

**Environmental Social Movements
And Their Influence on the EU Policy-Makers
A Case Study of Greenpeace and WWF**



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Abstract

The climate change is one of the most urgent problems the contemporary world has to face. Having adopted the highest emission reduction target of all industrialized countries, the European Union perceives itself as a frontrunner in the battle against global warming, however, being concerned about the pace of climate change environmental social movements call on the EU to take on more ambitious goals. This thesis examines the role of environmental social movements in the decision-making procedure of the European Union. It demonstrates the multiple points of access to EU institutions as those directly involved in the decision making process. The paper follows the assumption that environmental social movements exert a perceptible influence on the direction of the environmental policy formed within the European Union. Therefore, the advocacy work of two environmental organizations on climate change issues is analysed in terms of their influence on environmental policy outcomes. This thesis' core interest is to evaluate the extent to what environmental social movements can actually influence the European decision-making. The analysis of the aforementioned issues is supported by a theoretical framework comprising of the Theory of Collective Action, Resource Mobilization Theory and Rational Choice Theory.

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Introduction

The deep transformation that the world was undergoing in the late 1960s¹, mobilized people from different countries, economic and social classes, of different social status and education level to take actions showing the growing dissatisfaction with the direction of changes that were in the making. Presently social movements seem to be “a permanent component of western democracies”². Regional, national and supranational governments’ decisions concerning such crucial issues as, inter alia, environment, are carefully followed by social movements participants ready for prompt reaction.

During the last decades environmental concerns became one of the most important contemporary world issues. Apart from the researchers’ findings, observable evidences of global warming like frequent extreme weather events prove the urgent action is needed in order to mitigate climate change. What is more, as world begins to run short of fossil fuels and price rises affect all aspects of life, the role of renewable energy sources in worlds’ economy seem to be more prominent than ever. Hence, it is no wonder that “*the environment has moved from a minority passion to a hot topic in today's world*”³.

According to research on issue concerns carried out in six European cities, environment is placed on the 14 position out of 25 (among sport, youths issues, religious activities, hobbies, health and many more)⁴. At the same time green organizations⁵ such as WWF or Greenpeace are one of best recognized among social movements, even though the ecological range of problems in global terms has only recently became an issue of concern.

¹ Della Porta, D., M., Diani, *Social movements: An introduction*, Blackwell Publishing , 2006, p. 1

² Ibidem

³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7730449.stm>, accessed: 9/12/2008

⁴ King, G., B., A social movements Perspective of the Stakeholder Collective Action and Influence, , *Business & Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 21-49 (2008), p. 61

⁵ Organizations acting in favor of natural environment

As far as the European Union is concerned, not until the mid-1970s were environmental issues ranked high on its political agenda.⁶ Yet, it should come as no surprise since the preliminary aim of European integration was to form economic and political foundations that would eventually conduce to stable and peaceful growth in Europe. The need for deeper concerns of environmental problems began to prevail in discussions of policy makers since the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972. Even though the importance of environmental protection was underlined and three Environmental Action Plans were passed there, no EU law regulating implementation of these Acts existed at that time.⁷ Environmental policy was given a legal framework only in 1987, when the Single European Act (SEA) added a new Title VII – ‘Environment’, to the Treaty of Rome and acknowledged environmental issues as one of the main goals of further integration.⁸ The SEA incorporated also several structural changes including majority voting and harmonization of the community law. In 1992, when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, the policy making in the EU was revolutionised.⁹ According to Article 130 unanimity is required to pass environmental policy, however, there are few exceptions from this rule. Article 130r(2) requires the incorporation of environmental protection into Community policies. Though, in case harmonisation of standards affects the market, the policy falls under Article 100a, according to which policies are adopted by

⁶ environmental guidelines given by the European Commission at that time included: creation of Environment and Consumer Protection Service in DGIII (1973); creation of Committee on the Environment in European Parliament (1973); adoptions of First Environmental Programme (1973-76) and creation of the European Environmental Bureau (1974); successive development of the Environmental Action Programmes in 1977-81 and 1982-86, and creation of first Community environmental fund in 1984; in McCornick, J. *Environmental Policy in the European Union*, The European Union Series, Palgrave, 2001, table 2.1

⁷ Cave, L.A. and Blomquist, G.C, *Environmental policy in the European Union: Fostering the development of pollution havens?*, *Ecological Economics*, No. 65 (2008), p. 255

⁸ see Nugent, N., *The Government and Politics of The European Union*, New York, 2003, pp. 296, 318

⁹ Cave, L.A. and Blomquist, G.C, op. cit., p. 255

majority voting and Member States have no power to veto a proposal by themselves.¹⁰

Under Article 189 of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has the power to issue environmental directives to its member states, letting the environmental controls lie beyond national authorities' competence.¹¹ On the other hand, as Oates and Portney notice, unanimity is *de facto* needed in the EU decision making, what confines the factual power of domestic actors. Nonetheless coming the Maastricht Treaty into force allowed the centralisation of decision making in the field of environment and initiated the period of more severe environmental policy for all Member States.¹²

Definitions and problem formulation

In this paper we are interested in determining whether environmental social movements can influence the legislative process of the European Union as far as environmental issues are concerned. Our research focuses on selected case studies involving transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in terms of their actions designed to reduce the problem of climate change. Our overall aim is to examine whether environmental social movements attain successes in their ambition to exert influence on decision-making in the European Union and to which extent. The terms *social movements*, *NGOs*, *interest* or *advocacy groups* are used interchangeably throughout the paper.

When dealing with lobbying work and actors trying to exert influence on other actors, a clear understanding of what is meant by "influence" is required. Our analysis pertains to the EU legislative process, where the EU institutions have decision-

¹⁰ Wilkinson, D. "Maastricht and the Environment: the implications for the EC's Environment Policy of The Treaty on European Union", Oxford University, 2002 in Cave, L.A. and Blomquist, G.C, op. cit., p. 255

¹¹ Oates, W.E. and Portney, P. R., *The Political Economy of Environmental Policy*, Discussion Paper 01–55, November 2001, p. 22

¹² Cave, L.A. and Blomquist, G.C, op. cit., p. 255

making power. What they actually need from NGOs is specialized knowledge and that is why providing information is the main strategy of NGOs¹³ in their attempts to influence decision-makers. Thus, one possible way of defining influence could be: “(...) *when actor intentionally transmits information to another that alters the latter’s actions from what would have occurred without the information*”.¹⁴

In our paper we intend to focus on the so-called “new social movements” that have emerged since 1960s. We will base our analysis on two theories, namely Collective Action Theory and Rational Choice Theory, both of which have superseded the traditional approaches to understanding social movements. As we want to focus our research on contemporary movements, we find it relevant to use theories that seek to explain appearance and importance of social movements in post-industrial societies.

Although two approaches examine social movements at different levels of analysis, their use in the project may be relevant when attempting to obtain detailed, utter understanding of the subject.

Groups influenced or endeavored to be influenced by social movements vary in terms of power they demonstrate, therefore channels of influence may be direct or indirect. The pressure addressed at the European Commission and the European Parliament as those directly involved in decision making process needs to be analyzed. Moreover, Council of European Union will be discussed. Movements’ attitudes towards local governments, EU environmental policy and regulations will be analysed on the basis of empirical information collected on the organizations and activists that belong to the ecological movements. Hypothesis formulated is: *Environmental social movements have a perceptible influence on the direction of the environmental policy formed within the European Union.* Therefore, the paper will endeavor to evaluate the influence of social movements on different level decision

¹³ Corell, E. and Betsil, M.M., A comparative look at NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate Change, *Global Environmental Politics* 1:4, November 2001, p. 87

¹⁴ Knocke, D. *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, in Corell, E., Betsil, M.M, op. cit, p. 87

makers. There are two issues of concern: first of all whether there is any influence exercised by social movements and second of all to what extent it is exercised. With respect to the European Union we may note that European integration no longer operates under technocratic cover¹⁵, but is determined by an ongoing and explicit political struggle among contending coalitions of governments¹⁶, supranational actors and domestic interests. We will attempt to answer what the role of the social movements is among these representatives of various interests.

Methodology

Method applied is to be a case study. Two social movements were carefully chosen to depict set of cross-level interactions¹⁷ between two parties of the process: that is in general a social movement itself and the EU institutions. The actors chosen need to demonstrate certain characteristic and meet specific criteria, alter alia: transparency in terms of actions taken, high-profile, with a proven, consequent track of record, operating in the area of non-governmental organizations etc. That all determines a reliable subject of the research and assures (at least to some extent) findings to be reliable. Descriptive method will enable to present not only a process of influence but also its possible outcomes.

According to Margit Mayer “*the emergence and development of social movements are primarily explained in terms of variability in resources and in political opportunity structure. Movements are always measured by the criteria of strategic effectiveness*”¹⁸. We do not assume the effectiveness of the social movements can be entirely measured; however, an attempt will be taken to demonstrate the cross-level interactions.

¹⁵ It is not only the result of arid decisions of the EU institutions

¹⁶ Della Porta, D., *Social movements in a Globalizing World*, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, p. 14

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 5

¹⁸ Mayer, M., “*Social movement research in the United States: A European perspective*” in: *Social Movements. Critiques, Concepts, Case-Studie*, ed. Lyman, S.M., Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire, Great Britain, 1995, p. 177

Corell and Betsil¹⁹, who analysed the role of NGOs in international policy-making, developed a set of indicators to evaluate NGOs' influence on the international negotiation process. We believe the proposed framework may be useful while dealing with EU policy-making and internal negotiations as well.

The above mentioned authors maintain that they would expect influential NGOs: (1) to be present at the negotiations; (2) provide written information behind particular position to relevant government representatives (in case of the EU policy-making also to EU representatives) or to negotiation sessions; (3) provide oral information behind a particular position; (4) provide specific advice to political representatives; (5) to have an opportunity to define environmental issue being negotiated; (6) to have an opportunity to shape the negotiating agenda; and, finally (7) to have the ability to ensure that certain text supporting a particular position is incorporated in the policy. The first four indicators refer to aspects of NGO participation. However, this alone does not guarantee that interests are adopted and information turns into influence. According to Corell and Betsil²⁰ NGO have to fulfill at least some indicators 1-4 in order to be considered to influence negotiations. Indicators 5-7 address the visible effects of NGO participation. Consequently, they are the most important factors in assessing levels of NGO influence. There are three levels describing the extent of influence: low (when NGOs participation does not lead to a desirable effect); moderate (when NGOs participation leads to some success in shaping the negotiation process); and high (when NGOs participation leads to specific results in the agreement text).

We will apply the analytical framework to several cases examining the efforts of reaching the EU decision-makers and influence political processes by two environmental social movements – World Wide Fund for Nature and Greenpeace.

¹⁹ Corell, E. and Betsil, M.M, op. cit., p. 90

²⁰ Ibidem

Overview

Chapter 2 is dedicated to environmental policy, where it is also touched upon a concept of global warming. Typology of social movements will be presented in chapter 3, followed by theories related to emergence of social movements and their causes of action (chapter 4). Means and ways of influence with particular emphasis on the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union will be displayed. In practical part (chapter 6) we will attempt to illustrate actions of two environmental movements, namely WWF and Greenpeace, followed by discussion on possible outcomes (chapter 7) and final conclusion (chapter 8).

1. Insights into the EU's policy towards the problem of climate change

The climate change problem is currently one of the most crucial and pressing environmental matters in the international arena. It is a worldwide issue that affects developed and less developed countries alike. That is why it is so important to combat the problem on the international level. The European Union claims to be a world leader in environmental protection and in the international negotiations concerning global warming. Furthermore it considers itself a front runner in developing a legal framework as regards with climate.²¹ The following chapter illustrates the complexity of the climate change problem and its consequences for the survival of the planet. It will also examine the EU's policies and key developments concerning climate change.

1.1 The problem

The scientific research²² proves that the consequences of climate change, which seems to be happening at an especially fast rate from XX century onwards, can lead to serious economic and social problems. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 4th Assessment Report²³ noticeable changes in the climate system are '*unequivocal*' and with a high probability can be, in part, attributed to human activities.²⁴ The major cause of the problem of climate change, which often refers to global warming, is the rising level of the greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. As the result the surface of the Earth is warmed by the

²¹ Kulesa, M.E., Setting Efficient EU Climate Policy Targets: Mission Possible?, Forum "The Climate Policy of the European Union", Intereconomics, March/April 2007, p. 65

²² For a detailed account see IPCC: Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC on Climate Change, 2007, available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf, p. 30, accessed: 10/05/2008

²³ IPCC : Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC on Climate Change, 2007, p. 30; available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf, accessed: 10/05/2008

²⁴ Kulesa, M.E., op. cit. p. 64

atmosphere letting through shortwave solar radiation while increasing the absorption of longer infrared radiation coming back to the Earth²⁵. The overall consequence is a rise in global temperatures.

During the past 100 years the average temperature of the Earth's surface has increased by 0, 74° C.²⁶ If there is no significant change in the level of GHG emissions created by business and industry, it is plausible that global warming by another 3-4°C may occur by the end of the century.²⁷ The implications of a significant rise in global temperature would most likely include glacial melt, rising sea levels, changing weather conditions, flash flooding, hurricanes, droughts and the devastation of many fragile ecosystems.

The increasing levels of greenhouse gases can be attributed to a combination of land-use change, agricultural and industrial activities and an increase in the combustion of fossil fuels (carbon, oil, gas).²⁸ Among several greenhouse gases²⁹ the carbon dioxide (CO₂) is the major culprit. Increasing CO₂ levels³⁰ account for over 60% of the enhanced greenhouse effect³¹. Internationally concerted action is necessary in order to stabilise the GHG concentration in the atmosphere and avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference”³² with the climate system. The fact that some

²⁵ Grubb, M., Brack, D. and Vrolijk, C., *The Kyoto Protocol. A guide and assessment*, Earthscan, London, 1998, p. 3

²⁶ IPCC : Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC on Climate Change, 2007, p. 30; available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf, accessed: 10/05/2008

²⁷ Kulesa, M.E., op. cit., p.65

²⁸ *Greenhouse gases emissions and renewable energy*, Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, GHG Bulletin, No9, December 2001, available at: [http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/\\$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/cl9706/\\$File/GHGBulletinNo9RenewableEnergy.pdf](http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/cl9706/$File/GHGBulletinNo9RenewableEnergy.pdf), accessed: 10/05/2008

²⁹ Other so-called GHG include: methane (CH₄), nitrous oxides (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Europa, Environment website:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/campaign/pdf/gases_en.pdf; accessed: 10/05/2008

³⁰ Its annual emissions increased by app. 80% between 1970 and 2004; in IPCC : Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the IPCC on Climate Change, 2007, p. 30; available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf, accessed: 10/05/2008

³¹ Europa, Environment website:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/campaign/pdf/gases_en.pdf; accessed: 10/05/2008

³² UNFCCC 1992, available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, accessed: 11/05/2008

kinds of damage to the environment can be irreversible³³ provokes the urgent need for action.

1.2 The international climate change regime

The question of climate change was initially approached by the United Nations (UN) during the first World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1979. At that time mostly scientists took interest in the Conference. Not until ten years later the UN managed to draw politicians' attention to the problem, which gave birth to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It was passed by 150 countries and the European Community at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The explicit goal of the Convention is to stabilise the GHG concentration in the atmosphere at a level that prevents "the dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system"³⁴.

Industrialised countries agreed to voluntarily return³⁵ to CO₂ emissions level from 1990 by the year 2000. The most progressive promise came from the EU which publicly committed to stabilize its emissions by the year 2000 and onwards. Surprisingly the EU took on the role of an international leader on climate change, even though any coordinated climate or energy policy had not been agreed by the Council of Ministers at that time.³⁶ Though, the EU's promptness to take on the most ambitious commitment was not as ad hoc as it might have appeared. The initial awareness of the climate change problem was brought to the attention of the then

³³ in the sense that they can not be repaired; once a critical level is reached, some life-supporting functions and ecosystems can not be restored; in van den Hove, S., Participatory approaches to environmental policy-making: the European Commission Climate Policy Process as a case study, *Ecological Economics* No. 33 (2000), p. 461

³⁴ UNFCCC 1992, available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, accessed: 11/05/2008

³⁵ However, the EU did not manage to obtain the US consent to legally binding decisive text on goals in UNFCCC in Gupta, J. and Ringus, L., *The EU's Climate Leadership: Reconciling Ambition and Reality*, *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 1: 281-299, 2001, p. 287

³⁶ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., "WWF: European and Global Climate Policy" in Pedler, R. (ed), *European Union lobbying: changes in the arena*, Palgrave, 2002, p. 90

European Community in mid-1980s, as it was touched upon both by the European Commission and through a resolution of the European Parliament. Nonetheless action was not deemed to be taken in the Fourth Environmental Action Programme (1987-92)³⁷. However, increased legal basis in the environmental field by Single European Act in 1987 resulted in the Member States' resolving on stabilizing the total CO₂ emissions by 2000 at 1990 levels as the EU desired the unified position for the approaching World Climate Conference. This declaration enabled the EU to take on a role of a global leader, especially with regards to the US.³⁸

1.3 Towards the Kyoto Protocol

Ever since UNFCCC, providing the legal and political basics for a global action,³⁹ has come into force⁴⁰, the international arena of environmental concerns was busy rising to its challenge. At the European level hopes were high that the EU aspirations would be reached. At that time it was primarily focused on internal policies and 'burden sharing'. There were two challenging ideas floating within the EU. One of them was the issue of developing market mechanisms in order to further the implementation of the climate change treaty. In 1991 the EU proposed the idea of adopting carbon tax, which was considered to be of better utility than regulatory mechanisms and at the same time not to be causing as much distortion as unilateral measures employed by individual governments. On the other hand the reluctance to promote the nuclear agenda led to combined carbon/energy tax proposal that would result in a 3-5 per cent reduction of CO₂ emissions in 2000 comparing to 1990 levels. Not all of the Member States supported the idea without demur. The UK has already adopted the VAT on domestic fuel and objected the initiative of making tax policy at the EU level; cohesion countries pronounced against the tax unless they were assured

³⁷ McCormick, J., op. cit., p. 281

³⁸ Haigh, N. "Climate Change Policies and Politics in the European Community" in O'Riordan, T. & Jäger, J. (eds): *Politics of Climate Change: A European Perspective*. London. Routledge. 1996, p. 162

³⁹ Grubb, M., Brack, D. and Vrolijk, C., op. cit. p. xxxiv (Summary and conclusions)

⁴⁰ Over 50 countries had ratified the Convention by 1994

of obtaining structural funding in return; France dreaded the risk to its nuclear industry. Smaller countries like Netherlands and Denmark supported the proposal.⁴¹ Apart from the directive on a combined carbon/energy tax, the EU initiated a new range of measures related to climate change policies, which embraced a framework directive to fund energy efficiency (SAVE), endowment of renewable energy (via ALTERNER programme) and a monitoring mechanism conveying feedback capability to follow CO₂ reduction targets.⁴² Furthermore particular EU countries lobbied neighboring states to adopt CO₂ goals.⁴³ A number of forthcoming international meetings created the favorable opportunity to persuade also other parties.

The First Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP1)⁴⁴ in Germany gave the basis for the Kyoto Protocol through a so-called 'Berlin Mandate'⁴⁵, binding the negotiating parties to accept a protocol by the end of 1997. The core of the mandate stated that commitments made by industrialised countries to cut greenhouse gases emissions would not be sufficient⁴⁶ and further negotiations were necessary to set adequate binding goals. The European Union, which was the key supporter of the 'Berlin Mandate' succeeded to convince a group of developing countries (G-77) to support its suggestion to set a negotiating process for legally binding commitments for industrialised countries. The EU proposed a 15 per cent

⁴¹ Gupta, J. *The European Union and its role in climate change politics and law*, Colloque CERI: "L'Union européenne, acteur international", 2002, p. 6

⁴² Haigh, N. "Climate Change Policies and Politics in the European Community" in O'Riordan, T., Jager, J., (eds), op.cit., p. 159 and Brown, M. L. Scientific Uncertainty and learning in European Union, *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000 (576-596), pp. 587, 590

⁴³ Gupta, J. op. cit., 2002, p. 5

⁴⁴ COP (an association of all countries that are Parties to the Convention) meetings were the annual (unless the Parties decide otherwise) international summits for the Climate Change Convention, the first one taking place in Berlin (1995), the second one in Geneva (1996), third in Kyoto (1997), fourth in Buenos Aires (1998), fifth in Bonn (1999), sixth in Hague (2000) and Bonn (2001), seventh in Marrakesh, in UNFCCC, *A Guide to the Climate Change Convention Process*, Bonn, 2002, available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/process/guideprocess-p.pdf>, accessed: 19/05/2008

⁴⁵ "The Berlin Mandate establishes a process that would enable the Parties to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including a strengthening of developed country commitments, through the adoption of a protocol or other legal instruments" at: <http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/Be/Berlin+Mandate.html>, accessed 19/05/2008

⁴⁶ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 90

reduction relative to the 1990 emission levels by 2010 in three greenhouse gases: CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O from all developed countries. The implementation of the only just set goals depended on the COP3 that was to be held half a year later in Kyoto.⁴⁷

At that time the EU lacked the agreed, harmonized Policies and Measures that would monitor the most important GHG emissions sectors, though the first EU Member States commenced to implement domestic measures. On the other hand the internal coordination of enlarged Union⁴⁸ was not easy. Eight official United Nations meetings preparing for Kyoto summit and range of informal ministerial meetings contributed to a global ‘climate marathon’ which led to a conclusion that “any targets agreed in Kyoto should be legally binding”.⁴⁹ Equally, the Energy Council meeting on double co-generation of heat and power ended only in ‘Communication’, and the process to raise the use of renewable energies by 2010 also did not result in any binding commitments. The EU, going to Kyoto at the end of the 1997 was still lacking any key legally binding directives in order to hope for some considerable emission cuts.⁵⁰

1.4 The Kyoto Protocol

At the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) in Kyoto, Japan, the Protocol was signed as a consequence of long and tough negotiation process. Under article 3 of the Protocol, 38 industrialised countries – the OECD group and a number of the former Soviet Union countries⁵¹, agreed to reduce their collective emissions of the GHG in the first commitment period 2008-2012, with “demonstrable progress” to be made by 2005. The OECD group committed to achieve at least 5 per cent reduction below 1990 levels, whilst the countries of the former Soviet bloc committed to

⁴⁷ Gupta, J. and Ringus, L., op. cit., p. 287

⁴⁸ at that time the EU comprised of 15 Member States

⁴⁹ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., pp. 90-91

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 92

⁵¹ The complete list of the countries can be found in the Annex I to the Convention available at: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php, accessed: 12/05/2008

stabilise at the baseline year over the same period.⁵² A range of mechanisms set by the Protocol gave flexibility in how the targets are to be met.⁵³ These mechanisms incorporated⁵⁴:

- *Emissions trading*; countries with excess emission allowances will be able to sell the surpluses to the countries unable to meet their goals regarding the emission cuts; the same relates to credits gained by the other mechanisms.
- *Joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism*; it is possible for Parties unable to limit their emissions to pay for cuts elsewhere; hence, investing in low-emission technologies in a different country creates the possibility of obtaining “emissions reduction units” and “certified emissions reductions”.

Despite the general agreement about the need of greenhouse gases level control, the US and the EU were not on the same page as far as the scale of emissions cut is concerned. The first one opted for heterogeneous goals of emission reductions while the latter one persisted in cuts as large as possible at least for itself, the US, Canada and Japan.⁵⁵ Eventually, differentiated target plan was fixed, with each country establishing its own feasible aim. The European Union had taken on board the most ambitious of the targets agreeing to emission quota of the six greenhouse gases (CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs and SF₆) embracing a reduction of eight per cent below 1990 levels. However, different rates among its Member States were to be distributed to achieve that goal. The ‘burden-sharing’ among the EU Member States was revised in June 1998. The consensus achieved at the Environmental Council

⁵² Convery, F.J., *Insights for climate policy in Europe*, Baltzer Science Publishers BV, 2000, p.165

⁵³ Grubb, M., Brack, D. and Vrolijk, C., op. cit., 1998, p. 3

⁵⁴ Rodriguez, M. I., *Climate Protection in the European Union*, ERA-Forum, Vol. 5 (2) Springer Berlin, 2000, p. 259

⁵⁵ Bengochea-Morancho, A., Higon-Tamarit, F. and Martinez-Zarzozo, I. “Economic Growth and CO₂ Emissions in the European Union”, *Environmental and Recourse Economics*, 19, 2001 (19), p. 166

meeting included the employment of voluntary agreements, endorsement of renewable energy and greater energy efficiency, better fuel efficiency for passenger cars, afforestation programme and the Green Paper on the development of an emission trading programme within the EU.⁵⁶

At last the cuts commitments of 7 % for US and Canada and 6% for Japan were fixed. For other countries it was not necessary to limit their GHG emissions, furthermore they were committed to stabilise or even increase e.g. Norway by 1% and Australia by 20%.⁵⁷

1.5 The post-Kyoto era

At the beginning of 2000 the European Union initiated the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) set on a real targets basis, elaborated within the working groups of NGOs, academia, industry and country experts. As early as 2001 a draft Directive on doubling renewable energies in the EU was put on the political agenda and agreed by the Energy Council.⁵⁸ Recently the EU Kyoto targets have been updated. During the Brussels meeting in March 2007, the European Council announced the following goals to be met by the year 2020⁵⁹:

- The EU will cut its greenhouse gases emissions by 30 per cent compared to 1990 levels, “*provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately (...)*”⁶⁰.

⁵⁶ McCormick, J., op. cit., p. 289

⁵⁷ Bengochea-Morancho, A., Higon-Tamarit, F. and Martinez-Zarzozo, I., op.cit., p. 166

⁵⁸ Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., p. 92

⁵⁹ Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions 7224/07, p. 13, available at: <http://www.bdi-online.de/download/SchlussfolgerungenER.pdf>, accessed: 20/05/2008

⁶⁰ Ibidem

- In case other global actors will not make corresponding commitments in the international arena of climate negotiations, the EU will independently achieve a target of at least 20 per cent cut of GHG emissions by 2020, as it tends to transform Europe into “*a highly energy-efficient and low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy*”.⁶¹
- The EU will increase the share of renewable energies in its overall EU energy use to 20 per cent.
- In order to lower the energy use by 20 per cent compared to Commission forecast for 2020, the EU will raise energy efficiency.

1.6 Sum up

The climate change policy formulation was a hard nut to crack for both European and international arena. It is likely that if the European Union had not called for binding quantitative commitments in the period prior to the negotiations in Kyoto, the bulk of those commitments would be considerably smaller and the general target would not be as ambitious. There is no doubt that the EU has had the greater impact of all engaged parties on the negotiation process and its final resolutions. Perhaps the consensus would not be reached at all if the US insisted on postponing further discussion on this matter until the Group 77 settles on reducing their greenhouse gases’ emission level. There is one interesting conclusion that can be made in accordance with U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol ratification. Even though the nature of climate change suggests everyone contributes to the problem and will suffer its effects, it does not imply the strong group activity of all participants. Ostrom describes it as a public-good or collective good dilemma, in which all individuals who might take advantage from the provision of public good, such as for example pollution control, consider costs of contribution too high and therefore wait

⁶¹ Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions 7224/07, p. 13, available at: <http://www.bdi-online.de/download/SchlussfolgerungenER.pdf>, accessed: 20/05/2008

until others pay for a good.⁶² Undoubtedly all countries share the responsibility of protecting the Earth; however the overall well-being is sometimes pushed aside in favor of protecting domestic economies.

The development of the environmental policy analyzed in this chapter illustrates the growing concern of the EU in the area of climate change problem. In comparison to the US, which only recently has established the first climate policy⁶³, the EU policy-makers have been much more active in founding the new programmes and legal documents regulating the EU position towards the issue of climate change. Undoubtedly there has been a great progress in a way the EU perceives and deal with the problem of environment protection in general and climate change in particular within the last 30 years. However, the multi-level character of EU decision-making impedes the negotiation process. On the other hand it opens multiple points of access to external actors seeking to influence the EU legislative process. (We will discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 5).

Although the EU is leading in fight to reduce the problem of climate change, its member states' contribution to achieving the final goal of Kyoto Protocol are far from satisfactory. The data released by the European Environment Agency⁶⁴ show that the older member states - the EU-15 cut back on their GHG emissions by 0.8 per cent between 2005 and 2006 which brings the reduction of only 2,2 per cent below 1990 levels. The total emissions of the EU as a whole, including new member states, decreased slightly in 2006. They were 0.3 per cent lower in comparison to 2005 bringing the total reduction (between 1990 and 2006) to reach 7.7 per cent on base year levels.

⁶² Ostrom, E. *A behavioral approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action*, in McGinnis, M.D. (Ed), *Polycentric games and Institutions*, Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, *University of Michigan Press*, 2000, p. 472

⁶³ For a detailed account see: <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/index.html>, accessed: 30/09/2008

⁶⁴ "Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2006 and inventory report 2008" EEA report available at: http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2008_6/en/Summary_Annual_EC_GHG_inventory_1990_006_and_inventory_report_2008, accessed: 30/09/2008

The figures presented by EEA are troubling for the European Union. If the reduction goals established in Kyoto are not on schedule to be met, how are the even more ambitious emission cut targets agreed to in spring 2007 realistic? As Sonja Meister, climate campaigner at Friends of the Earth Europe states: *"The EU will only be able to fight dangerous climate change if all member states reduce their emissions year on year. The European Commission must be given the power to ensure that all Member States comply with their targets (...) Time is running out and only strong legislation including annual cuts will bring the EU on track to meet its long-term targets."*⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Friends of the Earth Europe press release, 18 June 2008, available at: http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2008/Jun18_Kyoto_targets_remain_distant_prospect_for_EU_countries.html, accessed: 1/10/2008

2 Actors: social movements

Social movements can be perceived as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life⁶⁶. “*They have their inception in a condition of unrest and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme of system of living*”.⁶⁷

2.1 Definition – different approaches

In order to define social movements one could refer to Charles Tilly⁶⁸, who describes them as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people can make collective claims at others⁶⁹. According to Tilly, social movements are a *major* vehicle for ordinary people’s participation in public politics⁷⁰.

Another scientist Sidney Tarrow⁷¹ defines a social movement as “*collective challenges to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities*”⁷².

Jeff Goodwin⁷³ and James M. Jasper⁷⁴ additionally denominate the challenges as organized, sustained and noninstitutional⁷⁵. A social movement can also be

⁶⁶ Blumer, H., “Social movements”, in Lyman, S. M.(ed.), *Social Movements. Critiques, Concepts, Case-Studies*, Mc Millan Ltd, Wiltshire, 1995, p. 60

⁶⁷ Ibidem

⁶⁸ Ch. Tilly (May 20, 1929 – April 29, 2008) was an American sociologist, political scientist, and historian whose professional interest was the relationship between politics and society.

⁶⁹ Tilly, C., *Social movements, 1768-2004*, Boulder, CO, Paradigm Publishers, 2004, p. 3

⁷⁰ Blumer, H., “Social movements” in Lyman, S. M. (ed.), op. cit., p. 60

⁷¹ S. Tarrow (present) is a professor of political science and sociology, known for his research in the areas of comparative politics, social movements, political parties, collective action and political sociology.

⁷² Tarrow, S. , *Power in movement: collective action, Social Movements and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 8

⁷³J. Goodwin is a professor of sociology at New York University; his research interests include visual sociology, social movements, revolutions, political violence, and terrorism.

characterized as an association or group of associations concentrated around a common interest that seeks to influence collective outcomes not necessarily obtaining authoritative offices of government⁷⁶.

Mario Diani⁷⁷, on the contrary, does not provide a clear definition claiming that social movements' nature is difficult to grasp, as they "(...) *cannot be reduced to specific insurrections or revolts, but rather resemble strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space.*"⁷⁸ "They cannot be identified with any specific organization either, rather consist of groups of and organizations, from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile"⁷⁹. That does not exclude, however, the possibility of grouping and classifying social movements.

2.2 The nature of social movements

In all four definitions it is clear that movements exercise power when they are able to activate public debate and put their opponents on the defensive through a combination of a joint action and moral arguments supported with facts. "*The rise of social movements in a society is a symptom of discontent with the existing social order*".⁸⁰ "*Genuine social movements aim at changes in the social order. They arise therefore among people who are dissatisfied with the order that is in operations.*"⁸¹ Dissatisfaction with a social order arises when individuals no longer consider the

⁷⁴ James M. Jasper is a member of the faculty of the Graduate Centre of the City of New York; social movements are one of his major professional interests.

⁷⁵ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M. (eds.), *The Social Movements Reader. Cases and Concepts*, Blackweel, Oxford, 2003, p. 3

⁷⁶ Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C. and Hernes, H., K. (eds), *Green states and social movements*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 2

⁷⁷ M. Diani has been the European editor of *Mobilization*, involved in research on social movements and collective behaviour since 1997.

⁷⁸ Diani, M., Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions and Social Networks: "From Metaphor to Substance?", in Diani M. and McAdam, D. (eds), *Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, , Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 1

⁷⁹ Ibidem, p. 1

⁸⁰ Heberle, R., "Social Movements and Social Order" in Lyman, S. M. (ed.), op. cit., p. 55

⁸¹ Ibidem

values or norms on which the order is founded to be the best or the only possible ones.⁸² They will not usually protest against the status quo, unless they sense that it is unjust or illegitimate and that they are capable to implement recognizable changes. The concept is known as cognitive liberation⁸³. If the minority in a society is not willing to implement the necessary adjustments and stays passive, these need to be achieved by other groups, inter alia, by social movements.⁸⁴

All the above is confirmed by Charles Tilly, when he lists three elements social movements emerged from. Namely that is:

- Organized public effort making collective claims on the particular authorities (campaigns)
- Employment of combination from among the forms of political actions, such as associations and coalitions, public meetings, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media
- WUNC displays: worthies, unity, numbers and the commitment.⁸⁵

Speaking of a campaign we need to realize it extends beyond a single event and combines minimum three parties: actors – claimers, object of claim and the public.

2.3 Social conflicts

Complex definition of social movements might often be associated with social conflict⁸⁶. In a consequence that assumes clearly an existence of opponents and competing actors and of the resources they are competing for or negotiating to take control of. Various types of social conflict need to be separated:

⁸² Ibidem

⁸³ Freeman, J., “The women`s Movement”, in Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M. (2003), p. 24

⁸⁴ Heberle, R., “Social Movements and Social Order” in Lyman, S. M. (ed.), op. cit., p. 56

⁸⁵ Tilly, C., op. cit., p. 4

⁸⁶ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M., *Social Movements*, Volume IV, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 8

- Pursuit of collective interests (it opposes individuals or groups tend to maximize their advantages on the market; it is related to actors' input and output in an organization – high input which receives low reward will provoke dissatisfaction).
- Reconstruction of a social, cultural or political identity (the actor defines himself as a community whose values are threatened by invasion or destruction).
- A political force (aims at changing the values of the game, not just the distribution of relative advantages in a given organization)
- A defense of a status or privileges (a negative equivalent of a political pressure).
- Social control of the main cultural patterns (cultural patterns of three kinds: model of knowledge, a type of investment, and ethical principles; these represent of truth, production, and morality depends on the capacity of the achievement, of self-production, of a given society. Society is opposed to community, because a collectively which has a high capacity to act upon itself and to transform itself is necessarily divided between leaders or ruling groups, which impose savings, deferred gratification patterns, abstract ideas, and moral principles and at the same time identify their own interests with these universal principles, and people or masses, which are both subordinated to the control of cultural values by ruling groups and agree to eliminate this domination and to identify themselves with these cultural values. The central conflict is endless and can not be solved.
- Creation of a new order (extreme form is revolution with the aim at recreating community, some scientists, eg. T. Skocpol questions revolutions as the direct results of a social convulsion, but explains it

in the first place by a breakdown of the state and of the political system; the result of occurrence of this sort of social conflict may lead to a historical change)⁸⁷.

2.4 The role of mass public

It comes as no surprise that individuals tend to be far more concerned with immediate needs or threats than with issues that seem remote or non-threatening. Re-occurring and increasing protests (in various forms) derive also from the distribution of the political skills. “An increasingly large proportion of the public is coming to have sufficient interest and understanding of national and international politics to participate in decision-making at this level”⁸⁸. Mass public has obviously always played a role in national politics, yet only now has it a real chance to participate in formulating the politics. The two processes: needs and believes present in each and every individual, combined with shift in the balance of political skills between elites and mass enable social movements to operate.

It requires to be emphasized that the lowest and poorest levels of the society are not always the most rebellious ones. Moreover, protests do not take place in the worst of times. That brings us to the conviction that individuals become dissatisfied when there is a large discrepancy between condition of their lives and the expectation. This concept is known as *relative deprivation*⁸⁹ and may occur even among wealthy and privileged people.

⁸⁷ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M. (eds.) *Social Movements*, Volume IV, Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 8-12

⁸⁸ Inglehart, R., “Changing Values in Post-Industrial Societies”, in Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M. (2003), p. 64

⁸⁹ Blumerg, L. R., “The Civil Rights Movement”, in Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M. (2003), p. 18

2.5 Shaping social movements

Despite the fact that collective identities form within social movement communities, they are shaped by both internal and external factors. The internal everyday practices of the organization design and re-design the boundaries between its members and between a challenging group and dominant groups. Resources, political opportunities and organizational strength are vital factors in determining a social movement culture that in turn creates collective identities. “*External events and structures can shape internal collective identity negotiations and its subsequent formation in a social movement organization*”.⁹⁰

“*Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time or membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organizations, networks, communities, and activists individuals, connected by participation in challenges and collective identities through participants define the boundaries and significance of their group within which they operate.*”⁹¹

The forms of collective actions that activists undertake are varied, as are the ways that activists are linked together. Those links include public collective action, formal organizations, and collective identities.

2.5.1 Emergence of social movements

There are several views on why the social movements emerge. *Resource mobilization* school observed that social movements consisted most of the time of formalized organizations and there was one main prerequisite: certain level of resources, mainly money to sustain it. “*They argued that there were always enough discontented people in society to fill a protest movement, but what varied over time –*

⁹⁰ Robnett, B., External Political Change, Collective Identities, and Participation in Social Movement Organizations, in Mayer, D., S., Whittier, N., Robnett, B. (eds.), *Social movements. Identity, Culture and the state*, , Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 269

⁹¹ Witter, N., Meaning and Structure in Social Movements, in Mayer, D., S., Whittier, N. and Robnett, B. op. cit., p. 289

and so explained the emergence of movements – was the resources available to nourish it".⁹² According to resource mobilization view, the number of social movements is directly proportional to possibilities of funding them. With the society growing wealthier and able to contribute money new social movements arise⁹³.

Another paradigm explaining the emergence of social movements is based on political process and it assumes the shifts of political and economic order, what creates a space of social movements' existence. As in this view movements are perceived as primarily political (who make demands on state and opt for changes in laws and policies), changes in the state are seen as the major opportunity a movement could need⁹⁴.

2.5.2 Social networks

Emergence of social movements is also justified with existence of *social networks*. Although it may seem social networks as tools to mobilize people for movements explain only *who* is recruited, existence of social ties among potential recruits is also seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of social movements⁹⁵. "*If spontaneous uprising exist at all, they remain small and local unless they have preexisting organizations and social ties. Those networks are important for communication, vital to the spread of movement*"⁹⁶. Moreover, they also shape what movements are capable to do once they emerge.

2.5.3 Framing

Speaking of networks one must not omit recruitment process. Direct personal contacts and so called framing are crucial, because they "allow organizers and their

⁹² Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J. M. (2003), op. cit., p. 11

⁹³ Ibidem

⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 12

⁹⁵ Ibidem

⁹⁶ Ibidem,

potential participants to “align” their “frames”, to achieve a common definition of a social problem and a common prescription for solving it”⁹⁷. There are three types of framing differentiated:

- Diagnostic: potential participants are being convinced that the problem needs to be dealt with.
- Prognostic: tactics, targets and strategies are chosen.
- Motivational: potential participants are urged to join and act.⁹⁸

2.6 Democratization and social movements’ dependency

There is a certain overlap of social movement and democratization. In the countries of no or little democratizations there are no social movements, whereas extensive democratization provokes social movements to emerge as well as widespread availability of social movement programs.⁹⁹ A state which either hardly opposes to social movements’ activisms, sets few barriers in the way the movement influences public policy or organizes the movement into the state is at the same time good for the degree of democracy prevailing in society and good for the likelihood of the movements’ goals being reached in collective outcomes. We would call such a state as “inclusive”¹⁰⁰. It may be reflected in various ways. The movement might be formed as an interest group or groups that become involved in lobbying. The group or groups might participate in the development and implementation of public policy by negotiating with government officials. The movement might also support financially a fraction of an established party.

It matters to a large extent whether a movement is capable of making a connection to a core state imperative. If it is, “(...) *then there are in principle no limits to a degree to which the movement can penetrate to the state’s core once the*

⁹⁷ Ibidem, p. 52

⁹⁸ Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M. (2003), op. cit., p. 52

⁹⁹ Tilly, Ch., op. cit., p. 126-129

¹⁰⁰ Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C. and Hernes, H., K., (eds.), op. cit., p. 4

movement has sought and achieved an entry into the state (be it as a political party, interest group or party fraction)”¹⁰¹. Rather than take an entire array of contemporary social movements in these terms, in this study we focus on environmentalism.

2.7 Taxonomy

The last four decades of the twentieth century were a scene for social movement activity in the developed liberal democracies, unprecedented in its sheer variety.

2.7.4 Ways of classifying social movements

There were movements in favor (or sometimes against) women, gays, lesbians, non-human animals, peace, youth, students, physical workers, the environment, racial and ethnic quality, indigenous people, hunting, religious fundamentalism, national autonomy and secession. Social movements can be classified in several ways, commencing with the basic distinguish between commercial and non-commercial groups. Further classification can be based on *type of changes* (innovation and conservative movements), *scope of result* (reform and radical movements), *methods of work* (peaceful, violent and terrorist movements), *range and resources* (local, regional and national-international movements), *targets* (group-focused and individual-focused movements), *time of founding* (old and new movements), *interest* (various could be enumerated: neoliberalism, war, racism, sexism and homophobia, human rights, democracy, public services, common goods, agriculture, ecology etc.)¹⁰².

Speaking of type of change criteria, two opposite groups are listed with innovation ones pursuing to enable particular rights and conservative ones, attempting to preserve existing norms or values. In terms of type of scope of result criteria,

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 2

¹⁰² Maloney, W., A. and Rossteutscher, S.(eds.) *Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies. A comparative analysis*, Routledge, 2007, p.58-73

reform movements are dedicated to changing norms, most of the time legal ones, whereas radical movements are devoted to a change of value system what involves fundamental changes.

In terms of methods of work criteria, it needs to be clearly stated that the group of violent movements, although armed, does not include terrorist movements and these two should never be confused. Speaking of time of founding criteria, there are differentiated the social movements that have existed since the beginning of society (old social movements), usually centered around material goals like improvement of the standard of living or political autonomy of the working class and those that become dominant from the second half of the 20th century (new social movements) like the feminist movement, civil rights movement, peace movement, alter-globalization movement and environmental movement. In the paper we intend to concentrate on the latter group.

2.7.2 Choice of social movement for analysis

Limiting the choice of social movements in terms of territory to European Union area, which may occur necessary for the purposes of more profound analysis, one could say the amount of interest organizations at European level rose together with the dynamics of European institutions¹⁰³. At the same time they rose to suit the running purposes and therefore its essence is very much dependant on what is the hot issue at the moment. Therefore the variety of social movements reflects quite precisely the European Union's problematique. The group of issues stressed out as of high importance only recently became environmental ones. Presently, environmentalism is the next social movement (to women's, gay and civil rights

¹⁰³ Eising, R., B. Kohler –Koch, *The transformation of Governance in the European Union*, London, 1999, p. 231

movements)¹⁰⁴ that attempts to shape new form of rights and develop ecological citizenship.

According to research on issue concerns carried out in six European cities, environment is placed on the 14 position out of 25 (among sport, youths issues, religious activities, hobbies, health and many more)¹⁰⁵. At the same time green organizations¹⁰⁶ such as WWF or Greenpeace are one of best recognized among social movements, even though the ecological range of problems in global terms has only recently became an issue of concern.

2.7.3 Final classification

Environmental movements are of main concern of this paper. Along with the classification presented above, they would fall into reform movements subset, as they discuss legal norms related to wide scope of environmental issues (such as climate change, waste, transport, harmful productive cycles, the cycle of water etc.). Type of change they stand for can be both “innovative” and “conservative”, therefore in terms of type of change criteria they can not be classified by default. Majority of environmental movements is focused on affecting groups. They all use peaceful methods of work, however, it does not exclude relying on some kind of violent force. All of environmental movements would certainly fall into new movements category, as the general concept they advocate is a recent one. In terms of range there is a wide variety of environmental movements in each subset.

¹⁰⁴ Tsaliki, L., Electronic citizenship and global social movements, available at: http://www.firstmonday.org/issuess/issue8_2/tsaliki/index.html accessed on 11.12.2007

¹⁰⁵ King, G., B., op. cit., p. 61

¹⁰⁶ Organizations acting in favor of natural environment

3 Theoretical chapter

In order to understand the emergence of social movements and reasons behind their activity it is necessary that we analyze the theories related. The choice is broad and differentiated. For the purpose of our analysis we require the theory that will enable understanding the core reason for emergence of social movements. Consequently, the logic behind social movements` performance is to be interpreted. Therefore we will use neither New Social Theory nor Marxism.

The first theory, the New Social Movement Theory objects Marxism, which perceives economic logic and class position as the only factors determining collective actions occurrence. New Social Movements theorists maintain that due to those two types of reductionism Marxism fails to explain contemporary social movements.¹⁰⁷ On the contrary Social Movement Theory scrutinizes the circumstances underlying collective action by “outsiders” to governing institutions emergence and facilitating admittance to those institutions, which enables “outsiders” to influence social and political change¹⁰⁸. Although the theory seems to be appropriate to provide answers to questions formulated in the first place, it lacks some components and variables. Due to this fact we commence with basic collective action and move straight to Resource Mobilization Theory.

As far as Resource Mobilization Theory is concerned, it questions Durkheim’s scrutiny of collective actions that we initially intended to use in the thesis. However after taking a closer look at the traditional paradigm, which concentrates on radical forms of collective behavior like panic or riots, we became convinced that the latest theory will be of better use. Since contemporary social movements elaborate strategies and have an organized structure, we believe Collective Action (as a starting point), Resource Mobilization Theory and Rational Choice Theory (elaborating on

¹⁰⁷ Canel, E. *New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: The Need for Integration*, available at: www.idrc.ca/en/ev-54448-201-1-DO_TOPIC.htm accessed: 17/12/2007

¹⁰⁸ King, G., B., op. cit., p. 62

rationality behind performance of social movements) will be an appropriate approach for needs of the paper.

3.1 Collective behavior

We commence with collective behavior, which is a basis of any joint action. The nature of collective behavior is strongly related to such concepts as crowds, mobs, panics, mass behavior, public opinion, propaganda, revolutions and reforms¹⁰⁹. “From one point of view practically all group activity can be thought of as collective behavior”¹¹⁰. Group activity means there are individuals that act together in some fashion, there is work distribution among them and one goal to reach. Elementary and spontaneous forms of collective behavior may develop into organized forms. There are, however, certain conditions that need to be met. Namely, we expect to observe so called *restlessness* and the development of *social unrest*. It appears when people have impulses and desires that can not be satisfied. Additionally, in the instance of social unrest, restlessness has a reciprocal character. It displays awakens of “*a similar condition of restlessness on the part of others and there occurs mutual reinforcement of this state as the individuals interact with each other*”¹¹¹. Social unrest plays an important role as it is “*(...) a symptom of disruption or breaking down of the order of living*”¹¹². However, unless social unrest displays its reinforcing effect and is involved in circular reaction, it is neither shared nor collective. Once its display in a consequence it makes a place for new forms of collective behavior such as reforms, revolutions, religious cults, spiritual awakenings, new moral orders and social movements. At this stage it needs to be emphasized that collective behavior’s main concern are studies on ways by which the social order comes into existence and not social order and its constituents as they are.

¹⁰⁹ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M., *Social Movements*, Volume I, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 18

¹¹⁰ Ibidem

¹¹¹ Ibidem, p. 20

¹¹² Ibidem, p. 22

Another factor present while dealing with collective behavior, apart from social unrest, is called *milling*¹¹³. It is understood as a circular reaction of individuals, who move around amongst one another in an aimless and random fashion. As an effect, they become more sensitive and responsive to each other and they become increasingly preoccupied with one another and decreasingly responsive to objects of stimulation. Individuals in such state are more likely to act together under the influence of common impulse.

An intense form of milling is known as collective excitement. “*Where people are collectively excited, as a result of some form of milling, (...) loss of normal control becomes pronounced, setting the stage of contagious behavior.*”¹¹⁴ People are likely to unify and join forces when they undergo together the derangement of their routines of living or experience fundamental disturbances in the feelings, thoughts and behaviors of people due to remarkable changes in their ways of living. Under the influence of collective excitement people are carried away by impulses and feelings, acting very emotionally. Also, individuals may demonstrate willingness to redesign their sentiments, habits and traits of personality. In this way a new successful form of collective behavior may easily be formed.

Where collective excitement is widespread, it is probable for some *social contagion* to take place. It may be regarded an intense form of both milling and collective excitement. As individuals catch the spirit of excitement and become more attentive to the external factors, they become more inclined to get involved in the situation. Social contagion attracts and infects even those individuals initially presenting themselves as indifferent. Under such conditions the given kind of behavior will spread¹¹⁵.

Milling, collective excitement and social contagion are likely to be found at the very early stage of the development of group behavior. They do operate, however,

¹¹³ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M., op. cit., p. 23

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 24

¹¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 25

also at any later point, in a less intense way. They operate to bring people together at the most primitive level and to form a basis for enduring and substantial unification.

To paraphrase once more “(...) *collective behavior is defined as purposive, socially oriented activity by which people attempt to reconstitute their sociocultural environment*”.¹¹⁶ One more force involved, except mentioned above, is a certain common type of belief, known as generalized belief. In an organized action of a social movement we will call it a target or goal.

3.1.1 Mobilisation of collective action

As collective actions take place in some environment, one could assume there has to be an impact of the *political opportunity structure*¹¹⁷ on the mobilization pattern of new social movements. In order to present the importance of political context for mobilization of new social movements, we will distinguish three sets of properties of a political system: “(...) *its formal institutional structure, its informal procedures, and prevailing strategies with regards to challengers and the configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with challengers*”¹¹⁸. The first two sets of properties define the general settings for the mobilization of collective action. The relevant settings of power may occur as constraint or facility for social movements in question. In other words, the configuration of power “specifies the strategies of the authorities or the members of the system with regard to the mobilization of the challengers. In consequence the extent to which challenging collective action will be facilitated or repressed by members of the system will be defined. Chances of success such actions may have may be assessed. And also, one could define the chances of success if no such actions take place.

All in all, the political opportunity structure plays an important part when discussing any sort of collective action, as it defines the set of strategic options

¹¹⁶ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M., *Social Movements*, Volume I, Routledge, London, 2007, p.46-47

¹¹⁷ Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J., M., *Social Movements*, Volume III, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 87

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 87

available for the mobilization of the challengers. There is a crucial link between POS (political opportunity structure) and the challengers decision to mobilize or not, the events to be conducted and the target of their campaign.

3.2 Resource mobilization

Social unrest, fear and changing life conditions have always been a starting point for any discussion on collective action (especially in its psychological approach). Empirical work, however, led scientists to doubt the existence of a close link between preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena¹¹⁹.

Resource mobilization theory construes why persons and institutions from outside of the collectivity under consideration become involved. Supporters of the theory are willing to assume that “*there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group*”¹²⁰ Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the supporters or members of social movements. “*Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in some cases supporters-those who provide money, facilities, and even labor-may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements*”.¹²¹ As for strategies and tactics, apart from classical ones such as bargaining, persuasion or even violence to influence authorities to change, there are so called strategic tasks, namely motivate supporters, attract members, neutralize or transform mass and elite public into sympathizers¹²². Additionally, the role of environment is emphasized. Collective

¹¹⁹ McCarthy J., D and N. Z., Mayer, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 82, No. 6. (May, 1977), p. 1214

¹²⁰ Ibidem

¹²¹ Ibidem, p. 1216

¹²² Ibidem

Action approach concentrates only on influence of environment towards social movement. The inverse effect is not taken into account, whereas Resource Mobilization Theory suggests that society (environment) offers infrastructure which social movement can utilize and benefit from (such as media, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers).

Although similar organizations vary tremendously in the efficiency on translating resources into action, the extent to which actions are undertaken toward goal accomplishment is purely dependant on the resources controlled by an organization. Some organizations may rely on a high extend upon volunteer labor, whereas others may depend upon purchased labor. Regardless of the case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible.

Parties involved are divided into adherents – individuals and organizations that believe in the goal of the movement and constituents who provide resources for it. In order to guarantee continuity and success of social movement, two targets need to be addressed irrespectively. First task is to convert adherents into constituents at the same time maintaining constituent involvement. Second task is to turn turning non-adherents into adherents.

Also at this stage it is appropriate to differentiate into those who will benefit directly from the accomplishment of social movement goals or not. It is worth mentioning that certain individuals or groups may benefit directly from the accomplishment of organizational goals, even though they are not adherents of the appropriate social movements. A perfect example would be women who oppose the preferences of the women's liberation movement or declare neutral might benefit from expanded job opportunities for women pursued by women's groups.

All in all, Resource Mobilization Theory examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized and emphasizes not only the behavior of individual and then of a group in a bigger picture but also the surrounding such as the linkages of social

movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements¹²³.

3.3 Rational Choice Theory

According to rational theorists “rationality” is constitutive of the individual. They assume that social agents’ activities derive from their beliefs and preferences which they are ready to modify in the light of empirical experience. Additionally, they argue that three more specific presumptions should be made with regards to rationality. The first one is that individuals’ actions are purposeful and directed toward achieving a target. The second one is that there is a choice, which is why rational individuals choose their strategies and tactics from a wide range of available alternatives. The third assumption made by rationalists is that individual actors “quest for the best” which means they choose the most desirable alternative available in order to maximize their benefits.¹²⁴ In the following section we endeavour to explain these assumptions in more depth and apply them to lobbying behaviour of social movements.

3.3.1 Rational version of exchange theory

For a long time economics has been perceived as the most successful of the social sciences. Presumption that money and possibility of making a profit motivate people, led it to construct a formal, predictive model of human behaviour. Envy of this apparent success, sociologists and political scientists have cast eyes in its direction. They were convinced that pursuing the means of economics will let them attain a similar success in their own studies. They have attempted to build their theories on the assumption that all human action is essentially ‘rational’ in character and that people’s decisions are formed by the use of costs-benefits analysis of their

¹²³ McCarthy J., D and N. Z., Mayer, op. cit., p. 1213

¹²⁴ Lichbach, M.I., *Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science?*, The University of Michigan Press, 2003,, p. 38

actions. The approach to theory devised by these scientists is known as ‘rational choice theory’ (RCT). Applied to social interaction it takes the form of ‘exchange theory’, foundations of which were set out by George Homans, a pioneering figure in establishing the RCT.¹²⁵ As contrasted to his contemporaries, he supported the idea that sociological explanations should appear as deductive arguments resting on comprehensible micro assumptions. In this respect his analyses were similar to those conducted by present rationalists, yet he did not base them on assumptions about rational actors. He claimed that the principles of sociological theories should be based on assumptions distinctive for behavioural psychology: “*the principles of behavioural psychology are the general propositions we use, whether implicitly or explicitly, in explaining all social phenomena*”.¹²⁶ Even though Homan’s sociology differed from contemporary rational choice sociology, his formulation of exchange theory gave the basis for the later mathematical models of rational action. This trend was apparent inter alia in the following areas: theories of voting and forming coalition in political science as well as explanations of ethnic minority relations and social mobility.¹²⁷ It has also influenced the sociological area of our interest, namely social movements¹²⁸. Generally speaking, rational choice sociologists study macro-level problems and try to elucidate the origins, operations and outcomes of civil society, liberalism, democracy and the state.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Scott., J. *Rational Choice Theory* in Browning, G., Halcli, A. and Webster, F. (eds), *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present*, SAGE, 2000, pp. 126-127

¹²⁶ Homans, G. The sociological relevance of behaviorism in *Certainties and Doubts: Collected Papers, 1962-1985*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987 in Hedström, P. and Stern, Ch., *Rational Choice and Sociology*, paper to be published in the *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, edited by L. Blume and S. Durlauf. p. 3

¹²⁷ Scott., J. *Rational Choice Theory* in Browning, G., Halcli, A. and Webster, F. (eds), op. cit., pp. 126-127

¹²⁸ Hedström, P. and Stern, Ch. op. cit., 2008, p. 1

¹²⁹ Lichbach, M.I., op.cit., p. 32

3.3.2 Rational individuals and social interaction

All forms of RCT derive from the assumption that the compound social phenomena can be explained with regards to the individual actions of humans of which they are compiled. This perspective, known as methodological individualism stands that: *“The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals”*.¹³⁰

Unlike the economic theories which emphasise the way in which money and the market mechanism manage the production, distribution and consumption of services and goods, the rational choice theorists have maintained that the same overall principles can be employed to understand interactions organised by time, information, approval and prestige. Individuals are perceived as motivated by the wants or targets expressing their preferences. *“They act within specific, given constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions under which they are acting.”*¹³¹ Inability to attain all the various things they desire, force individuals to make choices with regards to their targets as well as the methods for achieving them. As rational choice theorists state, individuals’ actions are free of external, casual factors. Therefore the actors are recognised as conscious decision makers who have to anticipate different results of their actions and calculate the best course of action. Rational actors decide on the alternative that is likely to satisfy them to the utmost.¹³²

The methodological individualism which relies on the emphasis on an individual actor is always a starting point for any theory of rational choice. Rather than focusing on the actions of single individuals, rational choice sociologists seek to explain aggregate outcomes, like emergence of various forms of collective actions, segregation patterns and norms. However, to comprehend such outcomes theorists

¹³⁰ Elster, J, *The Cement of Society*, Cambridge University Press in Scott, J., op. cit. p 1

¹³¹ Scott, J., op. cit, pp. 2-3

¹³² Scott, J., op. cit, pp. 2-3 and Hedström, P., Stern, Ch., op.cit., p. 2

focus on the actions and interactions that they were induced by.¹³³ In other words, whereas rationalist studies begin with the assumptions about individual actors attempting to maximize their gains, they culminate in questions concerning collective actions, choices and institutions.¹³⁴ Individual actors' beliefs, desires and choices are the sources of sociologists' deductions about consequences for 'collectivity or system of individuals'. They employ micro-data to analyse how the individual actions taken by self-interested actors merge together into collective actions, how preferences of individual actors join into common values, and finally, how interactions between individuals combine into social institutions. Coleman-Boudon diagram presented in figure 1 illustrates the search for micro-foundations of macro-relationships. It demonstrates the dependence between collective causes, preferences, beliefs and actions of individuals and collective consequences¹³⁵:




Fig. 1 Coleman-Boudon diagram

At the early stages of RCT rationalists were concerned with how the state, social order, group solidarity and collective actions emerge. Contemporary sociologists seek to explain how dissatisfaction of particular individuals aggregates into a social movement, how fright aggregates into a mass panic and how

¹³³ Hedström, P. and Stern, Ch., op. cit., p. 2

¹³⁴ Lichbach, M.I., op. cit., p. 12

¹³⁵ Ibidem, p. 32-34

transformation of individual citizens aggregates into social change.¹³⁶ The collective action has been incorporated to the theories of rational choice by requiring that groups' and organisations' actions be reducible to statements concerning action undertaken by individual actors. Political parties, social movements and other organised groups may, therefore, all be treated as actors in rational choice theories. Scott argues that it is reasonable to speak of collective actions whenever there is a possibility to show the existence of a "decision making apparatus" that enables the aggregation of individual intentions and formulation of an agreed policy.¹³⁷ Therefore, we find a rational perspective a good starting point for explaining lobbying by groups of interests. We will use the rational choice theory's assumptions regarding individual actors and apply them to explain social movements lobbying behaviours. We argue that lobbying the EU decision-makers, is not the aim of social movements itself but one of the alternatives to achieve desirable goal. Weighing all pros and cons attached to lobbying, allow social movements to decide whether it is rational to lobby or restrain from it.

3.3.3 Rational social movements

As mentioned above, rational choice theory is based on the assumption that decisions of individuals are determined by the assessment of expected costs and benefits. Pincione and Teson argue that lobbying decisions of interest groups also depend on this evaluation.¹³⁸ The Godwin and Seldom simple model of rational lobbying assumes that lobbying on a given issue rests on the three following factors: the probability (P) of gaining influence while lobbying on the policy decision; benefits (B) of a favourable policy decisions; and the costs (C) of lobbying. If $P \times B > C$ it is rational to lobby because the expected benefits (a function of the probability P and the benefits B) outweigh the lobbying costs. However, if $P \times B < C$, it is rational to

¹³⁶ Lichbach, M.I., op. cit., p. 34

¹³⁷ Scott, J., op. cit, p. 6

¹³⁸ Pincione, G., Teson, R. *Rational choice and democratic deliberation: A theory of discourse failure*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 5

restrain from lobbying, as the costs of lobbying on policy decision outweigh the expected benefits. In other words it is rational to restrain from lobbying if the expected benefits are low (lower than the costs). This can happen when: the existing policy agrees with the position of interest group; the proposed policy agrees with the position of interest group and will be passed regardless its lobbying; it is expected that lobbying will have an adverse (negative) effect, e.g. by giving a political character to a proposal which would otherwise be passed in silence; and finally, if the probability of success is low (e.g. a great majority of the decision-makers firmly oppose the proposed policy). Restraining from lobbying is rational also in case expected benefits are high but still outweighed by the costs of lobbying (the costs are even higher).¹³⁹

According to Kobrin there are two important criteria that interest groups have to consider when deciding whether or not to lobby, namely efficiency and effectiveness. At the EU level the costs of political activity might be comparatively high and benefits remain vague until the final stage of decision-making. Hence, inactivity may be the best way out, especially “if one can have a free ride¹⁴⁰ with stronger organisations or if one has a solitary position regarding the dossier at stake”.¹⁴¹ None of the interest groups can be active every time. As assumed by the theory of rational choice, one has to choose and set priorities, based on cost-benefits analysis of activity and passivity. Due to the miscalculations, quite ordinary in European public affairs, pressure groups need to have flexible organisational policy in order to avoid new risks or enjoy new opportunities.¹⁴²

Social movements, however, do not base their rational decisions on lobbying solely on costs-benefits analysis. Another factor that makes them engage in or restrain

¹³⁹ Gullberg, A.T., Rational lobbying and EU climate policy, *Springer Netherlands*, Vol. 8(2), 2008, p.165

¹⁴⁰ A 'free-ride' refers to a situation, when interest organizations refrain from lobbying as lobbying by other groups of interest will bring them benefits anyway.

¹⁴¹ Korbin, S. *Managing Political Risk Assessment*, California UP, Berkeley, 1982 in Peder, R.H., van Schendelen, M.P.C.M. (ed.) *Lobbying the European Union. Companies, Trade Associations and Issue Groups*, ECPA series on European Public Affairs, 1993, p. 13

¹⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 13

from lobbying is the performance appraisal of other groups. Social movements make rational decisions to benefit from opportunities that have been established by other group's actions. Tarrow calls it 'a cycle of contention', which takes place when gains made by a group attract others to seek similar results. It occurs also when an organization or institution adopts collective action in order not to lose predominance in a particular sphere.¹⁴³ To put it another way, other groups' lobby achievements encourage social movements to take similar course of actions. It seems rational to follow the blazed trail in order to maximize benefits rather than engage in actions which results are harder to predict.

3.3.4 The problem of collective action

The rational choice theory has not evaded critical judgement. According to theory's critics, it fails to provide sufficient explanation to the problem of collective action.¹⁴⁴ We will now briefly illustrate the problem itself, while trying to provide an answer by employing the collective interest model of collective-action behaviour (which has a close kinship to RCT).

The key problem that the rational choice theories have to face is that of demonstrating how organised groups come to be formed. The theory's critics question the probability of people's joining an organisation if they may benefit regardless of whether they are its members or not.¹⁴⁵ According to them, rational citizens will, most likely, decide to free-ride on other people's efforts.¹⁴⁶ Still, they join social movements and other organized groups and become active in them. Olson assigns it

¹⁴³ Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement, Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.24

¹⁴⁴ Scott, J., op.cit, p. 6

¹⁴⁵ Scott, J. op.cit., p. 7

¹⁴⁶ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A. Collectice action and Citizen Responses to Global Warming, *Political Behaviour*, Springer Netherlands, (2007) 29:391-413, p. 392

to what he calls ‘selective incentives’¹⁴⁷. He argues that organizations may attract members, for example, by ensuring that only their members will be available to gain benefits from what they will negotiate.¹⁴⁸ However, as far as environmental social movements are concerned, social benefits resulting from their actions are non-excludable.¹⁴⁹ The collective interest model of collective-action behaviour provides an explanation as to why people want to support environmental groups in the battle against climate change.

3.3.4.1 The Collective Interest model

The Collective Interest (CI) model of collective-action behaviour was developed to “*incorporate the demand for the public good into an individual’s utility calculus without violating the logic of free-riding*”¹⁵⁰. According to the CI model people decide to engage in collective action when expected value of participation exceeds that of non-participation. Their calculation is based on assessment of the total value of the public good, the probability of affecting collective outcomes and the selective costs and benefits of participation.¹⁵¹ The following deliberations point out how this expected value framework can be applied to explain people’s participation in collective efforts to fight the problem of climate change. We will base our considerations mainly upon the paper of Lubell, Zahran and Vedlitz *Collective Action and Citizens Responses to Global Warming*.

According to Lubell, Zahran and Vedlitz, “*global warming provides a particularly difficult test of the CI model*”¹⁵². Because of the fact that global warming is a worldwide issue, it creates a severe problem of collective-action as it is

¹⁴⁷ Olson defines selective incentives as the material, psychological or social consequences of participation available only for participating individuals, in Olson, M., *The Logic of collective action*, Harvard University Press, 1971

¹⁴⁸ Olson, M., *The Logic of collective action*, Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 51

¹⁴⁹ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 392

¹⁵⁰ Finkel, S.E., Muller, E.N. and Opp., K-D., ‘Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political action, *The American Political Science Review*, in Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 394

¹⁵¹ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 392

¹⁵² Ibidem, p. 392

practically impossible that a single individual can affect the climate; furthermore, one can not exclude the benefits of actions by others; finally, a number of recommended behaviours entail high individual costs.¹⁵³ Following this costs-benefits analysis one could assume a free-ride is the best possible alternative. However, as mentioned above, people participate in collective endeavours to combat the problem of climate change or, as Lubbell, Zahran and Vedlitz call it, a “global warming activism”¹⁵⁴.

There are five variables that can affect the expected value of participation: 1) the value that an individual place on the collective good produced through successful environmental action; 2) the increase in the probability of groups’ success if the individual participates; 3) the individual’s estimation of the group’s probability of success; 4) the individual’s perception of the selective costs of participation; 5) the individual’s perception of the selective benefits of participation.¹⁵⁵ The following equation, referred to as a ‘personal influence’ version of the CI model, summarises the basic relationships of the above factors¹⁵⁶:

$$EV(\text{Global Warming Activism}) = [(p_g * p_i) * V] - C + B$$

EV (Global Warming Activism) expresses the expected value of participation, p_g indicates the probability of groups’ success in achieving its collective goal (group efficacy); p_i stands for the marginal influence of the individual’s contribution on the probability of the group’s success (personal influence); V expresses the value of the

¹⁵³ Ibidem, p. 392

¹⁵⁴ Lubbell, Zahran and Vedlitz use the term Global Warming Activism to cope with the three interlinked dimensions of citizen behaviours: 1) support for global warming legislation; 2) environmental political participation like joining environmental organization; 3) engaging in recommended environmental behaviours affecting global warming. They argue that global warming policy will not succeed unless citizens support these policies in a variety of political venues and hope to implement these policies by engaging in personal environmental behaviours.

¹⁵⁵ Koontz, T., Why Participate? The Collective Interest Model and Citizen Participation in Watershed Groups, *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, Sept 01 2005*, pp. 2-3 and Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A, op.cit., p. 394

¹⁵⁶ Finkel, S. E., Muller, E.N. ‘Personal influence, collective goods, and non-electoral political behaviour’, *The American Political Science Review*, 83, 1989, in Lubbell, Zahran and Vedlitz, op.cit., p. 394

collective good; C is the selective costs incurred by participating, and B is the selective benefits gained by participating.

The terms in braces (p_g, p_i, V), referred to as the “collective interest” variables, incorporate the logic of free-riding as it is assumed that “*the contribution of a single individual only raises the probability of successfully providing a public good by a small amount*”.¹⁵⁷ This is the major overlap with rational choice models; there is a positive correlation between perceived personal influence (p_i) and expected value of participation (EV).¹⁵⁸ According to Olson’s logic of collective action, p_i is nearly zero in large groups.¹⁵⁹ It is more likely the rational individual will free-ride on a group’s effort when he expects a group to attain a success regardless of his contribution. There are, however, two “useful fictions”¹⁶⁰ which CI model of collective-action behaviour relies on. Firstly, people tend to overestimate their personal influence, and hence their willingness to engage in collective action is higher than “Olsonian logic” would expect. Secondly, individual actors consider groups’ probability to supply the collective good (p_g) when making decisions, since “*it is not rational to contribute to an ineffective group*”.¹⁶¹ Indeed, the greater chances to success the group has, the more likely to contribute a rational individual is.¹⁶²

While studies on the CI model place major emphasis on personal influence and the probability of groups’ success, the importance of the other variables should not be underestimated. The expected value of global warming activism is an increasing function of the value (V) of the collective good. As argued by Lubbell, Zahran and Vedlitz, the most significant measure of the expected collective benefits of environmental action is the perceived risk of global warming. Consequently, people convinced that the global warming has an extremely negative impact on

¹⁵⁷ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A, op.cit., p. 395

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem

¹⁵⁹ Olson, M., *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, in Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 395

¹⁶⁰ Finkel, S. E., Muller, E.N. ‘Personal influence, collective goods, and non-electoral political behaviour’, *The American Political Science Review*, 83, 1989, in Lubbell, Zahran and Vedlitz, op.cit., p. 395

¹⁶¹ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op. cit., p. 395

¹⁶² Koontz, T., op. cit., p. 3

human welfare and the environment are considered to be more likely to support policies or engage in actions designed to reduce this problem.¹⁶³

Finally, selective benefits (B) and costs (C) of participating in global warming activism include social, material and psychological aspects. People highly concerned about environmental threats are more likely to obtain psychological benefits of global warming activism, which reveal their preferences, or gain social benefits of participating with like-minded people.¹⁶⁴ Citizens may be attracted to participate in global warming activism also by “solidary benefits” of interacting with other people.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op. cit., p. 397

¹⁶⁴ Olson, M., *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, in Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 398

¹⁶⁵ Lubell, M., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., op.cit., p. 397

4 Channels of influence

Most obviously, social movements are effective to the extent their demands and postulates are taken into account and adopted by the state in the forms of public policies. It is no different in case of the European Union. There is no difference between rules of lobbying at the national and EU level either.

The EU policy network includes number of influences and actors, among which we can distinguish national and transnational pressure groups as well as the EU institutions.¹⁶⁶ Due to the multi-level character of the European policy process actors trying to influence the EU have a number of routes. The relation between interest groups and EU institutions is often described as *interdependency*, what would explain the growth of interest groups while widening the EU competencies.¹⁶⁷ Interest groups place great importance to the formulation as well as implementation of public policy within the EU as it exerts influence on their environment and activities. Equally, pressure groups are very important to the European institutions as far as legislative process is concerned.¹⁶⁸ *“Decision-making in the EU, at least in the most traditional areas of policy-making, is a dynamic process which demands that actors from different institutions and interest groups collaborate and compete to secure the outcomes they desire (...) institutional actors do not have a monopoly on decision-making. Actors from private and public interest groups can be influential in shaping decision, either through formal consultation or by acting as sources of information, expertise and mediation between (often institutional) actors”*¹⁶⁹ Defined, aggregated and articulated interests of pressure groups facilitate monitoring social change and taking on board new political issues. What is more, taking into account their opinions

¹⁶⁶ Sherrington, P. *The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European Union*, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2000, p. 11

¹⁶⁷ Warleigh, A. and Fairbrass, J., (eds.) *Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy*, Europa Publications, London, 2002, p. 2

¹⁶⁸ Eising, R., “Interest groups and the European Union”, in Cini, M. *European Union Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 198-199

¹⁶⁹ Warleigh, A. and Fairbrass, J., op. cit., p. 2

increases the legitimacy of the European policy. Occasionally pressure groups are even allowed to devise the policy themselves. Their formal role remains, however, less substantial. Still, they can be crucial “implementers” of EU public policy. Sufficient to say they are considered as “*more democratic, more decentralized, more effective, and less bureaucratic instruments of policy implementation than public administration*”.¹⁷⁰ In other words, the European Union is very open to lobbying activities of interest groups, to the extent that EU institutions find their involvement indispensable in development of “legitimate and appropriate EU policies”.¹⁷¹

We tend to consider public spheres and civil society as arenas of political activity that are in some sense distant from state power. We should, however, stress that it does not mean these arenas are powerless and irrelevant when it comes to influencing collective outcomes – including public policy.

It needs to be stated that not all policy success comes from direct influence and inclusion, in other words participation in the processes of public policy making. Movements have also possibility of influencing the policy from outside¹⁷². First of all, movements` activism can redirect or change the political discourse (discourse change). Such a change can permeate the understandings of policy makers and so change the content of policy. That in a consequence “may be enduring legacy of the first three or more decades of organized environmentalism”¹⁷³. “The very concept of “the environment” is itself the result of a discourse of industrialism. Associated concepts such as ecosystem, resource scarcity, pollution, and wilderness also made themselves felt in association with this shift”¹⁷⁴.

Moreover, as Torgerson puts it: “the public sphere does not directly govern, but it influences the government in the indirect fashion through the communicative power of opinion”¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷⁰ Eising, R, “Interest groups and the European Union”, in Cini, M., op. cit., p. 199

¹⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 197

¹⁷² Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C. and Hernes, H., K., (eds.), op. cit., p. 132

¹⁷³ Ibidem

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem, p. 2

¹⁷⁵ Torgerson, D., *The Promise of Green Politics: Environmentalism and the Public Sphere*, Duke University Press, Dugram, 1999, p.140

A second way in which a social movements can exercise influence from afar appears when they contribute to constitute more tangible forums within civil society. These kinds of forums are nowadays part of regular activity of many countries and take place at often international level (United Nations Conferences, EU Summits.). Third way by social protest may invoke fear in the government of political instability and that thread might lead to a change. Movement can also play an educational role which is highly recognizable in case of environmental ones. They may reformulate the distribution of power in society. “The public understanding of the terms ”whaling” or “working woman” or “gay” now means something very different than it did before the growth of the relevant social movement, and these changed understandings and perceptions can change norms of social behavior.”¹⁷⁶ Social movements occur to be effective to the degree they can impact a collective identity on participants who might otherwise be excluded and politically uninvolved. As mentioned above actors from private and public interest groups can be influential, but the main question of this paper is whether they are in fact. It will be attempted to provide an answer to that further.

Meanwhile, channels of influence will be presented. Despite all efforts that have been put into regulating the interest intermediation at the European level, uniform rules regarding the participation of interest groups in the policy-making process have not been established so far.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, each institution has a different way of dealing with external input, therefore social movements need to adapt to the structures they find.

4.1 European Commission

Analyzing the European Commission we shall note the role played by this institution in drafting policy initiatives and expressing its need to work with outside interests in pursuit of European integration. It is a central venue for lobbying

¹⁷⁶ Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C., Hernes, H., K., (eds.), op. cit., p. 133

¹⁷⁷ Cini, M. (ed.), op. cit., p. 197

activities of interest groups because of its central role in the EU legislative process¹⁷⁸. The Commission's importance as a route for interest representation derives from its power to initiate and draft legislation as well as from its role in representing member states in world trade negotiations¹⁷⁹.

There could be two kinds of influence: as reaction and as action. The former takes place when the legislative proposal already exists. The latter occurs in case when a need to initiate legislation is seen.

According to Bouwen¹⁸⁰, interest groups trying to get the influence on Commission's legislative proposals have to provide rapidly expertise of good quality. Due to the fact European Commission requires information concerning all European countries, it could be presumed that European associations (including social movements with their scientific findings, opinion pools and research as part of the main activities) have the highest degree of access to the Commission out of all European institutions. Yet, rather than approaching the European Commission as a "collegiate body", special interest groups focus on retaining relations with Directorates-General (DGs) – the Commission departments.¹⁸¹

4.2 European Parliament

The lack of a fixed majority to the European Parliament makes it highly coalition-building oriented and therefore become a natural venue of interest representation¹⁸². Once the legislative power of the European Parliament has been increased, the institution became even more attractive to any group of interests. As the EP has a competence to amend Commissions' proposals, it is interested in any kind of expertise and receiving one it maintain a certain degree of independence from

¹⁷⁸ Greenwood, J., *Interest representation in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003, p. 44

¹⁷⁹ Greenwood, J., *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Palgrave, New York, 2007, p. 30

¹⁸⁰ Bouwen, P., *A Comparative study of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers*, Discussion Paper 02/7, 2002, p. 2, 8

¹⁸¹ Eising, R., "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M., op. cit., p. 195

¹⁸² Greenwood, J. (2003) op. cit., p. 36

the other European institutions. However, we need to draw attention to the fact that a very high level of detail and technical insight are certainly less required on that stage. Therefore it could be assumed that lobbying the European Parliament is less time-consuming than the European Commission in terms of preparing the expertise. On the other hand, it might be also less effective.

In spite of the fact that plenary session has a final say on a particular legislation, it is a committee that plays a crucial role in terms of lobbying by any group of interest. Therefore the most significant targets in the EP are standing committees as majority of Parliament's legislative work takes part there.

What is interesting, according to Bund für Umwelt-und Naturschutz¹⁸³ social movement organizations tend, in general, to trust the European Parliament more than other EU institutions. They claim the Commission is not transparent enough and overall has too much influence.

4.3 Council of the European Union

Council of the European Union, known also as European Union Council or Council of Ministers, plays a pivotal role in the European Union legislative procedure. Before becoming European Union law, all initiatives originating from the European Commission have to meet with EU Council approval. Even though the EP legislative power has been raised with the introduction of co-decision procedure, it is the Council that was provided with both executive and legislative functions in the EU governance system.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, it remains at the core of EU decision-making process.

The fact that Council of Ministers has been given a final power in a legislative procedure makes it a highly relevant institutional target to pressure groups at the

¹⁸³ BUND kritisiert Umweltminister Gabriel: Das Klima braucht mehr Schutz und keine Ausnahmen: <http://www.bund.net/nc/bundnet/presse/pressemitteilungen/detail/browse/7/zurueck/archiv/artikel/bund-kritisiert-umweltminister-gabriel-das-klima-braucht-mehr-schutz-und-keine-ausnahmen/>, accessed: 18/08/2008

¹⁸⁴ Lewis, J. "The Council of the European Union", in Cini, M. (ed.) op. cit., p. 149

European level.¹⁸⁵ On the other hand the Council's position at the end of decision-making cycle significantly impedes exerting influence. Due to the fact that the final shape of the legislative initiative has already been established, interest representations may need to seek changes to ingrained positions. This, however, seems to be far more difficult than shaping problems into policy proposals.¹⁸⁶

Unlike the European Parliament that seeks any kind of expert knowledge, the Council's demands in this matter are substantially narrowed down. What it mostly takes interest in is the information that can facilitate negotiation activities amongst Member States.¹⁸⁷ Yet, it is worth mentioning that the Member States' national bargaining position in the Council is resolved by the ministers and their cabinet working in the national capital. This "(...) *allows the administrative and governmental structures in the national capitals to be identified as the most important locus for lobbying the EU Member States within the Council framework*".¹⁸⁸ As a matter of fact the Council as well as its administrative machinery, namely the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Council Working Groups, is rarely a direct venue of lobbying activities. Domestic groups of interests are more likely to approach the particular government departments instead.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, at this stage of decision-making procedure, pressure groups have to predominantly rely on the bargaining skills and support of ministers and national civil servants. Paradoxically, the rising importance of EU legislation may strengthen the dependence between interest groups and government ministers at the national level. Yet, the differences in the degree of cooperation between them are apparent both between countries and between groups, which differ in the degree of political legitimacy. As far as environmental sector is concerned, interest groups are very often at odds with

¹⁸⁵ Eising, R., "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M. (ed.), op. cit. p. 195

¹⁸⁶ Greenwood, J. (2003), op. cit., p. 32

¹⁸⁷ Bouwen, P., op. cit., p. 16

¹⁸⁸ Bouwen, P., op. cit., p. 26

¹⁸⁹ Lewis, J. 'The Council of the European Union', in Cini, M. op. cit., p. 149

their own national administrations, and therefore perceive the EU as an alternative venue in which to exert influence.¹⁹⁰

As stated above the Council of Ministers is not often directly approached by special interest groups. However, its own decision-making machinery also provides a venue for interest representation. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace report that “(...) *background material originating from private and public interest is sometimes circulated within the Council secretariat and working groups*”.¹⁹¹ At times pressure groups may assure themselves of representation on EU Council working groups, more particularly when there are proper circumstances suitable for national governments.¹⁹² According to Bellier¹⁹³ the EU Council working groups give great opportunities “*for the articulation of different interests affected by European policies*”. What is more, they give opportunities for influence on civil society interests.¹⁹⁴

4.4 Other institutions

4.4.1 European Court of Justice

Apart from the three aforementioned bodies involved in the decision-making process at the European Union level, there are number of other venues providing an access points for interest representation.

As pointed out by Mazey and Richardson¹⁹⁵, “(...) *any assessment of the techniques of Euro-lobbying must examine the use of the courts by groups*”. As the

¹⁹⁰ Mazey, S., Richardson, J. “Environmental Groups and the European Community: Challenges and Opportunities” in Jordan, A., (ed.) op. cit., pp. 111-112,

¹⁹¹ Hayes-Renshaw, F., Wallace, H. *Council of Ministers*, Basingstole: Macmillan in Greenwood. J. , op. cit., p. 41

¹⁹² Mazey, S., *Interest Groups and EU policy-making: organizational logic and venue shopping in European Union: Power and Policy Making*, Richardson, J. (ed.) in Greenwood, J. (2007), op. cit., p. 41

¹⁹³ Bellier, I. *The Commission as an actor*, in Wallace and Young, 1997 in Greenwood, J.(2007), op. cit., p.41

¹⁹⁴ Greenwood, J. (2003), op. cit., p. 41

¹⁹⁵ Mazey, S., Richardson, J., “Environmental Groups and the European Community: Challenges and Opportunities”, in Jordan, A., (ed.), op. cit., p. 112,

European Union's judiciary, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is responsible for monitoring compliance with and interpreting the EU law.¹⁹⁶ For that reason it is a very important lobbying target for any interest organization concerned with implementation of the European law. In particular there are two kinds of interest groups that have been using the ECJ as a mean to force wayward domestic governments to implement EU legislation and comply with EU law, namely environmental interest groups and women organizations.¹⁹⁷

Superior to national law, European law endows individual citizens with rights, which must be upheld by national courts.¹⁹⁸ As a result, the preliminary ruling procedure, which enables domestic courts to submit questions of the EU law to the European Court of Justice, allows pressure groups to confront the compatibility of national and European law.¹⁹⁹ In her study concerning liberalization of professional services in the EU, Jill Lovecy points out that due to the access to the European Court of Justice individual members of given professions were able to successfully (in some cases) confront restrictive national practices. Eventually, as a result of legal case, a policy was changed 'by the back door' since issues it contained had already been rejected by both domestic governments and the EU.²⁰⁰ Yet, in practice, if one wants to take a case to the ECJ, they might expect that usually it is required that body of the European law existed earlier. Even so, it is extremely hard to predict the outcome of such an action. The financial costs are usually heavy and duration of the case may be long, all of which lead to the conclusion that "*this avenue is clearly not available to all citizens and interest groups, and will only be worthwhile when the stakes are felt to be especially high.*"²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ Eising, R "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M. op. cit., p. 195

¹⁹⁷ Mazey, S., Richardson, J., "Environmental Groups and the European Community: Challenges and Opportunities", in Jordan, A., (ed.) op. cit., p. 112

¹⁹⁸ Hix, S., *The Political System of the European Union* in Eising, R "Interest groups and the European Union" in Cini, M. op.cit., p. 195

¹⁹⁹ Eising, R., "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M., op. cit, p. 195

²⁰⁰ Lovecy, J. *Governance Transformation in the Professional Services Sector: a case of market integration "by the back door"?* in Kochler-Koch, B., Eising, R. (eds.) *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union* in Eising, R., op. cit. in Cini, M. (ed.), op. cit., p. 195

²⁰¹ Eising, R., "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M. (ed.) op. cit., p. 195

4.4.2 Economic and Social Committee

The institution built around the concept of providing an arena for EU interest representation is the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). Even though the ESC has the right to construct conceptions on matters which it has not been consulted for, it acts in a purely advisory capacity to other institutions.²⁰² Strictly speaking, its main purpose is to channel the interest groups' opinions within the EU legislative process. There are three categories into which the ESC members are divided: a group of employers, a group of workers and other interests group. Despite its three-group structure, the Economic and Social Committee is not considered to be of dominant importance for interest representation at the EU level. As Eising maintains, close relations between the EU main bodies and pressure groups are more significant than this "*institutionalized forum of interest intermediation*".²⁰³

4.4.3 Committee of Region

Finally, the Committee of Region (CoR) is an institution of even less importance in terms of interest intermediation. Presumably, it will never advance beyond its consultative status. As a matter of fact it failed to meet expectations of both 'regional lobby' and adherents of 'Europe of the regions', who were the main supporters of its creation. Its inefficiency arises, inter alia, from inconsistency between interests in different parts of Europe as well as local and regional authority alignments.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Greenwood, J., (2003), op. cit., p. 64

²⁰³ Eising, R., "Interest groups and the European Union", in Cini, M., op. c it., p. 195

²⁰⁴ John, P., McArteer, M., 'Sub-national Institutions and the NewEuropean Governance: UK Local Authority Lobbying Strategies for the IGC', Regional and Federal Studies, in Greenwood, J. (2003), op .cit., p. 65

4.4.4 National route

Dealing with the issue of policy making at the European Union level, one should not underestimate the role of Member States in the process. The complexity of the EU's political system means that “(...) *many different public actors located at different territorial levels within the EU share political authority*”.²⁰⁵ That is why we need to draw attention to the next channel of influence, which is the national route.

The fact that policy making is not confined solely to EU institutions or to Member States implies that there are several points of access opened to organized interest groups. In order to ensure their interests are well represented and defended, organizations need to follow the political developments not only at the EU level but also at the national levels. What is more, in addition to EU level and national levels, their presence is required in relevant local and regional political arenas, especially as a number of European Union policy measures must be transposed into national law and need to be implemented by Member States. Also, the groups seeking to influence the EU legislative process must coordinate their strategies across all territorial levels, even though their mobility is often limited. As might be expected, the EU pressure groups dominate at the EU level whilst national groups have the lead in the domestic political arena.²⁰⁶

Due to the multi level-character of EU legislative process as well as the unpredictability of policy agenda, institutional actors of EU and Member States alike “*prefer to strive for consensus over political decisions taken at the European level*”²⁰⁷ Although very important to all of the actors, since it may raise the legitimacy of EU policy, the consensual decision making is especially significant in case of Member States as it protects them, at least to some extent, from being outvoted in the Council of Ministers. Despite all its virtues, however, decision-making by consensus may bring a result that no one is satisfied with. Consensus-based decision making

²⁰⁵ Eising, R., “Interest groups and the European Union”, in Cini, M., op. cit., pp. 195-196

²⁰⁶ Eising, R., “Interest groups and the European Union”, in Cini, M., op. cit., p. 196

²⁰⁷ Ibidem

implies that EU institutional actors consider the opinions of pressure groups in their negotiations. They often do so in order to avoid the situation, in which groups opposing initiatives build a coalition of “likeminded” actors and institutions against legislation and eventually block the agreement. Nevertheless, despite this type of decision-making, the national interest groups can not rely upon the national veto in the Council of Ministers as a last resort, taking into consideration the fact that since the mid-1980 the use of qualified majority voting has been considerably extended.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Ibidem

6 Case studies

We have chosen to base our analysis on two, well-recognised environmental social movements, namely Greenpeace and WWF. In this chapter we will illustrate the techniques used and results obtained while trying to influence the decisions of policy-makers in the field of environment policy, and in particular climate change issues. The two case studies display the different methods used by the movements, focusing on their activities to reach the desired outcome.

5.1 Greenpeace

Since the 1970s almost all industrialized societies have witnessed the emergence of numerous new environmentalist organizations. No sooner than until the 1960s an international environmentalism became visible at the organizational level with the formation Greenpeace International (1977). Greenpeace started to attract media attention to such problems as rapidly expanding population, global resource depletion and pollution of the air and seas, as well as continuing concerns over nuclear power and weapons production.

5.1.1 Nature of Greenpeace

Greenpeace is an international environmental organization dedicated to protect earth's natural resources, plants and animal life. Greenpeace, originally known as the Greenpeace Foundation, was founded in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada in 1972. On September 15, 1971, the *Don't Make a Wave Committee* sent an eighty foot halibut seiner "Phylis Cormack", from Vancouver, to oppose the United States testing nuclear devices in Amchitka in Alaska. While the boat never reached its destination and was turned back by the US military, this campaign was deemed the first using the name Greenpeace.

In 1972 the Greenpeace Foundation evolved in its own right to a less conservative and structured collective of environmentalists who were more reflective of the days counterculture and hippie youth movements who were spearheading the social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The social and cultural background from which Greenpeace emerged heralded a period of de-conditioning away from old world antecedents and sought to develop new codes of social, environmental and political behavior. The focus of the organization later turned from anti-nuclear protest to other environmental issues: whaling, bottom trawling, global warming, old growth and nuclear power.

Nowadays it stands up for biodiversity, acts to prevent pollution and to achieve global nuclear disarmament²⁰⁹. Based in Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Greenpeace has 2.8 million supporters worldwide and national as well as regional offices in 41 countries. Greenpeace is a global environmental organization that consists of Greenpeace International (Stichting Greenpeace Council) in Amsterdam and 28 national and regional offices around the world, providing a presence in 42 countries. These national and regional offices are largely autonomous in carrying out jointly agreed global campaign strategies within the local context they operate in and in seeking the necessary financial support from donors to fund this work. National and regional offices support a network of volunteer-run local groups. Local groups participate in many campaigns in their area and mobilize for larger protests and activities elsewhere. Millions of supporters who are not organized into local groups support Greenpeace by making financial donations and participating in campaigns as citizens and consumers.

On its official website, Greenpeace defines its mission as the following: Greenpeace is a global campaigning organization that acts to change attitudes and behaviors, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace by:

- Catalysing an energy revolution to address the number one threat facing our planet: climate change.

²⁰⁹ Ostopowich, M., *Greenpeace*, Weigl Publishers Inc., 2002, p.4

- Defending our oceans by challenging wasteful and destructive fishing, and creating a global network of marine reserves.
- Protecting the world's remaining ancient forests and the animal, plants and people that depend on them.
- Working for disarmament and peace by reducing dependence on finite resources and calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
- Creating a toxic free future with safer alternatives to hazardous chemicals in today's products and manufacturing.
- Campaigning for sustainable agriculture by encouraging socially and ecologically responsible farming practices.²¹⁰

5.1.2 Funding

In terms of resources, Greenpeace is independent of governments, political parties and industry. It is largely supported by its members and voluntary funding. On the official website of the organization one can find the following statement on funding: *“We don't accept money from governments or corporations and our financial independence is what allows us to pressure both. We rely on over 2 million people worldwide who give whatever they can.”*²¹¹ Financial independence is an important factor in proving its credibility.

5.1.3 Methods of work

*“Greenpeace never sought access to government through conventional channels.”*²¹² It does not accept any government or business funding. Nevertheless, its budget (German Greenpeace) was by far the largest among German environmental

²¹⁰ <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/>, accessed: 10/10/2008

²¹¹ Ibidem

²¹² Dryzek, J. S., Downes, D., Hunold C. and Schlosberg, op. cit., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 71

groups²¹³. It is often emphasized that Greenpeace has often stood out as the least willing to take part in formal governmental processes.

Greenpeace does not participate in “consensus talks” involving state, business, and NGO representatives on the grounds that influencing public opinion to pressure government and industry to behave more responsibly toward the environment is a better use of its resources. Greenpeace subsequently applied a judicious mix of radical strategies and policy specializations by developing expertise in scientific, legal, media and political areas.

Greenpeace is said to be at forefront of the new environmentalism with their supposedly non-class based demands, decentralized structures, anti-institutional focus and direct action campaigns.

In case of Greenpeace, the capacity for radical actions has been retained. It is a highly professional organization that at the same time keeps the distance from the state.

Greenpeace pursues radical, media-attracting strategies but departs from new social movement values in organizational terms, being hierarchical and restricting participation in decision making to just thirty members in Germany²¹⁴.

Along with the growth of organization, it is natural to adopt a more formalized, defined structure in order to be able to freely collect funds what may lead to increased effectiveness. That was clearly the case of Greenpeace. Its organizational form “*came closer to even the early environmentalism that to the loose network of activists proposed by new social movements’ theories*”²¹⁵.

In order to react and possibly influence the EU, Greenpeace has established an European Unit, based in Brussels, where work of institutions of the European Union is monitored and analyzed, deficient EU policies and laws are exposed and decision-makers are challenged to re-orient their actions.

²¹³ Ibidem, p. 183

²¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 42

²¹⁵ Sutton, P., W., *Explaining Environmentalism. In search of a new social movement*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2000, p.100

It is said²¹⁶ that as environmental advocacy group Greenpeace, in order to have any political influence at all, must base its claims on the basis of technical expertise. Given this technical orientation, Greenpeace Germany for instance does not try to gain access to government agencies through conventional channels.

5.1.4 Activities

When conducting campaigns, organization uses several methods such as scientific research, political lobbying, public education and direct actions. Randomly, we will refer to some of those instances related to climate change, where Greenpeace had a say.

5.1.4.1 Greenpeace asks EU not to break promises to cut GHG

On 14 October 2005 Greenpeace warned European Union governments not to backtrack on commitments to making further cuts in polluting greenhouse gases beyond 2012. EU environment ministers held talks in Luxembourg to discuss what joint position to take to United Nations talks in Montreal in Canada, in November on launching a global approach to cutting pollution post-2012. The United Nations meeting was called to seek a renewal of the Kyoto protocol. Greenpeace severely criticized the EU that intended to make only “a vague commitment” on what cuts the 25-nation bloc aims to achieve after 2012. Greenpeace openly accused the British EU presidency, which was drafting the proposal, on backtracking on earlier EU commitments.²¹⁷

One could say the environmental group plays a role of a public guardian in this case. In the first place, however, it equipped the public opinion and relevant parties with numerous high level expertise reports and documents collecting the possible outcomes of neglecting climate change issue, e.g.: “Montreal Climate

²¹⁶ Dryzek, J.S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C. and Hernes, H., K., (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 85

²¹⁷ <http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2005/10/14/65281.html>, accessed: 14/12/2008

Summit: Greenpeace Document Kit” (15 November 2005)²¹⁸. The document was followed by press releases and oral communication supporting Greenpeace position.

5.1.4.2 Protest to Berlusconi’s plan to veto EU climate accord

On 16 October 2008 Greenpeace activists protested at a power station north of Rome against Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's intention to veto an EU climate plan. A dozen activists climbed on a crane at the Civitavecchia power station and displayed two large banners that read "the government is against Kyoto" and "coal, no more". At an EU summit in Brussels, Berlusconi threatened to interfere the bloc's climate change plans, considering it to be a significant burden for business especially in the phase of global financial crisis. The EU has aimed to reach a deal by the end of December 2008 on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020, compared to 1990 levels. They have already pledged to have renewable energies make up 20 percent of all energy sources. Many EU nations, however, have demonstrated serious concerns with the costs involved and the consequences for industry of the climate change goals. According to Greenpeace, the Civitavecchia power station, which is still under construction and will run on coal, will produce more than 10 million tonnes of CO₂²¹⁹.

5.1.4.3 Climate Change Conference

The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Poznan – COP 14 took place 1 -12 December 2008. It is said European Leaders lack both the vision and the political will to co-operate in the name of climate. Commenting on the climate deal agreed in Brussels, Robin Oakley, Greenpeace UK climate campaigner, said: "*If Europe's leaders can't even bring themselves to rule out new coal plants and accept*

²¹⁸ <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports?page=2&related%5fitem%5fid=160458>, accessed: 13/10/2008

²¹⁹ EU Business available at: <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1224165722.04/>, accessed: 14/12/2008

*the emissions targets the science is demanding, you have to say they shouldn't have bothered going to Brussels*²²⁰. *Frankly our climate and our children's future would have been safer if they'd never got on their planes and gone to this meeting. We can't beat climate change with weak targets and new coal, whatever Brown and Merkel and the rest of them may choose to believe.*"²²¹ Joris den Blanken, Greenpeace EU campaigner claimed that "*European leaders have (...) shown insufficient political will to get a deal in Copenhagen*"²²²."

Concrete proposals on emissions targets and cuts came from developing countries such as South Africa, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea (Brazil announce a 70 per cent reduction in deforestation by 2017; Mexico announced a 50 per cent cut in emissions by 2050), whereas European leaders made no clear declaration.

Greenpeace urged international leaders to engage globally. However, it has condemned a climate change and energy deal agreed by EU leaders as a "failure". The EU Member States and the European Parliament have 99 days to get their act together. Before international congress "*Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions*" that is to take place 10-12 March 2009 in *Copenhagen*, the EU would be supposed to commit to strong support for developing countries and deeper domestic reduction cuts.²²³

The agreement commits EU governments to the so-called "Triple-20" challenge – cutting CO₂ emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, as well as getting at least 20 per cent of energy requirements from renewable sources, and achieving an overall 20% cut in energy use, also by 2020. In fact, the agreement allows around two thirds of the emissions reductions to be "offset" by paying for projects outside Europe rather than making restrictions within European Union territory.

²²⁰ Two –day EU Summit in Brussels, dominated by climate and energy issues, March 2008

²²¹ <http://www.stopclimatechaos.org/08/dec/eu-puts-coal-ahead-climate-greenpeace> , accessed: 14/12/2008

²²² Joris den Blanken refers to Climate Conference scheduled for 30 November – 11 December in Copenhagen

²²³ <http://www.stopclimatechaos.org/08/dec/eu-puts-coal-ahead-climate-greenpeace>, accessed: 14/12/2008

In addition, the manufacturing sector has largely been exempted from the requirement to buy the permits it needs to cover its carbon emissions, while the power sector has also won concessions over having to pay for its carbon allowances. Coal-dependent poorer countries such as Poland and heavily-industrialised Germany expressed their concerns that the proposals to make companies pay for their permits to cover their carbon emissions would negatively influence industry and be too costly.²²⁴

5.2 World Wide Fund for Nature

This case study displays the WWF's advocacy work to reach the EU policy-makers and influence their decisions concerning climate change issues. Specifically, it analyses the role of WWF in launching the Berlin Mandate, which gave the basis for the Kyoto Protocol, the WWF's efforts to keep the EU concentrated on means to achieve emission cuts goals, and successful work of the WWF which led to the adoption of a particular position of the European Union. The case covers the period from 1995 to June 2000. The first date corresponds to the commencement of 'Adhoc group on the Berlin Mandate' negotiations, while the second date marks the adoption of a common EU position in favour of the positive list of eligible projects at the Environmental Council.

5.2.1 Nature of WWF

Established in 1961, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), formerly named World Wildlife Fund, was initially a field-based environment conservation agency. It gradually started to develop a worldwide network of adherents while concentrating on the conservation of nature and campaigns to halt the accelerating degradation of the

²²⁴ <http://www.stopclimatechaos.org/08/dec/eu-puts-coal-ahead-climate-greenpeace>, accessed: 14/12/2008

Earth²²⁵. By making use of a mass-membership base through letter-writing campaigns it has created a network of national offices and Swiss-based WWF international headquarters.²²⁶ Since opening its international division in 1961, “(...) WWF has grown into genuinely transnational environmental activist group”²²⁷ with offices spanning five continents. At the beginning of 1990s organization’s mission was revised, as it became apparent that wildlife conservation involves more general environmental concerns like issues of economic development or climate change.²²⁸ Henceforward the WWF expanded its focus and classified its work into three independent categories: “*the preservation of biological diversity, promoting the concept of sustainable use of resources, and reducing wasteful consumption and pollution*”.²²⁹

Having its offices all over the world, WWF has always stressed the importance of institutional representation in Europe. In 1989 it opened a European Policy Office (EPO) in Brussels, designed to influence the policies and legislative activity of the EU. Alongside the growing importance of the European Union at the international arena of climate change concerns, the EPO’s position has gradually been strengthened. Eventually a decision was taken to expand its capacity to work on climate and energy issues, as they were selected to become the focus of WWF network global campaigns. In 1990 the WWF joined the global ‘Climate Action Network’ consisting of over 365 NGOs worldwide²³⁰. Ever since becoming a visible player in international climate change debates two years later²³¹ and as one of the largest independent conservation agencies, the World Wild Fund for Nature “*keeps a high concern and active participation in the climate change negotiations and is dedicated to develop the platform with governments, research institutions, business*

²²⁵ Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., p 87

²²⁶ Greenwood, J. (2003), op. cit., p.194

²²⁷ Wapner, P., *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1996, p. 77

²²⁸ Ibidem

²²⁹ http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/who_we_are/history/nineties/index.cfm, accessed: 26/11/2008

²³⁰ http://www.climnet.org/about/whois_can.htm, accessed: 26/11/2008

²³¹ Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., pp. 87-88, 94

and social societies to enhance multi-discipline dialogues during the negotiation processes.”²³²

5.2.2 EU Policies and Measures to reduce greenhouse gases emissions

5.2.2.1 Involvement in launching the Berlin Mandate

The first WWF climate change initiatives were undertaken in the period of international negotiations in Rio, where an action plan outlining the solutions to tackle the most serious environmental threats was agreed. The WWF’s contribution to the issue was marginal and activities of other environmentalist organizations, including Greenpeace, were more visible at that time. This, however, changed noticeably after the COP1 in Berlin.²³³

Once it became clear that the meeting would be held in Germany – a country immensely concerned about climate change improvement, the WWF worked very hard to reach policy decision-makers. A climate change problem awareness-raising campaign was entailed by a special climate team established to attend the preliminary meetings. Thanks to expertise from WWF staff, skillful media work and simple policy papers prepared for EU representatives to be used during international debates, the WWF has attained its first success in the international climate negotiations. The WWF experts helped in drafting a paper at COP1 that was instrumental in launching the Berlin Mandate.²³⁴

5.2.2.2 The WWF’s commitment to policies and measures

Alongside the commencement of ‘Adhoc group on the Berlin Mandate’ negotiations in 1995, the EU endeavoured to coordinate policies and measures (PAMs) for all industrialised countries to get some established goals of CO₂

²³² http://www.wwfchina.org/english/sub_loca.php?loca=3&sub=96, accessed: 26/11/2008

²³³ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 94

²³⁴ Ibidem

emissions reductions ahead of the Kyoto meeting. As the US strongly opposed the idea, reaching consensus was rather tricky. What is more, most environmental NGOs supported the US position on legally binding targets for GHG emissions cuts rather than on rules on how industrialised countries could achieve that goal. The WWF, on the other hand, underlined the need for sound policies and measures providing essential knowledge that country should have to agree on legally binding emission reductions. For this reason, the WWF ordered a report from the Dutch University in Utrecht, which analysed how the EU could reach a 20 per cent cut in CO₂ emissions by 2005²³⁵. A year later the WWF exposed the outcome of this study to the EU delegates. Interestingly, the report's pragmatic approach towards cost-effective measures and extension of renewable energy led to the conclusion that the 20 per cent goal of the EU was not achievable by 2005 unless the reduction of other greenhouse gases was made.²³⁶ Among other statements supported by the WWF were the proposals for doubling the renewable energy target in the EU and joint-implementation schemes in Eastern Europe and Russia - countries with huge possibilities of emissions cuts.

Although the outcomes revealed could not be adopted as an official source of the EU negotiation position on the international arena, the Dutch government preparing for its Presidency of the European Union in 1997 committed the same research from the Utrecht University. The studies conducted embraced three economic sectors, namely energy production, domestic and heavy industry. The researchers tried to establish achievable amount of emissions reductions for each Member States in these sectors. The report's findings, similar to those revealed by the WWF, appointed transparent and complete goals to all Member States. However, to stand for the official use of the European Union the allocations needed governments'

²³⁵ The same goal was proposed by the protocol prepared by the Small Island Nations (AOSIS) – *The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. It functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system, <http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/> accessed: 20/11/2008*

²³⁶ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op.cit., p.96

approval. The sharp and hard bargaining among the Member States, that became the “EU Burden-Sharing-Scheme”²³⁷, hence started. The scheme distributed individual targets to each country, in order to attain the EU overall target for the 10 per cent reduction of three greenhouse gases by 2010 compared to 1990.²³⁸

Parallel to the Dutch report, an ‘EU strategy for Kyoto’ had been published by the European Commission, according to which the EU was able to reduce CO₂ emissions by approximately 17 per cent below 1990 levels by 2010. Since the EU sought a “kind of radical idea” in order to oppose the weak proposals for goals by US and Japan, it suggested a 15 per cent cut in CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O as a “negotiation target” for Kyoto. The WWF in line with the other environmental NGOs confronted national authorities and the Commission with their own research, hoping it would increase the morale of EU representatives before the international negotiations.²³⁹

The overall Kyoto “negotiation target” of 15 per cent helped the European Union to push the less determined players towards more ambitious goals in the final protocol. The EU has taken on board the highest goal of 8 per cent emissions cuts by 2010²⁴⁰. The established targets have to be considered a success in view of the fact that some countries resisted to take climate policy as a serious issue and that GHG emissions in OECD countries rose in 1990s. Presumably they would not have been agreed if the Member States had relied explicitly on their earlier internal agreement. According to some authors, if it had not been for the contribution of WWF and other NGOs, the EU efforts designed to convince other advanced courtiers to take on “absolute emission-reduction targets” would not have been successful.²⁴¹

²³⁷ For more details on burden-sharing regime see chapter 2

²³⁸ Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., p.96-97

²³⁹ Ibidem, p. 97

²⁴⁰ For a detailed account of Kyoto agreements see chapter 2

²⁴¹ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 97

5.2.3 The Clean Development Mechanism

5.2.3.1 Background

In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol created three flexible mechanisms for emission cuts. One of them was an economic tool called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)²⁴² allowing industrialized countries to receive credit for energy projects in developing countries.²⁴³ However, the Protocol issued little guidelines on how to put this complex tool into operation. Most likely, weak rules and operations governing financed projects would benefit only marginal improvement in fossil and other energy practices, and thus would offer little incentive for shift to renewable energy sources and change in business practices. Furthermore weak rules could lead to fictitious carbon abatements resulting from free-ride projects.²⁴⁴

The WWF believed that accrued carbon credits come at a premium for industrialized countries, which can directly use them to meet the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, it's valid to draw attention to the fact that without operational guidelines for CDM, free-rider credits alone could be used to comply with 25 per cent of adopted goals with zero climate benefit.²⁴⁵ The WWF's position was that the CDM "(...) *must generate new and additional emissions cuts, or promote investment in clean, renewable energy technologies*"²⁴⁶ in order to be the most effective instrument possible. Only then could it act as a catalyst for driving factual shift in patterns of energy supply and use. Thanks to a well-constructed CDM, renewable energy markets in developing countries could grow by 300 per cent by

²⁴² The other two mechanisms adopted as a part of Kyoto Protocol are Emission Trading including trade in "Hot Air" and Joint Implementation

²⁴³ Bodansky, D., *Bonn Voyage: Kyoto's Uncertain Revival*, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 2001, p. 8

²⁴⁴ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 98

²⁴⁵ Ibidem

²⁴⁶ <http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2002/WWFPresitem10729.html>, accessed: 2/12/2008

2010. On the contrary, a regime where renewable energy CDM projects have to compete against free-ride projects would not attract renewables investors.²⁴⁷

Having had nuclear, fossil and hydropower industry groupings in the opposing corner, the WWF's together with other NGOs and sustainable industry lobby groups called on tighter rules for CDM. Prior to the advocacy work of WWF, at the end of 1999, neither the issue of determining what kinds of investment would be driven by CDM nor which categories of technology options stand to benefit, were ranked high on the political agenda of the EU. The WWF intended to extend progressive position on rules for CDM within the European Union during the period of the Portuguese Presidency (the first six months of 2002). The proactive EU position could then be developed at the international level under the Climate Convention in the second half of the year.²⁴⁸

5.2.3.2 Importance of the EU in the international debate

There are two reasons which underlined the importance of the European Union in the debate over the Clean Development Mechanism. The first one is that the EU negotiates as a one unitary actor in international climate talks and is a part to the Kyoto treaty in its own right. The other one is that the EU considers itself a frontrunner in negotiations on climate protection²⁴⁹ and is a major initiator who comes up with new, environmentally progressive, ideas.²⁵⁰

As far as policy-process is concerned, the European Commission and national governments representatives bargain common EU positions which are then approved by the ministers of the EU Member States at the Environment Council. On this basis the strategy for subsequent negotiations to the Climate Convention is coordinated by the current EU Presidency, which represents the European Union alongside the

²⁴⁷ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 98

²⁴⁸ Ibidem

²⁴⁹ Exchange of Views of the VP with the CLIM Committee, Keynote speech, Brussels, November 2007, p. 3 available at:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/compar/tempcom/clim/sessions/20071119/verheugen_en.pdf,

accessed: 6/12/2008

²⁵⁰ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 99

incoming Presidency and the EU Commission.²⁵¹ The latter one has good specialized knowledge and seeks the central position in the EU common stance, where it can provide essential tips and advice. The European Parliament's role in this debate is marginal. The resolutions it issues on climate affairs are seldom continued and do not affect the shape of common EU positions.²⁵² The advocacy work conducted by WWF was therefore directed mainly toward national governments' and European Commission representatives. The rest of the section illustrates the subsequent steps taken to ensure that the EU would take a proactive position on rules for Clean Development Mechanism.

5.2.3.3 WWF's techniques

The WWF's advocacy strategy relied predominantly on delivery of transparent and reliable information to a selected group of right people. It was crucial to back that information up through alliances with other groups and some media work. According to Long, Salter and Singer it is vital to get the point in this type of advocacy. The message has to be simple as well as tied into a number of existing positions and desires of the European Union. As soon as a substance has been developed, the WWF prepared briefing notes for EU and national representatives to skim through. Once main ideas had been reviewed, the time came to develop a product.²⁵³ The WWF's position was that CDM projects should be restricted through a "positive list" of qualifying technologies (renewable energy and demand-side energy efficiency). The positive list proposed by the WWF focused on projects that have not been very popular amongst investors in the past. The WWF proposal aimed at ensuring investments in projects that "(...) *are additional to what would occur in*

²⁵¹ Oberthür, S., Kelly, C. R., EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2008, 35–50, p. 38

²⁵² Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., p. 99

²⁵³ Ibidem, p. 100

the absence of CDM.”²⁵⁴ The vehicle for that message was a comprehensive lobbying document explaining both the issue and the logic of WWF’s ideas.²⁵⁵

5.2.3.4 Issue on the agenda

In order to carry one’s point when trying to shape the EU agenda, initiating the discussion on a certain issue may not be sufficient by itself. Hence, the advocacy groups need to make sure the subject will not only be taken on by the actors staying at the heart of decision-making process, but also be cemented on the political agenda.

Initially, the WWF had to place the positive list on the agenda. Two things were essential to achieve that goal: an overall awareness of the idea amongst the target group (combining of EU Commission and national officials) as well as supporters ready to back the issue. None of those things was difficult to obtain due to the previous work and established connections on the issues on climate change.²⁵⁶

The WWF circulated the lobbying document to target group just before the first major meeting under the Portuguese Presidency took place. The aim was to convince a few Member States to raise the positive list importance within the EU strategy. This generated a debate around the WWF’s concept.²⁵⁷

Once the awareness of the idea had been raised within the target group, the time was to consolidate it on the agenda and make it a priority. It required laborious work involving preserved contact with key representatives, direct lobbying of biased countries, numerous informal meetings and using the network of national offices or allied movements. Mobilizing support from the latter ones prevented the issue from being perceived exclusively as a WWF’s idea.²⁵⁸ However, as this case was meant to examine the WWF’s activities, we will skip detailed deliberations on the comprised

²⁵⁴ Rolfe, Ch., Counsel, S., *The Earth In Balance: Briefing Notes For The November 2000 Climate Summit*, Note 8. *Should All Types Of Projects Qualify For the Clean Development Mechanism?*, *West Coast Environmental Law Research Foundation*, p. 2, available at: http://www.wcel.org/wcelpub/2000/13242_8.pdf, accessed: 7/12/2008

²⁵⁵ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 100

²⁵⁶ Ibidem

²⁵⁷ Long, T., Salter L., Singer S., op. cit., p. 100

²⁵⁸ Ibidem

efforts of WWF and other NGOs. Sufficient to say, the idea of positive list was backed up by CAN as well as green parliamentarians' network called GLOBE.

5.2.3.5 Role of media

Getting press coverage is one of the useful ways in legitimating an actor's idea as well as expanding the support base. As a matter of fact, mass media is a crucial resource for social movements.²⁵⁹ The WWF did not expect the topic of positive list to draw much of the mass media's attention due to the complexity of CDM issues. Thus, it was important to give the media a general idea of what it actually was. This was attained using the nuclear debate that was of journalists' interest at that point of time and was carefully followed by anti-nuclear groups.²⁶⁰

Cooperation with anti-nuclear movement meant that they could be kept up to date with the political developments on the CDM. This ensured the concept would continue to be covered by some limited general press (mostly the energy-trade and climate-related media was interested in covering positive list and other CDM related issues). In this way key officials were reminded that the CDM would presumably become an important political issue and that they had to good look on it. One way to do that was to support the positive list²⁶¹, which would, obviously, exclude nuclear power²⁶².

5.2.3.6 Results obtained

By May 2000 the issue of positive list was one of the priorities on the agenda of the approaching Environmental Council. However, a common position among the different countries on how to put it into operation had not been established. Just

²⁵⁹ Johnston, H., Klandermans, B. (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture*, Routledge, 2003, p. 85

²⁶⁰ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 101

²⁶¹ Ibidem, pp. 101-102

²⁶² Nuclear power would be included in a "negative list" of ineligible types of project activity, in Rolfe, Ch., Counsel, S., op. cit., p. 1, available at: http://www.wcel.org/wcelpub/2000/13242_8.pdf, accessed: 10/12/2008

before the official Council meeting, two weeks of preliminary negotiations were held at the beginning of June. For WWF it was an occasion to attain three goals²⁶³:

- An augmentation of pressure via direct contact, making use of the negotiation journal and plane events.
- Collecting information on progress of the debate within the EU and most important lobby countries.
- Asking for support from other countries ready to back up an EU proposal on a positive list, and informing the EU about the results.

The European Union did not manage to reach an internal agreement during the negotiation process. Still, the problem itself as well as reasons behind it was clearly understood by the bargaining participants. Obviously, the WWF could come with a solution. It distributed a letter to ministers and main supporters just at the time when they received pre-Council briefings before arriving in Brussels. In spite of a fact they were in rush to reach a decision, the letter aided to broker a helpful compromise.²⁶⁴ This led to the following statement of the Council:

*"(...) a clear definition of projects eligible under the clean development mechanism (CDM) is needed in order to achieve its potential in terms of both greenhouse gas emissions reductions and sustainable development in non Annex I countries. In order to allow for a prompt start of the CDM, CoP6 should adopt a positive list of safe, environmentally sound eligible projects based on renewable energy sources, energy efficiency improvements and demand side management in the fields of energy and transport."*²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., op. cit., p. 102

²⁶⁴ Ibidem

²⁶⁵ Section 6 of the Council Conclusions from the 2278th meeting of the European Union Environment Council, June 22, 2000, Luxembourg available at: <http://www.nirs.org/climate/cop6/eustatement.htm>, accessed: 12/12/2008

Above conclusions underpinned the common EU position on CDM for the Climate Summit in Hague that was held in November the same year.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ Long, T., Salter L. and Singer S., *op. cit.*, p. 102

6 Discussion chapter

We make no claim that the two social movements we have studied are representative of all social movements. We would like to argue that these social movements involve themselves in complex process of interaction with the state in order to influence policy and legal structures.

The history of the European Union and social movements does show a possible inclusion of previously confrontational movements in the state. However, we have argued that effective inclusion can only take place when a movement can attach its interests to one or more of the imperatives that constitute the state's core. If it can, one could say there are in general no limits to the degree to which the movement can penetrate to the state's core once the movement has sought and achieved entry into the state. If it cannot, then the movement is likely to be rewarded either symbolically or marginally.²⁶⁷ "Whenever the movement's interest comes up against the core, the movement will lose, it is merely co-opted."²⁶⁸

When conducting campaigns, Greenpeace uses several methods such as scientific research, political lobbying, public education and direct actions. Analyzing randomly numerous cases listed above one could come to the conclusion that political lobbying is not only least visible, but also seldom practiced when compared to the other methods.

First of all, Greenpeace became famous across the world due to its spectacular protests (direct actions). Second of all, organization displays reluctant attitude towards any EU institution and governments. European Unit, based in Brussels does not contradict it as well as it does not prove any close relations with the European Union. Greenpeace turned out to be an outsider group, which guards its independence and often campaign against government policy.

The WWF, on the other hand, seems to give a priority to political lobby over direct actions. Participation in preliminary meetings and negotiations preceding the

²⁶⁷ Dryzek, J. S., Downes, D., Hunold, H., Schlosberg, C. and Hernes, H., K., (eds), op. cit., p. 164

²⁶⁸ Ibidem

official meetings of the European institutions are crucial elements of the advocacy techniques applied by the organisation. The WWF endeavors to continue contacts with key EU officials, as they may appear useful in subsequent advocacy work. Similarly to Greenpeace it often supports its postulates with scientific research – like in the case outlining the efforts to keep EU policy-makers concentrated on policies and measures during the international climate debate over the Kyoto protocol.

No matter which method the environmental social movements use, we argue the means they apply to achieve their demands are based on rational calculations along with Rational Choice Theory. From this point of view, the fact that they actually decide to take actions targeted at changing the EU position or keeping the EU focused on particular issues implicates their certainty about the relevance of their activities and successes they entail. The logic behind their performance is not pure social unrest, as the Theory of Collective Actions, however actions of Greenpeace and WWF is undoubtedly based on milling and collective excitement. People are likely to unify and join forces when they undergo together the derangement of their routines of living. The attractive form of both organizations with their appealing message and mission brings people together. Yet, not everyone will join. The other group of participants (members and supporters) falls into Resource Mobilization category. There is always sufficient dissatisfaction in any society to supply the minimal support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and that seems to be the case for both WWF and Greenpeace.

Applying influence indicators²⁶⁹, namely presence at negotiations, provision of written information, provision of verbal information, provision of advice through direct interaction, opportunity to define the issue, opportunity to shape agenda and ability to incorporate text in the agreement, we come to the general conclusion that both social movements analyzed exert influence on the EU institutions with regards to developing the EU policy related to climate change. All indicators are recognizable in cases described above. Both WWF and Greenpeace are present at negotiations (which

²⁶⁹ Corell, E. and Betsil, M.M., *op. cit.*, p. 87

in some cases happen to be loose events, protests, summits or conferences). They share their opinion supported with scientific findings in various papers and reports as well as speak up during official meetings and comment actions or statements of the EU officials. They provide advice through interaction, offering clear solutions to the problem of global warming or presenting demands (limiting emissions levels, focusing on means to achieve it, adopting clear rules for the flexible mechanism created by the Kyoto Protocol). They are involved in defining the issue by recognizing the global warming threat, raising awareness among the public about the risk posed by climate change and formulating the problem.

Although reluctantly, it needs to be taken into account that investigating the final agreement or outcome of an individual event does not bring a clear evidence whether these results would have been different if NGOs haven't had participated. In other words, we may not simply exclude the option where the absence of WWF and Greenpeace at climate change negotiations would have made any difference to the outcomes. However, in order to eliminate over-determination we need to confirm whether NGOs released official statement on their position with regards to climate change, whether negotiators received it or were aware of it, and finally whether behaviour of EU and governments' representatives was consistent with information provided. We do confirm, on the ground of cases quoted, that environmental movements provided written information that reached negotiators and therefore to some extent behaviour of negotiators was consistent with the information provided. It is notably visible in the case study of WWF, displaying the apparent successes of the organisation. First of all, engagement in drafting a paper at COP1 meant the organisation's voice was, beyond all doubts, heard by the key officials and ensured the WWF was perceived as a sound organisation when trying to carry its point later in the future. We would also argue that the EU position during the international debate on the Kyoto Protocol, focusing on PAMs to achieve the emission reductions goals, was, to some extent, the result of WWF's activities throughout this period. According to Corell and Betsil's indicators to access the NGOs influence, it could be argued that

WWF's influence was moderate. Although the conclusions on PAMs from WWF-commissioned report had not been adopted by the EU, they pushed the EU to order a similar research. On the basis of the results obtained (which were comparable to those revealed by the WWF), the reductions targets were established among the Member States. Thus, the burden sharing theme appeared on the EU agenda due to the WWF insistence on gaining knowledge on the means to achieve the GHG reductions goals. As for the efforts directed to place the positive list of qualifying technologies within the CDM projects on the EU agenda, again the moderate influence of the WWF can be noticed. The advocacy work conducted during the Portugal Presidency led to the establishment of common EU position on rules for CDM.

Nevertheless, protests of Greenpeace did not convert Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's intention to veto an EU climate plan. Although the information was provided, it was not adopted. In this case Greenpeace influence was therefore low. Moreover, even though the organization attempted to play a role of a public guardian during the talks in Luxembourg in October 2005, addressing severe criticism at EU British Presidency, it did not bring the immediate affect. For that reason Greenpeace influence can not be evaluated as high or even moderate. Again, similar incident took place in Poznan in December 2008, where despite an open dissatisfaction of Greenpeace EU campaigner Joris den Blanken, preceded with solid documentation and scientific research on the subject (information was provided to authorities), concrete proposals on emissions cuts targets were submitted by developing countries and not the EU countries.

There are several conclusions we would like to draw at this point. We would assume that the environmental social movements act rationally when deciding on the methods as well as the moment to articulate their demands, anticipating different results of their actions and calculating the best course of action. Not incidentally, Greenpeace protest actions take place simultaneously to EU and international official meetings and summits, when the probability their postulates will be heard increases. Furthermore, we believe the organisation intentionally chooses to take actions on

these occasions to turn public attention to the matters discussed and rise their awareness of problems often concealed by the officials. Not incidentally either, the WWF awaits the appropriate moments to provide letters and briefings to key officials as well as conduct informal meetings with them. Weighing the costs and benefits, the social movements seems to apply different methods on different stages of advocacy work, as in the case when positive list was placed on the EU agenda. At first, the initial awareness was raised among the right people. At this point previously established contacts with EU and national officials turned out to be very useful. Then, the lobbying document was circulated within the target group shortly before the first meeting under the Portuguese Presidency. The aim was to initiate a debate on the subject. Cementing the issue on the agenda involved other techniques, like conducting informal meetings and convincing the biased countries. The time when media was used, was also carefully chosen. Alignment with nuclear movement at the time of nuclear debate guaranteed the public attention would turn also towards the issue of positive list. Subsequently, supporting the positive list, in which nuclear power was absent, appeared to be the best possible solution for the officials to gain public favour.

The general conclusion to the above would be that environmental social movements do exert influence on different level decision-makers. However answering to the question of the extent to which they can actually do it, is a tricky task. As mentioned above we are not able to predict what outcome would have occurred in the absence of movements' advocacy work. We can not exclude the possibility that particular issue would have been placed on the EU agenda regardless of movements' efforts. Simultaneously we have no sound basis to claim that actors demonstrating similar aims do not contribute to the EU decisions as well. The exact extent of the social movements' influence on the EU legislative process in a field of climate change is therefore impossible to evaluate at this stage.

Conclusions

Climate change is a truly worldwide problem. No wonder then, that tackling the global warming remains one of the priorities also on the EU agenda. The EU claims to be a front runner in the international arena of climate negotiations. The environmental policy development discussed in chapter 2 of this paper seems to confirm this claim. However, the environmental social movements call on the EU to commit itself into more ambitious goals as far as climate issues are concerned.

In this thesis we have endeavoured to assess the extent to which environmental social movements can actually exert influence on the decision-makers in accordance with environmental policy-making within the EU. Though, before going to the actual analysis of the problem, the possible channels of influence have been discussed. It has been demonstrated that there are multiple ways of access for interest groups seeking to influence the policy-makers' decisions. In fact, interest groups are a permanent element of the policy-making process, as they provide decision-makers with information and expertise, essential to deeply understand the nature of climate change issues and their potential threat to the Earth.

Additionally, theories related to social movements were presented. It intended to provide the reader with better understanding of the complex issue of emergence of social movements and logic behind their performance.

Determining social movements' influence on the policy-making process of the European Union is a tricky task. Even though evidence may suggest that social movements were instrumental in influencing the outcome of negotiating process or shaping the final agreement, one can not definitely say that other actors having similar aims are not responsible for the outcome as well. That is why we would argue that influence the environmental movements exert on the EU policy-makers can not be assessed unambiguously.

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