Table of Contents

Abstract……....……………………………………………………………………………	4

List of Abbreviations..…………………………………………………………………….	5

1.0. Introduction .……………………………………………………………………...	8

2.0. Problem Formulation…………………………………………………………….	11

2.1. Aim and Research Questions ..…….……………………………………..	15

3.0. Methodology ……………………………………………………………………...	16

3.1. Research Methods …………………………………………………………	16

3.1.1. The Bias Problematic and Quality of Information……………. 16

3.2. Terminology …………………………………………………………………	19

3.3. Choice of Theoretical Approaches …………………………………........	20

3.3.1. Greed/Grievance Discussion …………………………………..	20

3.3.2. Emancipatory Theory …………………………………………...	22

3.4. Project Limitations …………………………………………………………	23

3.5. Thesis Structure ……………………………………………………………	24

4.0. Theoretical Concepts …………………………………………………………..	26

4.1. Greed Versus Grievance ………………………………………………….	26

4.1.1. The Greed Narrative …………………………………………….	26

4.1.1.1. Collier’s Survey and Analysis ……………………….	27

4.1.1.2. Collier’s Main Findings ………………………………	30

4.1.2. The Grievance Narrative ……………………………………….	37

4.1.3. Rethinking the Greed and Grievance Concepts ……………..	45

4.2. Emancipatory Theory ……………………………………………………...	50

4.2.1. An Emancipatory Approach to Conflict Resolution ………….	52

5.0. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka …………………………..	53

5.1. The Colonial History of Sri Lanka ………………………………………..	54

5.2. Social and Economic Situation …………………………………………...	54

5.3. The Northern and Eastern Districts ………………………………………	56

6.0. Main Events Leading to Conflict ………………………………………………	58

6.1. The Official Language Act (1956) ………………………………………..	61

6.2. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact ……………………………….	62

6.2.1. The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact………………………	63

6.2.2. Failed Promises and Civil Unrest ……………………………..	63

6.3. Educational Policies (1970s) ……………………………………………..	65

6.4. Sinhalese Resettlement Schemes ………………………………………	66

6.4.1. The Mahaweli Development Project …………………………	68

6.4.2. ‘Frontiersmen’ …………………………………………………..	68

6.5. The Vaddukoddai Resolution (1976) …………………………………….	69

6.6. The 1983 Riots – ‘Black July’ …………………………………………….	71

7.0. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ………………………………	73

7.1. Emergence of the LTTE …………………………………………………..	73

7.2. Organizational Structure, Strength and Culture ………………………..	77

7.3. Military / Political Tactics ………………………………………………….	78

7.3.1. Suicide Bombings ……………………………………………….	79

7.3.2. Political Assassinations …………………………………………	80

7.4. International Recognition ………………………………………………….	81

7.5. Funding the LTTE ………………………………………………………….	83

7.5.1. The Tamil Diaspora …………………………………………….	83

7.5.2. Financial Management …………………………………………	85

8.0. Social Environment, Ethno-Nationalism, Communal Polarization………	87

8.1. Communal Polarization / Ethno-Nationalism ……………………………	87

8.2. The Buddhist Clergy (Sangha) …………………………………………..	91

8.2.1. The Trincomalee Buddha Statue ……………………………..	91

8.3. The Sri Lankan Media …………………………………………………….	93

9.0. Failed Peace Attempts ………………………………………………………….	96

9.1. Indian Intervention …………………………………………………………	96

9.1.1. The Thimpu Declaration ……………………………………….	96

9.1.2. The India-Sri Lanka Accord …………………………………....	97

9.2. Peace Strategies in the 1990s/2000 …………………………………….	102

9.2.1. Political and Social Change……………………………………	103

9.2.2. The 1994-1995 Peace Talks…………………………………..	104

9.2.3. The ‘War for Peace’ Strategy………………………………….	105

9.2.4. The Battle for Peaceful co-existence…………………………	107

9.2.5. Main War Developments………………………………………..	107

9.3. The 2002 Ceasefire Agreement…………………………………………..	109

9.3.1. Initial Peace Negotiations………………………………………	111

9.3.2. Key Developments during the CFA…………………………..	111

9.3.3. Main Political Changes…………………………………………	113

9.3.4. Abrogation of the CFA………………………………………….	115

10.0. Analysis of Underlying Conflict Causes …………………………………….	117

10.1. Greed as Underlying Conflict Cause……………………………………	117

10.1.1. Proxies of an Economic Agenda……………………………..	118

10.1.2. Avoiding Greed Based Conflicts and Their Perpetuation….	119

10.2. Grievances as Underlying Conflict Causes…………………………….	123

10.2.1. Collier’s Grievance Proxies……………………………………	123

10.2.2. Propositions Indicating Grievances as Causes of Conflict...	124

10.2.3. Whose Greed, Whose Grievance?.......................................	132

10.3. Intrinsic Motivations……………………………………………………….	133

11.0. Analysis of Conflict Resolution Efforts………………………………………	136

11.1. Dimensions of Difference in Sri Lanka…………………………………	136

11.2. Structures of Dominance, Dependence and Inequality………………	139

11.3. Tendencies toward Communal Polarization…………………………	140

11.4. Dismantling the System………………………………………………….	141

12.0. Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………	144

13.0. References ………………………………………………………………………..	147

13.1. Recommended Viewing ………………………………………………….	156

Maps.

Map I.	The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka …………………….	6

Map II.	Areas claimed as historic Tamil Homeland (Tamil Eelam) ………...	7

Map III.	Areas under LTTE control in 2001 (pre-CFA) ……………………….	76

Abstract

The thesis focuses on the long-running armed-conflict in Sri Lanka, which officially resumed in January 2008, following the collapse of a nearly six year-old ceasefire agreement between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

An empirical investigation of the conflict’s historical background, main events and developments throughout the years is undertaken and an examination of the political, economic and social environments is conducted. Using theoretical approaches of ‘Greed versus Grievance’ the thesis attempts to uncover the underlying causes of the war and reasons for its continuation.

Previous peace attempts are analyzed, using an emancipatory theory approach, in an effort to understand why all peace-attempts, ceasefire agreements and international mediators have failed in achieving sustainable peace in Sri Lanka.

List of Abbreviations

ADB:	Asian Development Bank

CFA:	Cease Fire Agreement

EPRLF:	Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front

EROS:	Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students

IDP:	Internally Displaced Person

IPKF:	Indian Peace Keeping Force

JHU:	National Heritage Party (Jathika Hela Urumaya)

JVP:	People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukti Peramuna)

LTTE:	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the Tamil Tigers)

MDG:	Millennium Development Goal

MEP:	People’s United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna)

NEPC:	North East Provincial Council

PA:	People’s Alliance

PLOT:	People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam

PSC:	Parliamentary Select Committee

PSCCR:	Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform

PTA:	Prevention of Terrorism Act.

P-TOMS:	Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure

SLA:	Sri Lankan Army

SLFP:	Sri Lanka Freedom Party

SLMM:	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

TELO:	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization

TULF:	Tamil United Liberation Front

UNF:	United National Front

UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNP:	United National Party

UPFA:	United People’s Freedom Alliance

Map I. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Map II. Ares claimed as historic Tamil Homeland (Tamil Eelam)

(Fourth World Eye, 2007)

Introduction

Sri Lanka; formerly named Ceylon, also known as the Teardrop of India, Pearl of the Orient and dubbed “the finest island of its size” by Marco Polo. Among other things, the country is renowned for tea, textiles, cricket, beaches – and unfortunately, also a long-running civil war.

Since the 1970’s the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE / the Tamil Tigers), claiming discrimination by the Sinhalese, have fought against shifting governments to gain an independent Tamil homeland (Tamil Eelam) in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Although the conflict has impacted other actors it is widely acknowledged as being mainly a dispute between the Sinhalese, predominantly Buddhist majority and the Tamil/Hindu minority, which the LTTE acts as the self-proclaimed sole representative of.

Although sporadic communal uprisings did occur earlier it is generally accepted that the actual civil war, which remains today, was triggered in July 1983 when the most violent clashes between Sinhalese mobs and the Tamil minority took place.

Following the LTTE’s killing of 13 soldiers from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in Jaffna, the 1983 riots, often referred to as “Black July,” broke out. Violence aimed at Tamil civilians erupted in the capital of Colombo and spread to other parts of the country. Though figures relating to Black July vary significantly it appears plausible that at least 1,000 Tamils were killed, thousands were injured and 18.000 properties were destroyed (Preis 1996; DeVotta 2000; Herring 2001; President Kumaratunga 2004).

The riots, sometimes referred to as ‘pogroms’ (DeVotta 2000; Herring 2001) were commonly suspected of having some degree of state involvement due to the use of electoral registration lists in identifying Tamil properties, an unwillingness of military personnel to intervene and a political reluctance in renouncing the violence.

The riots, coupled with other events, aided Tamil backing of the militant groups, including the LTTE, which experienced a significant increase in recruitment and public support as many of the more moderate ethno-nationalistic Tamils, who previously supported the struggle for Tamil rights through peaceful, political means, began to view military power and Tamil Eelam as the best guarantee for safety and non-discrimination (Daniel 1996; Swamy 2004).

The LTTE has continually sought independence by force and eventually emerged as the dominant Tamil actor in the 1980’s after merging with- or largely exterminating all other Tamil militant groups. By the 1990’s the LTTE was so militarily strong and influential in the Tamil areas that it was in effect running a de facto state in most of Sri Lanka’s North and East.

The Tamil Tigers, headed by their undisputed leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, are known for an immensely dedicated, disciplined and well trained army which has also become notorious for its guerilla warfare and ruthless tactics, including suicide bombings; recruitment of child soldiers; brazen attacks against both civilian and military targets; and numerous political assassinations which have lead to the banning of the LTTE as a terrorist organization across most of the developed world (DeVotta 2000; Swamy 2003; BBC News 2006; Renner and Chafe 2007; U.S. Department of State 2007; BBC News 2008a,b).

Since the conflict’s eruption there have been several attempts at peace talks – all failing to achieve a lasting solution. Most notably are (I) the 1987 peace agreement, the “Indo-Sri Lanka Accord,” which was reached with India as a representative for the Tamils and resulted in an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) being deployed until 1990 when India withdrew under heavy pressure from both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and (II) the most recent 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

With Norway acting as international mediator, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a CFA in February 2002 and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), consisting of experts from the Nordic countries, was established to oversee the CFA, report on violations and serve as a means of communication between the parties.

For a while the prospects of a peaceful, political solution looked more promising than ever as several rounds of peace talks were held successfully and a considerable reduction of violence was reached - with the SLMM recording less than 130 deaths related to the conflict in the first three years. However, by late 2005 sporadic incidences of violence began to erupt. Severe violations of the CFA quickly became more frequent and by February 2007, on the five-year mark of the agreement, the SLMM reported that abductions, harassments, killings, shelling and air strikes were again taking place at a war like levels and that nearly 4,000 people had lost their lives in conflict-related incidents since December 2005 (SLMM 2007).

In January 2008 the government officially withdrew from the CFA, plunging Sri Lanka back into its decades-long war at full force.

There is little doubt that the conflict has had devastating consequences for the Sri Lankan population. In human terms, the conflict has claimed the lives of more than 70,000 people (BBC News 2008c; Reuters 2008) and according to UNHCR (2008), some 187,700 people have been displaced by renewed fighting since April 2006 while 312,000 persons remain in a state of prolonged displacement. Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government/SLA have been heavily criticized for their blatant disregard for human rights (Amnesty International 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; Reporters Without Boarders 2008).

2.0. Problem Formulation

Sri Lanka emerged from British rule with strong potential for development and as the envy of many developing nations.

“After four and half centuries of European colonial rule, when Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, Dubai was an undeveloped emirate without even basic facilities, Indian university degrees were not recognized in Sri Lanka and Singapore leaders vowed to turn their island into a Sri Lanka, which was then a Third World role model for economic prosperity, political stability and communal harmony. In 1948 Ceylon boasted the most powerful economy in Asia after Japan” (Virtual Library – Sri Lanka 2003).

However, the conflict has taken its toll and today the situation is very different. Rather than communal harmony, Sri Lanka has experienced severe polarization of the ethnic groups and the political landscape has been dominated by ethno-nationalistic – often bordering on chauvinistic – Sinhalese parties, with examples of nepotism, favouritism and suspected corruption being numerous. Sri Lanka has also failed to reach its potential in terms of economic prosperity.

According to the World Bank (2000) Sri Lanka, in the 1960s, had the same per capita income as Korea, Malaysia and Singapore but thirty years later these countries boasted per capita incomes several times higher than Sri Lanka. The World Bank notes that the first and most obvious reason for this disparity is Sri Lanka’s long war.

The macroeconomic impact of the conflict is estimated at 2-3 percent of GDP growth annually (World Bank 2007) and the World Bank made it clear in 2000 that “Realizing Sri Lanka's enormous potential will first require an end to the war” (p. i).

This sentiment was echoed by the U.S. Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Robert Blake (2007), when he addressed the assembly in the Sri Lanka Development Forum by saying:

“No amount of development assistance by the United States or any other donor can have any lasting impact, however, without finding a permanent solution to the conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka for more than 25 years”.

Although below it’s potential, Sri Lanka has experienced economic growth. In 2000 Sri Lanka’s GDP stood at USD 16.3 billion with an annual growth rate of 6% while in 2005 and 2006 (notably while the CFA was in place) GDP had risen to USD 23.5 billion (growth 6%) and USD 27 billion (growth 7.4%) respectively (World Bank 2008).

However, a 2007 poverty assessment published by the World Bank found that economic gains have been unevenly distributed and overall poverty reduction has been slow due to widening inequalities among income groups and across the Sri Lankan regions, and because growth has been concentrated in the Western Province (which holds the Capital of Colombo). Growth was 2 to 3 times faster in the Western Province than in the rest of the country and, in 2002, poverty in the two poorest districts was more than six times that in Colombo.

This widening inequality and lack of growth in many rural areas, including the North and East where the Tamil population is concentrated, might, apart from the obvious economic disadvantages also be a contributing factor in prolonging the conflict as it may aggravate both intra- and inter group resentment with large sections of society feeling deprived.

The relationship between economic development and peace was discussed by James Wolfensohn (2003) when he, as President of the World Bank, addressed participants at the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka. On the topic of reconstructing the North and East – the areas worst affected by the conflict, he asserted the following:

“Let me say that the issue of peace is closely tied with the issue of economic development. It is also closely tied with the issue of equity, with the issue of social justice, with the issue of combating poverty. And wherever we are in the world we find that this interrelationship between peace and development is one that becomes more and more true, and more and more apparent.”

It is perhaps a paradox that sustainable peace may be, to some extent, dependant on development and economic growth, while these very things are severely hampered by the war. And yet, it is only one of the many complexities found in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict.

Many researchers mention a correlation between ethnic conflict (and group mobilization) and issues such as poor economic conditions; relative deprivation, inequality, uneven distribution of resources and social injustice (or perceived injustice) (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985; Gurr and Harff 1994; Ruane and Todd 1996; Smith 2004).

Smith (2001) argues that a combination of poor economic conditions and a lack of political openings functions as a double injustice and that: “Political mobilization occurs around the theme of injustice: people commit themselves to a cause because they believe it to be just, or because they at least thing it will redress the injustice they see in their own lives. An exploitable sense of injustice, arising out of the underlying divisions of power and prosperity in a society or between different countries, is thus the basic material for political mobilization” (p. 9.).

Another notion is that a country with no or only a weak sense of community is more probed for conflict. It is argued that in a divided society the different groups will often work towards benefiting their own secluded group, instead of working for the society as a whole. A cause of this lack of common community feeling can often be explained in terms of different ethnicities, religions, cultures and economic means. Furthermore, the lack of a shared, national identity can be explained as either a consequence of historical events (a colonial history is often emphasized) or it can be based on political decisions (Gurr and Harff 1994).

Other conflict theoreticians claim that despite the seemingly irrational nature of conflicts they can be explained from a rational choice perspective, arguing that powerful actors can have economical incentives to instigate and reproduce war (Collier 2000; Keen 2000).

Clearly the emphasis placed upon- and importance attached to the various factors that can, potentially, contribute to conflicts, differ significantly among scholars. However, all seem to agree that correctly understanding the underlying courses is paramount as they explain not only the commencement of a particular conflict but are also linked to its continuation – and ultimately, hopefully, its resolution.

Smith (2001 p. 2.) argues that: “If we seek to prevent conflict from escalating into armed warfare, or, failing that, to at least achieve an end to fighting as soon as possible, and if we want to maximize the opportunity for avoiding the return of the war after apparent settlement, we must first be sure that we properly understand armed conflicts and their courses.”

According to Smith, a main reason for the resumption of war is that the underlying causes remain. He claims that: “Failure to address the long-term causes of the conflict will mean that all efforts at reconstruction are doomed to be, at best, cosmetic” (Smith 2001 p.4.).

This raises some interesting questions in relations to the Sri Lankan conflict – its background and actual underlying causes and whether these have been properly identified and addressed in past peace efforts.

It is perhaps important to note that underlying causes may change over time with the circumstances – especially during a long conflict like the Sri Lankan. What triggered the conflict may not be the underlying reasons for it continuation. For example, a conflict may initially be based on grievances but later prolonged due to greed-related motives e.g. corruption opportunities, the continuation of war economies etc.

Collier (2000) argues that although peace may be beneficial for the society at large, the ending of a conflict will depend upon whether the groups, which benefit from peace are more powerful than those who have economic incentives in prolonging a war. He also claims that the duration of rebellion is prolonged if society consists of two ethnic groups because:

“When there are two ethnic groups, probably one being the government and the other the rebels, the rebel organization has the best chance of imposing a cohesive monopoly of rebellion” (p.103.).

This indeed appears the case in Sri Lanka where the LTTE emerged as the all-dominating rebel group and the LTTE has long claimed to be the sole representative of the Tamil community. Thus, this monopoly may go some way in explaining the long duration of the conflict. Whether economic incentives in prolonging the war are also involved – and perhaps partly to blame for the recent breakdown of the CFA is something worth investigating.

Collier (2000) emphasizes that when analyzing the causes of conflict and, by extension, rebel groups, they must be judged on their actions rather than language and discourse (one would argue that the same goes for the government). As propaganda will normally be grievance-based, in order to justify/legitimize a cause and gain support – whether they are the real underlying motive or not.

Thus, although the LTTE have continually proclaimed their fight as a ‘freedom struggle’; a quest to protect Tamil’s from discrimination and undertaken on behalf of the Tamil community, it may in reality be based on preserving economic self-interests, and the LTTE might have motives for prolonging the war, and contributing to the demise of the CFA, which are not related to their publicly stated, ultimate goal of Tamil Eelam. Similarly, when the Sri Lankan government, during the CFA, repeatedly stated their preference for a peaceful, political settlement, yet simultaneously launched military offensives on LTTE territories, the sincerity of such statements deserves to be evaluated.

The mere length and intensity of the Sri Lankan conflict makes it an interesting subject of investigation. Furthermore, the 2008 breakdown of the CFA – an agreement, which despite its faults did produce some degree of peace, stability and optimism in Sri Lanka for several years, makes an examination of the conflict; it’s causes, complexity and continuation even more timely.

2.1. Aim and Research Questions

The main aim of the thesis is to undertake an in-depth analysis of Sri Lanka’s 25-year-old conflict in order to answer the following questions: goal

What are the underlying causes of the Sri Lankan conflict?

Why has no lasting peace been achieved in Sri Lanka?

Answering the research questions will require a thorough examination of Sri Lanka’s history, particularly following independence, in order to understand the political, economic and social aspects, which have triggered, and continue to influence the armed conflict today. Furthermore, a sound theoretical understanding of conflict-causes and conflict-resolution is necessary in order to answer the question in an informed manner.

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3.0. Methodology

The following chapter discusses the research method used, the pros and cons of secondary sources and the dangers of biased information. The chosen theories will be introduced and their intended application discussed. Sections are also dedicated to explaining the adopted terminology; the limitations of the thesis; and the project structure.

3.1. Research Methods

The thesis relies purely on secondary research i.e. sources of data and other information originally collected and presented by others (Stewart and Kamins 1993).

The use of primary information and qualitative research methods (e.g. interviews) was rejected because it was found unnecessary, and indeed unsuitable for meeting the aim of the thesis. Answering the research questions predominantly requires a more general, historic perspective rather than the opinions of individuals. It was concluded that although some interesting and knowledgeable interviewees could potentially have been identified and contacted in Sri Lanka, it would not result in information on conflict causes or the failure of ceasefires/peace-talks, which was anymore factual or unbiased than the information available through secondary sources and neither was it found suitable for the theoretical analysis.

In order to gain a broad and in-depth understanding of the topic under investigation, the thesis relies on information stemming from a variety of sources, including textbooks, journals, news-articles, speeches and internet sites. These sources are supplemented by reports and information from international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Transparency International and the World Bank – sources which we consider neutral in terms of ethnic bias although we acknowledge that they might not be value-neutral.

3.1.1. The Bias Problematic and Quality of Information

Research scholars repeatedly stress the necessity of properly evaluating the reliability and validity of secondary sources as the information can potentially be biased or misleading (Stewart and Kamins 1993; Ragin 1994).

We consider the issue of questioning the information obtained (and the sources from which it stems) highly important in regards to the Sri Lankan conflict, as it is a sensitive and subjective topic, which tends to raise big emotions, particularly in researchers/writers who have personal experiences or links to the conflict. Awareness exists that extremely contradictory arguments will be encountered, and while this is not necessarily a problem, care is taken not to interpret individual arguments as factual.

Great consideration will be given in determining the validity of information. When disagreement among sources arise, we will try to identify the reasons for the differences and, if possible, seek additional information to better determine which source is more credible.

For example, the death toll of Black July varies significantly among sources. Harrison (2003), a BBC News correspondent simply stated that nobody knew how many Tamils died that week and that estimates vary from 400 to 3,000 dead. Preis (1996) refers to 350 as being the official number but notes that according to Tamil sources the death toll was as high as 2,000. Decidedly anti-LTTE, terrorism experts Graeme and Gunaratna (2004) (the latter being Sri Lankan Sinhalese) state the number of deaths as 160 in their book on counterterrorism (this is the loWest estimate we have seen anywhere and we find this claim un-credible. It almost seems like an attempt to negate a cause of Tamil grievances – and by extension undermine any legitimacy in the LTTE’s fight). In a speech to commemorate the riots on their 21st anniversary, former President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, referred to the findings of the Truth Commission (a commission appointed in 2001 to investigate suspicious deaths relating to the 1983 riots), which had been able to find evidence of nearly 1,000 killings. She noted the possibility of the number having been higher as many incidents had not been reported.

Based on this conflicting mass of information we have chosen to conclude that at least 1,000 Tamils were killed, as it seems unlikely that a Sinhalese President/government would be prone to purposely exaggerate the numbers. The underlying reason for the vast number differences, we suspect, is mainly due to the 1983 government, which was believed to be implicated in the riots to some degree, downplaying the number of deaths while Tamil sources might have tended to overestimate them.

As far as possible, the use of Sri Lankan news-outlets will be limited to factual information e.g. official and verifiable information such as election results etc. as, overall, the Sri Lankan press is notorious for its bias along ethnic and/or political lines. Furthermore, both the LTTE and the government are known for manipulating, misleading and even directing parts of the Tamil and Sinhala media respectively.

In addition, independent media often face severe problems in verifying information due to both national and international journalists being barred from conflict zones, hospitals, IDP camps etc. Consequently, the press is often compelled to print conflict-related information as it’s been presented by the government, the military or the LTTE – and the validity of such information is often suspect. Examples of government sources and LTTE spokespeople misinforming the press, and thus the public, are numerous and the numbers provided by the parties virtually never tally.

An incidence involving such misinformation and number mismatch could be when the Army Commander Lt. Gen. Fonseka publicly claimed in December 2007 that only 3,000 Tigers remained and that the military targeted to annihilate them within the first half of 2008 (Ministry of Defence 2007). By May 2008, government provided numbers of killed LTTE cadres in the first five months stood at 3,636 and yet the war continued unabated (SATP May, 2008). Hence, at least one of the numbers must be presumed false.

Perhaps an even more absurd example is that provided by I. Athas (in Buerk 2008). She notes that if all the figures given by the government on LTTE fatalities since the beginning of the war (until March 2008) are added up, it equates to the army having wiped out the entire population of Northern Sri Lanka twice over. Similarly, the LTTE is prone to exaggerating its victories and downplaying losses.

A typical account of a violent incidence between the SLA and the LTTE reads like the following, which was reported by the BBC News (2008c).

“…. Meanwhile it has been reported that at least 165 soldiers were killed in fighting in the far North on Wednesday. The government has said that 43 soldiers were killed in the fighting in the Jaffna peninsula and that 38 soldiers were missing. However, military sources have now told the AFP news agency that at least 165 died and that 20 more were missing. More than 100 rebels were killed in fighting which ended after 11 hours on Wednesday, the military said. The rebels put their losses at 16. They said they had killed more than 100 soldiers and wounded about 500.”

Hence, any information provided by the warring parties in relation to conflict incidences and conflict developments must necessarily be questioned, as its credibility is often doubtful.

3.2. Terminology

A few terms frequently used in the thesis need some clarification in order to avoid confusion or misinterpretation by the reader.

Ethnic Conflict: Throughout the thesis, the Sri Lankan conflict is sporadically referred to as an “Ethnic Conflict” – and indeed most publications, news articles and textbooks describe it, and accept it, as being an ethnic conflict. We have adopted the use of this term simply because the conflict centers predominantly on two distinct ethnic groups. This is not to imply that any conclusions have been reached regarding ethnicity as being a dominant cause of the conflict.

Smith (2001 p.7.) concludes that: “Ethnic diversity alone is not a cause of armed conflict, but parties to a conflict are often defined by their ethnic identities.”

(He does argue however, that ethnic diversity may turn out to exacerbate conflict and increase the likelihood of serious escalation because ethnicity offers fertile material for political mobilization).

For the purpose of basic terminology we have accepted Smiths’ interpretation (although the overall issue of ethnicity and its role in conflicts will be discussed in more details in later theoretical chapters). Thus when we loosely refer to the conflict as ‘ethnic’ it is based on the understanding that it is a war between two ethnic groups rather than being a pre-concluded notion that the entire conflict rests on ethnic differences.

Tamils: For the purpose of ease, unless otherwise stated, the term “Tamil” refers exclusively to the Sri Lankan Tamils who are historic inhabitants of the country (predominantly residing in the Northern and Eastern districts – the areas claimed as Tamil Eelam). Sri Lankan Tamils however, (also in terms of the LTTE and their claim of representing the Tamil community) also include the large group of diaspora Tamils who have fled the country but still perceives Sri Lanka, or Tamil Eelam, as their home country. If exclusively discussing either the Tamil diaspora or the Tamils residing in Sri Lanka it should be clear from the given context.

The term “Tamil” excludes Indian Tamils and also the “Highland Tamils” who reside in the hillsides of Sri Lanka’s central districts. The Highland Tamils, who were basically brought from India to Sri Lanka during colonial times to work in the tea plantations, do not play a large role in relation to the conflict and neither are they perceived by either the Sinhalese nor the LTTE (or Sri Lankan Tamils in general) as being historic inhabitants with any entitlements to the country.

Sinhalese: When using the term “Sinhalese” it refers to all Sri Lankans of Sinhalese ethnicity. The large majority of the Sinhalese population is Buddhist but a minority of Christians also exists. However, unless specifically being discussed or otherwise stated, no religion-based distinction is made, and the Sinhalese part of the population is viewed as one group.

3.3. Choice of Theoretical Approaches

Although the contribution of numerous conflict researchers and academic scholars will be incorporated throughout the thesis, the theoretical discussion and the analysis focus predominantly on a select few. The theories and theoreticians selected were chosen based on their areas of focus; their explanatory value and adaptability to the Sri Lankan context; their diversity and thus combined ability to illuminate different aspects, and their perceived usefulness in answering the research questions.

3.3.1. Greed/Grievance Discussion.

In an effort to determine the underlying causes of the Sri Lankan conflict we will be drawing on the infamous debate of greed versus grievance motives. The two, sometimes viewed as opposing, approaches were chosen in order to gain a more varied insight into potential conflict reasons. The theoretical analysis should not be interpreted as an attempt to either verify or falsify either of the theories or their general validity in explaining conflict causes. Rather, their differing emphasis and arguments are used to better examine the Sri Lankan conflict from several angles and thus determine which causes/motives appear most probable in the Sri Lankan case.

As representative for the ‘grievance school’ the thesis relies predominantly on Paul Collier. Collier is a renowned economist and large contributor to- and advocate of a more economically based, theoretical approach to analyzing internal conflicts. His publications and arguments are often discussed and referred to by other conflict researchers.

Collier’s theory, which rests on quantitative research and statistical analysis of civil wars, has challenged many traditional, grievance-based understandings of conflict by adapting a rational-choice approach, and focusing on economic conditions and incentives, which influence the commencement and continuation of war. Thus, the theory was chosen because it offers a different perspective on conflict causes and it was felt that its inclusion would allow for a more in-depth analysis of the possible motives/causes of the Sri Lankan war.

Collier’s statistical analysis and his research methods will be described in the theoretical chapter to provide background information and better understand how he arrived at his conclusions and on what basis they were made. However, for the thesis analysis into conflict causes, we will be drawing mainly on Collier’s findings rather than his model of investigation. Furthermore, the main analytical focus will be on whether the conflict was initiated and is being continued due to economic incentives, rather than investigating whether Sri Lanka’s economic- and societal circumstances make armed insurgence possible or probable seeing as war is already a reality and hence, the mobilization of a strong rebel group must have been financially achievable.

To counter the economic-based focus of Collier’s theory and in an effort to investigate other possible causes of the conflict, the work of Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff is included.

Gurr and Harff (1994) focus on the mobilization of ethnic groups. They view politicizing of ethnic identity and the struggle for resources as being causes of conflict because ethnic grievances arise from discriminating practices and relative deprivation. They define the Sri Lankan conflict as ethno-nationalistic, based on grievances and thus propose different areas of investigation than those favored by Collier.

A very elaborate theoretical framework, resting on different hypotheses, was developed by Gurr and Harff, as a mean for examining conflict causes. Although the framework will be explained in the theoretical chapters in order to fully understand the theory on which they base their arguments, the analysis will draw predominantly on their findings.

Other conflict theoreticians such as Porto (2002) and Korf (2006) are included in the ‘greed-grievance’ debate in order to identify alternative points of view, assess the strength and weaknesses of the main theories chosen and determine whether they must necessarily be mutually exclusive or can be viewed as complimentary. Furthermore, Korf introduces a third dimension to the debate – that of pride and other intrinsic motivations as being contributing causes of armed conflict.

3.3.2. Emancipatory Theory

To help determine why no lasting peace has been achieved in Sri Lanka, the thesis draws on emancipatory theory as an explanatory tool.

The theory was developed by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd (1996) in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland but we find that the framework and its core points can effectively be adapted to other long-running, internal conflict situations, such as in Sri Lanka. As Goosen notes in connection to Ruane and Todd’s book - The dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland:

“The book is not only a detailed analysis of the dynamics of conflict in Ireland but also gives a valuable “emancipatory” theory, which can be applied elsewhere” (Goosen 2004, p.250).

To achieve sustainable peace between two population groups who have conflicting economic, political and cultural interests under conditions of an uneven balance of power, Ruane and Todd propose an emancipatory approach. They argue that a multi-stranded approach is necessary and that conflict-resolution attempts should simultaneously (i) address the dimensions of difference between the communities; (ii) undo structures of dominance, dependence and inequality; and (iii) weaken the forces that produce communal polarization.

Because it encompasses several aspects of conflict resolution rather than focusing on one area, the theory was chosen for inclusion in the analysis. It was determined that the three levels of emancipatory theory would encapsulate many of the key issues evident in the Sri Lankan conflict. The thesis aim is not to suggest conflict resolution measures but rather the emancipatory theory will be used to assess whether different dimensions have been sufficiently addressed in previous Sri Lankan peace attempts.

3.4. Project Limitations

Although a brief historical account of pre- and colonial times is included in the thesis, the emphasis will be on post-colonial developments. Violence between Sinhalese and Tamils is primarily a post-colonization phenomenon and although some underlying causes of the conflict may have developed earlier these have been omitted.

Even with the focus being limited to the post-colonial period, it is still virtually impossible to cover every aspect that may have potentially influenced the conflict in some way. Consequently, the empirical investigation and the analysis will be limited to the inclusion of main events and aspects, which are identified as having (most probably) contributed directly to starting and/or prolonging the conflict. Similarly, the thesis will not include an exhaustive account of Sri Lankan economics or politics since independence. Rather it focuses on the overall political/economic/social climate and contexts in which the conflict takes place.

The official abrogation of the recent ceasefire – on 16th of January 2008 - serves as the final event being included in the analysis. This seems an appropriate and highly significant development on which to conclude and even though events continued to unfold in Sri Lanka in the months following the CFA collapse (including high-intensity fighting and the planning of local elections in the Eastern District), the ultimate outcome of these events will not be known in time for inclusion in the analysis. However, some literature published after January 2008 will be used and some recent developments may be mentioned briefly in the empirical investigation even though they are omitted from further theoretical analysis.

The thesis will not be investigating specific cultural or religious differences e.g. Hinduism versus Buddhism and neither will the prevailing caste system within the Tamil population be explored in any detail. Although these aspects might play some part in conflict occurring between the two groups, the subjects were found to be too comprehensive to be included properly in the analysis.

Focus is kept on the relationship between the LTTE/Sri Lankan Tamils and the government/Sinhalese population as they are the key participants who are militarily engaged in the conflict. The role of other population groups such as the Muslim minority and the Highland Tamils will not be examined in detail, nor will the circumstances under which they live. It is fully acknowledged that the war has also had an immense impact on these groups - For example do thousands of Muslims live as long-term displaced after being expelled from the North by the LTTE in the 1990s. Muslim representatives were involved in the recent peace process/peace talks and undoubtedly the future of many Muslims would be influenced by decisions made during peace negotiations. However, as far as we can determine, the Muslims and Highland Tamils, although involved in- and affected by the conflict, have not played any significant role in actually causing it, nor were they instrumental in the failing of previous peace-talks or in ceasefire agreements being cancelled – and thus, analysis of these groups is not crucial in regards to the research questions.

As a final limitation, it must be noted that the purpose of the thesis is not to propose any solutions as to how the conflict may be solved, although some suggestions might indirectly be made in light of the analysis, but rather the emphasis is on the background and causes of the war and on understanding why peace attempts have failed.

3.5. Thesis Structure

The thesis is basically structured in three underlying, distinct parts, each with a particular purpose and focus.

Chapter 4 and its sub-chapters focus exclusively on theoretical concepts, which relate to conflict in general. In this section, no attempts are made to draw links- or apply the theories to the Sri Lankan context but rather the purpose is to review existing conflict, and conflict-resolution approaches and the discussions, arguments and findings of different scholars.

The chapters from 5 to 9 all form parts of an empirical analysis, undertaken to understand the Sri Lankan conflict; its historical background and the context in which it takes place. Chapters are dedicated to the main events, which are commonly perceived as having contributed to the conflict, and political, economic and social issues, which may be linked to both the conflict’s commencement and its continuation. An empirical investigation of previous peace attempts is also conducted.

Chapters 10 and 11 contain the analysis. The analysis draws on the information presented in the previous parts and attempts to link and apply the different theoretical approaches to the Sri Lankan context in an effort to better understand the conflict and its causes.

Following the three main parts, a conclusion, which addresses the research questions, will be drawn mainly based on the findings in the analysis.

4.0. Theoretical Concepts

The following section will be a presentation of the different theories, which will be drawn upon in connection to the research questions later in the analysis. Namely, theories focused on greed and grievance motives for conflict will be discussed as well as the emancipatory theory, which focuses on aspects related to conflict resolution and reconciliation. A short discussion of main reasons for the resumption of conflict will also be included.

4.1. Greed Versus Grievance

When trying to explain the causes and duration of violent conflict scholars have typically fallen into one of two groups: those who believe greed is the dominant cause of conflict and those who believe grievance is the most dominant cause of conflict. In this section the greed as well as the grievance school’s line-of-thought will be explained. Furthermore, an alternative way of viewing the greed versus grievance approach to conflict will be presented. One that argues that in order to best explain the cause and duration of conflict from a greed versus grievance perspective, it is crucial to leave the “either-or” narrative and understand that they are mutually inclusive rather than mutually exclusive.

4.1.1. The Greed Narrative

The greed narrative will be explained as it is presented by former World Bank economist Paul Collier, who is acknowledged as the most prominent representative of the greed approach in trying to understand the nature of violent conflict.

With the purpose of disclosing the reasons why violent conflict erupts and why they endure, Paul Collier conducted a statistical survey into the global patterns of large-scale civil conflicts. He notes that the discourse on conflict tends to be dominated by group grievances, beneath which inter-group hatreds lurk, which can often be traced back in time. Therefore he undertook his survey with the expectation of finding a close relationship between these grievances, inter-group hatreds, and the incidence of violent conflict. Instead however, his results pointed in an opposite direction, suggesting that much more emphasis should be put on narratives of greed, when trying to explain the eruption and endurance of violent conflict. He concluded that:

“The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed” (Collier 2000, p. 101).

The purpose of his statistical investigation was to disclose the most important aspects, which promote the eruption and endurance of violent conflict. Understanding these aspects should serve as a useful tool in creating more effective policy decisions to avoid conflict and solve ongoing conflicts.

“At one extreme rebellions might arise because the rebels aspire to wealth by capturing resources extra-legally. At the other extreme they might arise because rebels aspire to rid the nation, or the group of people with which they identify, of an unjust regime. These two motivations obviously imply radically different types of policy intervention if the international community wishes to promote the prospect of peace” (Collier 2000, pp. 91-92).

4.1.1.1. Collier’s Survey and Analysis.

The statistical survey will not be explained in detail, but the main aspects of Collier’s analysis will be presented. The more interesting- and most relevant part, in relation to the thesis’ area of focus, is to examine the conclusions drawn from this analysis, and therefore these will be given the most attention.

Overall Collier’s survey is a comparative study into the reasons behind violent conflict. It focuses on countries, which has, or still does, experience violent conflict from 1965 until 1998 when the survey was conducted.

Collier (2000) tries to determine patterns in the origins of civil war, and distinguishes between the causal factors, which are broadly consistent with an economic motivation and those causal factors that are more consistent with grievance.

Collier wishes to infer motivation from patterns of observed behavior. He gives an example: “if someone says ‘I don’t like chocolates’ but keeps on eating them, we infer that she really likes them, and the question of why she says the opposite is then usually relegated to being of secondary importance” (Collier 2000, p. 92).

This illustrates his point in regards to uncovering the actual incentives for rebel groups who take up arms in violent conflicts. As he notes, all rebel groups will claim that they are motivated by actual grievances, even in cases when they are not. This makes it impossible to distinguish between the groups that are indeed motivated by grievance and those motivated by greed, by simply accepting their respective rhetoric. Therefore it is essential to infer motivation from patterns of observed behavior instead of accepting group rhetoric as being the actual motivations.

Proxy indicators of an economic agenda:

The proxy indicators he uses to capture the notion of an economic agenda are: Share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP); the proportion of young men in the society; and the endowment of education (Collier 2000). He notes that there are many other potential economic agendas in conflict, such as suppliers of armaments and opportunities for bureaucratic corruption, but finds them to be too difficult to measure in a comparative study.

The most important proxy he uses to capture the notion of an economic agenda is the importance of primary commodity exports in GDP. His argument is that, primary commodity exports are likely to be a good proxy for the availability of lootable resources (Collier 2000). Primary commodity exports are the most heavily taxed component of the GDP in developing countries, as they are the easiest component to tax. The reason for this is that they are not dependent upon complex and delicate networks of information and transactions, as is the case with manufacturing. Primary commodity exports can better withstand predatory taxation because often they are imbedded in less competitive level playing fields, than those of manufacturing. In addition they are often dependent on long trade routes, usually origination from rural areas, which puts it in higher risk of predatory taxation from organized military forces. Collier points out that these factors apply both to rebel organizations and governments.

“Rebels, too, can impose predatory taxation on primary commodities as long as they can either interrupt some point in the trade route or menace an isolated, and difficult to protect, point of production” (Collier 2000, p. 93).

However, when it comes to taxation of primary commodities rebels have an advantage over governments, as rebels can directly extract a proportion of the production, rather than cash. This is more likely to occur where production is undertaken by poor households, rather than by large firms, as often there will be only little cash to extract, as the households only command a small fraction of the international value of their production. This scenario makes it necessary for the rebel groups to be able to dispose of these products, which is another advantage of primary commodities. As rebel organizations are often extralegal, they usually have problems exposing their products on international markets, meaning that the more identifiable the product is, the deeper the price will fall beneath the international price. Thus, primary commodity products have the advantage of being generic, as opposed to branded products, which makes it much harder to trace their origins. This prevents the prices, which rebel organizations can get from these products through extralegal marketing channels, from falling as much beneath the international prices as would be the case with manufactured products (Collier 2000).

Another proxy he uses to capture the notion of an economic agenda is the proportion of young men in a society. The reason for using this proxy indicator is explained as follows:

“Overwhelmingly, the people who join rebellions are young men. Hence, other things equal, we might expect that the proportion of young men in a society, say those between the ages of 15 and 24, would be a factor influencing the feasibility of rebellion: The greater the proportion of young men, the easier it would be to recruit rebels” (Collier 2000, p. 94).

This proxy is closely related to his third and final proxy, which is education. His argument for using this proxy is that education equals other income-earning opportunities, meaning that the higher an education, the less likely it is for a young man to choose to join a rebel organization.

In his analysis Collier defines education as the average number of years of education the population has received. He notes that in developing countries education has often been disproportionately supplied to young men, which in term means that differences in the average educational levels between societies will reflect much larger disparities in the educational endowment of young males (Collier 2000).

Proxy indicators of grievance:

To capture the rebel narratives of grievance Collier (2000) uses the following four proxies: Ethnic or religious hatred; economic inequality; lack of political rights; and government economic incompetence.

Collier notes that, out of the four factors, the one concerning ethnic or religious hatred has been given the most attention in Western media. He argues that it draws the most “horrified” fascination, and thus implies that it has more news value, but not necessarily higher explanatory value (Collier 2000).

Collier measures the tendency to these raw grievances by the extent to which a society is fractionalized by ethnicity and religion. He notes that ethnic and religious identities are not fixed phenomena, but rather they are social constructions. However, these social constructions are very slow to change and he therefore concludes that they are more or less fixed over the thirty-year period, which is the timeframe for his analysis.

Economic inequality is another important narrative of grievance and might refer to either unequal incomes or unequal ownership of assets. Collier’s measure of asset inequality is confined to the ownership of land, which he notes, is often the only major single asset in low-income societies, and as such should serve as a good proxy for asset inequality in a broad sense (Collier 2000).

The third narrative of grievance, lack of political rights, suggests that the more autocratic and repressive a government is, the more likely it is that the people will have a natural and justifiable desire to overthrow it (Collier 2000).

The fourth and final narrative of grievance is that of government economic incompetence. Collier’s argument for using this proxy is based on the assumption that a government, which is perceived to inflict sufficient economic misery on its population, is more likely to face an uprising (Collier 2000). He measures this proxy by looking at the rate of growth of per capita income in the preceding five-year period. Notably he adds that an economy that has experienced a rapid decline is more vulnerable to rebellion than one that has experienced a rapid growth. A declining economy does not imply positive aspirations for the future, as opposed to a prospering economy that inspires hope.

4.1.1.2. Collier’s Main Findings

The main results of Collier’s analysis will now be explained and discussed. The results from his analysis has the purpose of informing the researcher on both how important each factor appears to be, and how likely it is that the measurement of these factors are accurate. Preliminary Collier notes that:

“The results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievance. Indeed, the grievance factors are so unimportant or perverse that there must be a reason for it, and I go on to explain why, I think, grievance-based explanations of civil war are so seriously wrong” (Collier 2000, p. 96).

As the quote shows with striking clarity, Collier does not, based on his findings, put much emphasis on narratives of grievance when trying to explain the dynamics of conflict eruption and endurance. The rather conclusive statement in the above shown quote, suggest that the results of his analysis are strongly in favor of the greed narrative.

Firstly, his findings regarding the importance of economic agendas in civil conflict will be presented. The most important factor, that proxy greed is the share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product. According to Collier a country that has a quarter of its GDP from primary commodity exports, has a risk of conflict four times greater than a country without primary commodity exports (Collier 2000). He notes that, the result is highly significant as a statistic measure and as such there is only little chance that it is a statistical fluke.

In regard to the proxy of young men, Collier concludes that there is a higher risk of conflict in a country with a large proportion of young men. However, this proxy is not as important as that of education. His results show that if the proportion of young men is doubled its effect can be offset by increasing the average endowment of education by approximately two months. Each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by around 20 percent, which makes societies with only few years of education much more prone to conflict due to the lack of alternative economic prospects than rebellion (Collier 2000).

Collier notes that the factors multiply, meaning that a country with a high level of primary commodity exports, a high proportion of young men and a low level of education, is much more prone for violent conflict than a country with the opposite characteristics.

Overall Collier concludes that there is strong statistical evidence that the most important narratives when trying to explain violent conflict are those of greed opposed to those of grievance, which are generally perceived as the most explanatory narratives in the social sciences.

In regard to the narratives of grievance Collier overall concludes that there is no statistical support for this approach. The only result supporting the narrative of grievance is that a rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict. He concludes that it has around the same effect as education, meaning that 5 percent of annual growth rate has the same effect as one year of education. As mentioned earlier, one year of education reduces the risk of conflict by 20 percent, which in term means that, an annual growth rate of 5 percent reduces the risk of conflict by 20 percent. This also means that a country that has experienced a decline of 5 percent in its annual growth rate has a 40 percent greater risk of conflict than a country that has experienced a 5 percent increase in its growth rate (Collier 2000). Collier presumes that a rapid economic decline may trigger people into action, whereas growth inspires hope.

Inequality does not have any affect on the risk of conflict, whether it is measured as income inequality or inequality in terms of landownership. Collier notes that this is an interesting finding, taking into account how much attention that has been given to inequality as an explanation of conflict. He adds that this finding cannot be easily dismissed as it has significant statistical support.

Political repression has an ambiguous effect on the risk of conflict, in the sense that a fully democratic society is safer than a partially democratic society. However, severe political repression is safer than partial democracy. In regard to political repression it is most interesting to note that a fully democratic society has a 60 percent reduced risk of conflict compared to the most dangerous society, which is that of partial democracy.

The most interesting result concerning the narrative of grievance is that of ethnic and religious fractionalization. From his data, Collier concludes that it does have a significant effect on the risk of conflict. However, the effect is quite the opposite of what is generally perceived. A country that is highly fractionalized in terms of ethnicity and religion is significantly safer than a homogenous society (Collier 2000).

Summarized, Collier finds only little empirical support of the grievance theory. Inequality has no effect on the risk of conflict, political repression and ethnic and religious divisions have the exact opposite effects than predicted in grievance theory.

Based on his statistical data Collier concludes that violent conflict is far better explained from narratives of greed, than from narratives that proxy grievance.

Knowing the reasons why violent conflict erupts is closely related to its resolution and thus, Collier points out some of the issues that need addressing when trying to solve ongoing conflicts and avoid new conflicts from erupting in the future.

One problem facing conflict resolution is actors who gain from conflict and thus have incentive to perpetuate it. Violent conflict creates a more opportunistic society with groups of people benefiting from its continuation. Collier identifies four identifiable groups who are doing well out of war; the rebels who gain through predatory taxation on primary commodity exports, traders who will have widened margins on their goods, criminals who will do well through theft, and opportunistic businessmen who do well at the expense of those businessmen who exhibit honest conduct.

However, peace is more beneficial for the society at large as the groups that gain from war does this at the expense of all other groups in society. Collier (2000) notes that: “Overall, the losers lose more than the winners gain” (p.104). This implies that there is scope for a mutually beneficial peace settlement.

None the less, Collier identifies two major problems in attaining such a settlement.

The first problem is what he calls the “time-consistency” problem which is basically an issue of trust between cadres and their leader, and in this case the rebel group and the government. Usually a peace settlement will involve some measure of military disbandment from the rebel group, which in term will switch the balance of power in favor of the government. Governments might have incentive to make certain promises prior to a settlement, but less incentive to adhere to these promises once the settlement is in place. Rebel groups are aware of this predicament and thus hesitate to agree to a settlement that could in fact be beneficial to them (Collier 2000).

The second problem is according to Collier, that it is almost impossible to construct a settlement in which all four groups who benefit from civil war are sufficiently compensated. For example it would be very difficult to offer drug cartels sufficient economic compensation, and as such give them a strong incentive for peace.

This implies that although the society at large will benefit from peace, it is very hard to obtain as long as powerful actors have incentives for continued war. Collier notes that for peace to be achievable, it is necessary that those groups that have incentives for peace are more influential than those that have incentives for the continuation of war.

Unfortunately, influence is disproportionately in favor of smaller groups. Collier explains this as a result of what he calls a free-rider problem. Smaller groups are more cohesive, and because they are motivated by narratives of greed they do not have this free-rider problem, opposed to the much larger group in favor of peace which is less cohesive. Because the interests of these small groups are against the public interest, their true agendas will be hidden, which makes it difficult to reveal the true motives for the perpetuation of war. Collier notes that they are not merely crowded out by the loud discourse of grievance, but in addition, they are actively concealed.

If such groups cannot be bought of it is according to Collier, necessary to overcome such groups. This can be done by interventions that reduce the profit these groups are able to make out of conflict, and thus weaken their incentive for perpetuating war and reduce their capacity to influence decisions (Collier 2000).

When drafting policy with the aim of reducing economic incentives for conflict, it is therefore necessary to look at the list of causes of conflict, and based on this, determine where there is scope for intervention.

According to Collier’s data, the single most important factor that drives conflict is the export of primary commodities, and therefore this factor has a huge scope for intervention. One important policy aim is therefore to try and prevent illegitimate supplies from gaining access to legitimate channels. The effect of such an intervention would be that it would decrease incomes of the illegitimate acquisition of the commodities and hence reduce the incentive to contest the control of primary exports (Collier 2000).

Another way in which the international community can reduce the risk of conflict that is generated by primary commodity exports is by assisting those countries that are most at risk, in diversifying their economy. This can be done through development assistance. As substantial development assistance is only feasible during peace time, this measure is mostly preventive, whereas control of marketing channels may change the incentive for the continuation of conflict. To what extend it is possible to diversify a countries economy through the use of development assistance, vary from country to country. A well-located country without major natural resources has a better absorptive capacity for aid, than a country with large natural resources (Collier 2000). In a country with a high absorptive capacity for aid, development assistance can be beneficial not just in terms of diversifying its economy but also by reducing poverty and increasing the growth rate of the country.

As Collier’s data suggest, both poverty and decline in growth rate has a substantial impact on the risk of conflict, and as such it is imperative that a country has a good absorptive capacity, if development assistance is to be an effective tool in conflict prevention and resolution.

The absorptive capacity of a country depends on the economic policies of the government. If a government has adopted economic policies that are favorable to growth, development assistance can have an important effect on the acceleration of this process of growth. However, if a government has economic policies that are discouraging to economic activity, development aid has only little effect. Development assistance cannot change the negative effects of a damaging economic policy, but it can contribute substantially to the acceleration of processes of economic growth in societies with policies that stimulate growth and thus reduce the risk of conflict (Collier 2000).

Because marketing margins tend to widen during conflict and thus create lucrative monopolistic trading opportunities for opportunistic businessmen, it is essential to make markets as competitive as possible, as this would reduce profits to normal levels and thereby lessen incentives for opportunistic behavior. Collier notes that agencies of the international community themselves are often major purchasers during conflict and as such, contribute to the supernormal profits for wartime traders. Therefore it is crucial that these agencies become increasingly cost-conscious (Collier 2000).

The international community can also increase the incentive for peace through political actions. As mentioned earlier there is a time-consistency problem surrounding peace settlements, and here the international community can facilitate to remedy this problem by the disposal of international facilitators (Collier 2000).

Collier’s data suggest that full democratic societies are the least prone for conflict. However, the long transition period between repression and full democracy is the most dangerous phase for a country to be in, and therefore the international community should assist countries that are in a phase of partial democracy, in reaching full democracy as fast as possible.

Collier notes that according to his data small states that are homogenous in terms of ethnicity and religion are much more prone to violent conflict, just as large states are much safer than smaller states. He notes that the risk of conflict occurring on the territory of one large state is approximately one third lower than if the same territory was comprised of two smaller states. Collier remarks that political forces for self-determination of small, religious or ethnically homogenous groups may not be benign (Collier 2000).

In the last part of his analysis Collier considers policy priorities in post-conflict societies. They are generally the same as in conflict prevention, namely diversification of the economy and poverty reduction, but with some additions necessary in post-conflict societies in order to prevent conflict from revisiting.

During conflict, particular interest groups have developed and profited on the conditions created by civil unrest and these interest groups may have incentive to try and re-spark conflict. Thus, it is imperative that these groups are weakened as swift as possible.

One way of doing this through policy decisions is by weakening those opportunistic actors who have economic incentives for conflict, by reducing their profits. This can be done via improved market integration through promotion of deregulation, improved transport and improved market information. The purpose is to create a larger and more competitive market with strong actors who are dependent upon the continuation of peace (Collier 2000).

Another way in which post-conflict opportunism can be reduced is through improved information. Collier argues that this can be achieved through the use of free press, radio, television, more cell phones and radio.

The risk of conflict under post-conflict conditions can also be reduced through the rehabilitation of the justice system. As crime flourish under conditions of low detection it is of the essence that there is a functional justice system. This requires a process of rehabilitation of the army, police force and the courts. The army needs to be professionalized as the army itself may be an important source of crime and predation, and thus have little incentives for peace. For this purpose demobilization may be necessary. Collier notes that, ill-paid government soldiers may be less of a threat when they are disarmed, disbanded and dispersed.

Based on the analysis of his statistical data Collier concludes that greed seems more important than grievance, in explaining the reasons for conflict initiation, perpetuation and renewal.

The general discussion of civil conflict, however, is dominated by narratives of grievance. Therefore, policy toward conflict is mostly focused on appeasing perceived grievances and attempting to reconcile populations that have deep-rooted hatreds. Collier notes that there is no evidence on the causes of conflict that support this interpretation, and that policy should be diverted much more toward addressing narratives of greed because although the discourse of grievance is much louder than that of greed, it is less significant.

Thus, effective policy should reduce the economic incentives for conflict and the economic power of the groups that gain from conflict continuation. Therefore the international community should focus its policies towards restriction of access to international commodity market for illegitimate exports from countries in conflict and target more development assistance to high-risk countries that are not presently in conflict (Collier 2000).

As a final remark, it is important to note that although Collier (2000) argues that narratives of greed should be given more attention, as overall they are more frequent and significant than those of grievance, he does not deny that some conflicts might rest on grievances. Sri Lanka is later mentioned as an example where conflict could possibly be grievance-based.

“A possible example of grievance-rebellion driven by an excluded ethnic minority might be the conflict in Sri Lanka, where Tamil Tigers claim to defend the interests of the 12% of the population who are Tamil” (Collier and Hoeffler 2001, p.12.).

4.1.2. The Grievance Narrative

During the 1990´s the narrative of grievance was the most widely acknowledged explanation of the initiation and perpetuation of conflict (Collier 2000; Porto 2002). In the late 1990´s and beginning of the new millennium the narrative of greed has grown in recognition and the two sides draw equal attention. However, in recent years contemporary conflict analysis has gradually realized that they are not “mutually exclusive and can in fact be describing different sides of the same coin” (Porto 2002).

This section will concentrate on the narrative of grievance, which will be explained as it is presented by Robert Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff.

Ted Robert Gurr is one of the worlds leading authorities on political conflict and instability and is acknowledged as one of the most prominent representatives of the grievance approach in trying to understand the nature of violent conflict. His book Why Men Rebel (1970) introduced the term “relative deprivation” which can be viewed as the pillar on which grievance theory has been established. The book emphasized the importance of social psychological factors and ideology as root courses of political violence. Robert Ted Gurr is professor of government and politics and Distinguished Scholar at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland at College Park. In 1994 he published the book Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, with Professor Barbara Harff as co-author. Barbara Harff is associate professor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.

In Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Gurr and Harff develop a framework for analyzing ethnopolitical mobilization and conflict. They note that most social scientists aim at going beyond describing single cases, and provide more general explanations. For this purpose their framework is supposed to form a common ground that will enable people to critically analyze what is widely acknowledged as wisdom in regards to explaining ethnic conflict (Gurr/Harff 1994).

Gurr and Harff (1994) note that most theories have proposed explanations to political conflict and violence either in general or specific forms, but only little theory has tried to explain the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict.

They mention modernization theory; the dominant theory in the 1950s and 1960s, which proposed that increased political and economic interaction, growing communication networks and literacy rates and the migration of rural people into larger cities, would ultimately result in a dismantling of peoples “parochial” identities with ethnic groups and place their loyalties to larger communities. Basically suggesting that globalization or modernization would break down barriers between people and decrease the risk of ethnic violence. However, during the 1970s and 1980s the political facts showed that this was not the case (Gurr and Harff 1994).

Gurr and Harff (1994) also discuss primordialism, which argues that people are deeply rooted in their ethnic and religious identities and that these identities are based on a solid foundation of social, historical and genetic affiliations. According to this approach modernization is perceived as a threat against ethnic solidarities and thus prompts minorities to mobilize to defend their culture and way of life.

An alternative approach, which emphasizes the instrumental nature of ethnic mobilization is also mentioned by Gurr and Harff. This approach claims that the purpose of ethnic mobilization is to achieve material and political gains, and that cultural identity is called upon to attain those goals. According to this approach the most important aspect of mobilization is to emphasize economic differences between dominant groups and minorities and raise awareness of these differences, in order to form ethnically based political movements aimed at amending these differences. One might argue that this is very similar to parts of the ‘greed narrative’ as described earlier.

The primordial and instrumental approaches emphasize different factors in explaining ethnic mobilization and conflict. Primordialism emphasizes the defense of ethnic identity whereas the instrumental approach emphasizes the group-pursuit of material and political interests (Gurr/Harff 1994).

Gurr and Harff (1994) suggest that a fusion of these two approaches can give a valid suggestion as to the true reasons behind group mobilization. They point out that the two approaches are not mutually contradictory, as Gurr and Harff believe that ethnic groups mobilize when both conditions, that being, a strong sense of ethnic group identity in combination with imposed disadvantages, are present.

They note that a common argument is that when people of different ethnic groups compete for the same scarce resources and positions, that being jobs, political influence and status, their ethnic identities becomes increasingly important to them. If some of these groups do better than others, it will increase inequalities, which in term increases the risk of ethnic mobilization and conflict (Gurr/Harff 1994). They explain this by saying:

“The mobilization of ethnic groups is the immediate precursor of the political actions used to make demands on governments. The extent and intensity of the resulting conflict depend upon the strategies followed by ethic groups´ leaders and those followed by governments” (Gurr/Harff 1994, p. 79).

Only few theorists have attempted to explain what strategies governments use in response to challenging/mobilizing groups in general and ethnic groups in particular. An important exception is theories that deal with causes of genocides and politicides. These theories show how the competition between subordinate ethnic groups and dominant groups can lead to discrimination and repression of the subordinate groups. Subordinate groups will sometimes respond to this privation and repression by mobilizing for political action, which then again, is used by the dominant groups to justify their, often violent, response. Others are simply targeted because they are perceived by the dominant group’s ideology as posing a threat to the dominant group. As examples they mention the victims of the Holocaust and the Muslim Chams in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime (Gurr/Harff 1994).

Five internal factors that, when combined, makes genocides and politicides likely are identified: (1) the persistence of cleavages among ethnic groups; (2) when elites have a history of relying on repression to maintain power; (3) the third factor is when elites use their power to reward groups differentially for their loyalty; (4) when a society has recently experienced a political upheaval, for example, a revolution or a defeat in war, and finally, (5) when exclusionary ideologies arise that define certain groups as expendable. Gurr and Harff (1994) conclude that whenever all of these factors are present, it is likely that ethno-political conflict will turn into genocide.

In order to structuralize the above-mentioned arguments into a scientific framework for analysis, Gurr and Harff have developed a theoretical model. They find that in order to reach general conclusions on how and why ethnic groups engage in conflict, it is necessary to make systematic comparisons of different cases. Their model is supposed to form a guideline for a more general, empirically based knowledge on the causes of ethnic conflict. They see this as essential in order for scholars and policymakers to understand, anticipate and respond more effective in reducing human suffering caused by conflict.

The model is not supposed to produce conclusive statements as to the causes of conflict, as statements are more often tentative rather than conclusive. The statements, or hypotheses, put into the model are probability statements rather than truths.

The model will not be explained in dept as the conclusions, or in this case, probability statements are seen as the more interesting factors, in relation to the thesis research question. However, the main concepts, variables and indicators will be briefly presented and explained in order to gain a general understanding of the model applied in for reaching the probability statements.

Firstly, Gurr and Harff (1994) examine the question: what contributes to ethnic mobilization. Here they use two concepts: discrimination and ethnic group identity. They define discrimination as the extent of socially derived inequalities in the material wellbeing or political access by group members, compared with other social groups. Ethnic group identity is defined as a group of people who share identity based on common traits such as religion, culture, history, place of residence, and race.

They claim that people will react against discriminatory treatment in either of three ways: (I) constructively, (II) destructively, or (III) apathetic.

A constructive reaction could be peaceful activism and channeling anger into a greater effort to achieve. An apathetic reaction could be to emigrate to escape discrimination, and a destructive reaction could be in form of openly challenging their opponents, which in term could lead to violent conflict.

According to Gurr and Harff (1994) there is a correlation between the type of reaction people choose and the extent of their grievances. To examine these arguments they set up different propositions and hypotheses. The propositions are in affect questions that need answering, and these questions leads to additional sub-questions, or hypotheses, and by addressing these questions and sub-questions and understanding how they are mutually connected, one can gain a more in-dept understanding of the nature of conflict. They do not claim, however, that this will lead to undisputable truths, as to the nature of mobilization and conflict, but instead one can reach, what they refer to as ‘probability statements’.

Their first proposition is that when people with a shared ethnic identity are discriminated against, they are likely to be resentful and angry. This anger can be expressed in different ways. Some people might opt for accommodation whereas others might vent their frustrations openly (proposition 1). They expect that people who are discriminated against will be angry. This proposition leads to the hypothesis that; for people who are motivated to action, the greater the discrimination they experience the more likely they are to organize for action against the sources of discrimination (hypothesis 1). This hypothesis suggests that there is a correlation between the extent of the discrimination people are subjected to, and the measures they will take in reaction to this discrimination.

The second preposition is that individuals are not as likely to challenge institutions as groups are. Therefore when individuals join groups of people with shared grievances they are more likely to take action (proposition 2). The risk of conflict increases when people mobilize into groups. This leads to the hypothesis that; the more strongly a person identifies with an ethnic group that is subjected to discrimination, the more likely it is, that this person will be motivated into action (hypothesis 2a). This again raises the question of group cohesion, which again leads to another hypothesis that; factors other than shared grievances, including a shared religion, language, history and culture, and place of residence will strengthen group identity. The more of these traits a group have in common, the stronger the identity of the group will be (hypothesis 2b). A group of people with strong group cohesion, many common traits, is more likely to react against discrimination than a group that is less cohesive.

This leads them to the following question: “What triggers political action and turns action into open conflict with the government and other groups? And what kinds of action or types of violence are most likely to occur?” (Gurr/Harff 1994, p. 84).

To answer these questions they first assume that collective actions are determined by the political context in which an ethnic group is situated. The type and extend of political action are determined by a variety of factors such as, the cohesion of the group, strategies and tactics of group leaders, the type of political system that governs it, and to what extent the group receives outside encouragement (Gurr/Harff 1994). To examine these presumptions they look at group cohesion, ethno-political leadership, political environment, severity of force used by governments, and outside encouragement.

In connection to group cohesion, Gurr and Harff set up the presumption that a major determinant of the occurrence of ethno-political conflict is the cohesion of the challenging ethnic group and the strength and unity of its leadership (proposition 3).

Strong cohesion is dependant on strong networks of communication and interaction between leaders and followers. Strong leaders create a climate within the group where people are willing to subordinate their personal preferences to group preferences. In cohesive groups led by autocratic leaders, the risk of violent action is bigger than in less cohesive democratic groups. The reason, Gurr and Harff (1994) argue, is that in autocratically lead groups leaders are less likely to be challenged in their decisions, than in democratic groups that tend to be less cohesive and more diverse in their views about what kind of action that is preferred.

To examine what makes a group cohesive they set up the hypothesis that group cohesion increases if a group is regionally concentrated, have many traits in common, share grievances over a long period of time, and has autocratic leadership (hypothesis 3). This, in term, means that leaders of cohesive autocratic groups that share a common history of discrimination are more likely to decide on the use of violence in addressing grievances than leaders of groups with opposite trades.

When using the concept of political environment, Gurr and Harff refer to the type of regime governing a state. They distinguish between four different types: institutionalized democracies, autocracies and socialist and populist states.

They propose that in democratic states political participation is to a greater extent abided, being in the form of protests, riots, and open rebellion (proposition 4). Functional democracies protect such values as equality before the law and political and civil rights. Because of this, discrimination is less likely to occur, which decreases the risk of violent protest and rebellion. Based on this they form the hypothesis that the more democratic a political environment is, the more expected it is that ethno-political groups will voice their opposition in a nonviolent manner (hypothesis 4).

In other regime types, violence is more probable to be used to quell protest and riots (proposition 5a). This proposition escort the hypothesis that the more violence political authorities use, the more likely it is that challengers will respond more violently (hypothesis 5a). Moreover, this proposition leads to another which is, that state authorities that have used extreme force in the form of massacres, torture, and genocide, in responding to their challengers are also less likely to be openly challenged (proposition 5b). This can be either because groups cannot organize open resistance or because they fear the consequences of doing so. From this Gurr and Harff hypothesize that the more extreme force used by a regime, the less is the chance of open rebellion (hypothesis 5b).

This outlines that there is a correlation between violence used by the state and the extent, level and type of violence used by its challengers. They claim that terrorist groups and guerilla warfare are often responses to situations where government authorities have applied deadly force in their way of dealing with challengers (Gurr/Harff 1994).

According to Gurr and Harff (1994) external factors contribute to ethnic conflict. To examine what kind of external factors, they have developed two concepts: One being external support, and the other being economic status.

Gurr and Harff propose that groups depend on external support (proposition 6). The more external support a groups receives the more likely it is that this group will challenge authorities by means of violence (hypothesis 6). External support can be in the form of verbal encouragement, economics, supply of weapons, military personnel etc.

A second kind of external factor is how the government in the society that experiences challenges, is perceived by the international community. Status depend on the economic resources a group or government command. This is explained as interdependence between the international community and the group/government. They propose that the more resources a group or government command the more the international community is dependent on such resources (proposition 7). Therefore, they hypothesize that the more international status a state has, the smaller the chance is that challengers will receive external support (hypothesis 7).

In summary, Gurr and Harff (1994) set up 7 different concepts that they believe are contributing factors when trying to explain why ethnic mobilization and conflict occur. It is explained how these different concepts are interrelated and only by understanding this relationship between the different concepts, can one gain an insightful knowledge about the complex nature of conflict.

Concept 1:	Discrimination. Variable property: degree of discrimination.

Concept 2:	Group identity. Variable property: strength of group identity.

Concept 3:	Ethnopolitical leadership and group cohesion. Variable property: degree of cohesion among leaders and followers.

Concept 4:	Political environment. Variable property: type of political environment.

Concept 5:	Use of violence by governments. Variable property: the severity of force used by governments against ethnic groups.

Concept 6:	External support. Variable property: extent of external support.

Concept 7:	International economic status. Variable property: degree of international economic status (Gur and Harff 1994).

The propositions and hypotheses describe the interactive relationships among concepts. The nature of these interactive relationships is schematically depicted in the figure below (from Gurr and Harff 1994, p.86).

The essence of Gurr and Harff’s model as depicted in the figure, is the interactive relationships between different concepts. Each concept in itself is not sufficient to explain the complex nature of conflict. Instead it is necessary to understand how these different concepts interact and in some cases reinforce each other.

4.1.3. Rethinking the Greed and Grievance Concepts

In the previous sections the greed and the grievance explanations to conflict have been described as they are presented by respectively Paul Collier and Robert Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff.

They each represent a theoretical approach to the study of conflict. They share the same aim and objectives and to a certain extent incorporate similar factors into their explanations. However, where they differ the most is in relation to how they emphasize the importance of these different factors.

There is growing realization within the field of conflict study, that in order to truly comprehend the complex nature of conflict, a multi-stranded approach is needed. This means that although each of the theoretical positions present valid explanations of certain aspects of conflict, they are in themselves too generic as to, in a comprehensive and plausible manner, explain the complex nature of conflict. Therefore, it is argued, that the two concepts, greed and grievance, should be viewed as mutually inclusive instead of exclusive.

“In fact, contemporary conflict analysis has gradually realized that they are not mutually exclusive and can in fact be describing different sides of the same coin”

(Porto 2002, p. 7).

Furthermore, Benedikt Korf notes that: “Rather than debating the “either-or” of greed and grievance in explaining the outbreak and/or protracted duration of civil war, we need to understand how both, greed and grievance, are causally linked in a specific context and place” (Korf 2006b, p. 110).

Dan Smith expresses a similar opinion; that it is misguided to focus on the question of which are the most important causes of armed conflict, and that the question instead should be on how the different causes interact.

“In part, however, the argument about greed versus grievance can be summed up and put into a proper perspective by asking whose greed, whose grievance? That Milosevic is greedy for power, for example, does not in itself mean that ordinary Serbs feel no grievance. In other words, it may not be necessary to choose between greed and grievance as explanatory variables. These may rather be complementary and mutually reinforcing elements of political mobilization” (Smith 2001, p. 9).

This quotation serves as a good example of how both elements of greed and grievances are present in the same situation. In this case the population does have actual grievances, which then again can be utilized by political leaders to fulfill aims that rest on narratives of greed. In this sense grievances in themselves are not the sole course of ethnic conflict, but rather the politics surrounding these grievances that are defined within certain ethnical boundaries. Grievances; actual or perceived, can be utilized politically by leaders whether they are driven by narratives of greed or grievances. Grievances can be used as a tool for mobilization, but does not in itself lead to mobilization, unless they are utilized in a political sense. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the link between the narratives of grievances, the ethnic aspect, and the narratives of greed, the political aspects, in order to understand the dynamics of ethnic conflict, why they initiate and what perpetuates them.

A sense of grievance can often be found in conflict situations, they may not in themselves have led to conflict, but serve as fertile means for political mobilization. Often populations on both sides of a conflict believe that their struggle is based on actual grievances and that they are fighting to rectify these grievances, which in term gives them a sense of fighting for justice. The tactics and strategy of one or both parties in many armed conflicts today, involve direct attack on civilians – ethnic cleansing, massacre and bombing of civilian areas. The underlying cause of this is to perpetuate grievances, which increases group cohesion and group identity, which again can be utilized politically for mobilization and to perpetuate fighting (Smith 2001).

If ethnic conflict is explained either exclusively from narratives of greed or solely from narratives of grievances, the conclusions derived from such analysis, will merely be based on fragments of the bigger and more complex nature of conflict. Metaphorically speaking it can be compared to a puzzle. Each small piece is essential in putting together the puzzle, but unless they are put together in the right way, it will be impossible to make out what the puzzle actually depicts. In this sense both the greed and grievance explanations contribute with valuable pieces, but in themselves they are insufficient, unless they are put together in the right context.

Roughly summarized the essence and differences in the two approaches are that the grievance school argues that violent conflict and civil wars occur due to resource scarcity, inequality, exclusion and poverty, and rebels act in order to change these conditions. Whereas, the greed school argue that it is the opportunity for potential rebels to monopolize resource rents and extract wealth through violence and war that promote political rebellion (Korf 2006b).

The most common areas of critique directed at the two approaches will be briefly presented, as to add to the argument that the two approaches should be viewed as mutually inclusive instead of exclusive.

The grievance approach is often criticized in that it conceives war as inherently irrational or “senseless”. For some groups however, war does make sense, and failing to see the “rationale” of war, for some certain groups, leads to misinterpretations as to the true reasons for conflict initiation, perpetuation, and resumption. Another point of critique is that when explaining the reasons for conflict purely from narratives of grievance the true reasons will often remain hidden. This is due to the beneficial effect of undertaking a discourse of grievances, even when the rationale is purely based on greed (Mwanasali 2000, Collier 2000).

The greed approach is criticized that the quantitative evidence it produces is often not as much in favor of greed as followers like to make-believe. The reason for this is that quantitative scholars rely on different statistical data sources and on different proxy indicators. Furthermore, the link between these proxy indicators and the objects they are made-up to correspond to are often rudimentary and unclear. In addition, there is “an explanatory gap between the statistical inferences drawn from crosscountry econometric analyzes and the analytical and conceptual models employed subsequently to explain the data” (Korf 2006b, p. 111).

Such analysis, the critique goes, can only produce fuzzy conceptualizations and speculative theorizing. A similar critique is voices by Porto (2002 p.13) who notes that:

“The social scientist forgets that statistics require the oversimplification of data, and the forcing of events into common classifications, when it is the differences which are most conspicuous.”

Hence, the problem here is that oversimplification may lead to misleading results.

Another critique on the greed explanation of conflicts is voiced by Michael Nicholson, who argues that it is flawed to view violence merely as an instrument to achieve particular ends. Violence cannot be considered as a cost that is borne in order to attain these ends, in that the use of violence is ambiguous, ambivalent and complex. To simply ignore this and see violence as no more than an instrument and an unambiguous cost is to oversimplify the matter of human motivation. He notes that: “Peoples’ attitudes to the use of violence are often ambiguous, ambivalent and complex, and one cannot treat violence simply as an unambiguous cost” (Nicholson 1992 in Porto 2002, p. 12).

The greed narrative is also criticized in that there is evidence that greed is often not the determinative motive for rebel group behavior.

Arvind Ganesan and Alex Vines postulate in their article from 2004, that El Salvador and Sri Lanka, are examples of countries that have endured brutal civil wars where resources have not been a decisive factor (Ganesan and Vines 2004). They highlight another weakness in analyzing conflicts merely from narratives of greed, in that it fails to explain the role that governments play in conflict-affected countries. Often governments, especially in resource-rich states are plagued by corruption and hence act from narratives of greed. By solely focusing on rebel group behavior the greed explanation offers a one-sided explanation of the nature of conflict, and hence, fails to explain factors that in fact are essential if a thorough understanding of conflict is to be reached.

Benedikt Korf aims her critique, not on one or the other, but on how the interrelationship between the two is commonly viewed. The two approaches are not able to stand alone, she argues, and civil wars are different in nature and should be analyzed accordingly. She terms this “context matters” and introduces what she calls a greed-grievance continuum. The essence of the greed-grievance continuum is that instead of viewing greed and grievance in either-or terms one should examine which factors are more prominent in a specific civil war. She gives the examples of Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone, where she places Sri Lanka more towards grievance on the continuum and Sierra Leone more towards greed (Korf 2006b).

Korf (2006b) also introduces the concept of pride into the greed/grievance duo, which she claims has substantial explanatory power when trying to explain combatant’s behavior under conflict conditions. This is a view shared by the authors of this project, as pride seems to play a significant role in the case of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, and as such it will be incorporated into the analysis part of the project.

In extension of the pride aspect, Korf (2006b) talks about extrinsic- and intrinsic-motivations, issues first introduced by Bruno Frey in 1997. Extrinsically motivated agents act because of the compensation they will receive, whereas intrinsically motivated agents act because they are convinced that they are doing the right thing irrespective of rewards from outside. Often actors cannot be defined as purely extrinsically or intrinsically motivated but as hybrids. Because actors are driven by both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, actors are often caught in what Korf calls ‘decisional dissonance’.

Greed is an extrinsic motivation whereas pride is an intrinsic motivation, based on structures of social expectations and personal convictions. They are mutually linked in the following manner:

“Combatants are not cut off from the motivations and emotions of civilians of their own ethnic kin as mostly implicitly implied in other economic warlord models: if combatants focused solely on rent-seeking (´greed´), they would lose their political recognition among the civilians of their own ethnic kin, which, in turn, could undermine their political as well as economic basis of existence” (Korf 2006b, p. 114).

As the above quote shows, there is a link between grievances shared within an ethnic group or used as a political discourse and pride as motivation of rebel forces. Especially to clandestine groups such as rebel groups that use guerilla tactics, it is important to adhere to intrinsic motivations if motivations of a more extrinsic nature are to be realized. This is so because guerrilla movements are especially reliant on the support from the civilian population, as rebels need to be able to hide within- and with help from, the civilian population (Korf 2006b).

In conclusion, it is argued that in order to understand the greed-grievance nexus, it is necessary to consider the government, its legitimacy and broader issues of governance as well. The narratives of greed and grievance are useful tools in understanding conflict dynamics, when they are understood in both-and terms and not as either-or dichotomy.

“The greed-grievance causal nexus is not a priori, but contingent in space and time”

(Korf 2006b, p. 120).

4.2. Emancipatory Theory

Emancipatory theory is propounded by Ruane and Todd (1996) and originally relates to the conflict in Northern Ireland. However, the essence of the theory was also found to be applicable to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The theory has previously been applied to the Australian land rights conflict and the Aborigines’ pursuit of native title recognition by Goosen (2004) who notes, that the theory could be applied to other situations needing reconciliation, as most, if not all, the elements in the model are sufficiently generic to conflicts as to be universally applicable.

According to Ruane and Todd (1996) the immediate cause of conflict in Northern Ireland is due to the existence of two communities which have conflicting economic, political and cultural interests under conditions of an uneven and changing balance of power, which results in each community feeling impelled to struggle in order to advance or defend its interests. It is argued that underlying this communal conflict and producing it is a wider system of relationships which is now centuries old.

These characteristics are also found to accurately describe many aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict as it also involves mainly two different communities, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, who have conflicting economic, political and cultural interests under conditions of an uneven and changing balance of power. In Sri Lanka this has resulted in the two communities feeling impelled to struggle – and even resort to violence in order to advance or defend their own interests. This relationship between the groups can indeed be traced back centuries to the time Sri Lanka was under different colonial rules and until today. It would appear that conflicting political, economic and cultural interests are also, in the case of the Sri Lanka, essential factors in the long conflict. Hence, using the framework suggested by the Emaincipatory theory might be able to shed light on the Sri Lankan conflict and assist in understanding why it has not been resolved.

Most notably Ruane and Todd (1996) have identified three different levels of relationship between groups of people living in conflict, namely (1) dimensions of difference; (2) structures of dominance, dependence and inequality; and (3) tendencies toward communal polarization.

Dimensions of Difference:

The emancipatory theory suggests that the Northern Ireland conflict rests on sharp and overlapping differences in terms of ethnicity, religion, settler-native status, and notions of progressiveness/backwardness, national identity and allegiance. It is argued that the settler-native opposition distinguishes between powerful and powerless, victorious and defeated and possessor and dispossessed and that advanced/backward notions make fundamental judgments of cultural and moral worth and deny such worth to whole social categories (Ruane and Todd 1996).

Structures of Dominance, Dependence and Inequality:

Ruane and Todd (1996) argue that the Northern Ireland conflict is also generated by structures of dominance, dependence and inequality and that the disassembling of the structure is essential if conflict resolution is to be achieved.

The varying balance, in terms of power and dominance is explained as, in Ireland, being between the British government, Protestants and Catholics and it is argued that each time the balance between two parties is varied it has implications for the third part.

In the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, although there are only two prime actors, the conflict does involve other parties such as the Muslims, the highland Tamils and the international community. However, as this report focuses on the two main counterparts/warring parties, being the Sinhalese dominated government and the LTTE as representative for the Tamils, the impact of other actors, their involvement and influence in terms of power struggles and dominance will not be analyzed in detail, although it might be mentioned occasionally.

Tendencies toward Communal Polarization:

Emancipatory theory suggests that conflict is also produced by a tendency toward communal division, which means that people deal with each other not simply as individuals but as representative members of specific communities. It is claimed that for many people the boundaries of their community define the limits of their capacity for empathy and sense of moral responsibility (Ruane and Todd 1996).

4.2.1. An Emancipatory Approach to Conflict Resolution

In emancipatory theory it is basically argued that the three levels (described above) interlock, act back upon and mutually reinforce each other to such an extend that a conflict cannot be resolved by concentrating on one level alone or on one level at a time. Rather, it would involve a multileveled and multi-stranded approach to simultaneously moderate and differentiate the dimensions of difference; undo the structures of dominance, dependence and inequality, and to weaken the forces producing communal polarization.

To successfully achieve a dismantling of the systems and relationships within an existing society it requires that all those who are part of the system support the process and cooperate in its dismantling and thus bring an end to a mutually destructive power struggle and instead create a realm of greater freedom where new potentials can be realized.

Ruane and Todd recognize the difficulties involved in such an elaborate, all-inclusive approach and emphasize that the emancipatory does not promise a simple or risk-free solution to conflict (in Northern Ireland) but they argue that no simpler, quicker, neater solution is possible if sustainable peace is to be achieved after years of conflict and communal division.

5.0. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an island situated in the Indian Ocean, at the base of the Indian Sub-Continent, 880 km North of the equator. It has a tropical climate with average temperatures in the lowlands between 25-30 degrees Celsius.

Facts about Sri Lanka (CIA – The World Fact Book 2008):

Country name:

Conventional long form: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

Conventional short form: Sri Lanka.

Former: Serendib, Ceylon.

Government:	Republic

Area:	65,610 sq km (in comparison Denmark is 43,094 sq km).

Population:	21,128,773 million.

Ethnic groups:	Sinhalese	81,89%

Sri Lankan Moors	8%

Indian Tamil	5,08%

Sri Lankan Tamil	4,37%

Other	0,66%

Religions:	Buddhist 76,71%, Muslim 8,49%, Hindu 7,88%, Christian 6,06%, Other 0,86%

Languages:	Sinhala 74%, Tamil 18%, other 8%

Literacy:	Total population: 92,5%

Male: 94,5%

Female: 90,6%

Life expectancy:	73 years

Livelihoods:	Agriculture 30,7%, Industry 24,5%, Services 44,8%

The relatively low percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils of only 4,37% is much lower than it was in 1983 when the violent ethnic conflict began. Back in 1983 the Sri Lankan Tamils comprised 13% of the total population of Sri Lanka; however, during the conflict many Sri Lankan Tamils have fled the country (Nissan 1998).

5.1. The Colonial History of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has a very long history, and there is secure evidence of settlements in Sri Lanka as far back as 130.000 years ago. Over the last one million years Sri Lanka has had ground connection to India on many different occasions and it is hard to say with accuracy when Sri Lanka was first inhabited (CIA – The World Fact book 2008).

In more recent history Sri Lanka has been under various colonial rules, ranging from the 3rd century up till 1947 when they became independent.

From the 3rd century to the middle of the 12th century Tamil kings and invaders from Southern India dominated Sri Lanka. From 1408 to 1438 Chinese forces occupied the Island, which had been partitioned into a number of petty kingdoms.

The arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century marked the beginning of European dominance, which lasted for over 400 years. The Portuguese were in control of the coastal areas of Sri Lanka for 150 years, and during this time they set up a trading settlement in Colombo. During this time there were still places left in Sri Lanka governed by tribal kings, in the more mountainous areas in the middle of the island. In 1668 the Portuguese were driven out by the Dutch, who stayed until 1796 when the British supplanted them.

Britain ruled Sri Lanka until 1948 when it got its independence following negotiations that ended with the Ceylon Independence act of 1947. In 1972 there was made an amendment to the constitution and Ceylon became The Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (CIA – The World Fact Book 2008).

5.2. Social and Economic Situation

According to the World Bank (2000) Sri Lanka was one of the first developing countries to understand the importance of investing in human resources and promoting gender equality and as a result, it has achieved human development outcomes more consistent with those of high-income countries. Sri Lanka also liberalized its economy in the late 1970s, ahead of other developing nations and despite acceleration of the civil conflict in the 1990s, economic growth was healthy due to good macroeconomic management and progress in trade liberalization, privatization, and financial sector reform. The World Bank notes that Sri Lanka is today South Asia’s most open economy, and has a relatively well developed capital market infrastructure. However, the World Bank (2007) does estimate that the macroeconomic impact of the conflict is about 2-3 percent of GDP growth annually.

Despite the war, economic growth has averaged around 4.5 percent, with the exception of 2001, which saw the first negative growth (-1.4%) since independence (U.S. State Department 2007).

In 2006, Sri Lanka’s exports were USD. 6.8. billion and imports were USD. 10.2. billion. The resulting trade deficit was financed primarily by remittances from expatriate workers and through foreign assistance (U.S. State Department 2007).

According to the U.S. State Department (2007), Sri Lanka is highly dependent on foreign assistance and in 2006 the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan and other donors disbursed loans totaling USD. 912 million while foreign grants amounted to USD. 301 million.

Sri Lanka is well positioned to meet many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) before 2015 in areas such as universal primary school enrolment, gender equality in primary and secondary school enrolment, and in reducing maternal and child mortality.

The MDGs are: (1) Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger; (2) Achieve Universal Primary Education; (3) Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women; (4) Reduce Child Mortality; (5) Improve Maternal Health; (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases; (7) Ensure Environmental Sustainability; (8) Develop a Global Partnership for Development.

Sri Lanka is the best performer in South Asia in primary school indicators and is on track towards achieving universal primary education, with a net enrolment ratio in primary education in 2003 of 98.35%. Primary, secondary and tertiary education is free in Sri Lanka and, since 1997, education for the 5-14 year age group has been mandatory and facilitated through an island-wide network of primary and secondary schools.

Notably, however, if available data are disaggregated by gender, more boys than girls drop out after completing junior secondary education. Drop-out rates are especially prevalent in low-income urban neighborhoods, the plantation sector, remote deprived villages and in the conflict affected areas of the North and East. (MDGs in Sri Lanka 2008).

Although Sri Lanka is well situated to meet the MDGs in many areas, significant challenges also remain in regards to poverty eradication, achieving environmentally sustainable development, reducing unemployment and mitigating the social costs of migration (NewsLine 2008).

One of the substantial challenges in achieving the MDGs in a sustainable manner is in relation to the overcoming of regional disparities, and uneven distribution of wealth. Large regional differences exists, especially between the Northern and Eastern districts (traditionally Tamil dominated areas) and the Vest and Southern districts. The North is almost exclusively inhabited by Tamils and is commonly referred to as the Tamil District, whereas the Eastern district has become more diverse in terms of ethnic groups - comprising of 40% Tamils, 30% Sinhalese and 30% Muslims (Manikkalingam 2000).

A reason why the East is no longer dominated by Tamils is due to state-sponsored settlement schemes in conjunction with large-scale irrigation that brought Singhalese settlers from the South to the areas traditionally inhabited by the Tamil population.

Since commencement of the war in 1983, particularly the East and North has been a theatre of guerrilla warfare, inter-communal atrocities and struggle for territorial control (Korf 2006b). This has left its mark on the Eastern and Northern regions and they have in almost every sense fallen behind the rest of the country.

5.3. The Northern and Eastern Districts

Although the conflict has had tremendous effects on the entire country of Sri Lanka, the repercussions have fallen particularly heavily on the Northern and Eastern provinces. These two regions have fallen behind the rest of the country in terms of health and education outcomes and access to economic infrastructure and financial services.

Furthermore, the Eastern provinces of Batticaloa and Ampara were the districts that sustained the most devastation from the tsunami in December 2004. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the unique circumstances of these two provinces when trying to reduce regional inequalities, which in effect is a necessity if Sri Lanka is to reach the MDGs by 2015.

Following the 2002 ceasefire the North and East experienced an upturn in their economies but there are still substantial obstacles to sustained growth and poverty reduction in these areas. These obstacles include: poor availability and access to financial services, poor access and quality of economic infrastructure, restrictions on the use of the A9 highway (this highway connects the Northern Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the island), fishing restrictions, limits on mobility in certain areas (this is the case in Jaffna), and out-migration of the educated to the rest of the country or abroad (SRI LANKA Poverty Assessment 2007).

6.0. Main Events Leading to Conflict

The following chapter discusses the main historical events commonly perceived as having caused antagonism between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, and contributed to the eruption of violent conflict.

After decolonization many Sinhalese were resentful towards the Tamils, who they thought had been favoured by the British during colonization (DeSilva 2007). This resentment caused anxiety within the Tamil population, which feared that the unitary constitution would not adequately protect the rights of minority groups. This fear was expressed by the Tamil political leadership even prior to decolonization, where they raised their concerns to the British (Nissan 1998).

After decolonization the Tamil leaders had called for changes to the constitution that would protect minority rights. Tangibly this was expressed in a request that half of the seats in parliament and half of the cabinet posts should be reserved for minorities. This request was rejected, which resulted in the Tamil leadership calling for a federal constitutional structure that gave self-determination to the Tamil people within the confines of this constitution (Nissan 1998).

A reason for the resentfulness within the Sinhalese majority towards the Tamils was that they felt the Sri Lankan Tamils were disproportionately overrepresented in the universities and the public administration. This overrepresentation was partly due to superior educational skills. During colonization the British had build many schools in the Northern parts of the country and at an early stage, education became a high priority for the Tamils, who viewed education as a means to advance their positions within the existing caste system and thus increased their motivations to educate themselves. Especially within the Tamil community, jobs in public administration were perceived as high-status, and thus motivation was high to attain these positions. Neil deVotta (2002, p. 60) summarizes this issue in the following way:

“The paucity of industry and agriculture in the Northern regions, the prestige and security of state sector employment, and the opportunity thereby for upward social mobility in a rigidly castist Tamil society had spurred many Northern Tamils into seeking governmental careers, though significant numbers also migrated to the more populous Sinhalese areas as professionals and traders. Since many sought university placement as a stepping stone into the governmental apparatus, the Tamils came to be proportionately overrepresented in the universities and civil service”.

Neil deVotta further notes that In 1946, two years prior to independence, the Tamils comprised a staggering thirty-three percent of the Civil Service in Ceylon, and forty percent of the Judicial Service even though, they only comprised eleven percent of the total population. In the universities thirty-one percent of students were Tamil.

After independence the Sinhalese majority quickly sought to change this uneven distribution of power in the society, which was made possible due to their majority in parliament. Although the Tamils were highly represented in the public administration, the Sinhalese were still the majority in parliament, and they quickly used this in their favour, in terms of disassembling structures of power.

The earliest manifestation of this was the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 (the same year Sri Lanka gained independence). The function of this Act was to stop about a million highland Tamils, which had been imported by the British, getting citizenship and hereby the right to vote. Although this act did not directly affect the Sri Lankan Tamils it might still be perceived as the initial stage of a larger struggle of who was entitled to the country of Sri Lanka, and an indication that an all inclusive nation-building process was not given priority. A noteworthy aspect here is that the Act was passed with the support of several Tamil politicians in Parliament. This can be explained by the Tamil caste system, which has clear boundaries between the different castes. The Sri Lankan Tamils did not identify themselves with the Indian highland Tamils because they were seen as a lower caste, and thus culturally inferior (Preis 1996). The Tamil party, All Ceylon Tamil Congress´ support of the act is linked to the fact that the leader of the party was appointed minister in the UNP-government. A consequence of this was that Tamils were subsequently politically marginalized and Tamil parliamentarians who were appointed ministers were generally perceived as traitors (Nesiah 2001).

During the British colonial period a unified island-wide administration had been created for the first time, with English as the official language of government. After independence English remained the language of the government, which was in favour of the small English-speaking elite that had developed during this period, comprising of both Sinhalese and Tamils. They stayed in power until the first elections as a free nation-state were held in 1956. In the years from independence, leading up to this election, tension had increased between the English-speaking Colombo based ruling class and the Sinhala speaking rural elites in the South. The rural elites were upset by the barrier being presented by the English language in terms of advancement within the state. They also felt that the Sri Lankan Tamil community had gained a disproportionate share of power, and sought means to change this. As such the Southern Sinhala-educated rural elites were active in their pursuit of mobilizing for change.

In 1951 they created the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (Liyanage 1998; Nissan 1998).

The SLFP won a landslide-victory in the 1956 general elections, defeating the United National Party (UNP) government, after having run a campaign that asserted a close identification between the Sinhalese people, the island of Sri Lanka and the Buddhist religion. The stated aims of the SLFP were to remove the barriers to opportunity created by the formal status of the English language, and remove what they perceived to be unfair advantages enjoyed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Following these elections, a government was formed with the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna coalition (People’s United Front – MEP), led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike of the SLFP. The government stated that Buddhism would be re-established to its rightful place and that Sinhala would be made the official language of Sri Lanka. As a consequence, policy was drafted and passed in July 1956, stating Sinhala as the only official language of Sri Lanka (Nissan 1998).

From this time, the identification of the state and the interests of the Sinhalese people have been increasingly perceived as synonymous. A development towards defining Sri Lanka as a Buddhist, Sinhala-speaking country had started with the passing of the Official Language Act of 1956, which ultimately resulted in the 1972 constitution providing Buddhism special status and state patronage:

“With Buddhism and Sinhala both afforded superior status, Sri Lanka was now nearer to being an ethnocracy than a full-fledged secular democracy” (DeVotta 2000, p. 56).

6.1. The Official Language Act (1956)

The passing of the Official Language Act in July 1956, which is often referred to as “Sinhala Only”, was a huge step in direction towards defining Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese state. This legislation made Sinhala the only official language of Sri Lanka and had tremendous negative implications for the Sri Lankan Tamils and the minorities in general.

Communist Party leader, Colvin R. de Silva, an opposing MP at the time of the passing of the Official Language Act, describes its implications in the following manner:

“Two torn little bleeding states may yet arise out of one little state. One Language, two countries; two languages, one country” (DeVotta 2000, p. 58).

Unfortunately, the above quote was foresighted in accessing the future implications of the Official Language Act, as the consequences and reactions to this were to be both severe and violent.

In terms of employment, the act made it impossible for those who did not speak Sinhala to possess or apply for jobs within the public administration, and thus a large proportion of the Tamils already working within the public administration, lost their jobs. “Sinhala Only” is widely conceived as an attempt to minimize the chances of getting positions within the public administration, for the well-educated Tamils, and thus enhance the prospects of the Sinhalese (Nissan 1998; Preis 1996). It served as a comparative advantage in favour of the Sinhalese in the competition for jobs within the public administration.

An interesting aspect of the passing of the Sinhala Only Act was that it was supported by the Muslim members of Parliament, who represented the predominantly Tamil speaking Muslim community. Just as the representatives for the Sri Lankan Tamils had voted for the passing of the Ceylon Citizenship Act in 1948, due to short-term political benefits, the Muslim representatives did the same with the Sinhala Only Act. This was another opportunity passed, to mobilize a strong minority opposition to the Sinhalese ethno-nationalistic government.

The Sinhala Only Act was met with an intense non-violent protest campaign from the Tamils, prompting the first outbreaks of anti-Tamil violence, mostly in the South and East of the country. Approximately 150 people were killed during these upsurges, mostly Tamils. The leading Tamil party, the Federal Party, had organized a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience, and during a protest in Colombo they were attacked by an angry mob of Sinhalese. The police did nothing to stop these attacks (Armon et al. 1998a; Nissan 1998). The fact that the police remained passive and did nothing to protect the Tamil protesters, increased Tamil insecurity towards the state, and signalled an increased “Sinhalisation” of state institutions (Nissan 1998, p. 3.).

The passing of the Official Language Act was the first political plot against the Tamils after independence, and is widely considered, within the Tamil community, as a central grievance of the Sri Lankan Tamils (Nissan 1998). Through the years the issue of language has remained a major grievance for Tamil speakers, and even today monolingual Tamil speakers remain at a considerable disadvantage in their dealings with the state and in commercial and business life outside the Northeast. In the present situation in Sri Lanka many state institutions still issue forms in Sinhala-Only or in Sinhala and English (Nissan 1998).

6.2. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact

One month after the Sinhala Only act had been passed, in August 1956, the Federal Party made four main demands to the government; calling for a federal constitution; equality of status for the Tamil and Sinhala languages; granting of citizenship to the highland Tamils; and an immediate halt to government-sponsored Sinhalese resettlement in what were seen as traditional Tamil speaking areas. If these demands were not met, the Federal Party threatened another campaign of non-violent civil disobedience (Nissan 1998).

These demands were not met and non-violent agitation intensified in the ensuing eleven months, until Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Federal Party leader S.J.V. Chelvanayakam agreed on a pact, which offered devolution of powers to Tamil speaking regional councils and recognition of Tamil as a national minority language. This regulation in the pact was called “the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act” (Armon et al. 1998). The pact also contained a promise from the government, that it would reconsider the citizenship status of the highland-Tamils, and assurance against resettlement programmes in the North and East, in the future. However, Sinhala nationalist opposition to this act was so intense that it was publicly abrogated by Bandaranaike in April 1958 (Nissan 1998). This was to be the first of several occasions where the government went back on its promises and hence fuelled Tamil resentment and grievances.

Before the general election in 1960, the Federal Party once again stated their four demands. The SLFP promised that if they were elected, they would implement reforms within three months based on the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, and on this ground the two parties formed an electoral alliance during the campaign. However, the SLFP, after gaining majority in the elections, ignored the pact with the Federal Party, as they no longer depended on their support. Thus, this was the second time the government of Sri Lanka failed to keep its promises to the Tamils since independence.

6.2.1. The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact.

In 1965 the Federal Party yet again tried to reach an agreement with the government, which was now being led by the United National Party (UNP), with Dudley Senanayake as prime minister. The content of the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact was similar to the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. On agreement the Federal Party was granted permission to construct a coalition ´national government´ under Senanayake. However, yet again pressure asserted by the opposition was so intense, that the government abstained from keeping its promises. The Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act was not implemented, (it was eventually implemented in 1978 after a change in the constitution) nor were any of the other terms agreed upon in the original Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957.

6.2.2. Failed Promises and Civil Unrest.

Frustrated that the government continuously failed to live up to its promises, Tamil politicians intensified their campaign of civil disobedience and non-violent protest. These protests were often met, especially in the South, with counter protests by Buddhist monks and other Sinhala activists, which in effect added to the ethnic tension and polarization between the two communities.

Not only did the SLFP not keep its promises to the Federal Party, after the 1960 elections, in 1961 it went on to strengthen the implementation of the 1956 Sinhala Only Act. It instituted Sinhala as the only language of administration throughout the island, without making any substantive concessions to Tamil speakers (Nissan 1998).

In the North the civil disobedience campaign caused the government to strengthen the security presence, which had severe implications for the Tamils personal liberty. In February of 1961, the Federal Party launched its biggest campaign in the Northeast of the country, to protest the implementation of the Sinhala-Only Act. The Federal Party had already called for Tamils working within the government not to study Sinhala, and now it requested that they did not transact any business in Sinhala and that Tamil people only addressed the government, speaking Tamil. For several days during February 1961, Tamil protesters blocked entrances to administrative buildings in Jaffna.

The government responded by declaring the first State of Emergency in the history of the independent Sri Lanka, and army troops were deployed in Jaffna to regain control of the area. In July, the Federal Party’s “Tamil Arasu (state) postal service,” which issued its own stamps in the Jaffna district, was closed down by the government and all Federal Party MPs were imprisoned for the ensuing six months (Nissan 1998; Nesiah 2001).

Since independence the Tamils had been subjected to numerous examples of the government breaking its political agreements and in 1969, shortly after a draft bill which provided for new district councils, was dropped under opposition pressure, it resulted in the Federal Party leaving the government altogether (Nissan 1998). However, until the mid-1970s the establishment of a federal system remained the political aim of the Federal Party (Nesiah 2001).

The ethnic populism, which commenced with the “Sinhala Only” Act, has brought about a certain “rhythm” in Sri Lankan politics, since independence. Whenever one of the big Sinhalese parties (SLFP and UNP) is in opposition, they try to strengthen their position by playing into the ethno-nationalistic currents among the Sinhalese voters. This has repeatedly made it complicated for the party in power to make any decisions that could be considered as giving concession to Tamil demands, and hence been an obstacle to reformist policies.

6.3. Educational Policies (1970s)

In 1970 an SLFP-alliance won the general elections with a land-slide victory, and Srimavo Bandaranaike was again appointed prime minister. The government made new policies on access to higher education. Until the beginning of the 1970s the entrance system to universities had been based on competitive exams marked on a uniform basis throughout the country. Especially Jaffna Tamil students did well in their exams and as a result the proportion of Tamils in universities was significantly higher than their proportion in the population (Nissan 1998; de Silva 1996). An example of this is that in 1970 Tamil students comprised 35% of the total number of students in the natural-science faculties (de Silva 1996).

The stated reason for the governments’ new policies was to counter this uneven ethnic distribution of students in higher learning institutions. For the Tamils, however, it was seen as deliberate discrimination from the government towards the Tamils, and outright favouritism on behalf of the Sinhalese students.

During the 1970s educational reforms were made on several occasions. In 1970 the first change was made to the entrance system. Instead of basing it on competitive exams as earlier, a new system was introduced under which the number admitted in each language group was proportionate to the number who had sat the exam. As a consequence of this, Tamil speaking students had to do better at their exams than their Sinhala speaking counterparts, in order to be admitted into university. This means that many of the Tamil students who would have been admitted under the previous entrance system were now denied entrance (Nissan 1998; de Silva 1996).

In 1972 this ´standardization´ system was changed into a ´district quota system´. The purpose of this new system was to compensate students within each language constituency, who did not have sufficient access to educational facilities. This was especially beneficial for students from rural areas, regardless of ethnicity. Highland Tamils, Muslim and Tamil students from the East coast would all benefit but the Jaffna Tamils would still have to perform better than their counterparts due to their higher overall educational achievement. Whether this was an intentional way of isolating the Jaffna Tamils, by accommodating the educational aspirations of the east-coast Tamils, or simply a means to enhance the opportunities of those groups most marginalized, is difficult to determine, whatever the case, the reactions in the North were intense and riots broke out which were contained by the state through strong measures (Nissan 1998).

In 1977 elections brought a new UNP government to power, led by J.R. Jayewardene, who had promised to provide redress for some of the Tamil grievances. Soon after taking office, he abolished the district quota system even though it was still a sensitive subject politically (Nissan 1998).

Although a more fair entrance system was introduced, the damage was already done in a sense, and the educational reforms of the 1970s are still considered a substantial grievance to the Tamil community.

6.4. Sinhalese Resettlement Schemes

Since 1935 when Sri Lanka was still under British colonial rule, irrigation works had opened up large tracts of land in the dry zone areas of the North and East, which were thinly populated areas compared to the densely populated South. These projects intensified heavily in the late 1970s and continued into the 1980s. The stated aim of these projects was to resettle poor Sinhalese farmers from the South into thinly populated areas of the North. Successive governments implemented these policies as they seemingly made good sense, both in developmental and environmental terms. However, many Tamils feared that the government had a hidden agenda and that the real purpose was to change the demographic balance within the Tamil districts, and thus undermine their claim to a Northeast Tamil homeland (Nissan 1998).

Korf (2006, p. 115) describes this in the following way:

“Many Tamils have perceived the expansion of Sinhalese settlements in the Northeast as an act of political and geographic ´colonization of traditional Tamil areas´”

Sinhalese farmers saw it as an opportunity to better their living conditions, and considered it as an expansion into areas that had been abandoned by the Sinhalese in ancient times, and thus they were merely taking back what was rightfully theirs. The Sinhalese justified their resettlement policies on two levels; they pointed toward their ancient civilization in the Anuradhapura region in the North Central Province, and thus claimed to have ancestral rights to occupy the land, and on a more bureaucratic level, they referred to the high population density in the Western and Southern regions. Another justification, although unofficial, was the widespread belief in the Sinhalese community that Sri Lanka was Sihadipa and Dhammadipa, which means the island of the Sinhalese, and hence it was their duty to preserve and protect Buddhism (DeVotta 2000).

Furthermore, there is a self-image within the Sinhalese community that they are in fact the minority group, due to the 60 million Tamils in the Southern state of India, Tamil Nadu, which act as a socio-cultural bastion for the Tamil’s in Sri Lanka. Michael Roberts (1978, p. 367) defines the consequence of this self-imposed minority complex as follows:

“We are carrying on a struggle for national existence against the Dravidian majority. If the Tamils get hold of the country, the Sinhalese will have to jump into the sea”.

Although the above quote seems a bit extreme and possibly biased, it still encapsulates the essence of a part of the Sinhalese self-perception, which is important to understand.

For the Tamils the resettlement policies seemed to have two fundamental aims, which DeVotta (2000, p. 61) describe in the following quote:

“First, to dilute the region’s ethnic concentration so that Tamil electoral representation was curtailed, and second, to delegitimize Tamil claims regarding a distinctive geographical entity” (DeVotta 2000, p. 61).

The resettlement policies were effective and by the 1960s the government created a whole new district in the East, the Amparai (also called Ampara) district, comprising nearly 80 percent Sinhalese. The Amparai district was carved out of the Batticaloa district, which is a historic Tamil district, and still comprised a majority of Tamils at independence. A demographic study shows that in parts of the Eastern dry-zone a significant change occurred between 1946 and 1976. In 1946 the area was inhabited by 19 percent Sinhalese and in 1976 this number had increased to more than 83 percent (Herring 2001).

6.4.1. The Mahaweli Development Project

During the 1970s a large-scale resettlement scheme was initiated, called “the Mahaweli Development Project”. The project was scheduled to run over a 30-year period, it was primarily sponsored by international donors and was supposed to supply water to Sri Lanka´s dry-zones.

In 1977 the UNP won the parliamentary election, which caused an extensive liberalization of the country’s finances and the welfare system in general. Financial aid from international donors was quadrupled compared to the period 1970-1977 and as a consequence “the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project” was passed. Approximately half of the donor assistance was spend on this project, with the proclaimed aim of creating half a million jobs especially within the agricultural sector (Perera 1998). Due to population growth it was necessary to create new jobs to avoid an increase in unemployment.

A large proportion of the land, the project aimed to cultivate, was situated in the Amparai and Trincomalee districts, which were considered as Tamil areas. The original project also encompassed a plan to irrigate water to the Northern province, however, this part of the project was never realized. In the Tamil population, especially those in Jaffna, it was perceived as though they were excluded from the project, which was financed through international donors with the protracted aim of assisting the whole of Sri Lanka (Korf 2006). This further fuelled Tamil frustrations and grievances.

6.4.2. ´Frontiersmen´

In connection to the resettlement schemes and as a consequence of the 1983 riots, (which will be described in section 6.7), influential bodies within the Sri Lankan government asserted pressure, that more direct and militarized settlements should be formed in the Northeast, as to undermine the territorial claims of the militant Tamil groups (Korf 2006).

As a result the government came up with a strategy to settle poor Sinhalese farmers from the South, into strategic areas of the Northeast. This strategy was pursued openly as a part of the government resettlement program. Speculations have been made as to whether there were hidden agendas to the strategy within the ruling regime in Colombo who, based in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) from 1977 and the presidential constitution, had extensive political powers to pursue their aims, with the necessary means (Korf 2006).

This strategy was met with strong condemnation from the Tamil community, and numerous accounts of violent clashes between the Tamil militant group, the LTTE, and government army soldiers, took place in the ensuing years, especially in the Trincomalee district.

The army introduced what Thangarajah calls ´frontiersmen´, which were politically motivated and ideologically driven Sinhalese farmers. They were introduced into new irrigation schemes on what was generally perceived as Tamil areas, and given weaponry by the army, to defend themselves against Tamil militants (Korf 2006). To the Tamils this was seen as a clear encroachment into what they perceived to be their territory. In the ensuing years a certain rhythm developed as a consequence, with the LTTE attacking the Sinhalese frontiersman, the army and special police forces retaliating against Tamil civilians and so on. Many lines of attack have been documented to follow this certain line of logic (Hoole 2001).

The Sinhalese resettlement schemes are stated in the Vaddukoddai Resolution as one of the main grievances for the Tamil people, and it is clear that they are perceived by Tamils as a deliberate strategy on behalf of the Sinhalese, to make Tamils a minority group within their own “traditional homeland”.

The Mahaweli project in conjunction with the settling of Sinhalese farmers into what the Tamils perceived to be their ´homeland´, increased a feeling within the Tamil community, that they were being marginalized in areas they perceived as their own.

6.5. The Vaddukoddai Resolution (1976)

Due to previous circumstances a deepening distrust of Sinhalese politicians and national politics in general, had developed within the Tamil community. In May 1976 this led to the formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which marked a significant change in Tamil politics. Until this point, Tamil politicians had called for a decentralized government or a federal state but on May 14, 1976, TULF adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution, calling for a separate Tamil state. They declared that all attempts to cooperate with successive Sri Lankan governments had failed and that the Tamil grievances could only be met in a separate Tamil state (Nissan 1998).

The following quote is a part of the Vaddukoddai Resolution and was first stated on the first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (in Sathananthan 1998, p. 1.):

“…the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries…and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese”.

In calling for a separate Tamil state, a political solution within a federal state was no longer possible. Due to broken promises from the government in the past, the Tamils did not feel that they could trust any potential future agreements with the government to be upheld.

In the 1977 general elections, TULF won a massive victory, claiming almost total support from the Tamils in especially the Northern and Eastern provinces. This confirmed that there was general support for Tamil secessionism; however, the means to attain this objective was contested.

In this sense the Vaddukoddai Resolution symbolizes an ultimate vote of no confidence in the Sri Lankan government, on behalf of the Tamils.

In the years 1977-1983 TULF pursued their politics via parliamentary negotiations with the government but by 1983 it was clear that this was not possible. In the aftermath of the riots in July 1983, a constitutional amendment was introduced, banning advocacy of secessionism, even through peaceful, political means, and thus, realizing that they had no way of pursuing their aspirations of a separate Tamil state (the basis on which they were elected) TULF Parliamentarians had to forfeit their seats in parliament (Nissan 1998).

6.6. The 1983 Riots – “Black July”

Although sporadic communal uprisings did occur earlier it is generally accepted that the actual civil war, which remains today, was triggered in July 1983 when the most violent clashes between Sinhalese mobs and the Tamil minority took place.

The 1983 riots, often referred to as “Black July,” broke out following the LTTE’s killing of 13 soldiers from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in Jaffna. Violence aimed at Tamil civilians ensued in the capital of Colombo but also spread, to a lesser degree, to other parts of the country.

Swamy (2003, p. 80) describes Black July as follows:

“Suddenly, like an unexpected thunderstorm, the city was drenched in blood as mobs set upon innocent Tamils – men, women and children – with unnerving viciousness. There had been organized attacks on Tamils before – in 1956, 1958, 1977 and 1981 – but nothing came close to what happened in July 1983. It was a state-sponsored pogrom, a systematic attempt to virtually annihilate the country’s dominant ethnic minority.”

DeVotta (2000) and Herring (2001) also refer to the riots as ‘pogroms’ and although the extent of state participation is debatable, some degree of involvement seems indisputable due to the use of electoral registration lists in identifying Tamil properties; a conspicuous absence of police; an unwillingness of military personnel to intervene and the political delay in imposing curfews, re-establishing order and a reluctance to renounce the violence.

In at least one instance the rioters were led by a cabinet minister and on several other occasions during the 1983 pogrom, rioters were transported in government vehicles. In some instances the rioters were accompanied by the Buddhist sangha, which further exemplified the widening of the gap between the two communities (DeVotta 2000).

After three days of riots of unprecedented magnitude, the president finally addressed the country, however, he did not condemn what had happened, nor did he express any regret on behalf of his people, or express any sympathy for the victims and their families. Instead he spoke against separatism, and expressed the urgency in combating it. About two weeks prior to the riots, president Jayewardene told the Daily Telegraph: “I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people… Now we can’t think of them. Not about their lives or their opinions of us” (in DeVotta 2000, p. 65).

Figures relating to Black July vary significantly but it appears plausible that at least 1,000 Tamils were killed, thousands were injured and 18.000 properties were destroyed – leaving some 100,000 Tamils homeless and wiping out most of the Tamil wholesale and retail trade in the Capital. (Preis 1996; DeVotta 2000; Herring 2001; President Kumaratunga 2004).

Following the riots hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled the country (President Kumaratunga 2004; U.S. Department of State 2007) – probably feeling that the Sri Lankan state and institutions could not, or would not, guarantee the safety of the Tamil minority, nor protect their interests.

The riots, coupled with other events, also aided Tamil backing of the militant groups, including the LTTE, which experienced a significant increase in recruitment and public support as many of the more moderate ethno-nationalistic Tamils, who previously supported the struggle for Tamil rights through peaceful, political means, began to view military power and Tamil Eelam as the best guarantee for safety and non-discrimination (Daniel 1996; Swamy 2004).

7.0. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The following chapter examines the LTTE in terms of background, military capabilities, internal culture, structure, funding-sources etc. The information is necessary to gain a proper understanding of the organization and subsequently attempt an analysis of its motives and role in the Sri Lankan conflict.

7.1. Emergence of the LTTE

The Tamil New Tigers, which later became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (in 1976 the name was changed), were formed in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhakaran who has remained their undisputed leader ever since. Since its inception the LTTE has demanded a separate Tamil state, Tamil Eelam, in Sri Lanka’s North and East, which is seen as the historical homeland of Sri Lankan Tamils prior to colonization.

Believed to have been initially funded through bank-robberies, the LTTE started off targeting policemen, Tamil politicians and administrative figures affiliated with the government. Their first major operation was the assassination of the Tamil mayor, Alfred Duraiappah, in 1975 - the first successful assassination by Tamil militants and rumored to have been undertaken by Prabhakaran himself (Armon et al. 1998; Graeme and Gunaratna 2002; Swamy 2004; Wikipedia 2008a).

The LTTE emerged amongst a plethora of other Tamil militant groups formed in the 1970s and 1980s in reaction to discriminating practices by the Sinhalese government, which have been discussed in the previous chapter. Approximately 38 different militant groups have at one point or another fought for Tamil independence (Wikipedia 2008a) but the most dominant have been the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and the LTTE (Armon et al. 1998; Swamy 2003).

Initially, these groups were typically small in terms of membership, drawing support mainly from economically deprived agricultural workers who lost their livelihoods due to economic reforms in the late 1970s and from unemployed Tamil youth who faced economic and social discrimination due to the educational reforms and enactment of the “Sinhala Only” policy (Nissan 1998; DeVotta 2000; Graeme and Gunaratna 2004). According to Swamy (2004), the LTTE, prior to 1983, consisted of less than 40 people.

However, in 1979 the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which gave sweeping powers to the police and security forces and temporarily suspended certain constitutional safeguards against human rights violations (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998).

Among other things, the Prevention of Terrorism Act provides “immunity to those executing military activities under these Regulations. Police powers within this framework include the right to arrest and detain without warrant and to extend detention for up to 18 months. Detention orders are not reviewable. Additionally, the movement and association of suspected persons may be prohibited or restricted by ministerial order, enforceable by the police” (in: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007, p.4).

Reports of human rights violations by the security forces escalated with the PTA, including reports of mass arrests of Tamil youths, extra-judicial killings and ‘disappearances’, which exacerbated resentment among Tamil civilians and fuelled support for the militant groups. In 1982 the PTA was extended indefinitely (and remained in place until the 2002 CFA).

As support, funding and cadre levels steadily grew, the LTTE widened its targets to engage in larger confrontations with Sri Lanka’s military. In July 1983, it conducted its, till then, largest attack on the SLA by ambushing an army convoy in Jaffna. Thirteen soldiers were killed, and the event triggered the Black July Riots in Colombo – which ultimately benefited the expansion of the LTTE.

Tamil frustration was amplified by the atrocities of the 1983 riots and the subsequent constitutional amendment that banned all advocacy of secessionism even through political means. As TULF parliamentarians forfeited their seats, any constitutional path for Tamil independence was effectively blocked and instead many Tamils turned to the militant groups who were seen as the only remaining resort. As a result, militant recruitment increased dramatically and the groups, including the LTTE, grew exponentially (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; Swamy 2003).

In the 1980s the LTTE and other militant groups were supported by the Indian government. From 1983 to 1987 most of the LTTE administration, procurement, training camps and Prabhakaran himself, were based in the Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu, which is easily accessible by boat from Northern Sri Lanka (Graeme and Gunarata 2004; Swamy 2004).

The LTTE continued to successfully fight the SLA, using both guerrilla tactics and head-on clashes, but efforts were also spent on combating other Tamil militant organizations, including PLOT, TELO and EPRLF (both prior and during the India-Sri Lanka Accord). By 1987 the LTTE emerged as the victorious group, having either merged with, or largely exterminated most other groups (though part of the EPRLF remained). The LTTE become the all-dominating force in Tamil militant politics and de-facto rulers of the Jaffna Peninsula.

Nissan (1998) notes that from that time, as the LTTE continued armed warfare against the Sri Lankan state, it did not allow other Tamil groups or political parties to operate in areas under its control.

Graeme and Gunaratna (2004, p.196) summarize the situation in the following manner:

“By eliminating co-ethnic competitors and successfully engaging the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE prevented the government from gaining access to and control of the Northeast provinces of the country. By 1987, the LTTE effectively ruled the Northern peninsula…”

The first-time ruling of the Jaffna however, proved short for the LTTE as in late July 1987 an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived to help enforce a ceasefire, agreed under the India-Sri Lanka Accord. The LTTE renounced the agreement and engaged in armed confrontations with the IPKF, and the EPRLF (which had been re-armed and backed by India) until India withdrew its forces in 1990 and EPRLF members fled abroad (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004).

As the IPKF departed, the LTTE seized the vacated areas. Consequently, the LTTE suddenly found itself in control of Sri Lanka’s North, including Jaffna, and many areas of the East – and in effect, by 1990 it ran, as a quasi-state, large proportions of the area it wanted carved out as Tamil Eelam.

Indian journalist, Narayan Swamy, has undertaken extensive research into the LTTE and Prabhakaran, including hundreds of interviews with diaspora Tamils and people connected with the organization, in preparation for his books, Tigers of Lanka and Inside an Elusive Mind – the to date, most comprehensive profiles attempted on the LTTE and its leader. Although he in general appears skeptical of the LTTE, Prabhakaran and the means employed, Swamy is none-the-less evidently impressed with Prabhakaran’s success and the situation following the IPKF withdrawal. He describes the development as follows:

“It was a mighty leap forward. Few Tamils knew him barely a decade ago. He was a man on the run. In 1983 he headed a group of not more than 40 people. In 1987, he had thousands under his command but many doubted his ability to withstand the Indian military might. Now that he had outlasted the Indian onslaught, his stature as the most decisive arbiter of Tamil destiny in Sri Lanka was in full glory. He controlled the whole of the Northeast – a third of the country’s land area – and almost two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline. With a mixture of diplomatic cunning, military genius and sheer audacity, Prabhakaran had deftly turned the tables on both India and Sri Lanka. Asia had seen nothing like this since the Viet Cong humbled the mighty U.S. over a decade ago in similar circumstances” (Swamy 2004, p. 211.).

In 1995, following months of intense fighting, the SLA succeeded in recapturing the Jaffna peninsula, bringing it under government control for the first time in nearly a decade and it has been kept ever since through a heavy military presence. However, despite various territorial battles, by the time the 2002 CFA was signed, the LTTE still controlled large areas of Sri Lanka’s North and East.

Map III: Areas under

LTTE control in 2001

(pre-CFA).

7.2. Organizational Structure, Strength and Culture

There is little doubt that Prabhakaran is the supreme authority in the LTTE. However, the official command structure includes a Central Committee, which is the highest decision- making body and has Prabhakaran as chairman, and Area-commanders who are responsible for tactical decisions. The LTTE hierarchy uses army ranks and grades similar to the SLA (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004).

According to Graeme and Gunaratna (2004) the LTTE has developed into a formidable fighting force that has air, land and sea capabilities and possesses heavy weaponry, including artillery surface-to-air missiles, and rocket launchers. In addition, in March 2007, the Tigers launched their first ever air attack, bombing military targets near the Capital from light aircrafts – and proving that they now also possessed something akin to an air-force (Buerk 2007).

Armon et al. (1998) state that Sri Lankan and Western intelligence agencies estimate the LTTE to have between 14,000 and 18,000 armed cadres. Graeme and Gunaratna (2004) quote a similar figure from Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, which estimates the strength of the LTTE land-forces at 15,000 and 3,000-4,000 Sea Tigers (the naval wing).

All LTTE fighters undergo a thorough training programme, including combat training, physical training, rigorous indoctrination and the adherence to a strict code of conduct. Cadres must abstain from alcohol and pre-marital sex and are only allowed to marry after having served a five-year period in the LTTE. (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Swamy 2004). Upon completion of basic military training, all LTTE cadres are given a cyanide capsule, hung on a string around their necks, and to be consumed in case of capture (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Swamy 2004; Council of foreign Relations 2008).

LTTE fighters are highly disciplined, extremely motivated and trained to obey orders from their leaders unquestioningly (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004). Swamy (2004, p. xix.) summarizes the LTTE structure of command and cadre-discipline in the following manner:

“The members do what the leadership says. Theirs is not to ask why, theirs is to do and die. Matters little what the directive from the leadership is; the leader is always right, he is god, he alone knows what is good for the Tamil community. If the leader orders to kill, it will be carried out – without any question. Those who question have no place in the LTTE.”

Exclusively female units are incorporated into each military wing (e.g. the Sea Tigers, the artillery regiment, the suicide brigade etc). The LTTE is also renowned for- and has been heavily criticized by human rights groups, for their recruitment of child soldiers – commonly knick-named the “Baby-Brigade.” (Subramanian 2001; Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Amnesty International 2007, 2008b; Human Rights Watch 2008).

7.3. Military / Political Tactics

Throughout its long armed struggle, the LTTE has employed a mixture of conventional combatant warfare, guerilla tactics, suicide bombings and political assassinations. The LTTE has shown little regards to human rights or the rules of war with numerous examples of attacks on civilian targets, including Sinhalese settlers and Muslim villages. In 1990 the Tigers threatened to kill all Muslims in the Northern district unless they left, causing 120,000 to flee (Armon et al. 1998; Samuel 1998; Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Swamy 2004).

Samuel (1998, p. 2.) concludes that: “There have been serious human rights infringements and a significant toll of death and injury among civilian communities trapped in war zones, while neither the state nor the LTTE pay much respect to humanitarian laws governing the conduct of armed conflict.”

Regarding the LTTE’s methods, Graeme and Gunaratna (2004, p. 198) argue that while the LTTE has “few qualms about engaging and hurting civilians,” such actions are deliberate, to serve some purpose or objective, and are not due to breakdown in discipline.

The notion that the LTTE deliberately uses the harm of civilians to serve an overall purpose (rather than it being impulsive acts committed in the heat of battle) is also an issue mentioned by Swamy (2004) who claims the LTTE leadership followed a “gory, even perverse strategy,” prior to the India-Sri Lanka Accord being signed.

“It posed the most stringent military challenges to the military. Every time India put pressure on President Jayewardene to offer concessions to the Tamils or when the military killed innocent Tamils, the Tigers raided isolated villages populated by the Sinhalese and brutally massacred innocent men, women and children. This was meant to harden Jayewardene as well as the military which, unable to take the Tigers head on, would again go after helpless Tamil civilians. This persecution in turn gave Prabhakaran more soldiers for his cause” (Swamy 2004, p. 142).

Swamy also argues that during the IPKF deployment, the LTTE applied similar tactics of engaging the civilian population. The Tigers kept the Indian troops engaged in firefights in urban areas, knowing full well that it would result in civilian casualties, but using the logic that when innocent people suffered at the hands of Indian soldiers, for no fault of their own, they would be inclined to sympathize with the LTTE and even join them eventually.

Thus, it appears that the LTTE has purposely encouraged and provoked the SLA/IPKF to create new grievances in the Tamil population as it ultimately strengthens support for the LTTE.

7.3.1. Suicide Bombings

The LTTE has become notorious for its use of suicide tactics, a practice formally adopted in 1987. Since then, it has conducted some 200 suicide-bombings – far more than any other terrorist group (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Council on Foreign Relations 2008).

Suicide attacks are primarily used for high-profile assassinations, and attacks on larger economic, cultural and military targets. Suicide bombings are undertaken by the “Black Tigers,” a special brigade of the most dedicated and loyal LTTE cadres who are specifically trained for this purpose (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Swamy 2004).

In regards to the Black Tigers, Prabhakaran (in Swamy 2004, p. 233) claims that: This is a voluntary group. Whenever there is a specific operation, we select someone from that group. By carrying out suicide assaults we can terrorize the enemy and demonstrate that though small, we have the potential to inflict heavy damage on them”.

Prabhakaran goes on to explain that such commitment comes from discipline and dedication. He claims that for a person (including a suicide bomber), to dedicate his life to a cause, he must be free from a self-centered, egoistic existence and renounce personal pleasures.

“I have instilled discipline in the LTTE and selected a group of persons capable of renouncing their lives. Also, in our revolution, leaders are an example to the recruits. They are the first to swallow cyanide” (Prabhakaran in: Swamy 2004, p. 233).

Suicide bombers are venerated and treated with great honor. Upon death, their photographs and names are displayed in the LTTE headquarters as examples for future cadres (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004).

The mere existence of a suicide unit, and the sheer number of people (some 200) who have, to date, willingly given up their lives, to act as human bombs for the LTTE, indicate the high level of dedication within the organization. It also points to motivations that goes beyond economic incentives or other extrinsic motivations. This is in contrast to the Sri Lankan Army, which has faced problems with significant numbers of soldiers deserting (Armon et al. 1998).

7.3.2. Political Assassinations

The LTTE has generally refused to participate in mainstream Sri Lankan politics but does tacitly support some Tamil politicians who can further their cause (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Ganguly 2004). However, the (very justified) fear of assassinations of elected government candidates have led to the LTTE indirectly influencing political elections in Sri Lanka (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004).

In particular, the Tigers are known for regularly killing Tamil politicians who work with the Sinhalese government or are otherwise seen as traitors to the national cause – or as threatening to the LTTE’s influence, bargaining power, or self-made standing as sole representative of the Tamils. The LTTE disregards pluralism within the Tamil community and does not willingly accept opposition or alternative political views (Edrisinha 1998; Graeme and Gunaratna 2004, Human Rights Watch 2006b).

Assassinations attributed to the LTTE include:

Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991); Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1993); Member of Parliament Neelan Thiruchelvam (ethnic Tamil involved in peace initiative)(1999); Sri Lankan Industry Minister C.V. Goonaratne (2000); Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Lakschan Kadirgamar (Tamil, critical of the LTTE) (2005); Member of Parliament (UNP) T. Maheswara (2008) and Minister of Nation Building D.M. Dassanayake. (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Council on Foreign Relations 2008).

Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi:

The most famous, and arguably the most consequential, assassination by the LTTE was that of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian Prime Minister who had been instrumental in the India-Sri Lanka Accord. Gandhi was killed by a female suicide-bomber, on May 21, 1991, at a rally meeting in India (the only suicide bombing conducted by the LTTE outside of Sri Lanka).

After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, support for the LTTE dropped considerably in India, where large population groups and political figures had previously been sympathetic to the LTTE and its cause. It has been speculated that Prabhakaran decided to kill Gandhi as he considered him a traitor and against the Tamil liberation struggle after the India-Sri Lanka Accord and/or because he feared that Gandhi would re-instate the IPKF if he won the Indian election for which he was campaigning (Swamy 2004; Rediff news 2006).

Since the Gandhi assassination, the LTTE has been proscribed as a terrorist organization by India – the first country to do so. In 1998, the LTTE and Prabhakaran were officially found responsible for the killing and India regularly demands the extradition of Prabhakaran.

The LTTE spokesperson in 1996, Anton Balasingham, stated regret over the assassination although he did not outright admit LTTE’s responsibility for it.

7.4. International Recognition

According to Gunaratna (2002), after 1996 the LTTE exerted efforts to move away from terrorism (targeting civilians) and building guerrilla capabilities, in an attempt to restore the international legitimacy it had lost through over a quarter of a century of terrorism tactics. Prabhakaran too changed his macho appearances in army fatigues, holding a firearm, into a more statesmanlike figure in a safari suit, and the LTTE website quoted Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi.

Little did it help though, as in 1997, the United Stated followed India in proscribing the group as a terrorist organization. To date, the LTTE has been banned as a terrorist organization in 32 countries, including Australia, Canada and the European Union, where large portions of the Tamil diaspora resides (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004; Wikipedia 2008). The European Union banned the LTTE in May 2006, despite protests from the Nordic countries, staffing the SLMM, who feared it would exacerbate the conflict (Nesan 2006).

According to Edrisinha (1998) the LTTE views the war as a confrontation between two nations and as a justified struggle for self-determination and as a consequence: “It views itself, therefore, as a national liberation movement, not a political party or militant group, and desires to be acknowledged as such” (Edrisinha 1998, p. 5).

Indeed Prabhakaran commonly refers to the LTTE’s fight as a freedom struggle and a liberation movement, and he is clearly frustrated by the lack of international support and international recognition of its legitimacy. In his ‘Hero’s Day’ speeches in both 2006 and 2007 Prabhakaran openly criticized the international community for “yielding to diplomatic pressure from the Sri Lankan government” or “succumbing to the deception of the Sinhala State” and listing the “freedom movement as a terrorist organization”.

He points to the international support of East Timor, Montenegro and Kosovo, and subsequently argues that with respect to the Tamil national question, the actions of the international community are unjust. In both speeches he calls upon international actors to recognize the Tamil’s freedom struggle and stop supporting the Sri Lankan government.

“On this sacred day it is the hope of our people that the international community will cease giving military and economic aid to the Sinhala regime and accept the right to self determination and the sovereignty of the Tamil nation” (Prabhakaran 2007).

It seems unlikely however, that such a wish will be granted, on the contrary. In 2006, in light of renewed violence during the CFA, the co-chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference (international donor-funding mechanism established in 2003 for developing Sri Lanka, in particular the conflict-affected areas, in support of the peace-process) called upon both parties (the government and the LTTE) to return to the negotiating table. The U.S. in particular was heavily critical of the violence being perpetrated by the LTTE and consequently State Department officials, as well as the US ambassador, warned the LTTE that returning to hostilities would result in the Tigers facing a “more capable and more determined” Sri Lankan military, and thus implying that support would be given to the government (Huggle 2006).

Perhaps it is note-worthy, that absurdly on the same day as the U.S. warning to the LTTE, five Tamil students were shot dead in Trincomalee by security forces for no apparent reason, and in direct violation of the CFA (Wikipedia 2008c).

7.5. Funding the LTTE

Although not recognized by any international governments, the areas under LTTE’s control are basically run as a de-facto, quasi-independent state, which includes the provision of social services like transportation and education, a police force, a court of law and a bank. The administration of LTTE areas is partly funded through “taxation” imposed on every family – though family members of LTTE cadres (alive or dead) are exempt from this tax. Materials entering or exiting LTTE held areas are also taxed at check-points (Gunaratna 2004; Renner and Chafe 2007; Wikipedia 2008).

Other methods for collecting funds include extortion, illegal trade and front organizations to legitimate business and charities. The LTTE is also suspected of being involved in the piracy of software, CDs and DVDs (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004). The largest funding source however, appears to be the Tamil diaspora, which will be discussed in the following section.

No information has been located that suggests LTTE is financially dependant on primary commodities to any large extent. Notably, Sri Lanka’s main exports are manufactured textiles, produced in ‘free-trade’ areas of the South; and tea, grown in the central highlands – both areas outside LTTE’s control.

7.5.1. The Tamil Diaspora

“Expatriate Tamils continue to provide large proportions of the finance and propaganda which underpins the LTTE…” (Armon et al. 1998).

Since the war started it has prompted between 600,000 – 800,000 Tamils to leave the country, many fleeing government abuses. As a result, between one-quarter and one-third of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population now live abroad (Armon et al. 1998; Human Rights Watch 2006).

The LTTE enjoys widespread support from a network of overt, legitimate front and cover organizations of overseas Tamils. In addition, the LTTE itself is believed to manage offices and cells in at least fifty-four countries, the largest and most important ones being in the UK, Canada and Australia, where the majority of expatiate Tamils reside (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004).

According to Graeme and Gunaratna (2004) the LTTE maintains close bonds with the expatriate Tamil public both through dissemination of information e.g. Tamil newspapers, movie documentaries and internet sites (which apart from giving information also consists of the sales of calendars, Tamil music, books etc. as well as collection of donations) and by encouraging participation in public rallies, seminars, and political demonstrations in support of the Tamil cause. Proceeds from ticket sales, goods purchased, and donations during the event go to the LTTE.

Furthermore, to enhance interaction with the diaspora, the LTTE runs community organizations which provide social services and benefits in areas of welfare, housing, immigration assistance, legal aid, education, money transfers etc.

A report by Human Rights Watch (2006a) found that many members of the Tamil diaspora vividly remember government abuses during the war, and willingly contribute funds to the LTTE, which they see as a legitimate and important representative of the Tamil people and their interests. They support the LTTE’s goal of establishing an independent Tamil state and even the use of military means to achieve Tamil Eelam.

However, Human Rights Watch (2006a,b) also found that some members of the Tamil community who do not wish to contribute, either due to personal economic circumstances, or because they do not agree with the LTTE’s goals or methods, have been subjected to intense pressure or outright threats and forced to provide financial support for the LTTE operations. Some of these individuals may support Tamil politicians or political parties that have been decimated or marginalized by the LTTE.

Human Rights Watch (2006a) conclude that “While many members of the Tamil diaspora willingly and actively support the LTTE, others have been subject to intimidation, extortion, and physical violence as the LTTE seeks to suppress criticism of its human rights abuses and to ensure a steady flow of income.”

7.5.2. Financial Management

According to Grame and Gunaratna (2004) the annual budget of the LTTE is believed to be in the range of USD. 60 million. It is not made clear whether this amount is for military operations only, or partly/fully includes administrating costs relating to the LTTE-held areas of the North and East (we suspect it includes mainly military related expenditure).

Locating detailed information on the LTTE budget and internal financial procedures, has, not unexpectedly, proved impossible. However, Swamy (2004) mentions rigid financial procedures, with district offices being accountable to LTTE’s top administration for every rupee spent. A policy of no-tolerance of corruption or fraud is also implied and several examples relating to fund-raising and funds-expenditure suggest that a responsible financial management system is in place.

Swamy (2004) describes an instance where an LTTE member was caught steeling a smaller amount of cash and was sentenced to death by Prabhakaran. Following objections over the severe punishment from other Tigers the sentence was later revoked and the man was expelled from the LTTE, however the example does illustrate a no-tolerance policy.

Throughout the research process for the thesis, no literature or information has been encountered which suggest that LTTE funds are channeled to individual persons or purposely exploited to financially benefit a select few. No allegations against the LTTE or its leadership in regards to corruption or excessive, personal economic gains have been identified.

The only other public example found of an individual possibly extracting funds from the LTTE is that of former LTTE leader ‘Colonel Karuna’, who split from the LTTE and let a run-away fraction in the Eastern district in 2004-2007. Karuna was arrested in London in November 2007, carrying a genuine diplomatic passport and the equivalent to USD 5 million – believed to have been made predominantly through extortions and payments from the government for Para militia services.

Speculations on the Karuna-LTTE split are rife with Karuna claiming he left due to internal disagreements over strategy matters, while the LTTE claim Karuna left because he was being investigated over broken code of conduct/fraud. Karuna started the party TMVP, from which he was reportedly later expelled due to embezzlement (Izzadeen 2007; BBC News 2007; Sachitanandam 2007).

These incidences seem to suggest that although the LTTE may be having problems with individuals who attempts to swindle funds for personal gains, such instances are dealt with internally and it does not appear to be an encouraged nor tolerated practice.

8.0. Social Environment, Ethno-Nationalism and Communal-Polarization

There is little doubt that since decolonisation, Sri Lanka’s population has become increasingly divided along ethnic lines. This issue was also emphasized by former president Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in a speech at the Sri Lankan Independence Day parade, following some ethnic riots, where she stated honestly that:

“We have failed in the essential task of nation building” (in: DeVotta 2000, p. 55):

She repeated this sentiment when addressing the UN’s 53rd Annual General Assembly. And indeed it does appear that Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities have become severely polarized since independence, with many Tamils no longer feeling as part of the Sri Lankan nation.

8.1. Communal Polarization / Ethno-Nationalism

Ethno-nationalistic groups diverge from other ethno-political groups in terms of their political history and overall aim.

According to Gurr and Harff (1994, p. 18): “Ethnonationalists are relatively large and regionally concentrated ethnic groups that live within the boundaries of one state or of several adjacent states; their modern political movements are directed toward achieving greater autonomy or independent statehood. Most have historical traditions of autonomy or independence that are used to justify these contemporary demands”.

An important element in ethno-nationalism is how groups perceive themselves, their history and identity as a group. Peaceful co-existence is possible if the parties involved share the same perception of a common history. On the contrary, when opposing groups have divergent perceptions of the past, it will increase polarization along ethnic lines and strengthen an understanding of “them and us”.

The early stages of Sinhalese nationalism were a reaction to the British colonial power and Western influence and the predominant role of the English language in the public administration (Manor 1984). Before decolonisation the nature of the Sinhalese nationalism was significantly different from the ethno-nationalism that emerged after independence, in that, it did not show signs of any specific anti-Tamil tendencies.

The first major post-colonial manifestation of Sinhalese ethno-nationalism came in 1956, with the passing of the Official Language Act (Sinhala Only). It is often associated with the SLFP, due to their substantial use of ethno-nationalistic rhetoric in their campaign. The elections in 1956 were basically a power struggle between the English speaking, and English educated elite, the UNP, who had been given power by the English at independence, and the Sinhalese educated rural elite, the SLFP (Nissan 1998). As mentioned earlier, the SLFP challenged the UNP by asserting an ethno-nationalistic rhetoric in their campaign, playing into an understanding that there was a close correlation between the Sinhalese people, the island of Sri Lanka, and the Buddhist religion (Nissan 1998).

During the 1960s and especially 1970s controversial policies, as described earlier, on a number of areas were passed, which were signs of increased Sinhalese ethno-nationalism. These policies, whether they were deliberate signs of Sinhalese ethno-nationalism or not, were perceived as such by the Tamils. As mentioned earlier these policies fuelled Tamil grievances and spurred Tamil ethno-nationalism.

The first major post-colonial manifestation of Tamil ethno-nationalism was the formation of the Federal Party in 1949, which had federalism as its main objective. Prior to independence the majority of the Tamil elite supported a united Sri Lanka, as they feared that federalism would decrease job opportunities within the public administration. The passing of the Official Language Act in 1956 increased ethno-nationalism in the Tamil community but federalism remained the stated aim of the Federal Party and as a result they lost broad support among Sri Lankan Tamils.

As a consequence of the controversial policies during the 1970s a change occurred in the nature of the Tamil ethno-nationalism. Until this point, it was characterised as a moderate community feeling, calling for a federal state, through peaceful means. The formation of TULF and the ensuing Vaddukoddai Resolution signified a radical change, as the aim of Tamil politics was no longer federalism, but a separate state. The aim had changed but the means to obtain this aim remained unchanged, and the TULF continued their work within parliament until 1983. The 1983 riots had tremendous effects in terms of strengthening ethno-nationalism on both sides, and the following declaration that the call for secessionism, even through peaceful means, further polarised the Sri Lankan society.

Due to increased polarization and ethno-nationalism, many Tamils and even some Sinhalese, began to view the two communities as separate distinct nationalities.

That they are in reality two separate nations, or ought to be, is a notion supported by Sathananthan (1998, p. 2) who notes that:

“…the question is not whether the Ceylon Tamil nation possesses the right of self-determination; that it does is beyond doubt. What is at issue, and needs to be confronted, is the continuing denial of that right by the Sri Lankan government”.

Today, many conflict theoreticians believe that, in reality, Sri Lanka comprises of two distinct states, and that it should be categorised as a multinational state (Roberts 2001; Sathananthan 1998).

Whether Sri Lanka is a multinational state, depends perhaps on individual perception but, as mentioned in previous chapters, there is little doubt that the LTTE tries to protract the image that Tamils are a separate nation within Sri Lanka, and they should be considered as such.

In order to instate and encourage the notion within the Tamil community, that they are in fact a separate nation, the LTTE has for example, created specific Tamil ceremonial days such as ‘Heroes Day’. Every year on November 27, many Tamils celebrate ‘Heroes Day’, in honour of those LTTE cadres who have died in the struggle for Tamil Eelam. On this occasion, the LTTE leader Prabhakaran also addresses ´his´ people/nation (similar to the Queen of Denmark’s annual new-years speech). In this setting the LTTE’s fight is always portrayed as a just struggle for freedom. This issue can be exemplified by the words of LTTE Prabhakaran in his ´Heroes Day´ speech in 2007:

“We are an ancient people with special qualities. We have a unique national identity and national foundation. We have been struggling non-violently and by armed struggle for a very long time against national oppression. We are not terrorists, committing blind acts of violence impelled by racist or religious fanaticism. Our struggle has a concrete, legitimate, political objective. We are struggling only to regain our sovereignty in our own historical land where we have lived for centuries, the sovereignty which we lost to colonial occupiers. We are struggling only to re-establish that sovereignty and rebuild our nation. The Sinhala nation is continuing to reject our just and civilized demands for freedom. Instead, it has declared a genocidal war on our land and our people. Behind the smokescreen of fighting terrorism, it is creating immense human misery”.

This is in direct opposition to the Sinhalese notion of the conflict. The LTTE claims the conflict to be a just struggle for freedom, by a proud and independent people who has been oppressed by an unjust regime. The government, on the other hand, portrays the conflict as one between a nation state and a terrorist organization, which is terrorising the country through violent and covertly means. Due to the largely divergent perceptions a compromise is difficult and agreements are hard to negotiate.

This issue of differing perceptions of the conflict is also mentioned by Edrisinha (1998) as being an obstacle to peace. He argues that a major problem is that the government, the average Sinhalese, and indeed many Tamils and Muslims, have a very different view of the conflict than the LTTE, and that the gulf between these views is not sufficiently appreciated. He claims that:

“To the former parties, the problem is one of addressing minority grievances with, at most, substantial devolution of power and actual parity of status between the Sinhala and Tamil languages. The LTTE, however, views the war as a confrontation between two nations; the struggle of an oppressed people to assert its right to self-determination” (Edrisinha 1998, p.5).

Another example that illustrates the notion of two distinct and opposing nations is that of the Sri Lankan/LTTE flags. According to the Mahavamsa, prince Vijaya, who is considered to be the first ancestor of the Sinhalese people, arrived in Sri Lanka on the day the Buddha died. Supposedly prince Vijaya descended from a princess who mated with a lion, ´sinha´, hence the word ´Sinhalese´, the lion-people (Ebbesen 1990). This is symbolized in the Sri Lankan flag that depicts a lion. Later the LTTE chose the tiger as symbol of their struggle for Tamil Eelam, hence the name ´Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam´. The tiger symbolises the way LTTE cadres fight, and serves as an opposition to the lion. The tiger is also depicted in the national flag of Tamil Eelam (Swamy 2003).

8.2. The Buddhist Clergy (Sangha)

An important and influential body in mobilizing ethno-nationalistic feelings within the Sinhalese community is the ´Sangha,´ which is the Buddhist clergy. The Buddhist clergy has traditionally played an important role within several areas of Sinhalese society. The Sangha has often used the ´Mahavamsa´, which is a historical chronicle based on myths, to mobilize Sinhalese ethno-nationalism. According to the Mahavamsa there is a distinct bond between the country of Sri Lanka, Buddhism and the Sinhalese people and this, in their opinion, justify a hegemonic relationship between the Sinhala language, politics, religion, culture and economy (de Silva 2001).

Since independence Sri Lankan Buddhist leaders have been active in the political arena and asserted their influence whenever they felt it appropriate – and in particular on issues relating to the primacy of the Buddhist faith and the territorial integrity of the country. When Buddhist leaders voice concerns that the Buddhist faith is under threat, it is an extremely powerful and emotive message, which the Sinhalese population responds to (Liyanage 1998). Consequently, even though the Sangha has never had much political clout in the traditional sense (although in 2004 a political party, the JHU, led my monks was formed) they influence Sinhalese politics to a large extend as their public support is often crucial for the main parties.

8.2.1. The Trincomalee Buddha Statue

A recent and prime example of how the Buddhist clergy has asserted its influence and heightened communal tensions throughout the country is in relation to the erection of a Buddha statue in the town of Trincomalee.

On the night of May 15, 2005, the Trincomalee Three Wheel Drivers Association (TWDA) erected a big Buddha statue on a five-foot-high concrete platform behind the towns main market in the centre of Trincomalee. The statue was erected with assistance from the Sashanarakshaka Balamandalaya of Trincomalee and the Northern Eastern Sinhala Organization (Sinhalese, Buddhist organizations) (Wickremasinghe 2005, Sengupta 2006).

Trincomalee has a mixed population of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims, but is by the Tamils considered the historic (and potentially future) Capital of Tamil Eelam. Also, due to its large natural harbour and strategic location, Trincomalee has a significant importance to both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. During the resettlement schemes mentioned earlier, many Sinhalese farmers were, with the support from the government, settled in and around Trincomalee.

The illegal erection of a Buddha statue in the town centre, of what many Tamils consider the capital of their homeland, was seen as a direct act of provocation and the immediate reaction was that the Trincomalee District Tamil Peoples Forum (TPF), organised a district-wide ‘hartal’ (public strike/protest – and on a personal note, the authors of this project experienced the effect of these hartals first hand), and clashes between Tamil and Sinhalese mobs ensued. The hartal went on for four days and many more clashes took place in the following days, with several casualties being reported. For example, the man who led the protests against the statue was shot dead one morning on his way to the bank. (Wickremasinghe 2005; Sengupta 2006).

The TPF lodged a formal complaint, demanding the statue be removed but the Trincomalee magistrate merely ordered both sides to “peacefully settle” the issue (Wickremasinghe 2005) – a rather remarkable decision since there was no question that the statue had been erected without any legal permission.

The issue soon became a principal matter for both sides throughout the island. Especially two nationalistic Sinhalese parties, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), politicised the matter, and saw it as a principal issue of defending Sinhalese tradition, politics, religion and culture. On May 18, a JVP MP declared in parliament that it was indeed the Sinhala population that was being victimised and urged the government to protect the right of every religion. The party of the Sangha (JHU) was even more dramatic in their rhetoric, making two statements in parliament; that the government should destroy an alleged airstrip in LTTE-controlled territory, and demanded that the LTTE should disarm before any agreement could be made on the distribution of tsunami aid. (Wickremasinghe 2005).

Another monk drew a parallel between the removal of the newly- and illegally erected statue and the Taliban’s destruction of centuries-old stone statues in Afghanistan in 2001. Other sangha-members proclaimed that a group of monks would fast until death if some people were to remove the Buddha statue – or at least until the Government intervened and restored the status quo. (Wickremasinghe 2005, Sri Lanka News 2005).

In response to increased tensions in Trincomalee the government posted more soldiers in the area and four high-security zones were set up inside the city. Claiming that the statue was about to be attacked, a barbed wire fence was set up around it and armed soldiers were posted for protection around the clock (Wickremasinghe 2005).

To this day the statue stands in the city centre of Trincomalee and the results have been an increase in communal polarization and ethno-nationalistic tendencies. Furthermore, direct links can be drawn from the initial ‘Statue dispute’ to the deterioration of the CFA.

Following ongoing debate regarding the statue, nearly a year later, in April 2006, a bomb was exploded at the, predominantly Sinhalese-run market (where the statue had been erected) in Trincomalee. The explosion killed 16 people and prompted a Sinhalese mob to instantly torch Tamil-owned shops and hunt down Tamil civilians, further leading to Tamil gangs killing Sinhalese villagers. At the end of April, a suicide bombing in Colombo, said to have been retaliation carried out by the LTTE, prompted the first government air-strikes on rebel-held territory since the 2002 CFA had been signed (Sengupta 2006).

8.3. The Sri Lankan Media

The issue of the Trincomalee Buddha statue also provides an illustration of how the media plays a significant role in producing communal tensions. The Colombo, Sinhala media backed the communal campaign in defence of the statue, with especially the newspapers playing an important role.

On May 29, the Sinhala newspaper ´Irida Divayina´ declared that the removal of the statue would be “…the death knell of Sinhala Buddhists” (In: Wickremasinghe 2005, p. 2). In the editorial they justified Sinhala Buddhist domination of Sri Lanka on the pretext that Buddha on his deathbed had declared that Sri Lanka would protect Buddhism.

This is but one example of the seemingly unsophisticated and strongly biased media in Sri Lanka, which is evident in both communities.

Ethno-nationalistic media in Sri Lanka play a large role in promoting myths and hatred within and between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, and are thus a strong contributing factor in annihilating the two communities.

The media in Sri Lanka is strongly divided along Sinhalese/Tamil ethnic lines and it is used as an effective exponent of the positions, viewpoints and politics of the two sides respectively. Due to this explicit division of the media, the conflict has often been portrayed in an unsophisticated and polarized fashion, which influences opinions and perceptions within the two ethnic communities.

The Tamil media are generally curtailed, in that they are apprehensive as to express viewpoints that are considered by the LTTE, to be in opposition to their politics and agenda in general. The Tamil media and LTTE’s influence on it also transcends the national boundaries of Sri Lanka, as is pointed out in the following quote:

“About 80 percent of over forty Tamil newspapers in North Atlantic countries are either managed by the LTTE or its front companies (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004, p. 197).

As the above quote shows, the LTTE controls much of the Tamil media, either directly or indirectly. The LTTE has its own press and newspaper and propaganda section and furthermore, it is the first group to make use of the internet to spread its messages and propaganda their course, in order to garner support (Graeme and Gunaratna 2004).

The Sinhalese media is divided into two: the state held and the privately owned (Kandiah 2001). The private media is owned by powerful businessmen, who have personal economic interests, and seeing as it is often unwise to go against the interests of the legislators of the country in which they are doing business, it puts some restraints on the privately owned press in Sri Lanka.

A problem in relation to the state held media is that its profile is determined by which party that holds power. When there is a change in government, the media changes its profile to adapt to the politics of the government in power (Kandiah 2001). This creates a highly unsophisticated and biased media, with low credibility.

A specific problem with the state held media is the propagandised way in which it portrays the conflict and peace processes. Since the conflict plays out almost exclusively in the North and North-Eastern areas of the country, and access to conflict-zones is often denied by either the LTTE or the government, the free national/international media has no means to report on the conflict through first hand observations. Journalist must rely on the information received from either the government or the LTTE, of which the validity is highly questionable (Kandiah 2001).

Especially in the South where there is only little evidence of the ongoing conflict, the withholding of information have rigorous consequences. Because the majority of the Sinhalese population is being either misinformed, or not informed at all, they do not comprehend the actual consequences of the conflict, which in turn, in our belief, might have decreased Sinhalese opposition to a militarized solution to the conflict.

Another problem is that journalists who do express critical views of the government and its handling of the conflict, are typically labelled as traitors or LTTE sympathizers by government officials in state-owned media, which not only decreased their credibility in the eyes of the Sinhalese public but also puts them at personal risk for ‘retaliation’ by ethno-nationalistic forces. There are countless examples of intimidation, physical violence, and even murders of Sri Lankan journalist who have publicly raised opinions opposing either the government or the LTTE, or who have exposed issues of corruption or favouritism within the Sri Lankan administration. (Garyali 2007, Amnesty International 2008a, Reporters Without Borders 2008).

The media in Sri Lanka is summoned up by Armon et al. (1998, p.4) in the following quote:

“…government representatives often censor and intimidate journalists, restrictions have severely curtailed the flow of information in and out of war-affected areas while self-censorship has been widespread. The LTTE, for its part, has well-developed structures for information and propaganda which produce and distribute a regular and detailed news service and a selection of videos covering military actions, cultural history and television drama.”

9.0. Failed Peace Attempts

Since the inception of armed conflict in Sri Lanka there has been four main attempts to reach a political solution and achieve sustainable peace between the warring parties. All attempts have ultimately failed.

9.1. Indian Intervention

To ensure internal and regional security interests, and possibly to project itself as the main regional power, India became involved in the Sri Lankan conflict in the 1980s. Through its intelligence agency, RAW, it provided arms, training and monetary support to a number of Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004; Wikipedia 2008).

However, although India supported the Tamil militants it did not share their objective of a separate state as India feared it might fuel separatist tendencies in Indian states, especially in Tamil Nadu where ethnic kinship had resulted in strong support for the Sri Lankan Tamil militants. Rather, India wanted Sri Lankan Tamil grievances to be dealt with through devolution measures within a single state but believed that strong pressure on Sri Lanka’s government was necessary in order to achieve this goal. Therefore Tamil militant groups were supported to attain leverage over the Sri Lanka government during future negotiations (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004).

After discussion with Indian mediators, the Sri Lankan government, in 1984, convened an all-party conference. The conference, held to address Tamil grievances, included a range of political parties and religious organizations that ultimately failed to reach consensus on a devolution proposal (Armon et al. 1998).

9.1.1. The Thimpu Declaration.

In 1985 the Indian government convened the first peace talks in a preliminary attempt to reach a settlement between the warring parties. Thus, under strong pressure from India, the Sri Lankan government and a joint Tamil delegation met in Thimpu, Bhutan for discussions. The Tamil delegation consisted of representatives from TULF and the five main militant organizations: EPRLF, EROS, PLOT, TELO, and the LTTE (in essence a joint group characterized by intra group disagreements and resentment that soon afterwards led to armed clashes, assassinations etc.).

Despite intra-group rivalry the Tamil delegation did agree on some core principles, which any agreement or future solutions would have to be based upon in order to meet the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils (Nissan 1998; Tamil Canadian 2008):

Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation.

Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Recognition of the right to self determination of the Tamil Nation.

Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon the Island as their country.

The Sri Lankan government rejected these principles and talks broke down without any constructive discussions taking place between the parties. (Armon et. al. 1998, Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004).

Notably, the LTTE’s fight has been based on these principles ever since, with Prabhakaran referring to them as core principles for a lasting peace as late as 2007 and Prabhakaran has publicly proclaimed on several occasions that he should be ‘dubbed a traitor by his people’ if he ever renounces the quest for Eelam.’ There seems to be little room for any negotiations with the LTTE that do not address these issues to some extent.

9.1.2. The India-Sri Lanka Accord.

After the talks in Thimpu, the conflict escalated further with intense fighting in Sri Lanka’s North. The SLA launched a massive military campaign, holding Jaffna under siege and extending its economic blockade to include food, fuels and medicine. By mid-1987, India intervened by air-dropping supplies such as food and medicines to prevent what it claimed was harsh treatment and starvation of the Tamil people (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; U.S. Department of State 2007).

Following intense diplomatic activity the two countries agreed on the India-Sri Lanka Accord (or Indo-Lanka accord), which was signed on July 29, 1987 by Indian Prime Minister R. Ghandi and Sri Lanka’s President, J.R. Jayewardene. Under pressure from India (where several of the groups had bases at the time) all Tamil militant groups acceded to the accord, though none were signatures to it (Armon et al. 1998; Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004; U.S. Department of State 2007).

It is noteworthy that prior to the Indo-Lanka accord, Prabhakaran was temporarily held under house arrest in Madras and LTTE communications equipment was seized in Tamil Nadu by the Indian government in order to force LTTE compliance with the accord (Armon et al. 1998; Swamy 2004).

The 13th Amendment:

The Accord made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, including devolution of power to the provinces (through provincial councils); official status of the Tamil language and, subject to a later referendum, merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces (this referendum was never held). These changes became the 13th amendment to the constitution (U.S. Department of State 2007).

Edrisinha (1998) note that although the Sri Lankan government was clearly pressured by India into signing the accord, once signed it rammed the 13th amendment through Parliament in spite of strong opposition from both inside and outside the ruling United National Party (UNP).

While many Sinhalese objected to the accord, feeling it gave too many concessions, Tamil politicians (and later the LTTE) also rejected the amendment, demanding more substantive devolution of power (Edrisinha 1998). This might suggest that the content of the 13th amendment was actually somewhat placed in the middle of two extremes. What it clearly illustrates is the gap between the expectations of Sinhalese and Tamil ethno-nationalists and that a compromise, which would be acceptable for both parties, is immensely difficult to achieve.

Edrisinha (1998) criticizes the amendment from a Tamil perspective, claiming that practical devolution was completely undermined by the phrase that ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’ should be determined by Parliament. He argues that the main problems with the 13th amendment act were that (I) the exact division of power between the centre and the provinces was not made clear; (2) the powers of provincial councils could be controlled, reduces or abolished by the central government acting unitarily; and (3) there was no subject over which a provincial council could claim to exercise exclusive competence or jurisdiction.

Apart from the above mentioned problems, we would postulate that a main issue with the 13th amendment, from the LTTE’s and other Tamil ethno-nationalists’ point-of-view would have been that it did not address any of the core principles regarding Tamil nationalism that were put forward in the Thimpu Declaration.

Provincial council elections, under the 13th amendment, were held in November 1988. The EPRLF (heavily backed by India) become the largest party and its leader V. Perumal was sworn in as chief minister of the North East Provincial Council (NEPC). The role of the NEPC however, remained unclear. It was never granted the level of power or resources it had hoped for and Perumal accused the central government of obstructing devolution (Edrisinha 1998; Nissan 1998).

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF):

Under the India-Sri Lanka Accord, India agreed to establish order in the North and East, through the immediate deployment of a Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce cessation of hostilities and oversee the surrender of arms.

While other militant groups surrendered their arms and aligned themselves with the IPKF, the LTTE made a ceremonial hand-over of a few weapons but otherwise refused to disarm (Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004; U.S. Department of State 2007).

The LTTE soon made clear that it considered the accord a betrayal and subsequently launched attacks on not only the other militant groups, but also on Indian soldiers. In the following years the LTTE continuously fought the IPKF, using guerilla tactics and purposely provoking a frustrated IPKF to retaliate against the civilian population, which resulted in widespread resentment against the Indian forces (Nissan 1998; Swamy 2004; U.S. Department of State 2007).

As Nissan (1998, p.5) notes: “…the IPKF and its allies were soon accused of the same human rights violations that once characterized the Northeast operations of the Sri Lankan army.”

Defeating the LTTE rebels proved so difficult for the IPKF that the initial force of 5,000 Indian soldiers was steadily increased until it reached nearly 100,000 men (Swamy 2004).

LTTE / Premadesa Discussions:

While the IPKF fought the LTTE in the North, the Sri Lankan security forces were deployed to violently crush a JVP insurgence, which had risen in the South. Capitalizing on Sinhalese opposition to the India-Sri Lanka Accord and fears of Indian expansionism, the JVP had launched an intimidation campaign against supporters of the accord – and consequently numerous UNP members and other government supporters were assassinated. The SLA eventually put an end to the uprising but with a high number of casualties as a result (Nissan 1998; U.S. Department of State 2007).

In December 1988, Ranasinghe Premadesa (UNP) won the presidential election, which brought a change in the Sri Lankan policy towards Indian involvement. Premadesa was personally opposed to the accord and further wanted to end the JVP insurrection. Ghandi however, was reluctant to withdraw the IPKF. Consequently, Premadesa initiated negotiation with the LTTE who shared his aim of removing the Indian forces. The parties agreed to a ceasefire and Premadesa, apparently completely disregarding the elected NEPC, effectively promises the Tigers de facto control of the North and East until new provincial elections could be held (Armon et al. 1998).

There are also claims that these ‘peace-talks’ resulted in an almost absurd reversal of roles, with the Sri Lankan government now agreeing to provide weapons and other equipment to the LTTE for fighting the IPKF, in order to gain leverage over India in discussions on the India-Sri Lanka accord (Edrisinha 1998; Swamy 2004).

In the beginning of 1990, following Rajiv Ghandi’s defeat in Parliamentary elections, the new Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF. As the Indian forces departed, the LTTE established military control in the vacated areas and thousands of supporters of non-LTTE Tamil groups, including the EPRLF and members of the NEPC (including the provincial minister V. Perumal) fled to India (Edrisinha 1998; Nissan 1998).

Peace-talks between the government and the LTTE soon broke down, having lasted only as long as they shared the political objective of removing the IPKF. The violent conflict immediately resumed, continuing unabated throughout the 1990s, and interrupted only by a brief ceasefire, which will be discussed in the following section. Nissan (1998, p.6) summarizes the end of the India-Sri Lanka Accord in the following manner:

“With the IPKF gone, negotiations between the government and the LTTE soon broke down. In June 1990, the LTTE attacked police posts in the east, killing and capturing large number of officers. The Indo-Lanka Accord and the Indian government’s effort to resolve the conflict had both failed dismally. The Jaffna peninsula was under the control of the LTTE and ‘Eelam war II’ had begun.”

The North East Provincial Council was dissolved by the government; perhaps a rather superfluous move seeing as most members had fled and LTTE had established control of the area. However, it does illustrate that the central government had retained the power to do so and thus indicates the level of devolution, which the district councils and the 13th amendment act, had achieved.

Prabhakaran, in 1997, summarized the LTTE’s stance on the India-Sri Lanka Accord and implied their main criticisms. He argued that the accord had been forced upon the Tamil population without their input or consent and criticized it for not offering enough devolution and not addressing the Tamil national question (the core principles of the Thimpu Declaration).

“India signed an accord with the Sinhala State without the consent of the Tamils. The Indo-Lanka Accord was not signed to meet the aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. In fact, India then attempted to force an ineffectual solution on our people – a solution which did not even devolve powers to the extent of the Banda-Chelva pact signed in the 1950s. India tried to enforce that accord with the strength of more than 100,000 Indian forces, with the power of the agreement between two countries and with the assistance of treacherous Tamil paramilitary groups. However, even this ill-considered solution, which did not even address the basic national aspirations of the Tamils, was blocked by the chauvinistic Sinhala State” (Prabhakaran 2007).

Prabhakaran is obviously one-sided in his arguments and might only be raising the ‘official’ reasons why the India-Sri Lanka accord was impaired, while other underlying motives of the LTTE could also have been contributing factors.

However, from the previous examination, it is also our deduction that the Indo-Lanka accord was fundamentally flawed, as Sri Lankan Tamils were not properly included in the process. The accord was drafted by, agreed between, and signed by the Sri Lankan government and India – acting as a self-appointed representative of Sri Lankan Tamils. Believing that the agreement had secured enough devolution to satisfy, at the very lest the more moderate Tamils, it was subsequently presented to the leaders of militant groups who were given no opportunity to provide input, and were more or less, coerced into agreement. It would appear that despite knowing that Tamil militant groups, in particular the LTTE, were opposed to the accord, India found their objections insignificant, believing the groups would comply when a large peace-keeping force was deployed – obviously underestimating the determination and military capability of the LTTE.

Although the 13th amendment, had it been properly implemented, might have met the aspirations of many Tamils, we would still argue that signing a peace accord, without the participation or agreement of one of the main warring parties is unlikely to result in a sustainable solution.

9.2. Peace Strategies in the 1990s/2000

In 1991, a year after the collapse of the LTTE-Premadesa discussions, a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) was established to explore ways of achieving peace and political stability. This was at a time when war raged in the North, with the Sri Lanka Army failing to dislodge the LTTE from Jaffna and the re-enforcing of a strict embargo on products entering LTTE held areas.

The PSC, with 45 members, was the largest in the history of the Sri Lankan Parliament. It met 49 times with 253 memoranda being submitted for consideration by minority parties, individual MPs, and civic groups that formed part of the committee. No proposals were submitted by the two main parties or by the LTTE and ultimately the PSC failed to forge a credible political consensus – with all Tamil groups withdrawing after a proposal was approved that separated the provincial councils in the North and East and thus would break up the traditional Tamil territory, which had been specifically recognized in the 13th amendment under the India-Sri Lanka accord. (Armon et al. 1998; Edrisinha 1998). No political changes or developments occurred on the basis of the PSC, its discussions or proposals.

9.2.1. Political and Social Change

By the mid-1990s, political and social change in favor of peace and a negotiated settlement seamed to appear within the Sinhalese majority.

The People’s Alliance (PA), a coalition of the SLFP, centre-left and minority-based parties, won a fragile parliamentary majority in the 1994 elections after campaigning on a platform of peace and reconciliation. Following the elections, the PA, led by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (SLFP) immediately initiated preliminary peace talks with the LTTE and relaxed the embargo on the Northern province. A new Parliamentary Select Committee, now specifically focused on Constitutional Reform, (PSCCR) was established to pursue options and proposals concerning devolution of power (Armon et al. 1998; Samuel 1998).

The expectations of the budding peace process were further enhanced when Kumaratunga claimed a convincing victory in the November 1994, presidential election. Taking 62 percent of the vote, Kamaratunga won large support from all ethnic groups, including Tamils in some of the conflict affected areas. (Samuel 1998; Armon et al 1998).

Civil society peace groups renewed their activism, arranging a momentous march through the streets of Colombo and a rally where thousands of activists appealed to both the LTTE and the government to take the peace process forward. Subsequently the appeal was also taken to Jaffna by a group of Sinhalese activists – the first civic delegation to visit the peninsula since 1990 when transport links had been broken and the LTTE took control of the region (Samuel 1998).

The euphoria at the prospect of peace also spread to the Buddhist establishment, even among some who had previously opposed the India-Sri Lanka accord. A joint statement was issued in 1995 by prominent members of the Sangha and the Catholic clergy. The statement acknowledged the ethnic conflict; accepted that war was not a legitimate solution; and suggested a negotiated settlement based on devolution of power (a sentiment significantly different from the Sangha’s position in the past). The statement specified that ‘whatever the solution may be, it should not be a Sinhala solution imposed by force on the Tamil people’ (Liyanage 1998).

9.2.2. The 1994-1995 Peace Talks

Four rounds of peace talks, starting in October 1994, were held in Jaffna between various government teams and an LTTE delegation. The talks however, were supplemented, and affectively driven by letter exchange between the president and her representatives and the LTTE, including Prabhakaran personally.

The first three rounds of talks resulted in the cessation of hostilities and an easing of the embargo on Jaffna. It soon became apparent however, that the LTTE and the government had different agendas. The government had a multi-track approach, wanting to discuss confidence-building measures (lifting embargos, rehabilitation of the North, restoration of electricity replies etc.) but also simultaneously move towards an overall political solution. The LTTE however, first wanted evidence that the confidence building measures would be implemented before proceeding with further negotiations (Samuel 1998; Edrisinha 1998).

Samuel (1998, p. 1) notes that the LTTE’s position “Called for the redressing of the consequences of the war before addressing its causes.”

The fourth rounds of talks the LTTE made dependent upon the government accepting four main demands: (1) Complete lifting of the economic embargo on Jaffna, except for goods like weapons; (2) lifting of the ban on sea fishing; (3) dismantling of the Pooneryn army camp – located on the main road link between Jaffna and the mainland (Elephant Pass); and (4) the right for armed LTTE cadres to move throughout the East unimpeded (Samuel 1998).

The first two demands were partly accepted as they linked to people’s wellbeing – embargo on fuel would be lifted and fishing permitted except within a kilometer of coastal army camps. Furthermore, the government promised to review the status of the Pooneryn camp but at the same time suggested that this issues, as well as the movement of LTTE cadres should be addressed in the light of the cessation of hostilities agreement (agreement signed between the parties, which had provided for the freezing of all military positions and agreement to provide 72 hours notice before terminating the ceasefire) (Samuel 1998).

Although the government’s concessions resulted in a fourth round of talks being held, relations between the two parties had begun to deteriorate. Parts of the government doubted the LTTE’s intentions while the Tigers accused the government of not fulfilling its promises to relieve hardship in the North.

On April 18, about six months after talks had begun the LTTE rather abruptly announced their withdrawal from the peace process. The following day two gunboats of the Sri Lankan navy were attacked and destroyed by Tigers in Trincomalee (Samuel 1998; Edrisinha 1998).

There appears to be no clear explanations or conclusions as to why the negotiations broke down. According to Samuel (1998) it has been argued that the government was not serious about improving conditions for Northern civilians; that both parties used the peace period to re-arm and re-group; the LTTE leadership was unwilling to countenance a democratic process leading to a solution of the conflict; and that the government wanted merely to establish a favorable impression with the international community in order to secure economic assistance. Regardless of the reasons, however, Samuel (1998) notes that in unilaterally collapsing the peace process, the LTTE damaged its own credibility and enhanced that of the government both nationally and internationally.

9.2.3. The ‘War for Peace’ Strategy

Having failed to negotiate with the LTTE, the government embarked on what would seem to be largely a three-pronged strategy. It launched full-scale military assaults with the purpose of eliminating the LTTE’s control of the North and East. Simultaneously, to address Tamil grievances, it sought to devise an elaborate devolution package behind which the constitutional political parties could all agree. This strategy was termed ‘war for peace’ (Edrisinha 1998).

Furthermore, it adapted various measures in an attempt to alter public opinion of the conflict, seeking to make it a matter between the entire population and a terrorist group (the LTTE) rather than a conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese communities. The Tamil population was also presented as innocent victims of the war as the government sought to separate the Tamil civilians from the LTTE, both physically and in the minds of the public (Samuel 1998; Liyanage 1998).

On August 3, 1995 the PA government published its first devolution proposal. On this occasion, President Kumaratunga addressed the nation and declared that:

“The aspiration of the entire Sri Lankan populace is that the current national crisis centred around the North and East be brought to a peaceful, just and honorable settlement … The first task is a new approach predicated on unqualified acceptance of the fact that the Tamil people have genuine grievances for which solutions must be found” (in: Edrisinha 1998, p.3).

A sentiment, which seems to be in strong contrast to previous governments and their attempts to handle issues concerning the Tamil minority. The President proceeded with announcing that the government was seeking to rebuild the constitutional foundation of a plural society and in doing so Sri Lanka would become a ‘United and Sovereign Republic with a Union of Regions’ (Edrisinha 1998, Samuel 1998).

In effect the President promised a federal solution to address Tamil grievances – which would require the people’s approval of constitutional change through a referendum, as well as two-thirds parliamentary majority (Samuel 1998). The proposed changes however, were not received equally well within sections of the public and political sphere and consequently the proposal had to be revised to better appease the opposition.

“Unprecedented in their recognition of Tamil grievances and aspirations, the 1995 proposals were welcomed by many persons and groups committed to substantial devolution. They were fiercely opposed, however, by sections of the Sinhalese majority community” (Edrisinha 1998, p.3).

In January 1996 the PA submitted a revised proposal/legal draft, for discussion in the PSCCR. However, after nearly two years of deliberations the committee remained unable to reach any meaningful consensus. To move the process forward, the government again amended the draft incorporating issues raised at the select committee discussions. The draft was presented to Parliament in October 1997 and stirred heated debate among Southern politicians. However, all discussions proved largely academic as the opposition party, the UNP, soon rejected the draft – a move that assured the PA would not secure a two-thirds parliamentary backing (Samuel 1998).

The constitutional package basically stayed deadlocked in the PSCCR and in August 2000, President Kumaratunga succumbed to the pressure from Sinhala nationalist and postponed, indefinitely, the vote on the constitutional reform bill, which, if passed would have created a federal system and allowed a high degree of autonomy in the Northeastern Province (Ganguly 2004). Although it was a significantly diluted version compared to the original 1995 proposal it was never the less the most substantial devolution measure proposed to date.

9.2.4. The Battle for Peaceful co-existence.

Complimentary to the devolution proposals, which were under review, and the military campaign to eliminate the LTTE, the government also initiated a ‘battle for peace’ by launching the Sudu Nellum Movement (the White Lotus) and the Sama Thavalama project (the Caravan for Peace) (Samuel 1998).

According to Samuel (1998), the Sudu Nellum operated on two fronts, (1) offering support to the families of troops, particularly those killed or disabled, and (2) promoting the government’s proposals for a political solution through district-level seminars, discussions and workshops. Although a series of meetings and discussions were held in Jaffna in 1997 (when it had become under government control), the Sudu Nellum was generally limited to districts outside the Northeast. Hence, due to the war, the conflict-affected areas were not reached (including areas held by the government in the East), which would seem to have been the most crucial population group to reach.

The Caravan for Peace supported the Sudu Nellum initiative by taking the message of peace and co-existence to the grass-root level. Using street theatres, floats, posters and photo exhibitions it reached workers and peasants even in the remote areas, raising awareness and encouraging debate in a step to promote cross-cultural understanding and ethnic harmony. The messages conveyed were that ethnic and religious diversity was Sri Lanka’s strength and also that the Tamil people had legitimate historical grievances, which had to be resolved (Samuel 1998).

The promoting of peace also included a large convention, organized in Colombo by the National Peace Council in 1998, where 1,700 people from all districts and ethnicities participated in renouncing the war and calling for a ‘just and honorable peace’. Goodwill messages were received at the convention from both the President and the UNP leader Wicremesinghe as well as from Prabhakaran (Armon et al. 1998).

9.2.5. Main War Developments.

While devolution proposals were being prepared and peace-building initiatives undertaken in the general population, the war-part of the strategy was executed mainly in Sri Lanka’s North, with intense battles and offensives taking place. Periodically, however, the violence was brought to the South by LTTE bombings and suicide attacks.

Some of the main war/violent events in the 1990s were: The SLA recaptured Jaffna in late 1995 after two major offensives and five months of intense fighting; the LTTE attacked an army camp in Mullaitivu district, killing 1,200 soldiers; LTTE bombed high-profile targets in Colombo, including the Central Bank, the commercial centre and an oil refinery; the SLA launched a major offensive to recapture Elephant Pass, ultimately failing and military casualties on both sides reached an all time high. Both sides committed serious human rights violation and civilian casualties and ‘disappearance’ reached unprecedented levels. In 1999 President Kumaratunga was wounded in a suicide attack, she lost an eye but recovered in time to win her second term as president (Armon et al. 1998; Samuel 1998; Wikipedia 2008).

Among the many military battles and large-scale LTTE attacks on economic, political and even some civilian targets, the most significant in terms of illustrating altered political and communal opinions/strategies was arguably the attack on the Dalada Maligawa – the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, 1998.

The temple, believed to hold a tooth relic from the Buddha, has enormous religious significance and is at the heart of Sinhala Buddhist identity. When an LTTE suicide bomber targeted the temple, causing considerable damage and killing 13 people, the Sinhalese Buddhists were appalled and peace activist in the South were disconcerted as the attack seemed to target not the Sri Lankan state, but the Sinhalese people (Liyanage 1998).

Liyanage (1998) claims, however, that while the attack caused deep outrage, there was almost no violent reaction from the Sinhalese, apart from a small mob attacking a Hindu temple in Kandy, which was quickly dispersed on the orders of government ministers. This reflected a remarkable transformation within the Sinhalese communal (and political) attitudes and it would appear that the government’s ‘anti-terrorist’ agenda was having positive effects in keeping the war between the government and the LTTE and not between the Sinhalese and Tamil populations at large.

The bombing, rather than dividing the populations, raised Sinhalese support of the ‘war for peace’ strategy, with the public continuing to voice their concerns for the Tamil aspirations in general while asserting that the LTTE had to be completely defeated through military means. In the wake of the temple bombing, the government officially banned the LTTE as a terror organization and increased its efforts to persuade foreign governments to do the same. Public demonstrations to this effect also took place (Liyanage 1998).

It would appear however, that the non-violent and accommodating dimensions which blossomed in the mid-1990s within the Buddhist establishment has since evaporated somewhat as is exemplified by the Trincomalee Buddha Statue incident discussed previously and by the establishment of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) / the National Heritage Party in 1994. The JHU is led by ethno-nationalistic monks and advocates the maintaining of Sri Lanka’s unitary constitution with meager devolution of powers and the military extinguishment of the LTTE as a solution to the conflict (Aljazeera production 2007; Wikipedia 2008d).

9.3. The 2002 Ceasefire Agreement

In 2001, a UNP government, led by Ranil Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister, replaced the People’s Alliance, while C. Kumaratunga (SLFP) remained President. Wickremesinghe was in favor of a political, federal solution to the conflict and had indicated willingness to negotiate with the Tigers – as opposed to the SLFP, which had maintained the ‘War for Peace’ strategy since their 1995 negotiations had failed.

In February 2002, the government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement, with Norway acting as peace facilitator. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established to oversee the ceasefire, report on violations and act as a means of communication.

Numerous explanations exist as to why this peace-process/CFA was initiated and established.

Graeme and Gunaratna (2004) argue that a key factor was a long military stalemate caused by the success of the LTTE’s tactics and the ineffectiveness of the Sri Lankan counter-efforts. For example, in 2001 an LTTE suicide attack on the international airport in Colombo destroyed half the Sri Lanka Airlines fleet, damaging tourism, while the LTTE had also won some large military battles in the North, including the fight over Elephant Pass (Ganguly 2004).

Kelegama (2005) postulate that the ceasefire was agreed because the Sri Lankan economy was in trouble, having recorded a negative growth rate in 2001 (-1.4%) as the only country in South Asia (and for the first time since independence). Given the burden of the defence budget (5-6% of GDP) and diminishing opportunities for short-term revenue generation, the new government concluded that peace with the LTTE was the best way to revive the economy and to attract foreign direct investment (and development aid). Meanwhile the LTTE was faced with dwindling cadre recruitment and general war weariness. Furthermore, they were sensitive to the hardening global attitudes resulting from the US-led ‘War on Terror’ (Kelegama 2005).

In essence, very similar reasons, to those postulated in connection to the 1995 ceasefire.

Ganguly (2004), further adds that the LTTE was worried about facing an improved Sri Lankan military in the future as there were signs that in the post 9/11 environment the Sri Lanka government was actively pursuing supplies and training from India, the UK and the US, ostensibly to contribute to the global war on terrorism that it had joined.

Renner and Chafe (2007, p.2.) agree with the previously mentioned sentiments, that the 2002 CFA was “arguably driven more by a military stalemate and pressures of a severe economic crisis than by readiness for a true political compromise.”

Academics are clearly, and perhaps rightfully, skeptical about the genuine motives behind the CFA. The sentiments publicly expressed by the LTTE however, were those of sincerity.

In April 2002, Prabhakaran emerged from the Sri Lankan jungle to convene a press conference in the northern town of Kilinochchi (his first in over a decade). At the conference he indicated, for the first time since LTTE’s inception, their willingness to settle for less than a fully independent Tamil Eelam. Prabhakaran however, pointed out that the ‘right conditions had not arisen for the LTTE to abandon the policy of an independent statehood’ and that for any solution to be acceptable it had to incorporate the three fundamentals of Tamil homeland, Tamil nationality and Tamil right to self-determination (the core principles of the Thimpu Declaration). He claimed that if a political solution was put forward, which recognized those fundamentals and the framework was satisfactory for the Tamil people then the LTTE would consider giving up the demand for Eelam (Ganguly 2004).

This development, of the LTTE being willing to compromise, seems to have presented for the first time an actual chance (at least theoretically) of reaching a political settlement which could satisfy the LTTE, without fully dividing Sri Lanka, and thus put an end to the war.

9.3.1. Initial Peace Negotiations

After signing the CFA the government and the LTTE initially had five rounds of unconditional peace talks, without either party having to decommission weapons. Kelegama (2005) argues that the government’s aim was to negotiate a political solution after the initial phase of confidence building measures and reconstruction of conflict-affected areas had taken place and once an economic dividend was evident in the Northeast.

In connection with the peace talks, the government lifted its ban on the LTTE and yet again (as in 1995) the embargo on the North was suspended as a measure of goodwill. The main road linking the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland was also opened for the first time in 12 years (BBC News 2008b).

It appears that, as in the 1995 negotiations, focus was kept predominantly on addressing the consequences of the war rather than addressing its underlying causes.

In 2003, the Tigers suspended the peace talks, apparently due to a dispute over the high security zones in Jaffna, which the government refused to remove – very similar to the 1995 dispute over the Pooneryn army camp, which, allegedly caused the LTTE to end the ceasefire. This time however, the CFA largely held, possibly due to extensive diplomatic efforts by the Norwegian mediators (Ganguly 2004).

9.3.2. Key Developments during the CFA

Apart from the political changes, described in a coming section) some of the main developments, which are likely to have affected the 2002 CFA and the peace-negotiations will be briefly summarized below.

Tsunami Aid and Reconstruction:

In December 2004 the Asian Tsunami killed nearly 35,000 people and ruined housing, infrastructure, etc. along most of Sri Lanka’s coastline. In particular, the Northern and Eastern districts were badly affected, including the areas held by the LTTE.

Control over aid distribution soon became an intensely political issue. By June, the government and the LTTE, prompted by the international donors, had agreed to the Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS), an aid sharing agreement. However, Sri Lanka’s supreme court soon suspended the agreement, ruling that some provisions were unconstitutional and following Rajapaxe’s win at the presidential elections (discussed below), the P-TOMS was effectively abandoned (Renner and Chafe 2007).

Furthermore, the reconstruction efforts became controversial and a source of ethnic dispute and grievances due to large regional differences both in aid-expenditure and speed of delivery. Renner and Chafe (2007) note that, as of March 2007, the southern districts of Galle, Matara, Kalutara and Hambantota were slightly exceeding reconstruction targets (these districts are almost exclusively Sinhalese and are the presidents’ main constituency) while the conflict-affected areas lacked behind. In the Eastern Province (which has a mixed population group) 41 percent of reconstruction was yet to be completed while 72 percent remained in the North. On the issue of expenditure, Renner and Chafe claim that:

“The government’s own data show that as of December 2006, the eastern Ampara District had sustained 24 percent of all housing damage but received only 14 percent of reconstruction funds. Such discrepancies can quickly fuel ethnically charged allegations of favoritism and neglect” (2007, p.4.).

Divide in the LTTE:

In 1994 the dynamics in the East also shifted when the LTTE’s Eastern commander, ‘Colonel Karuna’ defected, leading a runaway fraction - the first known internal split in the LTTE. Though an LTTE offensive quickly regained control of the East, the Karuna group continued to challenge the LTTE in a shadow war, allegedly with the support of the Rajapakse government, though both sides have denied such allegations (SLMM 2006; Renner and Chafe 2007; BBC News 2008b).

International Bans on the LTTE:

In 2006 both Canada and the European Union, where large proportions of the Tamil diaspora live, banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Consequently, if an LTTE motive for entering into peace talks and a ceasefire agreement was to enhance its image internationally, gain recognition for its cause – or to prevent further terror branding this objective was effectively blocked.

De-merger of the North-Eastern District:

In late 2006, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court declared the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be illegal (DeSilva 2007). This merger had been an integral part of the concessions given to Tamils under the India-Sri Lanka Accord but the impending referendum on the issue had never been held. The de-merger of the northeast was a major knock to the LTTE – and even to moderate ethno-nationalistic Tamils who saw their traditional homeland as being broken up (as mentioned previously all Tamil groups left the 1991 PSC when the issue was discussed). The merger had strong political ramifications as Tamils would not longer have majority in the East where the population had become increasingly ethnic-diverse, partly due to the Sinhalese re-settlement schemes and thus depended on the strong concentration of Tamils in the North to gain an overall majority in political matters.

Tamil Expulsion from Colombo:

In June 2007, the Sri Lankan police forced hundreds of Tamils to leave the capital of Colombo. People were put on buses and driven out of the Western Province. The government cited security concerns, but a high-court order soon ordered an end to the expulsions, finding them unconstitutional (BBC News 2008b). There must be little doubt that this incidence caused grievances nationwide within the Tamil communities and probably had a negative effect on their national feelings in terms of being equal citizens in Sri Lanka.

9.3.3. Main Political Changes

President Kumaratunga in 2003, became so frustrated by, what she perceived as appeasement of the LTTE by the Wickremesinghe government (there were discussions of establishing an interim government in the Northeast) that she declared a state of emergency under which she suspended the parliament and took control of the ministries of Defence, Interior and Media from the government. Subsequently, in early 2004, Kumaratunga dissolved parliament, held new elections and an SLFP-JVP alliance – the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) formed government. The UPFA were more critical of the LTTE and took a harder stance in the peace negotiations than Wickremesinghe’s UNF government (Gunguly 2004; Kelegama 2005).

In late 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP), perceived hard-liner with his main allies being the JVP and the JHU, won the presidential election, narrowly beating Wickremesinghe who had been instrumental in establishing the 2002 CFA and promised a federal solution to the Tamils (DeSilva 2007; U.S. Department of State 2008). The most noteworthy part about this election is that Rajapakse’s victory was largely secured by a last minute election boycott ordered by the LTTE in the North (U.S. Department of State 2008).

As to why the LTTE preferred the tough stance of Rahapakse can only be speculated upon. Some analysts claim that the LTTE spent the time during the CFA to re-group and re-arm (Gunaratna 2003; Ganguly 2004). According to Ganguly (2004) the LTTE’s recruitment increased heavily and its cadre strength reportedly shot up from 6,000 to

16, 000 during the peace talks. Hence, perhaps the LTTE was simply ready for war to commence again, having never had any real intentions of a political solution, or having concluded that an acceptable federal solution was no longer likely due to the many political changes that had taken place. Thus, they may have wanted a President who was more likely to suspend the peace talks - the LTTE being unwilling to do so, considering the national and international condemnation it resulted in when they left the 1995 discussions.

In 2005, Rajapakse launched an all party, consultative process with the aim of reaching a broad consensus for a devolution strategy (IRNA 2005). As with all previous all-party-talks and parliamentary select committees in the past, the parties ultimately failed to reach any form of agreement, with the JVP and the JHU refusing any solutions not based on a unitary Sri Lankan state (DeSilve 2007). However, in order to eliminate his dependence on the JVP and JHU, Rajapakse aligned himself more with the main oppositional party and in October 2006 the UNP and the SLFP signed an Memorandum of Understanding to work together on major issues concerning the nations welfare, including conflict resolution (Reliefweb 2006; DeSilva 2007). Although no final agreements have actually been reached, one must consider the sentiment an unprecedented political development considering the past rivalry between the parties.

9.3.4. Abrogation of the CFA

In February 2006, four years after signing the CFA, a year after their last talks and in the midst of increasingly frequent violations of the ceasefire the LTTE and the government met for talks in Geneva. Both parties committed themselves to respect and uphold the CFA, the LTTE promised to refrain from violence against the security forces and police, while the government agreed to disarm the Karuna group (SLMM 2006; DeSilva 2007).

None of the promises were fulfilled as violence continued to escalate. The government re-invoked the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the LTTE resorted to suicide bombing of military targets and personnel in Colombo and territorial fighting commenced in the East. With the aid of the Karuna group, the SLA continued to gain ground and by mid 2007 the LTTE had been largely driven out of the Eastern District (Ganguly 2004; BBC 2008b).

With the victories in the East, the government believed they had the upper hand militarily and subsequently political and military figures publicly vowed, despite the peace process and CFA, which was technically still in place, that they would exterminate the LTTE in 2008.

It is clear that since signing the CFA in February 2002 till the end of 2007, both the political and the ground situation had changed considerably. The LTTE had lost control of the East, was facing a hard-line President/government as opposed to Wickremesinghe’s UNP government that had promised large concessions. The de-merger of the Northeastern District, coupled with the loss of territory also meant that the LTTE’s bargaining power in relation to the East had been considerably reduced.

Neither did the situation look good for the Tamil population in general, with many suffering constant air-bombardments, unequal access to tsunami reconstruction support, division of their (perceived) traditional homeland, and mass expelling from the Capital. There is little doubt that the recent developments in 2006 – 2008 will have caused new grievances in Tamil communities and possibly increased support for the LTTE.

In January 2008, the government officially announced its withdrawal from the 2002 CFA. Two weeks later, amongst international- and donor protests, the agreement expired, the SLMM soon left the country and thus, Sri Lanka has returned to the “war for peace” strategy that failed in the 1990s. So far however, the current version, appears to focus predominantly on war, rather than on the quest to find a long-term solution to Tamil aspirations of increased autonomy. Although the two main political parties in 2006 agreed to work together on key issues, including the conflict, no devolution proposals have yet been publicly presented or any new political initiatives taken to truly address Tamil grievances – and as Renner and Chafe conclude:

“The government portrays its renewed military campaign as one of self-defense against terrorists, denying the need to address underlying grievances. Those skeptical of such claims and worried about the corrosive consequences for democracy are denounced as LTTE sympathizers” (Renner and Chafe 2007, p 3).

10.0 Analysis of Underlying Conflict Causes

In this chapter we will apply different theoretical concepts to the Sri Lankan context in order to access whether the conflict is mostly based on narratives of greed or narratives of grievance. The purpose is to try and establish what have been the main reasons behind the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In order to disclose these underlying causes, we will draw on the theories presented in the theoretical chapter, and compare it to the empirical evidence presented in the empirical analysis.

The first part of the analysis will mostly be focused on the underlying causes of the conflict, as to answer the first of our research questions; “What are the underlying causes of the Sri Lankan conflict?” This part will mostly be drawing on the theories on greed and grievance, presented by Paul Collier and Robert Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff respectively, but other researchers will also be included.

The second part will focus mainly on addressing our second research question; “Why, despite numerous peace attempts and the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement has no lasting peace been achieved in Sri Lanka?” In this section we will mainly be drawing on emancipatory theory, in order to access what measures have been taken in the past.

10.1. Greed as Underlying Conflict Causes

Overall Paul Collier’s survey is a comparative study into the reasons behind violent conflict. In order to capture the notion of an economic agenda he uses the following proxy indicators: Share of primary commodity exports in gross domestic product (GDP); the proportion of young men in the society; and the endowment of education. To capture the rebel narratives of grievance he uses four proxy indicators: Ethnic or religious hatred; economic inequality; lack of political rights; and government economic incompetence.

His general conclusion based on his study is that:

“The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed (Collier 2000, p. 101). He goes on to say:

“The results overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievance” (Collier 2000, p. 96).

Through our empirical research we have not been able to identify evidence in support of Collier’s findings, in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict. Indeed finance is necessary to perpetuate war, this is true for both parties to the conflict. However, we have found nothing to suggest that greed was a strong factor in instigating the conflict, nor have we found it to be a strong factor in perpetuating it.

10.1.1. Proxies of an Economic Agenda

The LTTE is primarily financed through taxes on the local community and support from the Tamil diaspora. The means to collect these taxes are sometimes questionable, but in large it seems that most Tamils pay their taxes, and give their financial support voluntarily. There are exceptions, especially the Sinhalese living within LTTE held areas are for the most part reluctant to pay taxes, and thus threat and violence are sometimes used as a means to collect. In addition it is hard to access on what grounds the Tamil diaspora, gives their financial support, and to what extend, the donations are voluntary or as a consequence of threats and harassment.

However, the LTTE held areas are perceived by the LTTE as part of a separate state, Tamil Eelam, and is driven accordingly. The government of Sri Lanka is not financing public administration in LTTE held areas, and thus, public administration is run and financed by the LTTE. For this purpose they collect taxes. In relation to the predatory taxation on primary commodity exports, this does seem to be evident, in the sense that LTTE taxes commodities, which are transported into, from, and through areas under their control. In a sense this can be defined as predatory taxation, however, in our opinion, it would be over-simplistic to accept the term “predatory” as it is defined by Collier. Predatory taxation, as defined by Collier, rests on a narrative of greed. However, there is nothing in our empirical findings that suggest that the money extracted by the LTTE is being spent on anything other than what is necessary to continue their struggle for Eelam, and on public expenditures. On the contrary, the LTTE have very firm and clear rules of conduct on this area, and any failure to oblige to these rules are severely punished. We have only encountered two incidences of individuals, using the LTTE in pursued of personal financial gains and in both cases it has been clear that such conduct is considered intolerable within the organization. As mentioned earlier there was an incidence with a cadre who was accused of taking money from the LTTE and putting them in his own pocket, and he was sentenced to death by LTTE leader Prabhakaran. His life was spared because other LTTE cadres pleaded Prabhakaran to do so, but he was expelled from the organization. The other example, and on a granter scale, is that of Coruna. In both cases it seems to us, that this form of behaviour is clearly considered unacceptable, and is certainly not a pillar in the organizational structure of the LTTE.

In terms of the number of young men fit for the army and endowment of education, we have not been able to; locate demographic statistical data on the Sri Lankan Tamil population. Thus the number of young men in the age-group 15-24, which is the age- group Collier uses, is unknown to us. However, in regards to educational endowment, on which Collier emphasis more importance, it is clear from previous empirical findings that especially young men from conflict afflicted areas lack behind in terms of education. For this there are different reasons, the most significant being, to our belief, the societal structure of the rural Tamil areas; the young men are needed in the fields. The educational policies of the 1970s should also be considered in this respect. Although they did not specifically influence young men more than young women, they still limited access to education which in term has had an impact on the number of years of education received to young men. According to Collier’s findings, this significantly increases the risk of conflict.

10.1.2. Avoiding Greed Based Conflicts and Their Perpetuation

Based on his findings Collier suggests measures for reducing the risk of greed based conflicts occurring and to curtail their perpetuation. The following section will examine whether any of these measures have been applied in Sri Lanka.

One of the problems in conflict resolution, according to Collier, is actors who gain from conflict and thus have incentive to perpetuate it. These actors must be addressed in order to reach a settlement. Collier identifies four groups who have incentive to perpetuate conflict; rebels who gain through predatory taxation, traders who have widened margins on their goods, criminals who do well through theft and opportunistic businessmen who do well at the expense of honest businessmen.

As a measure to address these actors Collier notes that it is necessary to limit their financial gains from conflict, as to remove their incentive to perpetuate it. A measure for this is to prevent illegitimate products from gaining access to international markets via illegitimate business channels.

As we have established that the LTTE is primarily financed through taxation within the areas under their control, this measure does not seem effective in terms of limiting their economic capacity. We would argue that in the case of Sri Lanka opposite measures must be taken. It has been a matter of preventing legitimate products from gaining access to illegitimate markets, which in this case, being the LTTE held areas. It seems to us that the measures necessary are quite the opposite from those suggested by Collier (Collier 2000, p. 106):

“In most markets, however, the task may be to prevent illegitimate supplies from gaining access to legitimate channels”.

We do not suggest that this is not true in most markets, but through our research we have not found empirical evidence to support, that this is true in Sri Lanka.

To address the issue of preventing products and funds from coming into LTTE held areas, the government has imposed strict embargoes on supplies. Furthermore, they asserted pressure to have the LTTE banned a terrorist organization in order to prevent them from gaining funds legally through the Tamil diaspora. The banning of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, made it illegal to support them financially.

Another important issue suggested by Collier to address those actors who gain from conflict, is through the diversification of the economy. A measure for this is through development assistance. The impact of development assistance depends on the country’s absorptive capacity for receiving aid. Sri Lanka does seem to have a high absorptive capacity for aid, and aid has been given to Sri Lanka in the past, however, due to its unequal distribution, it did not have the intended effect. Rather than reducing poverty and thus decreasing resentment between the two communities, it further increased resentment; on account of the uneven way it was distributed. We have already established that the Sri Lankan economy is not to a large extent based on primary commodity exports; rather the economy is based on the free market. Collier’s findings suggest that a country with a rapid decline of its GDP has a much higher risk of conflict. An interesting observation in this respect is that in 2001, the year prior to the signing of the cease-fire agreement was in fact the only year since independence where Sri Lanka experienced a decline in its GDP. And in general Sri Lanka’s conflict does not seem to be linked to declining GDP-rates as the country in general, has experienced fairly healthy growth in spite of the conflict, although it has evidently fallen below its potential due to the conflict.

Collier argues that in a country with a high absorptive capacity for aid, development assistance can be beneficial both for diversifying the economy and for reducing poverty and increasing growth rates (which might be a preventative measure for decreasing the risk of greed-motivated conflicts). The absorptive capacity depends on the economic policies of the government. If a country has adapted economic policies favourable to growth then development assistance can have an important impact. Furthermore, Collier claims that a competitive market is essential for preventing opportunistic businessmen from benefiting from lucrative, monopolistic trading opportunities which conflict tends to create.

Seeing as Sri Lanka has adapted highly liberal economic policies since the 1970s – and has the most open economy in South-east Asia, it appears that these issues have been addressed. Consequently, Sri Lanka should have a high absorptive capacity for aid and yet, generous international donor assistance did not prevent the Sri Lankan conflict from re-erupting in 2008. These facts might suggest that the conflict does not rest on economic agendas.

Collier mentions another problem in conflict resolution, which he terms the time-consistency problem. We find this problem to be of significant importance in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict. Collier mentions international mediation and facilitation as a means to address this issue of lack of trust between opposing sides to a conflict. This has been tried in Sri Lanka on more than one occasion, first with India, and recently with Norway as facilitator, but to no prevail. However we do feel that this yet again would be necessary for any future peace-settlement to be achieved. This will be discussed more in the following section on grievances as underlying conflict causes.

Collier also conclude, based on his statistical findings, that fully democratic societies are the least prone for conflict, whereas countries that are in a transition period between autocracy and full-democracy are the most prone for conflict. Despite its deficiencies Sri Lanka does have full-democracy, but despite of this conflict did erupt. Based on his findings in terms of conflict-causes, Collier concludes that conflicts based on economic agendas, by far outnumbers those conflicts that are based on narratives of grievance. This is reflected in the measures he suggests to resolve ongoing conflict and keep those that have ended from re-erupting. In regard to democracy, it is notable that Sri Lanka does have democracy and yet conflict did erupt. On this issue it might suggest that the conflict does not rest on economic agendas.

Collier mentions the importance of information as means to address those actors who gain from conflict, and thus have incentive to perpetuate it. According to Collier, conflict increases opportunism; this is partly due to lack of transparency, which again is a consequence of lack of information. Improved information would, according to Collier, reduce opportunism, and hence curtail the activities of those actors with economic agendas.

In Sri Lanka lack of information is evident, which we have described in a previous chapter. This is true on both sides to the conflict; however, the government seems to be the most active party in keeping the free international press out of the conflict afflicted areas in the North. That lack of information in terms of an unbiased media and access for the free press has possibly had a prolonging effect on the conflict has been addressed earlier. However, in this respect, it seems to us that, although the use of a highly biased media is evident on both sides to the conflict, it is the government that is most actively keeping out the international press, which might suggest that they also wish to conceal certain aspects of the conflict in these areas. We will abstain from any further elaboration in this respect, as we wish to refrain ourselves from speculating. Nonetheless, in our opinion, it is fair to expect a higher standard of conduct on this area, from the government representing a democratic state, than that of the, to use their own rhetoric, terrorist organization they are fighting.

Some of Collier’s greed proxies and arguments concerning economic incentives for starting and perpetuating conflict appear to fit into the Sri Lankan context. For example, there is a regional difference in the level of education achieved by young men in the North-eastern districts, and the Tamil militant groups initially attracted high levels of uneducated young men or students denied access to higher education due to the educational policies in the 1970s. Economic incentives may have played a part in them joining the militant groups; however, it is also likely that grievances caused by these policies may have played a part in creating grievances which may also have influenced their decision to join the LTTE or other militant groups.

Overall, Collier’s proxies for greed and his findings do not appear to accurately explain the Sri Lankan conflict. The LTTE is not dependent upon, or funded to any great extent, through primary commodities. Neither was the war initiated, nor perpetuated during times of economic decline. Furthermore, measures which should theoretically decrease the risk of greed based conflicts erupting or continuing, are in place or have been attempted in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has full democracy, a liberal economy and receives generous amounts of development assistance. In spite of these factors even international mediation has failed to achieve sustainable peace, which might suggest that the underlying causes, rests on more than economic incentives.

10.2. Grievances as Underlying Conflict Causes

In the following section we will analyze grievance related motives for conflict as they have been explained by the various conflict researchers discussed in the theoretical chapter.

10.2.1 Collier’s Grievance Proxies

Collier uses four proxies to capture the notion of grievance as underlying causes of violent conflict; ethnic or religious hatred, economic inequality, lack of political rights, and government economic incompetence.

In relation to ethnic or religious hatred, it is evident that this has increased in Sri Lanka, from the time of independence and until the initiation of the conflict. Through our empirical analysis we have examined factors that has created communal polarization and spurred ethno-nationalism, and how both sides to the conflict has played into, and continuously perpetuated and exploited these tendencies. Economic inequality in terms of land ownership further seems to have caused grievances and consequently led to violent clashes between the two communities. This has been especially evident in relation to the governments’ resettlement schemes, which were described in the empirical analysis, as the Tamils felt that the Sinhalese were occupying their land, with help from the government. In the empirical analysis we have described how, on several occasions, the government has failed to adhere to political agreements with the Tamils, and how this ultimately led to the call for a separate state, versus the call for federalism which was initially the political aim of the Tamils. In terms of government economic incompetence, the case of Sri Lanka has ambiguous characteristics. Generally Sri Lanka has experienced an increase in its GDP in the years leading up to the conflict, and even during the conflict this increase has continued, although as mentioned earlier, it has fallen well below its potential. However, as we have previously pointed out, the problem is in the distribution of the wealth generated. The North and North-eastern districts have fallen behind the rest of the country, due to the conflict, which has caused resentment within the population of these districts. In this sense it is not economic incompetence on behalf of the government, as much as a conscious priority decision. However, government economic policies does seem to have caused polarization, created Tamil grievances, and as such seem to have a role in explaining the conflict.

Overall it would appear that Collier’s grievance proxies fit the Sri Lankan conflict more accurate than his greed proxies discussed in the previous chapter.

Grievance related causes of conflict will be described in more debt in the following section.

10.2.2. Propositions Indicating Grievances as Causes of Conflict

Underlying grievance causes will be analyzed in relation to Gurr and Harff’s approach, which is a fusion of the primordial and the instrumental approach. Gurr and Harff believe that the two approaches are not mutually contradictory, but that ethnic groups mobilize when there is both a strong sense of ethnic group identity and imposed disadvantages, which the empirical chapters suggest is the case in Sri Lanka. Gurr and Harff notes that when trying to explain ethnic mobilization and conflict, a common argument is that when peoples of different ethnic groups compete for the same scarce resources and positions, their ethnic identities becomes more important to them. Then if some groups do better than others, this will increase inequalities and hence increase the risk of ethnic mobilization and conflict. In the following section it will be analyzed, whether this also seems to have been the case with the Sri Lankan conflict. The analysis will be undertaken according to the seven concepts Gurr and Harff believe are contributing factors, to ethnic mobilization and conflict. The first two concepts, discrimination, and group identity, are aimed at explaining why groups mobilize and the last five; ethnopolitical leadership and group cohesion, political environment, use of violence by governments, external support, and international economic status, are aimed at explaining “What triggers political action and turns action into open conflict with the government and other groups? And what kinds of action or types of violence are most likely to occur (Gurr/Harff 1994, p.84)?”

Discrimination:

In reaction to discriminatory treatment people will, according to Gurr and Harff, act in either of three ways; constructively, destructively or apathetic. In Sri Lanka we can identify all three types of reaction. As described in our empirical analysis, it was not until 1976 with the formation of TULF and the Vaddukoddai Resolution, that Tamils first voiced their calling for a separate state. In 1983 the TULF forfeited their seats in parliament as a direct result of the new government imposed constitutional amendment, banning advocacy of secessionism, which was a turning point in the nature of Sri Lankan politics. Until this point the Tamils had been calling for a decentralized government or a federal state. In relation to Gurr and Harff’s theory, we believe this type of reaction must be considered as constructive.

As a reaction to the governments’ educational policies during the 1970s many well-educated Tamils migrated to either southern parts of Sri Lanka or to countries primarily in the West, which according to Gurr and Harff represents an apathetic reaction to discrimination. This type of apathetic reaction was also seen after the 1983 riots as hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled the country.

However, the 1983 riots also provoked another and more destructive form of reaction. In our opinion the significant increase in recruitment and public support to the LTTE and other militant groups, which occurred in reaction to the 1983 riots, signifies the beginning of a more destructive pattern of reactions on behalf of the Tamil community. This correlates well with Gurr and Harff’s argument that there is a correlation between the type of reaction people choose and the extend of their grievances, as there seem to be a direct connection to the increase in recruitment to the LTTE, and the 1983 riots which was the most violent incidence directed towards the Tamil community that has taken place in Sri Lanka until today.

Based on our empirical analysis, we conclude that there seems to be a distinct correlation between the extend of discrimination asserted by the government on the Tamil community, and the measures they have taken in reaction to this discrimination. This supports Gurr and Harff’s concept of discrimination and their related proposition and hypotheses, and thus seem to serve as a valid contribution as to explain why the Sri Lankan Tamils mobilized.

Group Identity:

Gurr and Harff propose that individuals are not as likely to challenge institutions as are groups. Therefore the risk of conflict increases when individuals join groups of people with shared grievances, and the risk further increases depending on how strongly a person identifies with an ethnic group that is subjected to discrimination. They hypothesize that a groups identity depends on more than shared grievances, including; religion, language, history, culture and place of residence. These are all factors, which we have been able to identify in our empirical analysis. The Sri Lankan Tamils comprises of a group of people with; shared grievances, religion, language, history, culture and place of residence.

According to Gurr and Harff’s definition of what constitutes a strong group identity, the Sri Lankan Tamils share all the necessary traits, typical of a group with a strong identity. A group of people with strong cohesion and many common traits is according to Gurr and Harff, more likely to react against discrimination than people who do not identify as strongly with a group. To us it seems, based on our empirical research, that LTTE leader Prabhakaran is fully aware of this, as he devotes much of his energy in trying to promote a sense of shared grievances. In his Heroes Day speeches he emphasizes these grievances, and points at many of the common traits shared within the Tamil community, as to strengthen group identity. This is also very evident in the Sinhalese community, as described in our empirical chapters, clearly signified in the rhetoric of especially the Buddhist clergy. On both sides to the conflict, it has been a very high priority to strengthen group identity, by pointing at common traits within the two communities respectively, and the differences between them.

Overall, we suggest, based on our empirical analysis, that the mobilization of the Sri Lankan Tamils show strong support of Gurr and Harff’s theory, in relation to both of their concepts relating to mobilization; discrimination as well as group identity.

Ethnopolitical Leadership and Group Cohesion:

According to Gurr and Harff it is likely that collective actions are determined by the political context in which an ethnic group is situated. To examine these presumptions they look at group cohesion, ethnopolitical leadership, political environment, severity of force used by governments, and outside encouragement. In relation to group cohesion they presume that a determinant factor in the occurrence of ethnopolitical conflict is the level of cohesion within the challenging ethnic group and the strength and unity of its leadership.

Strong group cohesion is according to Gurr and Harff, dependent on strong networks of communication and interaction between leaders and followers. In terms of communication we have described in our empirical analysis, how the LTTE has a huge control over the Tamil media, and how they use this power to their advantage. Furthermore we have explained how the use of symbols and ethno-nationalistic rhetoric has been used on both sides, in order to strengthen group identity, in the form of ceremonial days, flags, history, culture etc. Based on this we believe that there are justifiable evidence as to suggest, that there is a highly developed network of communication within the LTTE, both between its leader, its cadres, and the Tamil community at large. As such Gurr and Harff’s premise in relation to the level of communication seem to apply to the LTTE. In relation to Gurr and Harff hypothesis on strong leadership, this does evidently also seem to be the case within the LTTE. In Gurr and Harff optic, a strong leader is defined as someone who is able to create a climate within the group where people are willing to subordinate personal preferences to group preferences. As it is explained in our empirical chapter the LTTE is almost synonymous with its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. He formed the LTTE and has been its undisputed leader for the full 36 years of existence, and as described earlier, is almost considered a God within the organization. In terms of subordinating personal preferences to group preferences, this is an area which is considered very important in the organizational structure of the LTTE. Among other things, LTTE cadres are not allowed to get married; they do not have other personal possessions than what they are given by the LTTE, and they are all expected to swallow cyanide capsules they wear around their neck, in the circumstance that they are captured by the enemy. This strongly suggests that Prabhakaran has been able to create a climate within the organization, where people put the common welfare of the organization over individual preferences.

Within such groups, according to Gurr and Harff, the risk of violent action is much higher than in less cohesive groups. The reason for this is, that in autocratically lead groups leaders are less likely to be challenged in their decisions, than in democratic groups, as they tend to be less cohesive.

In relation to Gurr and Harff’s concept of ethnopolitical leadership and group cohesion, as triggers of violent conflict, we suggest, based on our empirical data that the circumstances relating to the LTTE, seem to support their theory.

Political Environment:

Gurr and Harff define political environment as the type of regime governing a state. They distinguish between four types of regimes; institutionalized democracies, autocracies and socialist and populist states.

Sri Lanka does to our belief constitute as a mixture of an institutionalized democracy and a socialist state. However, as mentioned in our empirical chapter, there were signs at an early stage that the democratic structure of the state might not equally represent the rights of all population groups in Sri Lanka. This was evident even at independence when the Tamil political leadership, as mentioned, out of anxiety, called for a change to the constitution, which should reserve half of the cabinet posts for minority group representatives. As mentioned in our empirical chapter, this request was rejected, which led the Tamil political leadership to call for a federal constitutional structure that would give self-determination to the Tamil people within the confines of this constitution. As described in the empirical chapter, this struggle for a federal constitution lasted until 1976 but to no prevail, and a call for a separate state was introduced.

This might suggest that there is something in the way the parliamentary structure is put together that does not satisfy the minority groups of the country. The structure is put together in a way, that Tamils democratic influence is mostly overridden by the Sinhalese majority, which has been evident on several occasions where Sinhalese based governments has failed to live up to agreements with and promises to, the Tamil minority, which has elaborately been explained in the empirical chapters.

According to Gurr and Harff, the more democratic a political environment is, the more expected it is that ethnopolitical groups will voice their opposition in a non-violent manner. This was mostly also the case in Sri Lanka, until 1983 where the government imposed an amendment to the constitution, making it illegal to call for secessionism regardless of the measures. Failing to establish a federal state and having no legal means to pursue their new aim of a separate state, the Tamils were, in our opinion, caught in a situation where they had no where to go within the legal confines of the system, which led to, as described earlier, a large proportion of Tamils, who had until this point, sought a federal solution, to join militant groups.

Based on our empirical analysis in relation to Gurr and Harff’s concept of political environment, we find that the political environment in Sri Lanka at the time when the conflict was instigated enhanced the risk of violent conflict. As such, Gurr and Harff’s theory in this respect seem to be supported by the political circumstances in Sri Lanka at the time of conflict initiation, which might suggest that their theory in this respect has a good explanatory value.

Use of Violence by Governments:

Gurr and Harff propose that there is a correlation between violence asserted by the state and the extent, level and type of violence used by its challengers. In other regime types than institutionalized democracies, it is more likely that the state will use violence to quell protest and riots. They hypothesize that the more violence used by political authorities, the more likely it is that challengers will respond with more violence. However, in cases where extreme force has been used by the state in form of massacre, torture or even genocide, it is less likely that they will be openly challenged. In Sri Lanka the use of violence by the government changed during the 1970s and took on a more brutal form. In 1971 they fiercely fought an uprising in the South, by the JVP, and in the North-eastern districts they fought against militant Tamil groups, who were reacting against the governments’ resettlement schemes, which have been explained in the empirical chapters. This marked a change in the state monopoly of violence, which has formed the basis of the governments’ increasingly violent measures in reaction to protest in the future. The state in Sri Lanka has never committed something that could be portrayed as genocide; however, they have used violence to quell protest on several occasions, which has been outlined in the empirical analysis. In relation to Gurr and Harff’s concept of use of violence by governments, it also seems that in this respect the reaction patterns of the Sri Lankan government, further increased the risk of conflict. The Sri Lankan government has used violence as a political means, but never to the extent where it can by defined as genocide, which according to Gurr and Harff is the level of government force used in response to its challengers, that mostly increases the risk of open resistance. The use of violence by the Sri Lankan government has been enough to increase resentment within the Tamil community, but not enough to stop them from organizing open resistance, or upsetting them to the point where they cease to do so out of fear of the repercussions. This correlates to Collier’s proxy of political repression, which his findings suggest have an ambiguous effect on the risk of conflict. He concludes that fully democratic societies are the safest, as do Gurr and Harff (hypothesis 4); partial democracies are the least safe, which also correlates to Gurr and Harff (hypothesis 5a), and that severe political repression is safer than partial democracy, which is similarly hypothesized by Gurr and Harff (hypothesis 5b). In this respect the two theories are similar, in their findings/probability statements respectively.

We would argue that in relation to Gurr and Harff’s concept concerning use of violence by governments and Collier’s proxy of political repression, our empirical research seem to support the theories.

External Support:

External factors contribute to ethnic conflict, according to Gurr and Harff. To examine what kind of external factors they develop two concepts; external support and economic status. They propose that groups depend on receiving external support and the more external support a group receives the more likely it is that this group will resort to violence in their challenge of the authorities. They note that there are numerous ways in which a group can receive external support, for example in the form of verbal encouragement, economics, supply of weaponry, military personnel etc.

In our empirical analysis we have explained how large sums of revenue are channelled into the LTTE via the Tamil diaspora. The LTTE receive support from the Tamil diaspora both in form of finance and verbal and moral encouragement. Furthermore they enjoy vast support from the Tamil community from within Sri Lanka, both in terms of moral backing and financial aid, which has been explained in the empirical part of the project. A very significant external factor in the Sri Lankan context is India, and especially the southern Indian state Tamil Nadu. With only 20-25 kilometres separating it from Sri Lanka, and comprising of more than 60 million Tamils, Tamil Nadu has great importance to the Sri Lankan Tamils’ struggle for an independent homeland, both in terms of moral support, verbal encouragement, and financial support. Furthermore, mainly due to the large number of Tamils in Tamil Nadu, India has been very actively involved in the Sri Lankan conflict, which has been explained in previous chapters. According to our research, this has mainly been the case because India was anxious that their Tamil population would be inspired by the Sri Lankan Tamils’ struggle for secessionism, and as a consequence, vents their own desires for a separate state in Tamil Nadu. It has also had an effect on the Sinhalese perception of the conflict, in the sense that, as previously mentioned, it has caused a so-called minority complex within the Sinhalese community. The Sinhalese feel outnumbered by the Tamils, although they comprise the majority in Sri Lanka, because of the large Tamil population in southern India.

During the 1980s the LTTE had strong connections with India, which has been described in the empirical analysis, and on many occasions LTTE leader Prabhakaran sought refuge in Tamil Nadu. Sometime during the 1980s the LTTE were even based in Tamil Nadu, where LTTE fighters received training from the Indian army, they were supplied with weapons and set up in government funded training camps. In this sense Tamil Nadu has been a safe haven for the LTTE, where they have been able to hide and regroup in times of trouble.

It is quite evident, in per our empirical research, that the LTTE to a large extend rely and depend upon the support they receive externally, both in term of economics, weaponry, training and moral support, which is in support of Gurr and Harff’s concept of external support.

International Status:

According to Gurr and Harff, status depend on the economic resources a group or government command. They propose that a strong economic status creates a relationship of interdependence between the international community and government/group. They hypothesize that the more international status a state has, the smaller the chance is that challengers will receive external support.

In the case of Sri Lanka, neither the government nor the LTTE seem to command economic resources that create an interdependent relationship between them and the international community. The country does not possess an abundant amount of natural resources, which could create such a relationship, due to the export of those. To use an example, Sri Lanka is not part of OPEC which would have put them in a strong interdependent relationship with the international community. However, it is clear that successive governments in Sri Lanka has tried to weaken external support to the LTTE by other means, just like the LTTE has tried to remedy these actions using countermeasures. In our empirical analysis it has been described how successive Sri Lankan governments has used propagandised rhetoric when describing the other, and how the media has been used in this respect on both sides to the conflict. The government has repeatedly proclaimed to the international community, that they are a just and democratic state fighting a violent terror organization within their country, in order to claim support. The LTTE on the other hand has devoted much energy into stressing out that they are not a terror organization, and that they should receive help from the international community, in their just struggle, as we have explained in our empirical chapter, in stead of being banned as terrorists. In this respect they experienced a huge setback as the EU enlisted them as a terror organization in 2006, which in turn was a help to the government especially due to the fact that this made it illegal for the Tamil diaspora living in EU countries, to support the LTTE financially. On the basis of our empirical research, we find that the Sri Lankan government has increasingly used this fight-on-terrorism rhetoric since 9/11 2001, as a conscious tactic to garner support and stifle the LTTE in their activities.

This implies that external support is of significant importance to both the government as well as the LTTE, which seems to support Gurr and Harff’s notion of the importance of external support. However, although the Sri Lankan government has had some success in recent years in restraining the LTTE from receiving external support, it does not seem to be as a consequence of their international status, based on their economic capacity, rather it has been achieved through anti-terrorist rhetoric. Also because the international community is not dependent on Sri Lanka, and the Sri Lankan government has expressed a desire to cope with their terrorist problem internally, with free hands so to speak, the international community has not had much incentive to intervene in Sri Lanka, in order to secure their own interests.

Overall, in relation to Gurr and Harff’s concept of international economic status the Sri Lankan conflict seems to show ambiguous signs. The international community does not support the LTTE; on the contrary, LTTE has been banned as a terrorist organization in many countries throughout the West. However it does not seem to be a product of an interdependent relationship with the Sri Lankan state, rather a lack of interest on behalf of the international community, seeing as they have no strong incentives to get involved, perhaps with a mixture of buying into the Sri Lankan governments’ anti-terrorism rhetoric.

10.2.3. Whose Greed, Whose Grievance?

Dan Smith introduces a different dimension to the greed/grievance debate, asking the question of whose greed and whose grievances. Dan Smith argues that it is misguided to focus on which are the most important causes of armed conflict, and that the focus instead, should be on how the different causes interact: “In part, however, the argument about greed versus grievance can be summed up and put into a proper perspective by asking whose greed, whose grievance” (Smith 2001, p. 9)?

Smith claims that it is possible that the leader of a group is greedy for power, but that this does not necessarily suggest that the group he represents does not have actual grievances, and as such, both greed and grievance can be found at the same time within the same group of people, merely by looking at the different levels within the group or organization. We find this to be an interesting observation in relation to the LTTE and the relationship between its leader Prabhakaran and his followers. We have previously suggested that Prabhakaran might over the years have developed a greed for power, rather than an economically based greed, and suggested via our empirical research that the Tamils do share actual grievances, which according to Smith, can be utilized by Prabhakaran to fulfil his personal greed for power. According to Smith this implies that grievances in themselves are not sole courses of ethnic conflicts, rather it is the political environment surrounding these grievances within certain ethnical boundaries, which are the determinant factor in conflict instigation. We believe that the political environment is important to understand in trying to explain conflict instigation and, especially in the case of the LTTE, conflict perpetuation. We have not found evidence that Prabhakaran should have been greedy for power when he started the LTTE, seeing as he formed a whole new group, and as such, being the leader of the LTTE in its first years did not put him in a strong power position, and as such we do not suggest that the LTTE was formed on the basis of individual greed for power. However, as we have described in our empirical analysis, Prabhakaran might have developed such greed over the years, as the organization grew, both in terms of size and political influence, and due to his almost godly status within the structures of the LTTE and much of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka as well as the Tamil diaspora.

Smith points out that more often than not, populations on both sides to a conflict believe that their struggle is based on actual grievances and that they see their struggle as a means to rectify these grievances, which gives them a sense of fighting for justice. He notes that in many armed conflicts today, tactics and strategies are being used, which involve direct targeting of civilians. The reason he says, is to perpetuate grievances, which can be utilized politically for mobilization and perpetuate fighting. We find this to be evident in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, as both the Tamil as well as Sinhalese civilians are often killed or injured in attacks from both sides respectively. Our empirical research suggest that this is applied as deliberate tactics by the LTTE as they sometimes, as described earlier, deliberately instigated battles with the Sri Lankan army, in areas with high numbers of civilians present, as to assure that the civilian population would sustain casualties, which in turn could be utilized in their own favour in terms of mobilization and perpetuate fighting.

10.3. Intrinsic Motivations

To discuss intrinsic motivations and more human-behaviour related aspects we will be drawing on the arguments of Benedikt Korf and Michael Nicholson.

Intrinsic motivations are inherently difficult to measure, prove and analyze. However, from the research conducted we have gained the impression that to a large extent Prabhakaran, the undisputed leader of the LTTE, is motivated by intrinsic factors.

Prabhakaran seems to take obvious pride in his cause, almost to the point of stubbornness and unwillingness to negotiate. Since he has dedicated the most of his life to the cause of Eelam, it has come to a point, to our belief that his personal desires in some respects, has taken precedence over the common good of the Tamil people. Furthermore, it is our impression that he may to some degree be motivated by greed for power, as mentioned in the previous section. Having led the LTTE for 36 years he is venerated as a hero within the organization, and has a large degree of influence and power, which to some extent seems to have become a driving force in its own right.

If sustainable peace was to be achieved, for example through a federal solution and the LTTE dissolved, Prabhakaran in a sense would become redundant, as he would not be able to keep his position as leader of the Tamil people. Prabhakaran would not be able to enter into politics due to a standing order of extradition from India and a long prison sentence for the bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo, which he received in absentia.

Thus, peace is not necessarily beneficial for Prabhakaran on a more personal level.

Korf mentions pride as an intrinsic motivation. In the case of the LTTE we find this to be an important motivational factor, as LTTE cadres, as previously mentioned, believe that they are fighting for a just cause. Another intrinsic factor which seems to be of importance when trying to comprehend the driving force behind the LTTE is that of prestige. We have previously described how the LTTE receives strong moral backing from the Tamil diaspora as well as from the local community in the North and the East, which, to our belief, instate a certain prestige into fighting for the LTTE to secure a separate Tamil state.

It is hard to prove intrinsic motivations, but a factor that might relate directly to intrinsic motivations is the large number of suicide attacks committed by the LTTE. As earlier described, this is an important and widely used military tactic within the LTTE. They even have a specific group called the “black tigers” whose sole purpose is to commit suicide attacks, comprised exclusively of voluntary cadres. Within the organization it is considered a great honour to be admitted into the black tigers. Also, as it has been described in our empirical part, all LTTE cadres from the top down, wear cyanide capsules around their neck, and are expected to swallow them in the case of imminent capture, as it is better to die than to surrender to the enemy. A way to in store this sense of pride into the cadres is among others, the celebration of Heroes Day, where fallen LTTE fighters are venerated as true heroes, who have died in their just struggle against a suppressive regime.

Michael Nicholson notes that it is flawed to view violence merely as an instrument to achieve particular ends, as the use of violence is ambiguous, ambivalent and complex. He notes that: “People’s attitudes to the use of violence are often ambiguous, ambivalent and complex, and one cannot treat violence simply as an unambiguous cost” (Nicholson 1992 in Porto 2002, p. 12). Overall we find this to be true in most situations, although there are exceptions, exemplified in the military tactics of the LTTE regarding the deliberate targeting of civilians, described in the previous section. Even so we believe that it is an important element in trying to encapsulate a sense of human nature, into the research on violent conflict, although it is hard to prove and put into specific formula in a scientific sense.

Overall, based on our research, we find that intrinsic motivations are important elements to include into any analysis on violent conflict, although they are inherently hard to measure and prove in a tangible manner.

11.0. Analysis of Conflict Resolution Efforts

In the following chapter, the emancipatory theory, as developed by Ruane and Todd (1996) will be used as a model for analyzing the context of the Sri Lankan conflict in order to assess why, despite several attempts at peace-talks and ceasefires, no sustainable peace has been achieved.

The emancipatory theory maintains that successful conflict resolution requires a multileveled and multi-stranded approach, which simultaneously moderates and differentiates the dimensions of difference between two communities; dismantles structures of dominance, dependence and inequality; and weakens forces that produce communal polarization.

Based on the empirical investigation, we will discuss whether the different levels of relationships identified by Ruane and Todd, are present in the Sri Lankan society and if so, to what extent they have influenced the conflict and conflict resolution measures. Whether any credible attempts have been made to address these relationships and disassemble the structures will also be assessed.

11.1. Dimensions of Difference in Sri Lanka

The emancipatory theory argues that the Northern Ireland conflict rests on sharp and overlapping differences in terms of ethnicity, religion, settler-native status, and notions of progressiveness/backwardness, national identity and allegiance. In Sri Lanka many of these factors are also clearly evident and do appear to have contributed to both conflict eruption and its continuation.

Ethnic and religious differences between the Tamil and Sinhalese population are clearly evident. In themselves, however, they do not appear to be a main source of conflict. Tamils and Sinhalese have similar cultures with no inherent reason for friction and Hindus and Buddhists should theoretically be able to co-exist peacefully. The LTTE does not apply or rely on religious rhetoric in their fight or propaganda and there is nothing to suggest that people join- or support the LTTE based on a common belief in Hinduism.

Religion however, has become a major factor in the conflict, not because basic religious convictions fundamentally clash, but mainly because since de-colonization it has become a source of discrimination and societal division. By affording Buddhism the status of national religion and given it the “foremost place” in the constitution, it portrayed Sinhalese domination and caused grievances in minorities who felt their religions were discriminated against.

Furthermore, the notion projected by the Sinhalese Buddhist establishments, that according to the Mohavamsa, the Sinhalese, Buddhism and Sri Lanka are connected and that this unity must be protected, has aided Sinhalese ethno nationalism and decreased support for any political settlement seen as potentially threatening to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity. The Sinhalese-Buddhist objections have complicated the matter of finding a political solution, which would adequately address Tamil grievances and the aspirations of Tamils in terms of self-government, while also being acceptable to ethno nationalistic Sinhalese. The problem is compounded by the fact that the main political parties have most often been dependant on the Sangha’s public support in order to gain- or keep their place in government and thus have rarely been free to make ‘unpopular’ decisions unless being prepared to loose elections or their parliamentary majority. The issue is well summarized by Liyanage (1998, p. 1):

“The argument that a unitary state with one religion and one language is required to honor the sacred trust of Lord Buddha, has clear ramifications for the self-determination aspirations of Tamils and other minorities living in Sri Lanka.”

The issue of Buddhism, Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese being historically connected also link to the dimension of settler-native status, with ongoing disputes between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities as to who were the first/original inhabitants of the country. Especially the Buddhist clergy have a strong belief that they, the Sinhalese population are entitled to call themselves the true natives of Sri Lanka and that the country was fully entrusted to them and thus the Tamils have no historical claim to part of it. This argument about who is the “true” or native Sri Lankans also seems to have had a strong counterproductive effect in terms of creating or maintaining a shared national identity, which in term has widened the gap between the two population groups.

National identity and allegiance have since de-colonization, in our opinion, grown to become the most significant dimensions of difference in relation to the conflict. Discriminating policies by the Sinhalese, coupled with several instances of riots and violence aimed at the Tamil community largely resulted in a marginalization of Tamil citizens who began to feel that they did not belong within- and felt no allegiance towards the ‘Sinhalese State' or its government. Rather they increasingly felt like a separate entity, a distinct nation, and the allegiance of many Tamils gradually shifted to the groups fighting for independence and Tamil rights, which by default has meant the militant groups after political advocacy for secessionism was banned. Thus, issues of national identity and allegiance seem directly related to the commencement and continuation of Sri Lanka’s armed conflict and needs addressing to some extent in conflict resolution attempts.

As a dimension of difference, in addition to those identified by Ruan and Todd in Northern Ireland, we will add the issue of language, which has been identified as a major source of disagreement and grievances in Sri Lanka. Implementation of the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ caused widespread resentment in the Tamil community and was a large contributor to the TULF adopting the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, the first political call for a separate state, which was overwhelmingly supported by the Tamil population.

Although the Tamil language was afforded official status through the 13th Amendment under the India-Sri Lanka Accord, the issue of language has remained a major dimension of difference and a source of grievance as even today monolingual Tamil speakers remain at a considerable disadvantage when dealing with state institutions or the commercial life outside the northeast. As mentioned previously, many state institutions still issue forms in Sinhala-Only or in Sinhala and English (Nissan 1998). Another personal example is that in 2006, Sri Lanka’s Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA), which coordinated tsunami-reconstruction activities under the ministry of Nation Building had no Tamil speaking staff and no means of translating a basic English text into written Tamil.

Notably, the main reasons stated in the Vaddukoddai Resolution, (also quoted in a previous chapter) justifying the demand for separatism, are almost identical to the dimensions of difference discussed in this chapter as part of the emancipatory theory.

“…the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries…and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from the Sinhalese” (in Sathananthan 1998, p. 1.).

Hence it appears that from a Tamil perspective, these dimensions were, and most likely continue to be, linked to the aspirations of a separate state and by extension they have influenced the conflict (and are issues aiding support for the LTTE – or at least the stated aim of the group).

Notions of progressiveness and backwardness do not seem to have been prime factors in dividing the two ethnic groups or in causing the conflict. However, aspects relating to such notions are identifiable in Sri Lankan society (for example are the highland Tamils generally perceived as being ‘backward’ or primitive as compared to the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils). There were also hints of progressive/backward notions prior to / immediately following independence when the English speaking elites (Tamil and Sinhalese) dominated the public administration and the political sphere but this was quickly ‘rectified’ as Sinhalese ethno-nationalists came to power. Hence, it was originally an issue to some extent but has not formed a large part of the empirical investigation and neither do we consider it a determining factor in perpetuating the armed conflict.

11.2. Structures of Dominance, Dependence and Inequality

According to Ruane and Todd (1996), in addition to the dimensions of difference [the Northern Ireland] conflict is also generated by structures of dominance, dependence and inequality and that the disassembling of these structures is vital if conflict resolution and sustainable peace is to be achieved.

Our empirical investigation clearly indicates that such structures have been present in Sri Lanka to a considerable extent and have been contributing factors to the rise of Tamil militancy. Originating in the post-colonial area when the Sinhalese strived to correct what they perceived as inequality and favoritism of the Tamil citizens by the British, and thus enforced new political policies, which instead favored and asserted the dominance of the Sinhalese majority. This consequently prompted a Tamil struggle for equal rights and opportunities, initially through political means, and largely failing that, later through armed conflict and with the added demand of complete independence from the Sinhalese.

Issues of inequality between Sri Lanka’s ethnic-groups are also evident and have included aspects ranging from unequal status of languages and religions and unequal access to education and public administration jobs. Inequality is also evident in terms of development and economic growth, which is primarily concentrated in the western and southern province while the rural areas, including conflict-affected, Tamil dominated districts, remain comparatively poor. Unequal distribution of aid and development resources has been apparent both historically and in present day Sri Lanka, as exemplified by the Mahaweli project in the 1970s and the more recent tsunami-reconstruction efforts.

11.3. Tendencies toward Communal Polarization

Emancipatory theory suggests that conflict is also produced by a tendency toward communal division, meaning that people view each other not as individuals but as representative members of specific communities. It is argued that for many people the boundaries of their distinct community define the limits of their capacity for empathy and sense of moral responsibility (Ruane and Todd 1996).

The empirical chapters have clearly identified profound communal division in the Sri Lankan society. Political policies and discriminating practices, which have favored the Sinhalese majority at the expense of the Tamils have indicated a lack or moral responsibility. Similarly, several incidences of brutal ethnic riots (to the point of pogroms) aimed at Tamil citizens have revealed startling little empathy for minority groups within sections of the Sinhalese population.

The LTTE too, through its propaganda and indoctrination that focuses on injustices, ethnic differences, national aspirations etc. has increased communal polarization. Their empathy and sense of moral responsibility is also, rather profoundly limited to the Tamil populations, as they have no apprehensions about harming Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in order to advance the position of the Tamils.

The polarization of the communities has been supported and further enhanced by Buddhist groups providing a sense of religious justification for not accommodating the preferences of Tamils in terms of devolution and regional self-governance. Furthermore, some ethno-nationalistic media, itself divided along ethnic/religious and political lines, have worsened communal divide by voicing one-sided arguments and overstating and amplifying issues linked to ethnic and religious disagreements.

11.4. Dismantling the Systems:

According to the emancipatory theory, conflict resolution requires a multi-stranded approach that addresses the dimensions of differences; structures of dominance, dependence and inequality; and communal polarization, simultaneously - as the different factors interlock and mutually reinforce each other and thus can not be successfully approached one level at the time (Ruane and Todd 1996).

It appears that Sri Lanka’s peace efforts in the past have almost exclusively focused on the structures of dominance, dependence and inequality and largely ignored other underlying conflict causes relating to dimensions of difference and communal polarization.

During the Thimpu talks, however, which were largely dominated by discussions within the Tamil delegation, emphasis was placed solely on a dimension of difference which needed to be addressed, namely that of nationality. Focus was not on how to moderate such nationalistic sentiments to better allow for peaceful co-existence though, such as emancipatory theory suggests, but rather emphasis was placed on accommodating the Tamil national aspirations by separating the communities into different states.

The peace negotiations in 1995 never got beyond the addressing and improving of the immediate consequences of the war which were felt in the North (i.e. lifting embargos, fishing restriction etc.) and thus never really touched on underlying causes of the conflict. During the 2002 – 2008 CFA, emphasis was placed on dismantling structures of dominance and dependence through a political solution, possibly to involve an interim government in the Northeast and later a long-term federal solution, could agreement be reached. Also, the peace talks were supported through discussions on developing the North and East in an effort to decrease regional and ethnic inequality - though such sentiments were somewhat wrecked when the tsunami reconstruction process taking place during the CFA also showed signs of unequal distribution and thus served to further enhance ethnic resentment and communal polarization.

Overall, rather than diminishing differences and addressing the forces that increase communal division, the changing governments (with very few exceptions) and the LTTE have themselves been main actors in instigating, exacerbating and focusing on differences that cause communal divide. Blatantly discriminating practices relating to the differences of language and religion have served to increase the ethnic divide, as has the LTTE’s propaganda concerning a distinct national identity, which sets the Tamil community apart from other ethnicities. The two parties have been effectively aided by a nationalistic, Buddhist-clergy and biased and/or intimidated media sources – who have been encouraged, rather than discouraged to negatively focus on dimensions of difference. In general, such issues have not been addressed or any real attempts made to rectify the situation during peace-negotiations. One must argue that in particular, for the LTTE to redress such aspects it must be fully committed to and have faith that an acceptable political solution will ensue – as their foundational support for military action within the Tamil community is based upon the very differences it would have to minimize.

The ‘War for Peace’ strategy adopted by the People’s Alliance in the 1990’s has been the only exception identified in terms of addressing underlying differences and weakening communal polarization, while simultaneously pursuing constitutional changes that would allow for a federal solution to adequately address Tamil grievances and their aspirations for greater autonomy. Although the devolution proposal was subsequently diluted and ultimately discarded due to protests from Sinhalese ethno-nationalist, the overall sentiment of the PA’s approach was that different levels of relationships had to be addressed to ensure a sustainable peace. The promoting of cross-cultural understanding at the grass-root level and the accompanying strategy of separating the LTTE and its methods from the general Tamil population in the minds of Sinhalese helped heal communal division, increased understanding of the Tamil community and thus garnered support for finding a just solution to the Tamil grievances. The problem seems to have been, however, that similar efforts were not made within the Tamil population, and thus did not increase Tamil ethno-nationalistic tendencies. Rather, Tamil grievances were being reinforced through the war raging in the North and East.

Ruane and Todd’s (1996) emancipatory approach to conflict-resolution emphasizes that to successfully dismantle the systems and relationships within an existing society it requires that all those who are part of the system support the process and cooperate in its dismantling. Herein, lies perhaps the biggest obstacle for successfully adopting an emancipatory approach as a means of resolving the Sri Lankan conflict.

Not only has it proved immensely difficult to reach a mutually acceptable compromise between the government and the LTTE, it has also proved almost impossible to reach a consensus on devolution measures within the Sri Lankan government.

The different political positions adopted in relation to the devolution of power in Sri Lanka is exemplified in the following model:

Extreme

Sinhalese- JHU/JVP Main opposition	Government	Semi-moderate	Extreme Tamil

Ethno-	party (UNP/SLFP)	(UNP/SLFP)	Tamils	Ethno-nationalists

nationalists	minority Parities	(LTTE)

Moderate Tamils

Central, Sinhalese Central government Some devolution, Devolution Will settle for	Tamil Eelam

Government. No	minor devolution to not to the extent of power	federalism	Complete

Devolution.	district councils of federalism to the point but prefer a	independence

of federalism separate nation.

Extreme ethno-nationalism exists in both the Sinhalese and Tamil political and public sphere. Since inception of the conflict, the government in power has increasingly positioned itself somewhere in the middle of the two extremes while the main opposition party has leaned to the left side of the above model. The consequence of this has been that any ‘ambitious’ attempts at establishing a federal system of governance, which could possibly be negotiated with the LTTE - at least theoretically after the LTTE agreed to consider federalism as a viable solution in 2002, are opposed by oppositional parties. Subsequently, (diluted) devolution proposals, negotiable for parties such as the JHU/JVP lie outside the LTTE’s ‘negotiable area’ (illustrated by the errow).

The issue is well summarized by Edrisinha (1998, p. 5):

“A major obstacle to negotiated peace in Sri Lanka is the inability of government and opposition parties to work together on conflict resolution. Over the years, of Sri Lankan independence, opposition parties have almost always mobilized populist sentiment against government peace initiatives, scuttling any chance of substantial political reform”

The 2006 agreement between Sri Lanka’s two main political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, that they would seek to cooperate on key areas such as conflict-resolution, have gone some way towards addressing the problematic, and may have a positive impact on future attempts at establishing sustainable peace.

12.0. Conclusions

In the following section we will draw tentative conclusions based on the thesis analysis and the empirical discussions and thereby attempt to answer the main research questions. Drawing firm and unquestionable conclusions has proved impossible due to the multi-faceted and subjective nature of the Sri Lankan conflict.

In terms of the underlying causes of the Sri Lankan conflict our theoretical analysis overwhelmingly points towards grievance based motives.

Although the economic incentives of some actors may play a role in perpetuating the war, they do not appear to have been prime factors in instigating the conflict, or the main reason why it continues. While financial funding is necessarily important for the LTTE in maintaining its organizational structure and military capabilities, both the empirical investigation and the analysis suggest that finances are predominantly a mean for continuing their struggle for Tamil Eelam. Hence, finances are a means to achieve a goal, but not the primary goal in itself.

Our findings suggest that the Sri Lankan conflict rests on deep rooted grievances in the Tamil community, caused by discriminating practices by the Sinhalese majority, since decolonization. Political policies, communal riots aimed at Tamils and broken political promises, have all served to marginalize the Tamil citizens and increasingly divide the country along ethnic lines. Extreme Sinhalese ethno-nationalism, reinforced by the Buddhist establishment, and the belief that the Sinhalese people, their language, and their religion, are inherently linked to Sri Lanka has influenced Sri Lanka’s political sphere. This in term, has polarized the ethnic communities and prompted similar ethno-nationalistic tendencies in the Tamil population, who increasingly felt as a distinct nation apart from the Sinhalese dominated state.

These issues all contributed to the mobilization of Tamil militant groups, who were increasingly seen as the best alternative for pursuing independence, and protecting Tamil rights, as political attempts to address Tamil grievances had been to no prevail.

Although, resting on historical grievances, the conflict is being perpetuated through new grievances that arise from the nature of war. Human rights violations by both the government and the LTTE have further enhanced communal divisions and resentment between the two ethnic groups. The LTTE’s deliberate tactics of attacking civilians and religious and cultural targets have now also resulted in actual personal grievances being present within the Sinhalese population, while counter-attacks serve to strengthen LTTE support in the Tamil communities. LTTE propaganda that focuses on differences and nationalistic sentiments further strengthens group cohesion among Tamils and garners support for the ‘common struggle’ for Eelam.

There are numerous reasons as to why the conflict has not been resolved. Previous peace attempts overall have failed to address underlying causes linked to the dimensions of difference, and have made no attempts to weaken communal polarization. Rather, focus has been almost exclusively on dismantling structures of dominance, dependence and inequality. Attention has been given to relieving the immediate consequences of war as opposed to the LTTE and the government discussing a long-term solution.

Some main problems in establishing peace also lie within the Sri Lankan political system. Despite numerous political attempts by successive governments, and the establishing of various parliamentary select committees, all party conferences etc. no consensus has ever been reached, on a solution that would satisfy all parties. The objections of ethno-nationalistic parties, such as the JVP and the JHU and the tendency for the main oppositional party to obstruct the governments’ proposals have all served as stumbling blocks to conflict resolution. This has made it exceedingly difficult to undertake reforms, which could adequately address Tamil grievances, and Tamil aspirations for a federal system.

The LTTE’s unwillingness to compromise in regards to Tamil Eelam and full nationhood (until 2002) has further complicated the matter of finding a peaceful political solution that may have otherwise satisfied more moderate Tamils. It is also plausible that the LTTE, including Prabhakaran, have underlying motives and self-interest in perpetuating the conflict, as much of their power and influence in the North and East would be lost through a federal solution and democratic governance.

A prime barrier for past negotiation attempts, in achieving sustainable peace, have also been an apparent lack of will to reach a political solution - on the part of either the LTTE, the government or both. The Thimpu Talks and the ensuing India-Sri Lanka Accord, which introduced the 13th Amendment, providing for increased devolution of power, were both linked to pressure being asserted on both the government and the LTTE by India rather than stemming from a mutual desire to resolve the conflict politically, while later peace attempts and ceasefire agreements (1995 and 2002) were also suspected of being initiated due to other motivations e.g. economic incentives, the need to regroup/re-arm etc. rather than stemming from a genuine wish for peaceful negotiations. As long as there is no sincere commitment or an honest desire to reach a political compromise it is unlikely that any actions will be taken to diminish dimensions of difference or to weaken communal polarization, which according to the emancipatory theory are prerequisite for achieving successful conflict-resolution – on the contrary, as in particular the LTTE are dependant upon the dimensions of differences e.g. perceptions of nationality, distinct ethnicity and communal divide, for gaining support of its operations/aim of Eelam from the Tamil community.

Overall, it appears that both the government and the LTTE have preferred a military win to a political settlement and that negations are most often attempted when military stalemates are reached. The LTTE’s military strength and the success of its tactics are in themselves reasons why no peace has been achieved, as it has, so far, made it impossible for the government to successfully extinguish the group and thus not having to appease extreme Tamil ethno-nationalists when attempting to address basic Tamil grievances (assuming there would still be political will to address such grievances without the pressure posed by the LTTE).

Basically, the military strength of the LTTE has rendered ‘War for Peace’ strategies hard to achieve, while the extreme nationalistic stance of both the LTTE and strong forces within the Sinhalese majority has made it virtually impossible to reach a mutually acceptable political compromise, which could resolve Sri Lanka’s long conflict.

Another barrier to achieving lasting peace has been the differing perceptions, which the groups have of the conflict and its underlying causes/purpose. The LTTE and ethno-nationalistic Tamils view the conflict as a national, freedom struggle of a historically independent and distinct population, while more moderate Tamils and the majority within the Sinhalese community perceive it as an ethnic-conflict which should be resolved by addressing minority rights and better accommodating the different ethnic groups within the same society. This dispute as to whether it is a territorial conflict between two distinct nations or an internal ethnic conflict between two Sri Lankan communities has made it difficult to agree the grounds on which a sustainable peace solution should be sought.

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Swamy, Narayan (2003). Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran – The first profile of the world’s most ruthless guerilla leader. Vijitha Yapa Publications; Colombo.

Tamil Canadian (2008). The Thimpu Declaration (1985). http://www.tamilcanadian.com/page.php?cat=37&id=272 [Accessed April 2008]

Thangarajah, Y. (2003). Ethnicisation of the devolution debate and the militarization of civil society in North-eastern Sri Lanka. In: Mayer, M., Rajasingham-Senanayke, D. and Thangarajah. Y. (edited). Building local capacities for peace: rethinking conflict and development in Sri Lanka. Macmillan Publishers. Pp. 15-36.

UNHCR (2008). UNHCR seeks $18.6 to respond to Sri Lanka displacement in 2008. Geneva; Switzerland. February 28. http://www.unhcr.lk/news/releases/2008/28Feb08.htm [Accessed March 2008]

U.S. Department of State (2007). Background Note: Sri Lanka. http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/sri-lanka.html [Accessed October 2007]

Virtual Library – Sri Lanka (2003). Sri Lanka Betrayed: Selfish politicians let Sri Lanka down. http://www.lankalibrary.com/pol.html [Accessed December 2007]

Wicremasinghe, Nanda (2005). Erection of Buddha Statue produces communal tensions in Sri Lanka. World Socialist Web Site. June 9.

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jun2005/sril-j09_prn.shtml [Accessed April 2008]

Wikipedia (2008a). The Sri Lankan Civil War. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Civil_War [Accessed April 2008]

Wikipedia (2008b). Tamil Eelam. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_Eelam

[Accessed March 2008]

Wikipedia (2008c). The Trincomalee Massacre. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Trincomalee_massacre [Accessed May 2008]

Wikipedia (2008d). The Jathika Hela Urumaya / National Heritage Party.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jathika_Hela_Urumaya [Accessed February 2008]

Wolfensohn, James, D. (2003). Address to the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka. Tokyo; Japan. June 10.

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20115169~menuPK:34472~pagePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html [Accessed April 2008]

World Bank (2000). Recapturing Missed Opportunities. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit; South Asia Region. June 16. Report No. 20430-CE.

World Bank (2007). Sri Lanka Poverty Assessment - Engendering Growth with Equity: Opportunities and Challenges. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit; South Asia Region. January 23. Report No. 36568-LK.

World Bank (2008). Sri Lanka Data Profile.

http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=LKA

[Accessed March 2008]

13.1. Recommended viewing

Killing for Peace (2007). Documentary. Channel 4. Unreported World.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-1795123143221171263&hl=en

[Accessed January 2008]

War Loving Sri Lankan Buddhist Monks (2007). Documentary. Aljazeera Production. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qNeypXY0Qk

[Accessed February 2008]

Wars and Waves: Sri Lanka’s Internally Displaced (2007). Documentary. COHRE Production. http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8095213661190142732

[Accessed January 2008]

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Mette Nøhr

2008-05-30

Private