to before 9/11, the USA supported brutal repressive regimes to protect its interests whilst championing for democracy in other places.

4.2 THE CASE AGAINST EXPORTING OR PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL

This section aims to argue why democracy in general should not be exported or imposed on any other country by the US and its allies for any reasons or motivations in the first place.

The chapter above discussed the main motivations or reasons why the USA and thereby successive administrations in that country encourage the exporting or promotion of democracies into non-democratic countries as a key foreign policy tool. According to Burnell (2000, pp. 45-47) these motivations include promoting democracy because it furthers American values, advancing the democratic peace notion, continuing western hegemony and dominance, maintaining useful foreign allies under the cover of democracy and making the world stable to facilitate free market ideals etc.

During President Bush's tenure, officials in his administration like Condoleezza Rice, then Secretary of State explained that the reason why the Bush Administration has made exporting or imposing democracy in non-democratic countries around the world and especially in the Middle East a priority was because democracies do not fight each other because democracy creates free markets which leads to dependable trading partners who are far less likely to go

to war with one another citing the EU and Canada/USA/Mexico as examples (Epstein, Serafino, & Miko, 2007, p. 8).

The Bush administration also made democracy promotion the center of its foreign policy because the administration believed that promoting or imposing democracy in the Middle East will serve as a useful tool in countering the rise and spread of Islamic fundamentalism which leads to terrorist acts (Dalacoura, 2005, p. 963) and that promoting democracy will lead to economic prosperity for all due to the stability and economic growth that comes with it (Epstein, Serafino, & Miko, 2007, p. 8). These reasons given by the Bush administration for promoting democracy around the world and especially in the Middle East fits in perfectly with the motivations given by Burnell (2000) as to why the USA promotes democracy.

The promotion of democracy in which ever form has however been challenged by many a scholar including as discussed in the previous chapter Jorg Faust (2013) and Karsten Struhl (2007) both of whom asserted that democracy and by that liberal democracy is not universal in character because it originated from western civilization and as such it shouldn't be promoted or exported into other countries in the form that is practiced by the USA and Europeans but every society must be able to adapt democracy on their own to reflect their cultures and values so that they can be beneficial to that society.

Furthermore, pushing democracy on other countries can have destabilizing effects on those countries and entire regions. A study conducted by Harvard University in 2005 revealed that democratic transitions which are not completed or seen to the end like the USA leaving Iraq when it was just a fledgling democracy can lead to wars in and between countries due to the weak nature of institutions in those countries like the judiciary, army or police and this can lead to regional instability due to cross-border wars (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005, p. 4). It can also lead to a plethora of problems like corruption, kickbacks and embezzlement if the transition is not handled well and done in good faith. An example is Iraq where corruption and embezzlement is now the order of the day in the new democratic country due to weak institutions brought about by the mishandled transition (Cammett, 2012, p. 2).

The notion that democracies do not fight each other or the democratic peace notion which was given as one of the reasons for the Bush Administration's democracy promotion or expansion efforts in the Middle East has also been criticised as a cold war phenomenon which was used to attract other countries from embracing the communist ideology and also the notion has more to do with how the interests of countries align than the characteristics of democracy and peace (Gowa, 1999, p. 113).

Christopher Layne (1994, p. 38) asserts that the democratic peace notion fails to identify a causal link between domestic structures and the absence of wars between democratic countries since a lot of democratic countries have been involved in many different wars between themselves in the course of history like the Ruhr crisis between Germany and France at which time both countries were democracies. Furthermore, Layne (1994, p. 46) argues that the USA has used the democratic peace notion which has no empirical basis as an excuse to cause interventions in other countries in order to guarantee the country's security and survival because the notion links America's security to the internal politics of other countries.

Democracy promotion can also be seen as interfering in the domestic politics of other countries and can lead to a backlash especially if countries like the United States which are

seen as dominant countries with a dodgy history in relation to democracy promotion in other countries like the Philippines and Panama, make democracy export or promotion a key objective of their national security and foreign policy aspirations (Epstein, Serafino, & Miko, 2007, p. 9). This interference can also lead to repercussions for NGOs and human rights abuses in non-democratic countries since it will initiate a government restriction and crackdown on such institutions. An example of this backlash is the election of governments which are anti-American and the election of Hezbollah into office in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon respectively despite the money and effort invested by the USA to encourage democratic reforms in those countries (Epstein, Serafino, & Miko, 2007, p. 10).

Finally, public opinion in some regions around the world like the Middle East and parts of Latin America interprets US democracy promotion efforts as hypocritical because they do not believe that America will promote democracy for any genuine reason or without a hidden agenda like controlling the oil industry in the Arab world or flat out extending its hegemony (Dalacoura, 2005, p. 974).

In conclusion, the export, promotion or imposition of democracy by either the USA or any other country on other countries should not be encouraged in the first place since western liberal democracy; the form of democracy often promoted by the USA is not universal in character as argued by scholars like Karsten Struhl (2007), Jorg Faust (2013) and William Robinson (1996) but a product of western political systems and as such should not be imposed on other societies, but rather, other cultures should be allowed to choose their own form of democracy which reflects their values.

Furthermore, the democratic peace notion which countries like the USA and indeed President Bush gave for advancing democracy in Iraq and the Middle East has been criticised as having no empirical or truth basis and as such cannot be trusted. Democracy can also have destabilizing effects on countries and regions if not planned well and seen through to the end like how Iraq has been plunged into violence ever since the USA invaded the country and imposed democracy.

Lastly, the export or promotion of democracy should not be encouraged as it leads to suspicion, repercussions and resentments especially if it is championed by countries like the USA who have a chequered history with promoting democracy in other countries, this is because the USA is always perceived and in some instances rightly so to have hidden agendas like promoting democracy in the Philippines and Panama to establish military bases in South East Asia to maintain their dominance in that region and control the Panama Canal respectively.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

This section is divided into three parts in order to diligently explore and explain the different elements being analysed in order to answer the problem formulation and research questions to prove why US democracy promotion in Iraq after 9/11 is a quest for hegemony. The first section will focus on the National Security Strategies of the United States for the years 2002 and 2006, that is, during President Bush's era when the strategy of democracy export and promotion in Iraq started. These two documents will provide the strategic vision of the US in terms of democracy promotion from 2002 to 2006 or how and why the US intended to promote democracy in other parts of the world at that period.

The next part will focus on the US approach to democracy export and implementation in the Middle East in general after 9/11, with the focus shifting from the status quo of supporting repressive governments in the Middle East in order to protect American interests to the promotion of democracy in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

The last part will then focus on US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq itself after 9/11, the strategy behind it as well as how it was implemented in order to answer the problem formulation and research questions and draw a conclusion.

5.1 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002

In 2005, Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State echoed the dynamic change of US foreign policy which hitherto supported some repressive regimes in the Middle East as a means to ensure stability to promoting democracy to ensure peace in a speech in Egypt in which she said "For sixty years, the USA has gone after stability instead of advancing democracy in the Middle East region but achieved neither and as such America is pursuing a different course by supporting the democratic dreams and aims of people in the Middle East and all over the world" (Rice, 2005)

This tone or view was clearly influenced by the democracy promotion strategy in the Middle East and introduced after 9/11 in the NSS 2002 and further reaffirmed and consolidated in the NSS 2006.

The National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) opens with the words "The great struggles of the twentieth century between freedom and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for freedom as well as a single sustainable model for national success which is the combination of freedom, democracy and free trade" (*Excerpt 1*) (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001, p. iii).

These words clearly echoes the way the United States and the western world views liberal democratic principles like freedom and democracy as a blue print to achieve success in other parts of the world irrespective of culture or social values, a view which has been buttressed by academics like Fukuyama (1989) and Diamond (1992) but intelligently contested by others like Chomsky (1992), Robinson (1996) and Struhl (2007).

The document then goes on to state on the fourth page that "America will encourage the promotion or promotion of democracy and economic openness in countries like Russia, China among others where liberal democracy is not being practiced because democracies

ensure internal as well as international stability and as such the USA will strongly resist aggression from other great powers to halt this promotion drive”(Excerpt 2) (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001, p. v). This goes in tandem with the assertion above that liberal democratic principles will ensure the success of countries within which they are practiced, with no thoughts given to how the culture or history of that particular country might not make these principles a success and that international stability enables America to maintain its hegemonic position.

Furthermore, the USA will extend the benefits of freedom and democracy around the world by promoting democracy and development, as well as free markets and trade to reduce the risk that failed states, which are mostly undemocratic and pose a threat to the USA and its allies (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001, p. v). Burnell (2000, pp. 45-47) describes this notion to promote democracy in order to avoid failed states which can pose a threat to the USA and its allies and their dominant position as promoting the notion of democratic peace, that is, democratic states do not fight each other and as such these nations will not pose a threat to America’s hegemony.

Section VII of the NSS 2002 deals with how the USA will expand development by opening up societies through the building of democracy infrastructure (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001, p. 21) as well as using foreign aid to promote democracy by supporting those who struggle for it non-violently.

This involves providing aid to societies that are committed to democratic reform and opening up their markets for liberal commerce and investment as well as the provision of good education and health through aid assistance in order to help societies around the world build up their societies to support democratic reform processes.

The United States will then be able to promote the values of liberal democracy, free markets and freedom in order to guarantee international peace as well as political and economic stability which will help fight the enemies of freedom into submission (Excerpt 3) (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001). This reflects the stance taken in the whole document which calls for the promotion of democracy, freedom and free market principles as a way to ensure stability and protect America’s primacy in the world system and which fits in well with the motivations Burnell (2000) gave for US democracy promotion efforts.

5.2 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2006

The sequel to the NSS 2002, which was published in 2006, also holds democracy promotion as a key element in US foreign policy during President Bush’s tenure. The document states that for the USA to meet its challenges and protect its interests, the country must among other things “expand development by making societies more accessible through the building of democratic infrastructures (Excerpt 4)” (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 1) (Burnell, 2000, pp. 45-47) argues that using democracy promotion to protect its interests helps America consolidate its imperial status.

The document goes on to stress the importance of democracy promotion or promotion by stressing how the world has seen extraordinary progress in expanding democracy and freedom due to the overthrow of the Taleban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq or replacing tyrannies with democracies (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 2).

The US saw democracy promotion and consolidation of democratic principles essential to their security and the promotion of their interests and values and therefore suggested in the NSS 2006 to promote democracy with all available resources and means because “democracies are the most responsible members of the international system and therefore promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and ensuring peace and prosperity (*Excerpt 5*)” (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 3). Gramsci (1971) contends that imposing or spreading an ideology into other countries by any means constitutes hegemony because the ideology is taken up by the masses and seen as the common sense thereby giving the control of that particular country to the one spreading the ideology.

This democracy promotion drive will help end tyranny according to the NSS 2006 (2006) and promote effective democracies and as such the US will support and advocate for democracy promotion in every country but with different tactics. The document suggests taking more vocal and assertive steps to ensure immediate change from oppressive governments to democracy whilst in some cases it will be more of quiet support to lay down the foundations for the future (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 6).

These steps can include political, economic, diplomatic and other tools and will come in the form of supporting democratic movements in repressive nations, using aid to encourage democracy, supporting economic reforms, working with international organizations, reforming and empowering civil society, the media and other institutions in societies with no democracies to help advance democracy, as well as forming strong partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society voices to support and strengthening their work (*Excerpt 6*) (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 6). They also included supporting democratic movements, going in partnerships with other nations to promote democracy around the world applying sanctions on non-democratic governments, strengthening and building new initiatives like the Foundation for the Future etc (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 6).

The NSS 2006 also sees democracy as the best way to fight terrorism and tyranny which leads to fail states which threaten international peace and stability as well as American interests because democracy ensures freedom, human dignity, rule of law and economic prosperity. These are values held high by Americans and as such should be ‘shared’ or promoted around the world. (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 11) The document mentions countries like Morocco, Jordan and Indonesia where efforts are being made to consolidate democracy and fight terrorism (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 11).

On the Middle East, the NSS 2006 states that the region has been having problems with freedom due to repression, corruption, conflicts, religious extremism etc which leads to instability and as such the US is devoted to backing the work of governments, people and institutions who undertake democratic reforms to achieve a better life for themselves which will ensure that Middle Eastern states will be at peace with one another and to participate in international commerce which ultimately leads to stability in the international political system (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 38).

Therefore the USA, in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular will support the march from tyranny to democracy by supporting changes that will help expand freedom in

order to build long lasting security and stability (*Excerpt 7*). (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 38)

5.3 SUMMARY CONCLUSION (NSS 2002 AND 2006)

The USA National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 both affirms the importance and need for the USA to promote democracy because democracy represents America's ultimate values as well the notion that it represents the blueprint for success for other countries irrespective of their culture or social values and beliefs and therefore help secure and protect American interests through the creation a stable political environment.

The USA therefore encourages the export and promotion of democracy to ensure stability and protection of its interests in order to maintain its leading position in the international political system. The document calls for the USA to advance democracy through all the tools available to it including supporting democratic movements and working closely with civil societies and NGOs in the countries where they want to promote democracy to achieve the democratic process at all cost, an element which is central to how a country pursues and achieves hegemony in Gramsci's theory of hegemony.

The documents therefore implores the USA to take initiatives which include diplomatic, economic, military, foreign aid and whatever means necessary to ensure the transition of societies around the world especially in the Middle East which are under repressive regimes to transit to the liberal democratic process to promote peace and stability in order to ensure and protect American interests and investments to protect their dominance in the world system.

The USA therefore had the strategy to promote democracy instead of support of repressive regimes like it had done in the Middle East and parts of Latin America in the past to ensure the eradication of failed states, fight terrorism and promote freedom which will in turn lead to peace and stability which ultimately helps secure and protect American interests thereby helping the country consolidate its premier or hegemonic position in the world system.

The analysis above shows that the Bush administration wanted to promote democracy according to the NSS 2002/2006¹ documents so as to ensure peace and stability, fight terrorism, promote American values etc through all available means in order to protect American interests and dominant position in the world. The following analysis will therefore focus on how the US rejected repressive regimes and instead advanced democracy in the Middle Eastern region and why and how the promotion of democracy in Iraq following the strategy laid out in the NSS 2002/2006 documents constitutes a quest to strengthen their hegemony.

5.4 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER 911

The USA just as it had done in countries in Latin America and Asia like Panama, Nicaragua and Philippines steadily encouraged the advancing of democracy in the Middle East after 9/11 in line with the NSS 2002/2006 (2001; 2006) documents recommendations as a means of seeking and ensuring stability to ultimately help strengthen its hegemony².

¹ (See Excerpts 2,3 and 4 in the NSS documents analysis)

² (See Excerpt 7 in the NSS documents analysis)

This represented a shift from supporting repressive regimes in the region which was its policy during the decades after WWII until 9/11³ (National Security Council, 1950, pp. 252-272). This shift reflected what Gramsci (1971) noted as a subtle shift from using coercion or force like the use/support of repressive regimes to a consensual form of social control (use of ideologies), which nonetheless was still aimed at achieving or strengthening hegemony. This shift was partly inspired by the perception that democracies do not fight each other and as such supporting democracy instead of autocracy in the Middle East will lead to a wave of democratization across the region thereby making the region more stable and free of terrorists and also on the fact that promoting democracy and free market transformation can lead to a contemporary age of security which protects US interests and help boost its image, because the country will be seen as promoting one of its core values, liberal democracy instead of supporting autocracy but will in the end achieve the same goal or objective; protecting its interests and ensuring stability to further its hegemonic aspirations, which were espoused by the NSS documents⁴.

Additionally, this shift only represented a move from the use of forceful to consensual social control, that is, abandoning the support of repressive governments to ‘promote democracy’ just as a method to exercise domination over the peripheral regions of the world (Robinson W. I., 1996, p. 623). Hegemony nonetheless but in a more subtle or subdued way through the very institutions and spheres that form the basis of democracy and not through coercion or military force.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 thwarted the time-honoured assumption in America that pro-American repressive governments or regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia could serve as a barrier to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in the Middle East. It was therefore the belief of the Bush administration after 9/11 that a regime change in Iraq could inspire a democratization process across the Middle East to ensure stability (Gambill, 2003).

To this end, President Bush in a speech at the UN General Assembly a year after the 9/11 attacks remarked that America “was looking forward to the day that Iraq will join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, encouraging changes throughout the Middle East” (Bush, 2002) and also unveiled a new National Security Strategy which stated that democracy is proper and correct for every person in every society (Gambill, 2003).

President Bush also acknowledged in a speech at an event in Washington DC that the “deficit in freedom and democratic governments in the Middle East region has done nothing to make America and the West feel safe and as such the USA will follow a new policy in the Middle East, which is intended to lead to freedom, peace and stability” (Bush, 2003).

In view of this, and in accordance with the NSS documents of 2002 and 2006⁵ which both advocated for a expansion in democracy throughout the world through all available resources to help protect, secure and maintain America’s security, interests and supremacy, the Bush administration launched a number of initiatives including publicly and privately persuading and arm twisting repressive governments in the region to transition to democracy, rewarding governments which transition to democracy with economic and free trade benefits,

³ (See *Historical Account and Motivations for Democracy Promotion Section*)

⁴ (See *Excerpts 2, 4 and 7 in the NSS documents analysis*)

⁵ (see *Excerpts 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the NSS documents analysis*)

establishing new initiatives like the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) to support political and socio-economic changes, revising bi-lateral aid policies to make them more democratic oriented and establishing various regional democratic initiatives like Foundation for the Future (FFF) (Carothers T. , 2007, p. 5). These initiatives clearly follow the suggestion of both NSS 2002 and 2006 for the USA to work closely with civil society, Non-Governmental Organizations and using new initiatives among others as a means of facilitating democratic transitions in other countries⁶.

The Foundation for the Future (FFF) was a multilateral non-profit organization launched in 2005 which supported initiatives by Civil Society Institutions to promote human rights and democratic and social changes in the Middle East as a response to the challenge of finding ways to technically and financially support the initiatives of civil society institutions aimed at helping reform the Middle East (Foundation for the Future, 2010).

The FFF also aimed at empowering civil society to help them make a positive contribution to the democratic transition process in Middle Eastern countries and to provide a channel for all citizens to be included in the democratic process to aid political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa so as to improve human rights, good governance and democracy (Foundation for the Future, 2010).

Apart from this and other initiatives aimed at spreading democracy in the Middle East and in accordance with the NSS strategy which calls for the use of any measures necessary to expand or promote democracy⁷ (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 6), the Bush Administration also engaged the Middle Eastern countries economically through the GMEI in order to facilitate the establishment of a conducive atmosphere for democracy by proposing the establishment of trade hubs, business incubator zones and the signing of free trade agreements with countries like Omar and Bahrain to encourage the establishment and increase in intra-regional trade as well as external trade between Middle Eastern countries and the West to help reduce poverty which will in turn bolster freedom and liberty of individuals (Shakdam, 2014).

The United States as part of its democracy promotion strategy and in accordance with the NSS 2006 provision which calls for taking more vocal and assertive steps to ensure immediate change from tyranny to democracy in some cases⁸ (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006, p. 6) also adopted the use of military interventions in the Middle East like it did in Panama in 1989 by invading Iraq in 2003 and overthrowing the repressive government of Saddam Hussein and citing a host of reasons for the invasion among which included democracy promotion or promotion, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and the harbouring of terrorists. However, democracy promotion in Iraq only became the central argument or rationale given by President Bush for toppling Saddam Hussein's government and replacing it with an elite-based democratic government when the WMDs and terrorism points were largely discredited (Hobson C. , March 2005, p. 40).

As a result of these initiatives and strategies taken in accordance with the strategy in the NSS documents, under President Bush's tenure, the Middle East saw a wave of electoral processes

⁶ (See Excerpt 6 in the NSS documents analysis)

⁷ (see Excerpt 5 in the NSS documents analysis)

⁸ (see Excerpt 6 in the NSS documents analysis)

and limited changes. The UAE, Bahrain and Qatar introduced new constitutions through various referendums and resumed parliamentary elections after decades without it and Saudi Arabia also organised a municipal election in 2005, a very rare occurrence (CNN, 2005).

However, these changes were seen just as a part of the promoted liberal democracy ideology because even though these states held elections and introduced some new constitutions as part of the democratic process, they were still ruled by autocrats and monarchies and as such these electoral processes were seen as means to make their rule seem more legitimate in order to be seen as progressing in the democratic process whilst the truth of the matter is, these countries (UAE, Bahrain, Oman etc) are still repressive countries and the USA cooperates with these countries because it only promotes democracy when the conditions are favourable to protect its interests plus although the USA might have an underlying interest to genuinely transform the Middle East, it also cannot do away with the important relations it has with repressive governments in the region due to their objective of protecting their interests in oil and geo-political superiority through all available means (Ottaway & Carothers, 2004, p. 2).

In conclusion, the United States emphasized on democracy instead of supporting repressive regimes as a means of ensuring stability in the Middle East after 9/11 in accordance with the strategy in the NSS 2002 and 2006⁹ documents and due to a number of reasons which include the notion that democracies do not fight each other and as such a democratic Middle East will lead to more stability. This shift was also necessitated by the need for the USA especially after the events of 9/11 and the domestic pressure to cut a clean image by withdrawing support for repressive governments which were seen as creating safe havens for terrorist and introducing or promoting one of its core values/ideology, that is, liberal democracy, which the country sees as the best form of government and which was also based on the preferred consensual form of governance rather than coercive, to ensure peace and stability.

These reasons notwithstanding, the underlying aim of this democracy promotion efforts according to the strategy laid out in the NSS 2002/2006 documents is to protect American interests around the world in order to protect the country's leading position in the world, a move which constitutes according to Gramsci, the quest for hegemony, because the strategy promotes an ideology which will be assimilated by the masses in the host countries without any questions or objections regarding its suitability or otherwise, thereby making the concept dominant and the embodiment of all thoughts and behaviour in that particular society which then helps the USA gain control and dominate that country.

5.5 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN IRAQ AFTER 9/11

President Bush on March 19, 2003 launched 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' after an ultimatum given to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours or face war expired and the USA and its allies, including Britain and Australia, invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein's government. The operation was the largest special operations force since the Vietnam War and among its objectives was to end the rule of Saddam Hussein, search for and eliminate Iraqi's Weapons of Mass Destruction, secure Iraqi oil fields and also to help the people of Iraq create an environment suitable for a democratic government (Pike, 2011).

The two major reasons or motivations given by the Bush government for this invasion at that time were Saddam Hussein's links to terrorists and the perceived Iraqi production of

⁹ (See Excerpt 7 in the NSS documents analysis)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). In the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush remarked that the USA knows Iraq had several mobile biological weapons developed in the 1990s (Bush, 2003) and then Secretary of State Colin Powell also presented a report to the UN in 2003 to show that Iraq apparently had Weapons of Mass Destruction (CNN, 2003). US officials also claimed that Saddam Hussein had a secret relationship with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, which masterminded the attacks of 9/11 (Hayes, 2003).

However, when these two principal factors for the invasion were largely discredited, democracy promotion in Iraq only became the central justification given by the Bush administration for the invasion (Hobson C. , March 2005, p. 40).

To this end President Bush in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in 2003 called democracy promotion in Iraq, a “strategy of freedom in the Middle East” which “will be an important event for how democracy evolves and spreads throughout the world” (Bush, 2003) because “as long as there is no freedom in the Middle East, the place will be a breeding ground for violence and animosity, which can be harmful to the USA and its allies” (Bush, 2003). He also remarked in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute that “the world has an interest in spreading democracy because freedom and stability helps countries avoid hateful ideologies” (Bush, 2003).

The need to promote democracy in Iraq was also seemingly driven by the Bush Administration’s desire to transform the whole Middle Eastern region into a democratic hub to address the so-called democratic deficit or lack of democracy in the region, integrate the Middle East into the world economic system, build a strong civil society with the help of elites or intellectuals in order to exercise a hegemony over the masses and finally prevent the rise of a regional power as a step to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict which will all help promote stability and protect American interests in the region and the world as a whole (Robinson W. , 2004, pp. 441-442).

The promotion of democracy in Iraq also reflected the strategies laid out in the NSS 2002 and 2006¹⁰ which affirmed the importance and the need for the USA to promote democracy because democracy represents America’s ultimate values as well as the notion that it represents the blueprint for success for other countries too irrespective of their culture or social values and beliefs and therefore help secure American interests through the creation of a stable political environment which represented a giant leap in US foreign policy towards Iraq in particular and the Middle East in general (National Security Strategy 2002, 2001) (National Security Strategy 2006, 2006).

In view of this strategy, the USA in a bid to create an internal system or structure of domination based on consensus or the promotion of democracy, cultivated the political and civil societies of Iraq as well as its economy through privatizations, reliance on intellectuals to lead and fill key positions in government, building a civil society base that will support the new government through puppet organisations, suppressing alternate political voices as well as funding local media to help in propaganda issues (Robinson W. , 2004, pp. 442-447) etc and this scenario is what Gramsci (1971) argued as the dominant class organizing and centralising certain elements within the political and civil society to assume control over society and spread their definition of reality on the masses thereby leading to the acceptance

¹⁰ (See Excerpts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 in the NSS documents analysis)

of this concept and its acceptance as the common sense or the natural thing which leads to hegemony.

Furthermore, any other alternate political drive within civil society must be silenced to prevent other political views which may be popular or autonomous from coming out (Robinson W. , 2004, p. 447). As such, the US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq will support civil and political organisations that can build a solid platform or foundation for the new Iraqi government and isolate and crush any organisation that opposes the US plan and strategy (Robinson W. , 2004, p. 447).

The promotion of democracy in Iraq was therefore according to (Robinson W. , 2004) based on fostering an elite or intellectual based democracy in the country aimed at strengthening their hegemony by cultivating changes in the political and civil society aspects of the Iraqi society, a move which also reflect the democracy promotion strategy in the NSS 2002/2006 documents which urged the USA to promote democracy through all available means, tools and channels and build democratic infrastructure in other countries¹¹ and which Gramsci also noted is key in the quest for hegemony through consensus and not force or coercion because it aims at promoting an ideology with the aim to dominate all aspects of social life in the country by taking control of its political and civil society landscape (Robinson W. , 2004).

In view of the above arguments, the USA therefore cultivated the political, civil society and economic landscapes of Iraq and also used this same strategy to take control of the Iraqi media and educational system and suppress labour unions in order to ensure the rapid acceptance of the liberal democratic ideology by the Iraqi people so as to tighten their control over the country and so as to strengthen their hegemony. This strategy and changes have been widely discussed by scholars like William Robinson (2004; 1996; 1996) Jeff Bridoux (2011) Al Rawi (2012) and James Dobbins et al (2009).

The Bush administration in a bid to cultivate and control the political institutions of Iraq, used a number of Iraqi exiled elites and intellectuals and some Americans to form the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to take control over the political landscape of Iraq to ensure the promotion of the liberal democracy ideology so as to bring about stability in order to ensure Iraq remains a leading oil supplier to the world to further American interests (Robinson W. , 2004, p. 446).

These intellectuals who were in exile and who share US interests, took up key posts in Iraqi ministries where they worked closely with American and other western officials (Jehl & Perlez, 2003), a move which can be explained by Gramsci's concept of organic intellectuals and control of the political society as they will help promote the western liberal democratic ideology and free market ideals, thereby making it appropriate and justifiable and leading to its acceptance by the masses as well as run the affairs of the country. This was the same move the USA used in the Philippines when it focused on key personnel in the Marcos government to put pressure on Marcos to relinquish power, promote liberal democratic principles and transition the Philippines from repressive to democratic rule.

The use of these intellectuals to govern also gave the USA total control over the direction the country should take because every decision and policy was determined by these intellectuals

¹¹ (See Excerpt 4, 5 in the NSS documents analysis)

who made up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and who were chosen carefully by the Bush administration because of their loyalty to the USA. These intellectuals are what Robinson (2004, p. 445) calls “agents of influence” because they serve as leaders in the political and civil arenas and are expected by the USA to convince the masses in Iraq to conform to the new ideology being promoted in order to get the country integrated into the global capitalist system and thereby help strengthen the USA’s hegemony.

The CPA team which run the country included only intellectuals exiled and educated in western countries and was also greatly swayed or influenced by the Bush government’s policies of implementing bold changes in Iraq and ideas and these policies were dictated to the CPA by the neo-conservative elements in the Bush government in order to serve US interests in Iraq. (Jehl, 2003)

The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was also created by and under the CPA and consisted of various tribal and political figures in Iraq who were appointed by the CPA to advice the authority and most of them like Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad Allawi were sympathetic to US interests. The council was therefore seen as a puppet of the CPA and to extension the USA because members of the council were hand selected and not elected thereby making a mockery of democracy itself and also members spent more time on their self interests than that of Iraq’s future thereby helping further America’s hegemonic ambitions in Iraq (sourcewatch, 2006).

Furthermore, the council was later upgraded but not elected into a government headed by US loyalist Ayad Allawi and still under the control of the CPA which then handpicked ministers who share US interests to head the various government organizations and also combined with the CPA to draw up the provisional Iraqi constitution (Jabar, 2007, p. 4) thereby effectively giving control over the Iraqi political terrain to the USA.

The Iraqi military and which Gramsci (1971) describes as being part of the political society was dismantled by the CPA by the issuance of CPA Order No. 2 which called for the dissolution of a wide range of state institutions like the military and intelligence services which led to a high rate of unemployment (Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, & Mohandas, 2009, s. 58).

The CPA then built a new army through a much more deliberate effort as a means to cultivate and control the military which is part of the Iraqi political society by recalling only a few units which were trained by the US Army under the overall command of the CPA. This led to the creation of the Iraqi Defense Corp who were not very well trained and depended on the US Army and CPA for support and supervision (Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, & Mohandas, 2009, s. 62).

In line with the theme of the NSS 2002 and 2006¹², as well as the long held position of US foreign policy on democracies being built on liberal market changes, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the transitional government set up by the US and its allies after the invasion began issuing binding orders and taking steps to privatize and opening up the hitherto state owned Iraqi economy to foreign investors just like how the US helped Chile

¹² (See Excerpt 6 in the NSS documents analysis)

adopt free market changes in the 1970s which later spread to other parts of Latin America, but did not work out for some of the countries (Remmer, 1998).

The CPA in a briefing to President Bush in May 2003, made reforming the Iraqi economy into a liberal market economy a top priority because it was only with this reform that the promotion of the liberal democratic ideology will work remarking that “the first priority of the CPA was to get the Iraqi people and its economy back to work because if the economy is not on track, changes in other institutions simply won’t work” (Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, & Mohandas, 2009, p. 198) because introducing and ensuring that the liberal democratic ideology works requires a strong liberal economic environment. This is also part of the fusion of liberal market changes with liberal democracy which helps promote a political market economy which helps furthers America’s hegemony.

The CPA therefore issued new bank notes to boost confidence in the Iraqi currency, the Dinar, undertook bank changes by privatising the hitherto state owned banks, removed subsidies, and revamped the commercial law which hitherto restricted non-Arab companies from owning stocks in Iraqi companies so that multi-national conglomerates from the west could set up new companies and own stocks in Iraqi companies and the CPA also set new laws allowing these overseas companies to send most of the profits they make back to their home countries. (Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, & Mohandas, 2009, p. 212)

Furthermore, the CPA reduced subsidies to state-owned enterprises, on food and on energy because they were seen as smothering the development of the Iraqi economy due to the huge costs involved and also helped the US government set up a trade and investment plan with Iraq aimed at helping secure a future free trade agreement between the two countries (Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, & Mohandas, 2009, p. 217).

Even though a number of these policies, including the removal of subsidies, temporary employment schemes, foreign ownership of Iraqi companies and repatriation of profits were hugely criticised as being detrimental to Iraq in the long term (Armstrong, 2009, p. 232), the changes were pushed through in order to jump-start the Iraqi economy to provide the foundation for the promotion of democracy, that is, to promote and support the liberal democratic ideology and principles in order to strengthen America’s hegemony.

The economic changes were criticised as being too naive and ideological due to their dedication to deregulation and free market ideas which is a clear endeavour to shape Iraqi’s post-invasion economy to suit American interests and to the detriment of the Iraqi people and indeed the Iraqi Finance Minister during that period, Ali Allawi said in his memoirs that “the economic policies of the CPA was made up of hopeless and unrealistic radical changes, which purported to introduce a liberal market economy, in an attempt to get the Iraqi economy running again” (Allawi, 2008).

The CPA modelled the Iraqi economy on the American capitalist system and therefore planned and implemented its economic policies with minimal input from Iraqis themselves even though the policies were criticised as being too centred on the oil sector neglecting other equally productive areas of the Iraqi economy like agriculture and production and the Authority was also criticised by law experts as having no authority to even implement these economic changes in the first place due to their nature as a body working for an occupying

force (Crocker, 2004, pp. 80-84), and this lends credence to the fact that these policies were only aimed to further American interests and not that of Iraqis.

Furthermore, these economic changes led to the laying off of over 500,000 Iraqi workers and the marginalization of many Iraqi businessmen due to the outsourcing of many key reconstruction business to American companies, thereby making the economy over-reliant on American investments (Thorn, 2013).

The CPA made a concerted effort to change and reform the Iraqi civil society through partners such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), International Republican Institute, CHF International and the Iraq Foundation (EPIC, 2010) just as the USA had done in Chile, the Philippines and other places before, in order to promote the democratic ideology so that it will be accepted rapidly by the Iraqi people.

These implementing partners were responsible for among other things providing training and assistance to local councils and building the capacity of civil society groups as the foundations for a democratic revolution (EPIC, 2010).

The NED which finances the International Republican Institute has been known and criticised for meddling in the internal affairs of other countries to further US interests through the provision of funds, training and technical assistance to selected political and civic groups, labour unions and the media in order to subvert popular uprisings which will threaten the primacy position of the USA and its interests (Blum, 2005, pp. 179-184).

The NED has also been criticised of manipulating elections in countries like the Philippines in the 1980s, Nicaragua in 1990, Bulgaria and Albania in 1990 and 1991 respectively to overthrow democratically elected governments who were out of favour or who were no longer yielding to the interests of Washington so as to maintain America's primacy (Blum, 2005, pp. 179-184).

CHF International also came under scrutiny during the Haitian disaster in 2010 for running corrupt programs, not having the competence to manage the crisis as well as being extravagant and yet they were one of the largest USAID contractors in Haiti because their President and CEO, David Weiss, is top notch Washington lobbyist and former State Department Official (Reitman, 2011).

The CPA also cultivated the Iraqi civil society, a move which Gramsci (1971) argued in his theory of hegemony is critical to spreading and gaining legitimacy for the imposed ideology, in this case, liberal democracy in Iraq due to the fact that it is made up of institutions through which society organises and represents itself independently from the state and therefore it was necessary to transform civil society in order to ensure the acceptance and legitimacy of a promoted ideology (Shaw, 2015). Therefore, the USA undertook and implemented changes with the help of intellectuals and institutions loyal to its interests like USAID, the media and educational institutions to help hasten the acceptance of the liberal democratic ideology so as to gain control of Iraq.

The CPA and its implementing partners mostly USAID, as a move to strengthen civil participation in governance, oversaw the creation of democratic town councils with the help of its professional advisors, most of whom were Americans and Iraqi expats who appointed

the heads of these town councils rather than them being elected by the local people. This led to many of the local and national leaders being appointed by the CPA rather than elected in order to ensure an Iraqi government favourable to US interests when the term of the CPA ended (Hasvold, 2004).

This process was seen as undemocratic because local elections were a better alternative and also it opened up the doors for US corporate interests to take over in Iraq. The process was also described as a selection building process which will lead to the eventual Iraqi government having very little internal accountability thereby providing more ways for the US to involve itself in Iraqi affairs (Hasvold, 2004).

The USA used organizations and individuals who clearly had a dodgy history to implement its civil society program in Iraq because these intellectuals and organizations are loyal to the USA and its interests and by using them to carry out the changes in Iraq; it will provide them with complete control of all facets of Iraq to help strengthen their hegemony. These individuals and organizations were used by the USA to introduce, spread and ensure support for the liberal democratic ideology which in turn gave them total control over the country and in to an extent a strong footing in Middle Eastern politics, a great boost for their hegemonic ambitions and this is what Robinson (2004, p. 445) calls the “agents of influence”.

Some of these intellectuals included Kanan Makiya, an advisor to the CPA and an academic Iraqi exile who was educated in the USA and a prominent member of the Iraqi opposition during Saddam Hussein’s era who was also described as a staunch proponent of the Iraq war. In the build up to the Iraq war, Makiya more than any other person made the case for the invasion because he thought it was the right thing to do because it would clear the ground for western style democracy and even told President Bush at the Oval Office two months before the invasion that Iraqis would greet Americans with “sweets and flowers” (Filkins, 2007).

Another one is Dr. Mowaffak Baqer al-Rubai, an Iraqi medical doctor who was educated in Britain and served as a member of the Iraqi Governing Council and also as the National Security Advisor in Iraq in 2003. Dr. Al-Rubai whilst in exile in London worked with a charitable organization called the Al-Khoei foundation which was described as loyal to the US and its interests and has been accused of laundering money for the CIA and close links to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (Sourcewatch, 2007).

One last but not the least intellectual used by the CPA and thereby the USA in spreading and gaining support for liberal democracy in Iraq was Ayad Allawi, who was nominated but not elected by the Iraqi Governing Council in 2004 to serve as Prime Minister. Allawi, who was exiled in London has been known to have ties to the CIA (Chandrasekaran, 2004) and was also one of the people who publicly spoke out and connected Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 terrorist and Weapons of Mass Destruction through a series of publications and interviews in various news outlets around the world (Sourcewatch, 2009).

Additionally, organizations like the NED, USAID and CHF International which have been involved in US democracy programs in other countries like Haiti and Panama before Iraq, are also seen as puppet organisations with strong ties to the US government and its interests and due to this and their past records with democracy promotion including destabilizing governments and funding opposition groups and parties in other countries (Golinger, 2014), these organisations and the programs they plan and implement in the civil society and

education sectors can be seen as helping the USA strengthen its control over the institutions in that particular society due to their loyalty to the US and its interests as their real goals or intentions are not always clear.

The use of intellectuals and organizations that are sympathetic or biased to US interests, which is a classic move used in achieving and strengthening hegemony according to Gramsci (1971), led to the reform of the civil society in Iraq through programs which were being implemented by the CPA and its partner organizations/intellectuals and these programs viewed the Iraqi state as one of the obstacles to promoting democracy and as such made communities stronger than the state itself by apportioning more power to the communities and thereby leading to the creation of civic organizations and institutions which are free from Iraqi state oversight but subversive to US interests and which also controls how the Iraqi social institutions function instead of acting as a counter weight to government, thereby giving control over the interests and will of the citizens to the USA (Saeed, 2010, pp. 3-4).

Furthermore, the changes carried out in the civil society sector by these organizations and individuals who are loyal to furthering American interests led to many of these civil society becoming proxies for the USA leading them to take over governmental functions and controlling state institutions at all levels, a situation which reduced their efficiency, professionalism and capacity to act as civic organizations, and rather helped the USA strengthen its control over Iraq by using these groups to spread the liberal democracy ideology, get the masses to accept it as the common sense and establishing their dominance over the country (NCCI, 2011, p. 16) Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jafaari described the reformed civil society in Iraq as a way for America and its allies to maintain their presence and control over Iraq even after they have withdrawn from the country (Mamouri, 2013).

The appointment rather than election of leaders by the CPA at the local government level also gave the USA a means to insert itself and control Iraqi politics and mindsets since these appointed leaders were appointed and under the control of the USA and as such yielded to their bidding.

The USA through the CPA and other partner agencies made wide scale changes in the Iraqi media and educational which are important aspects of civil society and Gramsci (1971) describes them as key in manipulating public opinion and therefore central to the hegemonic process because it is through the media and education sectors mostly that the values of the promoted ideology are debated, spread and accepted quickly thereby helping to give the liberal democratic ideology in Iraqi society in order to gain legitimacy. Trade unions were also suppressed with the exception of pro-US ones, a move which Robinson (2004) describes as part of the overall strategy to suppress any alternate political voice to the democracy promotion strategy in Iraq.

This strategy which was inscribed in the NSS documents of 2002 and 2006 which calls for reform in institutions like the media and civil society to advance democracy¹³, and which in the end will lead to what Gramsci called a total acceptance of the concept or ideology being promoted, thereby leading to the achievement of hegemony. This strategy had been employed

¹³ (See Excerpt 6 in the NSS documents analysis)

before in Haiti, Nicaragua and the Philippines as a means of furthering the democratic causes in those countries.

The media constitutes both the framework of contemporary civil society has the power to influence perspectives (Shaw, 2015) and as such it is a key component in civil society and as Gramsci (1971) puts it therefore central to the hegemonic process due to its power to spread information and influence perspectives.

Therefore, in October 2002 even before the invasion of Iraq, the USA set up the Office of Special Plans (OSP) under the Department of Defence to create a fresh image for the Iraqi media which is an important part of civil society and as such in conjunction with a department in the Pentagon which specialized in psychological warfare, the two bodies worked together to create the Rapid Reaction Media Team (RRMT). The RRMT became the core or basis of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), a government holding company for several media outlets which was established by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) (Al Rawi, 2012, p. 47).

The RRMT was tasked with providing a bridge between the State controlled media network and the new media outlets the USA set up which comprised of TV and radio stations like Radio Sawa and the Al Hurrah TV station as well as numerous newspapers which the USA established after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein with the aim of targeting and attracting younger audiences in Iraq and the Middle East and opening them up to American culture and values and encouraging them to accept these values (Dalacoura, 2005, p. 964).

The team dissolved the Iraqi Ministry of Information which it described as a tool for oppression and set out a strategy to broadcast programs which constantly portrayed Saddam Hussein as a blood thirsty, ethnocentric and corrupt President and these shows were constantly aired on the Iraqi airwaves as part of the US propaganda to persuade Iraqis to accept liberal democracy instead of autocracy, thereby making the new Iraqi media a propaganda tool for the occupying US forces (Al Rawi, 2012, p. 47).

The IMN which owned or operated most of the media outlets set up by the USA after the invasion was mostly controlled or managed by Iraqi exiles like Shameem Rassam, George Mansour and Ahmed Al-Rikabi who were all known to be sympathetic to US interests and ideologies (Al Rawi, 2012, p. 49).

The IMN therefore was established to increase US control over Iraq and to help forge the people of Iraq's acceptance of the actions of the USA in that country through the use of hand-picked US trained Iraqi media teams who portrayed the future of Iraq in the various media after the invasion as prosperous and democratic to help psych the Iraqi people into accepting the liberal democracy ideology (Al Rawi, 2012, p. 49).

As part of its strategy to use the Iraqi educational system to help spread and increase the acceptance of the promoted liberal democracy ideology, the USA through the CPA and USAID implemented strategies including reviewing the current curriculum with the aim of spreading democratic ideals in Iraq (Bridoux, 2011, pp. 124-125).

Accordingly, textbooks with reference to Saddam Hussein or his Ba'ath Party were erased which dramatically changed how Iraqi history was projected in classrooms after the invasion

and were replaced with textbooks and programmes with democratic values as their main themes. Anything with reference to Islam or which was deemed as anti-American was removed from textbooks and as such the revision of the curriculum did not give Iraqis the free hand to recreate their own society or promote critical thinking (Bridoux, 2011, pp. 124-125).

The CPA also removed senior officials perceived to be affiliated to the Ba'ath party from the Ministry of Education and replaced them with young, inexperienced western educated civil servants who were sympathetic to the US and its interests, thereby re-echoing the use of intellectuals by the US in the to gain control of Iraq and its institutions (Wilson, 2013).

This move was therefore seen as a way to reorganise the educational sector in order to prepare the next generations of Iraqis to embrace and practice democracy or the liberal democratic ideology that the USA was imposing on the country and to build strong foundations of democracy in the future of Iraqi civil society, (Bridoux, 2011, p. 125), a move which will see Iraqi's embracing the 'common sense' of liberal democracy introduced by the USA, a strategy which according to Gramsci will lead to the achievement of hegemony because America will gain a consensual social control over the Iraqi people through the education system and other areas of social life in the country.

Finally, Robinson (2004, p. 447) argues that as part of its strategy to use democracy promotion to ensure and increase its dominance over Iraq society, the USA controlled and muzzled any other alternate or popular independent voices initiative within Iraqi society which from developing to oppose the US program.

To this end, the USA through the CPA did not repeal a law from Saddam's era which banned trade and labour unions in Iraq's public sector and even added an addendum to the law called public order number one which banned anything that could lead to 'civil disorder or riots' in order to suppress any opposition to the implantation of democracy in Iraq (Busch, 2014).

The Southern Oil Company Union (SOCU) and other trade unions which sprang up immediately after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 were vehemently opposed to Iraq's occupation by the USA and the subsequent reforms and changes initiated by the CPA in order to control Iraqi society and minds like privatization of Iraq's oil sector and companies as well as laws allowing foreign companies to fully repatriate their profits back to their home countries (Isakhan, 2012, p. 4).

For example, SOCU resisted albeit unsuccessfully attempts by US Company Halliburton which was under the employ of the CPA to organise and secure Iraq's oil sector because the union saw the company and other companies which came with the US invasion as part of the CPA apparatus used in controlling Iraqi society and as such organised strikes against the CPA in all its branches (Isakhan, 2012, p. 5).

SOCU was therefore joined by other smaller unions which led to the creation of the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) in 2004 which became powerful and contested the CPA on almost every decision it made in regards to governing Iraq especially in the oil sector using mass strikes and conferences. Due to this rise of an alternate voice which threatened the activities of the CPA to ensure the smooth implantation and transition of democracy in Iraq, the authority issued the public order number one and limited the activities of trade and labour

unions in Iraq, a move which was against ideals like freedom of association and the rights of people, which are key ideals to the liberal democratic ideology the USA was promoting in Iraq (Isakhan, 2012, p. 5).

The only unions which were exempted by these laws and directives limiting trade and labour union activities were pro-US/CPA unions like the General Federation of Iraqi Workers (GFIW) (Isakhan, 2012, p. 6) and this ban on trade union activities which was described as detrimental to nation building and anti-democratic was enforced solely for the purpose of suppressing alternate political views which could affect the implementation of the liberal democratic ideology as well as silencing opposing voices on the massive privatization activities the CPA undertook in Iraq to ensure the success of the newly imposed democratic system (Harwood, 2005).

These changes helped spread and implement an ideology which in turn helped the USA to control all aspects of Iraqi life and determine the direction the country should take, and also gave the USA total control over the country and thereby its vast oil reserves, thereby reducing America's dependency on Middle Eastern oil.

The acceptance of the liberal democratic ideology as the common sense by Iraq and the subsequent control the USA gained over the country was evidenced in the agreement made in 2007 between the Bush Administration and the US backed Maliki government called the Declaration of Principles drafted by the White House. The declaration gave the USA unprecedented access and rights to install military bases around Iraq, perform combat operations when they want and also to ensure western oil companies have inhibited access to Iraq's vast oil resources even after the USA leaves Iraq (Chomsky, 2008).

This agreement helped the USA stabilise the world oil supplies by ensuring a steady flow of oil from Iraqi wells to the world markets and this also provided a lot of revenue for Anglo-American oil companies like Halliburton, Emerson, British Petroleum and ExxonMobil, most of which were repatriated back home to the US especially and many other western economies and this helped protect US energy interests in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole as well as boost these western economies (Nafeez, 2014). Indeed, General John Abizaid, former commander of US Central Command in Iraq remarked in an interview that the Iraq war and subsequent occupation by the USA was about the need to control Iraqi oil reserves and even though the USA itself has imported a large amount of Iraqi oil, the revenue did not reflect on the Iraqi economy (Juhasz, 2013).

John Judis argues that the neo-conservative elements in the Bush administration believed that taking control of Iraq and its vast oil reserves will seriously damage the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which will give the US much more power and influence in determining world oil prices, a scenario which will further consolidate their hegemonic position in the world (Judis, 2006).

Even after the USA declared their intention to withdraw their military and other personnel out of Iraq in 2011, they are still controlling Iraq's oil reserves and in charge of protecting Iraqi airspace, through the over 20,000 and strong personnel and military bases they left behind. This is because the control of Iraq's vast oil reserves gives America leverage in maintaining their strong hold on Middle Eastern politics and effects their dominant position in the world (RT, 2011).

This clearly shows that the democracy promotion efforts and its attendant changes undertaken by the USA in Iraq after the invasion in the political, civil society, economy, media and education sectors, was indeed about spreading an ideology through the use of intellectuals and organizations loyal to US interests to gain control of all aspects of the country in order to control including its vast oil reserves, a situation described by Gramsci (1971) as hegemonic. Indeed this situation gave the USA total access to Iraq's vast oil reserves, which helped the USA to be an even more vital player in the vastly important and influential global energy market, as well as generate revenue and provide opportunities for companies from that country thereby helping the country strengthen its hegemony in the global system.

Robinson (2004, p. 446) also argued that the objective of promoting democracy by the USA among other things was to ensure stability in Iraq so that the country can become a reliable oil supplier and help serve as a springboard for more economic and political penetration of the Middle East by the USA.

In conclusion, the NSS documents of 2002 and 2006 (2001; 2006) call for the promotion of democracy, by America through all available means to ensure stability and protection of its interests¹⁴, in order to maintain its leading position in the international political system. In the case of Iraq, the interests centred around oil and gaining a stronger foothold or having a stronger influence on Middle East politics.

In line with this the USA, after the invasion cultivated the Political and Civil Society and gained control of the economy through a number of changes or reforms. These transformations helped the USA gain control of Iraq after the country was invaded and occupied by America in 2003. These changes in these particular areas is what Gramsci (1971) described as a means to promote an ideology as the common sense with the aim to dominate all aspects of social life in the country by taking control of its economic, political and civil society landscape and thereby its vast oil resources and this shows how America used democracy promotion in Iraq to strengthen their hegemony and what Robinson (2004, p. 445) describes as building internal systems or structures aimed at consensual control or domination.

After the invasion, economic changes modelled on the American system including mass privatization, deregulation and laws allowing overseas companies to send most of the profits they make back to their home countries were criticised as being too naive and ideological but were implemented anyway because the economy serves as the basis for promoting the liberal democracy ideology. A handful of western educated intellectuals sympathetic to US interests were handpicked to govern the nation and local government appointments especially to the Iraqi Governing Council and key ministries were based on selection not election, in order to pick leaders who can serve American interests in influential positions of power in order to cultivate and control the political institutions in Iraq.

Civil society institutions were cultivated to help legitimize the implementation of democracy through the promotion of programs and initiatives planned and undertaken by companies founded and managed by western educated Iraqi exiles and intellectuals who were evidently loyal to protecting US interests as well as American organizations that are known to have served and protected US interests in other countries in the past. Local leaders who controlled

¹⁴ (See Excerpts 2, 3, 4, 5 in the NSS documents analysis)

the grassroots were also appointed by the USA and not elected by the people and so were sympathetic to US interests.

This led to more power being given to communities and civil society institutions subservient to US interests in subsequent years which led to the weakening of the state, and created a civil society completely free from government oversight and which also controlled the Iraqi social landscape, a situation which gave the USA control over the will and interest of the Iraqi people due to the fact that they controlled the civil society institutions.

The Media and Educational systems were also overhauled to help convince the Iraqi people that the promotion of democracy in their country was the best solution for them and their problems which in turn helped America gain control over the minds and worldview of the Iraqi people because they controlled how information and knowledge is spread and impacted on the masses. Trade and Labour unions which were viewed as a threat to the implementation of the democracy promotion strategy were banned and controlled, a move which is inherently anti-democratic and the military disbanded and reform to meet the demands of the CPA. These transformations and changes helped America strengthen its control over Iraq and therefore its oil reserves.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

The thesis begun with an assumption that the Bush Administration's promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 constituted a strategic quest to strengthen their hegemony.

A problem and a set of research questions were therefore formulated and the analytical framework from Gramsci's theory of hegemony applied to the US's democracy promotion efforts in Iraq to support the assumption and draw conclusions.

The main problem the thesis tackled was why the US promotion of democracy in Iraq after 9/11 was a quest to strengthen their hegemony and the research questions included finding out what the general historical account and motivations of democracy promotion by the USA after World War II until before 9/11 were, how the US related to the Middle East in general after 9/11, how the US advanced and implemented democracy in Iraq after 9/11, what the Gramscian Hegemonic theory entails and how it applied to the US promotion of democracy in Iraq and lastly how and why does this democracy promotion strengthen America's hegemony.

The thesis proved the assumption to be true if explained with Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony because the USA introduced liberal democratic ideology to Iraq and undertook a number of changes in the political, economic, civil society sectors as well as the media and education areas through the use of intellectuals and companies sympathetic to US interests to encourage the spread and acceptance of this ideology in the Iraq society which in turn gave them total control of the country including its vast oil resources.

This viewpoint is supported by William Robinson (1996; 2004) who was of the view that the US promotion of democracy in Iraq was aimed at the long term goal of strengthening their hegemony through a number of prejudiced changes in the political, economic and civil society aspects of the Iraqi society. Christopher Hobson (March 2005; 2009) contends that America's recent past history of democracy promotion in areas like Latin America, parts of Europe and certainly Iraq goes a long way to prove the country only supports a form of democracy that is compatible and subservient to overt or covert control/dominance thereby casting great doubts on the genuine goals of the democracy promotion strategy. Lastly, Noam Chomsky (1992; 2008) argues that the USA used democracy promotion as pretence to invade and control Iraq in order to take control over the country's large oil reserves to boost America's hegemony on the global stage.

However, Larry Diamond (1992), Francis Fukuyama (1989) and Linz & Lipset (1991) among others are against the viewpoint that US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq and other places constitutes a quest to strengthen their hegemony but rather they contend generally that liberal democracy principles especially when merged with liberal market changes is basically the blue print for success for any society or culture in the world and as such its promotion or promotion should be encouraged as liberal democracy is progressive and positive for the world as a whole. The viewpoint of these scholars also contradicts my key findings as those findings support the assumption that these scholars reject.

The viewpoint that democracy and indeed liberal democracy is the ideal form of government for every society irrespective of the culture or history and as such its spread or promotion

should be encouraged as especially espoused by Fukuyama (1989) and Larry Diamond (1992) was contested by this thesis as it made a case against exporting democracy to other countries by the USA and other western countries for any reasons or motivations because democracy or the form America promotes, liberal democracy, is not universal due to its history and values and as such shouldn't be imposed on other countries. Promoting or imposing democracy on other countries can also lead to destabilizing effects like regional wars if not well handled.

Additionally, democracy promotion is seen as interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign countries which can lead to repercussions, resentments and backlashes of which the ordinary citizens bear the full brunt of. Furthermore, the democratic peace theory or the notion that democracies do not fight each other which has been quoted many times as a key reason for promoting democracy even by the Bush administration has been found to be shallow with no empirical basis or truth.

This viewpoint is supported by Karsten Struhl (2007) and Jorg Faust (2013) who both contend that liberal democracy is specific to western societies and as such should not be exported to other societies in that form, but rather societies must be allowed to create and practice their own forms of liberal democracy as this is the true essence of democracy itself. Katerina Dalacoura (2005), Christopher Layne (1994) and Epstein et al (2007) support the view that democracy shouldn't be promoted or exported to other countries for any reasons or motivations due to the many downsides such efforts can lead to.

The key findings of the thesis which also answers the research questions can be summarized as that historically, the US has promoted democracy and also supported in some cases repressive regimes to further American values, advance the democratic peace notion, continue western hegemony and dominance, maintain useful foreign allies under the cover of democracy and make the world stable to protect its interests like the Panama Canal or the vast military bases in the Philippines. The country also supported repressive regimes especially in the Middle East to help protect its interests especially in oil. This viewpoint is supported by Peter Burnell (2000), Peter Sanchez (2007) and Mohammed Musavi & Heydari (2011) among others.

These motivations or reasons for promoting democracy notwithstanding, the thesis argues that democracy promotion or export into other countries should not be encouraged for any reason because

However the emphasis on promotion of democracy in started in the 1980s and was motivated by popular movements springing up in the poor parts of the world against suppressive regimes and exploitation leading to unpopular support of repressive regimes. Secondly, these uprisings made policy makers in the USA decide to 'promote democracy' instead of supporting repressive regimes to promote stability and finally the rise of last globalization changed the foreign policy goals of America. This promotion was implemented by through the use of civil society, the media and other institutions within the society as echoed by William Robinson (1996).

In the Middle East after 9/11 and with the introduction of the NSS 2002 and 2006 which urged the USA to promote democracy through all available means as a way of promoting its

interests and American values so as to maintain their primacy in the world¹⁵, the US policy of supporting repressive regimes in the Middle East was replaced by the need to promote democracy as a way to distance itself with such regimes who were seen as harbouring terrorists and also because of the notion that democracies do not fight each other and so promoting democracy in the Middle East will lead to stability and secure America's interests in that region.

The NSS documents (2001; 2006) outlined this strategy which included building democratic structures in countries to make them more open to the world through the use of political, economic and diplomatic tools like supporting democratic movements in repressive nations, using aid to encourage democracy, supporting economic reforms, working with international organizations, reforming and empowering civil society, the media and other institutions in societies with no democracies to help advance democracy, as well as forming strong partnerships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society institutions to support and strengthen their work¹⁶.

Christopher Hobson (March 2005; 2009) re-echoed the view that the USA replaced support of repressive regimes with democracy promotion and implementation to advance its interests and image.

In Iraq after 9/11, the USA introduced and implemented the liberal democratic ideology by cultivating the political, economic and civil society areas including the media and education institutions. These changes were done through programs planned and instituted by companies and intellectuals loyal to American interests thereby giving control of the country to the USA and its resources. This constitutes hegemony in the Gramscian perspective because the USA through these changes and intellectuals helped spread an ideology which became the common sense for the people and handed control over the country and its oil reserves to America.

Trade and labour unions which were seen as alternate and threatening political voices and alternates to the implementation of the democracy promotion strategy were banned and controlled with the exception of the ones loyal to the USA and its interests and the military totally reformed as per American recommendations.

These findings are in line with the concept of American hegemony or the need to exercise its influence and control over other countries and the international political system in general as acknowledged by William Odom (2005) and Joseph Nye (2015) as well as Gramsci's (1971) perspective of hegemony in particular because American democracy promotion efforts even in countries like Panama and the Philippines are always motivated by the need to protect its interests in order to ensure its primacy in the world if even it means supporting brutal repressive regimes which help create and perpetuate the concept of hegemony in general.

The case of Iraq is a classic example of how hegemony is acquired or expanded according to Gramsci (1971). This theory established that introducing an ideology as the common sense or ideal thing and making changes in key sectors of the country including the political and civil society (media & educational institutions included) to help spread and gain acceptance for that ideology constitutes a quest to achieve hegemony. Furthermore, using intellectuals, who

¹⁵ (See Excerpts 4, 5 and 7 in the NSS documents analysis section)

¹⁶ (See Excerpt 6 in the NSS documents analysis section)

are loyal to the dominant country to implement and spread this ideology, also helps achieve hegemony or control over that particular country because the masses see this new ideology as the natural order and thereby consensually give control over all the direction their country should take to the dominant country.

The USA in introducing the liberal democratic ideology in Iraq cultivated the key areas as mentioned by Gramsci (1971) as well as drastic biased changes in the media and education sectors coupled with the appointment to key positions of intellectuals loyal to its interests to gain control over Iraq and steer its affairs as evidenced with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 2007 which gave America unprecedented access to Iraq's oil wealth even after the country has withdrawn from Iraq and this goes on to support the initial assumption made in the thesis that the US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq was a quest to strengthen their hegemony, a position also supported by William Robinson (1996; 2004), Noam Chomsky (1992; 2008) and Christopher Hobson (March 2005; 2009) among others.

This thesis is significant because it helps deepen the understanding of US foreign policy in relation to democracy promotion and how this helps further American hegemony. This helps understand why the USA have different foreign policy goal and aims with regards to forms of governance in different parts of the world at different times.

It must however be noted that, the application of other theories of hegemony in International Relations like the conventional, neo-liberal and radical theories of hegemony on whether US democracy promotion efforts in Iraq was a quest to strengthen their hegemony might not yield the same conclusions as the one drawn in this thesis because these theories also have their own concepts which are used to analyse the dynamics and strategies for what constitutes a hegemony.

The conventional approach for example stresses on the disequilibrium of power in the international system which leads to one state becoming so powerful and achieves domination over others while the neo-liberal and radical approaches emphasize on not hegemony itself but the mechanism and conditions surrounding its operation and on how social forces produce and conceptualize hegemony respectively (Antoniade, 2008, pp. 3-4).

That being said, Gramsci's (1971) theory of hegemony despite being brilliant in explaining how hegemony is gained through the spread and promotion of an ideology, focuses too much in my opinion on dominance through the superstructures of society, that is, the political power structures, institutions and value systems without giving much attention to other social relations that help countries pursue and attain hegemony over others like economic and military might. This can make the theory unsuitable to apply to every case of hegemony or dominance of one country over the other in the international system because a particular case might involve the use of military or economic might to dominate other countries instead of a supposed superior ideology as Gramsci's (1971) theory espouses.

The theory has some methodological limitations as it is based on only one case study, that is, Iraq. Another case study like that of Afghanistan where the Bush administration also promoted democracy after 9/11 could have been added to make the conclusions of the thesis more replicable. Furthermore, a second theory to help answer the research questions and problem formulation would have been very ideal because a triangulation of theories help improve validity in research but as explained in the choice of theory section, Gramsci's

(1971) theory of hegemony was the most suitable International Relations hegemony theory for this thesis because it deals with how one country uses the spread and promotion of an ideology to gain control over another country through a number of changes in key institutions. Lastly, since the research strategy of content analysis relies on pre-existing data or sources the possibility of bias in terms of the opinions of researchers/scholars can influence how the problem area is perceived in some ways despite all the measures taken to prevent that.

This research could be developed further in the future with a research into how the Obama Administration is handling democracy promotion in its foreign policy and whether it breaks away from the status quo of using this democracy promotion efforts to protect its interests or stick to it.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The USA has in one way or the other over the years since World War II promoted democracy in different countries like the Philippines, Nicaragua and Panama despite the arguments and evidence against the strategy and mostly with aim of protecting its interests in order to preserve and strengthen its primacy due to the benefits and sphere of influence the country derives from this primacy or position of hegemony.

The USA made democracy promotion an essential part of its foreign policy in the 1980s as the country gradually sought to distance itself from support of repressive regimes in order to create a clean image and ensure even more worldwide stability due to the gradual growth of globalization in the 1980s. This key shift was also a move to defeat the Soviet ideology of communism which was spreading in Eastern Europe and Latin America, a situation which threatened American interests and therefore its hegemony. However, these democracy promotion efforts are always aimed at expanding American imperialism albeit through a more subtle way so as to consolidate their primacy and protect their interests through the stability these democracy promotion efforts create.

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the Bush Administration, democracy promotion therefore became a key justification for the war especially after other factors like Weapons of Mass Destruction production and the harbouring of terrorists by the Hussein regime could not be justified. To this end the Bush administration published two National Security documents (NSS 2004 AND 2006) which provided the foreign policy goals of the administration which included democracy promotion around the world as a means for America to strengthen and hold on to its primacy.

The documents stated that the USA needed to promote democracy all around the globe as democracy represented American values and the best form of government for every society, plus democracy will prevent states from failing thereby helping to ensure stability and secure American interests all over the world, a situation needed to ensure their primacy or domination.

The documents also implored the administration to promote democracy through all means and tools available to it including economic, military and diplomatic to help transition societies from repressive rule to democracies by working closely with civil society institutions, the media and Non-Governmental institutions both inside and outside the particular country as well as promoting educational changes to help build democratic societies to ensure the security and survival of American dominance.

The strategy in Iraq entailed promoting the liberal democratic ideology through companies and institutions loyal to US interests as well as cultivating institutions like civil and political society, the media and educational landscape coupled with a crack down on organised labour and trade unions which opposed the US occupation and democracy implementation strategy. The USA also used intellectuals or elites in forming the provisional government and to fill key positions in civil society to spread and gain legitimacy for the democratic agenda so as to

gain control over the Iraqi people and society or create an internal system of domination over Iraq.

This according to Antonio Gramsci (1971) leads to hegemony through a consensual form of social control because the ideology being promoted, whether good or bad is taken up by the masses and seen as the natural order or what he calls the common sense without any objections and when this happens, the dominant country promoting this ideology which in this case is the USA, gains control of all aspects of life in the dominated country (Iraq) and determines which direction the country should head thereby creating a hegemony and this is what happened in Iraq.

The Bush Administration through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the body it set up to govern Iraq right after the invasion and its advisors the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) cultivated and as such gained control over the political, economic, civil society, media and educational spheres of Iraqi society through mass privatization and new commercial laws to attract foreign companies mostly from America in order to control the economy, laws allowing these overseas companies to send most of the profits they make back to their home countries, appointing rather than electing local officials for local governance positions and appointing a group of exiled intellectuals sympathetic to US interests to form the CPA and IGC to manage the affairs of the country right after the invasion.

Furthermore, companies founded and managed by intellectuals loyal to American interests as well as American organizations known to promote US interests were used to cultivate and gain control of the civic sector at the expense of the state itself, whilst local leaders sympathetic to US interests were appointed to key local government posts rather than them being elected by the people. The USA also set up and controlled most media outlets for US propaganda purposes and also created a new educational curricula for schools based on the America democratic values to prepare the next generation to accept and practice democracy and suppressing the activities of trade unions seen as a threat to the democracy implementation strategy, which all helped America, according to Gramsci's theory gain control of and exercise a hegemony over Iraq. Trade unions were also subverted and the military totally overhauled to crack down on dissenting voices against the control exerted by the USA.

The cultivation of these key institutions of Iraqi society helped create a consensual form of social control exerted by the USA on Iraq as described by Gramsci (1971) and his theory of hegemony and this is evidenced in the USA gaining control Iraqi's oil production and export even after they had left the country, thereby consolidating the USA's position as a key player in Middle East and indeed world politics, a position which helps maintains their primacy and strengthen their hegemony due to the benefits derived from controlling vast oil reserves as that of Iraq and the platform the country will serve for future economic and political penetration into other Middle Eastern countries.

In the nutshell, the USA democracy promotion efforts in Iraq was a move to strengthen their hegemony in the Gramscian sense which supports the assumption in the introduction, because apart from its past records in countries like the Philippines, Panama and others, it promoted an ideology (liberal democracy) as the best form of government for the Iraqi people despite the critique against exporting democracy and based on this cultivated and gained control over

the political, economic, civil society, educational and media institutions in the country through the use of intellectuals and institutions subversive to US interests and suppressed opposing voices which gave them means to take absolute control over that country just as it had done previously in countries like Panama. This control in turn gave the USA authority over Iraqi's strategic oil reserves and the general direction the country should go, thereby helping the USA strengthen its hegemonic position in the Middle East and the global system.

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APPENDIX 1

NSS 2002

THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE
UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA



SEPTEMBER 2002

THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE
UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA



SEPTEMBER 2002



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.

To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold

to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security. We are also increasingly united by common values. Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great powers—even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, trade, and cultural advancement.

Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.

The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty—so the United States will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity. The United States will deliver greater development assistance through the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.

In building a balance of power that favors freedom, the United States is guided by the conviction that all nations have important responsibilities. Nations that enjoy freedom must actively fight terror. Nations that depend on international stability must help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nations that seek international aid must govern themselves wisely, so that aid is well spent. For freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected and required.

We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.

Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George W. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized "G" and "B".

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 17, 2002

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I. OVERVIEW OF AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

*“Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense.
We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty.
We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants.
We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers.
And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”*

PRESIDENT BUSH
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
JUNE 1, 2002

The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.

For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality.

That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty.

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.

To achieve these goals, the United States will:

- champion aspirations for human dignity;
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;

-
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
 - develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
 - transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

II. CHAMPION ASPIRATIONS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY

“Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities.”

PRESIDENT BUSH
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
JUNE 1, 2002

In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

These demands can be met in many ways. America’s constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people.

America’s experience as a great multi-ethnic democracy affirms our conviction that people of many heritages and faiths can live and prosper in peace. Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a freer and more just society.

Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And when openings arrive, we can encourage change—as we did in central and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 2000. When we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all cherish.

Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.

Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international bodies.

We will:

- speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom;
- use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take;
- make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and
- take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.

We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it.

III. STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM AND WORK TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST US AND OUR FRIENDS

“Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.”

PRESIDENT BUSH
WASHINGTON, D.C. (THE NATIONAL CATHEDRAL)
SEPTEMBER 14, 2001

The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.

In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress

will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen.

Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can, and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.

Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ ability to plan and operate.

We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.

The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative financial networks.

However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek.

We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

- direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and
- denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.

We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes:

- using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose;
- supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation;
- diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk; and
- using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.

While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense, we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter attack.

This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector.

This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just

bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.

While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide.

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international

organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.

In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

IV. WORK WITH OTHERS TO DEFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS

*“We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion.
The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements look so small.”*

PRESIDENT BUSH
BERLIN, GERMANY
MAY 23, 2002

Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid explosive escalation and minimize human suffering. In an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability.

No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action—direct or indirect—is warranted. We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind:

- The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.
- The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of human suffering, because of America’s close relationship with the state of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region’s importance to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic development, increased humanitarian assistance, and a program to establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state. As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them.

In South Asia, the United States has also emphasized the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes. This Administration invested time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a constructive role when tensions in the region became acute. With Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more open and tolerant society. The Administration sees India's potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly. Our involvement in this regional dispute, building on earlier investments in bilateral relations, looks first to concrete steps by India and Pakistan that can help defuse military confrontation.

Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and respect for the rule of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting the rule of law, and accepting open markets, Indonesia may be able to employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by Indonesia that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference.

In the Western Hemisphere we have formed flexible coalitions with countries that share our priorities, particularly Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Colombia. Together we will promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration advances security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as the Summit of the Americas process, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of the entire hemisphere.

Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the United States. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs, while—as important—we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own country.

In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people.

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law

enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.

An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats.

Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement and builds coalitions of the willing. This Administration will focus on three interlocking strategies for the region:

- countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention;

- coordination with European allies and international institutions is essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations; and
- Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.

Ultimately the path of political and economic freedom presents the surest route to progress in sub-Saharan Africa, where most wars are conflicts over material resources and political access often tragically waged on the basis of ethnic and religious difference. The transition to the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a common responsibility for democratic political systems offers opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent.

V. PREVENT OUR ENEMIES FROM THREATENING US, OUR ALLIES, AND OUR FRIENDS WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

PRESIDENT BUSH
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
JUNE 1, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- *Proactive counterproliferation efforts.* We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
- *Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.* We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.
- *Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.* Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

- In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.
- In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.
- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and

- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

VI. IGNITE A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH FREE MARKETS AND FREE TRADE

“When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount—no amount—of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively.”

PRESIDENT BUSH
MONTERREY, MEXICO
MARCH 22, 2002

A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.

We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America’s shores. All governments are responsible for creating their own economic policies and responding to their own economic challenges. We will use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth, including:

- pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business investment, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity;
- tax policies—particularly lower marginal tax rates—that improve incentives for work and investment;

- rule of law and intolerance of corruption so that people are confident that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their economic endeavors;
- strong financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most efficient use;
- sound fiscal policies to support business activity;
- investments in health and education that improve the well-being and skills of the labor force and population as a whole; and
- free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and opportunity.

The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies—industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing world.

A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security. European efforts to remove structural barriers in their economies are particularly important in this regard, as are Japan's efforts to end deflation and address the problems of non-performing loans in the Japanese banking system. We will continue to use our regular consultations with Japan and our European partners—including through the Group of Seven (G-7)—to discuss policies they are adopting to promote growth in their economies and support higher global economic growth.

Improving stability in emerging markets is also key to global economic growth. International flows of investment capital are needed to expand the productive potential of these economies. These flows allow emerging markets and developing countries to make the investments that raise living standards and reduce poverty. Our long-term objective should be a world in which all countries have investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access to international capital markets and to invest in their future.

We are committed to policies that will help emerging markets achieve access to larger capital flows at lower cost. To this end, we will continue to pursue reforms aimed at reducing uncertainty in financial markets. We will work actively with other countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the private sector to implement the G-7 Action Plan negotiated earlier this year for preventing financial crises and more effectively resolving them when they occur.

The best way to deal with financial crises is to prevent them from occurring, and we have encouraged the IMF to improve its efforts doing so. We will continue to work with the IMF to streamline the policy conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy on achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and

monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy.

The concept of “free trade” arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living. To promote free trade, the United States has developed a comprehensive strategy:

- *Seize the global initiative.* The new global trade negotiations we helped launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambitious agenda, especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, targeted for completion in 2005. The United States has led the way in completing the accession of China and a democratic Taiwan to the World Trade Organization. We will assist Russia's preparations to join the WTO.
- *Press regional initiatives.* The United States and other democracies in the Western Hemisphere have agreed to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas, targeted for completion in 2005. This year the United States will advocate market-access negotiations with its partners, targeted on agriculture, industrial goods, services, investment, and government procurement. We will also offer more opportunity to the poorest continent, Africa, starting with full use of the preferences allowed in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and leading to free trade.
- *Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements.* Building on the free trade agreement with Jordan enacted in 2001, the Administration will work this year to complete free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. Our aim is to achieve free trade agreements with a mix of developed

and developing countries in all regions of the world. Initially, Central America, Southern Africa, Morocco, and Australia will be our principal focal points.

- *Renew the executive-congressional partnership.* Every administration's trade strategy depends on a productive partnership with Congress. After a gap of 8 years, the Administration reestablished majority support in the Congress for trade liberalization by passing Trade Promotion Authority and the other market opening measures for developing countries in the Trade Act of 2002. This Administration will work with Congress to enact new bilateral, regional, and global trade agreements that will be concluded under the recently passed Trade Promotion Authority.
- *Promote the connection between trade and development.* Trade policies can help developing countries strengthen property rights, competition, the rule of law, investment, the spread of knowledge, open societies, the efficient allocation of resources, and regional integration—all leading to growth, opportunity, and confidence in developing countries. The United States is implementing The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act to provide market-access for nearly all goods produced in the 35 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. We will make more use of this act and its equivalent for the Caribbean Basin and continue to work with multilateral and regional institutions to help poorer countries take advantage of these opportunities. Beyond market access, the most important area where trade intersects with poverty is in public health. We will ensure that the WTO intellectual property rules are flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.
- *Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices.* Commerce depends on the rule of law; international trade depends on enforceable agreements. Our top priorities are to resolve ongoing disputes with the European Union, Canada, and Mexico and to make a global effort to address new technology, science, and health regulations that needlessly impede farm exports and improved agriculture. Laws against unfair trade practices are often abused, but the international community must be able to address genuine concerns about government subsidies and dumping. International industrial espionage which undermines fair competition must be detected and deterred.
- *Help domestic industries and workers adjust.* There is a sound statutory framework for these transitional safeguards which we have used in the agricultural sector and which we are using this year to help the American steel industry. The benefits of free trade depend upon the enforcement of fair trading practices. These safeguards help ensure that the benefits of free trade do not come at the expense of American workers. Trade adjustment assistance will help workers adapt to the change and dynamism of open markets.
- *Protect the environment and workers.* The United States must foster economic growth in ways that will provide a better life along with widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network" between multilateral environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the International Labor Organization, trade preference programs, and trade talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer trade.
- *Enhance energy security.* We will strengthen our own energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners,

and energy producers to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy efficient technologies.

Economic growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth, containing them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the global climate. Our overall objective is to reduce America's greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy, cutting such emissions per unit of economic activity by 18 percent over the next 10 years, by the year 2012. Our strategies for attaining this goal will be to:

- remain committed to the basic U.N. Framework Convention for international cooperation;
- obtain agreements with key industries to cut emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases and give transferable credits to companies that can show real cuts;
- develop improved standards for measuring and registering emission reductions;
- promote renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power—which produces no greenhouse gas emissions, while also improving fuel economy for U.S. cars and trucks;
- increase spending on research and new conservation technologies, to a total of \$4.5 billion—the largest sum being spent on climate change by any country in the world and a \$700 million increase over last year's budget; and
- assist developing countries, especially the major greenhouse gas emitters such as China and India, so that they will have the tools and resources to join this effort and be able to grow along a cleaner and better path.

VII. EXPAND THE CIRCLE OF DEVELOPMENT BY OPENING SOCIETIES AND BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRACY

*“In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it.
As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror,
we must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens.”*

PRESIDENT BUSH
WASHINGTON, D.C. (INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)
MARCH 14, 2002

A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy.

Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served to prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery. Results of aid are typically measured in dollars spent by donors, not in the rates of growth and poverty reduction achieved by recipients. These are the indicators of a failed strategy.

Working with other nations, the United States is confronting this failure. We forged a new consensus at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey that the objectives of assistance—and the strategies to achieve those objectives—must change.

This Administration’s goal is to help unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations. Sustained growth and poverty reduction is impossible without the right national policies. Where governments have implemented real policy changes, we will provide significant new levels of assistance. The United States and other developed countries should set an ambitious and specific target: to double the size of the world’s poorest economies within a decade.

The United States Government will pursue these major strategies to achieve this goal:

- *Provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of national reform.* We propose a 50 percent increase in the core development assistance given by the United States. While continuing our present programs, including humanitarian assistance based on need alone, these billions of new dollars will form a new Millennium Challenge Account for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest in

their people, and encourage economic freedom. Governments must fight corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and enable entrepreneurship. The Millennium Challenge Account will reward countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those that have not to implement reforms.

- *Improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development banks in raising living standards.* The United States is committed to a comprehensive reform agenda for making the World Bank and the other multilateral development banks more effective in improving the lives of the world's poor. We have reversed the downward trend in U.S. contributions and proposed an 18 percent increase in the U.S. contributions to the International Development Association (IDA)—the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries—and the African Development Fund. The key to raising living standards and reducing poverty around the world is increasing productivity growth, especially in the poorest countries. We will continue to press the multilateral development banks to focus on activities that increase economic productivity, such as improvements in education, health, rule of law, and private sector development. Every project, every loan, every grant must be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth in developing countries.
- *Insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the world's poor.* When it comes to economic development, what really matters is that more children are getting a better education, more people have access to health care and clean water, or more workers can find jobs to make a better future for their families. We have a moral

obligation to measure the success of our development assistance by whether it is delivering results. For this reason, we will continue to demand that our own development assistance as well as assistance from the multilateral development banks has measurable goals and concrete benchmarks for achieving those goals. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the recent IDA replenishment agreement will establish a monitoring and evaluation system that measures recipient countries' progress. For the first time, donors can link a portion of their contributions to IDA to the achievement of actual development results, and part of the U.S. contribution is linked in this way. We will strive to make sure that the World Bank and other multilateral development banks build on this progress so that a focus on results is an integral part of everything that these institutions do.

- *Increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in the form of grants instead of loans.* Greater use of results-based grants is the best way to help poor countries make productive investments, particularly in the social sectors, without saddling them with ever-larger debt burdens. As a result of U.S. leadership, the recent IDA agreement provided for significant increases in grant funding for the poorest countries for education, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and other human needs. Our goal is to build on that progress by increasing the use of grants at the other multilateral development banks. We will also challenge universities, nonprofits, and the private sector to match government efforts by using grants to support development projects that show results.
- *Open societies to commerce and investment.* Trade and investment are the real engines of economic growth. Even if government aid increases, most money for development

must come from trade, domestic capital, and foreign investment. An effective strategy must try to expand these flows as well. Free markets and free trade are key priorities of our national security strategy.

- *Secure public health.* The scale of the public health crisis in poor countries is enormous. In countries afflicted by epidemics and pandemics like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, growth and development will be threatened until these scourges can be contained. Resources from the developed world are necessary but will be effective only with honest governance, which supports prevention programs and provides effective local infrastructure. The United States has strongly backed the new global fund for HIV/AIDS organized by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and its focus on combining prevention with a broad strategy for treatment and care. The United States already contributes more than twice as much money to such efforts as the next largest donor. If the global fund demonstrates its promise, we will be ready to give even more.

- *Emphasize education.* Literacy and learning are the foundation of democracy and development. Only about 7 percent of World Bank resources are devoted to education. This proportion should grow. The United States will increase its own funding for education assistance by at least 20 percent with an emphasis on improving basic education and teacher training in Africa. The United States can also bring information technology to these societies, many of whose education systems have been devastated by HIV/AIDS.
- *Continue to aid agricultural development.* New technologies, including biotechnology, have enormous potential to improve crop yields in developing countries while using fewer pesticides and less water. Using sound science, the United States should help bring these benefits to the 800 million people, including 300 million children, who still suffer from hunger and malnutrition.

VIII. DEVELOP AGENDAS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION WITH THE OTHER MAIN CENTERS OF GLOBAL POWER

“We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”

PRESIDENT BUSH
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
JUNE 1, 2002

America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility.

There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade.

The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO, as NATO itself recognized when it invoked its Article V self-defense clause for the first time. NATO’s core mission—collective defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies—remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new circumstances. NATO must

build a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance.

The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, we must:

- expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests;
- ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;
- develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces;
- take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities;

- streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; and
- maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces.

If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War. We will sustain a common perspective on the threats to our societies and improve our ability to take common action in defense of our nations and their interests. At the same time, we welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. We cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come.

The attacks of September 11 energized America's Asian alliances. Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was an attack on Australia itself, following that historic decision with the dispatch of some of the world's finest combat forces for Operation Enduring Freedom. Japan and the Republic of Korea provided unprecedented levels of military logistical support within weeks of the terrorist attack. We have deepened cooperation on counter-terrorism with our alliance partners in Thailand and the Philippines and received invaluable assistance from close friends like Singapore and New Zealand.

The war against terrorism has proven that America's alliances in Asia not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are flexible and ready to deal with new challenges. To enhance our Asian alliances and friendships, we will:

- look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our close defense and diplomatic cooperation;
- work with South Korea to maintain vigilance towards the North while preparing our alliance to make contributions to the broader stability of the region over the longer term;
- build on 50 years of U.S.-Australian alliance cooperation as we continue working together to resolve regional and global problems—as we have so many times from the Battle of the Coral Sea to Tora Bora;
- maintain forces in the region that reflect our commitments to our allies, our requirements, our technological advances, and the strategic environment; and
- build on stability provided by these alliances, as well as with institutions such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.

We are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition—most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape.

With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the twenty-first century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United States. Russia's top leaders have a realistic assessment of

their country's current weakness and the policies—internal and external—needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas.

United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the global war on terrorism. We are facilitating Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, without lowering standards for accession, to promote beneficial bilateral trade and investment relations. We have created the NATO-Russia Council with the goal of deepening security cooperation among Russia, our European allies, and ourselves. We will continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of the former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable neighborhood will reinforce Russia's growing commitment to integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

At the same time, we are realistic about the differences that still divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it will take to build an enduring strategic partnership. Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation. Nevertheless, those opportunities are vastly greater now than in recent years—or even decades.

The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom

as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.

Differences remain, including over the development of India's nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India's economic reforms. But while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future.

The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future. Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst features of the Communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness.

The United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China. We already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future of Afghanistan and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counterterrorism and similar transitional concerns. Shared health and environmental threats, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challenge us to promote jointly the welfare of our citizens.

Addressing these transnational threats will challenge China to become more open with

information, promote the development of civil society, and enhance individual human rights. China has begun to take the road to political openness, permitting many personal freedoms and conducting village-level elections, yet remains strongly committed to national one-party rule by the Communist Party. To make that nation truly accountable to its citizen's needs and aspirations, however, much work remains to be done. Only by allowing the Chinese people to think, assemble, and worship freely can China reach its full potential.

Our important trade relationship will benefit from China's entry into the World Trade Organization, which will create more export opportunities and ultimately more jobs for American farmers, workers, and companies. China is our fourth largest trading partner, with over \$100 billion in annual two-way trade. The power of market principles and the WTO's requirements for transparency and accountability will advance openness and the rule of law in China to help establish basic protections for commerce and for citizens. There are, however, other areas in which

we have profound disagreements. Our commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments. We will work to narrow differences where they exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree.

The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, and with leaders in Russia, India, and China, we must develop active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships become routine and unproductive.

Every agency of the United States Government shares the challenge. We can build fruitful habits of consultation, quiet argument, sober analysis, and common action. In the long-term, these are the practices that will sustain the supremacy of our common principles and keep open the path of progress.

IX. TRANSFORM AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS TO MEET THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

"Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, and enterprise of our people."

PRESIDENT BUSH
WASHINGTON, D.C. (JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS)
SEPTEMBER 20, 2001

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.

It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must:

- assure our allies and friends;
- dissuade future military competition;
- deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
- decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.

The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed

to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur. We will channel our energies to overcome a host of operational challenges.

The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.

Before the war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and

transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space.

Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology. We must also transform the way the Department of Defense is run, especially in financial management and recruitment and retention. Finally, while maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends.

We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.

Intelligence—and how we use it—is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states. Designed around the priority of gathering enormous information about a massive, fixed object—the Soviet bloc—the intelligence community is coping with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set of targets.

We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build new ones to keep pace with the nature of these threats. Intelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement

systems and coordinated with our allies and friends. We need to protect the capabilities we have so that we do not arm our enemies with the knowledge of how best to surprise us. Those who would harm us also seek the benefit of surprise to limit our prevention and response options and to maximize injury.

We must strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide integrated threat assessments for national and homeland security. Since the threats inspired by foreign governments and groups may be conducted inside the United States, we must also ensure the proper fusion of information between intelligence and law enforcement.

Initiatives in this area will include:

- strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to lead the development and actions of the Nation's foreign intelligence capabilities;
- establishing a new framework for intelligence warning that provides seamless and integrated warning across the spectrum of threats facing the nation and our allies;
- continuing to develop new methods of collecting information to sustain our intelligence advantage;
- investing in future capabilities while working to protect them through a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence capabilities; and
- collecting intelligence against the terrorist danger across the government with all-source analysis.

As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend America's interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations. We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy. The State Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with other governments. And in this new era, its

people and institutions must be able to interact equally adroitly with non-governmental organizations and international institutions. Officials trained mainly in international politics must also extend their reach to understand complex issues of domestic governance around the world, including public health, education, law enforcement, the judiciary, and public diplomacy.

Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes. As humanitarian relief requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American readiness to play our part.

Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel.

We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and officials.

We will make hard choices in the coming year and beyond to ensure the right level and allocation of government spending on national security. The United States Government must strengthen its defenses to win this war. At home, our most important priority is to protect the homeland for the American people.

Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them. Our society must be open to people, ideas, and goods from across the globe. The characteristics we most cherish—our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life—are vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks. As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets, and squadrons. This is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive—in spite of it.

In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values.

Ultimately, the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our institutions. A diverse, modern society has inherent, ambitious, entrepreneurial energy. Our strength comes from what we do with that energy. That is where our national security begins.



THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SEPTEMBER 2002

APPENDIX 2

NSS 2006

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



MARCH 2006



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My fellow Americans,

America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people.

America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals that have inspired our history – freedom, democracy, and human dignity – are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure.

These inseparable priorities – fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair – have now guided American policy for more than 4 years.

We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks, leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated.

We have joined with the Afghan people to bring down the Taliban regime – the protectors of the al-Qaida network – and aided a new, democratic government to rise in its place.

We have focused the attention of the world on the proliferation of dangerous weapons – although great challenges in this area remain.

We have stood for the spread of democracy in the broader Middle East – meeting challenges yet seeing progress few would have predicted or expected.

We have cultivated stable and cooperative relations with all the major powers of the world.

We have dramatically expanded our efforts to encourage economic development and the hope it brings – and focused these efforts on the promotion of reform and achievement of results.

We led an international coalition to topple the dictator of Iraq, who had brutalized his own people, terrorized his region, defied the international community, and sought and used weapons of mass destruction.

And we are fighting alongside Iraqis to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq – a new ally in the war on terror in the heart of the Middle East.

We have seen great accomplishments, confronted new challenges, and refined our approach as conditions changed. We have also found that the defense of freedom brings us loss and sorrow, because freedom has determined enemies. We have always known that the war on terror would require great sacrifice – and in this war, we have said farewell to some very good men and women. The terrorists have used dramatic acts of murder – from the streets of Fallujah to the

subways of London – in an attempt to undermine our will. The struggle against this enemy – an enemy that targets the innocent without conscience or hesitation – has been difficult. And our work is far from over.

America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear – isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment – appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. Yet history teaches that every time American leaders have taken this path, the challenges have only increased and the missed opportunities have left future generations less secure.

This Administration has chosen the path of confidence. We choose leadership over isolationism, and the pursuit of free and fair trade and open markets over protectionism. We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country. We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.


The path we have chosen is consistent with the great tradition of American foreign policy. Like the policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.

To follow this path, we must maintain and expand our national strength so we can deal with threats and challenges before they can damage our people or our interests. We must maintain a military without peer – yet our strength is not founded on force of arms alone. It also rests on economic prosperity and a vibrant democracy. And it rests on strong alliances, friendships, and international institutions, which enable us to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace in common purpose with others.

Our national security strategy is founded upon two pillars:

The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.

The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we face – from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters – reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.



GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE

March 16, 2006

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I. Overview of America's National Security Strategy

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.

Achieving this goal is the work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression.

Like those who came before us, we must lay the foundations and build the institutions that our country needs to meet the challenges we face. The chapters that follow will focus on several essential tasks. The United States must:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. These nonnegotiable demands of human dignity are protected most securely in democracies. The United States Government will work to advance human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals.

B. Successes and Challenges since 2002

Since 2002, the world has seen extraordinary progress in the expansion of freedom, democracy, and human dignity:

- The peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq have replaced tyrannies with democracies.
 - In Afghanistan, the tyranny of the Taliban has been replaced by a freely-elected government; Afghans have written and ratified a constitution guaranteeing rights and freedoms unprecedented in their history; and an elected legislature gives the people a regular voice in their government.
 - In Iraq, a tyrant has been toppled; over 8 million Iraqis voted in the nation's first free and fair election; a freely negotiated constitution was passed by a referendum in which almost 10 million Iraqis participated; and, for the first time in their history, nearly 12 million Iraqis have elected a permanent government under a popularly determined constitution.
- The people of Lebanon have rejected the heavy hand of foreign rule. The people of Egypt have experienced more open but still flawed elections. Saudi Arabia has taken some preliminary steps to give its citizens more of a voice in their government. Jordan has made progress in opening its political process. Kuwait and Morocco are pursuing agendas of political reform.
- The "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have brought new hope for freedom across the Eurasian landmass.
- Democracy has made further advances in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, with peaceful transfers of power; growth in independent judiciaries and the rule of law; improved election practices; and expanding political and economic rights.

The human desire for freedom is universal, but the growth of freedom is not inevitable. Without support from free nations, freedom's spread could be hampered by the challenges we face:

- Many governments are at fragile stages of political development and need to consolidate democratic institutions – and leaders that have won democratic elections need to uphold the principles of democracy;
- Some governments have regressed, eroding the democratic freedoms their peoples enjoy;
- Some governments have not delivered the benefits of effective democracy and prosperity to their citizens, leaving them susceptible to or taken over by demagogues peddling an anti-free market authoritarianism;
- Some regimes seek to separate economic liberty from political liberty, pursuing prosperity while denying their people basic rights and freedoms; and
- Tyranny persists in its harshest form in a number of nations.

C. The Way Ahead

The United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human dignity transcends all nations and cultures.

Championing freedom advances our interests because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad. Governments that honor their citizens' dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize their people also threaten the peace and stability of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.

To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.

1. Explaining the Goal: Ending Tyranny

Tyranny is the combination of brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems. People living in nations such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe know firsthand the meaning of tyranny; it is the bleak reality they endure every day. And the nations they border know the consequences of tyranny as well, for the misrule of tyrants at home leads to instability abroad. All tyrannies threaten the world's interest in freedom's expansion, and some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten our immediate security interests as well.

Tyranny is not inevitable, and recent history reveals the arc of the tyrant's fate. The 20th century has been called the "Democracy Century," as tyrannies fell one by one and democracies rose in their stead. At mid-century about two dozen of the world's governments were democratic; 50 years later this number was over 120. The democratic revolution has embraced all cultures and all continents.

Though tyranny has few advocates, it needs more adversaries. In today's world, no tyrant's rule can survive without the support or at least the tolerance of other nations. To end tyranny we must summon the collective outrage of the free world against the oppression, abuse, and impoverishment that tyrannical regimes inflict on their people – and summon their collective action against the dangers tyrants pose to the security of the world.

An end to tyranny will not mark an end to all global ills. Disputes, disease, disorder, poverty, and injustice will outlast tyranny, confronting democracies long after the last tyrant has fallen. Yet tyranny must not be tolerated – it is a crime of man, not a fact of nature.

2. Explaining the Goal: Promoting Effective Democracies

As tyrannies give way, we must help newly free nations build effective democracies: states that are respectful of human dignity, accountable to their citizens, and responsible towards their neighbors. Effective democracies:

- Honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press;
- Are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government;
- Exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption; and
- Limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy.

In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. Political, religious, and economic liberty advance together and reinforce each other. Some regimes have opened their economies while trying to restrict political or religious freedoms. This will not work. Over time, as people gain control over their economic lives, they will insist on more control over their political and personal lives as well. Yet political progress can be jeopardized if economic progress does not keep pace. We will harness the tools of economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good governance to help ensure that new democracies are not burdened with economic stagnation or endemic corruption.

Elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are not enough – they must be reinforced by other values, rights, and institutions to bring about lasting freedom. Our goal is human liberty protected by democratic institutions.

Participation in elections by individuals or parties must include their commitment to the equality of all citizens; minority rights; civil liberties; voluntary and peaceful transfer of power; and the peaceful resolution of differences. Effective democracy also requires institutions that can protect individual liberty and ensure that the government is responsive and accountable to its citizens. There must be an independent media to inform the public and facilitate the free exchange of ideas. There must be political associations and political parties that can freely compete. Rule of law must be reinforced by an independent judiciary, a professional legal establishment, and an honest and competent police force.

These principles are tested by the victory of Hamas candidates in the recent elections in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian people voted in a process that was free, fair, and inclusive.

The Palestinian people having made their choice at the polls, the burden now shifts to those whom they have elected to take the steps necessary to advance peace, prosperity, and statehood for the Palestinian people. Hamas has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union (EU) because it has embraced terrorism and deliberately killed innocent civilians. The international community has made clear that there is a fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state. The international community has also made clear that a two-state solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel's right to exist, and disarm as outlined in the Roadmap. These requirements are clear, firm, and of long standing. The opportunity for peace and statehood – a consistent goal of this Administration – is open if Hamas will abandon its terrorist roots and change its relationship with Israel.

The elected Hamas representatives also have an opportunity and a responsibility to uphold the principles of democratic government, including protection of minority rights and basic freedoms and a commitment to a recurring, free, and fair electoral process. By respecting these principles, the new Palestinian leaders can demonstrate their own commitment to freedom and help bring a lasting democracy to the Palestinian territories. But any elected government that refuses to honor these principles cannot be considered fully democratic, however it may have taken office.

3. How We Will Advance Freedom: Principled in Goals and Pragmatic in Means

We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people.

The United States will stand with and support advocates of freedom in every land. Though our principles are consistent, our tactics will vary. They will reflect, in part, where each government is on the path from tyranny to democracy. In some cases, we will take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change. In other cases, we will lend more quiet support to lay the foundation for future reforms. As we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by what will most effectively advance freedom's cause while we balance other interests that are also vital to the security and well-being of the American people.

In the cause of ending tyranny and promoting effective democracy, we will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal, including:

- Speaking out against abuses of human rights;
- Supporting publicly democratic reformers in repressive nations, including by holding high-level meetings with them at the White House, Department of State, and U.S. Embassies;
- Using foreign assistance to support the development of free and fair elections, rule of law, civil society, human rights, women's rights, free media, and religious freedom;
- Tailoring assistance and training of military forces to support civilian control of the military and military respect for human rights in a democratic society;
- Applying sanctions that designed to target those who rule oppressive regimes while sparing the people;
- Encouraging other nations not to support oppressive regimes;
- Partnering with other democratic nations to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in specific countries and regions;
- Strengthening and building new initiatives such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative's Foundation for the Future, the Community of Democracies, and the United Nations Democracy Fund;
- Forming creative partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and other civil society voices to support and reinforce their work;
- Working with existing international institutions such as the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS) to help implement their democratic commitments, and helping establish democracy charters in regions that lack them;

- Supporting condemnation in multilateral institutions of egregious violations of human rights and freedoms;
- Encouraging foreign direct investment in and foreign assistance to countries where there is a commitment to the rule of law, fighting corruption, and democratic accountability; and
- Concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) that encourage countries to enhance the rule of law, fight corruption, and further democratic accountability.

These tools must be used vigorously to protect the freedoms that face particular peril around the world: religious freedom, women's rights, and freedom for men, women, and children caught in the cruel network of human trafficking.

- Against a terrorist enemy that is defined by religious intolerance, we defend the First Freedom: the right of people to believe and worship according to the dictates of their own conscience, free from the coercion of the state, the coercion of the majority, or the coercion of a minority that wants to dictate what others must believe.
- No nation can be free if half its population is oppressed and denied fundamental rights. We affirm the inherent dignity and worth of women, and support vigorously their full participation in all aspects of society.
- Trafficking in persons is a form of modern-day slavery, and we strive for its total abolition. Future generations will not excuse those who turn a blind eye to it.

Our commitment to the promotion of freedom is a commitment to walk alongside governments and their people as they make the difficult transition to effective democracies. We will not abandon them before the transition is secure because immature democracies can be prone to conflict and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. We will not let the challenges of democratic transitions frighten us into clinging to the illusory stability of the authoritarian.

America's closest alliances and friendships are with countries with whom we share common values and principles. The more countries demonstrate that they treat their own citizens with respect and are committed to democratic principles, the closer and stronger their relationship with America is likely to be.

The United States will lead and calls on other nations to join us in a common international effort. All free nations have a responsibility to stand together for freedom because all free nations share an interest in freedom's advance.

III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

Defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and a break with old patterns. We are fighting a new enemy with global reach. The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. To succeed in our own efforts, we need the support and concerted action of friends and allies. We must join with others to deny the terrorists what they need to survive: safe haven, financial support, and the support and protection that certain nation-states historically have given them.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

The war against terror is not over. America is safer, but not yet safe. As the enemy adjusts to our successes, so too must we adjust. The successes are many:

- Al-Qaida has lost its safe haven in Afghanistan.
- A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq.
- The al-Qaida network has been significantly degraded. Most of those in the al-Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot's mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed.
- There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate killing of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.
- Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.
- Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.
- The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt and implement key reforms like the Patriot Act which promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties.

The enemy is determined, however, and we face some old and new challenges:

- Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure.
- While the United States Government and its allies have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to stop them all. The terrorists have struck in many places, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. And they continue to seek WMD in order to inflict even more catastrophic attacks on us and our friends and allies.
- The ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.
- Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad.

C. The Way Ahead

From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the terrorists and against their murderous ideology. In the short run, the fight involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support. In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims.

While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions. The transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion of Islam to serve a violent political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. These terrorists distort the idea of jihad into a call for murder against those they regard as apostates or unbelievers – including Christians, Jews, Hindus, other religious traditions, and all Muslims who disagree with them. Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks since September 11 have occurred in Muslim countries – and most of the victims have been Muslims.

To wage this battle of ideas effectively, we must be clear-eyed about what does and does not give rise to terrorism:

- Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty. Many of the September 11 hijackers were from middle-class backgrounds, and many terrorist leaders, like bin Laden, are from privileged upbringings.

- Terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq. The United States was attacked on September 11 and earlier, well before we toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, countries that stayed out of the Iraq war have not been spared from terror attack.
- Terrorism is not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process.
- Terrorism is not simply a response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks. The al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted al-Qaida. Indeed, the terrorists are emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by demonstrations of resolve. Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent and easily intimidated and will retreat if attacked.

The terrorism we confront today springs from:

- Political alienation. Transnational terrorists are recruited from people who have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse vision based on violence and destruction.
- Grievances that can be blamed on others. The failures the terrorists feel and see are blamed on others, and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists' rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.
- Sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.
- An ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. A proud religion – the religion of Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused.

Defeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed. The genius of democracy is that it provides a counter to each.

- In place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one's own future.
- In place of festering grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromise.

- In place of a culture of conspiracy and misinformation, democracy offers freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of ideas, which can expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda.
- In place of an ideology that justifies murder, democracy offers a respect for human dignity that abhors the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians.

Democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny, which is why the terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it. Democracy is based on empowerment, while the terrorists' ideology is based on enslavement. Democracies expand the freedom of their citizens, while the terrorists seek to impose a single set of narrow beliefs. Democracy sees individuals as equal in worth and dignity, having an inherent potential to create and to govern themselves. The terrorists see individuals as objects to be exploited, and then to be ruled and oppressed.

Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists such as were responsible for the bombings in London in July 2005 and for the violence in some other nations. Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits.

The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists' ideology is to empower the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam. We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their faith. The most vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself, and Jordan, Morocco, and Indonesia have begun to make important strides in this effort. Responsible Islamic leaders need to denounce an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam for destructive ends and defiles a proud religion.

Many of the Muslim faith are already making this commitment at great personal risk. They realize they are a target of this ideology of terror. Everywhere we have joined in the fight against terrorism, Muslim allies have stood beside us, becoming partners in this vital cause. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have launched effective efforts to capture or kill the leadership of the al-Qaida network. Afghan troops are in combat against Taliban remnants. Iraqi soldiers are sacrificing to defeat al-Qaida in their own country. These brave citizens know the stakes – the survival of their own liberty, the future of their own region, the justice and humanity of their own traditions – and the United States is proud to stand beside them.

The advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today. To create the space and time for that long-term solution to take root, there are four steps we will take in the short term.

- **Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur.** A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed; they must be tracked down, killed, or captured. They must be cut off from the network of individuals and institutions on which they depend for support. That network must in turn be deterred, disrupted, and disabled by using a broad range of tools.
- **Deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation.** Terrorists have a perverse moral code that glorifies deliberately targeting innocent civilians. Terrorists try to inflict as many casualties as possible and seek WMD to this end. Denying terrorists WMD will require new tools and new international approaches. We are working with partner nations to improve security at vulnerable nuclear sites worldwide and bolster the ability of states to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist activity involving WMD.
- **Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states.** The United States and its allies in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.
- **Deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror.** The terrorists' goal is to overthrow a rising democracy; claim a strategic country as a haven for terror; destabilize the Middle East; and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow. This is why success in Afghanistan and Iraq is vital, and why we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas.

America will lead in this fight, and we will continue to partner with allies and will recruit new friends to join the battle.

Afghanistan and Iraq: The Front Lines in the War on Terror

Winning the War on Terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the successes already won must be consolidated. A few years ago, Afghanistan was condemned to a pre-modern nightmare. Now it has held two successful free elections and is a staunch ally in the war on terror. Much work remains, however, and the Afghan people deserve the support of the United States and the entire international community.

The terrorists today see Iraq as the central front of their fight against the United States. They want to defeat America in Iraq and force us to abandon our allies before a stable democratic government has been established that can provide for its own security. The terrorists believe they would then have proven that the United States is a waning power and an unreliable friend. In the chaos of a broken Iraq the terrorists believe they would be able to establish a safe haven

like they had in Afghanistan, only this time in the heart of a geopolitically vital region. Surrendering to the terrorists would likewise hand them a powerful recruiting tool: the perception that they are the vanguard of history.

When the Iraqi Government, supported by the Coalition, defeats the terrorists, terrorism will be dealt a critical blow. We will have broken one of al-Qaida's most formidable factions – the network headed by Zarqawi – and denied him the safe haven he seeks in Iraq. And the success of democracy in Iraq will be a launching pad for freedom's success throughout a region that for decades has been a source of instability and stagnation.

The Administration has explained in some detail the strategy for helping the Iraqi people defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency in Iraq. This requires supporting the Iraqi people in integrating activity along three broad tracks:

Political: Work with Iraqis to:

- **Isolate** hardened enemy elements who are unwilling to accept a peaceful political process;
- **Engage** those outside the political process who are willing to turn away from violence and invite them into that process; and
- **Build** stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis.

Security: Work with Iraqi Security Forces to:

- **Clear** areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters, and denying them safe haven;
- **Hold** areas freed from enemy control with an adequate Iraqi security force presence that ensures these areas remain under the control of a peaceful Iraqi Government; and
- **Build** Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.

Economic: Work with the Iraqi Government to:

- **Restore** Iraq's neglected infrastructure so that Iraqis can meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy;
- **Reform** Iraq's economy so that it can be self-sustaining based on market principles; and
- **Build** the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain their infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare and prosperity of all Iraqis.

IV. Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

Regional conflicts are a bitter legacy from previous decades that continue to affect our national security interests today. Regional conflicts do not stay isolated for long and often spread or devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. Outside parties can exploit them to further other ends, much as al-Qaida exploited the civil war in Afghanistan. This means that even if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely to be affected over time. Outsiders generally cannot impose solutions on parties that are not ready to embrace them, but outsiders can sometimes help create the conditions under which the parties themselves can take effective action.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

The world has seen remarkable progress on a number of the most difficult regional conflicts that destroyed millions of lives over decades.

- In Sudan, the United States led international negotiations that peacefully resolved the 20-year conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement.
- In Liberia, the United States led international efforts to restore peace and bolster stability after vicious internal conflict.
- Israeli forces have withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, creating the prospect for transforming Israeli-Palestinian relations and underscoring the need for the Palestinian Authority to stand up an effective, responsible government.
- Relations between India and Pakistan have improved, with an exchange of high-level visits and a new spirit of cooperation in the dispute over Kashmir – a cooperation made more tangible by humanitarian actions undertaken following a destructive earthquake.
- The cooperative approach to the relief effort following the tsunami that hit Indonesia resulted in political shifts that helped make possible a peaceful settlement in the bitter separatist conflict in Aceh.
- In Northern Ireland, the implementation of key parts of the Good Friday Agreement, including the decommissioning of weapons, marked a substantial milestone in ending that long-standing civil conflict.

Numerous remaining regional challenges demand the world's attention:

- In Darfur, the people of an impoverished region are the victims of genocide arising from a civil war that pits a murderous militia, backed by the Sudanese Government, against a collection of rebel groups.
- In Colombia, a democratic ally is fighting the persistent assaults of Marxist terrorists and drug-traffickers.
- In Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.
- In Cuba, an anti-American dictator continues to oppress his people and seeks to subvert freedom in the region.
- In Uganda, a barbaric rebel cult – the Lord’s Resistance Army – is exploiting a regional conflict and terrorizing a vulnerable population.
- In Ethiopia and Eritrea, a festering border dispute threatens to erupt yet again into open war.
- In Nepal, a vicious Maoist insurgency continues to terrorize the population while the government retreats from democracy.

C. The Way Ahead

Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.

The Administration’s strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Effective international cooperation on these efforts is dependent on capable partners. To this end, Congress has enacted new authorities that will permit the United States to train and equip our foreign partners in a more timely and effective manner. Working with Congress, we will continue to pursue foreign assistance reforms that allow the President to draw on the skills of agencies across the United States Government.

1. Conflict Prevention and Resolution

The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy. Effective democracies may still have disputes, but they are equipped to resolve their differences peacefully, either bilaterally or by working with other regional states or international institutions.

In the short term, however, a timely offer by free nations of “good offices” or outside assistance can sometimes prevent conflict or help resolve conflict once started. Such early measures can prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming wars. The United States is ready to play this role when appropriate. Even with outside help, however, there is no substitute for bold and effective local leadership.

Progress in the short term may also depend upon the stances of key regional actors. The most effective way to address a problem within one country may be by addressing the wider regional context. This regional approach has particular application to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the conflict within Nepal.

2. Conflict Intervention

Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability. Recent experience has underscored that the international community does not have enough high-quality military forces trained and capable of performing these peace operations. The Administration has recognized this need and is working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to improve the capacity of states to intervene in conflict situations. We launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative at the 2004 G-8 Summit to train peacekeepers for duty in Africa. We are also supporting United Nations (U.N.) reform to improve its ability to carry out peacekeeping missions with enhanced accountability, oversight, and results-based management practices.

3. Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction

Once peace has been restored, the hard work of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful. The world has found through bitter experience that success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning justice and penal system. This governance capacity is critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity.

To develop these capabilities, the Administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The office draws on all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military’s efforts. The office will also coordinate United States Government efforts with other governments building similar capabilities (such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the EU, and others), as well as with new international efforts such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.

4. Genocide

Patient efforts to end conflicts should not be mistaken for tolerance of the intolerable. Genocide is the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The world needs to start honoring a principle that many believe has lost its force in parts of the international community in recent years: genocide must not be tolerated.

It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.

We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of “genocide” to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace.

V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.

To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.

Countering proliferation of WMD requires a comprehensive strategy involving strengthened nonproliferation efforts to deny these weapons of terror and related expertise to those seeking them; *proactive counterproliferation efforts* to defend against and defeat WMD and missile threats before they are unleashed; and *improved protection* to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. We aim to convince our adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD, and thus deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these weapons in the first place.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

We have worked hard to protect our citizens and our security. The United States has worked extensively with the international community and key partners to achieve common objectives.

- The United States has begun fielding ballistic missile defenses to deter and protect the United States from missile attacks by rogue states armed with WMD. The fielding of such missile defenses was made possible by the United States’ withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was done in accordance with the treaty’s provisions.
- In May 2003, the Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material. More than 70 countries have expressed support for this initiative, and it has enjoyed several successes in impeding WMD trafficking.

- United States leadership in extensive law enforcement and intelligence cooperation involving several countries led to the roll-up of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network.
- Libya voluntarily agreed to eliminate its WMD programs shortly after a PSI interdiction of a shipment of nuclear-related material from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya.
- The United States led in securing passage in April 2004 of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, requiring nations to criminalize WMD proliferation and institute effective export and financial controls.
- We have led the effort to strengthen the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to detect and respond to nuclear proliferation.
- The Administration has established a new comprehensive framework, *Biodefense for the 21st Century*, incorporating innovative initiatives to protect the United States against bioterrorism.

Nevertheless, serious challenges remain:

- Iran has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations and refuses to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
- The DPRK continues to destabilize its region and defy the international community, now boasting a small nuclear arsenal and an illicit nuclear program in violation of its international obligations.
- Terrorists, including those associated with the al-Qaida network, continue to pursue WMD.
- Some of the world's supply of weapons-grade fissile material – the necessary ingredient for making nuclear weapons – is not properly protected.
- Advances in biotechnology provide greater opportunities for state and non-state actors to obtain dangerous pathogens and equipment.

C. The Way Ahead

We are committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people.

1. Nuclear Proliferation

The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security. Nuclear weapons are unique in their capacity to inflict instant loss of life on a massive scale. For this reason, nuclear weapons hold special appeal to rogue states and terrorists.

The best way to block aspiring nuclear states or nuclear terrorists is to deny them access to the essential ingredient of fissile material. It is much harder to deny states or terrorists other key components, for nuclear weapons represent a 60-year old technology and the knowledge is widespread. Therefore, our strategy focuses on controlling fissile material with two priority objectives: first, to keep states from acquiring the capability to produce fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons; and second, to deter, interdict, or prevent any transfer of that material from states that have this capability to rogue states or to terrorists.

The first objective requires closing a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear power program. To close this loophole, we have proposed that the world's leading nuclear exporters create a safe, orderly system that spreads nuclear energy without spreading nuclear weapons. Under this system, all states would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors. In return, those states would remain transparent and renounce the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In this way, enrichment and reprocessing will not be necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for strictly peaceful purposes.

The Administration has worked with the international community in confronting nuclear proliferation.

We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime's true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime's refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to "be wiped off the face of the earth." The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided.

As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The problems lie with the illicit behavior and dangerous ambition of the Iranian regime, not the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people. Our strategy is to block the

threats posed by the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing.

The North Korean regime also poses a serious nuclear proliferation challenge. It presents a long and bleak record of duplicity and bad-faith negotiations. In the past, the regime has attempted to split the United States from its allies. This time, the United States has successfully forged a consensus among key regional partners – China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) – that the DPRK must give up all of its existing nuclear programs. Regional cooperation offers the best hope for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of this problem. In a joint statement signed on September 19, 2005, in the Six-Party Talks among these participants, the DPRK agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear programs. The joint statement also declared that the relevant parties would negotiate a permanent peace for the Korean peninsula and explore ways to promote security cooperation in Asia. Along with our partners in the Six-Party Talks, the United States will continue to press the DPRK to implement these commitments.

The United States has broader concerns regarding the DPRK as well. The DPRK counterfeits our currency; traffics in narcotics and engages in other illicit activities; threatens the ROK with its army and its neighbors with its missiles; and brutalizes and starves its people. The DPRK regime needs to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct.

The second nuclear proliferation objective is to keep fissile material out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. To do this we must address the danger posed by inadequately safeguarded nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. The Administration is leading a global effort to reduce and secure such materials as quickly as possible through several initiatives including the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The GTRI locates, tracks, and reduces existing stockpiles of nuclear material. This new initiative also discourages trafficking in nuclear material by emplacing detection equipment at key transport nodes.

Building on the success of the PSI, the United States is also leading international efforts to shut down WMD trafficking by targeting key maritime and air transportation and transshipment routes, and by cutting off proliferators from financial resources that support their activities.

2. Biological Weapons

Biological weapons also pose a grave WMD threat because of the risks of contagion that would spread disease across large populations and around the globe. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons do not require hard-to-acquire infrastructure or materials. This makes the challenge of controlling their spread even greater.

Countering the spread of biological weapons requires a strategy focused on improving our capacity to detect and respond to biological attacks, securing dangerous pathogens, and limiting the spread of materials useful for biological weapons. The United States is working with partner nations and institutions to strengthen global biosurveillance capabilities for early detection of suspicious outbreaks of disease. We have launched new initiatives at home to modernize our public health infrastructure and to encourage industry to speed the development of new classes of vaccines and medical countermeasures. This will also enhance our Nation's ability to respond to pandemic public health threats, such as avian influenza.

3. Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons are a serious proliferation concern and are actively sought by terrorists, including al-Qaida. Much like biological weapons, the threat from chemical weapons increases with advances in technology, improvements in agent development, and ease in acquisition of materials and equipment.

To deter and defend against such threats, we work to identify and disrupt terrorist networks that seek chemical weapons capabilities, and seek to deny them access to materials needed to make these weapons. We are improving our detection and other chemical defense capabilities at home and abroad, including ensuring that U.S. military forces and emergency responders are trained and equipped to manage the consequences of a chemical weapons attack.

4. The Need for Action

The new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes. Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force.

Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence systems. These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also bolstering our security commitments to allies. Such security commitments have played a crucial role in convincing some countries to forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our nonproliferation objectives.

Deterring potential foes and assuring friends and allies, however, is only part of a broader approach. Meeting WMD proliferation challenges also requires effective international action – and the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads.

Taking action need not involve military force. Our strong preference and common practice is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners. If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption. The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

This Administration inherited an Iraq threat that was unresolved. In early 2001, the international support for U.N. sanctions and continued limits on the Iraqi regime's weapons-related activity was eroding, and key UNSC members were asking that they be lifted.

For America, the September 11 attacks underscored the danger of allowing threats to linger unresolved. Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of 16 UNSC resolutions over 12 years, combined with his record of invading neighboring countries, supporting terrorists, tyrannizing his own people, and using chemical weapons, presented a threat we could no longer ignore.

The UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling for full and immediate compliance by the Iraqi regime with its disarmament obligations. Once again, Saddam defied the international community. According to the Iraq Survey Group, the team of inspectors that went into Iraq after Saddam Hussein was toppled and whose report provides the fullest accounting of the Iraqi regime's illicit activities:

"Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As U.N. sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution."

With the elimination of Saddam's regime, this threat has been addressed, once and for all.

The Iraq Survey Group also found that pre-war intelligence estimates of Iraqi WMD stockpiles were wrong – a conclusion that has been confirmed by a bipartisan commission and congressional investigations. We must learn from this experience if we are to counter successfully the very real threat of proliferation.

First, our intelligence must improve. The President and the Congress have taken steps to reorganize and strengthen the U.S. intelligence community. A single, accountable leader of the

intelligence community with authorities to match his responsibilities, and increased sharing of information and increased resources, are helping realize this objective.

Second, there will always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programs since proliferators are often brutal regimes that go to great lengths to conceal their activities. Indeed, prior to the 1991 Gulf War, many intelligence analysts underestimated the WMD threat posed by the Iraqi regime. After that conflict, they were surprised to learn how far Iraq had progressed along various pathways to try to produce fissile material.

Third, Saddam's strategy of bluff, denial, and deception is a dangerous game that dictators play at their peril. The world offered Saddam a clear choice: effect full and immediate compliance with his disarmament obligations or face serious consequences. Saddam chose the latter course and is now facing judgment in an Iraqi court. It was Saddam's reckless behavior that demanded the world's attention, and it was his refusal to remove the ambiguity that he created that forced the United States and its allies to act. We have no doubt that the world is a better place for the removal of this dangerous and unpredictable tyrant, and we have no doubt that the world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril.

VI. **Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade**

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

Promoting free and fair trade has long been a bedrock tenet of American foreign policy. Greater economic freedom is ultimately inseparable from political liberty. Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom. Greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity for everyone. History has judged the market economy as the single most effective economic system and the greatest antidote to poverty. To expand economic liberty and prosperity, the United States promotes free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

The global economy is more open and free, and many people around the world have seen their lives improve as prosperity and economic integration have increased. The Administration has accomplished much of the economic freedom agenda it set out in 2002:

Seizing the global initiative. We have worked to open markets and integrate the global economy through launching the Doha Development Agenda negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States put forward bold and historic proposals to reform global agricultural trade, to eliminate farm export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to open global services markets. When negotiations stalled in 2003, the United States took the initiative to put Doha back on track, culminating in a successful framework agreement reached in Geneva in 2004. As talks proceed, the United States continues to lead the world in advancing bold proposals for economic freedom through open markets. We also have led the way in helping the accessions of new WTO members such as Armenia, Cambodia, Macedonia, and Saudi Arabia.

Pressing regional and bilateral trade initiatives. We have used FTAs to open markets, support economic reform and the rule of law, and create new opportunities for American farmers and workers. Since 2001, we have:

- Implemented or completed negotiations for FTAs with **14** countries on **5** continents, and are negotiating agreements with **11** additional countries;
- Partnered with Congress to pass the Central America Free Trade Agreement – Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), long sought by the leaders of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Dominican Republic;

- Called in 2003 for the creation of a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013 to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity;
- Negotiated FTAs with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman to provide a foundation for the MEFTA initiative;
- Launched in 2002 the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, which led to the completion of a free trade agreement with Singapore, and the launch of negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia;
- Concluded an FTA with Australia, one of America's strongest allies in the Asia-Pacific region and a major trading partner of the United States; and
- Continued to promote the opportunities of increased trade to sub-Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and extended opportunity to many other developing countries through the Generalized System of Preferences.

Pressing for open markets, financial stability, and deeper integration of the world economy. We have partnered with Europe, Japan, and other major economies to promote structural reforms that encourage growth, stability, and opportunity across the globe. The United States has:

- Gained agreement in the G-7 on the Agenda for Growth, which commits member states to take concrete steps to reform domestic economic systems;
- Worked with other nations that serve as regional and global engines of growth – such as India, China, the ROK, Brazil, and Russia – on reforms to open markets and ensure financial stability;
- Urged China to move to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime – a step that would help both China and the global economy; and
- Pressed for reform of the International Financial Institutions to focus on results, fostering good governance and sound policies, and freeing poor countries from unpayable debts.

Enhancing energy security and clean development. The Administration has worked with trading partners and energy producers to expand the types and sources of energy, to open markets and strengthen the rule of law, and to foster private investment that can help develop the energy needed to meet global demand. In addition, we have:

- Worked with industrialized and emerging nations on hydrogen, clean coal, and advanced nuclear technologies; and

- Joined with Australia, China, India, Japan, and the ROK in forming the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate to accelerate deployment of clean technologies to enhance energy security, reduce poverty, and reduce pollution.

Several challenges remain:

- Protectionist impulses in many countries put at risk the benefits of open markets and impede the expansion of free and fair trade and economic growth.
- Nations that lack the rule of law are prone to corruption, lack of transparency, and poor governance. These nations frustrate the economic aspirations of their people by failing to promote entrepreneurship, protect intellectual property, or allow their citizens access to vital investment capital.
- Many countries are too dependent upon foreign oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.
- Economic integration spreads wealth across the globe, but also makes local economies more subject to global market conditions.
- Some governments restrict the free flow of capital, subverting the vital role that wise investment can play in promoting economic growth. This denies investments, economic opportunity, and new jobs to the people who need them most.

C. The Way Ahead

Economic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberty to create and build or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society. Economic freedom also reinforces political freedom. It creates diversified centers of power and authority that limit the reach of government. It expands the free flow of ideas; with increased trade and foreign investment comes exposure to new ways of thinking and living which give citizens more control over their own lives.

To continue extending liberty and prosperity, and to meet the challenges that remain, our strategy going forward involves:

1. Opening markets and integrating developing countries.

While most of the world affirms in principle the appeal of economic liberty, in practice too many nations hold fast to the false comforts of subsidies and trade barriers. Such distortions of the market stifle growth in developed countries, and slow the escape from poverty in developing countries. Against these short-sighted impulses, the United States promotes the enduring vision of a global economy that welcomes all participants and encourages the voluntary exchange of goods and services based on mutual benefit, not favoritism.

We will continue to advance this agenda through the WTO and through bilateral and regional FTAs.

- The United States will seek completion of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. A successful Doha agreement will expand opportunities for Americans and for others around the world. Trade and open markets will empower citizens in developing countries to improve their lives, while reducing the opportunities for corruption that afflict state-controlled economies.
- We will continue to work with countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam on the market reforms needed to join the WTO. Participation in the WTO brings opportunities as well as obligations – to strengthen the rule of law and honor the intellectual property rights that sustain the modern knowledge economy, and to remove tariffs, subsidies, and other trade barriers that distort global markets and harm the world's poor.
- We will advance MEFTA by completing and bringing into force FTAs for Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates and through other initiatives to expand open trade with and among countries in the region.
- In Africa, we are pursuing an FTA with the countries of the Southern African Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
- In Asia, we are pursuing FTAs with Thailand, the ROK, and Malaysia. We will also continue to work closely with China to ensure it honors its WTO commitments and protects intellectual property.
- In our own hemisphere, we will advance the vision of a free trade area of the Americas by building on North American Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, and the FTA with Chile. We will complete and bring into force FTAs with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama.

2. Opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to ensure energy independence.

Most of the energy that drives the global economy comes from fossil fuels, especially petroleum. The United States is the world's third largest oil producer, but we rely on international sources to supply more than 50 percent of our needs. Only a small number of countries make major contributions to the world's oil supply.

The world's dependence on these few suppliers is neither responsible nor sustainable over the long term. The key to ensuring our energy security is *diversity* in the regions from which energy resources come and in the types of energy resources on which we rely.

- The Administration will work with resource-rich countries to increase their openness, transparency, and rule of law. This will promote effective democratic governance and attract the investment essential to developing their resources and expanding the range of energy suppliers.
- We will build the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to work with other nations to develop and deploy advanced nuclear recycling and reactor technologies. This initiative will help provide reliable, emission-free energy with less of the waste burden of older technologies and without making available separated plutonium that could be used by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. These new technologies will make possible a dramatic expansion of safe, clean nuclear energy to help meet the growing global energy demand.
- We will work with international partners to develop other transformational technologies such as clean coal and hydrogen. Through projects like our FutureGen initiative, we seek to turn our abundant domestic coal into emissions-free sources of electricity and hydrogen, providing our economies increased power with decreased emissions.
- On the domestic front, we are investing in zero-emission coal-fired plants; revolutionary solar and wind technologies; clean, safe nuclear energy; and cutting-edge methods of producing ethanol.

Our comprehensive energy strategy puts a priority on reducing our reliance on foreign energy sources. Diversification of energy sources also will help alleviate the “petroleum curse” – the tendency for oil revenues to foster corruption and prevent economic growth and political reform in some oil-producing states. In too many such nations, ruling elites enrich themselves while denying the people the benefits of their countries’ natural wealth. In the worst cases, oil revenues fund activities that destabilize their regions or advance violent ideologies. Diversifying the suppliers within and across regions reduces opportunities for corruption and diminishes the leverage of irresponsible rulers.

3. Reforming the International Financial System to Ensure Stability and Growth

In our interconnected world, stable and open financial markets are an essential feature of a prosperous global economy. We will work to improve the stability and openness of markets by:

- **Promoting Growth-Oriented Economic Policies Worldwide.** Sound policies in the United States have helped drive much international growth. We cannot be the only source of strength, however. We will work with the world’s other major economies, including the EU and Japan, to promote structural reforms that open their markets and increase productivity in their nations and across the world.
- **Encouraging Adoption of Flexible Exchange Rates and Open Markets for Financial Services.** The United States will help emerging economies make the

transition to the flexible exchange rates appropriate for major economies. In particular, we will continue to urge China to meet its own commitment to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime. We will also promote more open financial service markets, which encourage stable and sound financial practices.

- **Strengthening International Financial Institutions.** At the dawn of a previous era 6 decades ago, the United States championed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions were instrumental in the development of the global economy and an expansion of prosperity unprecedented in world history. They remain vital today, but must adapt to new realities:
 - For the World Bank and regional development banks, we will encourage greater emphasis on investments in the private sector. We will urge more consideration of economic freedom, governance, and measurable results in allocating funds. We will promote an increased use of grants to relieve the burden of unsustainable debt.
 - For the IMF, we will seek to refocus it on its core mission: international financial stability. This means strengthening the IMF's ability to monitor the financial system to prevent crises before they happen. If crises occur, the IMF's response must reinforce each country's responsibility for its own economic choices. A refocused IMF will strengthen market institutions and market discipline over financial decisions, helping to promote a stable and prosperous global economy. By doing so, over time markets and the private sector can supplant the need for the IMF to perform in its current role.
- **Building Local Capital Markets and the Formal Economy in the Developing World.** The first place that small businesses in developing countries turn to for resources is their own domestic markets. Unfortunately, in too many countries these resources are unavailable due to weak financial systems, a lack of property rights, and the diversion of economic activity away from the formal economy into the black market. The United States will work with these countries to develop and strengthen local capital markets and reduce the black market. This will provide more resources to helping the public sector govern effectively and the private sector grow and prosper.
- **Creating a More Transparent, Accountable, and Secure International Financial System.** The United States has worked with public and private partners to help secure the international financial system against abuse by criminals, terrorists, money launderers, and corrupt political leaders. We will continue to use international venues like the Financial Action Task Force to ensure that this global system is transparent and protected from abuse by tainted capital. We must also develop new tools that allow us to detect, disrupt, and isolate rogue financial players and gatekeepers.

VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

Helping the world's poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected. Past foreign assistance to corrupt and ineffective governments failed to help the populations in greatest need. Instead, it often impeded democratic reform and encouraged corruption. The United States must promote development programs that achieve measurable results – rewarding reforms, encouraging transparency, and improving people's lives. Led by the United States, the international community has endorsed this approach in the Monterrey Consensus.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

The United States has improved the lives of millions of people and transformed the practice of development by adopting more effective policies and programs.

- **Advancing Development and Reinforcing Reform.** The Administration pioneered a revolution in development strategy with the Millennium Challenge Account program, rewarding countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and foster economic freedom. The program is based on the principle that each nation bears the responsibility for its own development. It offers governments the opportunity and the means to undertake transformational change by designing their own reform and development programs, which are then funded through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC has approved over \$1.5 billion for compacts in eight countries, is working with over a dozen other countries on compacts, and has committed many smaller grants to other partner countries.
- **Turning the Tide Against AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases.** The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is an unprecedented, 5-year, \$15 billion effort. Building on the success of pioneering programs in Africa, we have launched a major initiative that will prevent 7 million new infections, provide treatment to 2 million infected individuals, and care for 10 million AIDS orphans and others affected by the disease. We have launched a \$1.2 billion, 5-year initiative to reduce malaria deaths by 50 percent in at least 15 targeted countries. To mobilize other nations and the private sector, the United States pioneered the creation of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We are the largest donor to the Fund and have already contributed over \$1.4 billion.
- **Promoting Debt Sustainability and a Path Toward Private Capital Markets.** The Administration has sought to break the burden of debt that traps many poor countries by encouraging international financial institutions to provide grants instead of loans to low-income nations. With the United Kingdom, we spearheaded the G-8 initiative to provide 100 percent multilateral debt relief to qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor

Countries. Reducing debt to sustainable levels allows countries to focus on immediate development challenges. In the long run, reducing debt also opens access to private capital markets which foster sound policies and long-term growth.

- **Addressing Urgent Needs and Investing in People.** The United States leads the world in providing food relief. We launched the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, using science, technology, and market incentives to increase the productivity of African farmers. We launched a 3-year, \$900 million initiative to provide clean water to the poor. We have tripled basic education assistance through programs such as the Africa Education Initiative, which will train teachers and administrators, build schools, buy textbooks, and expand opportunities inside and outside the classroom.
- **Unleashing the Power of the Private Sector.** The Administration has sought to multiply the impact of our development assistance through initiatives such as the Global Development Alliance, which forges partnerships with the private sector to advance development goals, and Volunteers for Prosperity, which enlists some of our Nation's most capable professionals to serve strategically in developing nations.
- **Fighting Corruption and Promoting Transparency.** Through multilateral efforts like the G-8 Transparency Initiative and our policy of denying corrupt foreign officials entry into the United States, we are helping ensure that organized crime and parasitic rulers do not choke off the benefits of economic assistance and growth.

We have increased our overall development assistance spending by 97 percent since 2000. In all of these efforts, the United States has sought concrete measures of success. Funding is a means, not the end. We are giving more money to help the world's poor, and giving it more effectively.

Many challenges remain, including:

- Helping millions of people in the world who continue to suffer from poverty and disease;
- Ensuring that the delivery of assistance reinforces good governance and sound economic policies; and
- Building the capacity of poor countries to take ownership of their own development strategies.

C. The Way Ahead

America's national interests and moral values drive us in the same direction: to assist the world's poor citizens and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy. We have accomplished many of the goals laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Many of the new initiatives we launched in the last 4 years are now

fully operating to help the plight of the world's least fortunate. We will persevere on this path.

Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people's lives.

1. Transformational Diplomacy and Effective Democracy

Transformational diplomacy means working with our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Long-term development must include encouraging governments to make wise choices and assisting them in implementing those choices. We will encourage and reward good behavior rather than reinforce negative behavior. Ultimately it is the countries themselves that must decide to take the necessary steps toward development, yet we will help advance this process by creating external incentives for governments to reform themselves.

Effective economic development advances our national security by helping promote responsible sovereignty, not permanent dependency. Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress.

2. Making Foreign Assistance More Effective

The Administration has created the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) in the State Department. The DFA will serve concurrently as Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a position that will continue to be at the level of Deputy Secretary, and will have, consistent with existing legal requirements, authority over all State Department and USAID foreign assistance. This reorganization will create a more unified and rational structure that will more fully align assistance programs in State and USAID, increase the effectiveness of these programs for recipient countries, and ensure that we are being the best possible stewards of taxpayer dollars. And it will focus our foreign assistance on promoting greater ownership and responsibility on the part of host nations and their citizens.

With this new authority, the DFA/Administrator will develop a coordinated foreign assistance strategy, including 5-year, country-specific assistance strategies and annual country-specific assistance operational plans. The DFA/Administrator also will provide guidance for the assistance delivered through other entities of the United States Government, including the MCC and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.

To ensure the best stewardship of our foreign assistance, the United States will:

- Distinguish among the different challenges facing different nations and address those challenges with tools appropriate for each country's stage of development;
- Encourage and reward good government and economic reform, both bilaterally and through the multilateral institutions such as international financial institutions, the G-8, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);
- Engage the private sector to help solve development problems;
- Promote graduation from economic aid dependency with the ultimate goal of ending assistance;
- Build trade capacity to enable the poorest countries to enter into the global trade system; and
- Empower local leaders to take responsibility for their country's development.

Our assistance efforts will also highlight and build on the lessons learned from successful examples of wise development and economic policy choices, such as the ROK, Taiwan, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Chile, and Botswana.

VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

Relations with the most powerful countries in the world are central to our national security strategy. Our priority is pursuing American interests within cooperative relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies. At the same time, we must seize the opportunity – unusual in historical terms – of an absence of fundamental conflict between the great powers. Another priority, therefore, is preventing the reemergence of the great power rivalries that divided the world in previous eras. New times demand new approaches, flexible enough to permit effective action even when there are reasonable differences of opinions among friends, yet strong enough to confront the challenges the world faces.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

The United States has enjoyed unprecedented levels of cooperation on many of its highest national security priorities:

- The global coalition against terror has grown and deepened, with extensive cooperation and common resolve. The nations that have partnered with us in Afghanistan and Iraq have developed capabilities that can be applied to other challenges.
- We have joined with other nations around the world as well as numerous multilateral organizations to improve the capability of all nations to defend their homelands against terrorists and transnational criminals.
- We have achieved extraordinary coordination among historic rivals in pressing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program.
- We have partnered with European allies and international institutions to pressure Iran to honor its non-proliferation commitments.
- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is transforming itself to meet current threats and is playing a leading role in stabilizing the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as training the Iraqi military leadership to address its security challenges.
- We have set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world's most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path.

At the same time, America's relations with other nations have been strong enough to withstand differences and candid exchanges of views.

- Some of our oldest and closest friends disagreed with U.S. policy in Iraq. There are ongoing and serious debates with our allies about how best to address the unique and evolving nature of the global terrorist threat.
- We have disagreed on the steps to reduce agricultural subsidies and achieve success in the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations. We have also faced challenges in forging consensus with other major nations on the most effective measures to protect the environment.

C. The Way Ahead

The struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side – opposing the terrorists. This circumstance differs profoundly from the ideological struggles of the 20th century, which saw the great powers divided by ideology as well as by national interest.

The potential for great power consensus presents the United States with an extraordinary opportunity. Yet certain challenges must be overcome. Some nations differ with us on the appropriate pace of change. Other nations provide rhetorical support for free markets and effective democracy but little action on freedom's behalf.

Five principles undergird our strategy for relations with the main centers of global power.

- First, these relations must be set in their proper context. Bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed.
- Second, these relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them.
- Third, we cannot pretend that our interests are unaffected by states' treatment of their own citizens. America's interest in promoting effective democracies rests on an historical fact: states that are governed well are most inclined to behave well. We will encourage all our partners to expand liberty, and to respect the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, as the surest way to advance the welfare of their people and to cement close relations with the United States.
- Fourth, while we do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, we do seek to influence the calculations on which these choices are based. We also must hedge appropriately in case states choose unwisely.

- Fifth, we must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners.

1. The Western Hemisphere

These principles guide our relations within our own Hemisphere, the frontline of defense of American national security. Our goal remains a hemisphere fully democratic, bound together by good will, security cooperation, and the opportunity for all our citizens to prosper. Tyrants and those who would follow them belong to a different era and must not be allowed to reverse the progress of the last two decades. Countries in the Hemisphere must be helped to the path of sustained political and economic development. The deceptive appeal of anti-free market populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the Hemisphere's poorest in cycles of poverty. If America's nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure.

Our strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and Mexico, a foundation of shared values and cooperative policies that can be extended throughout the region. We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere to reduce illegal immigration and promote expanded economic opportunity for marginalized populations. We must also solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values. And we must continue to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region's stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress. Together, these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people.

2. Africa

Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.

Africa's potential has in the past been held hostage by the bitter legacy of colonial misrule and bad choices by some African leaders. The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.

Overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, not paternalism. Our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges. Through improved governance, reduced corruption, and market reforms, African nations can lift themselves toward a better future. We are committed to working with African

nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the AU to support post-conflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve peacekeeping and disaster responses.

3. Middle East

The Broader Middle East continues to command the world's attention. For too long, too many nations of the Middle East have suffered from a freedom deficit. Repression has fostered corruption, imbalanced or stagnant economies, political resentments, regional conflicts, and religious extremism. These maladies were all cloaked by an illusion of stability. Yet the peoples of the Middle East share the same desires as people in the rest of the world: liberty, opportunity, justice, order, and peace. These desires are now being expressed in movements for reform. The United States is committed to supporting the efforts of reformers to realize a better life for themselves and their region.

We seek a Middle East of independent states, at peace with each other, and fully participating in an open global market of goods, services, and ideas. We are seeking to build a framework that will allow Israel and the Palestinian territories to live side by side in peace and security as two democratic states. In the wider region, we will continue to support efforts for reform and freedom in traditional allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Tyrannical regimes such as Iran and Syria that oppress at home and sponsor terrorism abroad know that we will continue to stand with their people against their misrule. And in Iraq, we will continue to support the Iraqi people and their historic march from tyranny to effective democracy. We will work with the freely elected, democratic government of Iraq – our new partner in the War on Terror – to consolidate and expand freedom, and to build security and lasting stability.

4. Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a vital pillar of U.S. foreign policy. The Alliance has been strengthened by expanding its membership and now acts beyond its borders as an instrument for peace and stability in many parts of the world. It has also established partnerships with other key European states, including Russia, Ukraine, and others, further extending NATO's historic transformation. The internal reform of NATO structures, capabilities, and procedures must be accelerated to ensure that NATO is able to carry out its missions effectively. The Alliance's door will also remain open to those countries that aspire for membership and meet NATO standards. Further, NATO must deepen working relationships between and across institutions, as it is doing with the EU, and as it also could do with new institutions. Such relationships offer opportunities for enhancing the distinctive strengths and missions of each organization.

Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies. Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation of shared values and interests. This foundation is expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. These democracies are effective partners, joining with us to promote global

freedom and prosperity. Just as in the special relationship that binds us to the United Kingdom, these cooperative relationships forge deeper ties between our nations.

5. Russia

The United States seeks to work closely with Russia on strategic issues of common interest and to manage issues on which we have differing interests. By reason of geography and power, Russia has great influence not only in Europe and its own immediate neighborhood, but also in many other regions of vital interest to us: the broader Middle East, South and Central Asia, and East Asia. We must encourage Russia to respect the values of freedom and democracy at home and not to impede the cause of freedom and democracy in these regions. Strengthening our relationship will depend on the policies, foreign and domestic, that Russia adopts. Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom's path.

Stability and prosperity in Russia's neighborhood will help deepen our relations with Russia; but that stability will remain elusive as long as this region is not governed by effective democracies. We will seek to persuade Russia's government that democratic progress in Russia and its region benefits the peoples who live there and improves relationships with us, with other Western governments, and among themselves. Conversely, efforts to prevent democratic development at home and abroad will hamper the development of Russia's relations with the United States, Europe, and its neighbors.

6. South and Central Asia

South and Central Asia is a region of great strategic importance where American interests and values are engaged as never before. India is a great democracy, and our shared values are the foundation of our good relations. We are eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure, and democratic path. Our goal is for the entire region of South and Central Asia to be democratic, prosperous, and at peace.

We have made great strides in transforming America's relationship with India, a major power that shares our commitment to freedom, democracy, and rule of law. In July 2005, we signed a bold agreement – a roadmap to realize the meaningful cooperation that had eluded our two nations for decades. India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.

Progress with India has been achieved even as the United States has improved its strategic relationship with Pakistan. For decades, outsiders acted as if good relations with India and Pakistan were mutually exclusive. This Administration has shown that improved relations with each are possible and can help India and Pakistan make strides toward a lasting peace between themselves. America's relationship with Pakistan will not be a mirror image of our relationship with India. Together, our relations with the nations of South Asia can serve as a foundation for deeper engagement throughout

Central Asia. Increasingly, Afghanistan will assume its historical role as a land-bridge between South and Central Asia, connecting these two vital regions.

Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy. The five countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another and our relations with each, while important, will differ. In the region as a whole, the elements of our larger strategy meet, and we must pursue those elements simultaneously: promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free-market reforms, diversifying global sources of energy, and enhancing security and winning the War on Terror.

7. East Asia

East Asia is a region of great opportunities and lingering tensions. Over the past decade, it has been a source of extraordinary economic dynamism and also of economic turbulence. Few regional economies have more effectively harnessed the engines of future prosperity: technology and globalized trade. Yet few regions have had greater difficulty overcoming the suspicions of the past.

The United States is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region's stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights.

Forging new international initiatives and institutions can assist in the spread of freedom, prosperity, and regional security. Existing institutions like the APEC forum and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, can play a vital role. New arrangements, such as the U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, or others that are focused on problem-solving and action, like the Six-Party Talks and the PSI, can likewise bring together Asian nations to address common challenges. And Asian nations that share our values can join us in partnership to strengthen new democracies and promote democratic reforms throughout the region. This institutional framework, however, must be built upon a foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in the region.

With Japan, the United States enjoys the closest relations in a generation. As the world's two largest economies and aid donors, acting in concert multiplies each of our strengths and magnifies our combined contributions to global progress. Our shared commitment to democracy at home offers a sure foundation for cooperation abroad.

With Australia, our alliance is global in scope. From Iraq and Afghanistan to our historic FTA, we are working jointly to ensure security, prosperity, and expanded liberty.

With the ROK, we share a vision of a prosperous, democratic, and united Korean peninsula. We also share a commitment to democracy at home and progress abroad and are translating that common vision into joint action to sustain our alliance into the 21st century.

With Southeast Asia, we celebrate the dynamism of increased economic freedom and look to further extend political freedom to all the people in the region, including those suffering under the repressive regime in Burma. In promoting greater economic and political liberty, we will work closely with our allies and key friends, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

China encapsulates Asia's dramatic economic successes, but China's transition remains incomplete. In one generation, China has gone from poverty and isolation to growing integration into the international economic system. China once opposed global institutions; today it is a permanent member of the UNSC and the WTO. As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success: enforcing the international rules that have helped China lift itself out of a century of economic deprivation, embracing the economic and political standards that go along with that system of rules, and contributing to international stability and security by working with the United States and other major powers.

China's leaders proclaim that they have made a decision to walk the transformative path of peaceful development. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual interests. China can make an important contribution to global prosperity and ensure its own prosperity for the longer term if it will rely more on domestic demand and less on global trade imbalances to drive its economic growth. China shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational concerns. Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and energy security. We will work to increase our cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation.

The United States encourages China to continue down the road of reform and openness, because in this way China's leaders can meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Chinese people for liberty, stability, and prosperity. As economic growth continues, China will face a growing demand from its own people to follow the path of East Asia's many modern democracies, adding political freedom to economic freedom. Continuing along this path will contribute to regional and international security.

China's leaders must realize, however, that they cannot stay on this peaceful path while holding on to old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate concerns throughout the region and the world. These old ways include:

- Continuing China's military expansion in a non-transparent way;
- Expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up – as if they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era; and

- Supporting resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes.

China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan.

Ultimately, China's leaders must see that they cannot let their population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship. Only by allowing the Chinese people to enjoy these basic freedoms and universal rights can China honor its own constitution and international commitments and reach its full potential. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.

IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century

A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed.

B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges

In the last four years, we have made substantial progress in transforming key national security institutions.

- The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security brought under one authority 22 federal entities with vital roles to play in protecting our Nation and preventing terrorist attacks within the United States. The Department is focused on three national security priorities: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur.
- In 2004, the Intelligence Community launched its most significant reorganization since the 1947 National Security Act. The centerpiece is a new position, the Director of National Intelligence, endowed with expanded budgetary, acquisition, tasking, and personnel authorities to integrate more effectively the efforts of the Community into a more unified, coordinated, and effective whole. The transformation also includes a new National Counterterrorism Center and a new National Counterproliferation Center to manage and coordinate planning and activities in those critical areas. The transformation extends to the FBI, which has augmented its intelligence capabilities and is now more fully and effectively integrated with the Intelligence Community.
- The Department of Defense has completed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which details how the Department will continue to adapt and build to meet new challenges.
 - We are pursuing a future force that will provide tailored deterrence of both state and non-state threats (including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression) while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. The Department of Defense also is expanding Special Operations Forces and investing in advanced conventional capabilities to help win the long war against terrorist extremists and to help dissuade any hostile military competitor from challenging the United States, its allies, and partners.
 - The Department is transforming itself to better balance its capabilities across four categories of challenges:

- **Traditional** challenges posed by states employing conventional armies, navies, and air forces in well-established forms of military competition.
- **Irregular** challenges from state and non-state actors employing methods such as terrorism and insurgency to counter our traditional military advantages, or engaging in criminal activity such as piracy and drug trafficking that threaten regional security.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involving the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD by state and non-state actors; and deadly pandemics and other natural disasters that produce WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** challenges from state and non-state actors who employ technologies and capabilities (such as biotechnology, cyber and space operations, or directed-energy weapons) in new ways to counter military advantages the United States currently enjoys.

C. The Way Ahead

We must extend and enhance the transformation of key institutions, both domestically and abroad.

At home, we will pursue three priorities:

- *Sustaining the transformation already under way in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Intelligence Community.*
- *Continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy*, which promotes effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Our diplomats must be able to step outside their traditional role to become more involved with the challenges within other societies, helping them directly, channeling assistance, and learning from their experience. This effort will include:
 - Promoting the efforts of the new Director for Foreign Assistance/Administrator to ensure that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet our broad foreign policy objectives. This new office will align more fully the foreign assistance activities carried out by the Department of State and USAID, demonstrating that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
 - Improving our capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed-state situations. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization will integrate all relevant United States Government resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations. This effort must focus on building

the security and law enforcement structures that are often the prerequisite for restoring order and ensuring success.

- Developing a civilian reserve corps, analogous to the military reserves. The civilian reserve corps would utilize, in a flexible and timely manner, the human resources of the American people for skills and capacities needed for international disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners who share our commitment to a safer, more compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing our channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting propaganda quickly, before myths and distortions have time to take root in the hearts and minds of people across the world.
- ***Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses*** covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.
 - We need to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning.
 - Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.

Abroad, we will work with our allies on three priorities:

- ***Promoting meaningful reform of the U.N.***, including:
 - Creating structures to ensure financial accountability and administrative and organizational efficiency.
 - Enshrining the principle that membership and participation privileges are earned by responsible behavior and by reasonable burden-sharing of security and stability challenges.
 - Enhancing the capacity of the U.N. and associated regional organizations to stand up well-trained, rapidly deployable, sustainable military and gendarme units for peace operations.

- Ensuring that the U.N. reflects today's geopolitical realities and is not shackled by obsolete structures.
- Reinvigorating the U.N.'s commitment, reflected in the U.N. Charter, to the promotion of democracy and human rights.
- ***Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions***, including:
 - Strengthening and institutionalizing the Community of Democracies.
 - Fostering the creation of regional democracy-based institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere.
 - Improving the capacity of the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to advance the freedom agenda through tools like the U.N. Democracy Fund.
 - Coordinating more effectively the unique contributions of international financial institutions and regional development banks.
- ***Establishing results-oriented partnerships*** on the model of the PSI *to meet new challenges and opportunities*. These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not international bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties. They are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation or rule-making.

X. Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization

In recent years, the world has witnessed the growing importance of a set of opportunities and challenges that were addressed indirectly in National Security Strategy 2002: the national security implications of globalization.

Globalization presents many opportunities. Much of the world's prosperity and improved living standards in recent years derive from the expansion of global trade, investment, information, and technology. The United States has been a leader in promoting these developments, and we believe they have improved significantly the quality of life of the American people and people the world over. Other nations have embraced these opportunities and have likewise benefited. Globalization has also helped the advance of democracy by extending the marketplace of ideas and the ideals of liberty.

These new flows of trade, investment, information, and technology are transforming national security. Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. Examples include:

- ***Public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders.*** The risks to social order are so great that traditional public health approaches may be inadequate, necessitating new strategies and responses.
- ***Illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era's greater ease of transport and exchange.*** Such traffic corrodes social order; bolsters crime and corruption; undermines effective governance; facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology; and compromises traditional security and law enforcement.
- ***Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis.*** Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response.

These challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national security. We have learned that:

- Preparing for and managing these challenges requires the full exercise of national power, up to and including traditional security instruments. For example, the U.S. military provided critical logistical support in the response to the Southeast Asian tsunami and the South Asian earthquake until U.N. and civilian humanitarian responders could relieve the military of these vital duties.
- Technology can help, but the key to rapid and effective response lies in achieving unity of effort across a range of agencies. For example, our response to the Katrina

and Rita hurricanes underscored the need for communications systems that remain operational and integrated during times of crisis. Even more vital, however, is improved coordination within the Federal government, with state and local partners, and with the private sector.

- Existing international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term. For example, U.S. leadership in mobilizing the Regional Core Group to respond to the tsunami of 2004 galvanized the follow-on international response.
- The response and the new partnerships it creates can sometimes serve as a catalyst for changing existing political conditions to address other problems. For example, the response to the tsunami in Southeast Asia and the earthquake in Pakistan developed new lines of communication and cooperation at a local level, which opened the door to progress in reconciling long-standing regional conflicts in Aceh and the Kashmir.

Effective democracies are better able to deal with these challenges than are repressive or poorly governed states. Pandemics require robust and fully transparent public health systems, which weak governments and those that fear freedom are unable or unwilling to provide. Yet these challenges require effective democracies to come together in innovative ways.

The United States must lead the effort to reform existing institutions and create new ones – including forging new partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental actors, and with transnational and international organizations.

To confront illicit trade, for example, the Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative and the APEC Secure Trade in the APEC Region Initiative, both of which focus on tangible steps governments can take to combat illegal trade.

To combat the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, the Administration devotes over \$1 billion annually to comprehensive counternarcotics efforts, working with governments, particularly in Latin America and Asia, to eradicate crops, destroy production facilities, interdict shipments, and support developing alternative livelihoods.

To confront the threat of a possible pandemic, the Administration took the lead in creating the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, a new global partnership of states committed to effective surveillance and preparedness that will help to detect and respond quickly to any outbreaks of the disease.

XI. Conclusion

The challenges America faces are great, yet we have enormous power and influence to address those challenges. The times require an ambitious national security strategy, yet one recognizing the limits to what even a nation as powerful as the United States can achieve by itself. Our national security strategy is idealistic about goals, and realistic about means.

There was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems in other lands, leaving America to lead by example alone. That time has long since passed. America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example. This is how we plan to lead, and this is the legacy we will leave to those who follow.