Moral Development,

Why Care?

A Theoretical and Empirical Study in Moral Development

Title page

Title: Moral Development, Why Care? -A Theoretical and Empirical Study in Moral Development

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Abstract

The motivation behind the thesis was to investigate morals as they relate to the ability to treat others nicely, and to gather a greater understanding of moral development in order to identify whether age differences could be found of importance for this development.

Initially, a theoretical investigation of different approaches to the understanding of moral development was conducted. Moral development was presented as: a global staged approach (Piaget, Kohlberg); a social-domain model postulating moral, social-conventional, and personal reasoning as coexisting; and an intuitionists post-hoc approach to morals (Haidt). The suggested developmental tracks and the theoretical inconsistencies were investigated by conducting a qualitative investigation, which was then quantified in a statistical analysis (a representative sample) in order to investigate any typical developmental progression.

The theoretical approaches were also analyzed philosophically, and the use of Wittgenstein's philosophical language approach sought to legitimize studying children's moral development through their reasoning.

The empirical study was designed to investigate children's moral judgments (using exclusion to foster moral arguments). The 'perpetrator effect' (testing arguments when authority/ peers were excluding) was measured on targets (being excluded on the basis of their gender or immigration status). Two conditions were investigated: one exposure condition where ~20% other ethnicities (bilingual children) were present; and a condition with minimal or no immigrants present (no bilingual children). The thesis then addressed whether children would be more willing to exclude a child from a dominant group (containing boys and Danes) or children from a week group (containing girls and immigrants).

Individual interviews (lasting 10-20 minutes) containing eight scenarios and the gender-typing test (the COAT) were conducted. 307 middle-class children were interviewed from 7 participating schools, with equal numbers of children from three age groups (app. 8, 10 and 12). Expectations from the theoretical discussion of the presented theories, were that younger children would use more moral arguments, and less social conventional arguments, and would be less willing to exclude. Older children were expected to use less moral arguments and more social conventions (e.g. group membership or social traditions), and be more accepting of exclusion. Children using more gender typing were expected to use more social conventional arguments, and be more willing to reject (especially based on gender).

After transcribing and coding all interviews, analysis showed no trajectories, gender biases, or willingness to accept teacher perpetrated exclusion. However it was found that children in the exposure condition used more social conventions. It was also found that children using more moral reasoning rejected others less. It was expected that children in the exposure condition (being exposed to different social conventions and experiencing more groups) would use more social conventional arguments, and this expectation was supported.

The target group (being either the dominant or weak group) was, as it was expected to be, of importance. It is also of importance to note that children would use more moral judgments when the excluded child was from the weak group than from the strong group, furthermore children used more moral reasoning when reasoning about the immigrant child and more social conventional reasonings for a girl. The overall findings indicate that children using more moral arguments are less willing to exclude. These findings suggest that the less group-focused children are, the more moral arguments they use, signifying that morals come from an individual ability (willing to challenge the group or authority).

Procesbeskrivelse In Danish

Dette speciale er blevet til i samarbejde mellem Aalborg Universitet og Kingston Universitet, London. Samarbejdet blev indledt, da jeg på 9. semester var på praktik i London ved Harriet Tenenbaum, en kontakt jeg fik gennem Francisco Pons, en tidligere forsker ved Aalborg Universitet. Under mit praktikophold foreslog Harriet mig at skrive et empirisk speciale, idet hun syntes, jeg klarede mit 'arbejde' som forskningsassistent godt (Jeg udførte forskellige forsøg og stod, under opholdet , for universitetets Psykologi Laboratorie og skrev samtidigt et "directed paper" med hende som vejleder).

Jeg var henrykt over ideen og begyndte at kigge på litteratur til en undersøgelse. Mine første forslag var vedrørende "Developmental Transformation", en retning, primært udviklet af Professor David Reed Johnson. (Jeg var på daværende tidspunkt medlem af "The British Association of Dramatherapists" og havde deltaget i deres konference i York). Disse ideer blev afvist på grund af områdets eksperimentelle karakter. På baggrund af, at overvejelserne om et speciale inden for Developmental Transformation udsprang fra måling af ændringer (transformation), blev Harriet og jeg enige om, at vores fællesinteresse var 'Change'. Dette ledte mig ind på udviklingen af moral, da jeg havde en idé om, at moral er et af hovedaspekterne i, hvordan vi mennesker behandler hinanden. Derudover øjnede jeg også muligheden for at kunne kigge nærmere på moral som en af faktorerne bag den daværende Muhammed konflikt.

I den resterende del af praktikken begyndte jeg at se på litteratur til specialet, udviklingen af moral samt forskelsbehandling af forskellig art (race og køn). Litteraturen om moral var samtidig meget modstridende m. hensyn til, hvordan denne udvikles. Egne oplevelser fra skoletiden og eksklusion brugt i litteratur som katalysator for moralske argumenter førte til valget af eksklusion til at skabe indsigt i moral/moralske argumenter.

På daværende tidspunkt havde jeg igen ideer om "Interaktive Interventions 'spil'", inspirerede af "Developmental Transformation", men selv om jeg havde lyst til denne form for tilgang , ville video-materiale besværliggøre at bevise noget, hvis jeg skulle ind og undersøge en reel moralsk udvikling i en repræsentativ gruppe (hvis jeg statistisk skulle kunne bevise noget med min undersøgelse).

Dette førte til ideen om historier, som børn kunne lytte til og give feed back på. Jeg var i gang med også at finde/lave illustrationer, da Harriet brød illusionen om den mere interaktive tilgang, idet hun påpegede, at der var alt for mange abstraktions-niveauer i min ellers fine 'opstilling'. Tilbage var så grundlaget for undersøgelsen: scenarier, der omhandler børn. Disse kunne tilpasses et design, der lod sig kvantificere (og med historier som udgangspunkt for kvalitative interviews) og således undersøge en mulig moralsk udvikling, i en repræsentativ gruppe (gennem sproglig analyse og udvikling af et 'kodnings' værktøj til kodning/kategorisering af pointerne fra den sproglige analyse). At bruge kodning til at skabe analyserbart data var inspireret af et studie af udviklingen af børns narrative evner, som jeg indsamlede data til for Harriet i praktik-tiden. Mit endelige forslag var: at undersøge to grupper børn og medtage kontakt med indvandrerbørn (anden generations børn) i tre aldersgrupper (for at kunne identificere mulige udviklingstendenser). For at kunne skabe statistisk gyldighed var der derfor tale om en undersøgelse med 240 børn i alt, (2 grupper, 2 køn og tre aldersgrupper, á minimum 20 informanter for hver gruppering). Harriet var meget positiv omkring undersøgelsen, hvis jeg kunne få 3 måneder ekstra til at kontakte skoler, interviewe og bearbejde data.

Jeg kontaktede min studieleder, Jens Kvorning, som havde været positiv omkring og accepteret min første idé om "Developmental Transformation". Han syntes godt om ideen og tilbød også sig selv som vejleder på dette projekt. Han så ingen problemer i specialets karakter (samarbejdet mellem to universiteter) eller det empiriske arbejde. Derudover var han også enig i, at den store mængde data

ville kræve tre måneder ekstra, hvilket Harriet og jeg havde udregnet tidsplan efter. Han lovede mig, at hverken samarbejdet eller den ekstra tid ville blive noget problem, et løfte han også har holdt.

Desværre nåede Jens kun lige at se – og godkende - skitserne til mine scenarier. Efter lang tids stilhed fra hans ende af nettet, fik jeg at vide, at Jens var sygemeldt, og at vi ville få tildelt nye vejledere hurtigst muligt. Harriet kunne ikke rigtigt forstå mine bekymringer om, hvorvidt vejlederskiftet kunne have indflydelse på, om jeg kunne færdiggøre projektet, som det var planlagt; derovre er et empirisk projekt anset som en stor fordel i sig selv, hvorimod det i Danmark nok mere betragtes som "lidt krydderi" til det teoretiske. I perioden uden (kontakt til) dansk vejleder var jeg meget nervøs for at miste muligheden for at kunne færdiggøre projektet, som jeg havde udlagt det, (det var samtidig meningen, at dataerne skulle bruges i en artikel, jeg skriver - med Harriets hjælp til korrektur og som medforfatter; noget, Harriet mener, er af stor betydning, hvis jeg vil forsøge at komme videre i universitetsverdenen). På grund af skolernes forestående sommerferie blev jeg dog nødt til at fortsætte med at interviewe, hvis jeg skulle have en chance for at nå det. Jeg vidste ikke, hvad konsekvenserne ville være ved at få en ny vejleder, der evt. ikke ville være lige så interesseret i specialets karakter (en stor empirisk opgave)? Vi bliver for vores egen skyld frarådet at tage fat på en for stor opgave til specialet, da reglerne er blevet strammet meget netop inden for dette felt (og eneste grund til, at jeg havde påbegyndt specialet, var Jens' opbakning). Jeg stod i en ubehagelig situation, idet jeg jo uddelte samtykkeerklæringer med Jens' navn på i skolerne.
Den vejleder, jeg først blev tildelt, vidste jeg selv udførte empiriske undersøgelser, dog blev jeg inden for en uges tid meddelt, at jeg havde fået en ny og endelig vejleder, Ulla Böwadt, der for tiden 'kun' forsker teoretisk. Netop dette, at kombinere de to tilgange, (min engelske vejleder, der primært forsker empirisk, og min danske, der primært forsker teoretisk), og med en vejleder på hver del af opgaven, har været krævende, og har ført til misforståelser, - fra begge sider. Men samarbejdet har også været særdeles givende, og jeg håber, at mit arbejde har båret frugt af begge tilgange. Indledningsvis gjorde spørgsmål fra min nye vejleders side mig lidt nervøs. Jeg følte jo en forpligtelse overfor skolerne og var bekymret over, om jeg havde gjort forkert i at fortsætte undersøgelsen, dengang jeg blev usikker på, om jeg kunne blive nødt til at revurdere hele projektet. Min nye vejleder, Ulla, trådte således ind på et tidspunkt, hvor jeg var i fuld gang med at interviewe transskribere og på flere ture til London for at udvikle en passende kodning, der både kunne fange meningen i børnenes argumenter og kombineres med mit analyse-design, der var opstillet således, at de kvalitative interviews skulle kunne kvantificeres og statistisk analyseres (ANOVA), og derfor skulle vi opnå 'reliability' hvis kodningen skulle kunne bruges. Der var i starten en del misforståelser af undersøgelsens karakter, men alt i alt har denne kritik dog forhåbentlig virket positivt og har tilført opgaven et ekstra lag. Undertiden kan det dog være en underlig situation at sidde i, når man fra den ene side får positive udmeldinger om både det empiriske arbejde, transskriberingen, udviklingen af- og kodningen i sig selv (analyse mm.), men kommentarer om, hvad filosofi laver i en 'Psychology Master'?- Og fra den anden side påpegninger af "mangelen på meta teoretisk diskussion" og en udtrykt bekymring om, at det hele ville drukne i arbejdet med den empiriske undersøgelse.

 Jeg håber, at det hele er kommet med, og har i hvert fald selv fået en kæmpe erfaring med både rekruttering, interviews, data analyse,- samtidig med det teoretiske fundament for både sådanne procedurer og moral inden for psykologien, og også lidt inden for filosofien.

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CHAPTER 1 Introduction

"Some days ago I saw a gentleman whose arm was in a plaster cast. I thought: everyone can see that he has a broken arm and can adjust their behaviour accordingly. Maybe they will show him sympathy, maybe they will help. But how about broken hearts and psychological traumas? If we could see these injuries, then how many people would we make bleed, how many people would we know to be disabled, or even walking corpses?"

Dr. Mahmood Delkhasteh

The opening quote reveals reflection on lack of visibility as a possible contributor to why people commit psychological harm to others, as well as dilemmas revolving around whether people committing psychological harm know the full impact of their actions. Any person who has experienced harassment (e.g. during public school) might have considerations such as: why?; why me?; and what makes people acting like that legitimately? Other considerations might be about whether it is reasonable to be treated differently based on one's family, lack of status symbols, race, gender or even physical size?

The main motivation of the thesis is, through investigating children's arguments on moral issues, to gather knowledge that might contribute to improving children's behaviour towards others. This will be accomplished through the use of a psychological perspective investigating children's moral development. Moral reasoning is understood as a contributing factor that enables children to conceptualize the effect of psychological harm. The reason for investigating moral development in children is thus to come closer to an understanding of what is important for this development, and thereby come to an understanding of how to support this development.

Some very fundamental questions have been raised through the investigation of moral development e.g. do they develop with age or are they applied by society? As psychology has a responsibility towards society, philosophical considerations about what different approaches add to the understanding of morals, should be included. In order to include this, and in an attempt to reach a better understanding of possible implications of contemporary approaches to morals, a rather historical approach will be followed. More specifically, rational theories of Piaget, Kohlberg and the social cognitive *domain* theory are presented together with the sociobiological evolutionary theories of Damasio and Haidt. The purpose of including these competing theories, is to investigate different theoretical approaches to moral development, as well as to include the important moral issues and implications of these approaches. After the empirical investigation is discussed, the prominent theoretical issues will be discussed through a philosophical perspective, which has been inspired by Svend Brinkmann's thoughts on psychology as a moral science.

Problem statement

To focus the investigation, three clarifying questions have been asked.

1) How are, and how have, morals (and the development of morals) been described in developmental psychology, and what is the theoretical implication of having different theoretical approaches to moral development?

2) Is there a developmental trajectory of children's moral reasoning, or is it context-dependent and idiosyncratic? In other words, are developmental psychologists able to describe children's reasoning based on children's age, or is it more dependent on situational and individual difference factors?

3) Are any (of the investigated) factors of more importance than others when making moral decisions, and do these (if any) change with age?

To process the problem statement and bring in the possibility of considering both the actual development of morals, as well as the implications of the different approaches to moral development, the problem statement is initially theoretically investigated. An empirical investigation is hereafter conducted, where an attempt is made to verify important aspects from the theoretical investigation; diverging issues are sought and clarified. Finally the results from the empirical investigation will be discussed together with the gained theoretical knowledge in order to bring about clarification, comparisons, and discussions of moral development in order to answer the problem statement.

To question the validity of the investigation, the results of the theoretical and empirical investigation are then examined through Svend Brinkmann's philosophical approach. Furthermore, the interviews will be verified from the Wittgensteinian 'language philosophy' point of view.

Morals

The psychological encyclopaedia (Egidius 2001) defines morals as:

1.The valid morals which are stated in codes of practices and which humans ought to know and follow.
2.The system of moral principles and rules an individual, a group or a population actually follows.
3. Individual perception of what is allowed and not allowed, what you are obligated to do and obligated not to do, what is good and evil, right and wrong (see also ethics).

...
Eng. Term: Morals; morality; moral
(Egidius 2001p. 374; own translation)

In the above, the definition of morals refers to ethics. Ethics are defined (in the same encyclopaedia) as:

The teachings about what is allowed and not allowed, mandatory or forbidden, good and evil, right and wrong.

Eng. Term ethics
(Egidius 2001 p.146; own translation)

According to these definitions morals seem to refer strictly to rules. In number one above, morals are defined through rules stated in codes of practices. In number two, they are defined as a system of principles and rules followed by individuals, groups and populations. Even though definition number three refers to the individual, what is allowed and not allowed still refers to organized obligations, divided into right and wrong, and rules for how to live by these obligations, further referred to in the descriptions of ethics as the teachings about what is allowed and not allowed.

To investigate how children learn to treat others better, these definitions of morals seem to be motivated by the rules and restrictions, which individuals have to learn how to follow. In other words: the definitions offer no other origin of morals than these (not profoundly described) rules, and no explanation is given as to why individuals or children ought to follow these rules.

A further investigation into morals using a philosophical encyclopaedia, gives the reference "see ethics"[1] and this reads:

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[1]   Svend Brinkmann in his Phd goes along with this use, that is a use which is interchangeable see Brinkmann (2006)

Ethics: Moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy which deals with moral phenomena.
There are three branches of ethics:
1) Normative ethics investigate which morals are the right ones.
2) Science of Morals investigates the moral phenomena's psychological, biological and historical
foundations.
3) Meta ethics is the question about how moral phenomena should be demarcated in relation to non
moral phenomena and to what is the epistemological, language philosophical and ontological
foundation for moral phenomena.
(Lübcke 2001 p. 120 own translation)

This definition brings about a more dynamic view of morals. For the first part of the thesis and the empirical investigation, definition number two is pursued to the extent that this part deals with psychological phenomena. This is because the philosophical definitions is found more fertile in that it does not decree anything concerning rules. Definition one and three will, however, be pertinent in the later investigation on morals inspired by Svend Brinkmann.

Furthermore, the cognitive domain oriented approach to psychology has inspired the empirical investigation. In their work on morals (using exclusion as a means to achieve moral argumentation), the *domain* theoreticians use a definition of morals inspired by philosophers such as Dworkin, Gewirth and Rawls:

...the obligatory and generalizable norms, based on concepts of welfare (harm), fairness, and
rights, that regulate social relationships.
Helwig & Turiel in (Killen & Smetana 2006 p. 121)

In using this definition of morals, moral transgressions are hypothesized to be actions with harmful effects for the welfare, fairness towards, and rights of others. Furthermore, as morals are seen as a cornerstone for the regulation of social relationships, its concepts are considered universal and obligatory, leading it also to be an impersonal and normatively binding concept. This approach is, by some, referred to as proceduralism (Brinkmann 2006).

As can be seen above, morals have proven to be polymorph. For this reason, the most consistent elements of the different definitions have been chosen (primarily ethics, and its implications). This choice is fundamentally consistent with both the motivation behind the problem statement and the empirical investigation of children's moral development which has been conducted (namely: what motivates children to treat each other nicely).The different understandings of morals lead to very different theoretical approaches when investigating morals as well as moral development. In the following, the perspectives chosen in order to investigate moral development are presented.

Perspectives presented

The different perspectives presented in the thesis are outlined below. The sequence will mirror the order in which the theoreticians are employed in the analysis.

The first definitions on morals presented above, focusing on rules, are similar to the Durkheimian perspective to morals. Durkheim (who Jean Piaget opposed) was of the opinion that children had to learn the virtues and values in society to live by them. According to Piaget, however, children acquire these rules while taking part in making them e.g. when playing games. Thereby, Piaget argues, the child (going from the heteronomous to the autonomous stage) would at the same time both be living and making morals.

Kohlberg extended Piaget's stage theory into a six stage theory to explain and place children appropriately into particular stages based on their reasoning when presented with different hypothetical dilemmas.

Carol Gilligan disagreed with Kohlberg's idea that moral reasoning follows strict and impartial moral principles (Brinkmann 2006). To develop a less gender biased theory, and in opposition to Kohlberg's principle of justice, Gilligan developed her 'ethics of care,' with a Freudian perspective introducing differences in moral development and focusing on care and interpersonal relations (Gilligan 1982).

Another associate of Kohlberg, Elliot Turiel, founded the social *domain* theory. Turiel's theory departs significantly from Kohlberg's theory. He demonstrates a moral conceptualization of the social world divided in three domains: social-conventional, moral and personal/psychological. Knowledge in each of the domains develop in parallel and does not, like the Kohlberian stage theory, follow a unilateral trajectory going from conventional to true morality. Children (down to five years old) have been found to be able to distinguish between morals and social convention and is considered capable of moral reasoning (opposing the theories of both Piaget and Kohlberg).

The socio-biological evolutionary approaches, presented with Damasios and Haidt, argue (in opposition to the rationalists) for a post-hoc approach to moral reasoning. Moral judgement happens, subsequently, as the conscious mind develops a plausible reason for the decision already arrived at through moral intuition.

Svend Brinkmann criticises Damasio, Haidt and the rational theoreticians presented. He has developed the *interpretative pragmatic view* which he refers to, not as a theory, but as a view of morals in psychology presented in his treatise: Psychology as a moral science. Here he offers a more up to date philosophical approach to morals inspired by Wittgenstein (central to this thesis) among others.

According to Wittgenstein, meaning is to be seen as use (Wittgenstein 1984), and consequently not to be understood as something personal (in the sense of 'private'). The use of words (or how they are used) makes up a criteria of the understanding behind words, and tells something about how a person thinks of (for example) a moral issue. Cognition is described, by Wittgenstein, as the connection between using language and thinking. In other words it seems reasonable, in an empirical investigation of moral development, to investigate children's moral arguments in so far as it can be argued that we think with language.

The empirical investigation

Welfare, fairness and rights are, as earlier defined, considered universal concepts by some philosophers and psychologists. Universal concepts, however, become problematic among other things due to their prescriptive nature; they do not (like gravity or night and day) exist as such, but are human constructs, and as such, universal concepts can become concepts that do not necessarily pertain to reality. Furthermore, if believing moral to be a universal concept, it can be difficult to understand the existing degree of maltreatment of others, and phenomena's such as sexism and racism.

Investigating children's moral considerations in present day Denmark (2008) might bring an insight into how moral might be constituted in this particular kind of Western society. The children's arguments might also aid in bringing forth what is considered to be morally acceptable, through an examination of their moral reflections when presented with various situations designed (using exclusion) to foster moral considerations.

The design of this thesis can be described as triangulation, because different methods are included. First, a theoretical investigation has been initiated and results from this analysis are the basis for a larger empirical study (the number of participants interviewed was 307). Next, the qualitative data from the interviews was converted using categorization in order to make the quantitative analysis possible. Also, this design can be referred to as a complementary design, supporting the theoretical investigation through an empirical study. As designs often are inspired by more scientific theoretical approaches, the design of this thesis can be said to follow both the triangulation and complementary

approach (Nielsen 2007).

The empirical investigation endeavours to clarify diverging issues and verify key aspects from the theoretical investigation. This investigation will also pursue areas of importance in the problem statement (if any) not answered by the theoretical analysis.

In the following, the aspects used as means to investigate children's moral arguments in the empirical investigation are presented.

Gender and immigrant status

Danish citizens perceive themselves as coming from a 'tolerant, egalitarian, secular, and assimilationst' society (Hedetoft, 2006). The relatively small number, and distribution of immigrants in Denmark result in areas more or less with no immigrants, and others with a relative high percentage of immigrants makes it possible to investigate how children's moral arguments change when exposed to immigrants (as opposed to not being exposed to immigrants). It might also be possible to compare children's moral arguments about immigrants to their moral arguments concerning gender, in order to conjecture about how societal values might be exemplified through children.

As mentioned in the opening quote, physical harm to others is physically visible whereas harming others psychologically (e.g. by rejecting them on basis of race or gender) will only to some extent leave physical marks (body posture, crying) and a kind of 'invisible psychological bruise.' For children, friendships are of importance for development (Rubin, Bukowski & Parker 1998) and for the adult population, race and gender equality are of crucial importance for their welfare (Killen & Smetana 2006). Exclusion is (since it, as a means to deprivation, is seen as inflicting psychological harm to others) therefore in the empirical investigation, as well as in other studies (ibid.) used as a means to foster moral arguments and thereby the children's moral reasoning is the basis in this investigation of moral development.

Structure

The following chapter (**chapter two**) provides a overview of moral development, presenting the way in which it has been investigated by different developmental psychological perspectives. The purpose here is to clarify moral development as it has been investigated by developmental psychologist from the early investigations of Piaget to the emergence of the *domain* theory.

The next chapter (**chapter three**) introduces the Intuitionist's approach to morals, originating in recent neurological research that supports a post-hoc approach to moral reasoning. Throughout the theoretical chapters, key aspects will be presented, which inform the theoretical discussion that later lead to the creation of the hypotheses for the empirical investigation. In the following chapter (**chapter four**) key aspects from the theoretic chapters are summarised and discussed. There will be further identification and investigation where the theories are diverging or inconclusive. Also, the theoretical issue deemed to be of most importance (namely the relationship between individual and group) is derived. Together, this will be the basis for the empirical investigation.

In **Chapter five** the empirical investigation is presented. First, the means to study moral development is described. Following this, hypotheses found of importance for further empirical investigation are derived from the theoretical discussion and the investigation design in presented. By using categorisation, the qualitative data has been coded for the quantitative analysis and the results from this analysis is presented in **Chapter six** and discussed with relation to the theories presented**.**

In the following chapter (**Chapter seven**), a philosophical approach to morals is introduced, criticizing the presented theoretical approaches. Wittgenstein's theories of language are introduced to be used as philosophical legitimation for the qualitative analysis.

In the final chapter (**chapter eight**) The findings from the theoretical investigation, the empirical

investigation and philosophical critique is discussed with relation to the problem statement. Furthermore areas of interest for future work are presented.

Illustration 1. provides a visual sketch the structure of the thesis:

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│ CHAPTER 1  Introduction                         │
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                    Initiates the Theoretical
                    Investigation
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│ Theoretical Investigation                        │
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│ │            evolutionary psychology           │ │
│ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │
│ │ CHAPTER 4  Theoretical Discussion            │ │
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The theories from the Theoretical investigation will be discussed with the Results from the empirical investigation, the philosophical critique, and the problem statement

The theories from the Theoretical investigation will be criticized from a philosophical point of view

Disclosure of part of the problem statement not covered leads to the empirical investigation

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│ Empirical Investigation                          │
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│ CHAPTER 7  Philosophical discussion and critique │
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Results from the empirical investigation is discussed with the philosophical critique, the Theoretical discussion with regard to the problem statement

The philosophical critique is discussed with the results from the empirical investigation, the theoretical discussion and problem statement

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│ CHAPTER 8  Discussion and conclusion             │
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Illustration 1:Structure of the thesis

CHAPTER 2 Morals in developmental psychology

The purpose for investigating the rationalistic psychological approaches to morals is to lay a foundation for later theoretical comparison. This comparison will bring in the opposing socio biological evolutionary approaches (chapter three), making it possible to consider both theories, as well as the implications and divergences within these approaches to moral development (chapter four).

Prior to the approach offered by social *domain* theory, research on moral development (within developmental psychology) depended primarily upon perspectives of global theories using stages. The two main theories to be mentioned here are the two-stage theory of Piaget and the six-stage theory of Kohlberg, which will be described below.

Piaget

According to Piaget's two-stage theory, children's moral development is nurtured through taking part in problem solving, as well as making decisions and taking part in deciding rules based on fairness.

Piaget's idea that the individual both alters his or her own moral base, while at the same time being part of making social rules, was in opposition to contemporary thought of his time. The prevalent thought of Piaget's time can be seen as represented through the sociologists Emile Durkheim 's theory on proper moral education (Durkheim 2002). Both Durkheim and Piaget believed children's moral development to have origins in social interaction, or believed moral development to emerge while participating in groups. Durkheim was of the opinion that moral development was the result of the child's attachment to a group, manifested in the respect for the group's existing authority, rules and symbols. Piaget, on the other hand, believed that children neither internalized nor learned existing group norms, but defined morality both individually and socially while defining fairness in cooperation with others. The major difference between these two approaches is represented by a shift in the understanding of how to empower moral development. The shift moves from Durkheim's perspective that children have to be indoctrinated with norms, to Piaget's opinion that this process could be supported only by providing children with the opportunity of personal discovery while taking part in problem solving (DeVries, R. & Zan, B. 1994).

Piaget studied children playing games with the purpose of analysing their moral understandings. By studying children's beliefs about moral issues such as right and wrong, he initiated his two stage theory. Piaget believed that development emerges through action; (assimilaition and accomodation) meaning that interacting with the environment results in individuals constructing and reconstructing their knowledge. According to Piaget, this is the case in a multitude of different development patterns (Mayer 2005). Observing children's play and their differentiation in application of rules, Piaget believed that morality is a developmental process as well as inherited. He studied several aspects of moral judgements made by children, and fit the majority of his findings into his two-staged theory. Children younger than 10-11 understand rules as absolute, given by adults leaving the rules unchangeable. After the age of 10-11 children's views become more relativistic, and an understanding of rules as changeable, when agreed upon by everyone, becomes clear. This process from one way of thinking to the other is a developmental transition of rules, from sacred and absolute to devices used by human beings that enables them to live in a cooperative. Around the same age, moral judgements also undergo a transition from being based on consequences (in

younger children) to children being capable of valuing judgements based on the intentions (in older children) (ibid.).

Key aspects

- Children's moral development can be observed while interacting (e.g while playing).

Furthermore by interviewing children about moral reasoning, and using lying as an example, Piaget found that younger children answered following a fixed set of rules, such as 'it is wicked'. However, when probed further into why lying is bad, younger children would not be able to give a proper explanation, other than the wrongness of not following the rules or exemplifying a consequence, such as 'when you lie you will get punished'. Older children, on the other hand, would be able to explain that you should not lie because it is not the truth or it is not a right thing to do. With age, children would also show awareness of the intention of the lie as relevant to the meaning of rightness or wrongness. Piaget terms the younger child's moral reasoning being dependent on rules and duties as well as obedience, the heteronomous stage. Piaget uses two factors to explain heteronomy: cognitive structure and the young child's social relationships with adults. With cognitive structure, Piaget means that young children can not simultaneously take both their own view of things and the perspectives of others into account, hence he derives that young children's thinking can be characterized by egocentrism. He identifies that young children lack the ability of taking perspective, and therefore project their thoughts and wishes onto others (Piaget 1965). Piaget describes (as demonstrated with the inkblot stories presented below) children as usually more aware of the outcomes of actions than the intentions underlying them. This is explained by saying that children view rules and power as uni-directional, in heteronomous moral thought. A difference in moral realism fosters a belief in young children that after having done something wrong, immanent justice through punishment follows as a natural consequence. Another consequence of the moral realism of young children is that it leads to objective responsibility, explaining why young children find it more important to follow the rules than to question or understand what purposes lie behind the rules (ibid). A young child's relative social relationship with adults is the other main contributor to the heteronomous perspective of moral thinking. The relationship between the grown-ups and children is characterised by a uneven relationship where the power of authority in the child's perspective comes from above. This causes younger children to be in a powerless position, and the feeling of powerlessness merged with the earlier mentioned egocentrism is, according to Piaget, the background of why the young child's moral orientation is heteronomous.

Key aspects

- According to Piaget young children appeal to rules more than older children.
- Children view adults arguments as more "powerful" than children's.

Inkblot dilemmas

How Piaget evaluate children's reasoning about dilemmas at the different developmental levels is in the following illustrated using an example from one of his classic story pair dilemmas. Piaget (1965). Piaget developed these story pairs to stimuli and elicit evaluations from children. Each story concerns a child accidentally making an inkblot on the tablecloth.
One story is about the boy Julian. Julian thought it would be fun playing a little with his father's ink-pot, and thereby accidentally made a small stain on the tablecloth. The other boy, Augustus, wanted to help his father by refilling his ink-pot, thereby Augustus accidentally made an even larger inkblot.

According to Piaget older children (from nine years and up) most often would argue Julian as the naughtier one since, Augustus, even though he made a lager stain than Julian, had a social goal (wanting to help his father) whereas Julian's goal was self-oriented (having fun). These older children's reasoning Piaget described as within the concept of subjective responsibility.

Younger children (six and seven years of age) would argue Augustus, (who wanted to help), was the naughtier one simply because he made a bigger mess. The reasoning of these children Piaget would describe as within the concept of objective responsibility.

The transition of the child's moral orientation from heteronomous to autonomous is, according to Piaget, taking place through actions. For example, he made observations of younger children playing together in groups, identifying that the children would try to find a way to play together which all of them found fair. In such a situation, children will naturally understand that other children's strict heteronomous adherence to rules is causing a problem. In trying to solve this cooperation problem, they consequently make the transition into the autonomous approach to moral reasoning. The autonomous moral orientation is an approach that critically considers rules. Children using autonomous moral orientation are able to select and apply rules, both according to their situational goals and in mutual respect and agreement with others, making the child able to cooperate. In this transition, the child's cognitive structure changes through an awareness of other children's behaviours. The change occurring is from egocentrism to being able to consider others' perspectives, enabling the child to act out of reciprocity and mutual respect of others. Hence moral development, according to Piaget, is the result of the child's interpersonal interactions while exposed to others, explaining how individuals work together to achieve a common set of rules that are fair to all. Through this process, the child coordinates their own perspective with the perspectives of others, thus coming to an agreement of rules through fairness and reciprocity.

Key aspects

- The two-stage theory, the child's change from egocentrism to an autonomous moral orientation happening around the age of ten where the child goes through several changes simultaneously.

- Children's contextual conventional beliefs are understood and interactively formed.

- The child is an interacting agent, interpersonal interactions takes place while exposed to others.

Kohlberg

Intrigued about children's ability to think in terms of moral issues, Lawrence Kohlberg, a student of Piaget continued to develop his theory beyond Piaget's stages. He began interviewing children as well as adolescents, investigating their reasoning on moral dilemmas. As a result of this, Kohlberg found that moral development reached well beyond the two stages described by Piaget. He theorised six stages (see Appendix A for an overview of the six stages), with the first three stages sharing a lot of features with the Piagetian stages.

Kohlbergs dissertation was initially motivated by investigating the hypothesised progressive increase in moral autonomy taking place in the years ten to sixteen. Inspired by the Kantian philosophy's relation between ethics and autonomy

"By mere analysis of the concepts of morality we can quite well show that the principle of autonomy is the sole principle of ethics. For analysis finds that the principle of morality must be a categorical imperative, and that this in turns commands nothing more nor less than precisely this authonomy"
Immanuel Kant

Kohlberg believed autonomy to be crucial for moral judgement and his understanding of the principles of justice as universal, applying to all of us, is inspired both by philosophers like Rawls and Kant, as well as great moral leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi. Kolberg's principles of justice require both the respect of people as individuals, as well as treating all parties' claims with dignity and impartiality based on an equal respect for all. Just decisions are defined by the child taking others' perspectives, which seems similar to the Theory of Mind perspective in cognitive theories (Harris, 1989; Pons, Harris & de Rosnay, 2003). However, developing the ability to make just decisions is not seen as a part of one's cognitive development, but rather, as occurring when taking part in shared problem solving while considering the viewpoints of others (Colby & Kohlberg 1987). Similar to Piaget Kohlberg understood moral development as emerging through interaction, when experiences contain aspects that promote moral understanding, both through concepts of rights, justice, equality, fairness and the welfare of others. Here Kohlberg brought together the different views on moral development by Durkheim and Piaget in how children need guidance to reach a more sophisticated level of moral development (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). But where Piaget proposed two main stages, in the Kohlbergrian model of moral development, the development happens more gradually, and a mature moral is not reached before far beyond the two stages proposed by Piaget.

Kohlbergs Stage Concept

Kohlberg found moral principles such as justice and fairness in various cultures and subcultures throughout the world, opposing relativist theories, and suggesting that specific principles of fairness and justice are the culmination of moral maturation (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Because Kohlberg's theory is based on Piaget's work on cognitive development, his approach to development does not focus on the child's gained knowledge, but on the qualitative changes in how the child is reasoning.

His division of the stages of development into sequential steps should be understood as organized and formed by developmental constraints. This forms the child's understandings of his or her environment, and consequently is the basis of the child's interactions with the environment. Eventually information is encountered that does not suit the former understanding of the environment. This provokes an adjustment in the child's understanding, to accommodate to the new information (referred to by Piaget as equilibration).

The progression trough the stages will, according to Kohlberg, happen in an invariant sequence. This led to revisions of the scoring method, which has been enhanced from the earlier models, to the latest model. The latest model were adjusted to rely more on the underlying reasoning of the informants, and less on the factual content of the interview. To some extent the definitions of the stages have thereby also been revised. The scoring system seems to include a need for a more precise demonstration of moral reasoning in order to reach the higher stages. In the earlier descriptions of the stages, stage four was described as being the dominant stage by the age of 16. However in later writings this stage does not become dominant before the 20's or 30's, with the following fifth stage appearing earliest in the mid 20's (and is not reached by many). The sixth stage was removed completely (Colby & Kohlberg 1987a).

The culmination of justice reasoning is, according to Kohlberg, the indicator of moral maturity. This can be exemplified using his 'Heinz dilemma', focusing on the value of life (see, table 1).

Level	Stage	Name	Description
Pre-conventional level	1	*Obedience and Punishment Orientation*	Value of life will be judged by what value it has to authorities.
	2	*Instrumental Exchange Orientation*	Value of life is judged by what personal value it has, or how useful it is in accordance with the child's own interest.
Conventional level of reasoning	3	*Interpersonal Conformity Orientation*	Value of life is based on the affection it arouses.
	4	*Law-and-Order Orientation*	Value of life is based on value within the actual social order.
Post conventional level	5	*Prior Rights and Social Contract Orientation*	Value of life gets differentiated, and regardless of other considerations, it becomes valued in its own right as a moral ideal.

Table 1:Kohlergs five stages exemplified with the value of life

Kohlbergs stages are hierarchically integrated. The child still understands the types of reasoning from earlier stages, which are integrated in subsequent stages, creating broader frameworks in those later stages. The fact that Kohlberg understood development as hierarchical integration might explain what he refers to as cognitive offshoots, or the basis for the trajectory in his stage sequence (not originating from genetics, nor developing with maturation). Each new stage is understood to provide a new and extended framework when dealing with moral dilemmas. This is said to happen as follows e.g. the limitations in the third stage are overcome in the fourth stage, implying that the child becomes concerned with, and takes part in, social organization. The emergence of 'stage five reasoning' makes the child consider weaknesses of the stage four perceptions; (e.g. that the well-organized society might not prove to be moral). 'Stage five reasoning' includes the rights and orderly processes necessary in a moral society. This unilateral progression allows each stage to develop cognitively, achieving a more adequate form with each stage.

According to Kohlberg, his stages (like the stages of Piaget) differ qualitatively and are organised as a structured whole. That is, the stages are not only isolated responses, they are the child's generalisable patterns of thought.

Key aspects

- As in the theories of Piaget, children's expectations and reliance on authority figures change with age. Younger children refer more to rules (authority), whereas older children's reasoning relate more to moral problems and dilemmas.
- Children's morals develop from conventional to post-conventional (true morals)

Sub-stages

Kohlberg did in some of his investigations include substages, these were divided into two types of moral judgements, type A, which referred to: *normative order* and *utility consequences,* and type B, which referred to: *justice or fairness* and *ideal self or perfectionistic.* Type B demands both an awareness of rules as well as judgement of their fairness which imply some sort of autonomy moral

reasoning and since some of Kohlberg's respondents did at the age of 12 emit type B moral judgement this shows that Kohlberg indeed found moral reasoning in pre adolescents, still these sub stage scores was according to Kohlberg not sufficient to prove moral maturity (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

Moral development according to Kohlberg

In accordance with Piaget, and as exemplified by the rejection of the Durkheimian perspective, Kohlberg opposed the contemporary character-education practices of his day. These practices understood virtues and values as basic to moral behaviour, leading to the assumption that moral character is comprised of certain virtues (patience, kindness, honesty etc.). Interventions to support the Durkheimian perspective of moral development would consequently consist of good examples for the child, as well as communication of convictions to help the child to practise these virtues (rewarding right expressions). This is a process that would require a common consensus on positive values. Kohlberg objected to the focus on virtues and values because of the difficulties in reaching consensus on virtues, and the complexity in practising values. For instance, you might share basic moral values with others, however, you may still come to a different decision. Kohlberg's approach to intervention focused on the stages in his theory. Because his stages regard the way that people organize and understand virtues and rules by the way in which they are integrated in moral choices, they can be used as a base from which to encourage individuals to develop (therefore reaching the following stage of moral development) (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989).

Key aspects

- Kohlberg both supports the idea of Piaget that development occurs through equilibration and the understanding by Durkheim that children need guidance.

Methodology

Kohlberg's sample consisted of a group of children, between the ages of 10-16, mainly boys, and later adding younger children as well. Studies on delinquents and cross-cultural studies were carried out as well (Colby & Kohlberg 1987).

Kohlberg developed his six stage theory based mainly on a research instrument, which was a moral judgement interview." Using this instrument, informants were confronted with moral dilemmas having two contradicting principles, the aim being to collect resolutions and justifications. This shows an interest, not in the child's particular answer to the dilemmas (yes/no), but in the child's reasoning behind the answers. The participants' reasoning was coded and placed in one of the stages, using a scoring list (ibid.). To lessen the subjectivity of the test, James Rest developed a Defining Issues Test including six of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas, and creating twelve questions for every dilemma. Questions contained examples of typical reasoning in each stage, for the informants to rate the degree of their willingness to consider issues in these statements, on a scale from one to five. By doing this, Rest made the test more quantitative, as well as adding the possibility of identifying multiple stages in reasoning (Rest 1986).

Key aspects

- Children's moral choices mirror their reasoning and they can be placed in stages accordingly.
- Children's moral development is unilateral and justice reasoning is an indicator of a culmination in moral maturity.

Carol Gilligan

Carol Gilligan (1982), co-author and associate of Kohlberg, criticized Kohlberg for being gender biased, and his dilemmas for following strict and impartial moral principles (Brinkmann 2006). In an effort to develop a less gender biased theory and in opposition to Kohlberg's principle of justice originating exclusively from interviews with male informants she proposed her theory with a focus on ethics and care. Gilligan hereby introduces an understanding of morals similar to what is referred to, in the *domain* theory, as morals.

Ethics of care

Gilligan argues that moral development is gendered, and for males it revolves around rights, rules and more abstract principles such as equality. Here, the ultimate goal is formal justice similar to the later Kolbergian stages (like the thinking of great philosophers who impartially evaluate all parties' claims). Gilligan believes that females have a different understanding of morals, not valuing rules and rights to the same extent as males, but instead basing them upon non-violence and focusing on the ethics of care and compassion, and the interconnectedness in relationships between people. Hence, the ultimate goal for female moral reasoning is more along the lines of affiliated living, rather than striving for impersonal justice. Males consequently tend to live out their moral considerations through hypothetical dilemmas, finding abstract solutions (and developing their measurement instruments accordingly). Female moral thinking, on the other hand, is more contextualized in interpersonal relationships. According to Gilligan, this is one of the major reasons why males and females often reach different stages on the Kohlbergian scale. Males typically reach stages 4 to 5 due to their more abstract conceptions of social organization, where females tend only to reach stage 3 due to focussing more on interpersonal feelings. As with cross-cultural studies, Gilligan's view implies that Kohlberg's scale is not sensitive to interpersonal orientations as well as other directions of moral development in which individuals might advance.

Gilligan has empirically tried to prove that females' moral development moves from conventional moral reasoning into post-conventional reasoning (see, Appendix B. Females are said to go from considering responsibilities (those they are conventionally expected to portray) to reaching their own insights on responsibilities and ethics of care.

She is theorising about gender differences in moral development and has thereby proposed the theoretical possibility that development might be multi-tracked. One of the moral tracks, the one that according to Gilligan, seems more developed in boys, is based on justice and logic as well as social organization, whereas the other track, as she claims, is more developed in females' focus on interpersonal relationships. The two distinct diverging tracks hence focus on either justice (e.g. fair treatment of others) or care (e.g. not leave anybody in need) are understood as two distinct moral development patterns, but contains the potential of being connected (Gilligan 1982). Gilligan explains this development as based in gendered attachment forms, with girls constructing an identity formation with their mother from a young age. Boys' attachment relations with their mother, and later forming masculine identities, cause them to separate and individualize from her. This is argued to strengthen boys as autonomous individuals as well as strengthening their awareness of power relations, hence engendering the more intense concern for inequality. Girls on the other hand will, due to the continued attachment to their mother, not develop this heightened awareness of power relations and inequalities, consequently not seeing fairness as much of an issue as boys do. Furthermore, she theorizes (inspired by the Jungian tradition) that in the adult years the sexes become increasingly responsive to this dominant orientation in the opposite sex (ibid.). Further research has suggested, however, that moral reasoning does not follow the distinct gender lines which Gilligan originally reported. The preponderance of evidence is that both males and females reason based on justice and care (Walker, 1984).

Key aspects

- Gilligan argue of general gender differences in moral development.
- Moral development is two tracked. One based on justice, logic and social organization (fair treatment of others) which is more developed in boys. One focusing on interpersonal relationships (not to leave others in need) and more developed in females.

Gilligan has been criticised by fellow researchers (Rest (1986) in particular) who have argued that she has overstated the significance of gender differences in the Kohlbergian scale. Except from it being gendered, Gillian was not the only one to suggest that moral development is multi tracked. Anomalies revealed in longitudinal studies of the stage sequence prompted Kohlberg and his research team to adjust the descriptions of the stages (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). Rest argued for a more graduated stage model, because he noticed that even children who were quite young, and should clearly score (based on their age) within the first two Kohblergian stages, seemed to reason in a way that spanned multiple stages. Other psychology researchers, such as Turiel and his colleagues (Killen & Smetana 2006) (belonging to another school of rationalists) found that the reoccurring irregular data both, as also suggested by Rest, implied that younger children showed more complex moral reasoning and suggested even more significant adjustments of Kohlbergs' theory. This led to the social-cognitive *domain* perspective of moral development, which is also sometimes referred to as a social-interactionist view.

Domain Theory

In the sections about Piaget and Kohlberg, moral development is described as the child's gradual differentiation of moral principles. The *domain* theoreticians have, in their research, verified differentiating social knowledge and contextual differences in children's reasoning. The findings here suggest that individuals' reasoning differs, and is distinguished in different domains (social conventional, personal, and morals). It is furthermore argued that different forms of thinking are applied according to the situation (Eisenberg 2006; Smetana & Asquith 1994). In other words, moral considerations vary by context, both according to judgements and reasoning.
The domains (personal, social conventional and morals) are understood as being differentiated early in life, and differing in developmental trajectories. According to the *domain* theory, moral development is to be seen in coordination (and sometimes intertwined) with the development of other social knowledge, also younger children is found capable of moral reasoning whereas in the Kohlberian stages this is accomplished at the post conventional level. According to the *domain* theory the stages in Kohlberg's single developmental framework, is actually children's age-related efforts to coordinate different domains of social normative understandings at various points in their development. *Domain* theory assumes therefore larger degree of inconsistency in the children's judgement across different contexts. This increases the likelihood of identifying morally based decisions (such as welfare and fairness) from much younger children which either Kohlberg or Piaget would expect.

Key aspects

- Reasoning is distinguished in different domains (social conventional, personal, and moral) and different forms of thinking are applied according to the situation.
- Childrens comprehension of the different domains increase with age.

Morality and social convention

The *domain* theory proposes a distinction in the development of morality and domains of social

knowledge referred to as social conventions. This is because it has been shown that children's understanding of social relationships differs from their understanding of social conventions, systems, and organizations (Eisenberg 2006).

Both concepts of morality and social conventions emanate from the children's attempts to account for distinct social experiences in conjunction with different social categories. That is, within the moral domain, the effect of an action (e.g. somebody unprovoked being tripped, with the effect of causing harm to the person) will occur whether or not there is a social rule concerning the legitimately of the act. Social convention is founded upon existing socially-agreed rules, and breaking those causes no inherent interpersonal consequence. By way of example, there is nothing inherent in the way that you either give hand or hug somebody when meeting them. The only reason that one form is seen as better than another, is solely based upon the socially agreed upon rules in the environments. This, as well as other social conventions, even though they seem random (because of the lack of inherent meaning), plays a major role in the functioning of the majority of social societies. These conventions provide members with protocols in which to coordinate social exchange. The child's understanding of social organization similarly structures his or her concepts of convention (Lieben & Bigler 2002).

Similar to the post conventional morality described by Gilligan, *domain* theory describes core features of moral cognition as emerging in considerations of the consequences of actions on people's well-being. This thereby restructures morality into concepts of welfare, fairness, and not least harm. Morality and convention are comprehended as distinct, meaning not as the single system theorised by Kohlberg, but as developing in parallel frameworks. Social events, as well as moral ones, are taking place in the context of a larger society. The child's reasoning about appropriate behaviour may require utilising gained information about, and eventually coordinating their understandings of, both social and cognitive frameworks. In relation to social authority, children develop the concepts of autonomy (Killen & Smetana 2006).

Moral cognition is tied to inherent features of human social interaction, probably grounded in natural, universal concerns for human welfare and fairness. This is unlike moral conventions and norms of a given community. It is hereby possible to foster children's morality and not promote virtues or religion as earlier exemplified in the Durkheimian approach. Here, analysing and identifying either the moral or conventional nature of social value is believed to foster an understanding of the underlying features of the domain and the function of these conventions (e.g the role of social expectations, social organizational functions, or social norms like justice or human welfare) thereby maximizing the child's ability comprehending and acting upon them (Killen & Smetana 2006).

Key aspects

- Knowledge in each domain develop in paralel and does not follow a unilateral trajectory going from conventions to true morality.
- Young children (from the age of five) can distinguish between social conventional and moral reasoning which develop in parallel.

Methodology

Moral behaviour has usually been studied from a social psychological approach (Optov 2007), as well as a developmental approach to relational aggression. The focus of these theories has been on the suffering person, as well as the antisocial motives behind amoral behaviour (Killen et al. 2002). Within the domain of social- cognitive *domain* theory, Killen and associates now investigate children's moral development using Opotow's definition of morals. In their view, children choose to act imorally: *"when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundaries in which moral*

values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply" (Optow 1990 p. 1). According to the cited definition, the considerations about treating others fairly becomes moral in nature. In the view of the *domain* theory children's living situations constitute a distinct social environmental difference in their beliefs, knowledge and hence intentions (meaning that they are not predisposed to stereotype in any certain way). Additionally, since the *domain* theory suggests that children have different types of social knowledge (e.g., moral, personal, and social conventional), including morality. When considering a situation, these evaluate different types of knowledge based on the situation and their experiences. This implies the possibility that children from different environments differ in social experiences and beliefs, and that their understandings and definitions of 'others' and the 'others' behaviour differs accordingly. Earlier studies on moral behaviour (exclusion) have indeed found a connection between the arguments of children considering moral behaviour, and the kinds of stereotypes present (Killen et al. 2002). Here, treating others badly due to prejudice can be found to be rooted in a social cognitive construct, internalised from the surroundings, and intensifying with time.

Since the stage conceptualization of Piaget and Kohlberg (among others) is rejected, social *domain* theory examines morals as a multidimensional construct, influenced by various social judgements, and initiated by individuals in a variety of social situations. But exclusion cannot simply be conceptualized as moral transgression, it is also to be found in other variants such as contextual domains. In the research findings, children and adolescents often use concepts such as personal choice and the individual freedom of choosing friends, when reasoning about exclusion in the context of friendship. When reasoning about exclusion in other contexts (such as social groups or clubs), children and adolescents use more social organizational concepts such as equality of social norms, and group functioning. When studying contextual reasoning on exclusion, qualities of pure morals, as well as more global concepts (such as: harmful effects on individuals, consequences for society, human rights, and justice) have mainly been measured in schools.

Key aspects

- Children's moral reasoning's are situational and differ according to context and can be divided into domains.

Context

Findings by Killen and colleagues, that informants consider both the moral aspects (rejecting exclusionary practices) while in other situations, the same informants argue for exclusion (for reasons like group functioning or personal choice) lead to considerations about the influence of contextual or logical personal variables (e.g. prejudice). Informants' tendency to use moral or non-moral reasoning when making judgements has been found to be highly dependent upon context. Informants who find exclusion acceptable in certain contexts apply moral judgements of justice and rights, in other situations. These judgements might seem inconsistent, but make sense when looking further at the reasoning behind the motives informants use when applying various types of judgements in different contexts. *Domain* theory argues that context is just as crucial as individuals' dispositional properties, when explaining moral judgements. That is, informant's reasoning covers a large set of different concerns, such as personal choice (own interests and desires), group norms (social organizational conventions), and universal principles (such as human rights or justice). Reasoning that, according to the *Domain* theory, is better accounted for using context, rather than the Kohlbergian theorised, age-sequential, stages of moral reasoning. *Domain* theory also contradicts Kohlberg's straightforward cognitive-developmental assumptions of social reasoning (that stages progress with age, ending with universal principles such as equality) (Kohlberg, 1984) in that the informants often, with age, are more accepting of moral transgressions. Hence in some contexts (but not all), it seems that as an individual's understanding of a group or societal organization develops and becomes more complex, the willingness to treat others equally decreases,

as the importance of the group's goals increases (Killen et al. 2001).

Key aspects

- The development of a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations increase with age leading to an increase in the importance of group goals.

CHAPTER 3 Morals in sociobiological evolutionary psychology

To further investigate different theoretical approaches to moral development the sociobiological evolutionary theories of Damasio and Haidt are presented in the next section. The purpose is to bring in an alternative understanding of morals to the rational approaches in the theories presented. This will make it possible to consider the actual development of morals through different understandings. It will also make it possible to examine the implications of the different approaches to moral development (in accordance with the problem statement).

Haidts' Social Intuitionism

Morality, by its very nature, makes it hard to study morality. It binds people together into teams that seek victory, not truth. It closes hearts and minds to opponents even as it makes cooperation and decency possible within groups.

Jonatan Haidt 2008
(http://people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/)

Rationalist theories such as those proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg, and their descendents (like Turiel and Killen), are seen by many theorists as insufficiently accounting for moral behaviour and judgements. This is because the rationalists understand moral behaviour as mainly a product of reasoning, describing it as both consciously-available and deliberate. According to Haidt (inspired by Damasio and others) emotions and feelings (not consciously available and deliberate thoughts), provide guidelines for reasoning, and not the other way around. That is, morals, according to Haidt, happen at a sub-level in what he refers to as 'the extended consciousness.' This is similar to the way that Ledoux explains emotions as no longer emotions when becoming thoughts (LeDoux 1996). Haidt oppose to the Kohlbergian approach which equates morality with justice and individual rights, as well as Gilligan's and the *domain* theory's approach focusing on the welfare of the individual. Earlier, moral theories (such as the Kohlberian approach) have been criticised as lacking a universal approach (Gilligan 1982). Haidt tries to take a broader view of the moral domain, claiming that many non-Western societies understand loyalty, sanctity, and respect for authority as moral concepts. As mentioned earlier, Piaget was in opposition to Durkheim's proposition that morality and sacredness are intertwined. Haidt hereby seems to use Durkheim as a source of inspiration for following to link morals with emotion.

Evidence for the post-hoc nature of moral reasoning.

Haidt argue that moral judgements consist of humans' affective states, describing them as automatic activations of associations and pattern recognition. In his early research, he was probing the emotion of disgust by testing informants reactions using stories such as: A starving family eats their pet dog after it has been run over by a car. With examples like these, Haidt explored the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding, defined by informants having strong feelings about the situational content as morally wrong, but being unable to reason about why. Moral dumbfounding, he explains, describes how moral judgement sometimes fails to find a rational explanation for what is already decided by ones moral intuition.

According to Haidt, the motivations influencing our reasoning process are, to a larger degree, serving to justify our beliefs instead of providing them with arguments. He explains this with

'relatedness motives,' which can be explained as a desire to be consistent with social goals trough both actions and beliefs (e.g. when desiring to agree with others). Another 'relatedness motive' is a 'coherence motive,' defined as a tendency (similar to cognitive dissonance) grounded by the desire of actions and beliefs being consistent with each other and the self-image. Accordingly, reasoning about moral judgements will be influenced by these motivations, leading to biases when considering evidence and information. Haidt understands these processes as causing behaviour and beliefs that are unconscious and hence automatic, when individuals use moral reasoning, make judgements, and reason in non-moral domains.

In one of Haidt's experiments (Wheatley & Haidt 2005) easily hypnotizable informants are told, during hypnosis, that they will feel disgusted when hearing one of the two target words: take and often. They are told that these words usually elicit the feeling of disgust. Subsequently, informants rate stories told by actors as higher in disgust and moral condemnation when the stories contain one of the two target words.

Haidt combine this with findings from Damasio and others, showing the function of conscious reasoning to be post-hoc, (you rely on the culturally supplied explanations not introspection) with the findings that the origin of intuition in moral judgement is due to intuitive and affective reactions, all tied together affective reactions are seen as the origin of processing, which then lead to moral evaluations. These findings are the basis for his dual processing theory of moral judgements (Haidt 2003).

Key aspects

- Moral reasoning is post-hoc and controlled by emotional intuitions.

The dual process model

The social intuitionist model by Haidt and colleagues can be referred to as a dual process model, describing two types of processes (Haidt 2001) that have the possibly of running parallel to one another. The first process is automatic, mostly subconscious, and requires a small effort. This process is referred to as the intuitive process. The second process is usually conscious, and requires attention and effort. According to Haidt, when making moral judgements the first process is given priority, and is then post hoc supported by the second process. The second process, to a large degree, is said to justify and supplement the automatic responses of the first process.
This leaves the role of emotion as the main focus in Haidt's theory. Haidt is drawing mainly on the work of Damasio[2].

Process I

Affective reactions are, according to Haidt, moral emotions or any emotions that might affect moral judgement. However, moral emotions, that are the driving forces behind moral judgements, can be sketched as possessing two features. These features are: Disinterested inhibitors: The moral emotions that can be explained as triggered *"when the self has no stake in the triggering event"* (Haidt 2003 p. 853) Pro-social action tendencies: The moral emotions that are found to elicit behaviours that *"benefit others or else uphold or benefit the social order"* (Haidt 2003 p. 854).

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[2] Neuroscientific work on moral origins focused in early studies on patients who received damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex. A famous example, referred to in a variety of books on human neuropsychology, is Phineas Gage (Kolb & Whishaw 2003). Phineas Gage's personality changed markedly after having damaged both hemispheres of the frontal cortex in a work related accident. A key figure in this area of behavioural neurology is Antonio Damasio, one of the main persons in developing and testing a hypothesis based on somatic markers. Damasio proposed that stimuli from bodily reactions is the basis of how decision making is influenced, by affective markers (Damasio Everitt & Bishop 1996; Anderson et al. 1999)

Emotions that can be sorted by these two dimensions Haidt refers to as moral emotions. Some of them are emotions such as disgust and contempt (as touched upon earlier), but also embarrassment, shame, and gratitude are included.

According to Haidt, moral intuition is consequently a response to environmental patterns driven by affect. This process is automatic since moral emotions are not purposefully activated, and they require the smallest amount of effort and occur below the awareness level.

Process II

The dual process model's second grade of processing is conscious reasoning, and most often gets associated with moral judgement. However, it differs from other psychological theories on moral development (and moral reasoning in general) because according to the dual process model, the moral reasoning is taking place post-hoc, explaining moral actions and beliefs as driven by intuitive moral processing. Put another way, what we in everyday life understand as gut reactions to moral situations, we would not usually experience as post hoc. However, according to Haidt, this is exactly what they are. He describes us as being moral lawyers, trying to make meaning out of what our automatic system has already decided for us. This perspective is definitely different from the moral scientists that rationalist psychological theories on moral judgement usually understand us as.

Subsequently, similar to *domain* theory socialization has an impact on moral development through large-scale cultural influences. Only here, the social approach to moral behaviour and beliefs motivates the post-hoc processing (process II) of moral judgement considerations. The need to provide evidence and arguments supporting our stand occurs only when moral beliefs have been challenged.

Key aspects

- Tradition and groups have special value in themselves.
- Children develop in accordance with societal demands.

The contractual and the beehive approach

The central role of morality is (similarly to Durkheim) to restrain selfishness, by learning virtues that vary widely in different cultures (e.g. east and west). Opposed to the rationalists individual approach to morals, Haidt proposes two ways in which cultures regulate and/or suppress selfishness. These perspectives give two different approaches about society and the way that society functions.

1. The *contractual approach*, where the fundamental unit of value is the individual. Because individuals tend to hurt each other, explicit laws and implicit social contracts are created, in order to build a safe, fair and free society. This allows individuals to develop relationships as they choose, pursuing their own interests, and developing as individuals. Hence, a contractual approach to morality builds upon the moral foundations that support individualization through fairness/reciprocity and harm/care. Other foundations, and religions build upon them, are considered to be the choice of the individual, as long as they do not cause harm to others. Inspired by John Stuart Mill and others, Haidt sees morality as concerning happiness and suffering. Consequently, the contractualists constantly try to refine laws, extend rights, and reinvent institutions, changing society in order to reduce suffering and increase happiness.
2. The *beehive approach*, where the fundamental unit of value is the group, and the territory of the group. Individuals die and new individuals are born... the society goes on. The role of the individual is to foster success for the society. The society is constantly threatened by

attacks from outside, and from subversion within. The individuals must work together, fulfilling their duties, and possibly sacrificing themselves for the survival of the group. According to Haidt, this behaviour is not innate, and cultural conservatives would therefore have to focus on influences within the family, in schools, the media etc.

The moral foundation in Western societies focuses on the individual and the protection thereof. Supporting fair treatment for everyone, and maintaining high levels of creativity, leaves the society less structured. Selfishness is also, according to Haidt, not as suppressed as in a lot of non-Western societies. The non-Western societies use practices such as rituals and stories to maintain the individual as cooperative, and part of a larger social entity. Here Haidt understands religion as playing an important role in evolution, extending and strengthening the unity that moral systems provide. He believes that the transition from small bands to bigger groups is only made possible through religion. This identifies religious behaviour as a possible result of natural selection by saying that religion makes people more cooperative, and that those people would be more successful at surviving (Haidt 2003).

Key aspects

- Similar to Durkheim children are interdependent, (a binding approach to morals)
- Individuals learn to limit desires and are expected to play the role they have in their group.
- Morals develop differently according to the relationship to the group (society)

CHAPTER 4 Theoretical discussion

To recapitulate the key aspects of the theories and discuss them in relation to the problem statement, the following three sections will present the implications of the different theories and their approaches in relation to each other. The sections also extract aspects of importance for the empirical investigation (including the unambiguous parts of the problem statement that have not been answered in the theoretical investigation).

First in the *Implication of the approaches to morals*, implications of the different theoretical approaches to morals are investigated. This is both in relation to how their approaches influence their methodology and how the approaches influence how morals is understood to develop. Next, *The different theoretical understandings of moral development*, seeks to summarise and discuss the different theoretical approaches to moral development and discuss them to extract differences and similarities. Finally, *The relation between the individual and group,* presents ways in which different theories deal with the relationship between individual and group, and how this can be a factor in moral development.

Implication of the approaches to morals

The main contrast between the intuitionists and rationalist theories lies in the approach to intuitions, and the implications of these approaches. According to Haidt moral reasoning is post-hoc and controlled by emotional intuitions, where rationalists' emphasize social aspects (such as the third-person focus). In his theories, Haidt emphasises intuitive moral beliefs as automatic and unconscious moral processes, making morals much more egocentric in origin than understood by the rationalist theoreticians. In short, morality should, according to Haidt, be induced by appealing to intuition, and to do so would require using intuitive ethics elevating the receivers' emotions (rather than appealing to reasoning, as the rationalist theories would suggest). The focus of the intuitionists', on the other hand, is on moral intuitions. According to Haidt, moral judgements and aesthetic judgements are similar; they both originate in gut feelings and are made intuitively, hence processed very quickly. Consistent with Haidt and colleagues, instead of trying to persuade children to reason about moralities (as was done in the Kohlbergian approach), awareness would have to be about invoking values through metaphors and images, in order to produce the intuition flashes people respond to. According to this approach, morality is not achieved by using intellectual reasoning (e.g. Kohlberg's last stage of higher moral reasoning, which he exemplify through philosophers and great leaders), but rather, through the use of metaphors generating recognition and moral emotion in their receivers. Once again using Martin Luther King jr. as an example of a moral leader, the approach to enforcing moral behaviour according to Haidt, lies in Martin Luther King jr.s' ability to capture his audience through the use of metaphors, and speaking to their emotions. For example, in his speech 'I Have a Dream,' he exemplified a vision, through a rich use of metaphors. Furthermore, he did not just criticize racism, but called for unity. According to Haidt, such a speech would elevate the receivers morally, by both addressing their innate predispositions of duties, decency, and hierarchy (linked to the feelings of respect and contempt) as well as appealing to the less-selfish nature that all people like to see themselves as possessing (due to natural group instincts). By doing so, the speaker is presented as the leader to follow. Kohlberg's definition of morals was inspired by such great historical figures like Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi. The right answers (showing true morality) to his difficult dilemmas were rooted in the Kantian philosophy.

Even though Gilligan and Turriel diverge from Kohlberg in various ways, some of the central themes still remain rationalist. This is due to their concept of what morality is, and how moral

judgements are made. However where both Gilligan and the *domain* theorists include what could look like innate morals, moral psychology according to Kohlberg is about deliberately abiding by rationally understood standards and rules of behaviour. Moral reasoning here plays a pivotal role when appropriate rules (in the specific moral context) are attempted, retrieved and used. A corner stone of Kantian moral philosophy, when concerned with the definition of morals, is the distinction between morals and other conventions (like social and personal behaviours). It concerns the origins in morals as not self-serving but other-directed. This implies that care indeed was a part of the approach to morals that inspired both Piaget and Kohlberg, but it is not included in Kohlbergs' global unilateral stage approach. Here, moral reasoning is proposed to lie within a fixed developmental pattern. Egoistic perspectives are followed by perspectives that focus on social norms and groups, and not before late adolescence or adulthood, are individuals (but not all) able to apply perspectives favouring universal human rights and equality.

In the psychological rationalist view on moral development, the moral reasoning of the child (and not moral intuitions) is central. Piaget was, when investigating children's moral development, inspired by his observations of children interacting (e.g while playing). He developed his dilemmas (used during interviews with children) to mirror his two theorized stages. Defined stages are, for him (and stage theoreticians by and large), a result of describing the types of reasoning the child uses when justifying a moral decision. While Piaget, in his test battery, also considered other aspects in his work on children's development, the tests of both Kohlberg and Rest depend solely on the informant's ability to articulate this reasoning (this being: conscious awareness of reasoning). This is mainly because the mechanisms underlying moral judgement are, according to Kohlberg, offshoots of cognitive abilities at different moments in development. Here, moral reasoning is mainly a subset of general mechanisms of reasoning, or part of the practical reasoning system occurring in the interaction between these mechanisms. According to Turiel, children's moral reasoning are situational and differ according to context, hence these must be in focus when investigating moral development, and the domains are believed to be a more suitable approach to investigating children's development than stages. The division into moral and social conventions also brings the probability for morals both to be innate and learned through socialization, contradicting the Kohlberian idea that younger children developmentally lack the foundation to be able to reflect upon morals as well as that the culmination of justice reasoning is the indicator of moral maturity.

Social conventions are built upon the behavioural bases for social values, beliefs, attitudes and judgements. This happens through the development of concepts such as morality, social justice, social relationships and understandings of exclusion and intergroup relationships (which are culturally influenced). Important aspect for the empirical investigation is therefore: *The relationship between social conventional knowledge and morals.* Probable backgrounds for such a relationship could be: *The relationship between morals and status,* and importantly, whether *Morals and social conventions differ culturally.*

The different theoretical understandings of moral development

According to Piaget's two-stage theory, understandings are created and recreated in the mutual interaction and communication between individuals and groups. In the *domain* theory cognition is understood as embedded in cultural, historical and social relational contexts. In this instance as well as by Piaget, cognition is not seen as an individual construction, but as influenced by the understandings established in the environment. Kohlberg does not understand the mechanisms underlying moral judgement as learned through socialization, or as a product of maturation (innate). He understands this development as an offshoot of cognitive abilities at different moments in

development. This distinguishes Kohlberg from the other theoreticians in that he places an emphasis on cognitive offshoots, and the abilities they contribute. Post conventional moral reasoning is a subset of general mechanisms of reasoning, and part of the practical reasoning system occurring in the interaction between these mechanisms. Social rules and contexts, therefore, seem less influential in this development.

In his staged theory, Kohlberg seems more inspired by Durkheim than Piaget, because he represents a more binding approach to morals. Before the highest level, people are interdependent and (like in the different societal organisations described by Haidt) children develop in accordance with their societal demands. However, when having reached the higher stages, the theorised Kohlberian individual seems to have capabilities similar to Piaget's 'free agent', who thinks independently (independent of authorities and adult supervision) and builds rules in reciprocity.

Haidt's individual changes according to the society and neither of the societies are seen as more morally developed than the other. This places focus not on the individual, but on the explicit laws and implicit social contracts that are created.

According to Kohlberg, before reaching post conventional thinking the individual must go trough all the previous stages. This makes the Kohlberian view on children's moral knowledge and competence significantly different from *domain* theory. According to Turiel and *domain* theory associates, children younger than previously expected (around the age of five) make moral judgements. This differs significantly from the heteronomous obedience to rules and authority as suggested by Kohlberg. A difference in the developmental trajectories is also indicated, because instead of going from a pre-moral stage to a stage where morals are comprehended (as the stage theoreticians suggests), Turiel and colleagues refer to the appearance of early moral thoughts.

The child is understood as capable of distinguishing between convention and morality, which is similar to the two tracked moral development theorized (though in a gendered development) by Gilligan. According to the *domain* theoreticians, intuitive moral behaviour is further distinguishable between different domains (Personal, conventional and moral). Different forms of thinking are applied according to the situation, leading moral development to be multi tracked and knowledge from each domain to develop in parallel.

The morals of Kohlberg implicate a certain amount of autonomy and justice thinking whereas *domain* theory focus on differences in individual and situational factors, rather than general developmental trajectories. This theoretical incongruence extracts the following aspect of importance for the empirical investigation: *The relationship between morals, social conventional knowledge and age.*

Kohlbergs was initially motivated by investigating the hypothesised progressive increase in moral autonomy and found (Inspired by the Kantian philosophy) autonomy crucial for moral judgement. This imply that according to Kohlberg, since children's reasoning in the preconventional stage is controlled by heteronomous considerations (e.g conduct themselves according to authority figures and the fear of punishment) moral reasoning's can not take place. Furthermore the distinction between moral and social conventions is not considered as conceivable. According to Haidt these distinctions are a western biased understanding of morals (the contractual approach) and in other societies the innate moral cues will contain different repertoires depending on the cultural influences.

Morals, as defined by Helwig and Turiel in the introduction, are personally binding principles, not like Haidt's societal contracts, or the Durkheimian virtues and values, but rather, refers to an "innate knowledge" about how morals (in some situations) make it obligatory to violate social conventions (e.g stealing to save life). This moral knowledge seem to be part of the origin of what Kohlberg refers to as post-conventional morality, however, are these the same morals Kohlberg has sought to demonstrate, when challenging children through the use of his dilemma oriented methodology? According to Kohlberg's stages, moral development is dependent on the ability to differentiate morality and non-moral social values (e.g convention and prudence). That is, in opposition to the

domain theory, Kohlberg finds that genuine morality can not underlie moral judgements before post-conventional reasoning (making it impossible to investigate morals as he understood morals before this level). Kohlberg did however in some of his investigations include substages where respondents at the age of 12 emitted type B moral judgement showing that Kohlberg indeed found traces of moral reasoning in pre adolescents.

Kohlberg's theory would, if explained by the *domain* theory, relate to children's age-related efforts at various points in development, within their domains (of social normative understandings). Uncovering whether these domains seem sufficient (for the investigation of children's moral development) therefore also addresses the issue of how children can use moral reasoning in one domain, and not in another. This can either be seen as children not having the ability to reason morally (as suggested by Kohlberg) or (as suggested by *domain* theory) as showing traces of moral reasoning developing differently in relation to domain and context.

Questioning this issue is found to be of importance for the empirical investigation, leading to an investigation of: *The use of arguments within the domains argued by the domain theory,* and further investigated through whether there are: *Differences in moral reasoning's according to the target of a moral dilemma.*

The relationship between people and society as a factor of importance when making moral decisions

The relationship between the group and the individual seems to differentiate between the theoretical directions. Basically two main lines can be identified: those with an individualistic approach to morals (individuals are fundamental units in moral values represented with the rationalists) that can be brought back to Piaget, (exemplified with Kohlberg, Turell and colleagues from the Social *domain* theory and to some extend Gilligan). Gilligan is also inspired by Jungian and Freudian theories, implicating a focus on the unconscious (in a less symbolized form the unconscious is found in the neurological work on emotions and morals as represented with the intuitionists). The other line, represented by the intuitionists emerges in natural scientific and evolutionary areas, and is more aware of the group than the individual.

The main difference in the previously mentioned controversy between Piaget and Durkheim can also be related to the relationship between the group and the individual. In Piaget's first stage, a temporary phase exists where the child possesses a unilateral respect for adult authority. This is, however, a temporary developmental phase on the initiation of a mature moral understanding. This is further emphasized by his proposal of how development maturation occurs while the child interacts and starts being able to cooperate with peers (e.g. playing games). Here the child will, independently of adult supervision, develop respect for rules. This respect does not stem from a fear of authorities, but rather out of a natural respect of each other. The child is seen as an agent between agents, building rules on the experience of the beneficial effects of reciprocity. Here a willingness to be fair is obtained and the development of a mature, as well as a sophisticated, understanding of justice occurs. Even though he build on the two stage theory by Piaget, Kohlberg both supports the idea of Piaget that development occurs through equilibration and the understanding by Durkheim that children need guidance.

The Durkheimian approach, on the other hand, understands the child as egoistic in nature, thus underlining a necessity to bend this egoistic will in the child, and provide the child with values and virtues. Kohlberg, like Piaget, proposed moral development ending in the individual going beyond society. His staged progression begins with pre-conventional thinking, which is based on anticipated punishment, and where the child consider actions as either right or wrong. In the next level, comprised of conventional responses, the child rely on the rules of society when determining right or wrong. Lastly, the highest level of moral thinking is only reached when the individual is able to think post-conventionaly (that is, beyond society with an abstract and universal approach to any

kind of justice principles).

Gilligan, as mentioned before, was both inspired by a Jungian approach, in that her model of ethics and care (as part of moral development) focused on the child's attachment to the mother. She proposes an amendment to Kohlberg's unilateral understanding of justice reasoning as an indicator of a culmination in moral maturity, when she theorises about the ethics of care as another post-conventional developmental track (focusing upon others) in moral development.

The *domain* theory basically understands the child as an individual, slowly comprehending its surroundings, but their emphasis lies more in the social world, and an interplay between the different domains. This is demonstrated through Turiel and colleagues demonstration of the child's three domain moral conceptualization of the social world: social-conventional, moral and personal/psychological. Children have been found to be able to distinguish the division of two of these moral rules as young as five years old. These are morals that protect people from harm, and transgressions are not acceptable even if there are no adult made rules about it. The other is social-conventional rules, which do not have intrinsic impact on human welfare, and hence are able to be adjusted to the convenience of society.

This implies a early presence of morals as other directed (protecting people from harm) and that knowledge in each of the domains is developing in parallel, therefore the development of morals does not follow a unilateral trajectory going from a conventional to true morality, instead children's comprehension of the different domains increase with age.

In the neurological and evolutionary approach presented with Haidt, morals are understood as a rapid intuitive process, a kind of aesthetic judgement. A frequent degree of moral reasoning does exist, but moral intuitions are more rapid and are also ongoing process. This makes this process superior, causing moral reasoning to take place less often, and rarely as unbiased as the rationalists approach to moral reasoning. Haidt's definition of morals is thereby functionalistic, based on evolutionary assumptions of human life and the anthropological approach. The origin of human morality, according to Haidt, is bound in cultural innovation and genetic evolution. Cultures contributions are mainly understood through how selfishness, in the human mind, is suppressed to support the development of communities and formations of cooperatives (beehive or contractual).

In the rationalist traditions the approach to morals is individualistic, because it is individuals whom are understood as the fundamental units in moral values. However according to the *domain* theorists, with age, a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations are developed (leading to an increase in the importance of group goals).

Even though the importance of group goals increase with age, individuals are still seen as the fundamental units. Individuals suppress selfishness and encouraging individuals to emphasize care for the vulnerable as well as those in need (as seen in the theory of Gilligan), or fight for justice and the respect of others rights (as found in the Kohlbergian approach). Tradition and/or authority is not a value in itself, but gets altered and varies. Groups have no special value in themselves and individuals form voluntary cooperatives.

As earlier exemplified by Durkheimian virtues, the emphasis lies in the individuals' interdependence and cohesiveness, and focuses on the limitation of choices and requirements. This might be referred to as a binding approach to morality since the group is regarded as the basic source of moral values, and hence anticipates that the individuals will learn to limit their desires, expecting them to play the role they have in their group. I.e. the perspectives of rationalistic moral psychologists limits the moral domain to welfare, rights and justice (and, when not overruled by social conventions, morals). This seems to be biased towards an individualistic, liberal approach to progression.

The understanding of the individual is either as a free agent (Piaget and the *domain* theory) or controlled by heteronomous considerations as suggested by Kohlberg. This leads to a desire for an understanding of: *The awareness of the group in moral reasoning,* as well as, *The influence of authority on moral reasoning.* The approaches of Kohlberg and Piaget (and part of the theorized

individual in the *domain* theory) leave more room for individuality. In order to understand whether these are prevalent, the following could be addressed: *The use of individualistic reasons in moral judgement* which further due to cultural variation rise the question: *Are morals influenced by the exposure to other cultures?*

CHAPTER 5 Investigating the development of morality

In the following section, the important aspects of the theoretical approaches will be discussed and related to contemporary society. Exclusion is presented as a means to investigate moral development. Thereafter, the aspects from the theoretical discussion will be formulated as hypotheses in order to answer the problem statement, and will function as the underlying basis for the empirical investigation.

Exclusion as a means to investigate morals

To investigate the theorized moral trajectories in children's moral development, exclusion will be used as a means to foster moral arguments from children. According to Opotow's definition, moral exclusion occurs:

> *"when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundaries in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply"*
> (Optow 1990 p. 1).

That is, exclusion becomes moral in nature, and useful for the investigation of moral arguments, which seems obvious in extreme cases (since moral reasoning can be useful for explaining immoral behaviours and injustice). Exclusion can thereby be used to illustrate various kinds of morals, including exclusion based on gender and race. In the contemporary Western society both gender, and people of other ethnicities or races, should be perceived as inside these moral boundaries where values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (Optow 2007).
Exclusion has historically been studied from a social psychological approach, and as the predecessor to the current developmental approach: *relational aggression.* The focus when studying exclusion tends to be on the excluding party, or the antisocial motives leading to exclusion (ibid.). That is, most research has focussed on individuals' social deficits and and the behavioural aspects of the exclusion or rejection as basis for rejection and exclusion (Killen et al. 2002). Individuals moral development as well as ethnicity and gender based group membership has rarely been the focus of exclusion studies in the way in which these issues are studied in this thesis. Furthermore children's moral considerations (their opinion) about both the exclusion and inclusion of peers, is not usually the focus. This is not to suggest that exclusion can be addressed solely as a moral matter, defining people as inside or outside the boundaries of morality. Doing so would oversimplify a rather complex phenomenon. Killen and colleagues have, in their research, have also found reasons for using certain kinds of exclusion (such as the smooth functioning of social groups, and the individuals right to use their own criteria when choosing friends) (Killen et al. 2001). This shall be taken into consideration when using exclusion as a means to foster moral arguments in the empirical investigation. That is, as well as bringing in arguments about groups and rights, exclusion will also be used as a means to investigate arguments that are moral in nature. Therefore, exclusion is expected to foster moral considerations, while at the same time covering the different approaches to morals presented in the thesis.

Gender

Given that attributes associated with gender and race exist and are utilized when justifying inequalities and certain forms of amoral behaviour (Killen et al. 2002; Neff & Terry-Schmitt 2002),

it is therefore important to examine the attributes used in children's reasoning about exclusion of both gender and race. It is also important to look at the interpreters' degree of gender typing, and the role that it might play in exclusion and moral development.

To gather a deeper understanding of the role of gender stereotyping, and whether this explains some of the contextual variations in reasoning and moral judgements of exclusion, participants' degree of gender typing will be measured using the COAT (Children's Occupational, Activity, and Trait–Attitude Measure) (see: Appendix J for further considerations about the COAT and Appendix K for the test itself).

Ethnicity, immigrants and race

In recent years has there been an increase in the number of immigrants from non Western countries to Denmark (Arnett 2007). This makes the word ethnicity and race interchangeable in everyday language (lumped into the same category of 'other' no matter race or ethnicity) making Danish children's classifications of ethnicity or race unspecific and interchangeable. However, slightly different than past research, the investigation looks at immigration status. Children with a second language are concentrated in bigger cities making it possible to investigate, if, and how, exposure to these children influence morals, and whether children with two cultures differ in their moral reasoning's (For further considerations see, Appendix J).

Targets

Gender and immigration status are identified as target qualities which could be identified by informants as basis of exclusion. Both qualities are visually distinguishable, and sometimes lead to unpleasant behaviour such as sexism and racism. Other examples could include overweight (Hebl & Xu 2001) or handicapped children (Mulderij 1996). Gender and immigration status also underline the importance to move beyond restrictions developed by socially constructed phenomenon. Examples from present day society include restrictions such as: women are bad at math (Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2006), and other races are not as smart as Caucasians (Nyborg & Jensen 2000). Most research investing the reduction of stereotyping proposes that contact with out-group members improves the perception and evaluation of the out-group. Recent studies supports earlier suggestions that intergroup contact decreases race based exclusion (Crystal, Killen and Ruck 2008) (For further considerations see, Appendix J).

Group identity and stereotyping

The identification of stereotypical descriptions can be socially transformed and perceived as factual and empirically grounded knowledge (e.g. immigrant children or boys being considered quarrelsome). Language or religion difference of immigrant children can be understood as impediments for relationships. Here culture is used as an argument to exclude, in that the child perceives cultural aspects as shaping personality.

Male positions are generally more prominent (http://www.dst.dk/), and for children, masculine toys are more desirable than feminine toys (Lieben & Bigler 2002). Furthermore, ethnic minorities have suffered for long periods under undervaluation by the majority in populations, and have only recently been accepted by most people as equals e.g. the emergence of anti-racist organisations (e.g. Amnesty International). This lead that within target, and immigration status in the empirical investigation two groupings can be identified. These groups are: 1) the 'weak group' (where the ethnic minority is grouped with the undervalued feminine gender); and 2) the 'strong group' in contemporary Western society (the ethnic majority grouped with the masculine gender).

The importance of morals in the relationship between the group and the individual lies in group identity and stereotyping. According to the *domain* theory (as well as many other types of reasoning) group identity and stereotyping can be seen as social-conventional beliefs, which usually

will be agreed on and accepted by the individual, and can furthermore be subject to disputation and consequently changed (Turiel 2006). Here, morals could be important because the characterization of groups is sometimes a less, and sometimes a more, accurate understanding of the nature of the group. Within their evidence that stereotypes are used to support exclusion, Killen and colleagues found traces of theories (such as in-group bias) that have been used by other schools of social psychology. Usually in experiments, when the interview targets of exclusion were Afro American, European American informants generally did not sanction exclusion more than Afro American informants. This challenges more simplistic or mechanistic explanations in social psychological models (such as in-group - out-group bias), and underlines the fact that judgements of exclusion should be examined by investigating the informant's processes of reasoning.

Targets for the empirical investigation

Aspects throughout the theoretical chapters are, in the following, examined, and address the investigation of moral development by approaching how children conceptualize their social world when presented with exclusion (using exclusion as a medium to foster moral arguments). Investigation hypotheses are then presented.

The influence of authority on moral reasoning

It have been found to be of importance for this investigation to investigate the child's relationship with authorities. When using exclusion to measure the influence of authority on moral reasoning, it is in accordance with Piaget, and the *domain* theory hypothesised that children's contextual conventional beliefs are understood and interactively formed. This has led to the following hypothesis:

1. Children's value judgements about exclusion will vary with the perpetrator of exclusion. More specifically, children will view exclusion as worse when it comes from an adult than a child.

Differences according to the target of a moral dilemma

Both gender and the understanding of other ethnicities change throughout history. Therefore according to Haidt and the *domain* theory, the tendency of arguing for a different treatment of genders and ethnicity is found in the environment children are raised in. Gender and immigration status are used as targets, in order to consider differences in children's moral arguments about exclusion and dependence. It is hypothesised that exclusion based on gender is seen as less problematic than the exclusion of an immigrant. This is due to the cultural acceptance of gender differentiation, whereas race differentiation (in the western world) is considered to be racist and wrong. This has lead to the following hypothesis:

1. Children's value judgements about exclusion will vary with target. More specifically, children will find exclusion less acceptable when based on 'immigration status,' as opposed to 'gender status' which they will find more acceptable.

The relationship between morals and status

The origins and emergence of morals seems innate, like when children down to 18 month have been observed trying to comfort an upset caretaker (de Rosnay, Harris & Pons 2007). At the same time, morals seem to be acquired through social interaction, based on the foundation for social values, beliefs, attitudes and judgements. Here, cultures influence the development of concepts such as morality, social justice, social relationships and understandings of exclusion and intergroup

relationships.

By clarifying how different groups are perceived in relation to exclusion, the factors involved are assessed (social conventions and care). The groups; the 'weak group' and the 'strong group' are focus for the following hypothesis:

3. exclusion will be deemed worse when a less powerful group (i.e., immigrant, girls) is rejected, than when a more powerful group is rejected.

The relationship between morals, social conventional knowledge and age

The cognitive-developmental assumptions of Kohlberg, among others, which state that because social reasoning progress with age, it will (with age) take more advanced forms, leading to a focus on universal principles such as equality and human rights. Whereas for the *domain* theoreticians, a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations are developed with age, leading to an increase in the importance of group goals (social conventions). It is argued that a different treatment of genders and ethnicity is found in the environment children are born into and with age children become more accepting of different treatment of others. It is therefore of importance in the empirical investigation whether children's moral judgements about exclusion will change with age:

4. Children's acceptability of exclusion will increase with age.

The relationship between social conventional knowledge and morals

According to *domain* theory, social knowledge would be intertwined with social conventional morals. This is due to the environmental role of societal social conventions. Accordingly, it is important in the empirical investigation to test the degree of stereotyping through a measurement implying social societal roles. Correlating with moral development (according to Killen et al. 2002) is the development of a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations. It is found of importance to investigate the influence of the degree of stereotyping, in order to question whether the willingness of equal treatment of others decreases when knowledge of group goals increases.

5. Children with more stereotyped gender values will see exclusion as more fair than those with less stereotyped values.

The influence of morals through exposure to other cultures

According to *domain* theory, children are aware of societal rules (e.g. it is considered wrong not to like a peer because of skin colour or to some extent gender status). In the empirical investigation, the children are expected to refer to socially acceptable reasons for excluding a child, and this to differ culturally. According to Haidt, culturally differing children are expected to develop morals differently e.g. develop a different relationship to groups and a different social conventional approach to morals. However, when exposed to other cultures, children's understanding of other children might increase, decreasing the willingness to exclude these children. This is supported by findings revealing that intergroup contact increases the acceptance of others (Crystal, Killen and Ruck 2008).

6. Children's value judgements about exclusion will vary with condition. More specifically, children in the exposure condition will view exclusion more negatively than children in the non exposure condition.

Cultural differences in morals and social conventions

Western children, according to Haidt, will be raised to follow the contract approach to moralities

(not harming others), whereas non western children are seen as following the 'Beehive pattern' which will make them differ in the use of social conventional arguments (developing a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations). Piaget and *domain* theory, however, argue that different contexts influence moral development. In the empirical investigation two conditions are present, homogeneous condition and exposure condition (ethnic and Danish children). The effect of multiple groups being present is investigated with the exposure condition believed to increase arguments about these groups (social conventional arguments).

7. Children from schools with immigrant students are expected to have a more social conventional approach to moralities.

The use of individualistic reasons in moral judgement

Important aspects of the Durkheimian perspective and the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg include the influence of authorities on children's moral reasoning. Children's expectations and reliance on authority figures will change with age. Younger children will refer more to rules, whereas (according to Kohlberg) older children's reasoning will relate to moral problem dilemmas, indicating greater autonomy. Also (according to Piaget) reciprocity is the key to the development of morals, whereas the relationship to authorities is not part of this development. In the empirical investigation this leads to the following hypothesis:

8. Younger children will refer to rules more than older children, when discussing whether the adult can exclude children

The use of arguments within the domain theory

The *domain* theory gives way for a larger degree of flexibility in children's moral judgements. Here morals are argued to develop across different contexts and ages. Social conventions, and morality, are also differentiated. As children's moral development is argued (by *domain* theory) as differing with socialisation. Haidt argues for culturally differentiated development of morals. Here, it is important to investigate whether there is a cultured difference in the degree of children's moral arguments. The frequent use of gender differentiation is expected to have a positive influence on the acceptance of exclusion of gender and an increase in social conventional arguments, whereas this is expected to differ when a child of another ethnicity is rejected. So:

9. Children's reasoning about exclusion will vary with target. Children will use more social conventional reasoning when discussing the gendered child than the immigrant child.

Design of the investigation

The design was created to collect a generalisable amount of qualitative data (using categorisation) for converting these interviews into quantitative data for a quantitative analysis. This was done for the purpose of both being able to test the theoretical diversities examined in the theoretical section, as well as to be able to test the hypothesis (for which a representative data sample is necessary). (for a detailed description of the criteria behind selection of participants, attributes of the included participants and investigation procedures, see Appendix D).

Design of the interview guide

The design of the interview guide was made to support the testing of the hypotheses. The general condensed question being addressed was how children's moral value judgements about exclusion

vary with the following parameters: Age, target of rejection, gender, gender signing, authorities, contemporaries and time limits (for a detailed description of the reasoning behind the attributes included in the interview guide, see Appendix K).

Coding

With the exception of the introductory question, all of the interview questions were qualitative, then being qualitatively analysed with a coding technique analysing the line of reasoning's. The researchers classified chidlren's typical arguments and identified the warrant, with an argumentational theoretic approach of the children's basic reasoning (Toulmin 1969; Bakeman & Gottman 1997; Kvale 1996). The design of the interview reflects a desire to collect a generalisable amount of qualitative data. Categorisation was used to convert the interviews into quantitative data. This quantitative data was then used for a quantitative analysis, testing the theoretical diversities extracted from the theoretical chapter. The coding scheme involves equality, self interest, emotional responsiveness, fairness, expectations, group norms and stereotyping as coding categories. These (and other categories) have been developed in an ongoing, iterative process inductively from the specific examples and deductively from the literature, which relates to Kvale's idea about how a coding procedure should continually question the purpose of the investigation and the hypotheses (Kvale 1996). The coding processes in this thesis also follows the procedure of Bakeman & Gottman, in: continually addressing whether the codings clarified the hypotheses; making the data fit the scope of answers, and systematizing the data for the analytical process (Bakeman & Gottman 1997). (for coding scheme and examples form the interviews see, Appendix I).

Reliability

Reliability for the coding procedure and translation was addressed. Inter-rater coding reliability was obtained by calculating the inter-rater reliability of 20% the coded interviews (using 'Cohens Kappa' calculations). The results of the inter-rater reliability calculations fell within measures for 'a substantial agreement'. In terms of language coding reliability, the reliability in translated versus Danish interviews was found to be significantly similar when coded (for detailed description see appendix G). Also, in terms of translation reliability, the interviews have been translated using a 'three step translation procedure' (for a description see, appendix H).

CHAPTER 6 Analysis and results

Results are presented separately for respondents' acceptability judgements and reasoning. Children rated how acceptable it was to exclude someone ranging from 1 (not at all acceptable) to 4 (very acceptable). This was followed by whether children's reasoning varied based on the type of exclusion circumstance (i.e., peer, teacher, etc.).

Acceptability judgements and reasoning were examined using mixed-design ANOVAs and correlations. Given the large number of statistical tests, where significant effects are indicated follow-up tests (Bonferroni) controlling for the probability by dividing .05 by the number of tests conducted were carried out. The resulting probability values are included with the reported analyses. Only significant main effects and interaction effects with significant follow-up tests related to the hypotheses are reported.

Analyses of exclusion

The first set of hypotheses is centred on the acceptability judgements. First (Hypothesis one), it was expected that children would find it less acceptable when a child is excluded by a teacher than by a peer. Second (Hypothesis two), it was expected that children would find exclusion less acceptable when based on immigration status than on gender. Third (Hypothesis three), exclusion would be deemed worse when a less powerful group (i.e., immigrant, girls) was excluded than when a more powerful group was excluded. Fourth (Hypothesis four), acceptability was expected to increase with child age. Fifth (Hypothesis five), children with more stereotyped views about gender were expected to see exclusion as more acceptable than children with less stereotyped views. This hypothesis was expected to be strongest for the gender exclusion. Finally (Hypothesis seven), children in schools with immigrants were expected to be more likely to view exclusion negatively than children in schools without immigrants since research suggests that children in schools with immigrants should be more accepting (Crystal, Killen and Ruck 2008).

Analyses of reasoning

The second set of hypotheses centred on the children's reasoning's.

First (Hypothesis seven), it was expected that children from schools with immigrant students have a more social conventional approach to exclusion. See the attached and below. Second Third (Hypothesis eight), younger children were expected to appeal more to rules, when discussing whether adults can exclude, than older children. No findings on this- not confirmed. Finally (Hypothesis nine), children's reasoning about exclusion were expected to vary with perpetrator and target. In this final hypothesis it is expected that children will use more social conventional reasoning when discussing exclusion based on gender than immigrant status.

Findings from the analysis of exclusion

To examine acceptability judgements for hypotheses one through four, a 2 (child gender: girl, boy) x 2 (school, immigrants attend, immigrants do not) x 2 (actor: teacher, peer) x 2 (power: majority, minority) x 2 (group: gender, immigrants) x 3 (grade: 2,4,6) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. Child gender, grade, and school were between-subjects factors. Actor, power, and group were within-subjects variables. Several interesting patterns emerged from the analyses.

Investigating hypothesis one: Children find it less acceptable when a child is excluded by a teacher than by a peer

In order to investigate hypothesis one, the children's acceptability correlation with the perpetrator is investigated further. An other interesting finding regarding perpetrator is its correlation with Power which is investigated further since it is of interest to establish an understanding of whether Power is an important factor when making moral decisions.

Perpetrator

Confirming the perpetrator hypothesis, children indeed believed that it was less acceptable when teachers excluded (M = 2.82, SD = .89) than when peers excluded (M = 3.38, SD = 1.00) a child, F (1, 294) = 81.97, p = .0001; eta^2 = .22. No other main effects were supported.

Perpetrator by Power

Another significant measure was the difference between the change in acceptability when a teacher reject a member from the strong group (male gender and majority ethnicity) compared to a weak group (female gender and minority ethnicity) and the acceptability change when a peer rejects one from the strong group or one from the weak group, F (2, 291) = 19.452, p = .0001; eta^2 = .062.

Children's acceptability of a teacher rejecting a member from the strong group versus a teacher rejecting a member from the weak group differed significantly F (1, 305) = 5.987, p = .015; eta^2 = .019, but with a much lower effect than the difference in children's acceptability of a peer rejecting based on same power relations, F (1, 305) = 51.733, p = .0001; eta^2 = .145.

In general the children found it worse when a teacher rejects, independent of the power, than when a peer rejects (which also was concluded investigating the role of the perpetrator independent of other factors). In both cases the children found it significantly worse to reject a member from the weak group than a member of the strong group; but the difference between when a teacher rejects a member from the weak group (M = 2.77, SD = .95) and a member from the strong group (M = 2.89, SD = 1.01) was smaller than the difference between when a peer rejects a member from the weak group (M = 3.18, SD = 1.06) and a member from the strong group (M = 3.60, SD = 1.18). Thus the children find it less acceptable for a teacher to reject, and even though a difference in power is observable, it is less important than the exclusion itself, than for a peer to reject. When a peer rejects, the power of the excluded child becomes more important. This is investigated further for answering hypothesis three.

Using exclusion to measure the influence of authority on moral reasoning therefore shows that authority indeed has an influence on moral reasoning. The following is a typical example of a child respecting the teacher, but still finding it less acceptable for a teacher to exclude.

> *'The teacher kind of decides that, so I think it is fair, the children can of course not decide for a grown up ... I think it is wrong what the teacher does ... I think it is wrong, the teacher could do like this, that she takes some from each group, three light skinned and three dark skinned together and three dark skinned and three light skinned together and then they can play ludo together ... That is a teachers responsibility they have to keep an eye on what is going on, and make sure everyone is well and all that kind of stuff'*
> *0809081348F - 2nd grade*

Even though a difference in power was statistically observable, this was found less important than the exclusion itself. This gives the impression of an uneven relationship between the child and authorities as suggested by Piaget and Kohlberg, among others. According the *domain* theory (and to some extent Piaget), it is also important to note how children's contextual conventional beliefs

differ, as can be observed in how children's reasons are observed to differentiate in the scenarios.

Investigating hypothesis two: It is expected that children will find exclusion less acceptable when based on immigration status than on gender

An significant difference in the children's acceptability depending on the target of the exclusion was indeed found and was investigated further to answer the hypothesis. Also an significant correlation between target and perpetrator was found and, in order to gather a deeper understanding of both hypothesis one and two, investigated further.

Target of exclusion

As predicted, children found it more acceptable to reject based on gender ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.16$) than based on ethnicity ($M = 2.80$, $SD = .77$), $F (1, 294) = 78.39$, $p = .0001$; $eta^2 = .21$. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant Category x Grade effect, $F (2, 294) = 5.562$, $p = .004$; $eta^2 = .04$. No significant, age change in reasoning about the exclusion of gender $F (2, 303) = 0.917$, $p = .401$ was found; in contrast, there was an age-related change in reasoning about immigrants $F (2, 303) = 6.766$, $p = .001$; $eta^2 = .04$. Children in sixth grade (M = 5.18, SD = 1.29) thought that rejecting immigrants was worse than did children in fourth grade (M = 5.74, $SD = 1.50$) or second grade ($M = 5.92$, $SD = 1.72$); children in second and fourth grade did not differ from each other. There were no other significant interaction effects.

Perpetrator by Target

It was hypothesised that children's judgements about exclusion vary with perpetrator and target. A significant measure was the difference between the change in acceptability when a teacher reject due to nationality or due to gender and the acceptability change when a peer rejects based on nationality or gender, $F (1, 294) = 8.29$, $p = .004$; $eta^2 = .027$.
Children's acceptability of a teacher rejecting based on nationality versus a teacher rejecting based on gender differed significantly $F (1, 305) = 83.795$, $p = .0001$; $eta^2 = .216$, and with a much higher effect than the difference in children's acceptability of a peer rejecting based on nationality versus a peer rejecting based on gender, $F (1, 305) = 24.443$, $p = .0001$; $eta^2 = .074$.

The children found it significantly, worse when a teacher rejects based on nationality (M = 2.43, SD = 0.75) than when the exclusion is based on gender (M = 3.22, SD = 1.46) and the same pattern was found when a peer rejects based on nationality (M = 3.17, SD = 1.18) compared to when a peer is rejecting based on gender (M = 3.62, SD = 1.37) but as stated earlier not as explicit. Thus in all cases children found exclusion based on nationality worse than exclusion based on gender, but for the teachers the difference was less distinct supporting that authority should be fair to everyone.

Differences in children's moral arguments about exclusion and the dependence on the targets gender and immigration status was found. It was hypothesised that exclusion based on gender would be seen as less problematic than the exclusion of an immigrant, this is believed to be due to the culturally acceptance of gender differentiation whereas race differentiation (in the western world) is considered wrong.

Children's value judgements about exclusion did vary with the target in the moral dilemma, children found exclusion less acceptable when based on immigration status than on gender. A characteristic example from the interviews would be:

'... it is tougher to be told that you can not join because you are not an immigrant than it is to be told that you can not join because yo are either a boy or a girl, it is tougher ... they might have said that they do not want to have girls in this game and then maybe she keeps asking and asking an then they are allowed to go and tell grown up, and then of course the grown up can tell the girl that

With age this acceptance seems to increase with a jump from fourth to sixth grade. As earlier mentioned, the Kohlberian dilemmas indirectly did contain gender roles, so a correct understanding of gender roles is believed to have had an impact on the stage children were placed in. However, Kohlberg was investing moral development using his dilemmas, and did not broach different treatment of others in his dilemmas, because the development of morals according to Kohlberg is unilateral. The difference in the acceptance of gender exclusion and the exclusion of immigration status indicates, not a gendered development as suggested by Gilligan, but that both gender and immigration status might be social constructs. In accordance with the *domain* theory, the tendency of arguing for a different treatment of genders and ethnicity is to be found in the child's surrounding environment, thus revealing societal values (this might also refer to morals as protection of the weaker group see below).

Investigating hypothesis three: Exclusion will be deemed worse when a less powerful group (i.e., immigrant, girls) is excluded than when a more powerful group is excluded

An interaction effect between Power and exclusion supporting the hypothesis was indeed found and investigated further. Furthermore, follow-up ANOVAs between exclusion and Power, target and perpetrator was found and also investigated further, to gather knowledge about Power as a possible important factor when making moral decisions.

Power

Children thought that it was less acceptable to reject a less powerful ($M = 2.98$, $SD = 1.42$) than a more powerful individual ($M = 3.23$, $SD = .89$), $F (1, 305) = 36.46$, $p = .0001$; $eta^2 = .11$. This effect was qualified by a significant Power x Target interaction effect, $F (1, 294) = 8.31$, $p = .004$; $eta^2 = .03$. There was a smaller difference in acceptability when rejecting a girl compared to rejecting a boy $F (1, 305) = 9.454$, $p = .002$; $eta^2 = .030$, than the difference in acceptability between rejecting a Dane (ethnic majority) and rejecting an immigrant (ethnic minority), $F (1, 305) = 37.467$, $p = .0001$; $eta^2 = .11$. This main effect was also qualified by a significant Power x Grade effect, $F (2, 294) = 3.101$, $p = .046$; $eta^2 = .021$. A significant age change was found in children's judgements about exclusion of the weaker group. In the second grade children did not differ significantly in their acceptance of exclusion of the weaker group (M = 6.13, SD = 1.81) compared to the stronger group (M = 6.34, SD = 1.99), F (1, 95) = 2.95, p = .095; eta2 = .029 whereas children from fourth grade found it significantly less acceptable to reject the weak group (M = 5.90, SD = 1.51) compared to the strong group (M = 6.64, SD = 1.70), F (1, 102) = 26.52, p = .001; eta2 = .206, as did the sixth grade, weak group (M = 5.83, SD = 1.56) strong group (M = 6.40, SD = 1.68), F (1, 106) = 25.21, p = .001; eta2 = .192.

Perpetrator by Target by Power

There was a significant Perpetrator x Target x Power interaction effect, F (1, 294) = 6.986, p = .009; eta2 = .023, between the following four groupings in acceptability: The change in acceptability between when a peer rejects a boy and when a peer rejects a girl F (1, 305) = 8.225, p = .004; eta2 = .026., the non significant change in acceptability when a teacher rejects a boy and when a teacher rejects a girl F (1, 305) = 2.337, p = .127; eta2 = .008, the change in acceptability between when a peer rejects an ethnic majority and when a peer rejects an ethnic minority F (1, 305) = 48.130, p = .0001; eta2 = .136 and the non significant change in acceptability when a teacher rejects a ethnic majority and when a teacher rejects an ethnic minority F (1, 305) = 3.098, p = .079; eta2 = .010.

In general children found it worse when excluding a member of the weak group (female gender or ethnic minority) than a member of the strong group (masculine gender or ethnic majority) independent of whether the actor was a peer or an authority (a teacher). In general children found it worse when excluded by an authority than by a peer, furthermore they found it worse when the exclusion was based on nationality than based on gender.

Children found it significantly less acceptable when a peer excludes a girl (M = 1.76, SD = .750) than when a peer excludes a boy (M = 1.86, SD = 0.744) they also found it significantly less acceptable when a peer excluded an ethnic minority (M = 1.42, SD = .675) than an ethnic majority (M = 1.75, SD = .760) There was as previously mentioned no significant difference between when a teacher excluded an ethnic majority (M = 1.25, SD = .541) and when a teacher rejects an ethnic minority (M = 1.18, SD = .450) or when a teacher rejects a boy (M = 1.64, SD = .791) and when a teacher rejects a girl, (M = 1.58, SD = .790) but the numbers underlie the general pattern described that overall it is less acceptable when teachers exclude anyone. Peers, rejecting a member of the weak group is seen as worse than peers rejecting a member from the strong group.

An example of an archetypal response saying it is worse to exclude girls and immigrants than it is to exclude boys and Danes does not exist, due to the nature of the questions. However, examples saying it is harder to exclude girls than boys, and examples saying it is harder to exclude immigrants than Danes, can be found bellow:

A representative example for exclusion of a boy, as well as a girl, was stated by a participant as follows:

Excluding a boy:
'It is not OK, but only a little ... It is girls you know so they like to be together only girls playing I do not quite know why, it is better if they let the boy join, I think it could be more fun for all of them.'

Excluding a girl:
'It is not ok at all because I feel sorry for her that she can not join ... they want to be together boys only, you know, because they want to be a little by themselves, but is more important that hey let her join, else they keep her outside you know, and then she will become sad.'
0809091349F - 4th grade

An emblematic example for exclusion of an immigrant, as well as a Dane, was stated by a participant as follows:

Excluding a Dane:
'.. it is not OK, but a little OK ... In this case [question] *it is the children, and it is also their game and they are allowed to decide you know, in some strange way.'*

Excluding an immigrant:
'I do not think it is OK at all ... Because once again it do not matter what skin colour they have, everybody is allowed to join, it is as before a racist thin to do, you can not say that he can not join because of the skin colour'
0809090914M - 6th grade

The relationship between morals and status can indicate morals as innate, as well as 'social interactionally' acquired upon behavioural bases for social values, beliefs, attitudes and judgements. The finding that exclusion is deemed worse when it involves a member from the weak group could indicate an internal ability to care about other people, especially those that are perceived as less capable of taking care of themselves. The groups investigated (the weak group and the strong

group) have shown to be of importance to the degree that exclusion was deemed worse when rejection was from the less powerful than from the more powerful group. Similarly, this difference can also rely on social constructional characteristics.

Investigating hypothesis four: Children's acceptability of exclusion will increase with age

Two significant age related changes in children's acceptability of exclusion was found. A significant age related decrease in acceptability of excluding immigrants between fourth and sixth grade and a significant age related increase in the difference between the acceptability of excluding a member of the week group compared to excluding a member of the strong group. This increase is mainly due to an decrease in the acceptability of excluding a member of the weak group.

The lack of strong coherence between age and 'exclusion acceptability' across the investigation indicates that this development is either idiosyncratic or context dependent, and not (as stated in the hypothesis) related to age.

The cognitive-developmental assumptions of Kohlberg (that social reasoning progress with age, taking more advanced forms, leading to a focus on universal principles) were not found in this investigation. According to the *domain* theoreticians, a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations develops with age, and this should lead to an increase in the importance of group goals (social conventions), however, this was not supported in this thesis. It was argued that since a different treatment of genders and ethnicity is found in the child's environmental surroundings, a different treatment should (according to the *domain* theory) become more acceptable with age (when the child's understanding of her surroundings increases). The results, however, indicate that moral development is not (as stated in the hypothesis) related to age, but is either idiosyncratic and/or context dependent.

Investigating hypothesis five: children with more stereotyped views about gender will see exclusion as more acceptable than children with less stereotyped views. This is expected to be strongest for gender exclusion

To examine whether children with more stereotyped gender scores viewed exclusion as more acceptable, eight correlations where stereotyping score as indexed by the COAT was correlated with acceptability judgements of each of the eight vignettes were conducted. As expected, children who were more stereotyped thought that it was more acceptable for teachers to reject girls, r (304) = .14, p =.01. No other correlations were significant.

This indicates correlation between gender stereotyping and acceptability Judgements. And that this, as expected, is strongest for gender exclusion. But the evidence found from this investigation really is not strong enough to significantly conclude the existence of a correlation.

In relation to the relationship between social conventional knowledge and morals, a correlation was found. This can be related to Haidt's argument that morals are social conventions, and that those will differ according to culture. Furthermore, the *domain* theory argues for social knowledge being intertwined with social conventional morals, and therefore also for the development of these. This is due to the environmental role of societal 'social conventions'. Even though it is a weak correlation, the results indicate that the willingness for fair treatment of others decreases, when children have more stereotyped gender values.

Investigating hypothesis six: Children's value judgements about exclusion will vary with condition. More specifically, children in the exposure condition will view exclusion more negative than children in the non exposure condition

Results from the investigation of hypothesis six is combined with the correlation between moral and social conventional reasoning's and acceptance of exclusion.

Correlation of moral and social conventional reasoning with acceptance of exclusion

The more time children use moral reasons for each question, the less likely they are to accept exclusion. When they appeal to social conventional reasons, they are likely to accept exclusion. Throughout the questions children who use moral reasoning have a likelihood of rejecting varying from r (304) = -.50 to r (304) = -.23 whereas children who use more social conventional reasoning have a likelihood of exclusion varying from r (304) = .21 to r (304) = .46. Actual correlations are displayed in table 2 below.

Question	r(304) for children using more moral reasoning	r(304) for children using more social conventional reasoning
1) Boy excluded by peer	-.45	.31
2) Girl excluded by peer	-.39	.21
3) Dane excluded by teacher	-.39	.26
4) Dane excluded by Peer	-.50	.46
5) Immigrant excluded by peer	-.43	.32
6) Immigrant excluded by teacher	-.23	.22
7) Girl excluded by teacher	-.37	.34
8) Boy excluded by teacher	-.40	.34

Table 2:Correlation of likelihood to reject with moral and social conventional reasoning

This together with the fact from the investigation of hypothesis six that children from schools with immigrants use more social conventional arguments indicates that children with immigrants in school are more likely to accept exclusion.

The exposure to other cultures did not have an impact on the use of moral arguments. However, the children from 'non immigrant schools' used fewer social conventional reasons. According to *domain* theory children are aware of societal rules (e.g. it is considered wrong not to like a peer because of skin colour or gender). The children therefore most often refer to socially acceptable reasons e.g. groupings. According to Haidt, culturally differing children are expected to develop morals differently e.g. develop a different relationship to groups and a different 'social conventional' approach to moralities. Morals (understood as caring about each other) might therefore not be morals in other cultures (but maybe social conventions). The number of culturally differing children in this investigation is not sufficient for analysis. The differences in the two conditions (schools with immigrants and schools with no immigrants) may rely more on possible extra groupings this brings (e.g. groups of Danes and groups of immigrants) than on an influence from other cultures. More groups are expected to give more social conventional reasoning's. A difference in the exclusion of social conventional reasoning has been found, this implies that when exposed to other cultures, children's acceptance of other children's traditions increases.

Findings from the analysis of reasoning

First children's reasoning were analysed across the vignettes to examine reasoning. This investigation of children's reasoning was conducted with individual ANOVA models for the eight vignettes. Specifically, each question was analysed with a 2 (child gender: girl, boy) x2 (school, immigrants attend, immigrants do not) x 2 (reason: social conventional, moral) x 3 (grade: 2,4,6) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted x Power x target. Child gender, grade, and school were between-subjects factors. Reason was the within-subjects variable.

These codes are further combined into the two groups: *moral* and *social conventional moral*. Moral codes refer to the combined measure of fairness, integration, and empathy whereas social conventional codes refer to the combined measure of social conventional, social conventional opposite, group, authority, and authority responsibility.

Investigating hypothesis seven: children from schools with immigrant students are expected to have a more social conventional approach to moralities

A significant effect in the ANOVA between immigrants in school and use of moral and social conventional arguments was found.

Immigrants in school by Reason

Children with immigrants in school use more social conventional arguments (M = 6.27, SD=2.49) than children without immigrants in school (M = 5.19, SD=2.55), F(1, 304) = 13.67, p = .0001; *eta²* = .043.
However, children with immigrants in school did not used significantly less moral arguments than children without immigrants in school.
Furthermore, with an effect of F(1, 304) = 23.62, p = .0001; *eta²* = .072 children with immigrants in school use more social conventional arguments when justifying the exclusion of a boy or Dane (M = 3.33, SD=1.55) than do children without immigrants in school (M = 2.50, SD=1.44).

Immigrants in School by Gender by Reason

Analysis on children's use of social conventional arguments show that the children's use of reasons differ according to gender and is related to whether immigrants are present in the school, *F* (10, 285) = 1.934, *p* = .041; *eta²* = .064.
The effect qualified by a significant Reason x Gender x Immigrant in school in that in schools with immigrants, girls use the reason social tradition opposite (stopp) (M= .15, SD = .50) less than boys (M = .46, SD=.36), F(1, 130) = 16.29, p = .0001; *eta²* = .11.

It could have been interesting to test Haidt's theoretical assumption that the group focused development in people from non Western cultures develops a more complex understanding of groups and social organizations in non western children. However, having grown up in Denmark might interfere with this cultural development. Furthermore the small number of immigrants did not allow for investigating this group. According to the *domain* theory, different contexts will influence moral development. Differences were found in the two groups (children from schools with immigrants and children from schools with no immigrants) exemplified by their use of social conventional arguments, not to mention their use of moral arguments (social conventions were found more in schools with immigrants). This could be due to more groupings (groups of ethnic children versus Danish children) since this is supposed to increase arguments having to do with these groups (social conventional arguments). The decrease in arguing against social conventions for girls (in schools with immigrants) might show that being familiar with other social traditions could increase an acceptance of different treatment of others.

Investigating hypothesis eight: Younger children will appeal to rules when discussing whether the adult can exclude
children more than will older children

A further ANOVA examined the 5 main reasons. Reasons had to be used at least 10% of the time to be included in the analyses so as not to violate the assumptions of the ANOVA. Specifically, each question was analysed with a 2 (child gender: girl, boy) x2 (school, immigrants attend, immigrants do not) x 5 (reason: fairness, empathy, integration, authority responsibility and social tradition

combined) x 2 (group : gender, immigrants) x (power) x Perpetrator x 3 (grade: 2,4,6) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. Child gender, grade, and school were between-subjects factors. Reason was the within-subjects variable. There was a significant Perpetrator x Group x Power x Reason x Immigrants in School interaction effect, $F (4, 1176) = 2.52$, $p = .04$, eta 2 = .01. For this reason, individual ANOVAs were conducted for each vignette with Reason (reason: fairness, empathy, integration, authority responsibility and social tradition combined) as a within-subjects variable and school type as a between subjects variable.

The repeated measures ANOVA with social conventional reasons for each of the dilemmas as a repeated factor and age as a within subjects factor indicated no difference between older and younger children in their use of social conventional reasoning, $F (2, 303) = 1.07$, $p =.37$.

The relationship between age and the use of individualistic reasons is shown not to be of statistical importance. Both according to the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, the influence of authorities on children's moral reasoning is emphasized. The children's expectations and reliance on authority figures is expected to change with age. According to Piaget, reciprocity is the key to the development of morals, whereas the relationship of authorities is developed separately. It might be the case that this change (from referring to rules to, with age, developing the ability to reason morally) can not be supported, and that in accordance with *domain* theory, other aspects are of more importance for moral development.

Investigating hypothesis nine: Children's reasoning about exclusion will vary with target. Children will use more social conventional reasoning when discussing the gendered child than the immigrant child

Further analysis of the repeated ANOVA was run to answer hypothesis eight, and revealed that children use more social conventional reasoning when discussing the vignettes where the child was rejected based on gender (M = 3.71, SD = 1.93) than the ones based on immigrant status (M = 1.94, SD = 1.25), $F (1, 303) = 242.45$, eta 2= .45.

The larger degree of flexibility in *domain* theory gives way to variations in children's moral judgements because morals are argued to develop within the domains, and are divided into morals and social conventions. The results support the hypothesis that moral reasoning does vary with perpetrator and target. This variation cannot be captured in any unilateral developmental trajectory. The degree of children's social conventional arguments when exclusion was based on gender arguments was expected to be more frequent due to the vivid use of gender differentiation in the contemporary society. Thus gender differentiation was expected to have a positive influence on the acceptance of exclusion of gender, with could be grounds for the finding of an increase in the use of social conventional arguments. Also, excluding a child based on immigration status was found to be worse, indicated by the increase in moral arguments considering it to be worse.

CHAPTER 7 Philosophy

Morals lie between an area of philosophy and psychology. Definitions studying morals are often philosophical. The theoretician Svend Brinkmann, presented below, is used to drive the philosophical criticism of the theories presented and used in this thesis. This chapter will be concluded with a presentation of Brinkmann's approach to Wittgenstein, as it relates to the empirical investigation.

Brinkmann

Brinkmann's purpose is not to develop a psychological theory on morals. His errand is to develop a view, or understanding, of psychology that embodies morals, instead of what he refers to as 'a psychology clinically cleansed for morality' (which is how he sees the inclination of contemporary psychological investigation and its practice).
Brinkamnn's approach is named the '*Interpretive-pragmatic view*' on psychology and morality. Here, introduced in his own words:

> *"'interpretive' should point toward my belief that moral judgement in practice necessarily involves situational interpretation and judgment, and can not be understood as a mere application of moral rules, and 'pragmatic' should emphasize the idea that the validity of moral judgements, rules, and concepts is to be evaluated by their effects in practical action."*

(Brinkmann 2006 p.1)

Brinkmann emphasizes the phenomenological aspect, that psychological phenomena are situated in concrete contexts, and that knowledge about the world is an activity. The view (Interpretive-pragmatic) is a contrast to morality, applying different kinds of moral theories (on one side emotivism, subjectivism and relativism - on the other side formalism and proceduralism) found in contemporary psychology. Brinkmann aims somewhere between emotivism (e.g. Haidt) and proceduralism (e.g. *domain* theory), and proposes a view, and not a theory (like e.g. the intuitionists or the Kantian psychologists such as Kohlberg). His aim is to focus psychology on the moral aspects of human experience that should not be ignored or removed from psychology, if the allegiance to the phenomena in psychology is to be held. Here, theories are stressed as functioning not as mirrors capable of mirroring reality, but as tools to investigate areas of importance. In this way Brinkmann introduces conceptual validity to psychological theories (a criteria for the validity of a psychological theory could be: does the theory enrich the world?).
The qualitative moral phenomena can be seen as primary to any theory that can be invoked to back up our action. The following situation exemplifies this point: When experiencing a drowning child, the conviction to save the child is primary compared to any theory that establishes a reason for saving the child. It would be absurd if we initially had to think theoretically about what we ought to do in a situation instead of acting (on instinct, for example). Brinkmann describes the psychologization of morality, referring to psychologists believing that 'moral normativity' is a result of epiphenomena of psychological operation's, as psychologizing morality. He sees moral normativity[3] as a prerequisite for psychological phenomena, and not the other way around.
The 'Interpretive-pragmatic' view defends a realistic approach. In Brinkmann's words:

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[3]   Briknmanns term 'normative' can in relation with morals be explained by the following quote:"*In summary, my central theses are very simple: First: Psychological phenomena are normative. Second: Not all normativity is conventional (and morality is one important kind of non-conventional normativity).*" (Brinkmann 2006 p. 9)

"I defend the realist view that our moral reasons are given us by how things are and what is of value, not by subjective beliefs, likings, or desires" (Brinkmann 2006 p. 7).

In the discussion about realism and anti realism and morality, social constructionists are described as typically underlining the linguistic construction of reality, using the later works of Wittgenstein as philosophical legitimation (opposed to Brinkmann's use of Wittgenstein as a proponent for moral realism). Brinkmann refers to how Wittgenstein (in his philosophical investigations) finds that language has no essence because it is used in different kinds of practices, with different rationales ('Sprachspiel'). This implies that linguistic meaning cannot be found in how language represents the world, but in how language is used in social practise. Opposing the core arguments of the social constructionists (who say that meaning is a product of social discourse), Brinkamm considers Wittgenstein as studying language, and (in language) not searching for how contact with the world is achieved (according to the social constructionists we are not able to contact a world which transcends social constructions). Wittgenstein compares imagining a language to imagining a life form (Wittgenstein 1984 §19). Here language gets its point, purpose and 'meaning in belonging' from a variety of practises. If language shall function, it must accordingly already be tied to practice (ibid.).

In relation to the empirical investigation and Brinkmann's conceptual validity criteria, Wittgenstein does not specify morals, but he writes about how language works. Hence, to investigate how language works in relation to situations where children judge moral dilemmas can thus be seen as an attempt to keep within Brinkmann's validity criteria.

Critique of the developmental psychologists

Brinkmann refers to the rationalist developmental psychologists approach to morals as proceduralism (i.e. morals as a universally applicable procedure).

The stage theory is described as lacking psychological realism, as well as a clear picture of mental processing when reasoning. Brinkmann ascribes to Gilligan's understanding of humans, meaning that we are not typically hyper reflective reasoners, following rigorous, impartial, and moral principles. Brinkmann also agrees with her criticism of Kohlberg's dilemmas as primary dealing with abstract justice, saying that they neglect the fact that in life, morality is also about caring and interpersonal relationships. This is further elaborated by Stanley Hauerwas, who in Brinkamnn's interpretation describes the Kohlbergian theory as promoting self-alienation as a central moral virtue, particularly with regard to personal relations and obligations. Here, the Kantian system of arguments (e.g the categorical imperative) is understood as abstract and impersonal, and if used to determine our actions (as it would be required by hyper reflective moral reasoning), would ruin the possibility of obtaining satisfaction within our lives (Brinkmann 2006).

In relation to the pragmatic-interpretative-view advocated by Brinkmann it is significant to note that altruistic and good natured people do not necessarily score high on the Kohlberian scale (Brinkmann 2006). Here, Kohlberg's theory is problematised as not accounting for the relationship between moral reasoning and moral deeds. This leads to the fact (according to Brinkmann) that it is because of a 'practicality problem' that the Kohlberian theory identifies morals as a universally applicable procedures, exemplified by the fact that the Kohlberian theory has proven difficult to apply to non-western cultural morality. In Brinkmann's view, Kohlberg produces moral theories, placing him in the category of proceduralists. The problem with proceduralism is said to be that it is difficult to deduce how one should act from theories (i.e. linking abstract principles and rules that have been generated from moral procedures). Principles for how to act need to leave an openness for the situation that they are applied in. As is the case with most moral principles, there will always be an exception to the rule, and in this way there can be no set of universal principles. Brinkmann also uses Charles Taylor's work to criticize Kohlberg, in pointing out the need for a "thick ethical conceptual" understanding of concrete social practises for the ability to reason

morally, and make moral judgements. Basically, we have to know when and how to employ principles and procedures. Here, this kind of knowledge cannot be procedural in its own right, but has to be based on fundamental knowledge of powerful values (the theory of Kohlberg is based upon the value of justice, and might therefore collide with other substantial values (e.g. equality, social rights etc.) (Brinkmann 2006).

Criticism of Kohlberg's theory can be divided into 5 primary arguments. In the following, these arguments will be presented with relation to the use of Kohlberg in this thesis, as well as its use in the empirical investigation.

1. According to Gilligan, the Kohlberian theory deals solely with abstract justice, and thereby neglects important aspects of morals (e.g. care and personal relationships). The definition of morals used in this thesis has been chosen, not to decree anything concerning rules, but rather to focus on welfare, fairness towards, and rights of, the individual. Furthermore, in the empirical investigation, the scenarios designed to foster moral reasoning's have been carefully created to mirror everyday situations in the children's environment (in schools). The scenarios were created for the consideration of practical dilemmas (of being excluded), rather than dilemmas involving life and death or stealing, as it is believed that these are not mirroring the typical situations of children's everyday experiences.

2. Kohlberg get criticized by Brinkmann for his Kantian approach, and the altruistic consequence this implies (which is argued to ruin *personal* quality of life), as well as for his scoring system, which Brinkmann identifies as dealing with higher justice and not rewarding good heartedness. In the empirical investigation of this thesis, the coding system was developed to capture the use of moral arguments, and the complexity and validity of the arguments was not addressed since it was more important to examine how the children's appeal to either moral or social conventions when investigating the development of morals (prior to higher moral reasoning), rather than the rightness or the wrongness of the arguments used when reasoning. Focusing on the quantity of moral arguments in this thesis addresses the *use* of moral arguments (and not the complexity). Thereby good hearted children will not score high on complexity (i.e. Kohlbergs higer stages), but rather in the use of morals compared to e.g. social conventional or other kinds of reasoning.

3. The universality of Kohlberg's theories has been criticized for focusing on the higher moral reasoning of individuals (which very few ever achieve), and for the relationship between the individual and the group, which differs between the West and other parts of the world, rendering the theory unable to be universalized. The scenarios in the empirical investigation of this thesis address groups of children and authorities excluding a child. Here the welfare, fairness towards, and individual (Western) rights of the excluded child are addressed. Moral reasoning therefore (in this thesis) has to do with opposing the group and the authority. The rights of the individual is believed not only to be a Western idea, although the individual does not come before society in many cultures. In cultures where the group is considered primary, individuals suffer under this societal structure (Lieben & Bigler 2002).

4. Proceduralism is the primary critic from Brinkmann. The Kohlberian stages and their application are seen as theoretical constructs, and because of this, the use of Kohlberg's theory suffers from problems of transferring theory into practical use. In the empirical investigation of this thesis, an analysis was done of the value judgements made by children. This approach was inspired by Wittgenstein, analysing language to identify the use of moral arguments in the judgement of exclusion (see, Appendix I). This approach does not use a theoretical application, but rather identifies the way in which different morals are used (in language), reflecting the children's argued considerations of treatment of others.

5. Kohlberg is criticizised for primarily focusing on the value of justice, and thereby his theory is argued to collide with other substantial values (e.g. equality and social rights). His moral

principles also lack an understanding of basic knowledge of powerful values for moral reasoning. In the empirical investigation of this thesis, the coding has been carefully developed to embody the reasoning's used. One exception to the universality of the thesis is that the means to study moral judgements (transgression of the welfare of, fairness towards, and rights of, the individual) is argued (by Schweder, among others) to be a Western value (Shweder et al. 1997). Values in general are investigated as a natural component from the child's surrounding environment, and not through the use of higher moral principles. Furthermore, a variety of codings have been used, designed to capture the scope of reasonings and not only what is considered as true morals.

Critique of *domain* theory

Turiel (according to Brinkmann (2006)) understands the distinction between domains of knowledge as universal across culture and history. Here, Turiel is compared with Kohlberg in that he perceives morals as not depending on specific cultural practises. According to Shweder, it is impossible to distinguish between morals and social conventions in a universal manner (Shweder et al. 1997). In contradiction to this view, the specified methods to distinguish between morals and social conventions are argued to vary culturally, and not all cultures agree with the West (saying that social practises are conventions). Shweder, in opposition, argues that the 'autonomous individual self' as the bearer of personal rights, prior to participation in social practises, is questionable in relations to other cultures. The Western idea of social practises (understood as social conventions) is connected to the prevalent market (neutral towards all specific social arrangements, which individuals then choose to be involved) in the Western culture. Schweder furthermore claims that the dominant idea in the West is the existence of a universal truth, and that universal rights for the individual exist. Social relations are understood as instruments for individual preference and satisfaction. Thus, Turiel's conception of domains becomes a Western prejudices. In his studies of Hindi culture Schweder found the worst moral transgression to be when the oldest son gets a haircut and eats chicken the day after his father's death (Shweder et al. 1997). According to Turiel, this would be a transgression of social conventions (based on the Hindi world view and social practises) and not morals. The same sort of critique can be applied to Turiel because his focus on the violation of the rights of the individual can be seen as an expression of a specific Western view, with social practices based on the individual as separated from the community.
Even though Brinkmann, to some degree, finds Turiel's theory superior to Kohlberg's stages, he finds that the problem of proceduralism still exists, and the abstract rules created by procedures are argued to be sterile (separated from practice) as well as unbound with practical life. Furthermore, according to Brinkmann *domain* theory portrays world-views (other than the Western) as morally inferior.

Critique of Turiel's work can (besides the critique that, like Kohlberg's theory, it suffers from being procedualistic) be divided into 3 primary points. In the following, this will be presented with relation to the use of Turiel in the empirical investigation, as well as throughout this thesis.

1. The major critic Brinkmann has of Turiel is that he believes his theory is universal. Turiel's domains can (according to Brinkamnn) not be universally applied, and his distinction between morals and social conventional knowledge also suffers from a Westernised approach. In this thesis (as well as in the empirical investigation) I believe that one of the most important issues is to investigate the basis for children's treatment of others (with morals hypothesised to be of importance). The investigation does not claim to be universally applicable, but rather, through language, studies what kind of reasoning's the children in the participant pool use in relation to the treatment of others. The parameters for the analysis

have been social conventions morals and personal. As Schweder would argue, these might not be appropriate parameters in other cultures, but it does seem safe to say that they would be appropriate for all western cultures (at the very least).

2. Turiel has been criticized for having a Western understanding of the individual, as well as the individuals relation to society. Morals (care about the welfare of others) are understood as innate. However, in a culture (Schweder's investigations primarily take place in India) with casts (this might be compared with apartheid or the nazi regime) children have to learn not to have sympathy with "all humans" (to think beyond their 'natural morals' so to speak), in order to maintain systems like these. The motivation of this thesis is to uncover, and improve, children's desire for treating others better. Brinkmann (through Schweder) may be correct in his criticism of it being Western - to value fair treatment of every individual (prior to community). However, the rights of the individual are considered of importance, as the focus of the thesis is on how to motivate a better treatment of every individual.

3. Lastly, Turiel is criticized for considering other world views (those that are not western) inferior. Brinkmann's criticism that Turiel believes in the existence of a universal truth, and universal rights for the individual, is acknowledged, and can also be applied to this thesis, in so far as the right of the individual (as subject for suffering) is the focus in the investigation, and thereby the rights of the individual are found to be of importance (universal rights). To claim morals as a universal truth might be a Western approach. However, to (as Schweder does) claim that social relations are to be understood as instruments for individual preference and satisfaction in the West, can similarly show a prejudice towards Western society. Believing that Westerners do not have interpersonal relationships with others (similar to those in other parts of the world) seems to portray the Western values as cold and proceduralistic.

Critique of the intuitionists

The critique of the intuitionists is presented in the following, mainly using Brinkmann and Wittgenstein (as interpreted by Brinkmann) to discuss their theory. The intuitionists theory is understood as a world view. Therefore, the 'pragmatic–interpretative' view of Brinkmann is used (as well as the Witgensteinian approach) to provide a philosophical critique. Morals are, by the intuitionists, investigated through hypnosis, and inspired by studies of brain-damaged informants and physical changes. Using language to investigate children's moral development, therefore, prevents any direct comparison of empirical work between this thesis and their work. However, because of the desire to study cultural differences, and the need to discuss the universality of the theories and empirical work presented in the thesis, the intuitionists work has been found of importance.

Brinkmann accuses the intuitionists of committing the Mereological fallacy, explained by ascribing (in this case psychological) attributes to a part of the human (i.e. the mind), which only makes sense when ascribed to a human (or an animal) as a whole. Here Brinkmann refers to Wittgenstein by identifying that one can only say about a living human (or something that behaves like one) that it has sensations (e.g it sees, it is blind etc.) (Wittgenstein 1984 § 281).

Brinkmann refers to William James's theory when criticizing the post-hoc approach to morals. According to James, common sense is wrong (e.g. we are sorry and cry because we loose our fortune). His hypothesis is that this sequence is not ordered correctly, and that the opposite would be more correct (Brinkmann 2006a). Here the distinction between emotion and reasoning (described by Haidt as moral lawyers) is criticized. Emotions are seen as observations or perceptions of bodily circumstances and changes, resulting in the fact that nearly every mental picture perceived or recalled is accompanied by a reaction from the emotions. Feelings (according to Brinkmann) does not "treat" or "reflect" changes in the bodily condition. What feelings reflect, are the *object* of the

feelings, i.e. I do not fear bodily changes, but the frightening tiger; neither am I proud of my somatic changes, but what I have achieved. Emotions are to be understood in relation to a normative order, deciding what is worth fearing and being proud of. It is a misunderstanding to believe that emotions are somatic markers informing us about what is good and bad behaviour (ibid.). The counter-intuitiveness of this evaluation provides for the following example: Somebody is indignant and blushes with anger, due to an unjust action (i.e. exclusion) of another person. The reason for their blushing is because of the knowledge that it is unfair or disrespectful, not because of feeling the blushing, but because there is a reason to be angry. To feel angry when somebody acts unjustly is hence a normative response to an action. I believe that anger cannot be understood in pure causal terms (as according to Damasio and Haidt) because blushing is not the basis for knowing an action is unfair (one blushes from hearing about the unfair action).

Ultimately following the theories of Damasio and Haidt, the personal character of somatic markers leads to 'solipsism' (i.e. the only certain knowledge is the existence of ones self and ones own experiences). Hence, the claim that others have similar somatic markers seems philosophically unwarranted (all I can know anything about are my own markers. I have no possibility to know whether others have markers or not) (Brinkmann 2006a).

Brinkmann argues that we do not observe our feelings, and that to say that we cannot observe feelings in others is inaccurate. When stating that it is evident that someone is i.e. happy, it is behavioural evidence (body posture, voice gestures, etc.). Behavioural evidence is observable. If it was not, it would be impossible to learn the words that relate to emotions, since these are learned ostensibly (pointing out e.g. happy people) (Wittgenstein 1984 §6). Words describing emotion are learned, referring to public objects and events, and not to private mental images or somatic perturbations. According to Wittgenstein, claiming that we interpret our feelings is therefore absurd. To express sadness about unjust treatment is exactly that, an expression of sadness, not a report about inner behaviour or feelings (Wittgenstein 1984 §246). Ergo, if I master the use of the concept sadness, I will not express sadness incorrectly. If this were not so, it would not be possible to differentiate between correct use of words for emotions, and what seems to be the correct use of words for emotions. Without this normative difference, it becomes impossible to use the concept of correctness. Accordingly, if feelings were private, the individual having the feelings would be the only one knowing about them, leading to solipsism.

In the empirical investigation the use of language to investigate children's moral development has been inspired by Wittgenstein. This, as shown in the discussion above, should take into account the Mereological fallacy. Also, in agreement with Brinkmann, the argument that emotion comes before moral reasoning has been rejected and discussed, leading to a normative approach to emotions, and not a private one. Wittgensteins *'sprachspiel'* (language games) are presented in the following section, after which the chapter is concluded with a section about truth and knowledge.

Brinkmanns use of Wittgenstein

Brinkmann emphasises Wittgenstein's focus on *use* in language. The main concept is 'Sprachspiel' (Language games);*"…Und eine Sprache vorstellen heisst, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen"* (Wittgenstein 1984 §19 p.246). The 'language game' entails the life form. If we are concerned with language use, then we are (so to speak) always in some sort of practice. According to Wittgenstein meaning is to be seen as use (ibid.), and consequently not to be understood as something personal (in the sense 'private'). This idea postulates that by looking at the use of (meaning how) words are applied, it is possible to get an understanding of their meaning. Hence, one gets an idea of the understanding that somebody has of the words that that person has applied. Basically, the use of words (or how they are used) makes a criteria for the understanding behind words (Wittgenstein 1984 §146), and tells something about how a person thinks about (for example) a moral issue. That is why the connection between using language and thinking is, by Wittgenstein, formulated in such

a way that cognition can be described using his metaphor "*...die Sprache selbst ist das Vehikel des Denkens.*" (ibid § 329 p.384) i.e. we think with language.

According to Wittgenstein, meaning is use and is thereby the utility of a sentence. That is, the use of words is a criterion for the understanding of the words, or, the use of words and concepts can be looked at in practise when focusing on children's moral thoughts. This understating has also been applied by this thesis.

Truth and knowledge

Wittgenstein's understanding of truth is not relativistic (meaning it could be everything), for him truth is absolute. People might hold something as true, but that does not mean it is necessarily the truth. Put another way, just because a concept is prevalent, does not mean that it is true (e.g. Columbus' discovery of India). In contradiction to values or beliefs, truth (according to Wittgenstein) *belongs* to the sentence (Wittgenstein 1984 §136-137). Truth can - according to these paragraphs - not be private (purely subjective), but is a public phenomenon (meaning it is objective due to the common, public use of sentences), and cannot, therefore, be relative (in the sense that it could be everything). Truth belongs to sentences, and can be proved or disproved. In his view, instead of there being multiple approaches to the sentence "the earth is flat," when it is disproved, there is only one interpretation, which is that the sentence was false in the first place. This does not make the concept of truth relative (or subjective), but introduces a more dynamic understanding of truth. What is *considered* to be true is therefore what has, for example, inductively been shown to be true. However, this *could* turn out to be false anyway; just because we have observed a large number of white swans in Europe, with no exceptions, we might one day find a swan in another colour somewhere else in the world. If this happened we could no longer conclude that "all swans are white", based on this account. But then again, could we seriously have doubts about whether gravity is a "true" force, or whether it will be there tomorrow?

That is not to say that truth cannot be found in disciplines other than the natural sciences. Why would one bother to conduct research in the normative sciences at all, if it was not possible to find truths here as well?

The scientific foundation for the empirical investigation is an indicator for how most children reason about exclusion in terms of morals, but as in the example with the white swans mentioned above, the research is only pinpointing some tendencies amongst children in the investigated age groups (generalisable through the large number of interviews). I do not claim that the majority (of children) rules, or that the investigation embodies the definition of truth. However I do believe that this investigation could be useful for looking into how the majority of Danish children reason about moral dilemmas.

When considering the participant's moral reasoning, the children simply verbalising thoughts (in this case about morals), shows that the participants in the investigation can be considered as verbalising moral understandings. This is because these verbalisations represent an idea about the concept of morals, and as words and actions are two different sides of the same coin (comparable, or alike), my hope is that the quantified qualitative analysis (i.e. the coding) of the empirical results will bring forth a good idea of the moral understandings possessed by children in the different ages investigated. In accordance with Wittgenstein's idea that meaning is use, and that the use of words (for example, how a child uses them) is a criteria for their understanding, it is my hope that the coding in the investigation gives a good pointer to how children reason about morals, and hence behave in like situations (similar to the imagined scenarios asked about in the interview). A good pointer to how children reason is understood as being an analysis of their arguments, placing focus on phrases which identify importance for their arguments, in an argumentative theoretical approach to the children's basic reasoning. Whether this reasoning is 'right' or 'wrong' in some sense, it does not alter the child's argument from being either moral, personal or social conventional. Therefore, I believe that (for this thesis, and perhaps for the study of moral development generally) is more

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important to look at children's reasoning's about moral judgements rather than whether the judgements fit into societal norms and practises.

Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusion

The approach to this conclusion will be to address each of the specific issues of the problem statement, highlighting main discussions, and discussing main findings. The problem statement was divided in 3 parts. The following will describe how each of these parts have been answered throughout this thesis, in the theoretical, empirical and scientific/ philosophical discussions.

How are, and how have, morals (and the development of morals) been described in developmental psychology, and what is the theoretical implication of having different theoretical approaches to moral development?

These questions were mainly addressed in the theoretical discussion (Chapter 4), through the section titled: *Implication of the approaches to morals.* This began by laying out the diversity which exists in theoretical approaches discussing moral development. The development of morals is heavily influenced by the way in which different theoreticians define morals. Morals have been described as solely emotional impulses with no cognitive relationships (e.g.Haidt), where with age individuals would be educated to fit within a specific community (contractual or beehive). The cognitive understanding of morals is described through the Kohlberian approach, and it was found that higher moral thinking (as Kohlberg defined moral thinking) can occur in late adolescence (at the very earliest), depending, to a high degree, on the ability of more complex reasoning needed for morals to exist. Turiel and his social cognitive approach to morals (*domain* theory) finds moral reasoning to be present at a very young age (innate tendency). Because morals are seen (by *domain* theory) as present from a very early age, they and differ from social conventional reasoning (which children find increasingly important with age). Here the *domain* theoreticians argues that a universal desire to care is also present from a very early age, which is of importance to this thesis. However, According to *domain* theoreticians, morals do exist, but do not mature to a higher level of reasoning. According to Gilligan, morals develop to a post-conventional level, where care and principles of non-violence are achieved. Post conventional morals are even more closely aligned with this thesis, because they show awareness of development of moral qualities. Haidt's understanding of moral intuition (as dictating moral reasoning) might be compared to the *domain* theoretician's idea of morals as differentiated from social conventions, and how the importance of group goals and organization increase with age. Social conventions similarly dictate whether morals should be sustained, leaving morals as relativistic, and care for others (other than e.g. family) as a matter of cultural dictation. According to the *domain* theory, Kohlberg's description of the culmination of justice reasoning as an indicator of moral maturation, is impossible. This is because *domain* theory differentiates the development of morals and social conventions: morals being an innate sense of fair treatment (care) towards others , and social conventions being adopted with age, to model societal norms (and which can be created to *model* morals, e.g. justice). However the emphasis is not placed on a desire to e.g. make social conventions mirror morals, and *domain* theory therefore lacks (for the purpose of this thesis) a clear description of 'higher' morals, or moral development generally.

The implications of having different theoretical approaches to moral development (dealt with mainly in the philosophical discussion Chapter 7), are discussed within two major theoretical directions. This presentation opens up for a number of implications examined in the theoretical discussion (chapter 4). A discussion about the rational versus 'social biological evolutionary' approach was covered, which was seen as leading to two completely different theories of morals,

and hence two completely different approaches to morals and moral development (namely emotional intuitions, and innate morals). In the philosophical section, this led to two extremes. The rationalist extreme was seen as suffering from having a Western understanding of the relationship between individual and society, and loosing the intimate bond between people in logic principles. The 'social biological evolutionary' approach was seen as ending in the rejection of any understanding of others, because of solipsism (i.e. the only thing one can know for certain is ones own existence and experiences) The theory also suffers from the Merelogical fallacy (i.e. the brain dictates our moral judgements through emotions) where figuratively phenomena such as e.g group behaviour or instincts can be used as an argument not to act morally. The *domain* theory is accused of using divisions (into domains) that cannot be ascribed universally. The understanding of morals and social conventions as separated, is argued to make morals separate from culture. However, in some cultures morals are more important than in others, since morals might be argued to be what make people treat others nicely even though there is no rule or social convention about it. Therefore universal theorizing is believed to be part of *domain* theory's Western heritage (believing in individual rights and the welfare of everybody prior to the community). It was found that the focus on abstract justice in the 'Kohlberian approach to morals' led to neglecting important aspects of morals (e.g. care and personal relationships). It is precisely this critique that led to the definition of morals used in this thesis focusing on the welfare, rights, and fairness, of the individual. Kohlberg's scoring system (dealing with higher justice) was criticized (by Brinkmann) as not rewarding good-heartedness. In the empirical investigation of this thesis, focus was therefore placed on developing a coding system that would capture the use of moral arguments, and not the complexity of arguments. Furthermore, the scenarios designed to foster moral reasoning were carefully created to mirror everyday situations in the children's environment (in schools), as well as to consider practical dilemmas (of being excluded), rather than dilemmas involving life and death or stealing (as was prevalent in Kohlberg's work).

Is there a developmental trajectory of children's moral reasoning, or is it context-dependent and idiosyncratic? In other words, are developmental psychologists able to describe children's reasoning based on children's age, or is it more dependent on situational and individual difference factors?

These questions were addressed in the theoretical discussion (Chapter 4) called *The different theoretical understandings of moral development* (p. 25), and it was also addressed through the extracted hypotheses in the empirical investigation (p. 32).
As exemplified by Piaget and Kohlberg, it was found that early developmental psychologists base children's moral reasoning on their age and 'developmental stage' classification. However, more resent theories (such as the *domain* theory) focus on individual differences and situational factors. The morals of Kohlberg imply a certain amount of autonomy and justice-thinking, and were therefore found to fit into a unilateral staged development, as opposed to Gilligan, who believed moral development to be gendered and containing ethics of care therefore fitting into two trajectories. Both Gilligan and Turiel believe morals to refer to something that develops earlier than previously suggested, as well as that 'prevention of harm' is a basic moral (and of more importance than principles of justice). It was also understood that the complex moral judgement presented by Kohlberg should be the same as Kantian philosophy's understanding of other-directedness, but that this other-directedness is not included in the Kohlberian approach (where focus seems to be on principles), and therefore not morals but social conventions.
The question about whether moral development is stage oriented or not was empirically addressed, discussing whether there was a shift in moral reasoning with age, from social conventional to morals. This shift was not found through the empirical investigation of this thesis. However, Piaget's understanding of 'free agents' having mutual respect was suggested to leave space for

constituting morals as emerging at a young age, and in an innate form (coexisting with his proposed staged moral development). Piaget's ink blot stories (p. 10) imply that he was somehow aware of social conventions (as separated from morals, which might be referred to as the basis for the equal cooperation of his 'agents'). Also, Kohlberg's 'type B reasoning' (p. 13) implies the presence of both moral and social conventional reasoning in young children (younger than 12).

The universality of moral development was questioned in the philosophical chapter, exemplified by Schweder's understanding of morals (which differs according to culture). This critique was taken into consideration, and the morals investigated in this thesis can therefore be understood as examining Western morals. This is not to say that children are not born with the ability to develop morals (care and prevention of harm), but to underline that if the society the child is born into does not emphasize these morals, the natural predispositions (of care and prevention of harm for others than personally involved) seem easy to overrule or redirect. This is well understood in *domain* theory, which states that with age, social conventions become increasingly more important than morals. This also supports the Kohlberian view that the individual needs autonomy to be able to make moral decisions (following innate morals and not the authority).

Moral judgements were used by most participants interviewed for this thesis, and no age-related decline was found in their use of moral argumentation. Suggesting that it is not the complexity nor the quantity of moral arguments that is of importance, but the autonomy of not letting social conventions overrule morals. Unlike Kohlberg's sterile application of Kantian principles, displaying moral reasoning has to do with innate principles being valued before one's social conventions, and perceiving others as individuals deserving fair treatment and care. This is also supported in the empirical investigation by the finding that children perceived as weak were the means for *more* moral reasoning than those perceived as stronger (indicating a tendency to care for those in need). In the empirical investigation, no developmental trajectories were found, and although some sudden jumps in development were noticed, there was no clear connection across the different types of reasoning's investigated, indicating that children's moral development is context dependent and/or idiosyncratic.

In the philosophical discussion, proceduralism was discussed (namely: problems of transferring theory into practical use). In the empirical investigation of this thesis, an analysis was made of children's value judgements, with an approach to language inspired by Wittgenstein. This linguistic approach does not use a theoretical application, but rather identifies the way in which different morals are used (through language). Kohlberg was criticised for primarily focusing on the value of justice, and his theory thereby collides with other substantial values. Kohlberg's moral principles are also argued to lack an understanding of basic knowledge of powerful values for moral reasoning. This leads to the non-universality of this thesis, because the means to study moral judgements (transgression of a good treatment of an individual) is argued to be a Western value.

The main motivation for this thesis is the investigation of the basis for children's treatment of others (with morals hypothesised to be of importance). Brinkmann criticises Turiel's beliefs in the existence of a universal truth, and universal rights for the individual. This critique can also be applied to this thesis, since it is the individual and the rights of the individual which are the focus of this investigation.

Are any (of the investigated) factors of more importance than others when making moral decisions, and do these (if any) change with age?

This question was addressed in the theoretical discussion (Chapter 4) called; *The relationship between people and society as a factor of importance when making moral decisions* (p. 27), and it was also addressed through the extracted hypotheses in the empirical investigation (p. 32). According to the domain theory, with age, the individual comprehend their surroundings better. This should foster an increase in the importance of group goals, and concurrently, a decrease in morals.

In opposition to this, the Kohlberian moral development culminates with an abstract and universal approach to any kind of justice principles. However, before this culmination, the individual is controlled by heteronomous considerations, contradicting Piaget's 'free agent' (also found in the domain theory). In opposition to the rationalists, Haidt leaves any decisions to the intuitions and societal rules, to dictate reasoning about these intuitions.

I see the approaches of Kohlberg and Piaget (and part of the theorized individual in the domain theory) as leaving more room for individuality. The relationship between the individual and the group is therefore argued to be of importance for moral development. The scenarios in the empirical investigation address groups of children and authorities excluding a child. Moral reasoning therefore (in this thesis) has to do with opposing the group and the authority. The relationship between individual, group, and moral arguments (in the empirical investigation) were primarily addressed through the children's judgements of whether it was ok for a group to exclude a child. Another aspect was approached through how a difference was observed when the excluded child belonged to the strong group, as opposed to the weak group (see, section *Group identity and stereotyping* p. 31). Results from this thesis indicate that Kohlberg's arguments (that it takes autonomous individuals to reason morally) were supported. Children using social conventional reasoning were less focused on fair treatment of the individual. Also, more moral reasoning's were used when considering the exclusion of a child from the weak group, compared to a child from the strong group. It is argued that social conventions in a moral society will mirror morals. However findings from this thesis seem to show that morals are individuals' innate dispositions, showing in the bond between individuals (the weak group were shown to receive more 'care'). Morals are sometimes more (sometimes less) visible in the rules individuals make for the protection of others and themselves. For example, weak groups will (in contemporary Western society) not bring any threat, and therefore the natural willingness to protect those weak individuals does not go against any societal rules (which they might, in a society suffering from e.g. starvation). Also in the Western world where the explicit rules are not as hard as in other cultures morals is more important to uphold a decent behaviour towards others than in cultures with strict rules about social behaviour. It is argued, (similar to Piaget) that if individuals are constrained with rules their natural ability to cooperate is suppressed. A similar finding in the empirical investigation was that the included children did not accept exclusion made by an authority figure. Furthermore this shows that (as suggested by Piaget and Kohlberg) children do not always obey authorities, and can therefore (if given the possibility) make just decisions based on their understanding of what is right and wrong. The finding that the children scoring high in gender typing were more willing to exclude girls indicated that the more group-focused children were, the more they accepted exclusion generally, in contrary the more moral arguments children used, the less they excluded. This might be of importance because the prevention of group prejudices and stereotyped knowledge (at least in the investigated environment) consequently should foster moral development. These findings seems to exemplify individual and autonomous tendencies in children.

Conclusion

The majority of the children in this study used moral arguments regardless of their age category, suggesting that morals (in the investigated group) exist and are not age dependent. When the target of the exclusion was perceived as coming from a weaker group, a tendency to use *more* moral arguments was found. Generally, the more moral arguments the child used, the less likely it was that the child would accept any kind of exclusion (harm). Morals can thereby be seen as indicating a higher tendency to care about others, and might very well be what makes us able to cooperate. The religious minded ancestors of ours who were argued (by the socio biological evolutionary directions) to do better because of their religion, may in fact have been better at cooperating exactly because they cared about others (and not because they were able to be religious). In other words, the

idea of cooperation would never have come into their mind if they did not care (why bother if you do not care about others). Trust and care must have been there for them to be able to make these groups. Schweder argues that what we would call social conventions are morals in other parts of the world, and thereby (as suggested by Brinkmann) morals become constructs. I think that it would be of importance for our perception of people as naturally disposed to treating others nicely, if this could be stated the other way around. Just imagine if we made groups because we cared about each other, and if religion was based on an idea about wanting to make rules in order to secure the best possible treatment of others. This can be seen in relation to the Kohlberian stages, which were initially inspired by the Kantian principles, made by Kant because he cared. The 'other-directedness' of Kantian philosophy may embody the need for morals as directed towards others (besides those with whom we are closely bound) and therefore address how morals can be directed towards others (ensuring good treatment of others).

Initially, this thesis posed the question that if psychologists and philosophers claim morals to be universal, then why does maltreatment of others exist? This might be answered through one of Brinkmann's criticisms of Kohlberg: It might very well be that morals initially exist in the bond between people, and that altruism (as Brinkmann argues Kohlberg's morals address) is a social convention, but a social convention that mirrors morals. This also seems possible since, with age, domain theory argues that the individual comprehends more of the societal rules, and with age the theorised Kohlberian individual reaches an insight into these higher social conventions. The answer to why maltreatment of others occur, even in a moral society, might be that the same higher social conventions can be misguided, in order to believe that something is done in the name of some greater good. Herein may lie the weakness of social conventions: in this practical approach, the natural innate ability to care about those close to us exists, but this 'caring ability' can also be controlled in the name of survival. The findings suggested that Danish children used more moral reasoning when arguing about the exclusion of a member from the weak group than a member from the strong group (suggesting a desire to care for the weak) also children using more social conventions were more willing to exclude supports that the more aware of 'the group' the child is the less morals matters.

Future Work

An important aspect in this thesis (inspired by Kohlberg) is the autonomous criteria for moral judgements. In the empirical investigation, it was found that children using social conventional reasons showed a significant increase in the exclusion of others. This has raised the question about whether being group-focused could (not only in the West, but everywhere) lead to a decrease in morals. If autonomy is of extreme importance (of more importance for moral development than any of the other aspects investigated), then moral development might be approached by enhancing the ability to question authority.

Another important aspect for future work could be to analyse the validity of children's arguments, considering whether well articulated children were more eager to give others good treatment, and whether any further identification of indicators for fair treatment could be found. This could be of importance for addressing interventions leading to an increase in moral development.

Appendix A Kohlberg's stage theory

Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning are further grouped into three major levels, because it was Kohlberg's belief that fundamental shifts take place in the child's social-moral perspective at each level.

Level	Stage	Description
Level One: *The pre-conventional level* age: two to eight Kohlberg's first three stages are similar to Piaget's two stages (moral realism). Although Kohlberg describes the change as appearing in three stages, and Piaget in two, both theories describe a sequential change from obedience to relativistic awareness, as well as an early emergence of motives.	**Stage One:** *The Obedience and Punishment Orientation*	The child does not reason as a member of society, but perceives morality as external. This first stage is characterized by an orientation towards obedience and punishment, where the child's moral judgements are concrete in nature and the child makes judgements from an individual perspective. This is very similar to Piaget's first stage of 'heteronomous orientation', where the reason why the child is concerned with not breaking rules is to avoid punishment (obedience in order to avoid negative consequences). In both Kohlberg and Piaget's theories, the child in stage 1 is ego-centric and not able to take the perspective of others.
	Stage Two: *The Instrumental Exchange Orientation*	The child reasons on a pre-conventional level, as an isolated individual who is not yet a full-fledged member of society. However, an early emergence of moral reciprocity is showing, and the child begins bargaining and perceiving others as having individual interests of their own. Fairness becomes a sense of equal exchange, considering pragmatic and instrumental values of actions. In this stage, the individualistic sense of right is relative to the child. So, breaking rules contains the risk of punishment which the child tries to avoid, but might neglect this for the purpose of pursuing his or her own interests.

(Table Continued on next page)

Level	Stage	Description
Level Two: *The conventional level of reasoning* Age: 11+ The child becomes capable of seeing things from others' point of view in these stages. The child becomes more reflective. Morals are still understood as rules, but rules for the purpose of maintaining social order.	Stage Three: *The Interpersonal Conformity Orientation*	To gain approval, the child conforms to family and community standards, although the child does not yet consider the generalized social system. An awareness of some of the aspects from the more mature stages are initiated, like expectations, agreements, and shared feelings, challenging the former purely individual interests. The child becomes more loyal and trustworthy because of an ability to experience feelings such as gratitude and reciprocal respect, which also brings in more mutual relationships. The child identifies itself with rules that are consistently upheld, and morality is understood as acting properly by conforming to what, in society, is defined as right and wrong. Hence, the child believes that convention and norms are upholding society.
	Stage Four[4]: *The Law-and-Order Orientation*	The larger social system is taken into account, and obeying the established norms and laws is understood as necessary. This system of laws is understood as protecting everybody, and is only to be disobeyed when the laws conflict with prescribed social obligations. Morals can be understood as 'being a good citizen' or fulfilling social responsibilities or duties. Kant's categorical imperative can be used to explain the strong affiliation to society, which to a great extent still remains unquestioned in this stage (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987).

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[4] By being obedient to a greater authority, stages 1 through 4 might give an impression of the child as following the same reasoning throughout. However, where a child in stage 1 can only describe rules and is not able to elaborate beyond these rules, a child in stage 4 is aware of the function of rules in society as a whole and is able to articulate this.

Level	Stage	Description
Level three: *The post conventional level* Age: 20+ At level three the child is able to reason on its own, in a perspective based on underlying principles norms and rules "prior to societal decrees", simultaneously rejecting the uniform application of norms and rules. These last two stages share many similarities with the Kantian deontology.	Stage Five: *Prior Rights and Social Contract Orientation*	The individual evaluates laws according to principles such as fairness, instead of simply upholding their position in the social order, and implies reasoning based on principles of ethical fairness, as devising moral laws. The individual recognizes the existence of different social groups with different values within society, but considers everybody as wanting certain basic rights. These basic rights, such as liberty, human welfare, and life, are not limited to certain cultures or societies, and are to be maintained above normative obligations and conventions. The good society is understood as a social agreement that people freely accept for the benefit of all, like democratic procedures having the ability to change unfair laws to improve society.
	Stage Six: *Universal Ethical Principles Orientation* (This stage has been removed in Kohlbergs later work)	The individual understands ethical rules, not as given by authorities, but as a product of individual reasoning from individualistic, democratic perspectives, guided by principles such as fairness and justice. Civil disobedience might consequently be an option, just as when Martin Luther King, Jr. proposed the idea of laws as only valid when grounded in justice. In this instance, the commitment to justice also meant an obligation to disobey laws when the laws were perceived as not being fair (ibid.).

Appendix B Gilligans' stages of Moral Development

Stage	Goal
Pre-conventional	Individual survival
Conventional	Self sacrifice, sign of goodness
Post-conventional	Non-violence principle, avoid hurting others/self

Tabel 1: The stages of Moral Development according to Carol Gilligan

Appendix C Haid's five mental modules

According to Haidt intuitive ethics are universal and can be found in all cultures. He has divided these ethics into sets of moral intuitions (shown in the five mental modules underneath), which are all connected to distinct moral emotions:

Ethics	Emotions
Victimization / Suffering	Compassion
Justice / Fairness / Reciprocity / Rights	Anger / Indignation
In-group / Out-group	Pride / Belongingness
Duty / Hierarchy	Contempt / Respect
Sacredness / Purity	Disgust

Tabel 2: Haid's five mental modules

The part of the moral system which is especially important for this thesis is that which is concerned with fairness and reciprocity (concerning the protection of the individual), as well as the prevention of harm to both the individual and others.

Other parts of the moral system are concerned with strengthening and binding the group together by promoting behaviours such as: respect for authority / hierarchy, seeking sanctity / purity, and in-group loyalty.

Appendix D The empirical investigation

Participants

To test the hypotheses, the investigation has to involve a generalisable number of participants (240) with the following characteristics. A total number of 306 participants are included.

Age - Both Piaget and Kohlberg have suggested that a marked change takes place around the age 10-12. Also, to be able to use the same test on all the children (COAT should not be used below the age of 8 (Killen et al. 2002) giving a natural lower limit. In order to investigate a proposed developmental curve, 3 age groups were included. Participants around 8, 10, and 12 years of age were chosen as participants for this investigation.

Gender - As suggested by Gilligan, among others, moral development might be gendered. In order to test this, as well as to assure generalisability, an equal distribution of boys and girls was obtained.

Immigration status - Because it is argued that the development of morals might differ according to social environment (including the exposure to knowledge about culturally different people), two settings have been chosen. The first setting includes children without children of other ethnicities in their peer groups. The other setting includes children with children of other ethnicities in their peer groups. In order to make a sample of the general population, while at the same time keeping Danish children as the majority, the group in the exposure condition should have around 20% ethnically differing children (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister 2005) and must be an ordinary public school with no special need, religious values or private educational practices. This study fulfilled these requirements.

Amount of participants - According to general statistical considerations of the statistical power (ibid.), each category of participants (gender, ethnically exposed, and age group) must contain a minimum of 20 informants for each category. The total equals a minimum of 240 equally distributed participants (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister & Zechmeister 2005).

Content - To address children's moral arguments, exclusion of the targets gender and ethnicity have been chosen. This also presents the possibility to measure cultural dominance, because the two target groups (namely gender and ethnicity) differ culturally. This is because findings shows that the balance of power is favourable to male culture in contemporary Western society (Lieben & Bigler 2002). Furthermore, other ethnicities are a minority group in Denmark (Arnett 2007). Also, all target groups must be easily identifiable.

Place - In the investigations of Killen and colleagues, most measured moral arguments were obtained in schools. In this study, public schools were, similarly, chosen as place to collect information about moral development. Furthermore, to collect the sample in public schools, a representative sample of the general population has been obtained.

Included participants

Participants include two partly homogeneous groups, one group attending Danish public schools in a suburban area with no immigrant children. Participants in this group was recruited from four different schools. The other sample consists of children attending public schools with immigrant children (M=19,6%, SD=2,97, range 17,4% to 23,0%) in same suburban areas. Participants in this group was recruited from three different schools.

In the first group (the one with no immigrant children) there were 50 2nd graders (M=104,82 months, SD=4,279, range 98 to 120 months), including 24 females and 26 males. There were 61 4th graders (M=130, 73months, SD=4,740, range 118 to 141 years), including 36 females and 25 males and 64 6th graders (M=152,72 months, SD=4,135, range 148 to 167 months), including 40 females and 24 males.

In the second group there were 46 2nd graders (M=107,26 years, SD=5,455, range 100 to 123 months), including 23 females (two of them immigrants) and 23 males (two of them immigrants). There were 43 4th graders (M=132,35 years, SD=5,228, range 122 to 148 months), including 21 females (five of them immigrants) and 22 males (one of them an immigrant) and 43 6th graders (M=155,16 years, SD=6,071, range 146 to 176 years), including 23 females (six of them immigrants) and 20 males (two of them immigrants).

Interviews with children observed as other races than north European, were marked but the size of the group is not statistically large enough for analysis.

All the students included came from households with a middle income as determined by the school records and home address information.

Recruitment procedure

Several schools were contacted in suburban areas in Jylland. These schools were controlled for a representative distribution of immigrants, and each school contained about 20% immigrants. First contact was made by phone, giving a short introduction to the main purpose of the project. For schools that confirmed an interest in participating, a request for a personal meeting was made. When the personal meeting was confirmed, an email was sent immediately thereafter.

At the meeting, the interview guide and the test was presented, and a more thorough explanation of the project was given. The School leader was told not to distribute either the test or the interview guide, and that talking to the children about the contents of the interviews beforehand would make the results invalid. Not to make it seem like wanting to brand schools and/or children as immoral, the focus (as explained in the Appendix J on ethical considerations) was, (both when explaining about the project to the participating schools, and in the information in included material, consent forms and writings) explained to be on the development of the moral arguments children make when categorising (rather than rejecting), others.

Wen requests for project participation were approved by the school leaders, consent forms were left. An email was then sent, providing a proposed text to use when presenting the information to the teachers, as well as for use on the school's intranet (skolecom) (see appendix E).

After the school principal's approval, it was up to the staff of teachers to approve the project. The the teachers agreeing to participate were (in the message written on their intranet) informed of how to get a hold of the parental consent forms (see appendix F) (which I had left at the schools for the teachers to distribute to their primary class). All students who brought back a signed consent form were interviewed.

Interview procedure

Children were individually brought to a quiet room at their school to be interviewed. The interviews usually lasted between 10 and 20 minutes. The children were told that if they wanted, they should feel free to end the interview at any time and that they could ask questions any time during the interview. They were furthermore informed that there were no right or wrong answers and that their interview (after being recorded) would be treated only as a number. The recorder was a small digital recorder, laying on the table not meant to cause any special attention. Any systematisation of the procedure was done prior to the interview, trying to make it seem casual and as comfortable as possible for the children.

The interview technique

The interview consisted of two separate parts. In the first part, eight different scenarios were read out loud to the participant. After listening to a scenario, the participant were asked whether the outcome of the situation from the scenario was ok or not ok (then being further specified into whether it was either, not ok at all or a little ok, or ok or only a little ok, depending on their answer). The general format followed the structural developmental interview method, also referred to as 'probing questions' (Kvale 1996) which enable the interviewer to probe the participants reasoning ("why?", "can you tell me more about that?", "how come?", "what do you mean?", etc.) (Killen et al. 2002). Because of the young age of the interview participants, interview methods like direct questions, leading or interpreting questions were deliberately deselected to try to avoid impact of the uneven power relation. The interviews are transcribed, translated (Danish/ English) and back translated (English/Danish) see Appendix H.

The COAT

The second part of the interview included the COAT. The children were re-reminded that there were no right or wrong answers, that this part of the test would be faster, and that many children enjoyed it more than the first part, and that the questions were about jobs, and that (differently from the first part), each question only had three possible answers: women, men or both. The children were asked to tell who should be a e.g. police officer, a man, a woman or both. The test consisted of 25 items, and after having finished this test the children were thanked for their willingness to participate. While being led back to their classroom, they were informed that the interviewer hoped they had found the interview at least as amusing as classes.

Pilot Study

The first version of the interview-guide was tested on two children not participating in the investigation from two of the age groups in a Pilot Study, in order to incorporate all the considerations. This led to a slight change of the formulations in the stories, and explanations of the COAT test and the general introductory notes. Also, a change in ethnic names was made. While still chosen from the most popular Arabic unisex names used in Denmark, both were changed to names not sounding too unfamiliar, as well as to names that were more easily pronounced. This change was made so as not to cause either too much focus on the name, or cause confusion or misinterpretations. Also, a change of activity from the more specific game Schrabble to the general term board game, was made, since Schrabble was shown not to be generally known, and (by the youngest pilot study participant) also understood as a rather difficult game. Furthermore table soccer was changed to table tennis. This change was made both because of its lack of availability in the schools where the informants came from, and because the word soccer is usually associated with males.

Consent

Consent forms were developed in accordance to the ethical considerations and to the standards of Aalborg University. Both contact instructions to the schools (Appendix E) and parental consent forms (see appendix F) have been approved by the leader of the psychology unit as applying to the standards required in "Ethical principles for Nordic Psychologists". Furthermore, the parental consent forms included contact information, including phone, mail and address, to both the leader of psychology: Jens Kvorning as well as my own contact information.

Transskription

The interviews were transcribed word for word, all words included (Kvale 1996) using the transcribtion program minCHAT. This transcription system is used by the CHILDES database, making it possible to apply a variety of different facilities for data handling, as well as getting a structural overview. It is also possible in minCHART (using a coder mode) to code directly in the program, making the data more manageable.

Appendix E Letter to schools

An example of the letter sent (by e-mail)to be posted on the schools intranet. Names have been removed to ensure anonymity.

(Letter on next page)

Kære Lærer for 2., 4. og 6. årgang, XXX Skole.

Jeg hedder Signe Juhl Møller, er specialestuderende ved Aalborg Universitet og er ved at lave et forskningsprojekt ang., hvordan børn begrunder kategoriseringen af deres medmennesker. Dette er udarbejdet i samarbejde med Aalborg Universitet og Prof. Harriet Tenenbaum, Kingston University, London, som jeg også afviklede min praktikperiode hos. I den forbindelse har jeg været ude på flere Sønderjyske skoler, og skoler i Aalborg og omegn, for at interviewe. Jeg har haft en positiv samtale med XXX der bakker op omkring jeres skoles deltagelse i projektet.
Da jeg håber, I er lige så interesserede i at deltage, har jeg sendt samtykkeerklæringen, som børnenes forældre skal underskrive, til XXX, som vil sørge for, at I får dem.

Håber I vil uddele dem i starten af uge 22 og indsamle dem i slutningen af ugen. Ud over det kræver jeres deltagelse ikke andet, end at jeg, i én til to timer, alt efter hvor mange elever, der har afleveret samtykkeerklæring, låner én elev ca. 10 - 15 minutter af gangen, hvor jeg optager deres forklaringer til 8 små historier samt opfølgende spørgsmål. Dette har jeg forestillet mig vil foregå i starten af uge 23 men det kommer igen an på, hvor mange elever der vil deltage.

Mit projekt tager udgangspunkt i børns begrundelser, og hvorledes disse vurderinger ændrer sig aldersmæssigt. Hertil oplæser jeg otte små scenarier, derefter bliver eleven spurgt om sin opfattelse af, hvem der bedst udfører en række erhverv (mand - kvinde - begge), sidstnævnte ift. elevens opfattelse af samfundsmæssigt skabte kategoriseringer.

Der er ikke tale om en undersøgelse, hvor eleven kan have en dårlig eller god præstation. Jeg undersøger især deres begrundelser, disse bliver derefter kodet, og der vil således kun blive set på gennemsnit af grupper. Forklaringerne er fortrolige og anonyme; kun barnets interview-nummer og køn vil blive brugt i forbindelse med indsamlingen. At der skal anføres navn på deres samtykkeerklæringer er udelukkende for at sikre, at kun de, der har fået lov, bliver interviewet.

I alle former for publikationer fra data-indsamlingen vil der ligeledes udelukkende blive set på gennemsnit af grupper. Evt. personlige oplysninger fra de indsamlede forklaringer vil hverken blive belyst eller videregivet. Min engelske vejleder har et ønske om, at jeg skriver en artikel til et engelsk fagblad, som hun vil være anden forfatter på, hvis alt går som det skal sender jeg den selvfølgelig også til jer.

Hvis I har spørgsmål om elevernes deltagelse i undersøgelsen, er I velkomne til at kontakte mig.
Kontakt venligst.
Signe Juhl Møller Tlf: 31181534
Mail: shiny03@hum.aau.dk

Hvis I har spørgsmål om deltagernes rettigheder eller etiske regler, kontakt venligst min vejleder, studieleder for Psykologi og Musikterapi ved Institut for Kommunikation, Aalborg universitet.
Jens Kvorning Tlf.: 9635 9065
Mail: kvorning@hum.aau.dk

1000 tak for jeres opbakning omkring undersøgelsen!

Appendix F parental consent form

Kære Forældre.

Jeg er ved at lave et forskningsprojekt ang., hvordan børn begrunder kategoriseringen af deres medmennesker. I den forbindelse optager jeg børns forklaringer til 8 små historier samt opfølgende spørgsmål.

Jeg håber, du synes, det er i orden, at dit barn deltager, og forsikrer dig om, at indsamlingen af forklaringer er fortrolig og anonym; kun barnets interview-nummer og køn vil blive brugt i forbindelse med indsamlingen.

I alle former for publikationer fra data-indsamlingen vil der udelukkende blive set på gennemsnit af grupper. Evt. personlige oplysninger fra de indsamlede forklaringer vil hverken blive belyst eller videregivet.

<u>Det er naturligvis frivilligt at deltage.</u>

Hvis du skulle føle dig usikker omkring dit barns deltagelse i indsamlingen, er du velkommen til at kontakte mig.

Kontakt venligst.
Signe Juhl Møller Tlf: 31181534
Mail: shiny03@hum.aau.dk

Hvis du har spørgsmål om deltagernes rettigheder eller etiske regler, kontakt venligst min vejleder studieleder for Psykologi og Musikterapi ved Institut for Kommunikation,
Jens Kvorning Tlf.: 9635 9065
Mail: kvorning@hum.aau.dk

Barnets navn: _____

[ ] må gerne deltage.

[ ] må ikke deltage.

Underskriv venligst her.

1000 tak for din opbakning omkring undersøgelsen!

Signe Juhl Møller,
Speciale-studerende, psykologi
Institut for Kommunikation
Aalborg Universitet
Kroghstræde 3, 9220 Aalborg Øst

Appendix G Reliability

To make it possible to obtain inter-coder coding reliability with American researcher Harriet Tenenbaum, as well as enable any further cooperation, the interviews are translated into English (see appendix H). Coding reliability and inter-language reliability will now be explained.

Coding Reliability

To obtain inter-rater reliability, the author and Harriet Tenenbaum met and coded 20 interviews in English together over the course of a few hours. The remaining 60 interviews (20% of the data set) were coded separately. An overall kappa of .81 was obtained for these codes obtained equals a substantial agreement (Landis & Koch 1977) with individual kappas as follows: fairness, $\kappa = .88$, empathy, $\kappa = .90$, integration, $\kappa = .73$, group functioning, $\kappa = .68$, social traditions, $\kappa = .76$, and authority, $\kappa = .87$. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Translation reliability

The interviews coded in English were re-coded in Danish and it was found to have a slightly higher kappa ($\kappa = .83$) was obtained assuring that the coding do not differ language wise.

Appendix H Translation procedure for translation of the interviews

To be able to measure the inter rater coding reliability with Researcher Harriet Tenenbaum, after being transcribed, the Interviews had to be translated to English. To minimize the information lost in translation, the interviews were translated following a three-step procedure that suggested converting the source language (Danish) into the target language (English).

Step 1: **Translation,** the text was translated from Danish to English, staying as faithful to the meaning of the source text as possible. The translation was made as literally as possible, while still making sure that it was understandable. This was done to eliminate additions ti the meaning of the source text, and thereby achieve a translation as similar as possible to the source text.

Step 2: **Back translation,** in order to be able to clarify whether the meaning of the translated target text is exact to the source text, the initial target text was back translated to the source language.

Step 3: **Verification,** the original text (source) and the back translation was compared. This is to verify that the meaning from the translated (target) text complied with the original (source) text. Any parts of the original text where the meaning did not comply with the back translated text were re translated, re back translated and re verified in order to get the meaning of the source text as close as possible to be consistent with the meaning restored in the back translated text. This process was repeated until a satisfactory compliance was met.

Word for word translations were thus addressed, and various linguistic factors were taken into consideration, when not through literature in contact with a native English speaker.

The meaning in the source language, have been seen as more important than the syntax, the content is in this type of text and have mostly been straightforward and understandable with very little use of e.g. allegory. In the translation what was seen as the most important was that the meaning of the translated target language was as close to the original source language as possible.

This is of importance not to create interview technical bias, as for example to create a different coding of the informants when executed in English than in Danish. T know the impact the translation had on the coding, the inter-rater reliability procedure was also worked with considering translation see Appendix G

Appendix I Coding

The coding scheme has been developed to explore children's use of social conventional knowledge and moral reasoning's when presented with material containing ex- or inclusion. As demonstrated in the coding scheme below equality, self interest, emotional responsiveness, fairness, expectations, group norms and stereotyping are among the categories of coding, categories. These and other categories have been developed in an ongoing process during meetings while in the coding procedure continually questioning the purpose of the investigation and the hypotheses of this investigation (Kvale 1996). Also whether the codings clarified these hypotheses as well as making the data both fit the scope of answers and systematize these for the analytical process (Killen et. al 2002; Bakeman & Gottman 1997).

Category Descriptions

In the following the coding categories used in the coding process will be described, the coding's are further organized due to their qualities into moral, social conventional and psychological coding categories to implement the analysis, answering the hypotheses. Some of the developed coding's have not been found useful of either answering the hypotheses or finding their legitimation in the empirical data (e.g. cognitive physical maturation). Examples are taken from different interviews and the coding are from the actual data used.

Category	Code	Description	Example *From the interviews*
Morals The codings in this category have been chosen and developed to answer the hypotheses regarding moral development. Clarifying children's use of moral arguments.	**FAIR**	Covers arguments of fairness and the maintenance of fairness found in the arguments dealing with the treatment of other children. This can be arguments supporting an equal treatment of others, or their rights to be treated fairly.	*"Because there should not be a difference you know, difference, you know, that a boy that is not an immigrant can not join and then another immigrant is allowed to, it is first come, first served, you know."*
	EMP	Covers arguments originated in empathy such as the child's comments on feelings of the involved children and argument emphasizing caring about and helping other children.	*"I feel a little sorry for Mathias, he gets pains in the stomach because of it, the girls does not behave nicely, ..."*
	INT	Covers arguments identified to contain children's arguments about integration, this is defined as children's arguments of the wrongfulness of discrimination and prejudice e.g. when the child refer to the consequences for society and humanities of the acceptability of these discriminations.	*"Everybody have to be able to join, I think it is too bad that you leave someone out either because of sex or kind. ... I do not know if you can say that there is no other kinds, that I do not know, I just think there have to be room for everybody to join."*

(table continued on next page)

Category	Code	Description	Example From the interviews
Social conventional The coding's in this category has been chosen and developed to answer the hypotheses. Clarifying children's use of social conventional arguments.	**GROUP**	Covers when children in their arguments refer to the functioning of groups such as the need to make the group function well, impairments of the identity of the group, the groups jurisdiction and the decision-making of the group.	*"... me and my friends we have an agreement that we will not accept any dark skinned to join, because there are some of those Africans here in the school, and we will not let those join because they are pretty annoying sometimes, but it is because they are annoying and because we do not understand their language very well either, but they have learnt to speak Danish."*
	SOC TRAD	Covers when children's arguments refer to social traditions, social traditions are conventions such as the labels attributed to the children in the stories e.g. labels based on stereotypes or the membership of a specific group.	*"... because the immigrants they are a little different you know, and they do other things and stuff like that, they do other things that the Danish children do not do, when she want to try some of those things, then they will tell her that she cannot join because they do not believe she can figure out how to do so".*
	AUTH	Covers children's arguments about authority, this can be both the authority in parental jurisdiction but also governmental or schools rules and laws and religious authority.	*"... it is mostly because it is the teacher saying it, you know, you can not really do anything against what a teacher decide, it is them who decide at school."*
	STOPP	Refer to opposite social tradition. This coding covers when children's arguments is opposing social traditions. This can be when opposing the social traditions or conventions earlier referred to as the labels the children attribute to the children from the stories. Children might oppose to the labels as based on stereotypical knowledge, or the questioning whether membership of groups can be legitimized by social tradition and conventions.	*"Just because it is a girl and the boys think it is uncool to play with girls, but I just do not think it is OK to think it is uncool to play with girls, because you should b allowed to. ... Because it is OK, there is nothing wrong in playing with girls. ... It is not OK at all."*
	AUTH RESP	Covers children's arguments about the responsibility of the authorities, such as the responsibility of authorities when it comes to the jurisdiction of parents, but also governmental and schools responsibilities.	*"A proper teacher let the ones who wants to join join, and do not make differences between boys and girls".*

(table continued on next page)

Category	Code	Description	Example From the interviews
Psychological The codings in this category has been chosen and developed to answer the hypotheses. Clarifying the Psychological qualities in children's arguments.	**CHOICE**	Covers arguments referring to the chilren's personal choice, exemplified with the character's rights to have prerogatives and individual preferences.	*"Because if you want to be alone then you shall be allowed to, without anyone else joining, and what they say about only girls can join, I think that it is a bad excuse, they would have let him join if they liked him."*
	CHILD	Covers when children argue of the rights of the children themselves to decide such as children's own rights to dictate rather that following suggestions and guidelines from others.	*"... but if Mads want to play with the immigrants himself then it is not OK for the teacher to decide that he can not play with them, only he can decide that."*
	OUTCOME	Covers arguments containing children's considerations of the outcomes of a situation or a choice, and consequences hereof. This can be the positive and negative aspects of a situation.	*"...you are together with the teacher almost all the time, you know, and if it then is, that you do not have a good relationship to the teacher, the being in school will not bring anything good, and then you stop going there."*
Other	**OTHER**	Covers when children's responses even though they seem to be fitting into some kind of specific category, these codings do not fit the other categories and is therefore coded as uncodable responses since they might refer to codings that could be developed after carefully going through this part of the data.	*"Because it is just not OK like that, it is just not all right to do that, this is the way you want to be as a person".*

Appendix J Considerations

Methodological considerations

The COAT (children's scale of occupation activities traits) test is a standardised shortened version of the original OAT (occupation activities traits) test, developed by Liben and. Bigler. The test has been shown to be significantly correlated with other used gender tests such as The CSRIF and CSRIM as well as the CPAQF, CPAQM and CPAQMF (for a throughout review see Lieben & Bigler, 2002). The COAT-AM, (attitude measure) has been developed to give a fair picture of the participants' gendered attitude/ gender typing -of others. The test consist of 25 items, 10 masculine 10 feminine and 5 neutral items, occupations, the participants are asked to label the 25 occupations as either male female or both male and female occupations, as this is an American test considerations have been given to the translation and the compliance to a Danish participants. Gender attitudes can be argued as a cultural constructed phenomena (Liben & Bigler 2002) and the comparability between the American and the Danish version of the Western culture might have some inconsistencies, as an example item number 20 of the test is dentist, which according to American standards is considered as a male occupation but because children (under 18) dental care in Denmark is within the social health care system, a lower paid sector than the private sector, it is generally female dominant (http://www.dst.dk/). This part of the test is argued to be redesigned for use in a Danish environment. A change idea have been developed, and applied in that: dentist have in preliminary calculations been changed to feminine and first telephone assistant was changed to masculine but another calculation that, without making a bigger study, tough seemed more applicable to the Danish society, was to change comedian and chef to masculine occupations and dentist to feminine.
The large scope of the COAT test compensated for any significant changes in the general results used in this thesis and it was, due to generalisability decided to use the original parameters for the final calculations. It is however still suggested that if the measure shall be used in later investigations applied to a Danish sample a pre study shall be conducted on a Danish sample to adjust the COAT parameters.

Ethnicity, immigrants and race

In societies with larger populations of immigrants, ethnicity, immigrants and race are very different expressions such as in the American population. In America, to continue with that as an example, the native Americans are a minority, and the majority of the American population is a mosaic of immigrants who have (to one degree or another) become a part of the American melting pot (Arnett 2007). The Danish population is traditionally relatively homogeneous, and only in recent years has there been an increase in the number of immigrants from non European countries. These immigrants come mostly from Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Palestine, and are often concentrated in the bigger cities (ibid). Because immigration historically has been from northern Europe, this makes the word ethnicity and race interchangeable in everyday language, because other ethnicities will usually be lumped into the same category of 'other' no matter what race or ethnicity they are. This happens because there have typically been so few immigrants in most areas of Denmark that it has not seemed necessary to differentiate.
This is an important clarification because it is children in Denmark whom are being used as informants in the present study. This means that the Danish children's classifications of ethnicity or race will not be that specific (and may be interchangeable). The study is hence not based upon race or ethnicity, but is looking at immigration status, which makes it slightly different than past

research. The study has been conducted this way because immigration from non Nordic countries is a rather new phenomenon in Denmark (ibid) that is immigration status refer to culturally differing individuals in the population, furthermore in schools, children with a second language will most often be concentrated in bigger cities and this makes it a possibility to study if and how exposure to these children influence morals and also to study whether children with two cultures differ in their moral reasoning's.

Both gender and immigration status are identified in this study as target qualities which could be identified by informants as the basis of rejection of a child. This is because these qualities are visually distinguishable, and sometimes lead to unpleasant behaviour such as sexism and racism. Other examples could include overweight (Hebl & Xu 2001) or handicapped children (Mulderij 1996). Both gender and immigration status also underline the importance to move beyond restrictions developed by socially constructed phenomenon, since some of these phenomena are harming human beings. Examples from present day society include restrictions such as: women are bad at math (Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2006), and other races are not as smart as Caucasians (Nyborg & Jensen 2000). Most research investing the reduction of stereotyping proposes that contact with out-group members improves the perception and evaluation of the out-group. These studies have mostly examined social conditions in order to reduce stereotyping and prejudices in a context which provides positive contact (Verkuyten 2002). In natural settings, the positive conditions are not self-evident, and conditions for the contact is influenced by a variety of factors (e.g. social support, the origin of the contact, cooperative interdependence etc.). However, recent studies supports earlier suggestions that intergroup contact decreases race based exclusion (Crystal, Killen and Ruck 2008).

Ethical considerations

Not to cause unintended worries or exam feelings the effort was, when presenting the material for the children, on, that it was an interview and not a test, this made some disappointments (if it was an interview where was the camera, or the big microphone to talk into and when am I going to be a TV star?) This was done so to make the children come up with their own meanings, they where furthermore truly instructed that there were no wrong or right answers and if they felt like leaving it was no problem, this not to cause any uncomfortable feelings about investigations or expressing own meanings.

When presenting the project to the schools the theorized moral process behind exclusion (presented with a more neutral word categorisation, focusing on whether children categorizes the child in the story as a relevant participant in the game or not) was not mentioned, this careful use of neutral wordings is not to cause any kind of suspicion that the school or the children should be presented in a morally, gendered or race related topic, as both morals gender and race seems to be sensitive topics. This more neutral presentation is also in accordance to suggestions by study leader Jens Kvorning.

With concern to the use of exclusion, and the ethical considerations concerning that children should not be presented as, or familiarised with, ether racists or sexists, exclusion in the stories is presented to investigate the moral arguments fostered in the children, the word exclusion is not used and children are never personally confronted with their answers, as standardised probing techniques are used (see, the *Interview section* of Appendix D).

In the thesis the term exclusion is used, translation considerations have been on what seem to be a more fatal nature of the word exclusion than e.g. rejection, but since there is no defined time factor e.g. you can exclude one person now, and the next moment you include the person again, exclusion and rejection is considered as similar and not to cause any categorical confusion it is decided to use exclusion as also used by *domain* theorists (Killen et al. 2002)

Appendix K Interview guide

Description of the considerations behind the Interview Guide as well as the actual Interview guide and the COAT questionnaire.

Design of the interview guide

The design of the interview guide was made to support the testing of the hypotheses. The general condensed question being addressed was how children's moral value judgements about exclusion vary with the following parameters:

Age -This includes development between approximately 96 months (~8 yrs.), up to approximately 144 months (~12 yrs.). Three age groups are addressed with the same interview guide, and for this reason, the interview guide must be carefully designed not to either exceed or underrate the cognitive development of the informants. The interview guide must also be careful not to address aspects which might change drastically within the age span of informants e.g. love relationships or age specific games.

Target of rejection - Two targets have been chosen to foster moral arguments: rejection based on gender; and rejection based on ethnic status. This complicates the investigation since both gender roles and the perception of other ethnicities change over time, situation, and place.

Gender - To investigate 'gender based exclusion', questions were formulated to analyse how different gendered informants argue about the rejection of either a female or a male child. Focus has been placed not on addressing social conventions (e.g. boys playing with cars), but rather an effort has been made to choose gender neutral activities. Furthermore, for the questions containing an immigrant child, unisex names have been chosen to minimize gender relevance.

Gender signing -To measure the degree of stereotyping, as well as the gendered socialization/ understanding of societal gender roles, the COAT test has been chosen. The American origin of this instrument has been given further consideration (see, Appendix J).

Authority - To address the effect of authority, the perpetrator of the exclusion has been chosen to be either a peer group (when no authority is present), or a teacher (when authority is present).

Contemporariness - The activities, as well as the made up names used in the scenarios, have been chosen from typically occurring games, and were independently verified by two public school teachers. Furthermore, the names for the children occurring in the scenarios have been chosen from a list of the most popular names in the birth year of the middle age group (from a Copenhagen University study of names). For the ethnic children, the most common unisex Arabic name in the Danish population was chosen. Using the most popular names also assures that the name (in itself) does not cause extra attention, and also does not personalise the name.

Time limits - since recruitment are from various schools, and consequently take place during classes, interviews did not last more than 10 minutes. This was necessary in order to get schools agree to participate, as well as to make it possible to collect the statistical amount of data necessary. Furthermore, the academic school year also needed to be taken into account, because holidays, school trips, activity days, and tests all limited the availability of the informants.

Interview Guide

Der er ikke noget, du kan sige eller gøre forkert, så hvis der er noget, så spørg bare! Hvis du gerne

vil stoppe interviewet så siger du bare til. Interviewet vil blive optaget men det bliver behandlet som et nummer, altså dit navn kommer ikke til at stå nogen steder.

Du skal lige vide at når jeg i et par af spørgsmålene snakker om indvandrer børn, så er det børn hvor deres forældre kommer fra et andet land.

Dreng ekskluderet - jævnaldrende

En gruppe piger står på rulleskøjter. Mathias vil gerne være med, men pigerne siger, at kun piger kan være med. Er det ok eller ikke ok for pigerne ikke at lade Mathias være med i legen?

Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Pige ekskluderet - jævnaldrende

En gruppe drenge spiller rundboldt. Emma vil gerne være med, men drengene siger, at kun drenge kan være med. Er det ok eller ikke ok for drengene ikke at lade Emma være med i legen?

Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Dansker ekskluderet - Lærer

Mads vil gerne spille bord-tennis, men læreren siger, at han ikke kan spille med, fordi der allerede er tre indvandrer drenge og -piger, der spiller. I stedet giver læreren en indvandrer fra klassen lov til at spille med. Er det ok eller ikke ok at læreren ikke lader Mads spille med indvandre børnene?

Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Dansker ekskluderet - jævnaldrende

Julie vil gerne være med til at spille bold op ad muren med en gruppe indvandrerbørn, indvandrerbørnene siger, at kun indvandrerbørn kan spille med. Er det ok eller ikke ok for indvandrerbørnene ikke at lade Julie være med i legen?

Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Indvandrer ekskluderet - jævnaldrende
En gruppe danske drenge og piger spiller scrabble, Sultan vil gerne spille med, men de danske børn der allerede spiller, siger at Sultan ikke kan spille med. I stedet vil de ha en dansk klassekammerat til at spille med dem. Er det ok eller ikke ok at de danske børn ikke vil lade Sultan spille med?
Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Indvandrer ekskluderet - lærer
Shahar vil gerne spille ludo, men læreren siger, at Shahar ikke kan være med, fordi der allerede er tre danske drenge og piger der spiller. I stedet giver læreren en dansk klassekammerat lov til at spille med. Er det ok eller ikke ok at læreren ikke lader Shahar være med til at spille?
Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Pige ekskluderet - lærer
En gruppe drenge leger gemme. Sarah vil gerne være med, men læreren siger, at kun drenge kan lege med. Er det ok eller ikke ok at læreren ikke lader Sarah være med i legen?
Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Dreng ekskluderet - lærer
En gruppe piger spiller kort. Christian vil gerne være med, men læreren siger, at kun piger kan spille med. Er det ok eller ikke ok at læreren ikke lader Christian være med i legen.
Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke?

	Meget	Lidt
Ikke ok	1	2
Ok	4	3

Dreng ekskluderet	Pige ekskluderet	Etnicitet ekskluderet	Etnicitet ekskluderet
lærer	lærer	lærer	lærer
jævnaldrende	jævnaldrende	jævnaldrende	jævnaldrende

COAT

<u>Oversat fra original tekst, bruges ved spørgeskema udfyldt af respondenten:</u>
Her er en liste over jobs som folk kan have. Vi vil gerne have at du for hver af disse jobs fortæller os om det bør udføres af mænd, kvinder eller både af mænd og kvinder. Der er ikke nogle rigtige eller forkerte svar. Vi vil bare vide hvem du mener bør udføre disse jobs. Hvis du mener det skal udføres kun af mænd skal du sætte en cirkel omkring 1; hvis du mener det bør udføres kun af kvinder sæt en cirkel omkring 2; hvis du mener det kan udføres af både mænd og kvinder sæt en cirkel omkring 3.

<u>Tekst til information, bruges ved spørgeskema udfyldt af interviewer:</u>
Jeg vil nu læse en række jobs/arbejder op og bede dig efter hvert job at sige om du mener det bør udføres af mænd, af kvinder eller både af mænd og kvinder (drenge/piger). Der er ikke nogle rigtige eller forkerte svar. Jeg vil bare gerne vide hvem du synes bør udføre disse jobs.
Denne del af interviewet er kortere end den anden og de fleste synes den er sjovere.

(Questionnaire on next page)

HVEM KAN (VÆRE):	Kun Mænd 1	Kun Kvinder 2	Både Mænd og Kvinder 3
Opvasker på en Restaurant	1	2	3
Sidde ved kassen i et supermarked	1	2	3
Kunstner	1	2	3
Rengøringsassistent	1	2	3
Passe Telefoner	1	2	3
Skolepedel	1	2	3
Bibliotekar	1	2	3
Kok i en restaurant	1	2	3
Babysitter	1	2	3
Sekretær	1	2	3
Vand, Varme, Sanitet, montør	1	2	3
Sygeplejerske	1	2	3
Fabriksejer/ Direktør	1	2	3
Frisør	1	2	3
Videnskabsmand/ Forsker	1	2	3
Bager	1	2	3
Politibetjent	1	2	3
Computer tekniker	1	2	3
Arkitekt	1	2	3
Tandlæge	1	2	3
Komiker	1	2	3
Tandlægeassistent	1	2	3
Skibs kaptajn	1	2	3
Spion	1	2	3
Blomsterdekoratør	1	2	3

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